Audit quality and auditors independence in nigeria

Research Journal of Finance and Accounting www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)
Vol.4, No.11, 2013
131
Audit Quality and Auditors Independence in Nigeria: An
Empirical Evaluation
Dr A. O. Enofe Dr C. Nbgame Okunega, E. C*
Ediae, O. O
Faculty of Management Sciences, Department of Accounting, University of Benin, Benin City, Edo State,
Nigeria.
*ejie_okunega@yahoo.co.uk
Abstract
Many have argued that auditors’ independence plays a pivotal role in enhancing the quality of the audit in an
organization. This is the focus of this study, using Nigerian quoted companies as a reference point. This study
empirically evaluates the relationship between audit quality and auditors independence. In pursuance of this, a
cross sectional analysis of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange was carried out. The dependent
variable was audit quality that was measured by the fees charged by the audit firms. The independent variables
were the audit tenure, board independence, and ownership structure. The data collected for the variables were
subjected to the ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis. The results indicated that as auditors’
independence increase, the quality of the audit also improves and as the independence of the board and the
ownership structure increases, the quality of the audit reduces. It is therefore recommended that auditors should
strive for independence in other to ensure quality audits.
Keywords: audit quality, auditors’ independence, ownership structure.
1.Introduction
The quality of the audit services rendered by the auditor and the audit report issued are to a great extent affected
by the independence of the auditor. Auditor independence is a cornerstone of the auditing profession, a crucial
element in the statutory corporate reporting process and a key prerequisite for adding value to an audited
financial statement (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961). The agency relationship that existed between the owner
(shareholders) and the managers of the company necessitate the services of an auditor whose report on the
financial statement has to be an unbiased and impartial view of the company’s financial activities in other to be
useful to users.
Companies like Xerox, Enron and WorldCom, amongst others, have disclosed improprieties in their financial
statements amounting to billions of dollars. Xerox disclosed that it had incorrectly realized $6.4 billion in
revenues and overstated its pretax income by $1.41 billion over five years from 1997 to 2001. In some of these
high profile audit failures, auditor misconduct has been alleged. For example, according to the Wall Street
Journal (2003), the SEC filed civil fraud charges against KPMG for its role in auditing Xerox. The accounting
improprieties at Enron regarding related party transactions led not only to its demise but also the failure of its
auditor, Arthur Andersen (Bajaj, Gunny, Sarin, 2003).
The probability that the auditor will uncover a breach and disclose such discovery is what DeAngelo (1981b)
describes as audit quality. If the auditor’s independence of mind and in appearance is compromised then the
auditor is less likely to report the irregularities and this would result in the impairment of the audit quality.
In light of the ever present importance of the independence of auditors and in the aftermath of the global
economic crises, which first made itself felt in 2008, several international bodies proposed new requirements to
enhance audit quality as well as address market concentration of audit firms including revising auditors
independence.
In recent times, the length of the audit tenure has become a cause for concern in relation to impairment of the
auditor’s independence. As a lengthy audit tenure could result in a close relationship between the auditor and the
client, causing the auditor to act in favour of management thus reducing objectivity and audit quality.
1.1 Statement of the research problem
Several studies (Dopuch, King & Schwartz, 2001; Myers, Myers & Omer, 2003) have attempted to evaluate
possible explanatory variables for the state of audit quality, focusing on the relationship between company
specific and audit firm specific factors that could mediate audit quality. In light of these studies, auditor tenure
has become the focus of much debate. Should a firm replace its auditors on a regular basis, or should the auditor
be allowed to build a long-term relationship with the client?
The crux of the debate rests on how tenure affects auditor independence. Proponents of mandatory auditor
rotation claim that lengthy auditor tenure erodes independence, which in turn impairs audit quality. Others argue
that independence and audit quality increase with longer tenure because of improved auditor expertise from

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132
superior client-specific knowledge. Since independence is not observable, regulators, practitioners, and
academics often rely on the appearance dimension to define auditor independence (Dopuch et al, 2003).
A considerable number of these studies (Healey & Kim, 2003; Carcello & Nagy, 2004) consider rotation of audit
firms as a way strengthening the independence of the auditor and of improving audit quality. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 consolidates this view as it requires rotation of the lead audit partner every five years so that
the engagement can be viewed “with fresh and sceptical eyes.” The argument basically is that longer auditor-
tenure tends to result in an opportunity cost of auditor independence. Conversely, other studies (Defond &
Francis, 2005; Jenkins & Velury, 2008) also argue that longer auditor tenure improves audit quality as auditors
may need time to gain expertise in the business they audit and acquire client-specific knowledge over time. This
implies that audit quality is lower during the early years of the Auditor- Client relationship, and audit quality
increases with length of auditor-tenure due to the reduction in information asymmetry between auditor and client
(Azizkhani, Monroe & Shailer, 2007).
However, in the Nigerian audit setting, the challenge of auditor tenure on auditors’ independence and client
relationship though still budding has not attracted much analytical attention and empirical studies beyond mere
anecdotal opinions. Consequently, there has been a dearth of research in this area and inadequate empirical
evidence from Nigeria. Hence the study attempts to analyze the significance of the interactive effects of the
independence of the auditor on audit quality using a study sample from Nigeria.
In light of the above, the research questions for this study are:
1. What is the relationship between audit tenure and audit quality?
2. What is the relationship between board independence and audit quality?
3. What is the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality?
1.1.1 Objectives of the study
This study’s main objective is to examine if audit tenure is an intervening variable in determining audit quality.
The specific objectives are to:
1. Ascertain the relationship between audit tenure and audit quality
2. Find out the relationship between board independence and audit quality.
3. Examine the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality.
1.1.2 Hypothesis of the study
Hypothesis is a tentative answer to a research question. Therefore, the following hypotheses, stated in their
alternate forms are been raised in light of our objectives.
HA: Audit tenure is positively related to audit quality in Nigeria.
HA: Board independence is positively related to audit quality in Nigeria.
HA: Ownership structure is positively related to audit quality in Nigeria.
1.1.3 Significance of the Study
The principal-agent relationship can be used in explaining the importance of the auditor. The directors (the
agents) prepare the financial statements for use of interested parties one of which are the shareholders(principal),
the demand for external audits is to ensure that the assertions of management are true. Therefore, this study is
expected to provide useful insight into improving audit quality. This study contributes to the audit literature as it
provides additional empirical evidence on the impact of auditors’ independence on the level of audit quality. This
study will be useful to stakeholders in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) as it provides evidence on the
relationship between audit quality and the reforms instituted by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 demanding
mandatory audit rotation every five years
1.1.4 Scope of the Study
This study is premised on the appraisal of audit quality in Nigeria. Therefore, data on corporate organisations in
Nigeria were sought in providing answers to the problems and questions that have been raised in this research
work. The study focuses on companies listed on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II discusses the relevant literature including audit
quality, audit committee and corporate governance, board structure, ownership structure, and CEO duality and
audit quality. The methodology adopted to lend empirical weight to the findings was outlined in Section III.
Section IV provides the results while Section V concludes the paper.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Audit quality
An audit is an independent examination of the financial statements of an enterprise as prepared by the
management of that enterprise by an appointed person called the auditor in order to express a professional

Vol.4, No.11, 2013
133
opinion whether or not those financial statements show a true and fair view of the position of the enterprise as at
the end of the financial period in accordance with the relevant statutory and professional regulations (Izedonmi,
2000).
DeAngelo (1981) noted that audit quality consists of two components: auditor competence and auditor
independence. Deterioration in audit quality in a short tenure audit may be due to either lack of competence or
loss of independence, while a loss in quality in a long tenure audit is most likely due to a loss of independence
(Knechel &Vanstraelen, 2007).
Moizer (1997) noted that the appraisal of the indices of measuring the quality of the audit service is not without
its challenges since audit quality is typically unobservable (Francis, 2004). Thus, according to Hay and Knechel
(2010), auditing could be categorized as a type of credence good and hence auditors add credibility to corporate
financial reports by expressing an opinion about the true and fair representation but only in so far as the users of
financial statements perceive that opinion as valuable. In this regards, Hardies, Breesh and Branson (2010)
argued that audit quality is not simply a linear function of auditor competence and auditor independence, but also
on the market’s perception about the value of the auditor’s report which is the result of the perceived competence
and the perceived independence of the auditor. Seen from this perspective, audit quality refers in this case to
credibility of the audit opinion which is a measurement for the degree of confidence users place upon the
information provided by the auditor.
2.2 Auditor independence
Independent auditors are considered the "gatekeepers" of the public securities markets (SEC 2000).
The auditors’ independence could be affected by the length of time the auditor works for a particular client. In
particular, the familiarity developed from lengthy auditor tenure and the percentage of the total income of an
audit firm which is accounted for by any particular client has been alleged to contribute to this erosion of auditor
independence. In order to restore public confidence, policies such as mandatory audit firm rotation,
prohibition/disclosure of certain non Audit Services have been initiated by regulators and accounting bodies in
the US, Nigeria and elsewhere (Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002).
There are two opposing views on the effects of auditor tenure on the audit quality. Auditor competence may
increase as a result of long auditor tenure as the auditor can base audit decisions on extensive client knowledge
that has developed over time, or it may hamper auditor independence as lengthy tenure encourages closeness and
familiarity between management and the auditor (Knechel &Vanstraelen, 2007).
The first one suggests that as the auditor-client relationship lengthens, the auditor may develop close
relationship with the client and become more likely to act in favour of management, thus reducing the audit
quality. Therefore, imposing mandatory limits on auditor tenure is expected to improve audit quality by reducing
client firms' influence over auditors (Mautz & Sharaf , 1961).
Barbadillo and Aguilar (2008) in a study of the relationship between the duration of audit engagement and audit
quality specified a model to show the functional relationship between the dependent variable (value of audit
quality) and the main explanatory factor (tenure). Using a sample of non-financial Spanish companies quoted on
Madrid Stock Exchange, the study reveals an inverse relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality and
suggest that auditors tend to be more dependent in the first years of the auditing engagement. The study
concludes that the shorter the auditor’s tenure, the more they behave in a dependent fashion.
The other view, on the other hand, indicates that as the auditors tenure becomes longer, the auditor develop their
understanding of the business and also their expertise during the audit, resulting in higher audit quality.
Short auditor tenure may undermine auditor competence since the auditor knows less about a company in the
early years of an audit, but it may also undermine auditor independence since auditors will wish to retain a new
client long enough to recoup the costs of the initial audit setup or a lowball fee (Dye, 1991).
Shockley (1982) reports that auditors did not perceive tenure exceeding five years as reducing auditor
independence. The opposing viewpoint holds that problem audits occur more frequently for newer clients
because auditors have less information about these firms (AICPA 1992). Client-specific knowledge of items such
as operations, accounting system, and internal control structure is crucial for auditors to detect material errors
and misstatements.
Myers et al, (2003) apply the dispersion of accruals as a proxy. They report that as auditor tenure lengthens, the
discretionary accruals and current accruals are less dispersed, suggesting higher earnings quality. Jenkins and
Velury (2008) suggest that conservatism in reported earnings increases between short and medium tenure but
does not change between medium and long tenure.
Apart from accruals, Stanley and DeZoort (2007) utilize restatement as a proxy for low quality of financial
reports. Their test results also suggest that as the length of auditor-client relationship increased, the likelihood of
restatement decreased, suggesting better financial reporting quality. Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) find that

Vol.4, No.11, 2013
134
longer auditor tenure neither increase nor reduce the likelihood of auditor’s issuance of going concern report for
a company that subsequently went bankrupt. However, the study involving going-concern report in the US
suggest that audit reporting failures are significantly higher in the first few years of auditor-client relationship
(Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002).
In the light of the positions of various studies as reviewed above, we can argue that the effects of auditors’
independence (using audit tenure as a proxy) on audit quality are controversial. Moreover, few empirical studies
use publicly available secondary data in order to determine whether perceived threats to auditor independence
actually compromise auditor independence. Again, documentary evidence from Nigeria in this subject area is not
readily available. Therefore, this study which was motivated by the lack of consensus in the literature on the
impact of audit independence on audit quality will contribute to the debate by examining the relationship
between auditor tenure and audit quality in Nigeria.
2.3.1 Board independence
Fama and Jensen (1983) have theorized that the board of directors is the best control mechanism to monitor
actions of management. The study explored board independence based on the agency theory. The study of
O’Sullivan (2000) found that the proportion of non-executive directors had a significant positive impact on audit
quality. It suggests that non-executive directors encouraged more intensive audits as a complement to their own
monitoring role while the reduction in agency costs expected through significant managerial ownership resulted
in a reduced need for intensive auditing. We therefore control for the effects of board characteristics on audit
quality in Nigeria.
2.3.2 Ownership Structure
The relationship between outside shareholders and managers is marked by moral hazard and opportunism, which
result from information asymmetry. The social role of financial reporting increases with the separation of
ownership and control.
3.METHODOLOGY
This study is a cross sectional study. The population of the study is made up of companies listed on the floor of
the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). A sample of twenty (20) audited financial reports of these companies for
the period ending 2011 was selected using the simple random sampling technique. The regression model for this
study takes the form:
AUDITQUAL = β0 + β1 ATEE + β2 BIN + β3 OSTR + ε...................................... (1)
Where:
AUDITQUAL= audit fee charged by audit firms which is used as a proxy for audit quality
ATEE= audit tenure which is used as a proxy for auditors independence
BIN= board independence
OSTR= ownership structure
ε = the error term
4.DATAANALYSIS
4.1Descriptive Statistics
A study of table 1 below shows that the range of the fees paid by the observed companies for audit is 95,996,000
and on the average, a fee of 6,466,757 is paid for a financial audit. Furthermore, the table reveals that the mean
average time an audit firm spends with client is 3years as inferred from the mean mark of 0.6. With respect to
board independence, a good number of the companies observed can be said to be fairly independent as the
average ratio of independence is approximately 60%. Lastly, a critical appraisal of the Jarque-Bera statistics
reveals that all the observed variables are normally distributed with the exception of audit tenure and board
independence.
Table 2 below examines the correlation between the various variables. A cursory look at the table shows that all
the independent variables with the exception of audit tenure have a negative relationship with audit quality.
Furthermore, looking at the magnitude of values, we can deduce that the relationship amongst these variables is
weak as none is above 0.4. A critical analysis of the above table reveals the presence of first order autocorrelation
as evidenced by the Durbin-Watson Statistics of 1.80. Hence, adjustments were made in an attempt to correct for
the observed autocorrelation
4.2.Analysis Of Result
Having corrected for autocorrelation as best as possible; we observe the following, from table 3 and 4. The (R2
)
value of 0.384193 indicates that approximately 30% of the systematic variation in the dependent variable is

Vol.4, No.11, 2013
135
explained by the independent variables. A further adjustment for degree of freedom shows that approximately
19% of the systematic variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. This is
evidenced by the adjusted (R2
).
The F-statistics which reveals the overall explanatory power of the model is 2.03 with probability of
approximately 0.15. The implication of this is that the explanatory power of the model is weak as the
independent variables taken holistically do not significantly explain our dependent variable.
The t-statistics value of audit tenure is 0.174459, which is an indication of a positive relationship between audit
tenure and audit quality. The probability value of 0.8642 is an indication that audit tenure does not significantly
affect audit quality at 5% significance level. We therefore accept the hypothesis that audit tenure is positively
related to audit quality.
The t-statistics value of -1.836015 shows a negative relationship between board independence and audit quality.
The probability value of 0.0893 indicates that the relationship between board independence and audit quality is
not significant at 5% significance level but it is however significant at a 10 percent level of significance. We
therefore reject the hypothesis that board independence is positively related to audit quality.
Ownership structure has a t-statistics value of -2.647092, which reveals a negative relationship with audit quality.
The probability value of 0.0201 is an indication that the relationship between ownership structure and audit
quality is significant. We therefore reject the hypothesis that ownership structure is positively related to audit
quality.
4.3.Discussion Of Findings
The (R2
) value of 0.384193 indicates that approximately 30% of the dependent variable is explained by the
independent variables. All the independent variables except ownership structure exhibited non significant
relationships with audit quality; as a probability figure of less than 0.05 is deemed to be significant. This entails
that shifts in the independent variables such as audit tenure and board independence would be accompanied by
only slight changes in audit quality. The negative relationship between board independence and audit quality
however, indicates that increases in board independence and ownership structure would be accompanied by
decreases in audit quality and vice versa.
The findings of the study are in consonance with those of Shockley (1981), Tirole (1990), Geiger and
Raghunandan (2002), Myers et al., (2003), Stanley and Dezoort (2007), our finding however contradicts that of
O’Sullivan (2000), as we find a negative relationship between board independence and audit quality.
5.CONCLUSION
This paper is set out to ascertain the relationship between auditors’ independence and audit quality. This stream
of research quality has received considerable attention due to its significance to the auditing profession. Audit fee
is used to proxy for audit quality based on previous research. It is observed that organizations that have been
consistent with one audit firm for a period of at least 5 years are associated with high quality audits. This could
be explained by the fact that auditors are more conversant with the clients business and are better able to carry
out their functions.
Research concerning auditor independence and audit quality may benefit from cross-countries comparison.
People in different countries are likely to have different attitude and culture. Finally, researchers can continue to
generate future research questions around the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, many of which aim
towards auditor independence. The law has been in effect for over five years. This provides a good opportunity
to perform related studies with less concern on limited sample size and more intense focus on the ability to
generalize the findings.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Parameter AUDITQUAL ATEE BIN OSTR
Mean 6466757 0.6 0.5915 6.340055
Median 167500 1 0.63 0.34105
Maximum 96000000 1 0.17 66.81
Minimum 4000 0 0.33 0
Std. Dev 21783625 0.502625 0.113845 16.81195
Skewnes 3.761508 -0.408248 -1.126479 2.844798
Kurtosis 15.84542 3.197279 3.197279 9.998983
Jarque-Bera 184.6672 4.262284 4.262284 67.79764
Probability 0 0.186702 0.118702 0
Sum 1.29+08 12 11.83
Sum Sq.Dev 9.02E+15 4.8 0.246255 126.8011
5370.189
Observations 20 20 20 20
TABLE 2
Dependent Variable: AUDQ Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1 – 20
Included observations: 20
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 55765569 31483909 1.77124 0.0956
ATEN 2132144 10064197 0.211854 0.8349
BIND -81758868 48259235 -1.69416 0.1096
OSTR -349796.3 326913.5 -1.069997 0.3005
R-squared 0.172303 Mean dependent var 6466757
Adjusted R-squared 0.01711 S.D. dependent var 21783625
S.E. of regression 21596463 Akaike info criterion 36.79081
Sum squared resid 7.46E+15 Schwarz criterion 36.98996
Log likelihood -363.9081 F-statistic 36.82969
Durbin-Watson stat 0.374023 Prob(F-statistic) 1.808548
Source: E-Views 3.1 Output

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138
TABLE 3
Dependent variable: AUDQ
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1 – 20
Included observations: 20
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 58932362 34909377 1.688153 0.1152
ATEN 1812110 10387005 0.174459 0.8642
BIND -92698133 50488753 -1.836015 0.0893
OSTR -860296 324996.8 -2.647092 0.0201
AR(2) 0.583453 0.274253 2.127425 0.0531
R-squared 0.384193 Mean dependent var 7169275
Adjusted R-squared 0.194714 S.D. dependent var 22915623
S.E. of regression 20563960 Akaike info criterion 36.74611
Sum squared resid 5.50E+15 Schwarz criterion 36.99344
Log likelihood 2.027628 F-statistic 36.78021
Durbin-Watson stat 0.149664 Prob(F-statistic) 1.818535
TABLE 4
Pearson’s Correlation
AUDQ ATEN BIND OSTR
AUDQ 1.0000 0.1257 -0.3237 -0.1030
ATEN 0.1257 1.0000 -0.1085 -0.1117
BIND -0.3237 -0.1085 1.0000 -0.4036
OSTR -0.1030 -0.1117 -0.4036 1.0000

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