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Increase awareness around DevOps
infra security
DevOoops
Gianluca Varisco

@gvarisco
$ whoami
VP Security @ Rocket Internet SE
Formerly at Red Hat, Lastminute.com Group, PrivateWave
DevOps is about creating a conveyor belt to systematically pull
together all of the pieces that need to go into production using
automation to create a safe and reliable application deployment.
What is DevOps?
Why Security needs DevOps
How vulnerabilities get introduced
Configuration errors Missing patch
Coding mistakeHuman mistake

(bad OPSEC)
We learned (the HARD WAY) that DevOps is more than
giving root to developers….
alias devops=sudo
DevOps Borat
01 GitHub
02 RCS tools
03 CI tools
04 AWS config files
05 Client provisioning tools
06 Elasticsearch
07 In-memory databases
Agenda
08 Docker
GitHub
It does support “advanced” search operators, eg.
• extension:conf ftp server configuration
• extension:pem private
• extension:xls mail
• extension:sql mysql dump
• extension:php “preg_replace(“/(.+)/e” (RCE)
• OSINT (within companies’ and employees’ repos)

GitHub - Search
Pushing code to GitHub as Linus Torvalds?
GitHub – Impersonating others
People trust

pictures!
• Hey, look! Linus is the main committer of my
github.com:gvarisco/swag.git repo!
• Sad truth! Design flaw or targeted feature? Official
response below..
GitHub – Impersonating others / 2
• Always audit who has access to your repos
• Be suspicious of pull requests with other authors’ code within
the PR.
• Always delete a private fork of a private organization
repository if a member leaves your organization.
• Audit organization members for 2-step verification
GitHub – Learnings / TODOs
RCS Tools
Does your website expose the .git/ folder on a webserver
out there?
▪ Access to such content lets you download the full
source code
▪ tl;dr: NO, Turning DirectoryIndex (Apache) /
autoindex (nginx) ON/OFF is NOT the fix!
.git exposure
• Source code, config files, credentials, developer names,
public/private keys, SSL certificates, e-mail addresses,
etc.
• Repo HISTORY (security issues fixed, password wrongly
committed and removed later)
• Archives / backups {My,Postgre,XYZ}SQL dumps
• Session generation keys
.git exposure / What can you get?
• $ mkdir website-source-code
• $ cd website-source-code
• $ wget –mirror –include-directories=/.git http://
www.example.com/.git
• $ cd www.example.com
• $ git reset –hard

HEAD is now at […]
.git exposure / DirectoryIndex ON
• Git-fsck to the rescue!
• Bruteforce: Predictable file names and known object
hashes, etc.
• DVCS-{Pillage,Ripper} do it for you
• Many admins tend to answer either 403 or 404 for .git/
but .git/config works just fine.
• Git stores file information within the objects folder.
.git exposure / DirectoryIndex OFF
• See the SHA-1 for index.php:
• $ git cat-file –p master^{tree}
• Take the SHA-1 and give it to ‘git cat-file’ to print out the
file contents:
Abusing the .git/ Objects folder
• 1.6.x and earlier
• Check for .entries files
• Walk SVN chain to retrieve all files. Metasploit does
it for you (auxiliary/scanner/http/svn_scanner)
Subversion 1.6.x
• 1.7.x uses SQLite.
• Metasploit’s auxiliary/scanner/http/
svn_wcdb_scanner to the rescue! It will retrieve
SVN’s wc.db for you

• As we know the file name and the SHA-1 used,
we can map all files.
Subversion 1.7.x
$ sqlite3 wc.db 'select local_relpath, ".svn/pristine/" || substr(checksum,7,2) || "/" ||
substr(checksum,7) || ".svn-base" as alpha from NODES;’



index.php|.svn/pristine/4e/4e6a225331f9ae872db25a8f85ae7be05cea6d51.svn-base

style/style.js|.svn/pristine/2s/2cc5590e0ba024c3db77a13896da09b39ea74799.svn-
base

...



$ wget -O - http://www.example.com/.svn/pristine/4e/
4e6a225331f9ae872db25a8f85ae7be05cea6d51.svn-base



<?php
Subversion 1.7.x
CI Tools
• The leading open-source continuous

integration server.
• Built in Java, it provides 985 plug-ins to 

support building and testing virtually 

any project.
• Latest and greatest release: 1.638
• A “few” security advisories…
Jenkins
Jenkins – Searches on Shodan
• Metasploit modules:
• auxiliary/scanner/http/jenkins_enum

(It enumerates a remote Jenkins installation in an
unauthenticated manner, including host OS and Jenkins
installation details)
• exploit/multi/http/jenkins_script_console

(It uses the Jenkins Groovy script console to execute OS
commands using Java.)

• If no authentication is required, it is trivial to gain remote code execution
via script console.
Abusing Jenkins
• Wanna display jenkins’ user private SSH key? No problem! It is as
simple as executing:



println new ProcessBuilder('sh','-c','cat /Users/batman/.ssh/
id_rsa').redirectErrorStream(true).start().text
Abusing Jenkins – Script console
• Last, but not least:
• If you have access to /view/All/newJob, create new
builds and run commands.
• Browse WORKSPACEs, read config / folders
containing sensitive data, eg. credentials, API keys
Abusing Jenkins
AWS config files
• ALL credentials are stored in plain-text in “”hidden files””, eg.

/home/gvarisco/.foo/bar
• Typically privileged accesses
• Once credentials are found, any of the OSS libraries available out
there can interact with AWS (eg. Nimbostratus, AWS CLI tools)
• OSINT / Information leakage via GitHub, Pastebins, etc.
AWS config files
Provisioning tools
• If you expose a dashboard (eg. PuppetBoard/PuppetDB) be careful
with your custom FACTS
• Encrypt your sensitive YAML files’ information (if you use HIERA, a
key/value lookup tool for config data) with HIERA-EYAML
• It does provide asymmetric encryption of sensitive data
• Store the keys securely when using puppet, as only the
puppetmaster needs access to them in order to perform
decryption when the agent runs on a remote node
Puppet
Puppet – Hiera-EYAML
• Web Interface (Chef Server), Rails powered, uses admin /
p@ssw0rd1 as default credentials
Chef
• Databags items (eg. MySQL data) can be encrypted
• Use knife – a cli tool that provides an interface between a
local chef-repo and the Chef server
Chef
• Did you change your SSH keys?
• Vagrant 1.7+ embeds vagrant-rekey-ssh plug-in
Vagrant
• Common user/passwords: root/vagrant OR vagrant/vagrant
• NO pass to sudo ☹
Vagrant
Vagrant – Scans using the default private key
• Vagrant workflows encourage you to edit your code outside the VM.
• That’s why it helpfully shares the project directory as /vagrant/ in
the VM.
“Put evil things in /vagrant/.git/hooks/post-commit and wait for the
user to commit some code. Since the /vagrant/ directory is mounted
from the host, such hook will persist even if the user destroys the VM.”
Vagrant – breaking in!
• Root passwords are either set:
• During installation

• Crypted hash defined in the KS file 

(rootpw –iscrypted)

• Clear text defined in the KS file 

(rootpw –plaintext)
Kickstart files (Red Hat, CentOS, …)
Elasticsearch
• A distributed full-text search engine with a RESTful web
interface and schema-free JSON documents
• 9200/TCP (GET request shows version)
• No authentication
• Can search stored data via HTTP API
• Update data with PUT requests
• Join an existing, open cluster and get all the data
• REMOTE CODE EXECUTION prior to 1.2.0
Elasticsearch
• Own a server with a query like this (as the search function allows
dynamic scripts execution):
• 1.3.x adds a sandbox to control what classes and functions can
be executed.
• Add ‘script.disable_dynamic: true’ to your elasticsearch.yml
• Make sure your instance is only binding on localhost
Elasticsearch
Elasticsearch – read inside /etc
In-memory databases
• Default config comes with:
• NO encrypted communication
• NO credentials
• 6379/TCP
• Binds to all interfaces (now FIXED in )
Redis
Redis – Shodan results
Abusing Redis instances
• FLUSHALL (Remove all keys from all databases)
• SCRIPT LOAD
• EVAL / EVALSHA
Redis – “Funny” commands
• Free & open-source
• High-performance, distributed memory object caching system
• Fun things get put into memcache
• SECURE IT:
• First and always, FIREWALL
• Check your bindings (interfaces)
• If you need it, use SASL
• DO NOT RUN AS ROOT
Memcache
Memcache – interesting findings…
Docker
• It automates the deployment of applications inside software
containers
• Docker works as a client that communicates with a daemon
process (dockerd) via a Unix domain socket called /var/run/
docker.sock
• Highly privileged, effectively having root access
Docker
• Error:

# docker run -t -i -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
• PoC:
• The container gets a docker client of its own, pointed at
the /var/run/docker.sock
• The container launches a new container mounting / on /host 

(It’s the host root filesystem, not the first container’s)
• The second container chroots to /host, and is now
effectively root on the host..
Don’t expose the Docker socket!
Video
Gianluca Varisco - DevOoops (Increase awareness around DevOps infra security)
• Add authentication to Jenkins
• Make sure all your tools / systems are only available
from/to hosts that need it
• Change default private keys / credentials EVERYWHERE
• Update to latest versions of all your devops tools
And now what?
• Don’t push DevOps back but rather embrace it.
• Participate in or create cookbooks/modules/scripts for
security
• Check for known security items you don’t want going into
production by creating audit scripts
Go forward
THANKS!

Questions?
• Ken Johnson
• Chris Gates
• Laurens Van Houtven
• Rocket Internet’s Security Team
Credits
© 2015 Rocket Internet SE. All rights reserved.
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Gianluca Varisco - DevOoops (Increase awareness around DevOps infra security)

  • 1. Increase awareness around DevOps infra security DevOoops Gianluca Varisco
 @gvarisco
  • 2. $ whoami VP Security @ Rocket Internet SE Formerly at Red Hat, Lastminute.com Group, PrivateWave
  • 3. DevOps is about creating a conveyor belt to systematically pull together all of the pieces that need to go into production using automation to create a safe and reliable application deployment. What is DevOps?
  • 5. How vulnerabilities get introduced Configuration errors Missing patch Coding mistakeHuman mistake
 (bad OPSEC)
  • 6. We learned (the HARD WAY) that DevOps is more than giving root to developers…. alias devops=sudo
  • 8. 01 GitHub 02 RCS tools 03 CI tools 04 AWS config files 05 Client provisioning tools 06 Elasticsearch 07 In-memory databases Agenda 08 Docker
  • 10. It does support “advanced” search operators, eg. • extension:conf ftp server configuration • extension:pem private • extension:xls mail • extension:sql mysql dump • extension:php “preg_replace(“/(.+)/e” (RCE) • OSINT (within companies’ and employees’ repos)
 GitHub - Search
  • 11. Pushing code to GitHub as Linus Torvalds? GitHub – Impersonating others People trust
 pictures!
  • 12. • Hey, look! Linus is the main committer of my github.com:gvarisco/swag.git repo! • Sad truth! Design flaw or targeted feature? Official response below.. GitHub – Impersonating others / 2
  • 13. • Always audit who has access to your repos • Be suspicious of pull requests with other authors’ code within the PR. • Always delete a private fork of a private organization repository if a member leaves your organization. • Audit organization members for 2-step verification GitHub – Learnings / TODOs
  • 15. Does your website expose the .git/ folder on a webserver out there? ▪ Access to such content lets you download the full source code ▪ tl;dr: NO, Turning DirectoryIndex (Apache) / autoindex (nginx) ON/OFF is NOT the fix! .git exposure
  • 16. • Source code, config files, credentials, developer names, public/private keys, SSL certificates, e-mail addresses, etc. • Repo HISTORY (security issues fixed, password wrongly committed and removed later) • Archives / backups {My,Postgre,XYZ}SQL dumps • Session generation keys .git exposure / What can you get?
  • 17. • $ mkdir website-source-code • $ cd website-source-code • $ wget –mirror –include-directories=/.git http:// www.example.com/.git • $ cd www.example.com • $ git reset –hard
 HEAD is now at […] .git exposure / DirectoryIndex ON
  • 18. • Git-fsck to the rescue! • Bruteforce: Predictable file names and known object hashes, etc. • DVCS-{Pillage,Ripper} do it for you • Many admins tend to answer either 403 or 404 for .git/ but .git/config works just fine. • Git stores file information within the objects folder. .git exposure / DirectoryIndex OFF
  • 19. • See the SHA-1 for index.php: • $ git cat-file –p master^{tree} • Take the SHA-1 and give it to ‘git cat-file’ to print out the file contents: Abusing the .git/ Objects folder
  • 20. • 1.6.x and earlier • Check for .entries files • Walk SVN chain to retrieve all files. Metasploit does it for you (auxiliary/scanner/http/svn_scanner) Subversion 1.6.x
  • 21. • 1.7.x uses SQLite. • Metasploit’s auxiliary/scanner/http/ svn_wcdb_scanner to the rescue! It will retrieve SVN’s wc.db for you
 • As we know the file name and the SHA-1 used, we can map all files. Subversion 1.7.x
  • 22. $ sqlite3 wc.db 'select local_relpath, ".svn/pristine/" || substr(checksum,7,2) || "/" || substr(checksum,7) || ".svn-base" as alpha from NODES;’
 
 index.php|.svn/pristine/4e/4e6a225331f9ae872db25a8f85ae7be05cea6d51.svn-base
 style/style.js|.svn/pristine/2s/2cc5590e0ba024c3db77a13896da09b39ea74799.svn- base
 ...
 
 $ wget -O - http://www.example.com/.svn/pristine/4e/ 4e6a225331f9ae872db25a8f85ae7be05cea6d51.svn-base
 
 <?php Subversion 1.7.x
  • 24. • The leading open-source continuous
 integration server. • Built in Java, it provides 985 plug-ins to 
 support building and testing virtually 
 any project. • Latest and greatest release: 1.638 • A “few” security advisories… Jenkins
  • 25. Jenkins – Searches on Shodan
  • 26. • Metasploit modules: • auxiliary/scanner/http/jenkins_enum
 (It enumerates a remote Jenkins installation in an unauthenticated manner, including host OS and Jenkins installation details) • exploit/multi/http/jenkins_script_console
 (It uses the Jenkins Groovy script console to execute OS commands using Java.)
 • If no authentication is required, it is trivial to gain remote code execution via script console. Abusing Jenkins
  • 27. • Wanna display jenkins’ user private SSH key? No problem! It is as simple as executing:
 
 println new ProcessBuilder('sh','-c','cat /Users/batman/.ssh/ id_rsa').redirectErrorStream(true).start().text Abusing Jenkins – Script console
  • 28. • Last, but not least: • If you have access to /view/All/newJob, create new builds and run commands. • Browse WORKSPACEs, read config / folders containing sensitive data, eg. credentials, API keys Abusing Jenkins
  • 30. • ALL credentials are stored in plain-text in “”hidden files””, eg.
 /home/gvarisco/.foo/bar • Typically privileged accesses • Once credentials are found, any of the OSS libraries available out there can interact with AWS (eg. Nimbostratus, AWS CLI tools) • OSINT / Information leakage via GitHub, Pastebins, etc. AWS config files
  • 32. • If you expose a dashboard (eg. PuppetBoard/PuppetDB) be careful with your custom FACTS • Encrypt your sensitive YAML files’ information (if you use HIERA, a key/value lookup tool for config data) with HIERA-EYAML • It does provide asymmetric encryption of sensitive data • Store the keys securely when using puppet, as only the puppetmaster needs access to them in order to perform decryption when the agent runs on a remote node Puppet
  • 34. • Web Interface (Chef Server), Rails powered, uses admin / p@ssw0rd1 as default credentials Chef
  • 35. • Databags items (eg. MySQL data) can be encrypted • Use knife – a cli tool that provides an interface between a local chef-repo and the Chef server Chef
  • 36. • Did you change your SSH keys? • Vagrant 1.7+ embeds vagrant-rekey-ssh plug-in Vagrant
  • 37. • Common user/passwords: root/vagrant OR vagrant/vagrant • NO pass to sudo ☹ Vagrant
  • 38. Vagrant – Scans using the default private key
  • 39. • Vagrant workflows encourage you to edit your code outside the VM. • That’s why it helpfully shares the project directory as /vagrant/ in the VM. “Put evil things in /vagrant/.git/hooks/post-commit and wait for the user to commit some code. Since the /vagrant/ directory is mounted from the host, such hook will persist even if the user destroys the VM.” Vagrant – breaking in!
  • 40. • Root passwords are either set: • During installation
 • Crypted hash defined in the KS file 
 (rootpw –iscrypted)
 • Clear text defined in the KS file 
 (rootpw –plaintext) Kickstart files (Red Hat, CentOS, …)
  • 42. • A distributed full-text search engine with a RESTful web interface and schema-free JSON documents • 9200/TCP (GET request shows version) • No authentication • Can search stored data via HTTP API • Update data with PUT requests • Join an existing, open cluster and get all the data • REMOTE CODE EXECUTION prior to 1.2.0 Elasticsearch
  • 43. • Own a server with a query like this (as the search function allows dynamic scripts execution): • 1.3.x adds a sandbox to control what classes and functions can be executed. • Add ‘script.disable_dynamic: true’ to your elasticsearch.yml • Make sure your instance is only binding on localhost Elasticsearch
  • 44. Elasticsearch – read inside /etc
  • 46. • Default config comes with: • NO encrypted communication • NO credentials • 6379/TCP • Binds to all interfaces (now FIXED in ) Redis
  • 47. Redis – Shodan results
  • 49. • FLUSHALL (Remove all keys from all databases) • SCRIPT LOAD • EVAL / EVALSHA Redis – “Funny” commands
  • 50. • Free & open-source • High-performance, distributed memory object caching system • Fun things get put into memcache • SECURE IT: • First and always, FIREWALL • Check your bindings (interfaces) • If you need it, use SASL • DO NOT RUN AS ROOT Memcache
  • 53. • It automates the deployment of applications inside software containers • Docker works as a client that communicates with a daemon process (dockerd) via a Unix domain socket called /var/run/ docker.sock • Highly privileged, effectively having root access Docker
  • 54. • Error:
 # docker run -t -i -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock • PoC: • The container gets a docker client of its own, pointed at the /var/run/docker.sock • The container launches a new container mounting / on /host 
 (It’s the host root filesystem, not the first container’s) • The second container chroots to /host, and is now effectively root on the host.. Don’t expose the Docker socket!
  • 55. Video
  • 57. • Add authentication to Jenkins • Make sure all your tools / systems are only available from/to hosts that need it • Change default private keys / credentials EVERYWHERE • Update to latest versions of all your devops tools And now what?
  • 58. • Don’t push DevOps back but rather embrace it. • Participate in or create cookbooks/modules/scripts for security • Check for known security items you don’t want going into production by creating audit scripts Go forward
  • 60. • Ken Johnson • Chris Gates • Laurens Van Houtven • Rocket Internet’s Security Team Credits
  • 61. © 2015 Rocket Internet SE. All rights reserved.