Distributed ledger technology in payments clearing and settlement - blockchain fintech

Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs
Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.
Distributed ledger technology in payments, clearing, and
settlement
David Mills, Kathy Wang, Brendan Malone, Anjana Ravi, Jeff
Marquardt, Clinton Chen, Anton Badev, Timothy Brezinski,
Linda Fahy, Kimberley Liao, Vanessa Kargenian, Max Ellithorpe,
Wendy Ng, and Maria Baird
2016-095
Please cite this paper as:
Mills, David, Kathy Wang, Brendan Malone, Anjana Ravi, Jeff Marquardt, Clinton
Chen, Anton Badev, Timothy Brezinski, Linda Fahy, Kimberley Liao, Vanessa Kar-
genian, Max Ellithorpe, Wendy Ng, and Maria Baird (2016). “Distributed ledger
technology in payments, clearing, and settlement,” Finance and Economics Discussion
Series 2016-095. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.095.
NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminary
materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forth
are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the
Board of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other than
acknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.

1 The authors would like to thank Mari Baca, Daniel Ebanks, Sarah Wright, Thomas Doheny, Robert Carper, Patrick Adler, Peter
Lee, Michael Warner, and Kaushik Ashodiya for their contributions and assistance. The views expressed in this paper are solely
the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System.
Distributed ledger technology in payments,
clearing, and settlement1
David Mills, Kathy Wang, Brendan Malone, Anjana Ravi, Jeff Marquardt,
Clinton Chen, Anton Badev, Timothy Brezinski
(Federal Reserve Board)
Linda Fahy, Kimberley Liao, Vanessa Kargenian, Max Ellithorpe, Wendy Ng
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Maria Baird
(Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)

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Table of Contents
1 Overview.......................................................................................................................................3
1.1 The Federal Reserve’s interest in DLT...........................................................................................3
1.2 Organization of this paper ............................................................................................................4
2 Payments, clearing, and settlement.............................................................................................4
2.1 Essential elements of a financial transaction................................................................................5
2.1.1 Payments processes..............................................................................................................5
2.1.2 Securities, commodities, and derivatives post-trade processes...........................................5
2.1.3 Roles of financial intermediaries in payments, clearing, and settlement ............................6
2.2 Innovations in payments, clearing, and settlement .....................................................................8
2.3 Opportunities for new innovations in payments, clearing, and settlement.................................9
3 Distributed ledger technology....................................................................................................10
3.1 Entities can be connected on a peer-to-peer basis via nodes....................................................10
3.2 Participants in a DLT arrangements can be permitted to play different roles or functions.......12
3.3 Ownership of an asset can be stored on a ledger within the DLT arrangement........................12
3.4 DLT arrangements can use cryptography to facilitate PCS processes........................................12
3.5 Transactions histories and current states of ownership can be distributed across the nodes of
the DLT arrangement..................................................................................................................13
3.6 The protocol in a DLT arrangement can define the procedures necessary for the asset transfer
process........................................................................................................................................13
3.7 Application programming interfaces can improve usability of DLT arrangements....................14
3.8 Smart contracts may be used in DLT arrangements to automate certain transfers based on pre-
specified events agreed to by counterparties to a transaction..................................................14
3.9 DLT implementation can be considered from a legal entities perspective in addition to a
technology perspective ..............................................................................................................15
4 Potential opportunities for DLT in payments, clearing, and settlement....................................16
4.1 Path to adopting new technology...............................................................................................16
4.2 Potential applications of DLT in payments, clearing, and settlement ........................................17
4.2.1 Securities, commodities, and derivatives transactions.......................................................17
4.2.2 Cross-border payments.......................................................................................................18
4.2.3 Financial inclusion...............................................................................................................19

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4.2.4 Information-sharing............................................................................................................20
4.3 Industry approaches to adopting DLT.........................................................................................20
5 Challenges to adoption and implementation: business, technical, and financial design issues 21
5.1 Business issues............................................................................................................................22
5.1.1 Cost-benefit considerations of potential use cases............................................................22
5.1.2 Network effects...................................................................................................................22
5.2 Technical issues...........................................................................................................................22
5.2.1 Viable technology solutions................................................................................................22
5.2.2 Standards development......................................................................................................23
5.2.3 Cryptographic key and access data management ..............................................................24
5.2.4 Information management...................................................................................................24
5.3 Financial design issues ................................................................................................................25
5.3.1 Financial instruments..........................................................................................................25
5.3.2 Monetary instruments........................................................................................................26
5.3.3 Financial intermediaries......................................................................................................26
6 Challenges to adoption and implementation: risk management...............................................27
6.1 Legal considerations ...................................................................................................................27
6.1.1 Legal basis of certain DLT components...............................................................................28
6.1.2 Licensing..............................................................................................................................29
6.1.3 Compliance with BSA/AML .................................................................................................30
6.2 Governance.................................................................................................................................30
6.2.1 Open permissionless systems.............................................................................................30
6.2.2 Closed permissioned systems.............................................................................................31
6.3 Settlement finality ......................................................................................................................31
6.4 Financial risk................................................................................................................................32
6.5 Operational risk...........................................................................................................................32
7 Summary.....................................................................................................................................34

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1 Overview
Digital innovations in finance, loosely known as fintech, have garnered a great deal of attention across
the financial industry. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) is one such innovation that has been cited as
a means of transforming payment, clearing, and settlement (PCS) processes, including how funds are
transferred and how securities, commodities, and derivatives are cleared and settled. DLT is a term that
has been used by the industry in a variety of ways and so does not have a single definition. Because
there is a wide spectrum of possible deployments of DLT, this paper will refer to the technology as some
combination of components including peer-to-peer networking, distributed data storage, and
cryptography that, among other things, can potentially change the way in which the storage,
recordkeeping, and transfer of a digital asset is done.
The driving force behind efforts to develop and deploy DLT in payments, clearing, and settlement is an
expectation that the technology could reduce or even eliminate operational and financial inefficiencies,
or other frictions, that exist for current methods of storing, recording, and transferring digital assets
throughout financial markets. The purported benefits of DLT that could address these frictions, including
improved end-to-end settlement speed, data auditability, resilience, and cost efficiency, have led
industry participants to investigate the application of DLT to a wide variety of PCS processes. Proponents
of the technology have claimed that DLT could help foster a more efficient and safe payments system,
and may even have the potential to fundamentally change the way in which PCS activities are conducted
and the roles that financial institutions and infrastructures currently play.
Although there is much optimism regarding the promise of DLT, the development of such applications
for PCS activities is in very early stages, with many industry participants suggesting that real-world
applications are years away from full implementation.2
Even so, given the industry momentum in
developing new proofs of concept (PoCs), this timeline may accelerate. In some cases, there have
already been announcements that the technology will be used within the next year or two in actual
production environments. An important goal of this paper is to examine how this technology might be
used in the area of payments, clearing, and settlement and to identify both the opportunities and
challenges facing its practical implementation and possible long-term adoption.
1.1 The Federal Reserve’s interest in DLT
In the aggregate, U.S. PCS systems process approximately 600 million transactions per day, valued at
over $12.6 trillion.3
Given that safe and efficient arrangements for conducting PCS processes are critical
to the proper functioning of the financial markets, and to financial stability more broadly, the benefits
and risks that may arise with any potentially transformative changes to PCS processes should be
thoroughly understood and managed by the relevant stakeholders. As part of its core objective to foster
the safety and efficiency of the payment system and to promote financial stability, the Federal Reserve
2 For example, technology research firm Gartner, which monitors emerging technologies, estimates that it will be five to ten
years until DLT achieves “mainstream adoption.” See Gartner (2016), “Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies.”
3 Average daily volume and value were calculated using 2014 data on U.S. retail and wholesale PCS systems and were
approximated based on the number of business days in the year. See Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures
(2015), Statistics on Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the CPMI Countries,
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d142.htm.

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has a public policy interest in understanding and monitoring the development of innovations that could
affect the structural design and functioning of financial markets.4
Further, as a regulator and supervisor
of financial institutions involved in PCS activities, an operator of retail and large-value payment and
settlement systems, and a catalyst for payments system improvement, the Federal Reserve is also in a
unique position to view the different implications of payments innovations from a wide range of
perspectives.
As a preliminary step to understanding the implications of DLT developments in payments, clearing, and
settlement, a team of Federal Reserve staff (FR research team) held discussions with a broad range of
parties that are interested in, participate in, or are otherwise contributing to the evolution of DLT.5
The
team conducted interviews and conversations with approximately 30 key industry stakeholders,
including market infrastructures, financial institutions, other government agencies, technology start-ups,
more-established technology firms, and industry consortia. Additionally, the team attended numerous
industry conferences and symposia and continues to engage with industry participants and follow
developments related to the technology. This paper is informed by this outreach.
1.2 Organization of this paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the essential elements of
payments, clearing, and settlement, including an overview of the role financial intermediaries play.6
Section 3 describes the key technological components of DLT and how they relate to the essential
elements discussed in section 2. Section 4 describes several potential uses for DLT that were identified
over the course of the research team’s industry engagement and summarizes the approaches the
industry is taking to investigate the potential of the technology. Sections 5 and 6 introduce some of the
challenges to the adoption and implementation of DLT. Section 5 focuses on business, technology, and
financial design challenges, while section 6 focuses on challenges related to risk management. Section 7
provides a summary.
2 Payments, clearing, and settlement
Many proponents in the fintech community have suggested that the widespread deployment of DLT
may bring fundamental changes to not only the technology architecture of financial markets but also the
financial market structure. This view stems from the perceived potential for DLT to facilitate certain PCS
processes in ways that are not currently achievable without the aid of financial intermediaries that are
entrusted by market participants, including households and businesses, with ensuring that their
transactions are settled successfully on an on-going basis. As the first step in analyzing the potential
4 The Federal Reserve Board adopted its Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk (PSR policy) with the objectives of
fostering the safety and efficiency of payment, clearing, settlement, and recording systems and promoting financial stability,
more broadly. The PSR policy includes the Board’s views on standards for the management of risks (including legal, operational,
and financial risks) in these types of systems. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2016), “Federal Reserve
Policy on Payment System Risk,” Board of Governors, https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf.
5 The research team is a multi-disciplinary group of officers and staff from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
6 For purposes of this paper, a financial intermediary is broadly defined to include financial institutions (such as banks,
broker/dealers, and other institutions that interact with the end-users of a financial transaction) and infrastructures (such as
payment, clearing, and settlement systems for funds, securities, and derivatives).

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impact of DLT on how activities in payments, clearing, and settlement are conducted, this section
discusses the essential elements of PCS processes and how these processes have evolved with previous
innovations, including how they have shaped the roles that financial intermediaries, such as financial
institutions and infrastructures, currently play.
2.1 Essential elements of a financial transaction
In its simplest form, the clearing and settlement of a financial transaction, regardless of the asset type,
requires (1) a network of participants, (2) an asset or set of assets that are transferred among those
participants, and (3) a transfer process that defines the procedures and obligations associated with the
transaction. Typically, the set of direct participants are financial institutions such as banks or broker-
dealers. Indirect participants include end users such as households or businesses. An asset can be any
financial instrument, such as a monetary instrument, security, commodity, or derivative.
Communications among the participants in a network involve sending electronic messages,
acknowledgements, statements, and other information between computer systems typically maintained
by a network operator and its participants. Payments and post-trade securities clearing and settlement
are characterized by somewhat different transfer processes and may involve different types of financial
intermediaries, as described in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2., respectively.7
Section 2.1.3 describes further
the role(s) of financial intermediaries that facilitate today’s PCS processes.
2.1.1 Payments processes
For a funds-only transfer, the process involves a series of four conceptual steps that are called
submission, validation, conditionality, and settlement. These processes are generally facilitated by
financial intermediaries, such as payment systems.8
After a sender submits a payment message to a
payment system, the message must pass through that system’s validation procedures. Validation will
vary by system and can include security measures, such as verification of the sender’s identity and the
integrity of the message. If a payment is determined by the system to be valid, the system then typically
checks whether necessary conditions for settlement are satisfied, such as the availability of sufficient
funds or credit for settlement. Payments that pass the conditionality test are prepared for settlement.
Under some payment system frameworks, settlement finality (that is, when settlement is unconditional
and irrevocable) occurs when the receiver’s account is credited.
2.1.2 Securities, commodities, and derivatives post-trade processes
For securities, commodities, and derivatives transactions, post-trade processes provide confirmation of
trade terms, clearing, and settlement. In many cases, these processes are facilitated by financial
7 The discussion in sections 2.1.1and 2.1.2 are based on Annex D of the following: Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems and Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (2012), Principles for Financial
Market Infrastructures, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf. Effective September 2014, the Committee on Payment
Settlement Systems changed its name to the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures.
8 A “payment system” is defined in the PSR policy as a set of instruments, procedures, and rules for the transfer of funds
between or among participants. Payment systems include, but are not limited to, large-value funds transfer systems,
automated clearinghouse systems, check clearinghouses, and credit and debit card settlement systems. See Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (2016), “Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk,” Board of Governors,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf.

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intermediaries, such as payment systems, securities settlement systems (SSSs), central securities
depositories (CSDs), and central counterparties (CCPs), which specialize in particular PCS functions.9, 10
Confirmation involves counterparties agreeing to the terms of the trade and settlement date. The next
step is clearing, in which an entity calculates the counterparties’ obligations to make deliveries or
payments on the settlement date. This entity may compute settlement obligations individually (that is,
on a transaction-by-transaction basis) or on a net basis (that is, determining the net obligations of
buyers and sellers for a number of transactions).
After clearing comes settlement, during which the relevant delivery and payment obligations of the
counterparties to the securities, commodities, or derivatives transaction are discharged. For example, in
a securities transaction, settlement occurs when securities are delivered to the buyer and funds to the
seller. Depending on the commodity and terms of settlement, commodities transactions may involve
settlement of only funds obligations, or it may also involve the delivery of financial instruments, other
documents, or even a physical commodity (e.g., precious metals, oil, wheat, etc.). The settlement of
derivatives contracts other than commodity contracts also depend on the type of derivative and terms
of settlement. Finality of each leg of the transaction occurs when the transfer is irrevocable and
unconditional. When there are multiple legs in a transaction, delivery versus payment (DvP) mechanisms
are often used to coordinate settlement of the different legs, as well as manage the risk that one leg
settles with finality when the other does not.11
2.1.3 Roles of financial intermediaries in payments, clearing, and settlement
Certain institutions serve as intermediaries in payments, clearing, and settlement and may play one or
more critical roles in fostering the smooth functioning of the broader financial system. These roles
generally include the provision of services as well as financial, operational, and legal risk management,
and a governance structure for them, their customers, and the markets they serve.
Intermediaries such as banks and broker-dealers are typically trusted by end users, such as households
and businesses, to store, maintain ownership records of, and transfer assets on their behalf. When these
end users initiate a transaction, their banks or broker-dealers interact with other intermediaries, such as
financial market infrastructures (FMIs), that can take the form (and function) of a payment system, SSS,
CSD, or CCP.12
FMIs centralize and facilitate the clearing, settlement, and recording of financial
9 A “securities settlement system” is defined in the PSR policy as an entity that enables securities to be transferred and settled
by book entry and allows the transfers of securities free of or against payment. A “central securities depository” is defined in
the PSR policy as an entity that provides securities accounts and central safekeeping services. A “central counterparty” is
defined in the PSR policy as an entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial
markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (2016), “Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk,” Board of Governors,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf.
10 In some cases, one entity may perform multiple PCS functions, such as securities clearing and settlement, as well as
safekeeping and custody.
11 For a description of the different models, see Annex D of the following: Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (2012), Principles for Financial Market
Infrastructures, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf. See also Committee on Payment and Settlement System (1992),
Delivery Versus Payment in Securities Settlement Systems, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d06.htm.
12 A “financial market infrastructure” is defined in the PSR policy as a multilateral system among participating financial
institutions, including the system operator, used for the purposes of clearing, settling, or recording payments, securities,

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transactions for the markets they serve, often on a multilateral basis. In doing so, FMIs can allow
participants to manage their risks more effectively and efficiently and may reduce certain risks.13
The transfer process is typically organized with the FMI as a central hub through which banks or broker-
dealers interact with one another. Because banks and broker-dealers may be active in multiple financial
markets, they often interact with multiple FMIs. Figure 1 depicts a very simple hub and spoke system
with one FMI and its participants. In the figure, the FMI has a master copy of the transactions ledger for
trades that go through it. Each participating financial institution has its own ledger of transactions which
may include both transactions that go through FMI A and transactions that do not. In practice, FMI A
may have multiple ledgers organized by business line, operational activity, geographic area, or
accounting center. The reconciliation within and among the various parties to a transaction may occur
as part of the clearing process or daily balancing activities. Some reconciliation steps may take place
after individual transactions have been settled.
Figure 1: Simple example of a hub and spoke structure with one FMI and financial institutions (FIs) as participants
The broader financial system contains numerous hub and spoke systems that are intricately linked
through, among other things, the PCS relationships between entities ranging from end-users to
intermediaries. Figure 2 depicts a stylized example of how the simple hub-and-spoke structure is
essentially more complex because of the interconnectedness of various participants. Financial
institutions may often participate in multiple FMIs, as shown by FI 2 in figure 2. Further, participation in
derivatives, or other financial transactions. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2016), “Federal Reserve
Policy on Payment System Risk,” Board of Governors, https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf.
13 However, FMIs may also concentrate risks and create interdependencies between and among FMIs and participating
institutions.

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FMIs may cross jurisdictional boundaries, as shown by the connections of FI 6 and FI 7 in figure 2, which
adds another layer of legal and operational complexity.14
Figure 2: Example of a more-complex hub and spoke structure with multiple FMIs, FIs, and jurisdictions
2.2 Innovations in payments, clearing, and settlement
The methods for executing, clearing, and settling financial transactions have evolved over centuries.15
As
transaction volumes and the complexity of market participants increased, certain frictions emerged and
increased the costs as well as the risks of transacting in financial markets. Frictions, such as operational
and financial inefficiencies, prompted market participants to seek solutions that would reduce costs.
Solutions to these inefficiencies, in turn, took the form of technological development, changes in market
structure (for example, formation of new intermediaries or changes to the roles of existing
intermediaries), or a combination of the two.16
The availability and maturity of technology are key
factors in determining the extent to which a technological solution versus a change to the market
structure would serve to address a particular friction or inefficiency.
14 For an example depiction of this complex set of linkages in the derivatives market, see figures 1 and 2 in Jerome Powell
(2014), “A Financial System Perspective on Central Clearing of Derivatives,” speech delivered at “The New International
Financial System: Analyzing the Cumulative Impact of Regulatory Reform”, a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago and the Bank of England, held in Chicago, Illinois, November 6, 2014,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20141106a.pdf.
15 Trade execution takes place before PCS processes, but is referenced here for illustrative purposes.
16 One example in which a change in market organization and structure provided a solution to an operational inefficiency was
the formation of check clearinghouses. The New York Clearing House was formed in the 1850s for the purposes of interbank
check collections, before computer technology was available to address the increasingly cumbersome physical settlement of
checks by payment in gold among multiple banks. As a result, the settlement process itself was redesigned by introducing a
new facility that centralized physical check clearing and settlement on a multilateral basis in one location. Many other local or
regional check clearinghouses were subsequently created around the United States. See J.S. Gibbons (1859), the Banks of New-
York, Their Dealers, the Clearing House, and the Panic of 1857 (New York: D. Appleton & Co), pp. 292-295.

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Often, the introduction of a new technology necessitates a change in market structure. One such
example was the introduction of advanced communications networks and electronic databases to the
physical processes associated with clearing and settling paper stock certificates. This evolution reduced
both the liquidity and operational costs required to complete a geographically diverse, multi-party
transaction and was aided not only by the technical ability to produce digital representations of physical
certificates or assets, but also by the changing roles of financial intermediaries.
New FMIs were created to play the roles of CSDs and, in some cases, CCPs. These market infrastructures
assumed the responsibility and legal liability of ensuring that valid transactions submitted by banks and
broker-dealers for themselves and their customers were cleared and settled. The CSDs, which often also
operate as SSSs, provided the storage and recordkeeping of ownership of securities by their members
and facilitated funds and securities transfers by providing trust, and in many cases, liquidity, throughout
the transfer process. If CCPs were also created for a particular market, they would frequently provide
the clearing function and, importantly, would typically provide a “guarantee” of settlement between
shortly after the trade date until the settlement date of the transaction.17
Broker-dealers and banks
fulfilled their roles, in part, by maintaining various independent ledgers for recording and posting debits
and credits to customer funds and securities accounts on those ledgers. As trusted intermediaries with
sole authority to update their own electronic transactional databases (that is, ledgers) within their
purview, the different financial intermediaries worked under rules and governance processes that
provide the necessary integrity and reliability for end users to have confidence in the transfer process.
2.3 Opportunities for new innovations in payments, clearing, and settlement
Innovations have made way for the bulk of today’s payments, clearing, and settlement in the wholesale
and retail financial markets to be conducted over a set of large and complex electronic networks of
participants and processes. Taken together, these comprise the financial architecture and are often
broadly called the U.S. payment system. There remain, however, opportunities for improvement.
Traditional payment services, often operating on decades-old infrastructure, have adjusted slowly to
changes in technology, increasing end-user expectations for speed and convenience, and increases in
security threats.18
DLT represents an opportunity to deal with existing frictions in payments, clearing,
and settlement (section 4) and, as stated above, may cause market structure changes. The extent of
these changes, however, depends on how the financial industry addresses certain challenges to
implementation and adopts the technology. Before examining these challenges, this paper first
considers the technological components of DLT and how they may be applied in the PCS context.
17 An important element of any CCP design is the legal mechanism for the CCP to become the counterparty to its participants’
trades (such as through novation and substitution of counterparties), which allows the CCP to assume the original parties’
contractual obligations to each other. Other legal mechanisms that allow the CCP to guarantee obligations may also exist, such
as explicit and legally binding settlement guarantees.
18 Federal Reserve System (2015), “Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System,” white paper, January 26,
https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/strategies-improving-us-payment-system.pdf

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3 Distributed ledger technology
In the strictest sense, a distributed ledger is a type of database that is shared across nodes in a
network.19
However, because the financial industry is considering a wide range of applications for the
technology, this paper considers “distributed ledger technology” in a very broad sense to be some
combination of components, including peer-to-peer networking, distributed data storage, and
cryptography that, among other things, can potentially change the way in which the storage,
recordkeeping, and transfer of a digital asset is done. The composition of these combinations is dictated
by the particular friction or inefficiency a particular implementation of DLT is designed to solve.
In order to differentiate between the broader topic of DLT and specific implementations of DLT, this
paper refers to a “DLT arrangement” when describing a particular selection, combination, or
configuration of these technological components. These arrangements could take a number of forms,
that, when implemented, range from having a minimal to a very significant impact on how PCS
processes are conducted. For example, existing financial intermediaries may adopt a few of the key
components of DLT as an enhancement to their existing technical platforms. This type of incremental
adoption may not change any underlying business, operational, or behavioral practices supporting the
PCS process. At the other extreme, a comprehensive DLT arrangement might be implemented to replace
entire functions traditionally managed by existing financial intermediaries (that is, entire PCS processes).
This type of comprehensive approach might result in very significant changes to the architecture of the
financial system for conducting payments, clearing, and settlement. For example, in very extreme but
unlikely scenarios, the use of banks to conduct payments could become obsolete. In between these
extremes lie a number of potential future states for the financial architecture.
The extent to which DLT will have an impact on the financial architecture may become clearer as the
technology matures. The level of impact will depend at least in part on decisions about which
components of DLT are adopted and how DLT arrangements are ultimately implemented. As the
industry considers a wide variety of applications, DLT arrangements are likely to take on a range of
forms, with different components of the technology being used for different purposes. Thus, this section
reviews some of the key components of DLT that could be adopted in the context of payments, clearing,
and settlement.
3.1 Entities can be connected on a peer-to-peer basis via nodes
In a DLT arrangement, nodes are the devices running the DLT software that collectively maintain the
database records. In this design the nodes are connected to each other in order to share and validate
information.20
At its extreme, this structure enables any entity, such as end-users, financial institutions,
or FMIs, with a node to share database management responsibilities directly with each other on a peer-
to-peer basis. This is in contrast to traditional database architectures that operate with a central hub
that acts as the single source of valid information and control. Outside of the conduct of PCS processes,
19 One specific type of distributed ledger is a blockchain, which adds changes to the database via a series of blocks of
transactional data that are chronologically and cryptographically linked to one another. The terms “distributed ledger
technology” and “blockchain technology” are often treated as synonyms in the industry even though blockchain is actually a
specific type of distributed ledger.
20 Communication channels between nodes may be separate from the channels used by end users to access the nodes or the
institutions that maintain them.

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DLT also enables a single party to maintain its database records across multiple nodes, for purposes
including increased operational resiliency.
Figure 3 represents two examples of this peer-to-peer connectivity. In contrast to the hub-and-spoke
model of figure 1, in which each entity maintains its own independent ledger, each node in figure 3 has
a copy of a common ledger. Further, although the connectivity of the nodes is the same between the
two panels of figure 3, the ownership and housing of the nodes are different. In the left panel, the nodes
are hosted within a single entity. In the right panel, however, multiple entities are in the arrangement,
and each of them hosts a node. Section 3.9 will discuss the importance of this distinction.
Figure 3: Two simple examples of node connectivity structure
An entity’s ability to participate in a DLT arrangement, however, depends not only on that entity’s
computing resources (i.e., operational capabilities) for running nodes, but also on whether the
arrangement is designed to be an open or closed system. Open systems are those that accept all
interested entities that have the technical ability to participate. Closed systems have additional
membership criteria that must be satisfied in order for an entity to be permitted to operate a node.
These criteria can include financial requirements such as the entity’s creditworthiness or ability to
access liquidity resources, as well as legal requirements such as the entity’s ability to meet any
contractual obligations to the arrangement or to have proper business licenses to conduct business.
Cryptocurrency DLTs such as Bitcoin are generally open systems. Many DLT arrangements being
contemplated by the financial industry, however, are envisioned as closed.21
21 In the context of Figure 3, the left panel is a clear example of a closed DLT arrangement, as all the nodes are hosted by a
single entity. The right panel, however, could represent either an open or closed arrangement. The determining factor of which,
is whether the entities that host the nodes also needed to meet additional criteria to be permitted to participate in the
arrangement.

12
3.2 Participants in a DLT arrangements can be permitted to play different roles or
functions
Regardless of whether a DLT arrangement is open or closed, participants (and therefore the nodes they
maintain) may be differentiated by the roles they are permitted to play or functions they are permitted
to perform. DLT arrangements in which the participants are allowed to perform all activities are often
called “permissionless.” Those that restrict participants’ activities are often referred to as
“permissioned.” For example, for certain DLT arrangements, some participants may only be permitted to
have nodes that send and receive asset transfers for existing assets. Other participants may have the
ability to issue new assets. Still others may have permissions to validate transactions (as discussed
below), while another set of participants may be able to update the history of transactions to the ledger
(also discussed below). Some participants may be limited to only reading the ledger, while others may
also be allowed to write to the ledger. Cryptocurrency DLT arrangements such as Bitcoin are examples of
permissionless systems. The financial industry, however, is focused mainly on developing permissioned
systems because these systems offer a way to provide controls over important functions performed in
the arrangement.
3.3 Ownership of an asset can be stored on a ledger within the DLT arrangement
Assets can be designed in a variety of ways. For example, they can be issued and traded entirely within
the ledger or they can be representations of assets that exist outside the ledger. Regardless, ownership
information with respect to an asset can be stored on a ledger within the DLT arrangement, which
maintains the ownership positions of all participants in the system. The asset owner within the DLT
arrangement could be financial institutions such as banks or broker-dealers, much like today. In a more
extreme scenario where services are disintermediated, these assets could be held directly by
households and businesses.
3.4 DLT arrangements can use cryptography to facilitate PCS processes
DLT arrangements use cryptography for several purposes, such as identity verification and data
encryption. For example, during asset transfers, a form of cryptography known as public key
cryptography usually forms the foundation of the transaction validation process.22
To transfer an asset, a participant may create what is known as a digital signature with its non-shared
cryptographic credential called a private key. To confirm that the asset in question belongs to the
participant initiating the transaction, other participants of the DLT arrangement with the required
permissions to act as validators of transactions can verify authenticity of the ledger entry by decrypting
it with a mathematical algorithm and the asset owner’s publicly available public key. As a consequence
22 Public key infrastructure (PKI) is the name given to the set of entities and procedures that govern the creation, distribution,
and validation of public keys. With respect to some implementations of DLT, roles and procedures played by specific entities in
the traditional PKI framework may be executed by the DLT protocol and thus may not require centralized authority or control.
For additional information on public key infrastructure, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (2013), Digital Signature Standards (DSS), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf, and U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Institution of Standards and Technology (2001), Introduction to Public Key Technology and
the Federal PKI Infrastructure, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-32.pdf.

13
of this process, ownership of an asset, including the ability to transfer it to other parties, often depends
on having access to the correct private keys.23
Additionally, cryptography may be used to encrypt transactional information on the ledger such that
only certain participants can decrypt the details of each transaction. Since most DLT arrangements
require some level of distribution of records on the ledger, cryptography employed for this purpose can
be an important tool in instances where some degree of privacy is necessary.
Finally, cryptography can also be used to facilitate the consensus process discussed in 3.6.
3.5 Transactions histories and current states of ownership can be distributed across the
nodes of the DLT arrangement
In a DLT arrangement, information regarding records of ownership and transaction histories can be
distributed across the nodes in the network. Importantly, this distribution is the foundation of the
technology, with the ledger of transaction histories and ownership positions shared as one common
ledger that participants agree is correct. Important design choices for this ledger include the appropriate
level of information that should be contained and shared on the ledger and which participants have the
ability to read or write to the ledger. Typically, even if all nodes have a complete copy of the ledger, it is
technologically possible that some of the data on the ledger is encrypted so that only authorized
participants can decrypt and read the underlying information.
3.6 The protocol in a DLT arrangement can define the procedures necessary for the
asset transfer process
For DLT arrangements intended for facilitating payments, clearing, or settlement, the PCS processes are
coded into a protocol, which is a syntax and set of procedures that define how members of the
arrangement interact. For a payment transfer, a DLT protocol may lay out validation checks (for
example, verify ownership) and conditionality checks (for example, access to sufficient funds or credit).
For a securities, commodities, or derivatives transfer, a DLT protocol could provide the conditions
around confirmation, clearing, and settlement.
An important difference in these protocols and processes between today’s financial architecture and a
DLT arrangement is the process for settlement. Settlement in a DLT arrangement involves the updating
of the common ledger with the new ownership positions of the relevant counterparties. For a
distributed ledger, proposed transactions and subsequent positions are broadcast to nodes that
maintain a copy of the ledger and ultimately accepted as the new version of the ledger.
The process of having nodes accept a new version of the ledger is commonly referred to as consensus,
which is consequently an important part of sharing a common ledger in a peer-to-peer network.
Because multiple participants typically have the ability to write to the common ledger, it is possible that
two seemingly valid transactions could be broadcast to the network at the same time. For example, a
sender of funds may be able to submit a payment using funds that are already allocated to a previous
23 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2013), Digital Signature Standards (DSS),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf.

14
payment before the sender’s previous transaction is reflected in the ledger. This possibility is the so-
called “double-spend problem,” which arises in an environment where settlement may not occur
instantaneously and is not under a single decision maker’s control.24
DLT arrangements use consensus
algorithms or other similar processes as a way for nodes on the network to prioritize one valid transfer
over another so that only one transfer is accepted and posted to the common ledger and the other is
ultimately rejected.
Specific to protocols and processes for validation of transactions, the design of consensus algorithms
used in a DLT arrangement can help to prevent invalid transactions from being accepted by the system
and can also make the ledger more tamper-resistant. These processes may also be designed to address
specific aspects of types of transactions. For example, transfers over a certain threshold could trigger
additional validation steps or alternative consensus rules to be applied before the transaction is
accepted in the ledger.
The design of a DLT arrangement’s protocols, however, can have consequences for the scalability and
performance characteristics of the overall DLT arrangement. For example, the choice of consensus
model may affect the rate at which transactions can be processed and considered final by the
arrangement. For this reason, the industry is currently researching a number of consensus algorithms
that it hopes will reduce this latency and increase the scalability of DLT arrangements.
3.7 Application programming interfaces can improve usability of DLT arrangements
Application programming interfaces (APIs) are a set of routines, protocols, and tools for building
software applications. An API specifies how software components should interact, and within a DLT
arrangement APIs can enable the addition of new features or enhancements not native to the
distributed ledger protocol itself. For example, they could communicate directly with the underlying
protocol of a distributed ledger to effect transfers and gather information. APIs can also provide user-
friendly interfaces that make using the technology easier for a broader set of potential users. These
applications can be customized to meet the needs of particular asset types or markets. As the number of
DLT arrangements using different protocols increases, APIs may play a critical role in improving usability
and interoperability between different protocols and between protocols and legacy systems.
3.8 Smart contracts may be used in DLT arrangements to automate certain transfers
based on pre-specified events agreed to by counterparties to a transaction
Smart contracts are coded programs that are used to automate pre-specified transactional events based
on agreed upon contractual terms. Like with traditional contracts, a smart contract depends on
participants’ consent to its terms. These agreed-upon smart contracts can be used in conjunction with a
distributed ledger to self-execute based on information received in the distributed ledger or from other
sources. For example, several companies developing DLT products are exploring the use of smart
contracts to model corporate debt issuances. In these simulations, a debt-issuing company specifies the
24 In both DLT arrangements and traditional payment systems, the double-spend problem may arise, for example, if identical,
duplicate payments or transfers can be sent even when only one payment or transfer can be valid. In a DLT arrangement, an
example would be multiple simultaneous attempts to transfer a digital asset with the same serial number or unique identifier.
Note that a related but not identical problem can occur if a party attempts to make two valid transfers, but owns an insufficient
amount of a digital asset to settle both transfers.

15
parameters of the contract, such as its par value, tenor, and coupon payment structure. Once assigned
to an owner, the smart contract would automatically make the required coupon payments until the
bond reaches maturity.
3.9 DLT implementation can be considered from a legal entities perspective in addition
to a technology perspective
As noted in the beginning of section 3, the extent to which DLT will have an impact on the financial
architecture may become clearer as the technology matures. Some proponents of DLT point to the
possible use of the technology to automate and even replace functions traditionally played by financial
institutions and FMIs. Nonetheless, information technology is only one factor that typically influences
the function and organization of PCS processes. Other factors include business, coordination, and
network economics as discussed in section 5. Legal issues, as discussed in section 6, also loom large.
From a fundamental perspective, certain types of legal entities appear necessary to carry out ordinary
PCS activities even as some of their functions and operations may adjust with the advent of new
technologies. For example, CCPs for derivatives are inherently designed to be the buyer to every seller
and the seller to every buyer when they are used to centrally clear either exchange traded or over-the-
counter derivatives. In order to effectively carry out the CCP function, some type of central legal entity
appears to be necessary; this type of entity is essentially a financial intermediary.25
With respect to CCPs
for cash securities trades, there is discussion of whether concepts like real-time clearing and settlement
of such trades would make unnecessary, the use of CCPs to guarantee trades between trade execution
and final settlement. This is a logical possibility and could be a case of technology used in a way that
makes the need for a settlement guarantee obsolete. However, markets will likely need to evaluate the
costs and benefits of the types of changes that financial institutions and FMIs would need to implement
for real-time clearing and settlement as well as the financial issues involved in faster settlement such as
liquidity management.26
It may also happen that if there is a business case for real-time settlement in
the securities markets, DLT would be only one of the technologies considered for implementation.
Additionally, traditional financial assets such as securities are typically a liability of a legal entity, such as
a government or corporation. In a DLT arrangement, decisions about what type of entities can issue
what instruments on a distributed ledger may be important to provide a firm legal foundation for DLT
activity. Moreover, entities such as custodians may be needed to effectively control and manage the
issuance of digital assets – potentially from a significant number and wide range of issuers – onto
distributed ledgers, much like how securities custodians have been used since the 1970s to immobilize
securities certificates and issue book-entry securities against them. Such intermediaries may not be
technologically necessary to make the use of DLT feasible, but their use could result from the economics
of issuing and managing securities, including the need to meet regulatory requirements.
25 Even in the pre-2008 environment of voluntary central clearing of standardized over-the-counter derivatives, CCPs existed
and performed important functions such as clearing interest rate swaps for major dealers.
26 For information on the issues considered by the industry on the plan to shorten the settlement cycle of U.S. equities from
three days after trade date (i.e., T+3) to T+2, see Industry Steering Committee (2015), White Paper: Shortening the Settlement
Cycle: The Move to T+2, http://www.ust2.com/pdfs/ssc.pdf. For additional information on the initiative to move to T+2, see the
industry T+2 website at http://www.ust2.com/.

16
Financial institutions acting for their own accounts and on behalf of clients may wish to hold and trade
digital assets and to manage various risks. Some of these types of intermediaries have emerged already
to provide services to Bitcoin users, even though Bitcoin is an open system in which anyone may hold
the cryptocurrency directly. More generally, third-party service providers currently provide a wide range
of technology and other services to financial institutions and their clients, which creates an “ecosystem”
of financial and non-financial entities that are frequently involved in producing and delivering PCS
services. Overall, the economics of intermediaries will likely continue to be more complex than a simple
problem of technology or technology costs.
A particularly important and traditional issue in PCS economics is the need for groups of firms and
individuals to coordinate PCS activity to reduce the costs and risks of clearing and settlement. In
addition to legislation and regulation, governments and the private sector have historically established
rule-setting bodies, clearinghouses, and specialized financial institutions to address the need for
multilateral rules and functions.27
Depending on the era, the jurisdiction, and the problem being
addressed, some of these multilateral organizations have also been given roles as financial
intermediaries. Although technology has been one contributing factor in determining the design of a
particular PCS arrangement, the fundamental need for coordination has often required joint action
through new or existing legal entities to, at a minimum, provide organization and governance.
4 Potential opportunities for DLT in payments, clearing, and settlement
Industry participants and technology firms are increasingly exploring ways to develop and deploy DLT
arrangements for use in payments, clearing, and settlement. Although the technology has the potential
to provide a new way of storing, recording, and transferring digital assets, at present most industry
participants are looking at ways to integrate the technology into existing systems and institutions. Many
models may alter or eliminate some roles of current intermediaries in payments, clearing, and
settlement but may not necessarily eliminate the need for coordination or centralization of certain
functions by trusted intermediaries. These trusted intermediaries could still be needed to play important
roles in addressing frictions beyond what DLT may be able to accomplish or may be able to use DLT
arrangements to improve or evolve how they accomplish their respective missions.
4.1 Path to adopting new technology
The path to adoption of any new technology, including DLT, typically follows several stages of
development, beginning with a “proof of concept.”28
These PoCs are simple, experimental uses of the
technology on a very small scale in a controlled environment (for example, nonproduction) and are
often used to help researchers understand the potential and limits of a technology for a specific
purpose. At this stage, some important aspects of the technology and operations that are critical in a
production environment, such as scalability or security, may not be fully understood or addressed. Much
27 Associations of financial institutions have also been used to establish model master agreements used in bilateral clearing.
28 Scott Campbell (2013), “POC vs. Pilot vs. Production,” January 25, https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2013/01/25/poc-vs-pilot-vs-
production/. See also National Defense Industrial Association 2008, “Engineering for System Assurance”, Version 1.0, pp. 84,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/SA-Guidebook-v1-Oct2008.pdf.

17
of the industry has been working on PoCs in 2016, usually for particular asset classes and use cases.
Some of these PoCs are referenced below.
PoCs that show potential may move into the pilot phase in which the technology could be used for real
transactions. Pilots have a limited duration, defined objectives and milestones, and typically also limit
the number of participants in order to determine how the technology works in production. Technologies
that are successful in the pilot phase may then move toward the production stage. Technologies at this
stage have the full set of features necessary to facilitate the storage, recordkeeping, and transfer of the
asset being considered. The final stage of the development process is broad adoption of the technology
by participants in the payments, clearing, and settlement system. At the time of the FR research team’s
interviews, most of the DLT experimentation was at the PoC stage. There have been some
announcements of the intent to put distributed ledger technology into production.
4.2 Potential applications of DLT in payments, clearing, and settlement
Information collected through interviews with industry stakeholders indicates that firms have several
common motivations behind efforts to develop and deploy DLT arrangements:
• Reduced complexity (especially in multiparty, cross-border transactions)
• Improved end-to-end processing speed and availability of assets and funds
• Decreased need for reconciliation across multiple recordkeeping infrastructures
• Increased transparency and immutability in transaction recordkeeping
• Improved network resiliency through distributed data management
• Reduced operational and financial risks
DLT is essentially asset-agnostic, meaning the technology is potentially capable of providing the storage,
recordkeeping, and transfer of any type of asset. This asset-agnostic nature of DLT has resulted in a
range of possible applications currently being explored for uses in post-trade processes. The following
section describes a set of “use cases” identified during the industry interviews and discusses, among
other uses, post-trade clearing and settlement, cross-border payments, and financial inclusion. For each
potential use, the industry has noted a set of existing frictions that might be addressed by DLT
technology and developed one or more PoCs to explore major issues in developing and applying the
technology further. The PoCs also suggest that DLT arrangements may introduce new challenges to
potential uses, and as a result, sections 5 and 6 will discuss questions that will need to be addressed in
order to transition from the PoC stage to widespread adoption.
4.2.1 Securities, commodities, and derivatives transactions
Many organizations are particularly interested in identifying which aspects of post-trade processing
could benefit from DLT’s potential to reduce information transfer times from trade execution to
settlement, and thus to increase the speed and efficiency of the operations that influence the length of
settlement cycles. In theory, the distributed and consensus forming aspects of DLT could allow for
multiple parties to agree on the terms of trades in a fraction of the time required with existing
processes. In addition, some contend that eliminating other frictions in clearing, such as reconciliation
across various independently managed ledgers, would allow market participants to reduce processing
delays and operational costs.

18
Specific use cases that have received public attention include clearing and settlement in equities
markets as well as international commodities markets. For example, several large exchanges are
exploring DLT-based solutions to improve existing post-trade processes for clearing and settling trades
made on exchanges. These exchanges are developing PoCs to track ownership of digital representations
of securities in order to potentially combine the trade and post-trade processes for asset transfers into
one step. For commodities markets, a DLT arrangement is in development to potentially allow for more
efficient transfers of commodity “certificates” tied to specific physical assets such as precious metals.
Both examples connect with legacy payments systems for the payments leg of an asset transfer. Thus,
interoperability between the DLT arrangement and legacy systems becomes an area of focus because
final settlement is tied to the completion of both legs of a securities or commodities transfer (as
discussed in section 6.3). The industry has been focusing on ways to make those connections, including
the establishment of escrow accounts that interact with or are within a DLT arrangement. These escrow
accounts would hold onto one side of the transaction until confirmation that the other side is executed.
The potential for DLT to reduce frictions in the clearing and settlement of securities has led many
industry participants to explore this technology as a way of reducing middle and back office costs. For
example, many such costs are driven by procedures that must be done manually or duplicated at
multiple firms. During securities trades, all parties typically keep duplicative records of the trade details,
requiring costly reconciliation between firms. DLT arrangements are being developed to, among other
things, share the costs of maintaining such recordkeeping infrastructures.
4.2.2 Cross-border payments
Numerous firms have identified the slow, indirect, and expensive settlement of cross-border payments
as a current point of friction that could be alleviated through the application of DLT arrangements.
Currently, electronic cross-border payments are effected by credit (and sometimes debit) transfers that
convert funds from bank to bank through a series of correspondent banking relationships, often with an
assessment of multiple fees.29
Although actual message communication between banks, using “straight-
through-processing,” can take place in near real time, correspondent banks may not act on messages
promptly, and settlement may take longer. Exception processing can take even longer. According to one
report, the settlement times for cross-border payments can take up to five days for the most common
currency pairings, generally with limited clarity regarding the total amount of fees to be charged and the
timing of settlement.30
Depending on the jurisdiction and the banks involved, costs are generally passed on to the end-users
and may be deducted from the face amount of the funds transferred. For the end-user, the frictions
include the predictability of settlement timing and costs, as well as the general opaqueness of
correspondent banking networks. For small to medium-sized banks that offer such services to their
customers but often lack the relationships to directly process cross-border payments, the frictions
include the reliance on larger institutions, the associated costs of maintaining relationships, and the
29 Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures (2016), Correspondent Banking, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d147.pdf.
30 McKinsey and Company (2015), “Global Payments 2015: A Healthy Industry Confronts Disruption,” October, pp. 23-24,
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/Financial%20Services/Latest%20thinking/Payments/Glo
bal_payments_2015_A_healthy_industry_confronts_disruption.ashx.

19
associated fees and timing of settlement for payments. Frictions may also include problems in exception
processing and reconciliation.31
Some startups are attempting to alleviate some of these frictions by using DLT and more direct
transacting as a replacement for intermediaries, which potentially reduces the number of steps to
complete cross-border payments and enables direct relationships between counterparties. Developers
argue that certain attributes of DLT, such as the ability to share ledgers across geographic distances and
time-zones, could reduce the number of intermediaries needed to effect cross-border payments. By
reducing the number of intermediaries, certain regional banks may be able to directly access the
network, resulting in a more transparent and efficient cost structure for cross-border payments. Some
of these cost savings could then potentially be passed onto their customers.
In addition, a particular industry development of note is the Interledger Protocol (ILP) which allows
transactions to flow across different ledgers and creates connection points between two or more digital
ledgers. In effect, the protocol defines a set of procedures for proposing a payments path and
cryptographically escrowing funds across a series of interoperable ledgers and then subsequently
executing the escrowed transactions once the recipient of the payment validates or acknowledges
receipt of payment. The ILP is being developed as an open standard and is intended to improve
interoperability and streamline the process for transferring digital assets by enabling entities in different
countries with different payment systems to more easily transact with one another. Adoption of this or
a similar protocol could spur further innovation and adoption of DLT-based systems for the cross-border
payments use case.32
4.2.3 Financial inclusion
Financial inclusion is another challenge both domestically and abroad that some are attempting to
address with DLT. Some of the potential benefits of DLT for cross-border payments described above
might also be able to help address issues involving cross-border remittances as well as challenges in
providing end-users with universal access to a wide range of financial services. Access to financial
services can be difficult, particularly for low-income households, because of high account fees,
prohibitive costs associated with traveling to a bank.33
Developers contend DLT may assist financial
inclusion by potentially allowing technology firms such as mobile phone providers to provide DLT-based
financial services directly to end users at a lower cost than can (or would) traditional financial
intermediaries; expanding access to customer groups not served by ordinary banks, and ultimately
reducing costs for retail consumers.
31 Lipis and Adams (2014), SWIFT Institute, “Cross-Border Low Value Payments and Regional Integration: Enables and
Disablers,” November, https://www.swiftinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SWIFT-Institute-Working-Paper-No-2014-
005-Cross-border-LVP-Regional-Integration-Lipis_v4-FINAL.pdf. See also The World Bank (2015), “Withdrawal from
Correspondent Banking; Where, Why, and What to Do About It,” November,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/113021467990964789/pdf/101098-revised-PUBLIC-CBR-Report-November-
2015.pdf.
32 See https://interledger.org/interledger.pdf for more details.
33 Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures and The World Bank (2016), Payment Aspects of Financial Inclusion,
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d144.pdf. See also Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2016), FDIC 2015 National Survey of
Unbanked and Underbanked Households, October, https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2015/2015report.pdf.

20
4.2.4 Information-sharing
According to interviews, the ability of DLT to maintain tamper-resistant records can provide new ways to
share information across entities such as independent auditors and supervisors. As an example, DLT
arrangements could be designed to allow auditors or supervisors “read-only access” to certain parts of
the common ledger. This could help service providers in a DLT arrangement and end users meet
regulatory reporting requirements more efficiently. Developers contend that being given visibility to a
unified, shared ledger could give supervisors confidence in knowing the origins of the asset and the
history of transactions across participants. Having a connection as a node in the network, a supervisor
would receive transaction data as soon as it is broadcast to the network, which could help streamline
regulatory compliance procedures and reduce costs. At the same time, however, since not all of a
service provider’s transactions with a customer, or information about a customer, might be on one or
any distributed ledger, certain regulatory requirements could be difficult to meet by simply providing
access to a ledger. Notwithstanding such questions, however, the industry is actively exploring this use
case.
4.3 Industry approaches to adopting DLT
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the financial industry’s focus thus far has been on
experimentation and the development of PoCs. Stakeholders have taken different approaches to
developing these PoCs, all with the objective of achieving adoption of distributed ledger technologies in
payments, clearing and settlement. Some firms are exploring the development of DLT solutions within
specific markets or asset classes and are designing DLT arrangements that are tailored to a particular use
case. Other firms are developing DLT frameworks as a general purpose, open source technology that can
be configured and deployed in a wide array of settings. The strategies employed broadly fall into the
following categories:
• Projects by financial institutions. Many global financial institutions have at least one DLT-
related initiative. Several have formed dedicated teams to study and experiment with the
technology and/or established innovation labs in order to understand the potential costs and
benefits of DLT arrangements, as applicable to their businesses. FMIs and similar organizations
are also involved to varying degrees in these efforts. Some have published papers on this
topic.34
• Product development by technology firms: Technology companies are experimenting with their
own DLT product offerings. For example, some firms are looking to expedite settlement,
whereas others are seeking technical solutions for issuing securities in a cryptographically
secured, digital form and trading them securely on a shared platform.
• Partnerships between technology firms and financial institutions. Several large financial
institutions are investing in or collaborating directly with DLT startups in ways that are mutually
beneficial. For example, financial institutions may provide the capital, regulatory expertise, and
34 Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (2016), “Embracing Disruption: Blockchain White Paper,” white paper, January,
http://www.dtcc.com/news/2016/january/25/blockchain-white-paper. See also SWIFT and Accenture (2016), “SWIFT on
distributed ledger,” April, https://www.swift.com/insights/press-releases/swift-and-accenture-outline-path-to-distributed-
ledger-technology-adoption-within-financial-services. See also Euroclear and Oliver Wyman (2016), “Blockchain in Capital
Markets,” February, http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/2016/feb/BlockChain-In-Capital-
Markets.pdf.

21
access to depositors that startups need to grow. In return, financial institutions benefit from
access to innovative financial technology, with which they may experiment within or alongside
their existing systems with limited disruption to operational or organizational practices.
• Blockchain-as-a-Service (BaaS) partnerships. BaaS refers to a model for the provision of DLT
systems or services where technology companies charge fees for centrally hosting the
computing infrastructure, typically in a cloud environment, and codebase necessary for DLT
systems, making it easy for other firms to deploy and test DLT systems with limited overhead.
Established technology firms are competing to be the leading provider of BaaS services.
• Participation in consortia. Consortia are helping industry participants mutualize the costs and
risks associated with developing DLT arrangements. In addition, these multilateral partnerships
are acting as catalysts for future discussions related to common ledger operability standards and
enabling the testing of PoCs. By joining consortia, firms are able to lower development costs and
test solutions together instead of in silos. Some consortia have membership fees and are driven
by the need to generate commercial solutions, while others are focused exclusively on
developing a unified code base and open standard.
• Hosting or supporting business development programs for startups. By offering or co-
sponsoring programs such as an accelerator or incubator, which can include providing funding,
business consulting services, or even physical equipment, some financial institutions are seeking
to steer the future of promising startups early on.
As described in section 2, a complex network of participants is involved in PCS. Each of these
participants plays one or more critical roles in the smooth functioning of the financial system. Any
changes to the technology underlying the PCS processes, therefore, would likely affect this entire
network of participants. To that end, many of the aforementioned efforts to achieve wider adoption of
the technology are attempting to build acceptance among the existing network of intermediaries and
their ecosystem that is at the heart of the PCS activity, including financial institutions, market
infrastructures, end users, and service providers. Although the DLT community has generated much
excitement, there remain certain challenges for the technology to take hold in payments, clearing, and
settlement.
5 Challenges to adoption and implementation: business, technical, and
financial design issues
As noted above, the industry is at an early stage of development regarding DLT. As the industry
continues to experiment, a number of business, technical, and financial design challenges must be
addressed before DLT can become a practical solution for some aspects of payments, clearing, and
settlement. This section summarizes some challenges the industry must address in order to reach broad
adoption of DLT.

22
5.1 Business issues
5.1.1 Cost-benefit considerations of potential use cases
The previous section referenced several use cases for DLT that the industry is exploring. A key challenge
is identifying appropriate use cases where the potential reduction in costs of operational and financial
inefficiencies would justify the cost of the investment and operational changes needed to implement
DLT. In addition, the longer term operating costs of DLT would need to be favorable relative to current
or plausible alternative technologies. Some see potential in targeting markets that today have significant
operational inefficiencies, such as highly decentralized and disorganized post-trade operations. Others
see opportunities for spillover benefits such as an opportunity to standardize business processes
alongside DLT implementation. Still others have targeted markets where the transition to a DLT
arrangement may have relatively lower costs because of certain efficiencies already in place, such as
markets where assets are already in digital form. Importantly, evaluations of these use cases involve a
comparison of other viable alternatives to address the frictions present in the markets where DLT is
being considered.
5.1.2 Network effects
Fundamentally, if broad adoption of DLT is to take place in payments, clearing, and settlement, the
industry will need a critical mass of participants for any application of the technology to be successful.
Network effects are derived from the fact that each additional user of a network increases the benefit of
the network for existing users. This effect can often lead to a problem for early adoption because the
net benefits for early adopters may be negative without sufficient participation, leading to a possible
lack of adoption. Indeed, many of the interviewed firms explicitly recognized network effects as a critical
factor that will influence the adoption of DLT for PCS processes. The industry is trying to address these
effects in various ways, as mentioned in section 4. These efforts include establishing consortia to
facilitate cooperation on issues related to the technology and partnerships between start-ups and
established FMIs that help coordinate decision-making for a particular market segment.
5.2 Technical issues
5.2.1 Viable technology solutions
In addition to finding a business case, the industry must also be comfortable that the technology can
achieve sufficient scale of operations and interoperability with legacy systems and other DLT
arrangements. Both must be considered when developing a viable DLT solution.
5.2.1.1 Scalability
As mentioned in section 1.1, U.S. PCS systems process hundreds of millions of transactions daily.
Consensus algorithms and cryptographic verification introduce latency and limit the number of transfers
that some DLT arrangements can process concurrently. Additionally, ledgers that add transactional
histories on top of one another, such as blockchains, may challenge storage capacity over time. Design
choices, such as the choice of consensus algorithm, can mitigate some of these concerns. For example,
some in the industry are considering limiting permissions to write to the common ledger to only a

23
trusted central intermediary as in current arrangements, reducing latency by eliminating the need for
consensus altogether. Nonetheless, electronic payments technology must have the scalability needed to
provide fast and reliable service to the market or it is unlikely to be acceptable to financial institutions or
public authorities.35
5.2.1.2 Interoperability
Interviews with firms suggest the future will not be characterized by a single DLT arrangement. Instead,
multiple DLT arrangements will likely be developed and deployed based on the needed functionality and
on the required regulatory and market stipulations of a specific business case. Certain legacy systems
may also continue to exist. Given that the broader financial system will continue to have a diverse set of
participants interacting within a single financial market or across different financial markets, the ability
for participants to process transactions smoothly among the relevant systems will be critical to the
continued efficient functioning of the broader financial system.
As now, intermediaries, businesses, and households would still need to interact with a (potentially large)
number of systems to conduct their PCS activities in a DLT arrangement. Interoperability across DLT
arrangements or between DLT arrangements and legacy systems is likely to be an important factor in
determining the extent of DLT adoption. Intermediaries may help address this problem for businesses
and households; nonetheless, frictions and costs rise as the complexity of connections to and use of
different systems increase. Moreover, the likely co-existence of legacy and new DLT arrangements adds
further complexity and fragmentation.
In the short run, a reasonable amount of coordination, communication, and interoperability between
proposed DLT arrangements with existing systems and providers will be necessary for benefits of DLT to
be realized. Standards-based APIs and interoperability protocols can serve as a needed bridge between
emerging and existing systems. As DLT arrangements seek to improve the speed and efficiency of the
transfer and exchange of value, it is critical that access to and interoperability with these arrangements
are equally fast and efficient. As transactions are potentially processed more quickly within a given DLT
arrangement, other systems that depend on information such as confirmation of transaction settlement
may be exposed to risk if there are delays in or barriers to these systems’ ability to access such
information.
5.2.2 Standards development
Standards development is another critical area for the successful adoption of DLT. Standards are
important for providing a base layer of interoperability across different DLT arrangements and legacy
systems. If organizations eventually interact with multiple DLT arrangements, open industry standards
can also help to lower implementation and integration costs and ensure consistent expectations about
how information from DLT-based arrangements is structured and accessed. Indeed, the industry is
contemplating ways of achieving common standards. One challenge, however, is that many applications
35 See generally, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (2004), FFIEC Information Technology Handbook,
“Operations Booklet,” July, http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets/operations/introduction.aspx. See also SWIFT and
Accenture (2016), “SWIFT on distributed ledger,” April, https://www.swift.com/insights/press-releases/swift-and-accenture-
outline-path-to-distributed-ledger-technology-adoption-within-financial-services.

24
of DLT are still being developed and tested, and the industry may not have sufficient information at this
point to develop appropriate standards. This is typical of emerging technologies in the PoC stage.
Beyond interoperability, APIs may be required to enable DLT arrangements to make requests to external
systems to achieve enhancements that are not core to the DLT arrangement itself. A robust set of APIs
may also help organizations to realize the operational efficiencies of DLT arrangements without
requiring dramatic changes to IT architecture in the short-term. From this perspective DLT arrangements
are not merely an end product, but can be viewed at least in part as a platform developers can build
upon. Building open APIs in common, industry-standard languages, and enhancing software
development kits lowers the barriers for organizations and their development teams to enter the DLT
industry, acting as a potential catalyst to interoperability.
5.2.3 Cryptographic key and access data management
Effective management of cryptographic keys and access credentials is a particularly important business
issue in the context of DLT because, unlike many other applications of this type of cryptography, users
can potentially suffer immediate and irrevocable monetary losses without recourse if keys or access
credentials are lost or compromised. Key compromises may lead to economic losses associated with
account takeover and fraud. Lost keys may render data unreadable or inaccessible, resulting in the
permanent loss of the value secured by the cryptography. The ability to bind the identity of public keys
to individual or corporate identities is also an important privacy-related aspect of digital signature
arrangements in which users are subject to legal requirements such as those associated with anti-
money-laundering compliance.
The ability to maintain the secret nature of private keys and achieve the desired security properties of
public key encryption is a complex and challenging undertaking, which depends on a variety of factors
including the strength of the cryptography and the protocols used for key generation, storage,
distribution, revocation, and destruction. Reflecting these challenges, numerous standard setting and
regulatory bodies have established detailed guidance and minimum requirements for enterprise use of
cryptographic keys and the design of cryptographic key management systems.36
Applying the
requirements and guidance to DLT arrangements will be an important step for such arrangements to
become viable. Beyond specific key-management issues, organizations that employ DLT will still need to
consider best practices in information security that extend well beyond cryptography.
5.2.4 Information management
The introduction of DLT brings the promise that participants share common information on a ledger
with a history that is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to alter. It is fundamentally important that the
36 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2013), A Framework for Designing
Cryptographic Key Management Systems, August, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-130.pdf.
See also U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2016), Recommendation for Key
Management, January, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf. See also International
Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission (2005), Information Technology – Security
Techniques – Code of Practice for Information Security Management, June,
http://www.slinfo.una.ac.cr/documentos/EIF402/ISO27001.pdf. See also Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(2016), FFIEC Information Technology Handbook, “Information Security,” September,
http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/216407/informationsecurity2016booklet.pdf.

25
common information be correct. This requirement can be difficult to achieve if many participants can
write to the ledger. For example, decisions regarding who can create new assets and how information
that is input to the system is checked for accuracy are fundamental. Also, the designers of a DLT
arrangement must determine how errors and known fraudulent account take-overs are handled and
resolved.
An additional challenge is the determination of exactly what information to share. This issue is especially
challenging when information, possibly including customer information, is shared among competitors.
Relevant privacy laws and regulations must also be satisfied. Participants will have to agree on the
extent of information that is shared and whether the complete set of information will still need to be
entrusted to a central institution, such as a clearinghouse. Failure to agree on the level of this
“differentiated privacy” could be one challenge in reaching a critical mass of users.
5.3 Financial design issues
The use of DLT technologies may raise basic issues about how financial instruments are designed and, in
some cases, the role and need for financial intermediaries. The design of a DLT arrangement could take
many forms and involves decisions about the nature of the digital assets in the system, the entities that
can issue the digital asset and how they do so, and the roles that intermediaries will ultimately play
regarding the issuance, storage, recordkeeping, and transfer of the digital assets. Some of these issues
echo debates from the development of book-entry securities and electronic payments over the past five
decades.
5.3.1 Financial instruments
As discussed in section 4, some of those interviewed are considering electronic representations of
securities that can be held and transferred on DLT arrangements. Securities may be originally issued in
electronic form or in paper form, and regardless of issuance method, traditional design choices are
applicable to book-entry securities which are “immobilized” or “de-materialized” through the use of a
securities custodian. Further, design choices need to be made to determine whether either type of
book-entry security is issued directly to the ultimate holder, with transfers of the security requiring
changes in the registration of the security, or whether securities can be held in a fungible form that can
be held and transferred through a series of intermediaries.37
Over time, DLT may provide opportunities to re-visit the traditional choices for the design, holding, and
transfer of securities. For example, one new development appears to be the concept of ““tokenization,”
in which coded data are intended to represent a security on some type of ledger and to enable rapid
and easy transfers by owners or their intermediaries, but not to be the security itself or the bundle of
rights and obligations the security represents. One aspect that will not change is that the securities
themselves will by definition continue to be liabilities of the ultimate issuer of the securities.
Intermediaries that carry electronic securities on their books will presumably continue to have rights
and responsibilities with respect to those securities. If systems with tokens representing securities are
developed, and the tokens are not designed or intended to be securities, then questions may arise
about the status of the tokens, what they represent, and how they are treated when holdings or
37 Securities Transactions Settlement, 69 FR 12921 (March 18, 2004),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2004/03/18/04-5981/securities-transactions-settlement.

26
transfers go awry. The legal status of digital assets is discussed further in 6.1.1.1 below. Related
questions exist for physical commodities, although the legal framework may be different and the role of
physical underlying assets must be taken into account.
5.3.2 Monetary instruments
Similar points can also be made about monetary instruments. In the case of what might be called book-
entry money, financial intermediaries issue deposit liabilities that holders treat as assets and use to
make payments and store wealth. Traditionally, each intermediary issues its own liabilities, and the
completion of payments from one party to another when each holds their monetary instruments at a
different institution typically involves a specific change in the amount of the account ledger (the
monetary liability at each institution) held by each party. In principle, the use of DLT could involve the
establishment of a common ledger for each bank, with links between ledgers designed to process
payments between ledgers. However, if multiple institutions are involved in the transfer of payments,
some way to settle the payments between them will be needed. The general options for conducting
such settlements are well known. Either banks settle using adjustments to their claims on each other or
settle using claims on a third-party financial intermediary, such as a correspondent or central bank.
Interbank settlement using a commodity such as gold is a historical possibility, but is unlikely within the
current monetary regimes.
The design of monetary instruments that parallel some of the original properties of banknotes is also a
possibility. Historically, commercial banks issued banknotes that were negotiable instruments, that is,
they were essentially the property of the holder of the note, without a clearing and settlement process
in which account balances were adjusted at a central intermediary with each payment. Certain kinds of
pre-paid cards are currently designed in this way, and the debate over the design of prepaid cards and
electronic money in the mid-1990s has lessons for today.38
In the case of DLT, each bank could presumably maintain its own ledger for its customers to use to make
payments directly between one another without needing to send payment instructions through that
bank. The liabilities of the bank held on the ledger could be registered to each holder individually but
might also be issued in “bearer form” and owned by whoever holds the liability. Design choices would
presumably be influenced by the benefits and costs of the different types of arrangements. When
multiple banks are involved and have customers who want to make payments across the banks, a
mechanism would be needed to communicate and settle transactions between institutions in order to
complete payments.
5.3.3 Financial intermediaries
Another design choice for both securities and monetary instruments would be the types of institutions
that would be allowed to issue these liabilities and act as intermediaries. In some cases, institutions may
be needed to act as custodians. Regulatory frameworks have been established and enhanced over time
to address these questions and to help foster safe and efficient systems for issuing and transferring
securities and money. To the extent new entrants into these processes come forward with new types of
design concepts, those entrants may need to interpret and review regulatory issues.
38 Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures (2015), Digital Currencies, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf.

27
Some have raised the possibility that DL technology may make financial intermediaries obsolete. One
cannot rule out long-run changes in the roles and responsibilities of intermediaries in financial markets
and the demand for their services. However, intermediaries play important roles in matching borrowers
and savers in the economy, providing safe monetary instruments that form the basis of the payment
system, aggregate financial activity and more. It is far from clear that these functions will all become
obsolete in the foreseeable future.
6 Challenges to adoption and implementation: risk management
In addition to the challenges identified above, questions also arise about the way in which the
implementation of DLT would fit into the risk-management frameworks that already exist to promote
safety and confidence in payments and securities transfer processes.
Legal, settlement, operational, and financial risks are inherent in the conduct of PCS activities. With the
current design of the financial markets, such risks are typically concentrated at intermediaries such as
banks and FMIs, which, in turn, specialize in managing and controlling these risks. For example, today’s
FMIs establish rules and manage risks through a centralized governance structure, help eliminate certain
risks (for example, provide for legally defined settlement finality and delivery versus payment), mitigate
and measure others (for example, credit and liquidity risks), reduce costs of clearing and settling
transactions between and among multiple parties (for example, netting), and provide a level of
transparency to the market. However, a tradeoff may arise because FMIs also typically concentrate
much of the conduct of PCS activities, and therefore risks, into a single or handful of central entities.
Much of the focus of the policy and regulatory environment, therefore, has been on ensuring that these
intermediaries appropriately and adequately manage risks, so that they may run effectively even in
times of stressed market conditions.
A key consideration that may affect the assessment and adoption of any DLT solution is whether a
change to one aspect of the PCS process, even if it is meant to increase efficiencies or to mitigate a
particular risk, merely shifts the risks among actors in the PCS process or increases the overall risks in
the conduct of PCS activities. The extent to which a particular solution affects the fundamental design of
the financial system as well as day-to-day activities is likely to affect this assessment. For example, on
the one hand, if a solution reduces the cost of clearing, but does so by shifting financial and operational
risk to end-users of a system or by reducing the ability of specialized intermediaries to manage risk,
difficult decisions may be needed about the trade-off between the benefits of greater efficiency and the
associated costs and risks. On the other hand, if a solution unambiguously would reduce costs and risks
to financial markets over the long run, it may face short-term challenges to adoption, but may also have
clear long-run strategic benefits to the markets.
6.1 Legal considerations
The legal framework (for example, statutes, regulations, policy, and supervision) governing financial
markets and the conduct of PCS activities is well-established. Much of the existing legal environment,
however, is organized and implemented in a manner consistent with the current financial market
architecture, which has a complex network of participants that perform a variety of functions and are
regulated, supervised, and overseen by a diverse group of regulators. The relevant laws, regulations, and

28
supervisory policies are aimed at achieving broad objectives such as market transparency, safety and
soundness of financial institutions, and the efficient and effective functioning of the broader financial
system, and are not generally intended to favor a particular electronic technology.39
Even so, the laws and regulations applicable to PCS can affect the manner in which, speed by which, and
extent to which any implementation or configurations of DLT for a particular use case can be adopted by
regulated entities or new entrants to the financial system. It is therefore important to consider how the
legal framework may differ depending on the configurations of DLT, as the industry further develops DLT
use cases.
6.1.1 Legal basis of certain DLT components
6.1.1.1 Distributed ledgers
As DLT matures, the legal basis for certain components of the technology, which may not be
contemplated in the current legal framework for PCS activities, will merit careful consideration. One of
the purported benefits of DLT is that it provides an auditable record of information that is
simultaneously updated and distributed among participants.40
Businesses using and trusting the records
that are stored on shared ledgers must consider the legal basis for these records. Users of these records
will need to be assured of their reliability as an authoritative source of the underlying obligations and
the enforceability of those obligations. Shared ledgers should be designed to provide these assurances
under existing laws, or, alternatively, statutes and rules may need to be adjusted to accommodate DLT-
enabled recordkeeping.
6.1.1.2 Digital representations of assets
Digital representations of a physical asset, such as tokens, as well as natively issued digital assets are
also key components of a DLT arrangement. The ownership rights and obligations associated with digital
tokens and assets may not be clearly defined in today’s legal framework. Many ownership interests in
assets, such as negotiable instruments and securities, are already represented using physical or book-
entry records, and the corresponding legal frameworks are robust and have developed over time.
Careful legal analysis must be done to understand how ownership of digital tokens on a distributed
ledger fit into the current legal frameworks and what gaps need to be filled by contractual agreements
or new laws and regulations.
6.1.1.3 Smart contracts
DLT has also raised the possibility of writing terms and conditions between parties into computer code
to be executed automatically. In order for these “smart contracts” to be enforceable, they must have a
sound legal basis. Contract law is an established set of rules that govern the basic principles of
contracting, including formation, amendment, termination, and dispute resolution. Some classic
39 Some laws and regulations have been designed to reduce the use of paper in PCS systems following, for example, the
“paperwork crisis” of the 1960s and 1970s. Some legal frameworks have also had implicit biases toward paper notices and
other documents since these were the accepted communications or authentication technologies when the frameworks were
adopted.
40 An example of how using a DLT-enabled shared ledger may be inconsistent with existing laws has been highlighted in the
following article: Jenny Cieplak and Mike Gill (2016), “How Distributed Ledgers Impact Post-Trade in a Dodd-Frank World,”
Coindesk, July 9, http://www.coindesk.com/distributed-ledger-cftc-post-trade-dodd-frank/.

29
contract doctrines, such as voiding unconscionable contracts, or amending contracts due to changed
circumstances, conflict with the automatic execution of smart contracts. If smart contracts proliferate,
judges and juries will have to review them to determine their legal basis and evidentiary status.
Complex applications of smart contracts could potentially allow for traditional organizations, such as
businesses and nonprofits, to be run through rules encoded as smart contracts. The legal status of
organizations that are run on smart contracts is unclear.41
If “management” of an organization is
conducted automatically by code, legal systems will have to determine who to hold accountable if laws
are broken and disputes arise. The legal frameworks around corporations and other business
associations would have to adapt to the concept of distributed management.
6.1.2 Licensing
As discussed in section 2, PCS innovation can emerge from new technology, changes to the existing
market structure, or both. The emergence of DLT is likely to augment the existing market structure to
include new participants that provide PCS services. Some of these participants are specific technology
firms or software companies that partner with existing financial intermediaries to implement a DLT
arrangement. Others may augment or even replace the services of existing financial intermediaries.
Although it is too soon to predict what corresponding change in market structure might emerge as a
result of DLT, one challenge for any emergent firm that takes on a traditional financial intermediary role
is the likely need to acquire some type of charter or license to provide services or conduct activities that
involve the holding and transferring of assets on behalf of households and businesses. The nature and
form of such charters or licenses remains an open question as lawmakers and regulators may consider
whether existing financial institution licenses are sufficient, or alternative licenses may need to be
developed. In the cryptocurrency world, the New York State Department of Financial Services’
“BitLicense” is one such example for institutions that play roles related to storing, recordkeeping, and
transfer services.42
In DLT arrangements, intermediaries might provide services around the storage,
recordkeeping, and transfer of more-traditional financial assets but not other traditional functions of
banking such as household and business lending (so-called narrow banks). It may be useful to explore
the pros and cons of a special banking charter with requirements that differ from traditional banking
licenses based on the more limited scope of services provided.43
41 For example, the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) was a smart contract running on the Ethereum blockchain
that acted as a venture capital fund. Participants pledged ether, the Ethereum blockchain’s native cryptocurrency, to the DAO
in exchange for tokens, which represented voting shares in the organization. Curators (well-known members of the community)
were to select projects seeking funding and put them up for a vote, with token holders receiving votes proportional to the
amount of ether they pledged.
42 New York State Department of Financial Services (2015), Final BitLicense Regulatory Framework, June 24,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/bitlicense_reg_framework.htm.
43 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has sought comment on similar ideas. See Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (2016), Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal Banking System: An OCC Perspective, March,
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-responsible-innovation-banking-
system-occ-perspective.pdf. See also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2016), Recommendations and Decisions for
Implementing a Responsible Innovation Framework, October, https://occ.gov/topics/bank-
operations/innovation/recommendations-decisions-for-implementing-a-responsible-innovation-framework.pdf.

30
6.1.3 Compliance with BSA/AML
Compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and anti-money-laundering (AML) requirements is the
responsibility of a variety of intermediaries, including but not limited to banks, money services
businesses, and securities broker-dealers. AML compliance includes transaction monitoring, know your
customer requirements, and reporting of suspicious activity to the U.S Department of the Treasury’s
Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network (FinCEN). As DLT matures and the types of intermediaries in
existence potentially change, the appropriate government agencies may need to provide guidance on
the application of existing law to any new intermediaries or PCS processes.44
In fact, this process was
followed when FinCEN issued new guidance with respect to the BSA’s application to virtual currency
exchangers.45
6.2 Governance
Effective, accountable, and transparent governance arrangements are critical to the risk management of
PCS systems. Ideal governance arrangements are clear and transparent, promote the safety and
efficiency of the system, and support the stability of the broader financial system. Sound governance
arrangements would continue to be necessary for DLT arrangements in order to determine the rules
regarding functionality, risk management, and access to the network, as well as which entities are
responsible for maintaining and modifying the protocol. The methods by which governance
arrangements take effect may differ depending on the design of the DLT arrangement. Two extremes in
the design of DLT arrangements are discussed below.
6.2.1 Open permissionless systems
Open and permissionless systems, discussed in section 3.1, may require distributed governance
arrangements, in which consensus could be used to determine any changes to the network’s protocol or
functions. It is not clear, however, the extent to which such arrangements would address significant
unforeseen issues or the potential need to change significant rules once they are put into motion. The
potential lack of clear, transparent, and predictable governance, particularly in an open and
permissionless DLT arrangement, could potentially have a negative effect on the stability of the network
and broader financial system, especially if it at any point the network interacts significantly with
regulated entities in the traditional financial system.
The 2016 hack of the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) demonstrated the challenges of
having a decentralized governance arrangement that requires consensus of the network to deploy
changes. In this example, the debate centered on whether the Ethereum community should claw back a
large amount of ether that was transferred by an unknown participant from the DAO’s address to a
separate address. With no single accountable decision-making authority, philosophical differences arose
about whether to retain a known illegitimate action in order to preserve the inalterability of the
44 In the United States, the AML authority responsible for interpreting the BSA and its implementing regulations is FinCEN:
https://www.fincen.gov/.
45 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (March 18, 2013), FIN-2013-G001, “Application of
FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies,”
https://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.

31
common ledger or to attempt to essentially reverse the action because it was known to be illegitimate.
This debate led to a division that resulted in uncertainty for the network and volatility in the value of
ether.46
6.2.2 Closed permissioned systems
Conversely, closed systems, and particularly those in which participants are differentiated based on the
roles they play and functions they are permitted to perform, may involve one or more institutions that
have ownership rights over the arrangement. To that end, this type of arrangement could create a
more-centralized governance structure for granting access to the system arrangement, making
significant decisions such as rules or technology upgrades on behalf of the arrangement, as well as
determining permissions to write changes to the ledger. Such arrangements are likely to be more
recognizable as traditional corporate or FMI governance arrangements than computer protocols for
open and permissionless arrangements. Permissioned systems may also employ governance
arrangements that allow for distributed (potentially delegated) governance for some aspects of the
network and centralized governance for others. Importantly, as with the traditional corporate or FMI
governance arrangements, uncertainty could be reduced around responsibility, accountability, and
liability for decisions related to the system. The flexibility of the governance arrangement to adjust over
time might also increase.
6.3 Settlement finality
A key risk in entering into any financial transaction is the risk that settlement will not take place as
expected. Failure to settle as expected can be due to a number of factors, such as a counterparty’s
default, an operational issue, or uncertainty about when settlement is considered final and irrevocable.
This section discusses two types of uncertainties in settlement finality that a DLT arrangement might
introduce.
In post-trade clearing and settlement, settlement finality is currently a legally defined moment, typically
supported by a statutory, regulatory, and/or contractual framework underlying a given financial
transaction. Parties to a transaction and their intermediaries rely on the definition and timing of finality
when they update their own ledgers to effect settlement, determine the ownership of assets, and
measure and monitor various risks. In contrast, in some versions of DLT arrangements, multiple parties
are permissioned to update a shared ledger, and those parties must agree to a particular state of the
ledger through the consensus process. Settlement finality in this world rests on probabilistic finality,
whereby the longer a transaction is considered settled by the system participants, the less likely this
transaction will be reversed (or dropped). This approach to finality contrasts with the traditional
approach of defining an unambiguous and transparent moment of finality. With a probabilistic approach
to finality, legal liability may be difficult to assign or be ambiguous in such a network, and the
uncertainty has implications for the balance sheets of participants as well as the rights of their
customers and creditors.
46 For additional information on the DAO hack, see Dan Goodin (2016), “Bitcoin Rival Ethereum Fights for its Survival after $50
million Heist,” June 21, http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/06/bitcoin-rival-ethereum-fights-for-its-survival-after-50-million-
heist/.

32
Settlement finality is even more complicated when considering both legs of a financial transaction, for
example, the delivery of an asset against payment for the asset in rigorous versions of DvP. Not only
must finality be clear and certain for both legs, but each leg’s finality should be conditional on the
finality of the other. This interdependency can be a challenge in a situation where the payment and
asset delivery legs may not be occurring on the same network, platform, or ledger and where no
intermediary exists to provide assurance for settlement finality. Should a counterparty default on its
obligations after only one of the legs of the transaction settles, there could be an open question
regarding the status of the transaction. At a minimum, such designs for DvP deserve rigorous scrutiny,
and may require extra layers of risk management.
6.4 Financial risk
Counterparties to a financial transaction may also face credit or liquidity risks arising in each step of the
payment, clearing, or settlement processes. Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty may be unable to
fully meet its settlement obligations when due or at any point through the duration of the exposure.
Liquidity risk is the risk that a counterparty will have insufficient funds to meet its financial obligations
when due but may do so at some point in the future. Although these two risks are distinct concepts,
they are often related.47
In a financial system with financial intermediaries that have responsibilities for facilitating the payment,
clearing, or settlement processes and sometimes even guaranteeing settlement of a transaction on
behalf of its customers or participants, much of this credit and liquidity risk between the original
counterparties is assumed and managed centrally by the intermediary. Tools for managing credit risks
range from those that eliminate credit risk (for example, requirements that payment obligations be fully
prefunded) to those that mitigate and manage credit risk (for example, allowing for posting of collateral
at reasonable haircuts, or discounts from market value). Whether an FMI participant is required to fully
prefund a payment account or post collateral in order to complete a transaction affects the participant’s
own liquidity. Similarly, how a DLT arrangement is designed to handle counterparty credit risk could
have a significant impact on the participants’ liquidity needs.
6.5 Operational risk
The risk of operational failures or disruptions threaten the successful settlement of financial
transactions, irrespective of whether the underlying payment, clearing, or settlement processes are
supported or facilitated by an intermediary or through a decentralized and automated technological
platform. Possible operational failures include errors or delays in processing, system outages,
insufficient capacity, fraud, and data loss and leakage. Therefore, system resiliency and security are
critical components of managing operational risk.
Safety and integrity in clearing and settlement is critical for broader financial stability which is a key
reason that major clearing and settlement systems are regulated. Hence, a fundamental threshold test
for new technologies will be whether they can be deployed and operated safely, with the requisite high
47 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (2012), Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf, page 19.

33
degree of resiliency and security across a wide range of adverse scenarios.48
Many of the interviewed
firms suggest that the distributed data storage aspect of DLT provides greater resilience and data
integrity than traditional centralized clearing and settlement systems do. If one or several entities that
hold a copy of the distributed ledger experience a failure, the remaining unaffected entities would be
able to maintain an accurate ledger and, therefore, continue the system’s operations. Further, some
interviewed firms suggested that individual firms or system might be able to employ DLT to store backup
copies of data within legacy systems in a technologically diverse system in order to strengthen resilience
against cyberattacks.49
DLT arrangements must also address the same risks as existing PCS systems and, although the current
procedures and controls used to address these risks appear to be generally relevant for DLT,
modifications may be required in order to make these currently used risk-mitigation strategies
applicable to a distributed environment. Similar to traditional PCS systems, one of the biggest concerns
with DLT solutions is endpoint security. As with any system where vulnerabilities can potentially exist
within both software and hardware components, DLT may face increased exposure to cyber-attacks
through its distributed network of participants, or endpoints, which are validating transactions and
writing to the blockchain. Endpoint security remains an ongoing challenge for which no easy
technological solution may exist.
Additionally, the strength issue of cryptography is particularly important for DLT arrangements.
Cryptography can be used not only to protect data but also to serve as a way to manage rights and
access to data. Although layered approaches to security, known as Defense in Depth, would be expected
for any organization using DLT or any other technology, if the system’s encryption is compromised, DLT
arrangements may be particularly vulnerable. Not only is the strength of the encryption important, but
so too are the procedures and controls surrounding the security of encryption keys and any key
management processes used. Furthermore, because risks and threats are continually evolving, the
procedures and controls to secure DLT systems must also continually assess risk, improve, and adapt,
which may be particularly challenging in an open and permissionless system. Ultimately, these and other
security concerns will have to be fully addressed before DLT can achieve widespread adoption.
However, these same design properties may also help DLT address certain resiliency and security risks
that are present in traditional systems. For example, some experts suggest that DLT arrangements can
be created without the reliance on centralized databases that are typically susceptible to disruptive
cyber-attacks. By using certain distributed ledger arrangements, it may be possible to reduce or avoid
the risk of extensive and prolonged system outages (and even permanent losses of data) in a manner
different from the traditional approach of systems that rely on centralized databases. Instead, identical
and widely dispersed databases that are hard to impact simultaneously may be able to assist one
another in recovering from a cyber-attack. Nonetheless, there are a number of important factors to
consider that underlie such suggestions, including the difficulty of simultaneous attacks on all of the
48 Lael Brainard (2016), “The Use of Distributed Ledger Technologies in Payment, Clearing, and Settlement,” speech delivered at
The Institute of International Finance Blockchain Roundtable, Washington D.C., April 14,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20160414a.htm.
49 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(2015), Guidance on Cyber Resilience for Financial Market Infrastructures, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d146.pdf. See also
National Institute of Standards and Technology (2014), Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Feb 12,
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.

34
databases in a distributed network, the difficulty of corrupting data stored on a DLT, the ability to
quickly propagate data to compromised sites, and the ability of a compromised site to quickly begin
using the refreshed data. For DLT to be successful, careful and ongoing analysis of the security
considerations will be critical.
7 Summary
This paper has examined how DLT can be used in the area of payments, clearing and settlement and
identifies both the opportunities and challenges facing its long-term implementation and adoption. In
the context of payments, DLT has the potential to provide new ways to transfer and record the
ownership of digital assets; immutably and securely store information; provide for identity
management; and other evolving operations through peer-to-peer networking, access to a distributed
but common ledger among participants, and cryptography. Potential use cases in payments, clearing,
and settlement include cross-border payments and the post-trade clearing and settlement of securities.
These use cases could address operational and financial frictions around existing services. Nonetheless,
the industry’s understanding and application of this technology is still in its infancy, and stakeholders are
taking a variety of approaches toward its development. Given the technology’s early stage, a number of
challenges to development and adoption remain, including in how issues around business cases,
technological hurdles, legal considerations, and risk management considerations are addressed.
Finally, as a recent innovation, DLT has the potential to also drive change to the financial market
structure in ways that take advantage of the new technology. Although it is too soon to predict what
these changes may be, the way that the industry finds use cases and addresses the challenges identified
in this paper will provide clarity over time. As the technologies and experimentation with these
technologies continue to develop, it will be important to thoroughly understand how these changes
apply broadly. Understanding the potential range of DLT adoption and its link to changing the financial
market structure is an area for future research.

Distributed ledger technology in payments clearing and settlement - blockchain fintech

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