Sogei2014 lisi v01
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EGNOS and Galileo are critical components of the European navigation system, providing advanced positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services while facing various vulnerabilities like cyber-attacks and signal jamming. Both systems require seamless integration with non-GNSS infrastructures to ensure reliability and resilience. The document elaborates on the security threats, infrastructure requirements, and future developments in European navigation technology.
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Critical Infrastructures
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Critical infrastructures are “so vital (…) that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.” [U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, December 17, 2003];
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Critical infrastructures are required to:
Assess their vulnerabilities to both physical and cyber attacks;
Plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities;
Develop systems to identify and prevent attempted attacks;
Alert, contain and rebuff attacks and then plan to rebuild essential capabilities in the aftermath.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/sogei2014lisiv01-140930053142-phpapp02/85/Sogei2014-lisi-v01-27-320.jpg)
Sogei2014 lisi v01
- 1. Navigation solutions powered by Europe EGNOS and Galileo: towards an Integrated European PNT Infrastructure Dr. ing. Marco LISI European Space Agency Special Advisor of the European Commission International Workshop on "GNSS technologies advances in a multiconstellation framework“ SOGEI, Roma, 26th Sptember 2014
- 2. Summary EGNOS and Galileo are the key elements of the European navigation “system of systems”, a strategic and critical infrastructure of the European Union; The Galileo global navigation satellite system, joint initiative by the European Union and the European Space Agency, is one of the most ambitious and technologically advanced service systems being developed in Europe, by European industries and with European resources; As any large and complex system, Galileo, besides suffering from some intrinsic limitations (e.g. too weak radio signals, not allowing for indoor, underground and underwater applications), is vulnerable and exposed to many threats, such as cyber-attacks, jamming and spoofing; The only way to guarantee to the world a reliable, continuous and resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) service comes from a full, seamless integration of GNSS and of non-GNSS infrastructures and platforms. 2
- 3. EGNOS and Galileo Objectives
- 4. EGNOS: the European SBAS
- 6. EGNOS: a GPS Augmentation System
- 8. The SBAS Worldwide Infrastructure
- 10. Galileo Services
- 11. Galileo System Architecture 11
- 12. Galileo System Interfaces 12
- 13. Galileo Implementation Plan 13
- 15. Galileo FOC Spacecraft (OHB) 15
- 17. Galileo Centers in Europe 17
- 18. Galileo IOV – Ground Control Centres © Axel Schultes Architekten 2 Complementary Control Centres: • Ground Mission Segment (GMS) in Fucino has the responsibility for the mission aspects , • Ground Control Segment (GCS) in Oberpfaffenhofen, to control and monitor the constellation. Both centres will be completed to become fully redundant.
- 19. GCC-I at Telespazio - Fucino
- 20. Galileo Stations for Early Services 20
- 21. From Products to Systems to Services 21
- 22. “Loyola de Palacio” GNSS Service Centre Come and visit us at: www.gsc-europa.eu 22
- 23. 23 11 September 2001
- 24. 24 11 September 2014
- 25. 25 11 September 201?
- 26. 26 An Escalating Threath • In 2012 nearly 200 cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure targets were reported to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security – an increase of more than 50% vs. the previous year; • Growing evidence indicates that many of these attacks originated from military and/or government institutions in China, Iran and other countries.
- 27. 27 Critical Infrastructures • Critical infrastructures are “so vital (…) that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.” [U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, December 17, 2003]; • Critical infrastructures are required to: Assess their vulnerabilities to both physical and cyber attacks; Plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities; Develop systems to identify and prevent attempted attacks; Alert, contain and rebuff attacks and then plan to rebuild essential capabilities in the aftermath.
- 28. 28 Critical Infrastructures are Interdependent
- 30. 30 GNSS Threats: Jamming
- 31. 31 Commercial GNSS (GPS) Jammers
- 32. 32 Susceptibility to Interference/Jamming
- 33. 33 GNSS Threats: Spoofing Spoofing is the possibility to generate, through relatively inexpensive and technologically simple equipment, fake replicas of GNSS signals. In this way, it is possible to provide to the attacked user or infrastructure inaccurate information about both location and time; The reality of this type of threat was glamorously proven in 2013 by a team of researchers from the University of Texas. They boarded a 65-meter, $80 million luxury yacht named “White Rose of the Drachs”, sailing from Monaco to the island of Rhodes in the Mediterranean.
- 34. 34 Galileo Security Doctrine
- 35. 35 Accreditation Core Activities Accreditation Authority Security Accreditation Board (SAB) Galileo Security Accreditation Panel (GSAP) Crypto Distribution Authority (CDA) System accreditation System design review System audits Verify that all Galileo security requirements are met Site accreditation Audits and on-site inspections Ensure that local security requirements are met Components Review Security Targets Follow evaluation and certification process PRS User Segment PRS receiver certification, evaluation and accreditation PRS manufacturers accreditation
- 36. TECHNOLOGY IS NOT ENOUGH! 36 GLONASS Suffers Temporary Systemwide Outage; Multi-GNSS Receiver Overcomes Problem GLONASS Gone . . . Then Back Explanation for GLONASS outage? GLONASS GNSS Constellation Suffered 11 Hours Outage GLONASS navigation system suffers outage GLONASS Loses Control Again Altus Positioning Systems Pinpoints Cause for GLONASS Default Glonass Plagued by Glitches for 2nd Time This Month
- 37. Is GNSS a Time Bomb? 37 IT DOES NOT NEED TO BE!
- 38. GNSS System of Systems 38
- 39. 39 North Korea’s e-Loran System
- 40. GNSS-Based Sensor Fusion 40 DARPA's “timing & inertial measurement unit” (TIMU) MICRO-TECHNOLOGY FOR POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND TIMING (MICRO-PNT) Chip-Scale Atomic Clocks (CSAC)
- 41. Future PNT System of Systems Infrastructure 41
- 42. Future PNT Infrastructure: the US DoT View 42
- 43. ATM SoS GEOSS The Global Systems of Systems Infrastructure 43
- 44. Conclusion 44 EGNOS and Galileo: eager to serve
- 45. Korean Thank You English Russian Danke German Grazie Italian Gracias Spanish Obrigado Brazilian Portuguese Arabic Simplified Chinese Traditional Chinese Thai Merci French Japanese