CONTROL CLOUD DATA ACCESS PRIVILEGE AND ANONYMITY WITH FULLY ANONYMOUS ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION.
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The document presents a semi-anonymous privilege control scheme (anonycontrol) and a fully-anonymous scheme (anonycontrol-f) for managing cloud data access, addressing both user identity privacy and fine-grained privilege control. It emphasizes the decentralization of authority to prevent identity leakage while ensuring security against authority compromise and collusion attacks. Additionally, the proposed schemes have been analyzed for security and performance, showcasing their viability in cloud storage systems.
![challenge in the application of ABE schemes. Making our schemes compatible
with existing ABE schemes who support efficient user revocation is one of our
future works.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Shamir, “Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes,” in Advances
in Cryptology. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1985, pp. 47–53.
[2] A. Sahai and B. Waters, “Fuzzy identity-based encryption,” in Advances in
Cryptology. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 457–473.
[3] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryption for
fine-grained access controlof encrypted data,” in Proc. 13th CCS, 2006, pp. 89–98.
[4] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Ciphertext-policy attributebased
encryption,” in Proc. IEEE SP, May 2007, pp. 321–334.
[5] M. Chase, “Multi-authority attribute based encryption,” in Theory of
Cryptography. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 515–534.
[6] M. Chase and S. S. M. Chow, “Improving privacy and security in multi-
authority attribute-based encryption,” in Proc. 16th CCS, 2009, pp. 121–130.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/controlclouddataaccessprivilegeand-150511061335-lva1-app6891/85/CONTROL-CLOUD-DATA-ACCESS-PRIVILEGE-AND-ANONYMITY-WITH-FULLY-ANONYMOUS-ATTRIBUTE-BASED-ENCRYPTION-10-320.jpg)
![[7] H. Lin, Z. Cao, X. Liang, and J. Shao, “Secure threshold multi authority
attribute based encryption without a central authority,” Inf. Sci., vol. 180, no. 13,
pp. 2618–2632, 2010.
[8] V. Božovi´c, D. Socek, R. Steinwandt, and V. I. Villányi, “Multi-authority
attribute-based encryption with honest-but-curious central authority,” Int. J.
Comput. Math., vol. 89, no. 3, pp. 268–283, 2012.
[9] F. Li, Y. Rahulamathavan, M. Rajarajan, and R. C.-W. Phan, “Low complexity
multi-authority attribute based encryption scheme for mobile cloud computing,” in
Proc. IEEE 7th SOSE, Mar. 2013, pp. 573–577.
[10] K. Yang, X. Jia, K. Ren, and B. Zhang, “DAC-MACS: Effective data access
control for multi-authority cloud storage systems,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr.
2013, pp. 2895–2903](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/controlclouddataaccessprivilegeand-150511061335-lva1-app6891/85/CONTROL-CLOUD-DATA-ACCESS-PRIVILEGE-AND-ANONYMITY-WITH-FULLY-ANONYMOUS-ATTRIBUTE-BASED-ENCRYPTION-11-320.jpg)
CONTROL CLOUD DATA ACCESS PRIVILEGE AND ANONYMITY WITH FULLY ANONYMOUS ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION.
- 1. CONTROL CLOUD DATA ACCESS PRIVILEGE AND ANONYMITY WITH FULLY ANONYMOUS ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION. Abstract—Cloud computing is a revolutionary computing paradigm, which enables flexible, on-demand, and low-cost usage of computing resources, but the data is outsourced to some cloud servers, and various privacy concerns emerge from it. Various schemes based on the attribute-based encryption have been proposed to secure the cloud storage. However, most work focuses on the data contents privacy and the access control, while less attention is paid to the privilege control and the identity privacy. In this paper, we present a semianonymous privilege control scheme AnonyControl to address not only the data privacy, but also the user identity privacy in existing access control schemes. AnonyControl decentralizes the central authority to limit the identity leakage and thus achieves semianonymity. Besides, it also generalizes the file access control to the privilege control, by which privileges of all operations on the cloud data can be managed in a fine-grained manner. Subsequently, we present the AnonyControl-F, which fully prevents the identity leakage and achieve the full anonymity. Our security analysis shows that both AnonyControl and AnonyControl-F are secure under the decisional
- 2. bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption, and our performance evaluation exhibits the feasibility of our schemes. EXISTING SYSTEM: A multi-authority system is presented in which each user has an ID and they can interact with each key generator (authority) using different pseudonyms. One user’s different pseudonyms are tied to his private key, but key generators never know about the private keys, and thus they are not able to link multiple pseudonyms belonging to the same user. Also, the whole attributes set is divided into N disjoint sets and managed by N attributes authorities. In this setting, each authority knows only a part of any user’s attributes, which are not enough to figure out the user’s identity. However, the scheme proposed by Chase et al. considered the basic threshold-based KP-ABE, which lacks generality in the encryption policy expression. Many attributebased encryption schemes having multiple authorities have been proposed afterwards, but they either also employ a threshold-based
- 3. ABE, or have a semi-honest central authority, or cannot tolerate arbitrarily many users’ collusion attack. The work by Lewko et al. and Muller et al. are themost similar ones to ours in that they also tried to decentralize the central authority in the CP-ABE into multiple ones. Lewko et al. use a LSSS matrix as an access structure, but their scheme only converts the AND, OR gates to the LSSS matrix, which limits their encryption policy to boolean formula, while we inherit the flexibility of the access tree having threshold gates. Muller et al. also supports only Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) in their encryption policy. Besides the fact that we can express arbitrarily general encryption policy, our system also tolerates the compromise attack towards attributes authorities, which is not covered in many existing works. PROPOSED SYSTEM: Therefore, we propose AnonyControl and AnonyControl-F (Fig. 1) to allow cloud servers to control users’ access privileges without knowing their identity information. Their main merits are:
- 4. 1) The proposed schemes are able to protect user’s privacy against each single authority. Partial information is disclosed in AnonyControl and no information is disclosed in AnonyControl-F. 2) The proposed schemes are tolerant against authority compromise, and compromising of up to (N −2) authorities does not bring the whole system down. 3) We provide detailed analysis on security and performance to show feasibility of the scheme AnonyControl and AnonyControl-F. 4) We firstly implement the real toolkit of a multiauthority based encryption scheme AnonyControl and nonyControl-F. Module 1 System Model In our system, there are four types of entities: N Attribute Authorities (denoted as A), Cloud Server, Data Owners and Data Consumers. A user can be a Data Owner and a Data Consumer simultaneously. Authorities are assumed to have powerful computation abilities, and they are supervised by government offices because some attributes partially contain users’ personally identifiable information. The whole attribute set is divided into N disjoint sets and controlled by each authority,
- 5. therefore each authority is aware of only part of attributes. A Data Owner is the entity who wishes to outsource encrypted data file to the Cloud Servers. The Cloud Server, who is assumed to have adequate storage capacity, does nothing but store them. Newly joined Data Consumers request private keys from all of the authorities, and they do not know which attributes are controlled by which authorities. When the Data Consumers request their private keys from the authorities, authorities jointly create corresponding private key and send it to them. All Data Consumers are able to download any of the encrypted data files, but only those whose private keys satisfy the privilege tree Tp can execute the operation associated with privilege p. The server is delegated to execute an operation p if and only if the user’s credentials are verified through the privilege tree Tp Module 2 DesignGoals Our goal is to achieve a multi-authority CP-ABE which: achieves the security defined above; guarantees the confidentiality of Data Consumers’ identity information; and tolerates compromise attacks on the authorities or the collusion attacks by the authorities. For the visual comfort, we frequently use the following
- 6. notations hereafter. Ak denotes the k-th attribute authority; Au denotes the attributes set of user u; Auk denotes the subset of Au controlled by Ak; and ATp denotes the attributes set included in tree Tp. Module 3 Anonycontrol construction Setup At the system initialization phase, any one of the authorities chooses a bilinear group G0 of prime order p with generator g and publishes it. Then, all authorities independently and randomly picks vk ∈ Zp and send Yk = e(g, g)vk to all ther authorities who individually compute Y := _k∈ A Yk = e(g, g)_k∈ A vk . Then, every authority Ak randomly picks N − 1 integers skj ∈ Zp( j ∈ {1, . . . , N}{k}) and computes gskj . Each gskj is shared with each other authority Aj. An authority Ak, after receiving N −1 pieces of gs jk generated by Aj. Module 4 ACHIEVING FULL ANONYMITY We have assumed semi-honest authorities in AnonyControl and we assumed that they will not collude with each ther. This is a necessary assumption in AnonyControl because each authority is in charge of a subset of the whole
- 7. attributes set, and for the attributes that it is in charge of, it knows the exact information of the key requester. If the information from all authorities is gathered altogether, the complete attribute set of the key requester is recovered and thus his identity is disclosed to the authorities. In this sense, AnonyControl is semianonymous since partial identity information (represented as some attributes) is disclosed to each authority, but we can achieve a full-anonymity and also allow the collusion of the authorities. The key point of the identity information leakage we had in our previous scheme as well as every existing attribute based encryption schemes is that key generator (or attribute authorities in our scheme) issues attribute key based on the reported attribute, and the generator has to know the user’s attribute to do so. We need to introduce a new technique to let key generators issue the correct attribute key without knowing what attributes the users have. A naive solution is to give all the attribute keys of all the attributes to the key requester and let him pick whatever he wants. In this way, the key generator does not know which attribute keys the key requester picked, but we have to fully trust the key requester that he will not pick any attribute key not allowed to him. To solve this, we leverage the following Oblivious Transfer (OT). Modue 5 Fully Anonymous Multi-Authority CP-ABE
- 8. In this section, we present how to achieve the full anonymity in AnonyControl to designs the fully anonymous privilege control scheme AnonyControl-F. The KeyGenerate algorithm is the only part which leaks identity information to each attribute authority. Upon receiving the attribute key request with the attribute value, the attribute authority will generate H(att (i ))ri and sends it to the requester where att (i ) is the attribute value and ri is a random number for that attribute. The attribute value is disclosed to the authority in this step. We can introduce the above 1-out-of-n OT to prevent this leakage. We let each authority be in charge of all attributes belonging to the same category. For each attribute category c (e.g., University), suppose there are k possible attribute values (e.g., IIT, NYU, CMU ...), then one requester has at most one attribute value in one category. Upon the key request, the attribute authority can pick a random number ru for the requester and generates H(att (i ))ru for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. After the attribute keys are ready, the attribute authority and the key requester are engaged in a 1-out-of-k OT where the key requester wants to receive one attribute key among k. By introducing the 1- out-of-k OT in our KeyGenerate algorithm, the key requester achieves the correct attribute keythat he wants, but the attribute authority does not have any useful information about what attribute is achieved by the requester. Then, the key
- 9. requester achieves the full anonymity in our scheme and no matter how many attribute authorities collude, his identity information is kept secret. CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS This paper proposes a semi-anonymous attribute-based privilege control scheme AnonyControl and a fully-anonymous attribute-based privilege control scheme AnonyControl-F to address the user privacy problem in a cloud storage server. Using multiple authorities in the cloud computing system, our proposed schemes achieve not only fine-grained privilege control but also identity anonymity while conducting privilege control based on users’ identity information. More importantly, our system can tolerate up to N − 2 authority compromise, which is highly preferable especially in Internet-based cloud computing environment. We also conducted detailed security and performance analysis which shows that Anony- Control both secure and efficient for cloud storage system. The AnonyControl-F directly inherits the security of the AnonyControl and thus is equivalently secure as it, but extra communication overhead is incurred during the 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer. One of the promising future works is to introduce the efficient user revocation mechanism on top of our anonymous ABE. Supporting user revocation is an important issue in the real application, and this is a great
- 10. challenge in the application of ABE schemes. Making our schemes compatible with existing ABE schemes who support efficient user revocation is one of our future works. REFERENCES [1] A. Shamir, “Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes,” in Advances in Cryptology. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1985, pp. 47–53. [2] A. Sahai and B. Waters, “Fuzzy identity-based encryption,” in Advances in Cryptology. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 457–473. [3] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryption for fine-grained access controlof encrypted data,” in Proc. 13th CCS, 2006, pp. 89–98. [4] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption,” in Proc. IEEE SP, May 2007, pp. 321–334. [5] M. Chase, “Multi-authority attribute based encryption,” in Theory of Cryptography. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 515–534. [6] M. Chase and S. S. M. Chow, “Improving privacy and security in multi- authority attribute-based encryption,” in Proc. 16th CCS, 2009, pp. 121–130.
- 11. [7] H. Lin, Z. Cao, X. Liang, and J. Shao, “Secure threshold multi authority attribute based encryption without a central authority,” Inf. Sci., vol. 180, no. 13, pp. 2618–2632, 2010. [8] V. Božovi´c, D. Socek, R. Steinwandt, and V. I. Villányi, “Multi-authority attribute-based encryption with honest-but-curious central authority,” Int. J. Comput. Math., vol. 89, no. 3, pp. 268–283, 2012. [9] F. Li, Y. Rahulamathavan, M. Rajarajan, and R. C.-W. Phan, “Low complexity multi-authority attribute based encryption scheme for mobile cloud computing,” in Proc. IEEE 7th SOSE, Mar. 2013, pp. 573–577. [10] K. Yang, X. Jia, K. Ren, and B. Zhang, “DAC-MACS: Effective data access control for multi-authority cloud storage systems,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr. 2013, pp. 2895–2903