11.[38 47]two-tier corporate governance model for pakistan

European Journal of Business and Management www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online)
Vol 4, No.6, 2012

Two-Tier Corporate Governance Model for Pakistan

Safdar Hussain Tahir1* Hazoor Muhammad Sabir2 Adnan Arshad1 Muhammad Anwar ul Haq1
1. Department of Banking & Finance, Government College University, Faisalabad, Pakistan.
2. Department of Economics, Government College University, Faisalabad, Pakistan.
* E-mail of the corresponding author: safdartahir@gmail.com
Abstract
The main purpose of this study was to formulate a model of corporate governance suitable for the Pakistani
environment. For this the corporate governance models like Anglo-US, German and Japanese working for
the companies of developed and developing nations were critically reviewed. After studying the pros and
cons of these models, a hybrid model for Pakistani companies was proposed. According to this model, two-
tier boards’ i.e. supervisory board and management board have been suggested instead of one-tier board.
Entire supervisory board will be comprised of non-executive directors (NEDs) whereas management board
will consist of only executive directors (EDs). These boards will together constitute a joint board headed by
a chairman (an INED) who will also head the supervisory board and management boards. Supervisory
board will conduct its affairs with the help of subcommittees. The hybrid model would aim to fill the board
room in the sense of ensuring the balance of representation, talents, power and attitude which is the prime
source of poor corporate governance in Pakistan.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Two-tier boards, hybrid CG model, Pakistan
1. Introduction
Corporate governance is a way of governing activities of a corporation for the well being of all stakeholders
(not only for shareholders) that ultimately leads to better financial performance. It is the set of process,
customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a corporation (or company) is directed,
administered or controlled. “Corporate governance refers to the manner in which the affairs of a corporate
body are or should be conducted in order to serve and protect the individual and collective interests of all
stakeholders” (Butt 2008)

According to OECD “Corporate Governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and
controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities
among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing
this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set”.

According to La Porta et al., (2000), “corporate governance is a set of mechanisms through which outside
investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders. They define “the insiders” as both
managers and controlling shareholders.” Therefore, corporate governance refers to the manner in which the
affairs of a corporate body are or should be conducted in order to serve and protect the individual and
collective interests of all stakeholders.

Corporate governance is a subject with various facets like all stakeholders with different interests. An
important subject matter of corporate governance is to make sure the accountability of individuals in an
organization through mechanisms that try to reduce or eliminate the principal-agent problem. A related but
separate thread of discussions focuses on the conduct of a corporate governance system in economic
efficiency, with a strong emphasis on shareholders' welfare. This subject has become a focal interest in the
world especially after crisis of Enron and WorldCom. In 2002, U.S. federal government passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, intending to restore public confidence in corporate system.

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Corporations played a pivotal role in economies in the twenty-first century. Some had become global
mergers/acquisitions that had a great deal of influence upon community on the daily basis. Large
corporations involved in industries such as media, oil, transport, computing, clothing, food, construction
and infrastructure, were examples of this powerful influence. The responsibility of the corporations was
extended with the diversity of their functions in various territories of world. Even though, the science of
corporate governance and how firms grow and develop is still evolving

The various models of corporate governance that exist globally have evolved as economies and the
corporate structure were shaped. The bases of modifications in the corporate governance models were
environmental influences such as worldview, culture, and the legislative and political framework (Shleifer
1997). Thus, the basic aim these models are not only to achieve the particular objectives but also to
maximize efficiency, economic benefit, shareholder wealth or the protection of minorities. Pakistan is a
specific area in point where corporate governance is evolving. The economy is essentially in a state of
metamorphose - simultaneously growing, developing and being transformed from a command system to a
market economy. A significant recent driving factor of this transformation is the accession of Pakistan to
the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In 1997, the economies of Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and The Philippines rigorously
affected by the exit of foreign investment named , The East Asian Financial Crisis, mainly due to the lack
of corporate governance mechanism in these countries. In the early 2000s, massive financial crises like
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia Communications, AOL, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing and Tyco paved
the way to raise the issues of corporate governance and resultantly Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

The impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has changed the ways of corporate governance in listed
companies .Recent studies concluded that the cost of compliance with SOX was significant. These
mandatory requirements apply almost exclusively in public companies. In order to cost of compliance,
many companies adopted the umbrella privatization. While the costs of application the provisions of SOX
are undeniably high, certain provisions do have significant advantages. This advantageous mechanism can
be applied by non-corporate companies to provide good organizational governance and reduce the potential
for falsified activity. In addition, all enterprises should believe that failure to respond properly today could
lead to impending disaster in the future. The penalty may include not only the loss of resources but also the
negative media hype that can relentlessly damage a corporation’s reputation. One particular element of
SOX that is applicable to non-corporate companies is whistle blowing, the act of reporting unlawful
activity to another party. Grant Thornton study concluded that only 29% of non-profits had a whistleblower
policy in position. Firms of all kinds should better realize what whistle blowing is, what the elements of a
whistle blowing policy are, and where to turn for more information.

1.1 Corporate Governance in Pakistan
Corporate governance in Pakistan has recently started scratching the surface. Due to many distortions in
economy, market forces do not reward good governances or punish unethical practices. The large part of
the undocumented economy discourages promotion of transparency and accountability in the organization.
Overall management structure is also not conducive to establishing the norms of good governance. Many
companies in listed Stock Exchange are not fully practicing the code of good governance. Tightly held
ownership, lack of professional skills, missing change agents, audit dependability and overall structural
weaknesses are bottlenecks in developing the corporate governance in the organizations.

1.2 Objectives of the study
The main purpose of this study is to explore the framework for appropriate model of corporate governance
for Pakistan. The specific objectives of the research are to:

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Vol 4, No.6, 2012

1. Review different international models of corporate governance from developed and developing
economies.
2. To highlight the pitfalls of these models being faced by the economies.
3. Review the effectiveness of existing models.
4. Identify the potential alternative model to fit with existing environment of Pakistani system.
5. To make policy suggestions and recommendations based on alternative model for Pakistan.
1.3 Contribution of Research Study
This research study will make a meaningful contribution to the research environment as it will analyze and
identify the pros and cons of some important models working for the corporations for developing and
developed economies. Learning from the success stories of these models, an alternative hybrid model
suitable for the specific situation of Pakistan, has been proposed. This model if adopted in its essence will
alleviate the current corporate governance issues in Pakistan. It will not only run the corporations smoothly
and efficiently but also enhance the GDP growth leading to reduction in poverty which is the prime
objective of Government in Pakistan.
2. Literature Review
There is an emergent literature of different models of capitalism from alternative analytical frameworks
showing the nature and extent of diverse forms of capitalism, their comparative strengths and weaknesses,
and the prospects for institutional miscellany when confronted with mounting pressures for international
economic integration (Deeg and Jackson 2006). The varieties of capitalism research articles illustrated by
Hall and Soskice (2001) takes on a firm centered approach focusing on the incentives for coordination; a
wider typology of governance mechanisms in terms of social systems of production is existed by
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997); and a national business systems approach of Whitley (1999) inspects the
internal capacities of business corporations.
The Japanese model of corporate governance which developed under these situations has sometimes been
explained as ‘state-contingent corporate governance’ (e.g. Aoki et al., 1994). Whenever firm performance is
satisfactory, management acts independently or, some argue, is examined by the company’s large and stable
shareowners. When firm performance is poor, then creditors, and in particular, the firm’s intervene, initiate a
restructuring plan, and discipline the poorly performing management
The function of the top institutional owners, such as Allianz, as spiders in the web of cross-holdings has
been well identified (Story and Walter, 1997). Like other characteristics of ownership concentration
however, the understanding of the dynamics of top holders and cross-holdings is at best scrappy. Many
authors report on big banks and insurers selling their stakes and leaving boardrooms (O’Sullivan, 2000;
Mülbert, 1998). Some of these stakes are not really sold but rather spun off to one by one managed
holdings or investment funds, still controlled by the big actors (Jürgens and Rupp, 2001). This is one of the
reasons why Doremus et al. foreseen that universal banks would maintain their position in the German
market for corporate control (1998). Interconnected with the position of the top institutional shareowners, is
whether the responsibility of cross-holdings, extensively reported to be significant in the past (Prowse,
1994; Wenger and Kaserer, 1998), has varied. In the light of the questionable research evidence, I
anticipate that the power of the top institutional shareowners was maintained.
3. Methodology
This is a descriptive study. In order to fulfill the objective of this study, three most commonly used
corporate governance models (Anglo-US, German and Japanese) in the whole world are selected for
review. The Anglo-US, German and Japanese models are working successfully in majority of the
developing and developed nations of the world. Among them the most important countries are United
States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, India, South Korea, Thai-land
and the Republic of Ireland etc. Due to the success stories of the economies in which these models are
working, it is decided to review the Anglo-US, German and Japan for final descriptive analysis.

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Vol 4, No.6, 2012

3.1 Salient Features of Anglo-US Model (ASM)
Anglo-US model mainly concentrates on the free financial market, as the bulk of the literature basically
focuses on this idea. The different components of the business like inputs, operation/ production, out puts/
pricing are the main principle factors of the theory of the firm. The principal objective of firms is to
maximize shareholder’s wealth irrespective of ownership or control in the board. Prior to the twentieth
century, wealthy and powerful industrialists and entrepreneurs typically controlled all big corporations.
However, a lot number of corporations listed publicly changed the scenario of ownership and control,
starting from the mid nineteenth to twentieth century.

The main characteristics of Anglo-US model are share ownership of individuals, increasing institutional
investors, outsider shareholders, well defined rights and responsibilities. There is comparatively
uncomplicated relationship among three main key players, management, directors and shareholders in
AGM. Evidences from US and UK indicate that equity financing is the common method of raising capital
in the Anglo-US model. The origin of Anglo-US model can be found in Berle and Means Model.

Figure-1: Berle Means Model

3.2 Salient Features of Japanese Model
The Japanese model of corporate governance is essentially featured by a high level of share ownership by
allied banks and corporations. “Keiretsu” is a well built, long-term industrial and trading relationship
between bank and corporations where banks take part largely in debt and equity financing of businesses. A
legal, public policy and industrial policy networking structure has been planned to support and promote
“keiretsu”.

In Japanese model of corporate governance board of directors comprises almost wholly by insiders and
very low level of outsider. It is found that this dominant insider board of directors in most cases makes the
procedure complex for exercising shareholders’ vote. Equity financing is vitally important for Japanese
companies. On the other hand, insiders and their associated parties are the major stockholders in most
Japanese companies. As a result, they play duplicate role in individual companies and in the system as a
whole. The duplicate role means that owners working as managers as well. On the contrary, the interests of
outside stockholders are minor. The percentage of foreign investment in ownership of Japanese stocks
exchange is small, but it may become an essential factor in making the model more responsive to outside
stockholders.

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Figure-2: Japanese Corporate Governance Model

3.3 Salient Features of German Model
The corporate governance model of German is significantly different from both the Anglo-US model and
The Japanese model of corporate governance, although some of its features resemble with the Japanese
model. In both German and Japan models, institutional investors play very important role in the formation
of corporate governance structure. In both countries, Japan and German, bank representatives are elected
to the board of directors but this representation is constant in Germany while in Japan the representation
comes only at the time of financial distress. There are three largest universal banks (providing a multiplicity
of services) whereas play a major role in the whole economy in Germany. Also, in some parts of country,
public sector banks are major active players in financial markets than the private sector banks.

There are three distinctive features of the German model that differentiate it from the other existing models.
Two of these elements relate to board composition and one concern stockholders’ rights: Firstly, the
German model prescribes two layers of boards with separate members. German firms have a two-tiered
board structure comprising of a management board (composed completely of insiders, that is, executives of
the company) and a supervisory board (composed of labor/employee representatives and stockholder
representatives). The two boards are entirely different; no one may serve at the same time on a firm’s
management board and supervisory board. Secondly, the size of the supervisory board is set by law and
cannot be changed by stockholders.

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Figure-3: German Corporate Governance Model

Thirdly, in all countries following German Model, the voting right restrictions are legally imposed by
regulatory authority that is necessary of certain percentage of casting voting out of total shares regardless of
ownership position. Bank financing/ loan are traditionally preferred over equity financing in most countries
following German model of corporate governance. So in Germany equity capitalization is small as
compared to the size of economy. In addition, the level of individual stock ownership in Germany is low,
showing Germans’ conservative investment strategy. It is not amazing for that reason, that the corporate
governance structure is geared towards preserving relationships between banks and companies.
These models were critically reviewed and their salient features like key players, shareholding, ownership
concentration, board size, board compositions, regulatory framework and disclosure requirements etc were
analyzed individually. After analyzing the features of these models, a model covering different aspects of
aforesaid models suitable for the corporation of Pakistan economy was proposed. Some important
additional innovations which existing Pakistan model was lacking were also incorporated. The proposed
model covers the important features of said models as well as proposes more additional innovations that are
specific to Pakistani environment.

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Vol 4, No.6, 2012

4. Empirical Evidences
Table-1: Comparison of the Competing models
S.No. Critical Issue Current Anglo-US Model Japanese Model German Model
Situation in
Pakistan

1 Investors Well defined, yet stringent More stringent More stringent
Protection not very effective
2 Participation of Discouraging, Low High High
shareholders in unmanageable and
AGM cumbersome
3 Ownership High. Majority Discouraging Encouraging Encouraging
concentration and often controlled
control by families/
managers.
4 Disclosure Strict Most strict Strict Strict
Requirements
5 Related party Explicit Most strict Strict Strict
transaction guidelines
6 Check and No real system The system exists The system exists The system exists
Balance on Audit exists. but is outside the but is outside the but is outside the
profession (ineffective) content of corporate content of corporate content of corporate
law law law
7 Duties of care and Insufficient Comprehensive Less comprehensive Less comprehensive
loyalty: guidance
8 Independent Non-existing in Less non-executives More non- More non-
directors real sense executives executives
9 Remuneration of Very low Low High High
Non-Executive
Directors
10 Enforcement by Strongly needed Self regulatory, no Comprehensive role Comprehensive role
Authority need to be regulated regulatory regulatory
by authority authority. authority.

5. Conclusion
In summary, it can be seen that both the outsider-based system (Anglo-US Model) and insider-based
systems (Japanese and German Models) of corporate governance have their respective flaws. No
individual model/system of corporate governance is suitable to be adopted for the Pakistan. There is
dire need to formulate and adapt a hybrid model of corporate governance for the betterment of
Pakistani economy.

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Vol 4, No.6, 2012

Figure-4: Proposed Corporate Governance Model for Pakistan

5.1 Discussion
1. It is concluded that the traditional insider and outsider models of corporate governance are
unsuitable for Pakistan due to her diverse social, cultural and economic conditions.
2. The proposed model recommends intensive regulation of the companies through regulatory
bodies.
3. Joint board of directors will be a higher decision making body of the companies. It will scrutinize
the proposals or agenda sent by supervisory board.
4. Supervisory board will be comprised of non-executive directors (NEDs). The NED would be a
representative non-executive director (RNED) or/and independent non-executive director (INED).
5. The strength of the AC committee will be at least three non-executive directors including
chairman.
6. An external auditor is an audit professional who performs an audit on the financial statements of a
company, government, individual, or any other legal entity or organization, and who is
independent of the entity being audited.
7. Whistle blowing mechanism is an essential ingredient of the body of corporate governance as it
signals about the working of the corporation to the decision makers.
8. The Nomination & Remuneration (N&R) committee will consist of three members.
9. The proposed hybrid model also suggests hiring the external consultant to solve the complex
problems which may be beyond the approach of internal experts.
10. The middle and lower class of the employees working in the companies is of prime importance.
Particularly the job satisfaction of this class is a key to the success of the company.

6. Recommendations
Pakistan has made considerable development in efforts of improving corporate governance especially in
current decade. World Bank Report “Getting Finance in South Asia 2009” has ranked Pakistan first in the
areas of corporate governance, performance and efficiency. However entirely tapping the potential of
financial markets, and professionalizing management and board of directors will require more efforts to
continue. No doubt, good governance ensures that corporations use their resources more effectively,

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efficiently and pad to better relations with employees and other stakeholders. For the rapid business growth
that will ultimately lead to economic growth of Pakistan following areas are to be intensified regarding
corporate governance in Pakistan.
1. SECP should focus on enforcing the rule of law on disclosure especially ownership and related
parties transactions. In this regards three areas are important. First, the disclosure of beneficial
ownership and control; Second, reporting of related parties transactions; third, compliance of
company with respect to the AGM.
2. SECP should continue to enhance its enforcement capability. For this purpose SECP should take
important steps include increasing the technical size and level of staff in critical areas like
accounting etc.
3. SECP should refine enforcement procedures regarding all accounting, legal and technical issues
particular in code of corporate governance.
4. The existence of one tier is discouraged and be replace with two tier board system in Pakistan.
5. The chairman board of directors must be an independent non executive director (INED).
6. The strength of the Supervisory Board (SB) must be twice of the strength of Management Board
(MB).
7. Simple majority of the directors is recommended for approval of agenda sent by lower level.
8. The audit committee must have a member with the expertise and experience related to the area of
financial reporting.
9. In order to tackle the burning issues faced by the company some Adhoc committees are
recommended under the supervision of SB.
10. The statements regarding financial performance of the business should be disclosed to
stakeholders on quarterly basis.
11. The suggested first tier (MB) and second tier (SB) will call their meetings regularly on quarter
basis. The meeting session of SB will follow the MB session.
12. A final meeting joint session for the decision of unsettled issue would be called by the joint
chairman after the meeting of SB.
13. Whistle blowing mechanism is strongly recommended, which is a weaker area under existing set
up of the corporate governance of Pakistan.
14. The qualification for the independent non-executive director (INED) should be clearly stated in
article of association/ charter of the company.
15. In order to keep in touch with latest development in the area of corporation, the periodical
trainings of the directors are strongly recommended under the supervision of Pakistan Institute of
Corporate Governance (PICG).
References
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Dormus, P. N., Keller, W. W., Pauly, L. W., & Reich, S. (1998), “The Myth of the Global Corporation”
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New York: Cambridge University Press.

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