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Agile Secure Software Development in a Large Software Development Organisation
Security Testing
Achim D. Brucker
achim.brucker@sap.com http://www.brucker.ch/
SAP SE, Vincenz-Priessnitz-Str. 1, 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany
ASSD Keynote
First International Workshop on Agile Secure Software Development (ASSD)
Toulouse, France, August 24–28, 2015
Agile Secure Software Development in a Large Software Development Organisation
Security Testing
Abstract
Security testing is an important part of any (agile) secure software development lifecyle. Still, security testing
is often understood as an activity done by security testers in the time between “end of development” and
“offering the product to customers.”
Learning from traditional testing that the fixing of bugs is the more costly the later it is done in development,
we believe that security testing should be integrated into the daily development activities. To achieve this, we
developed a security testing strategy, as part of SAP’s security development lifecycle which supports the
specific needs of the various software development models at SAP.
In this presentation, we will briefly presents SAP’s approach to an agile secure software development process
in general and, in particular, present SAP’s Security Testing Strategy that enables developers to find security
vulnerabilities early by applying a variety of different security testing methods and tools.
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 2 of 28
Agenda
1 Background
2 Motivation
3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2
DL
4 Lesson’s Learned
5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development?
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 3 of 28
SAP SE
• Leader in Business Software
• Cloud
• Mobile
• On premise
• Many different technologies and platforms, e.g.,
• In-memory database and application server (HANA)
• Netweaver for ABAP and Java
• More than 25 industries
• 63% of the world’s transaction revenue touches an SAP
system
• over 68 000 employees worldwide
over 25 000 software developers
• Headquarters: Walldorf, Germany (close to Heidelberg)
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 4 of 28
Personal Background
• I wear two hats:
• (Global) Security Testing Strategist
• Research Expert/Architect
Working for the central software security team
• Background:
Security, Formal Methods, Software Engineering
• Current work areas:
• Static code analysis
• (Dynamic) Security Testing
• Mobile Security
• Security Development Lifecycle
• Secure Software Development Lifecycle
http://www.brucker.ch/
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 5 of 28
SAP Uses a De-centralised Secure Development Approach
• Central security expert team (S2
DL owner)
• Organizes security trainings
• Defines product standard “Security”
• Defines risk and threat assessment methods
• Defines security testing strategy
• Selects and provides security testing tools
• Validates products
• Defines and executes response process
• Local security experts
• Embedded into development teams
• Organize local security activities
• Support developers and architects
• Support product owners (responsibles)
• Development teams
• Select technologies
• Select development model
• Design and execute security testing
plan
• . . .
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 6 of 28
Agenda
1 Background
2 Motivation
3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2
DL
4 Lesson’s Learned
5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development?
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 7 of 28
Vulnerability Distribution
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Code Execution DoS Overflow Memory Corruption Sql Injection
XSS Directory Traversal Bypass something Gain Privileges CSRF
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 8 of 28
When Do We Fix Bugs
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 9 of 28
Microsoft’s SDL
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 10 of 28
Agenda
1 Background
2 Motivation
3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2
DL
4 Lesson’s Learned
5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development?
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 11 of 28
Our Start: SAST as a Baseline
ABAP
Java
C
JavaScript
Others
SAST tools used at SAP:
Language Tool Vendor
ABAP CVA (SLIN_SEC) SAP
JavaScript Checkmarx CxSAST Checkmarx
C/C++ Coverity Coverity
Others Fortify HP
• Since 2010, mandatory for all SAP products
• Multiple billions lines analyzed
• Constant improvement of tool configuration
• Further details:
Deploying Static Application Security Testing on a Large
Scale. In GI Sicherheit 2014. Lecture Notes in Informatics,
228, pages 91-101, GI, 2014.
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 12 of 28
Combining Multiple Security Testing Methods and Tools
Client Application
Web Browser
Server Application
Runtime Container
Backend Systems
• Risks of only using only SAST
• Wasting effort that could be used more wisely
elsewhere
• Shipping insecure software
• Examples of SAST limitations
• Not all programming languages supported
• Covers not all layers of the software stack
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 13 of 28
Combining Multiple Security Testing Methods and Tools
Client Application
Web Browser
Server Application
Runtime Container
Backend Systems
Checkmarx (JavaScript)
Fortify (Java) Coverity (C/C++)
• Risks of only using only SAST
• Wasting effort that could be used more wisely
elsewhere
• Shipping insecure software
• Examples of SAST limitations
• Not all programming languages supported
• Covers not all layers of the software stack
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 13 of 28
Combining Multiple Security Testing Methods and Tools
Client Application
Web Browser
Server Application
Runtime Container
Backend Systems
Checkmarx (JavaScript)
Fortify (Java)
DOMinator
Coverity (C/C++)
HPWebInspect/IBMAppScan
• Risks of only using only SAST
• Wasting effort that could be used more wisely
elsewhere
• Shipping insecure software
• Examples of SAST limitations
• Not all programming languages supported
• Covers not all layers of the software stack
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 13 of 28
Combining Multiple Security Testing Methods and Tools
Client Application
Web Browser
Server Application
Runtime Container
Backend Systems
Checkmarx
Fortify (Java)
DOMinator
HPWebInspect/IBMAppScan
• Risks of only using only SAST
• Wasting effort that could be used more wisely
elsewhere
• Shipping insecure software
• Examples of SAST limitations
• Not all programming languages supported
• Covers not all layers of the software stack
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 13 of 28
A Risk-based Test Plan
Select from a
list of
predefined
application
types
Implementation
detao;s ,e.g.,
programming
languages,
frameworks
Priority of SAP
Security
Requirements
Security
Test
Plan
RISK ASSESMENT
(e.g., SECURIM, Threat Modelling, OWASP ASVS)
• Combines multiple security testing methods, e.g.,
code scans, dynamic analysis, manual penetration
testing or fuzzing
• Selects the most efficient test tools and test cases
based on the risks and the technologies used in the
project
• Re-adjusts priorities of test cases based on identified
risks for the project
• Monitors false negative findings in the results of risk
assessment
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 14 of 28
SAP’ Secure Software Development Lifecycle (S2
DL)
Figure: SAP SSDL
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 15 of 28
Security Validation
• Acts as first customer
• Is not a replacement for security testing during development
• Security Validation
• Check for “flaws” in the implementation of the S2
DL
• Ideally, security validation finds:
• No issues that can be fixed/detected earlier
• Only issues that cannot be detect earlier
(e.g., insecure default configurations, missing security documentation)
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 16 of 28
Security Validation
• Acts as first customer
• Is not a replacement for security testing during development
• Security Validation
• Check for “flaws” in the implementation of the S2
DL
• Ideally, security validation finds:
• No issues that can be fixed/detected earlier
• Only issues that cannot be detect earlier
(e.g., insecure default configurations, missing security documentation)
Penetration tests in productive environments are different:
• They test the actual configuration
• They test the productive environment (e.g., cloud/hosting)
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 16 of 28
How to Measure Success
• Analyze the vulnerabilities reported by
• Security Validation
• External security researchers
• Vulnerability not detected by our security testing
tools
• Improve tool configuration
• Introduce new tools
• Vulnerability detected by our security testing tools
• Vulnerability in older software release
• Analyze reason for missing vulnerability
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 17 of 28
How to Measure Success
• Analyze the vulnerabilities reported by
• Security Validation
• External security researchers
• Vulnerability not detected by our security testing
tools
• Improve tool configuration
• Introduce new tools
• Vulnerability detected by our security testing tools
• Vulnerability in older software release
• Analyze reason for missing vulnerability
Covered
Not Covered
Success criteria:
Percentage of vulnerabilities not covered by our security testing tools increases
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 17 of 28
How to Measure Success
• Analyze the vulnerabilities reported by
• Security Validation
• External security researchers
• Vulnerability not detected by our security testing
tools
• Improve tool configuration
• Introduce new tools
• Vulnerability detected by our security testing tools
• Vulnerability in older software release
• Analyze reason for missing vulnerability
Covered
Not Covered
Success criteria:
Percentage of vulnerabilities not covered by our security testing tools increases
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 17 of 28
How to Measure Success
• Analyze the vulnerabilities reported by
• Security Validation
• External security researchers
• Vulnerability not detected by our security testing
tools
• Improve tool configuration
• Introduce new tools
• Vulnerability detected by our security testing tools
• Vulnerability in older software release
• Analyze reason for missing vulnerability
Covered
Not Covered
Newly
Covered
Success criteria:
Percentage of vulnerabilities not covered by our security testing tools increases
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 17 of 28
Agenda
1 Background
2 Motivation
3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2
DL
4 Lesson’s Learned
5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development?
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 18 of 28
Key Success Factors
• A holistic security awareness program for
• Developers
• Managers
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 19 of 28
Key Success Factors
• A holistic security awareness program for
• Developers
• Managers
• Yes, security awareness is important
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 19 of 28
Key Success Factors
• A holistic security awareness program for
• Developers
• Managers
• Yes, security awareness is important but
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 19 of 28
Key Success Factors
• A holistic security awareness program for
• Developers
• Managers
• Yes, security awareness is important but
Developer awareness is even more important!
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 19 of 28
Listen to Your Developers!
We are often talking about a lack of security awareness and, by that,
forget the problem of lacking development awareness.
• Building a secure system more difficult than finding a successful attack.
• Do not expect your developers to become penetration testers (or security experts)!
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 20 of 28
Security Testing for Developers
Security testing tools for developers, need to
• Be applicable from the start of
development
• Automate the security knowledge
• Be deeply integrated into the dev. env.,
e.g.,
• IDE (instant feedback)
• Continuous integration
• Provide easy to understand fix
recommendations
• Declare their “sweet spots”
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 21 of 28
Collaborate!
Security experts need to collaborate with development experts to
• Create easy to use security APIs (ever tried to use an SSL API securely)
• Create languages and frameworks that make it hard to implement insecure systems
• Explain how to program securely
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 22 of 28
Agenda
1 Background
2 Motivation
3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2
DL
4 Lesson’s Learned
5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development?
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 23 of 28
Agile Development
• What is agile for you?
SCRUM, Continuous Delivery, DevOps, SCRUM, Cloud development, . . .
• Cloud/agile development lifecycle
t
Deliveries
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 24 of 28
Secure Agile Development
Level of TrustLevel of Trust Risk IdentificationRisk Identification
Threat ModellingThreat Modelling
Security
Measures
Security
Measures
Security
Testing
Security
Testing
PSC SecurityPSC Security
Risk Mitigation & TestingRisk Mitigation & Testing
Static TestingStatic Testing
Dynamic TestingDynamic Testing
Manual TestingManual Testing
Security ValidationSecurity Validation
Secure ProgrammingSecure Programming
Security
Response
Security
Response
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 25 of 28
Open (Research) Questions
• Social aspects
• Does the SecDevOps model increase security awareness?
(Developers and their managers are also responsible for operational risks)
• Does this impact the willingness to take (security) risks and/or the risk assessment?
• Process and organisational aspects
• What services should be offered centrally?
• How to ensure a certain level of security across all products?
• How to ensure a certain level of security across the end-to-end supply chain?
• Technical and fundamental aspects
• How do we need to adapt development support
• How do we need to adapt threat modelling or risk assessment methods
• How do we need to adapt security testing techniques
• The big challenge in practice:
Products are often offered in the cloud (SaaS) and on premise
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 26 of 28
Thank you!
http://xkcd.com/327/
Dr. Achim D. Brucker
achim.brucker@sap.com
http://www.brucker.ch/
Related Publications
Ruediger Bachmann and Achim D. Brucker.
Developing secure software: A holistic approach to security testing.
Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD), 38(4):257–261, April 2014.
http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/bachmann.ea-security-testing-2014.
Achim D. Brucker, Lukas Brügger, and Burkhart Wolff.
Formal firewall conformance testing: An application of test and proof techniques.
Software Testing, Verification & Reliability (STVR), 25(1):34–71, 2015.
http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-formal-fw-testing-2014.
Achim D. Brucker and Uwe Sodan.
Deploying static application security testing on a large scale.
In Stefan Katzenbeisser, Volkmar Lotz, and Edgar Weippl, editors, gi Sicherheit 2014, volume 228 of Lecture Notes in Informatics, pages 91–101. gi, March 2014.
ISBN 978-3-88579-622-0.
http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-sast-expierences-2014.
Achim D. Brucker and Burkhart Wolff.
On theorem prover-based testing.
Formal Aspects of Computing (FAC), 25(5):683–721, 2013.
ISSN 0934-5043.
http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-theorem-prover-2012.
© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 28 of 28
© 2015 SAP SE. All rights reserved
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or for any purpose
without the express permission of SAP SE. The information contained herein may be changed
without prior notice.
Some software products marketed by SAP SE and its distributors contain proprietary software
components of other software vendors.
Microsoft, Windows, Excel, Outlook, and PowerPoint are registered trademarks of Microsoft
Corporation.
IBM, DB2, DB2 Universal Database, System i, System i5, System p, System p5, System x,
System z, System z10, System z9, z10, z9, iSeries, pSeries, xSeries, zSeries, eServer, z/VM,
z/OS, i5/OS, S/390, OS/390, OS/400, AS/400, S/390 Parallel Enterprise Server, PowerVM, Power
Architecture, POWER6+, POWER6, POWER5+, POWER5, POWER, OpenPower, PowerPC,
BatchPipes, BladeCenter, System Storage, GPFS, HACMP, RETAIN, DB2 Connect, RACF,
Redbooks, OS/2, Parallel Sysplex, MVS/ESA, AIX, Intelligent Miner, WebSphere, Netfinity, Tivoli
and Informix are trademarks or registered trademarks of IBM Corporation.
Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries.
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trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated in the United States and/or other countries.
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trademarks or registered trademarks of Citrix Systems, Inc.
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Web Consortium, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Java is a registered trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc.
JavaScript is a registered trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc., used under license for
technology invented and implemented by Netscape.
SAP, R/3, SAP NetWeaver, Duet, PartnerEdge, ByDesign, SAP BusinessObjects Explorer,
StreamWork, and other SAP products and services mentioned herein as well as their
respective logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of SAP SE in Germany and other
countries.
Business Objects and the Business Objects logo, BusinessObjects, Crystal Reports, Crystal Decisions,
Web Intelligence, Xcelsius, and other Business Objects products and services mentioned herein as well
as their respective logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Business Objects Software Ltd.
Business Objects is an SAP company.
Sybase and Adaptive Server, iAnywhere, Sybase 365, SQL Anywhere, and other Sybase products and
services mentioned herein as well as their respective logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of
Sybase, Inc. Sybase is an SAP company.
All other product and service names mentioned are the trademarks of their respective companies. Data
contained in this document serves informational purposes only. National product specifications may
vary.
The information in this document is proprietary to SAP. No part of this document may be reproduced,
copied, or transmitted in any form or for any purpose without the express prior written permission of
SAP SE.
This document is a preliminary version and not subject to your license agreement or any other
agreement with SAP. This document contains only intended strategies, developments, and
functionalities of the SAP® product and is not intended to be binding upon SAP to any particular course
of business, product strategy, and/or development. Please note that this document is subject to change
and may be changed by SAP at any time without notice.
SAP assumes no responsibility for errors or omissions in this document. SAP does not warrant the
accuracy or completeness of the information, text, graphics, links, or other items contained within this
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© 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 29 of 28

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Agile Secure Software Development in a Large Software Development Organisation: Security Testing

  • 1. Agile Secure Software Development in a Large Software Development Organisation Security Testing Achim D. Brucker [email protected] http://www.brucker.ch/ SAP SE, Vincenz-Priessnitz-Str. 1, 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany ASSD Keynote First International Workshop on Agile Secure Software Development (ASSD) Toulouse, France, August 24–28, 2015
  • 2. Agile Secure Software Development in a Large Software Development Organisation Security Testing Abstract Security testing is an important part of any (agile) secure software development lifecyle. Still, security testing is often understood as an activity done by security testers in the time between “end of development” and “offering the product to customers.” Learning from traditional testing that the fixing of bugs is the more costly the later it is done in development, we believe that security testing should be integrated into the daily development activities. To achieve this, we developed a security testing strategy, as part of SAP’s security development lifecycle which supports the specific needs of the various software development models at SAP. In this presentation, we will briefly presents SAP’s approach to an agile secure software development process in general and, in particular, present SAP’s Security Testing Strategy that enables developers to find security vulnerabilities early by applying a variety of different security testing methods and tools. © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 2 of 28
  • 3. Agenda 1 Background 2 Motivation 3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2 DL 4 Lesson’s Learned 5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development? © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 3 of 28
  • 4. SAP SE • Leader in Business Software • Cloud • Mobile • On premise • Many different technologies and platforms, e.g., • In-memory database and application server (HANA) • Netweaver for ABAP and Java • More than 25 industries • 63% of the world’s transaction revenue touches an SAP system • over 68 000 employees worldwide over 25 000 software developers • Headquarters: Walldorf, Germany (close to Heidelberg) © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 4 of 28
  • 5. Personal Background • I wear two hats: • (Global) Security Testing Strategist • Research Expert/Architect Working for the central software security team • Background: Security, Formal Methods, Software Engineering • Current work areas: • Static code analysis • (Dynamic) Security Testing • Mobile Security • Security Development Lifecycle • Secure Software Development Lifecycle http://www.brucker.ch/ © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 5 of 28
  • 6. SAP Uses a De-centralised Secure Development Approach • Central security expert team (S2 DL owner) • Organizes security trainings • Defines product standard “Security” • Defines risk and threat assessment methods • Defines security testing strategy • Selects and provides security testing tools • Validates products • Defines and executes response process • Local security experts • Embedded into development teams • Organize local security activities • Support developers and architects • Support product owners (responsibles) • Development teams • Select technologies • Select development model • Design and execute security testing plan • . . . © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 6 of 28
  • 7. Agenda 1 Background 2 Motivation 3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2 DL 4 Lesson’s Learned 5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development? © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 7 of 28
  • 8. Vulnerability Distribution 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 Code Execution DoS Overflow Memory Corruption Sql Injection XSS Directory Traversal Bypass something Gain Privileges CSRF © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 8 of 28
  • 9. When Do We Fix Bugs © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 9 of 28
  • 10. Microsoft’s SDL © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 10 of 28
  • 11. Agenda 1 Background 2 Motivation 3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2 DL 4 Lesson’s Learned 5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development? © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 11 of 28
  • 12. Our Start: SAST as a Baseline ABAP Java C JavaScript Others SAST tools used at SAP: Language Tool Vendor ABAP CVA (SLIN_SEC) SAP JavaScript Checkmarx CxSAST Checkmarx C/C++ Coverity Coverity Others Fortify HP • Since 2010, mandatory for all SAP products • Multiple billions lines analyzed • Constant improvement of tool configuration • Further details: Deploying Static Application Security Testing on a Large Scale. In GI Sicherheit 2014. Lecture Notes in Informatics, 228, pages 91-101, GI, 2014. © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 12 of 28
  • 13. Combining Multiple Security Testing Methods and Tools Client Application Web Browser Server Application Runtime Container Backend Systems • Risks of only using only SAST • Wasting effort that could be used more wisely elsewhere • Shipping insecure software • Examples of SAST limitations • Not all programming languages supported • Covers not all layers of the software stack © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 13 of 28
  • 14. Combining Multiple Security Testing Methods and Tools Client Application Web Browser Server Application Runtime Container Backend Systems Checkmarx (JavaScript) Fortify (Java) Coverity (C/C++) • Risks of only using only SAST • Wasting effort that could be used more wisely elsewhere • Shipping insecure software • Examples of SAST limitations • Not all programming languages supported • Covers not all layers of the software stack © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 13 of 28
  • 15. Combining Multiple Security Testing Methods and Tools Client Application Web Browser Server Application Runtime Container Backend Systems Checkmarx (JavaScript) Fortify (Java) DOMinator Coverity (C/C++) HPWebInspect/IBMAppScan • Risks of only using only SAST • Wasting effort that could be used more wisely elsewhere • Shipping insecure software • Examples of SAST limitations • Not all programming languages supported • Covers not all layers of the software stack © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 13 of 28
  • 16. Combining Multiple Security Testing Methods and Tools Client Application Web Browser Server Application Runtime Container Backend Systems Checkmarx Fortify (Java) DOMinator HPWebInspect/IBMAppScan • Risks of only using only SAST • Wasting effort that could be used more wisely elsewhere • Shipping insecure software • Examples of SAST limitations • Not all programming languages supported • Covers not all layers of the software stack © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 13 of 28
  • 17. A Risk-based Test Plan Select from a list of predefined application types Implementation detao;s ,e.g., programming languages, frameworks Priority of SAP Security Requirements Security Test Plan RISK ASSESMENT (e.g., SECURIM, Threat Modelling, OWASP ASVS) • Combines multiple security testing methods, e.g., code scans, dynamic analysis, manual penetration testing or fuzzing • Selects the most efficient test tools and test cases based on the risks and the technologies used in the project • Re-adjusts priorities of test cases based on identified risks for the project • Monitors false negative findings in the results of risk assessment © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 14 of 28
  • 18. SAP’ Secure Software Development Lifecycle (S2 DL) Figure: SAP SSDL © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 15 of 28
  • 19. Security Validation • Acts as first customer • Is not a replacement for security testing during development • Security Validation • Check for “flaws” in the implementation of the S2 DL • Ideally, security validation finds: • No issues that can be fixed/detected earlier • Only issues that cannot be detect earlier (e.g., insecure default configurations, missing security documentation) © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 16 of 28
  • 20. Security Validation • Acts as first customer • Is not a replacement for security testing during development • Security Validation • Check for “flaws” in the implementation of the S2 DL • Ideally, security validation finds: • No issues that can be fixed/detected earlier • Only issues that cannot be detect earlier (e.g., insecure default configurations, missing security documentation) Penetration tests in productive environments are different: • They test the actual configuration • They test the productive environment (e.g., cloud/hosting) © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 16 of 28
  • 21. How to Measure Success • Analyze the vulnerabilities reported by • Security Validation • External security researchers • Vulnerability not detected by our security testing tools • Improve tool configuration • Introduce new tools • Vulnerability detected by our security testing tools • Vulnerability in older software release • Analyze reason for missing vulnerability © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 17 of 28
  • 22. How to Measure Success • Analyze the vulnerabilities reported by • Security Validation • External security researchers • Vulnerability not detected by our security testing tools • Improve tool configuration • Introduce new tools • Vulnerability detected by our security testing tools • Vulnerability in older software release • Analyze reason for missing vulnerability Covered Not Covered Success criteria: Percentage of vulnerabilities not covered by our security testing tools increases © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 17 of 28
  • 23. How to Measure Success • Analyze the vulnerabilities reported by • Security Validation • External security researchers • Vulnerability not detected by our security testing tools • Improve tool configuration • Introduce new tools • Vulnerability detected by our security testing tools • Vulnerability in older software release • Analyze reason for missing vulnerability Covered Not Covered Success criteria: Percentage of vulnerabilities not covered by our security testing tools increases © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 17 of 28
  • 24. How to Measure Success • Analyze the vulnerabilities reported by • Security Validation • External security researchers • Vulnerability not detected by our security testing tools • Improve tool configuration • Introduce new tools • Vulnerability detected by our security testing tools • Vulnerability in older software release • Analyze reason for missing vulnerability Covered Not Covered Newly Covered Success criteria: Percentage of vulnerabilities not covered by our security testing tools increases © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 17 of 28
  • 25. Agenda 1 Background 2 Motivation 3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2 DL 4 Lesson’s Learned 5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development? © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 18 of 28
  • 26. Key Success Factors • A holistic security awareness program for • Developers • Managers © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 19 of 28
  • 27. Key Success Factors • A holistic security awareness program for • Developers • Managers • Yes, security awareness is important © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 19 of 28
  • 28. Key Success Factors • A holistic security awareness program for • Developers • Managers • Yes, security awareness is important but © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 19 of 28
  • 29. Key Success Factors • A holistic security awareness program for • Developers • Managers • Yes, security awareness is important but Developer awareness is even more important! © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 19 of 28
  • 30. Listen to Your Developers! We are often talking about a lack of security awareness and, by that, forget the problem of lacking development awareness. • Building a secure system more difficult than finding a successful attack. • Do not expect your developers to become penetration testers (or security experts)! © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 20 of 28
  • 31. Security Testing for Developers Security testing tools for developers, need to • Be applicable from the start of development • Automate the security knowledge • Be deeply integrated into the dev. env., e.g., • IDE (instant feedback) • Continuous integration • Provide easy to understand fix recommendations • Declare their “sweet spots” © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 21 of 28
  • 32. Collaborate! Security experts need to collaborate with development experts to • Create easy to use security APIs (ever tried to use an SSL API securely) • Create languages and frameworks that make it hard to implement insecure systems • Explain how to program securely © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 22 of 28
  • 33. Agenda 1 Background 2 Motivation 3 Risk-based Security Testing as Part of SAP’s S2 DL 4 Lesson’s Learned 5 How Does This Resonate With Agile Development? © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 23 of 28
  • 34. Agile Development • What is agile for you? SCRUM, Continuous Delivery, DevOps, SCRUM, Cloud development, . . . • Cloud/agile development lifecycle t Deliveries © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 24 of 28
  • 35. Secure Agile Development Level of TrustLevel of Trust Risk IdentificationRisk Identification Threat ModellingThreat Modelling Security Measures Security Measures Security Testing Security Testing PSC SecurityPSC Security Risk Mitigation & TestingRisk Mitigation & Testing Static TestingStatic Testing Dynamic TestingDynamic Testing Manual TestingManual Testing Security ValidationSecurity Validation Secure ProgrammingSecure Programming Security Response Security Response © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 25 of 28
  • 36. Open (Research) Questions • Social aspects • Does the SecDevOps model increase security awareness? (Developers and their managers are also responsible for operational risks) • Does this impact the willingness to take (security) risks and/or the risk assessment? • Process and organisational aspects • What services should be offered centrally? • How to ensure a certain level of security across all products? • How to ensure a certain level of security across the end-to-end supply chain? • Technical and fundamental aspects • How do we need to adapt development support • How do we need to adapt threat modelling or risk assessment methods • How do we need to adapt security testing techniques • The big challenge in practice: Products are often offered in the cloud (SaaS) and on premise © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 26 of 28
  • 37. Thank you! http://xkcd.com/327/ Dr. Achim D. Brucker [email protected] http://www.brucker.ch/
  • 38. Related Publications Ruediger Bachmann and Achim D. Brucker. Developing secure software: A holistic approach to security testing. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD), 38(4):257–261, April 2014. http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/bachmann.ea-security-testing-2014. Achim D. Brucker, Lukas Brügger, and Burkhart Wolff. Formal firewall conformance testing: An application of test and proof techniques. Software Testing, Verification & Reliability (STVR), 25(1):34–71, 2015. http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-formal-fw-testing-2014. Achim D. Brucker and Uwe Sodan. Deploying static application security testing on a large scale. In Stefan Katzenbeisser, Volkmar Lotz, and Edgar Weippl, editors, gi Sicherheit 2014, volume 228 of Lecture Notes in Informatics, pages 91–101. gi, March 2014. ISBN 978-3-88579-622-0. http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-sast-expierences-2014. Achim D. Brucker and Burkhart Wolff. On theorem prover-based testing. Formal Aspects of Computing (FAC), 25(5):683–721, 2013. ISSN 0934-5043. http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-theorem-prover-2012. © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 28 of 28
  • 39. © 2015 SAP SE. All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or for any purpose without the express permission of SAP SE. The information contained herein may be changed without prior notice. Some software products marketed by SAP SE and its distributors contain proprietary software components of other software vendors. Microsoft, Windows, Excel, Outlook, and PowerPoint are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. IBM, DB2, DB2 Universal Database, System i, System i5, System p, System p5, System x, System z, System z10, System z9, z10, z9, iSeries, pSeries, xSeries, zSeries, eServer, z/VM, z/OS, i5/OS, S/390, OS/390, OS/400, AS/400, S/390 Parallel Enterprise Server, PowerVM, Power Architecture, POWER6+, POWER6, POWER5+, POWER5, POWER, OpenPower, PowerPC, BatchPipes, BladeCenter, System Storage, GPFS, HACMP, RETAIN, DB2 Connect, RACF, Redbooks, OS/2, Parallel Sysplex, MVS/ESA, AIX, Intelligent Miner, WebSphere, Netfinity, Tivoli and Informix are trademarks or registered trademarks of IBM Corporation. Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries. Adobe, the Adobe logo, Acrobat, PostScript, and Reader are either trademarks or registered trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated in the United States and/or other countries. Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation. UNIX, X/Open, OSF/1, and Motif are registered trademarks of the Open Group. Citrix, ICA, Program Neighborhood, MetaFrame, WinFrame, VideoFrame, and MultiWin are trademarks or registered trademarks of Citrix Systems, Inc. HTML, XML, XHTML and W3C are trademarks or registered trademarks of W3C®, World Wide Web Consortium, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Java is a registered trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc. JavaScript is a registered trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc., used under license for technology invented and implemented by Netscape. SAP, R/3, SAP NetWeaver, Duet, PartnerEdge, ByDesign, SAP BusinessObjects Explorer, StreamWork, and other SAP products and services mentioned herein as well as their respective logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of SAP SE in Germany and other countries. Business Objects and the Business Objects logo, BusinessObjects, Crystal Reports, Crystal Decisions, Web Intelligence, Xcelsius, and other Business Objects products and services mentioned herein as well as their respective logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Business Objects Software Ltd. Business Objects is an SAP company. Sybase and Adaptive Server, iAnywhere, Sybase 365, SQL Anywhere, and other Sybase products and services mentioned herein as well as their respective logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sybase, Inc. Sybase is an SAP company. All other product and service names mentioned are the trademarks of their respective companies. Data contained in this document serves informational purposes only. National product specifications may vary. The information in this document is proprietary to SAP. No part of this document may be reproduced, copied, or transmitted in any form or for any purpose without the express prior written permission of SAP SE. This document is a preliminary version and not subject to your license agreement or any other agreement with SAP. This document contains only intended strategies, developments, and functionalities of the SAP® product and is not intended to be binding upon SAP to any particular course of business, product strategy, and/or development. Please note that this document is subject to change and may be changed by SAP at any time without notice. SAP assumes no responsibility for errors or omissions in this document. SAP does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of the information, text, graphics, links, or other items contained within this material. This document is provided without a warranty of any kind, either express or implied, including but not limited to the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or non-infringement. SAP shall have no liability for damages of any kind including without limitation direct, special, indirect, or consequential damages that may result from the use of these materials. This limitation shall not apply in cases of intent or gross negligence. The statutory liability for personal injury and defective products is not affected. SAP has no control over the information that you may access through the use of hot links contained in these materials and does not endorse your use of third-party Web pages nor provide any warranty whatsoever relating to third-party Web pages. © 2015 SAP SE. All Rights Reserved. Page 29 of 28