Serena Essapour | Criminal Law III Week 3 Summer 2010
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The document explores various legal cases related to conspiracy, highlighting the definitions and applications of conspiracy laws in Illinois and beyond. It discusses notable rulings, including the implications of a single agreement versus multiple agreements, the role of accomplices, and the responsibilities of individuals involved in crimes. Key cases such as People v. Foster and Ianelli v. US illustrate the evolution of conspiracy laws and the legal consequences surrounding intent and participation in criminal activities.
Serena Essapour | Criminal Law III Week 3 Summer 2010
- 1. Criminal Law III Week 3 Summer 2010 John C. Schick 209.235.2937 [email protected] [email protected]
- 2. People v. Foster • Foster speaks to another about a plan to do a robbery. • The person to whom he proposes the idea goes to the police, and has no intent to agree to the plan. • If only one person has a plan to do a crime, is there a conspiracy?
- 3. Foster, cont. • The court looks to the changes in the law on conspiracy that Illinois has undertaken. • The new statute states that a person commits a conspiracy when he agrees with another. • The statute deleted the words “two or more persons.”
- 4. Foster, concluded • Illinois does have a solicitation statute, with penalties very similar to those for conspiracy. • So it would make little sense for the changes made to reflect a legislative intent to adopt the “unilateral” theory of conspiracy. • Since a defendant gets the benefit of uncertain language, the court affirms the dismissal of the charges. • Foster will still face the possibility of prosecution under the solicitation section.
- 5. Foster definition A person commits conspiracy when, with intent that an offense be committed, he agrees with another to the commission of the offense.
- 6. Kilgore v. State • Kilgore is convicted of murdering Roger Norman. • Evidence at the trial showed a conspiracy to kill Norman. • In fact, there were three separate agreements involving different parties, all geared to accomplish this crime.
- 7. Kilgore, cont. • The first effort involved Carden, Benton, and Oldaker. • The second effort involved Carden, Kilgore, and Berry. • The third effort involved Carden, Kilgore and Price.
- 8. Kilgore, cont. • The conspiracy involved here is often called a wheel conspiracy. • There is one central figure who is the hub, here the person who wanted Norman killed. • The participants in separate conspiracies may not know each other or have a part in the separate agreements. They are spokes which are not connected.
- 9. Kilgore, concluded • Because the conspiracy involving Kilgore did not involve the earlier ones that involved others, the evidence admitted regarding B was improper • Thus the conviction for murder must be reversed. • Note that Georgia law merges the conspiracy and the completed crime so there can only be a charge of murder and not one of conspiracy.
- 10. Braverman v. US • Although there is only one actual conspiracy, there are many goals attached to that one. • Government wanted to punish for each separate act that was done. • Court concludes that with only one goal, there can only be one punishment.
- 11. Braverman definition The gist of the crime of conspiracy as defined by the statute is the agreement or confederation of the conspirators to commit one or more unlawful acts.
- 12. Ianelli v. US • The charges involved conspiring to violate a federal gambling statute. • The statute said that it was a crime for more than five persons to conduct a gambling business. • Defendants were convicted and sentenced BOTH for the substantive offense and for the conspiracy.
- 13. Ianelli, cont. • Does Wharton’s rule apply, which would limit the offense to merely the substantive offense? • Wharton’s rule suggests that in order to show a conspiracy there must be MORE than the minimum number needed to commit the substantive crime. • What the rule does is to make one crime out of the otherwise separate crime of conspiracy and the substantive offense.
- 14. Ianelli, continued • The theory is that since conspiracy law exists because of the danger of many persons being involved in crime, there must be more than the minimum number for the substantive offense, or else the danger does not really exist. • This law’s effects go beyond the participants and there is a reason to allow both offenses to be punished.
- 15. Ianelli, concluded • The purpose of this particular law was to go after organized crime and the effects this had on interstate commerce • The dangers presented by a combination of people in gambling is legislatively noted and thus an exception to Wharton’s rule is noted in upholding the conviction
- 16. Gebardi v. US • This case involves an indictment against two people. • The offense is a violation of the Mann act, which made it a crime to take a woman across interstate lines for immoral purposes. • The purpose of the law is to protect the woman, yet she appears to be a co-conspirator in the charges.
- 17. Gebardi, concluded • Since the woman cannot be convicted under the Mann act, can there be a conspiracy violation of the act? • If she is not a party to anything illegal, the man cannot by himself commit conspiracy. • Thus the case must be dismissed.
- 18. People v. Sconce • A conspiracy to commit murder involves Sconce, Estephan, Garcia and Dutton. • Before the substantive crime occurs, Sconce decides he wants out. • Trial court dismissed the conspiracy count. • The people contend this is error.
- 19. Sconce, concluded • California law says withdrawal is effective only if done BEFORE an overt act is done. • Once an agreement comes into place AND an overt act is done, the crime is complete • In this case, there had been an overt act. • Thus the withdrawal is too late and the crime of conspiracy has been committed.
- 20. State v. Ward The common law had four categories of criminal wrongdoers. •The actual perpetrator(Principal 1st degree) •Aider and abettor at the scene (Principal in 2d degree) •Accessory before the fact- Aider who is NOT present at crime •Accessory after the fact-aider after the crime is done
- 21. Basis of Accomplice Liability • When analyzing the liability of the accomplice, it is important to remember that the liability is based on the act of the principal. • That is why we call the liability of the accomplice DERIVATIVE LIABILITY.
- 22. Elements • An aider and abettor must have knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator. • And with an intent or purpose either of committing or of encouraging or facilitating commission of the offense the perpetrator intends to commit.
- 23. State v. Hoselton • Kevin was convicted based on his role as a lookout to a group of kids who did a burglary. • The basis for his conviction is his own voluntary statement. • Kevin did not see his accomplices and did not know what they were doing. • A true lookout who is acting to alert his confederates so they may do the crimes that he knows are taking place is an ACCOMPLICE.
- 24. Hoselton, cont. • What evidence is there of his awareness of the intent of his confederates? • He was never told what they were to do and he got none of the proceeds of the crime. • This does NOT make him either a lookout or an ACCOMPLICE.
- 25. What sort of intent is needed? • There must be an intent to aid the party who does the crime. • There must also be an intent that this aid result in the successful completion of the crime—that is there must be the mens rea or intent to aid the crime that the perpetrators are accomplishing.
- 26. People v. Lauria, again • This time we look at the facts to see if Lauria was an accomplice. • The acts done were an ongoing business of prostitution. • Lauria knew of the operation and in fact used the services of one of the women. • Is his knowledge enough to make him an accomplice?
- 27. Riley v. State • Riley and Portalla opened fire on some folks and the victims were injured. • The charge filed was first-degree assault. • The evidence was unclear which of the two was the actual shooter who caused the injuries. • Riley was convicted as an accomplice and not as a principal (shooter).
- 28. Riley, cont. • Riley says the jury instruction given was in error. • The instruction did not correctly state the mental state for an accomplice. • First degree assault required proof that the actor was reckless in regard to the resulting criminal act. • A prior case suggested that the state had to prove the act of an accomplice was intentional.
- 29. Riley, concluded • This means that the accomplice would seemingly want the result of the act by his principal to occur. • Riley would not fit that mold since he did not do the injurious act. • The court decides that the prior case was error and assesses liability. • Based on MPC 2.06(4) the court concludes that even if the result is NOT intended, the person who acts with the same mental state as the principal will be deemed an accomplice.
- 30. The meaning of Riley case • Put in its simplest terms, the case means that a person CAN be an accomplice to an unintended crime. • The mental state of recklessness is present for both the actor and the accomplice. • Thus both can be guilty based on derivative liability.
- 31. State v. Linscott • Linscott is convicted of one count of murder and one count of robbery. • He went with others who were planning on robbing a drug dealer. • He knew of the plan and was to receive a portion of what they thought they would get.
- 32. Linscott, cont. • Fuller, a fellow robber, shot at and killed Grenier. • Linscott argues that he had no intent to kill, which Fuller did. • He was merely aiding in a robbery. • State did NOT pursue this on a felony murder rule theory since the statute that spelled out accomplice liability carried a longer sentence, which the state wanted from Linscott.
- 33. Linscott, concluded • The robbery contemplated that a foreseeable consequence could be a killing. • This rule requires the application of an objective standard. • The subjective belief of Linscott is not as important as the objective analysis. • This means that objectively viewed, Linscott was liable since he wanted the robbery, which was the precursor of the murder.
- 34. Meaning of natural and probable consequence rule • Did the primary party (perpetrator) commit the target offense? • Did the jury decide that the other party was an accomplice in the target offense? • Did the primary party commit another crime beyond the target crime? • Was that later crime one that was a natural and probable consequence of the first act?
- 35. ThankYou