Andreesen horowitz regulation a comment letter 2.26.14

February 26, 2014

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549
Re: Release No. 33-9497, File No. S7-11-13 – Regulation A and Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933
Ladies and Gentlemen:
We are writing to you in our capacity as Managing Partner of Andreessen Horowitz (“Andreessen”) and
Chief Executive Officer of Cowen and Company, LLC (“Cowen”). Andreessen is a venture capital firm
which provides venture capital to private technology companies with breakthrough ideas and assists
entrepreneurs to build the resulting business. Cowen is a registered broker-dealer providing investment
banking advice and capital raising services to Emerging Growth Companies as well as equity research
and sales and trading services for institutional investors in the growth sectors of the U.S and world
economy, such as health care, technology and energy. In our roles, Andreessen and Cowen are situated
at the crossroads of companies in need of venture and growth capital and institutional investors looking
to invest in those companies.
We commend the Commission for recognizing the importance of Regulation A as reflected by its
proposed changes to Regulation A. In our view, Regulation A offerings are an attractive financing
alternative for growth companies, many of which require substantial amounts of capital. Regulation A is
a less expensive option than a traditional registered offering and is more favorable as compared to a
private placement.
Andreessen and Cowen have been enthusiastic proponents of the JOBS Act. We believe the “IPO OnRamp” has been a great success in kick-starting the IPO market. The Commission has an opportunity to
do the same for other growth companies seeking to raise capital. Andreessen and Cowen strongly
believe that a new Regulation A will be another important step towards helping growth companies
acquire the capital needed to grow their businesses, while providing investors with adequate
protections against fraud and malfeasance.
With the following suggested changes to the current proposal, we believe Regulation A will be a more
useful and practical means for growth companies to raise capital, achieving the intended goals of
Congress. Our comments are consistent with the views outlined in a November 2013 report presented
to the United States Treasury by the Equity Capital Formation Task Force which we both co-chaired,
“From the On-Ramp to the Freeway: Refueling Job Creation and Growth by Reconnecting Investors with
Small-Cap Companies.”

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I.

Eligible Issuers and Offering Limitations

We believe that the Regulation A proposing amendments should be expanded to include
reporting companies with a non-affiliate float of less than $250 million, which we will refer to as
“micro-cap companies”. Based on our experience, many of these micro-cap companies have substantial
capital needs in order to grow their businesses but are unable to raise a sufficient amount of capital in a
traditional registered offering. Though reporting companies may have the ability to raise capital using a
Form S-1 or S-3, some micro-cap companies are ineligible to use Form S-3 and using a Form S-1 may be
cost prohibitive. For those micro-cap companies that are eligible to use Form S-3, many are significantly
limited by the amount of proceeds that may be raised due to the limitation set forth in Instruction I.B.6,
which limits the amount that an issuer can raise to one-third of its non-affiliate public float during a 12
calendar month period. In these cases, a capital raise representing one-third of the company’s nonaffiliate public float oftentimes does not provide the company with a sufficient amount of capital to
execute on its business plan within a given timeframe. As a result, many of these companies attempt
Rule 506 offerings as a way to raise a substantial amount of capital. However, these offerings are
oftentimes unsuccessful or come with onerous terms.
If the Regulation A proposing amendments were to be expanded to include micro-cap
companies, we believe it would be appropriate to condition the availability of the Regulation A
exemption on such companies’ being current with their reporting requirements under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). This is consistent with Regulation A before the 1992
amendments, and similar to both the Regulation A proposing amendment to make the exemption
unavailable to issuers that have not filed the ongoing reports required by the proposed rules during the
two years prior to the filing of a new offering statement, as well as the proposed rules for crowdfunding
transactions.
We further believe it would be appropriate to allow micro-cap companies to meet the disclosure
requirements of Regulation A through incorporation by reference to their reports under the Exchange
Act, and to suspend ongoing reporting obligations under Regulation A provided that, and only for so
long as, the company continues to meet its periodic reporting requirements under the Exchange Act.
We believe this approach is consistent with the goal of promoting capital formation and providing
meaningful investor protection. Periodic reports under the Exchange Act requires more detailed
disclosure than reports under Regulation A, thus permitting incorporation by reference will provide
meaningful investor protection while minimizing unnecessary costs and overlapping or duplicative
reporting requirements.
We further believe that the Regulation A proposing amendments should be expanded to
include foreign private issuers. The U.S. capital markets are the most sophisticated and liquid markets
in the world. However, over the past 10 years, a number of foreign companies chose to forego the U.S.
capital markets for their IPOs and a number of foreign private issuers de-registered from the U.S. While
there are a number of reasons for these trends, the most common reason we hear is the cost associated
with a U.S. IPO and the on-going cost associated with being a U.S. public company. We believe it is in
the best interests of the U.S. to encourage foreign companies to raise capital from U.S. investors in a

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regulated and cost-efficient manner, and we believe the Regulation A regime is an ideal way for foreign
companies to access the U.S. capital markets.
The global capital markets continue to become increasingly competitive and internationalized.
The onerous nature of Sarbanes-Oxley has made public offerings and listings in the U.S. less attractive to
foreign private issuers. If foreign private issuers continue to choose not to seek capital formation
activities in the U.S. market because of either the restrictive liquidity of privately placed securities or the
onerous and costly nature of Exchange Act reporting, the U.S. market suffers in reputation and risks
sheltering U.S. investors from opportunities that generate above market returns.
Under Rule 12g3-2(b), the SEC already allows the securities of foreign private issuers that trade
on foreign exchanges to trade in the U.S. market without becoming an Exchange Act filer. Purchasers of
these securities are making their investment decisions based solely on the disclosure regimes of the
foreign countries in which the foreign private issuer is primarily listed. We believe that, except for
audited financial statements, foreign private issuers of a Regulation A offering should be required to
disclose substantially similar information as a U.S. or Canadian issuer. For audited financial statements,
we believe foreign private issuers should be permitted to use IFRS. This will likely increase the level of
disclosure many foreign private issuers currently provide to U.S. investors, and will provide U.S.
investors with adequate protection.
It is our opinion that by encouraging all issuers, including foreign private issuers, to seek capital
formation activities in the United States under new Regulation A, we reinforce the message that
investment from, not just a presence in, the U.S. market provides a staple for global growth. In addition,
many foreign private issuers have significant U.S. operations that require capital formation activities that
could be satisfied by new Regulation A.
We view that availing Regulation A to U.S., Canadian and all other foreign private issuers will
serve to welcome and encourage all entrepreneurial companies, both foreign and domestic, to seek
capital from U.S. investors at earlier stages. By allowing Regulation A to be utilized by foreign private
issuers, not just those located in Canada, foreign private issuers can achieve broader U.S. capital
formation activities in a way that provides a stepping stone to becoming listed on a national securities
exchange and reporting under the Exchange Act. In addition, extending Regulation A in this way will also
serve to diminish/eliminate the ‘liquidity discount’ that often accompanies private placements done
under Regulation D and 144A, allowing for broader US investor participation.
For Regulation A offerings which include convertible, exercisable or exchangeable securities,
we believe that the manner in which the size of the offering is determined should be amended to
exclude the aggregate offering price of the underlying securities, until such time as those securities
are convertible, exercisable or exchangeable. Footnote 112 of the Proposing Release states that:
If the offering included securities that were convertible, exercisable or exchangeable for
other securities, the offer and sale of the underlying securities would also be required to
be qualified and the aggregate offering price would include the aggregate conversion,

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exercise or exchange price of such securities, regardless of when they become
convertible, exercisable or exchangeable.
In our experience, investors in small companies typically do not purchase straight equity
securities, but will instead require warrants and/or convertible securities. For many of these offerings,
the warrant is issued with an exercise price at a premium to the offering price and may be exercisable
for a substantial number of shares relative to the offering size over a specified term, which is often five
years. Similarly, a convertible security may be converted at a premium to the offering price and often
has a five year maturity. For these types of offerings, if the aggregate offering price of the underlying
securities is included in the $50 million offering size limitation, the actual proceeds to the company at
the time of the Regulation A offering may be substantially less than the company requires to execute its
business plan. Moreover, in the case of warrants, many times the company never receives any
additional proceeds from the warrant because the warrant expires out-of-the-money, or, the company
does not receive those proceeds until maturity of the warrant, much past the time in which the
company needs the capital.
Summary Recommendations
Suggestion #1: We propose that Tier 2 of Regulation A should apply to public micro-cap companies,
thereby enabling these companies to raise a sufficient amount of capital needed to grow their
businesses in a cost effective manner. We believe it may be appropriate to consider conditioning the
availability of Tier 2 on a micro-cap company being current for the past two years in its reporting
obligations under the Exchange Act.
Suggestion #2: We propose that micro-cap companies should be permitted to incorporate by
reference their Exchange Act reports into their Offering Circular, thereby reducing the time and the
cost of a Regulation A offering.
Suggestion #3: We propose that the ongoing reporting obligations under Regulation A for a micro-cap
company be suspended for so long as the micro-cap company is current in its reporting obligations
under the Exchange Act.
Suggestion #4: We propose that foreign-private issuers should be allowed to conduct Tier 2
Regulation A offerings.
Suggestion #5: We propose that the aggregate offering price of the underlying security should only be
included in the $50 million limitation only during the 12-month period in which such security is first
convertible, exercisable or exchangeable. This will allow the company to raise the capital it needs at
the time it needs it.
II.

Investment Limitation

We believe that the 10% investment limitation should be removed or, in the alternative, not
apply to “Accredited Investors,” as that term is defined in Regulation D. Title IV of the JOBS Act was
created as a means for smaller, growth companies, to access the public market in a less expensive, more

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streamlined manner. The statute does not mandate any limit on the amount an investor may purchase
in a Regulation A offering. We believe that the disclosure obligations, and the liability that attaches
thereto, is sufficient investor protection, and that limiting the amount an investor may purchase is
unnecessarily restrictive.
All investors in Tier 2 offerings will have the means to make an informed investment decision
and will have adequate protections against false and misleading statements. The proposed rules require
that potential investors be provided an Offering Circular at least 48 hours in advance of confirming sales.
Moreover, all versions of the Offering Circular will have been made public for at least three weeks prior
to pricing the offering. This will provide investors with a substantial period of time to make an informed
investment decision, and investors will have protection against false and misleading statements because
of the Section 12(a)(2) liability that will attach to the offering materials. In addition, because the
proposed rules do not put a limit on the amount of Regulation A securities investors may acquire in the
after-market, the utility of the investment limitation is limited.
Alternatively, if the Commission decides that the 10% investment limitation is necessary, we
believe that such limitation should not apply to “Accredited Investors.” Under Regulation D, the SEC has
bifurcated the investor universe into “accredited investors” and “non-accredited investors.” Under Rule
506 of Regulation D, an unlimited number of accredited investors can each purchase an unlimited
amount of privately placed securities. An “accredited investor,” whether an individual or an institution,
is assumed to have the financial wherewithal to make an investment decision, and to absorb any losses
associated therewith, without the benefits of a disclosure document. We believe that accredited
investors can make similar decisions and can bear similar risk with respect to Tier 2 offerings.
Limiting the amount investors can invest in a Tier 2 offering may significantly limit the amount of
capital that an issuer can raise in a Tier 2 offering and may require a longer and more expensive
marketing process for the offering. Circumstances may arise where a small handful of investors (most
likely accredited investors) would be willing to invest a substantial amount of capital, but because of the
10% limitation, these investors may not be able to invest the amount they wish to invest, and may force
the issuer to prolong the offering.
Summary Recommendation
Suggestion #1: We propose that the 10% investment limitation be removed, or as an alternative, the
limitation should be removed for “accredited investors.”
III.

Section 12(a)(2) Liability and Research

We believe that the Commission should create a safe-harbor from Section 12(a)(2) liability for
research reports prepared by broker-dealers on Regulation A issuers. Broker-dealers that participate
in Regulation A offerings may choose to provide research coverage on those companies as a service to
their investor clients. Broker-dealers may be reluctant to provide research coverage without a safeharbor from Section 12(a)(2) liability similar to that in Section 2(3) of the Securities Act for emerging
growth companies.

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One of the primary goals of the JOBS Act was to encourage broker-dealers to provide research
coverage for emerging growth companies. The JOBS Act accomplished this goal in part by amending
Section 2(3) of the Securities Act to expressly state that “[t]he publication or distribution by a broker or
dealer of a research report about an emerging growth company that is the subject of a proposed public
offering…shall be deemed for purposes of paragraph (10) of this subsection and Section 5(c) not to
constitute an offer for sale or offer to sell a security…”. By deeming a research report not to constitute
an offer for sale or an offer to sell, broker-dealers cannot be held liable under Section 12(a)(2) for the
contents in a research report. In addition, Rule 139 contains a similar safe-harbor for broker-dealer
research reports for companies that are not emerging growth companies.
It would be an inappropriate result for broker-dealers to have Section 12(a)(2) liability on
research reports covering Regulation A issuers while a similar liability is not applicable for emerging
growth companies or for companies that meet the requirements of Rule 139.
Suggestion #1: We request that the Commission adopt a rule whereby a research report on a
Regulation A issuer would not be deemed an offer for sale or offer to sell a security for purposes of
Section 12(a)(2).
IV.

Federal Preemption of Re-Sales

The proposing release defines “qualified purchaser” to encompass all offerees and purchasers
of Regulation A offering as a simple means to preempt state blue-sky laws. We believe Regulation A
should go further and preempt re-sales of Regulation A securities as well.
One of the greatest benefits of a Regulation A offering versus a 4(a)(2)/Regulation D offering is
that the securities sold in the Regulation A offering will be freely tradeable immediately upon closing of
the offering. Many institutional investors are restricted by their governing documents from investing in
restricted securities. Under the current SEC proposals, we believe that these institutional investors will
be allowed to invest in Regulation A securities because those securities will be freely tradeable. This is
expected to result in improved investor demand for these offerings as well as improved terms and
additional capital for issuers than may be available in a 4(a)(2)/Regulation D offering. However, without
clear federal preemption of blue-sky laws governing the re-sale of Regulation A securities, investors,
both retail and institutional, may be concerned about their ability to re-sell their securities which will
reduce their willingness to purchase the securities in the offering.
Suggestion #1: We request that the Commission adopt a rule preempting state blue-sky laws from the
re-sale of Regulation A securities.

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In conclusion, we are very pleased with the Proposed Rules and we hope you will take these comments

under advisement. Please do not hesitate to contact us with any questions or comments.

Sincerely,

Scott Kupor
Jeffrey M. Solomon
Managing Partner, Andreessen Horowitz
Chief Executive Officer, Cowen and Company

Andreesen horowitz regulation a comment letter 2.26.14

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