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Return of the kernel rootkit
malware
(on Windows 10)
Matt Oh (jeongoh@Microsoft.com)
Microsoft
‹#›
Whoami?
• Microsoft WDATP research team
• EDR, Blueteam
• Special interests in new exploit and malware technique
• Reverse engineer
• Tearing down exploits, malware
• Use the knowledge for better defense tactics/strategy
• 1-day researcher
• DarunGrim – opensource binary diffing tool
‹#›
Rootkits: Subverting the Windows
Kernel
• Rootkits: Subverting the Windows
Kernel was published in 2005
• This is the reference for Windows
rootkits
• Many techniques were used by
malware in the wild (DKOM, SSDT
hooks)
2
Windows driver signing requirements
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/kernel-mode-
code-signing-policy--windows-vista-and-later-
• The Windows rootkit era
ended with the release of
Windows Vista, mainly due to
Windows signing requirements
and Kernel Patch Protection
(aka KPP, PatchGuard)
• Now malware authors need to
overcome signing requirement
• Only very advanced actors
used rootkits so far
(Equation, Duqu2, etc)
3
Zacinlo ad fraud operation
• Bitdefender reported Zacinlo Ad Fraud operation in
June of 2018
• Microsoft detection – Trojan:Win64/Detrahere
• Seemed very usual until it mentioned “digitally signed
rootkit”
• The report focused on the ad fraud aspects of the malware
• This presentation will focus on the rootkit aspects of
the Zacinlo malware
4
Detrahere: low detections
• It is believed that the
threat has been running
since early 2012
• According to VirusTotal,
Malwarebytes identified
the rootkit component of
this threat as early as
September 2017
• Low detection rates
(6/67) until June 2018
5
Detrahere: Stealthiness+Persistency
• The threat was under the radar for a long time
• It infects other executable to propagate
• The infected file will run the original executable after
infecting victim machine
• It installs a kernel driver that loads additional payload
drivers from the hidden file system
• The rootkit component blocks visibility into the related malware
files using hidden file system
• It registered it as a shutdown handler and also put
itself in the early phase of driver loading order
• Remediation can be challenging because it installs a shutdown
handler to reinstall itself for persistency
6
Components
Name Functionality Descriptions
DriverProtect
Shutdown handler
registration
Register a shutdown handler to regain persistence when the
service is removed
Hidden file system Hide file contents of the malware files
Anti-
analysis/debugging
Block security products and analysts tools process launch and
check for attached kernel debugger
User-mode
process
USB file infection
When a USB drive is connected, all PE files on it will be
infected
Network traffic
injection
Modify network traffic and inject Ad Fraud
C&C Connect to C&C servers
Netfilter2
Network traffic
injection (driver)
Provides driver-level support for network traffic injection
which will be used by user-mode process
udiskMgr Anti-remediation
Blocks security products and analysts tools process launch
Blocks some files creation (ex. FIXLISTS.TXT) used by a system
recovery tool
7
Infection/propagation
8
USB file infection: threat
delivery mechanism
9
USB file infection: threat delivery
mechanism
• Bitdefender report focused on one case where malware is delivered through fake
VPN client.
• In reality, the threat can spread through USB infections. When a user inserts a
USB drive into the infected machine, the rootkit component will infect the PE
files on the USB drive
• Probably the VPN client found by Bitdefender might be infected in the first place.
10
File infection
Verified: Signed
Signing date: 2:45 AM 7/16/2016
Publisher: Microsoft Windows
Company: Microsoft Corporation
Description: Notepad
Product: Microsoft« Windows«
Operating System
Prod version: 10.0.14393.0
File version: 10.0.14393.0
(rs1_release.160715-1616)
MachineType: 64-bit
Verified: Unsigned
Link date: 5:24 AM 11/21/2017
Publisher: n/a
Company: Microsoft Corporation
Description: Notepad
Product: Microsoft« Windows« Operating
System
Prod version: 10.0.14393.0
File version: 10.0.14393.0
(rs1_release.160715-1616)
MachineType: 32-bit
Infection
The file becomes unsigned and the machine type becomes 32-bit because the
malware only has a 32-bit infector.
The original 64-bit file will run by this infector later after being
extracted from resource section of the infected file.
11
Original PE file is inserted as a
resource
12
Running original PE payload
13
Running the infected executable
14
Loading kernel driver
15
Stolen and revoked certificate
Countersignatures
are missing – no way
to verify validity
of the certificate
Stolen and revoked certificate
16
And expired
• The certificate used for this
driver was issued to “Handan City
Congtai District LiKang Daily
Goods Department” and was revoked
• The malware performs system time
change to sign this driver on-the-
fly to generate expired
certificate intentionally
• For compatibility reasons, Windows
will accept this certificate
thinking it was previously
generated for legacy driverExpired valid time range
17
Mitigations
• Windows 10 S mode will prevent loading of these
drivers
• More strict driver requirements:
• Windows Defender Application Control policy (Device Guard)
• SecureBoot + HVCI (Memory Integrity) + VBS
• More of anti-rootkit, exploit approach
18
Detections: WDATP
• RS5 detection: certificate telemetry + machine
learning
• The revoked and expired certificate from a vendor never
signed Windows kernel driver
• Using machine learning to mass analyze the certificate
information
• When it fits into the profile, detection will be made
19
Variant drivers
• Searching VTI (Virus Total
Intelligence) will return
thousands of files with
revoked certificate from
“Handan City Congtai
District LiKang Daily Goods
Department”
• These are all variants files
generated by the infector
20
Variant drivers
Variants are
basically
same except
some padded
bytes
21
Persistence
22
Infection/persistence
23
Shutdown handler registration
• The DriverProtect component will register its main
infection routine as a shutdown handler
• With next reboot, the threat will be persistent
• Traditional remediation fails because it doesn’t
have control over this handler
24
Shutdown handler registration
• This routine shows how the shutdown handler is
registered
• Remediation is extremely tricky
• The system will be re-infected with each reboot of
the system unless the resident kernel driver is
unloaded
25
Shutdown handler registration
26
Group order list
• The DriverProtect kernel module is in very early
stages of the driver loading order
• Will affect following security product related
drivers detection attempts
27
Windows Defender Offline
• Windows Defender Offline can provide offline
remediation capability
• When threat is detected, WDO will:
• Guide through offline remediation process
• Cut down the reloading of the rootkit modules
28
Windows Defender Offline
• WDO will be able to remove
the threat
• WDO is a special Defender
service where Defender runs
scanning from clean OS image
from WINRE (Windows Recovery)
partition
• Once system reboots, the
kernel malicious drivers
clean up itself, before any
AV scans.
29
Anti-analysis/debugging
30
Anti-analysis/debugging
31
Anti-analysis tools
• Process creation callback
• Also CreateProcess callback is installed by DriverProtect to prevent
some analysis tools
• WorkItem queue is used to terminate the process from the callback
32
Anti-analysis tools
• Image load callback
• Usual analyst tools are
prohibited from launching
on the target system from
LoadImage callback
installed by DriverProtect
module.
33
Anti-detection
• Monitor Kernel Driver
Loading
• If security product related
kernel drivers are loaded, it
will nop out the entry point
(xor eax, eax; ret)
34
Anti-detection
• Disable ProcessCreateCallbacks
and FLT callbacks
• The anti-analysis code will
enumerate
PspCreateProcessNotifyCallback
and FLT driver routines
• If it is registered by a
security products, it will put
nop return instructions over the
callback
• The determination logic for
security products include driver
path comparison and driver PE
header scanning for version
information
35
Anti-detection: Security products
• The DriverProtect has extensive list of Anti-
malware product processes. They are encoded in file
and decoded dynamically.
Decoded
36
Anti-detection: Security products
• Scanning happens upon PE
header
• ReadFile ->
ScanSecurityProductPatterns
37
Anti-debugging:
Kernel debugger check
• The rootkit
checks whether
kernel debugger
is enabled
• If enabled, it
will call
KeBugCheck.
38
Anti-analysis: obfuscations
• Some rootkit kernel
images are obfuscated in
file (VMProtect)
• When it is loaded in the
kernel, it will unpack
itself with original
contents
• It will not create new
+RWX kernel memory, but
will use existing
section memory to de-
obfuscate itself
Interfering with recovery tool
• If any process
tries to write
contents to
FIXLIST.TXT, the
contents will be
replaced with
NULLs.
• FIXLIST.TXT is
used by Farbar
Recovery Scan Tool
40
Hidden file system
41
Hidden file system – loading
components
42
Creating user-mode process
43
Hidden file system
• The DriverProtect module installs filter driver
module to limit access to it’s components
• The other core drivers (netfilter2 and udiskMgr)
will be directly loaded from the DriverProtect
itself
• Security products’ operation in user-mode will have
limited visibility into the core files because they
are loaded from hidden file location
44
Hidden file system
• DriverProtect will
filter out access to
protected files
(malware components).
• Security products run
in userspace will fail
to access malware
components
• The file contents
inside protected
storage is broken PE
and will patched up
when loaded into memory
• It is implemented as
filtering driver
45
Hidden file system
• The rootkit drivers show missing files
• When DriverProtect driver runs, it will:
• Prevent access to the real file contents on the file system
• The components reside on the hidden location have
intentionally broken PE header
• Act as a proxy and load the real contents from the protected
storage after modifying the contents to be a valid PE file
46
WDATP visibility into driver
loading
• Even though the file never touches the file system,
WDATP still detects the driver loading activity
• DriverProtect protection only works against user-mode tools
• WDATP sensor works in kernel level
47
Hidden file system
• Through this Filter driver, the malware components are protected from
investigations and false information on path is provided to the system. This
will confuse security products and analysis tools.
• Ex) C:windowssystem32sncibkt.exe image is actually
C:WindowsSystem32spsatrmsncibkt.exe
48
Network traffic
injection
49
Network traffic injection
50
Network traffic injection –
netfilter2.sys
There is a MITM kernel
component that are written
based upon commercial
netfilter2 driver code from
netfiltersdk.com
51
Netfilter2 – transparent proxy
The filter driver provides functionality to inject
packets on the fly.
https://netfiltersdk.com/nfsdk.html
52
Network traffic injection –
netfilter2.sys
• The netfilter2.sys driver will be loaded with random
names through hidden file system
• It looks like this netfilter2.sys has close
similarity to the NetFilterSDK.com provided one
• We believe the attackers have access to the
netfilter2.sys source code
• The source code is commercially available
53
Adding new root certificate
• The malicious user-mode component will add new root
certificate
• Used to hijack HTTPS sessions on the system
54
Installed root
certificate
Conclusion
• Detrahere (Zacinlo) is a threat that intercepts network traffic on
a machine to inject ads
• It has multiple self-protection mechanisms
• Hidden file system to hide core drivers
• Anti-analysis/debug/detection
• It abuses feature in Windows driver verification to load kernel
drivers using revoked certificate
• WDATP has a good visibility into the detailed behaviors from the
threat
• WDO can be used to remediate the threat overriding persistence
mechanism 55
C&C Servers
IP Description
119.28.136.132:80
(gpt5.com)
ASN: 132203
City: Beijing
State: Beijing
Country: China
Organization: TENCENT CLOUD COMPUTING (BEIJING) CO. LTD.
104.193.88.77:80
(www.baidu.com)
ASN: 55967
City: Cupertino
State: California
Country: United States
Organization: BAIDU USA LLC
211.159.220.234:80
(adxco.cn)
ASN: 45090
City: Beijing
State: Beijing
Country: China
Organization: TENCENT CLOUD COMPUTING (BEIJING) CO. LTD.
119.28.137.94:8080
(www.user2best.com)
ASN: 132203
City: Beijing
State: Beijing
Country: China
Organization: TENCENT CLOUD COMPUTING (BEIJING) CO. LTD.
56
IOCs
SHA1 SHA256 Filename Defender/descriptions
deb585177e3fb4a935ca177260b02
714ab511353
5edeba23daabdeaaefea7d0ba3c15
3a8db07363a16c659cd120e3aa998
1f485b
setup.exe Infector
954e690318768729b2e825622c883
b803fcb8433
bf57248c47bb1fc44bafad7bb257d
1e03e04128d847e5d895a05ec83ce
a5bd27
C:WindowsSystem32spsatrmsncibk
t.exe
Trojan:Win64/Detrahere
94ec03ad3168a1b8bead60555f062
9b9186e00e6
8f0d55b54ddccf97ea798b40fc0a9
21f59010e5f02118251438ffcf79f
19847a
C:windowssystem32sncibktsvc.exe NULL filled file
86218530d9043ff51e1d581a96e89
140820c8fcb
d9fcc3554d657d68c94001438ebce
24842cec393ad97d3789a30c07426
1519ad
C:WindowsSystem32spsatrmsncibk
t.sys
VirTool:Win64/Detrahere
0cbe4787b9a25bdbd8978e477d1d4
bcbe06ae341
fcbce0027b85069790b25b08444ac
c4ebcb24567d6f461e63ca20f067e
7284e6
bfilps.sys Trojan:Win64/Detrahere.S
1cb1f70a120a61ee9c97d8f7c5ba6
e9ea8674e51
78ac863f8ccea5cd81a3361c203ba
792379735ba5a311d8607f1f1e587
2edb2d
lsswzcgj.sys Trojan:Win64/Detrahere.S
9258b5d3a559ed02a4afaf0dd8079
820ebff3bc8
c86de08ac277735e62bef81a30685
36b43cccf8f278e6cd59e50a6a887
4c4973
rtdsuxz.exe Trojan:Win32/Detrahere.B
!dr
69d209cb78d8e37de47bc697169f6
bb7de4fa738
69d209cb78d8e37de47bc697169f6
bb7de4fa738
notepad.exe Trojan:Win32/Detrahere.B
!dr 57
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  • 1. Return of the kernel rootkit malware (on Windows 10) Matt Oh ([email protected]) Microsoft ‹#›
  • 2. Whoami? • Microsoft WDATP research team • EDR, Blueteam • Special interests in new exploit and malware technique • Reverse engineer • Tearing down exploits, malware • Use the knowledge for better defense tactics/strategy • 1-day researcher • DarunGrim – opensource binary diffing tool ‹#›
  • 3. Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel • Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel was published in 2005 • This is the reference for Windows rootkits • Many techniques were used by malware in the wild (DKOM, SSDT hooks) 2
  • 4. Windows driver signing requirements https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/kernel-mode- code-signing-policy--windows-vista-and-later- • The Windows rootkit era ended with the release of Windows Vista, mainly due to Windows signing requirements and Kernel Patch Protection (aka KPP, PatchGuard) • Now malware authors need to overcome signing requirement • Only very advanced actors used rootkits so far (Equation, Duqu2, etc) 3
  • 5. Zacinlo ad fraud operation • Bitdefender reported Zacinlo Ad Fraud operation in June of 2018 • Microsoft detection – Trojan:Win64/Detrahere • Seemed very usual until it mentioned “digitally signed rootkit” • The report focused on the ad fraud aspects of the malware • This presentation will focus on the rootkit aspects of the Zacinlo malware 4
  • 6. Detrahere: low detections • It is believed that the threat has been running since early 2012 • According to VirusTotal, Malwarebytes identified the rootkit component of this threat as early as September 2017 • Low detection rates (6/67) until June 2018 5
  • 7. Detrahere: Stealthiness+Persistency • The threat was under the radar for a long time • It infects other executable to propagate • The infected file will run the original executable after infecting victim machine • It installs a kernel driver that loads additional payload drivers from the hidden file system • The rootkit component blocks visibility into the related malware files using hidden file system • It registered it as a shutdown handler and also put itself in the early phase of driver loading order • Remediation can be challenging because it installs a shutdown handler to reinstall itself for persistency 6
  • 8. Components Name Functionality Descriptions DriverProtect Shutdown handler registration Register a shutdown handler to regain persistence when the service is removed Hidden file system Hide file contents of the malware files Anti- analysis/debugging Block security products and analysts tools process launch and check for attached kernel debugger User-mode process USB file infection When a USB drive is connected, all PE files on it will be infected Network traffic injection Modify network traffic and inject Ad Fraud C&C Connect to C&C servers Netfilter2 Network traffic injection (driver) Provides driver-level support for network traffic injection which will be used by user-mode process udiskMgr Anti-remediation Blocks security products and analysts tools process launch Blocks some files creation (ex. FIXLISTS.TXT) used by a system recovery tool 7
  • 10. USB file infection: threat delivery mechanism 9
  • 11. USB file infection: threat delivery mechanism • Bitdefender report focused on one case where malware is delivered through fake VPN client. • In reality, the threat can spread through USB infections. When a user inserts a USB drive into the infected machine, the rootkit component will infect the PE files on the USB drive • Probably the VPN client found by Bitdefender might be infected in the first place. 10
  • 12. File infection Verified: Signed Signing date: 2:45 AM 7/16/2016 Publisher: Microsoft Windows Company: Microsoft Corporation Description: Notepad Product: Microsoft« Windows« Operating System Prod version: 10.0.14393.0 File version: 10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616) MachineType: 64-bit Verified: Unsigned Link date: 5:24 AM 11/21/2017 Publisher: n/a Company: Microsoft Corporation Description: Notepad Product: Microsoft« Windows« Operating System Prod version: 10.0.14393.0 File version: 10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616) MachineType: 32-bit Infection The file becomes unsigned and the machine type becomes 32-bit because the malware only has a 32-bit infector. The original 64-bit file will run by this infector later after being extracted from resource section of the infected file. 11
  • 13. Original PE file is inserted as a resource 12
  • 14. Running original PE payload 13
  • 15. Running the infected executable 14
  • 17. Stolen and revoked certificate Countersignatures are missing – no way to verify validity of the certificate Stolen and revoked certificate 16
  • 18. And expired • The certificate used for this driver was issued to “Handan City Congtai District LiKang Daily Goods Department” and was revoked • The malware performs system time change to sign this driver on-the- fly to generate expired certificate intentionally • For compatibility reasons, Windows will accept this certificate thinking it was previously generated for legacy driverExpired valid time range 17
  • 19. Mitigations • Windows 10 S mode will prevent loading of these drivers • More strict driver requirements: • Windows Defender Application Control policy (Device Guard) • SecureBoot + HVCI (Memory Integrity) + VBS • More of anti-rootkit, exploit approach 18
  • 20. Detections: WDATP • RS5 detection: certificate telemetry + machine learning • The revoked and expired certificate from a vendor never signed Windows kernel driver • Using machine learning to mass analyze the certificate information • When it fits into the profile, detection will be made 19
  • 21. Variant drivers • Searching VTI (Virus Total Intelligence) will return thousands of files with revoked certificate from “Handan City Congtai District LiKang Daily Goods Department” • These are all variants files generated by the infector 20
  • 22. Variant drivers Variants are basically same except some padded bytes 21
  • 25. Shutdown handler registration • The DriverProtect component will register its main infection routine as a shutdown handler • With next reboot, the threat will be persistent • Traditional remediation fails because it doesn’t have control over this handler 24
  • 26. Shutdown handler registration • This routine shows how the shutdown handler is registered • Remediation is extremely tricky • The system will be re-infected with each reboot of the system unless the resident kernel driver is unloaded 25
  • 28. Group order list • The DriverProtect kernel module is in very early stages of the driver loading order • Will affect following security product related drivers detection attempts 27
  • 29. Windows Defender Offline • Windows Defender Offline can provide offline remediation capability • When threat is detected, WDO will: • Guide through offline remediation process • Cut down the reloading of the rootkit modules 28
  • 30. Windows Defender Offline • WDO will be able to remove the threat • WDO is a special Defender service where Defender runs scanning from clean OS image from WINRE (Windows Recovery) partition • Once system reboots, the kernel malicious drivers clean up itself, before any AV scans. 29
  • 33. Anti-analysis tools • Process creation callback • Also CreateProcess callback is installed by DriverProtect to prevent some analysis tools • WorkItem queue is used to terminate the process from the callback 32
  • 34. Anti-analysis tools • Image load callback • Usual analyst tools are prohibited from launching on the target system from LoadImage callback installed by DriverProtect module. 33
  • 35. Anti-detection • Monitor Kernel Driver Loading • If security product related kernel drivers are loaded, it will nop out the entry point (xor eax, eax; ret) 34
  • 36. Anti-detection • Disable ProcessCreateCallbacks and FLT callbacks • The anti-analysis code will enumerate PspCreateProcessNotifyCallback and FLT driver routines • If it is registered by a security products, it will put nop return instructions over the callback • The determination logic for security products include driver path comparison and driver PE header scanning for version information 35
  • 37. Anti-detection: Security products • The DriverProtect has extensive list of Anti- malware product processes. They are encoded in file and decoded dynamically. Decoded 36
  • 38. Anti-detection: Security products • Scanning happens upon PE header • ReadFile -> ScanSecurityProductPatterns 37
  • 39. Anti-debugging: Kernel debugger check • The rootkit checks whether kernel debugger is enabled • If enabled, it will call KeBugCheck. 38
  • 40. Anti-analysis: obfuscations • Some rootkit kernel images are obfuscated in file (VMProtect) • When it is loaded in the kernel, it will unpack itself with original contents • It will not create new +RWX kernel memory, but will use existing section memory to de- obfuscate itself
  • 41. Interfering with recovery tool • If any process tries to write contents to FIXLIST.TXT, the contents will be replaced with NULLs. • FIXLIST.TXT is used by Farbar Recovery Scan Tool 40
  • 43. Hidden file system – loading components 42
  • 45. Hidden file system • The DriverProtect module installs filter driver module to limit access to it’s components • The other core drivers (netfilter2 and udiskMgr) will be directly loaded from the DriverProtect itself • Security products’ operation in user-mode will have limited visibility into the core files because they are loaded from hidden file location 44
  • 46. Hidden file system • DriverProtect will filter out access to protected files (malware components). • Security products run in userspace will fail to access malware components • The file contents inside protected storage is broken PE and will patched up when loaded into memory • It is implemented as filtering driver 45
  • 47. Hidden file system • The rootkit drivers show missing files • When DriverProtect driver runs, it will: • Prevent access to the real file contents on the file system • The components reside on the hidden location have intentionally broken PE header • Act as a proxy and load the real contents from the protected storage after modifying the contents to be a valid PE file 46
  • 48. WDATP visibility into driver loading • Even though the file never touches the file system, WDATP still detects the driver loading activity • DriverProtect protection only works against user-mode tools • WDATP sensor works in kernel level 47
  • 49. Hidden file system • Through this Filter driver, the malware components are protected from investigations and false information on path is provided to the system. This will confuse security products and analysis tools. • Ex) C:windowssystem32sncibkt.exe image is actually C:WindowsSystem32spsatrmsncibkt.exe 48
  • 52. Network traffic injection – netfilter2.sys There is a MITM kernel component that are written based upon commercial netfilter2 driver code from netfiltersdk.com 51
  • 53. Netfilter2 – transparent proxy The filter driver provides functionality to inject packets on the fly. https://netfiltersdk.com/nfsdk.html 52
  • 54. Network traffic injection – netfilter2.sys • The netfilter2.sys driver will be loaded with random names through hidden file system • It looks like this netfilter2.sys has close similarity to the NetFilterSDK.com provided one • We believe the attackers have access to the netfilter2.sys source code • The source code is commercially available 53
  • 55. Adding new root certificate • The malicious user-mode component will add new root certificate • Used to hijack HTTPS sessions on the system 54 Installed root certificate
  • 56. Conclusion • Detrahere (Zacinlo) is a threat that intercepts network traffic on a machine to inject ads • It has multiple self-protection mechanisms • Hidden file system to hide core drivers • Anti-analysis/debug/detection • It abuses feature in Windows driver verification to load kernel drivers using revoked certificate • WDATP has a good visibility into the detailed behaviors from the threat • WDO can be used to remediate the threat overriding persistence mechanism 55
  • 57. C&C Servers IP Description 119.28.136.132:80 (gpt5.com) ASN: 132203 City: Beijing State: Beijing Country: China Organization: TENCENT CLOUD COMPUTING (BEIJING) CO. LTD. 104.193.88.77:80 (www.baidu.com) ASN: 55967 City: Cupertino State: California Country: United States Organization: BAIDU USA LLC 211.159.220.234:80 (adxco.cn) ASN: 45090 City: Beijing State: Beijing Country: China Organization: TENCENT CLOUD COMPUTING (BEIJING) CO. LTD. 119.28.137.94:8080 (www.user2best.com) ASN: 132203 City: Beijing State: Beijing Country: China Organization: TENCENT CLOUD COMPUTING (BEIJING) CO. LTD. 56
  • 58. IOCs SHA1 SHA256 Filename Defender/descriptions deb585177e3fb4a935ca177260b02 714ab511353 5edeba23daabdeaaefea7d0ba3c15 3a8db07363a16c659cd120e3aa998 1f485b setup.exe Infector 954e690318768729b2e825622c883 b803fcb8433 bf57248c47bb1fc44bafad7bb257d 1e03e04128d847e5d895a05ec83ce a5bd27 C:WindowsSystem32spsatrmsncibk t.exe Trojan:Win64/Detrahere 94ec03ad3168a1b8bead60555f062 9b9186e00e6 8f0d55b54ddccf97ea798b40fc0a9 21f59010e5f02118251438ffcf79f 19847a C:windowssystem32sncibktsvc.exe NULL filled file 86218530d9043ff51e1d581a96e89 140820c8fcb d9fcc3554d657d68c94001438ebce 24842cec393ad97d3789a30c07426 1519ad C:WindowsSystem32spsatrmsncibk t.sys VirTool:Win64/Detrahere 0cbe4787b9a25bdbd8978e477d1d4 bcbe06ae341 fcbce0027b85069790b25b08444ac c4ebcb24567d6f461e63ca20f067e 7284e6 bfilps.sys Trojan:Win64/Detrahere.S 1cb1f70a120a61ee9c97d8f7c5ba6 e9ea8674e51 78ac863f8ccea5cd81a3361c203ba 792379735ba5a311d8607f1f1e587 2edb2d lsswzcgj.sys Trojan:Win64/Detrahere.S 9258b5d3a559ed02a4afaf0dd8079 820ebff3bc8 c86de08ac277735e62bef81a30685 36b43cccf8f278e6cd59e50a6a887 4c4973 rtdsuxz.exe Trojan:Win32/Detrahere.B !dr 69d209cb78d8e37de47bc697169f6 bb7de4fa738 69d209cb78d8e37de47bc697169f6 bb7de4fa738 notepad.exe Trojan:Win32/Detrahere.B !dr 57