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Efficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security privatization
- 1. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension system Oliwia Komada Krzysztof Makarski & Joanna Tyrowicz FAME|GRAPE, Warsaw School of Economics, NBP, IAAEU & University of Warsaw PenCon, Lodz 2018 1 / 39
- 2. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Motivation Longevity ⇑ Pay-As-You-Go Defined Benefits (PAYG DB) ⇒ fiscally unstable if not reformed (Feldstein for US: deficit +1.4pp of GDP share ) ⇒ reform needed Defined Contribution (DC) immune to longevity risk (fiscal side) (Partial) funding fosters accumulation of capital Literature Reform : PAYG DB =⇒ (partially) funded DC shift of contributions to funded pillar ⇒ short run financing? 2 / 39
- 3. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Motivation in deterministic setting horse-race between efficiency fiscal cost for cohorts paying for the reform efficiency prevails - reform welfare improving in stochastic setting: loss of insurance Nishiyama & Smetters (2007, QJE) and subsequent papers: negative welfare effects of the reform But: fiscal policy counteracts / reinforces redistribution affecting also economic efficiency (scope of distortions) Is Nishiyama & Smetters (2007) result universal? compare variants of fiscal closures (accompanying the reform) introduce new fiscal closures 3 / 39
- 4. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Literature differs in terms of fiscal closures and do not compare across fiscal closures 4 / 39
- 5. Motivation Model & Calibration Results What we do Challenge the view that in stochastic framework pension system privatization is welfare deteriorating Provide a systematic overview of the interaction between the pension system reform and fiscal closure Consider new ways of financing the pensions system reform tax on capital income labor tax progression 5 / 39
- 6. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Preview of the results Nishiyama & Smetters (2007) result is NOT universal ⇔ fiscal closure matters Depending on the fiscal closure in stochastic framework: welfare effect of the same reform can be positive or negative with political support or not Welfare gains and political support only sometimes overlap there are many combinations of fiscal policy that make pension system reform welfare improving public debt often “buys” political support for the reform (both improving and deteriorating) 6 / 39
- 7. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Contents 1 Motivation 2 Model & Calibration 3 Results 7 / 39
- 8. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Model & Calibration Standard OLG model Consumers face uncertain life span (up to 20 periods = 100 years), earnings subject to idiosyncratic shocks, uninsurable, consumers work until retirement age, contributing to the social security and paying taxes (on labor income, capital income and consumption). Competitive producers with a standard CD production function Government collects taxes, finances government expenditure and services the debt, balances pension system ⇐ fiscal closure Calibration to replicate 2015 US economy Model solving 8 / 39
- 9. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Pension system Baseline scenario PAYG DB equal benefit for whole cohort (provides insurance) b ¯J,t = ρ · wavg,t indexed with payroll growth rate (GE labor ↑ ⇒ benefits ↑) longevity ↑ creates deficit (no balancing mechanism in a system) Reform scenario partially funded DC contributions go into PAYG and funded pillar: τt = τI t + τII t individual pension accounts ⇒ no insurance b ¯J,t = accrued ‘savings’ life expectancyt + accrued savings life expectancyt Reform generates a deficit in the pension system ⇒ need for fiscal closure. 9 / 39
- 10. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Fiscal closures Three new closures details progressive labor tax ⇒ working cohorts with favorable shocks ⇒ labor supply capital tax (+ debt) ⇒ cohorts with more wealth ⇒ savings & investment Two closures within pension system details contributions ⇒ working cohorts ⇒ labor supply pensions ⇒ on retirees ⇒ consumption Four closures outside pension system details consumption tax (+ debt) ⇒ all cohorts ⇒ consumption labor tax (+ debt) ⇒ working cohorts ⇒ labor supply In total: 9 closures (and a 81 possible combinations of fiscal policy in baseline and reform) 10 / 39
- 11. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Contents 1 Motivation 2 Model & Calibration 3 Results 11 / 39
- 12. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Baseline: PAYG DB with aging and thus deficit Adjustment in pension parameters contribution rate ↑ from 7.8% to 9% tax on pensions ↑ from 0.0% to 17.3% Adjustment in fiscal parameters pension system deficit ↑ by 1pp of GDP 12 / 39
- 13. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Reform: partially funded DC capital labor Pension system deficit temporary ↑ from 0% to 2% of GDP 13 / 39
- 14. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Major effects of the reform Links pensions to contributions 1 Efficiency gain 2 Loss of insurance Necessitates fiscal adjustment 1 Affects degree of efficiency gain 2 Affects degree of insurance loss 14 / 39
- 15. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Welfare analysis - like Nishiyama & Smetters (2007) What happens within each experiment? 1 Run no policy reform scenario ⇒ baseline 2 Run policy reform scenario ⇒ reform 3 For each cohort compare utility, compensate the losers from the winners 4 If net effect positive ⇒ reform efficient 15 / 39
- 16. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Result 1: insurance is small & efficiency is large capital tax: the highest welfare gain due to efficiency progression: the smallest welfare loss due to insurance 16 / 39
- 17. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Result 2: loss of insurance important but not decisive other closure τk has larger gain than τc towards the end, → positive overall welfare effect 17 / 39
- 18. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Result 3: public debt help gaining political support It helps pensioners (who gain anyway) Young always loose (→ are against the reform) With debt we sway some working who remain in the old system → majority 18 / 39
- 19. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Result 3: public debt help gaining political support Welfare effect – τk 19 / 39
- 20. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Result 3: public debt help gaining political support Welfare effect - τk & debt + τk 20 / 39
- 21. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Result 3: public debt help gaining political support Welfare effect - transition - τk & debt + τk 21 / 39
- 22. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Aggregate welfare effect and political support Fiscal closure Baseline τk dτk prog. τ τb τc dτc τl dτl Reform τk 0.57 0.56 1.01 0.59 0.50 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 dτk 0.54 0.54 0.99 0.56 0.47 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 prog. -0.45 -0.45 0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.35 -0.35 -0.36 -0.34 τ -0.13 -0.12 0.35 0.09 0.14 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 τb -0.15 -0.14 0.33 0.07 0.13 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 τc -0.14 -0.14 0.33 0.11 0.17 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 dτc -0.16 -0.16 0.31 0.09 0.15 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 τl -0.46 -0.46 0.01 -0.11 -0.03 -0.36 -0.35 -0.37 -0.35 dτl -0.45 -0.45 0.01 -0.1 -0.02 -0.36 -0.35 -0.36 -0.35 % of consumption in the reform scenario which you are willing to give up to ensure that the reform take place green cells refer sufficient to political support τk is always a good idea little effect of debt on welfare prog. (almost) always better then τl in the reform 22 / 39
- 23. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Conclusions: fiscal closure DOES matter Social security reform requires fiscal adjustment Fiscal closures redistribute and affect efficiency, therefore matter a lot (unnoticed in earlier literature) Loss of Insurance important but not necessarily decisive for evaluation of (partial) privatization Preferred policy options Debt closures: allow to smooth the transition burden on more cohorts Tax on capital income 23 / 39
- 24. Motivation Model & Calibration Results Questions or suggestions? Thank you! w: grape.org.pl t: grape org f: grape.org e: [email protected] 24 / 39
- 25. New fiscal closures GO BACK capital tax tax, τk,t Tt = τl,t(1 − τt)wtLt + τk,trtAt + τc,tCt + Υt J j=1 Nj,t Gt + subsidyt + rtDt = Tt + ∆Dt smoothing tax adjustments with public debt part of the costs of the reform shifted to the future generations fiscal rule τk,t = (1 − )τfinal k + τk,t−1 + D Dt Yt − D Y final debt in the final steady state the same as in the initial steady state 25 / 39
- 26. Fiscal new closures GO BACK tr1 the lowest income threshold trn is the highest income threshold n is the number of income brackets m is a tax multiplier such that τi l,t = τ0 l,t ∗ mi Income threshold is multiple of average labor income, (1 − τt)wt ¯lt. In the initial steady state m = 1 In the transition path m = 1.15 and n = 4 26 / 39
- 27. Fiscal closures new in the literature Total gross labor income (1 − τt)wtLt is a sum of n + 1 components: earnings taxed by one of n + 1 tax rate. L0 t = ¯J j=1 Nj,t Ω min(ωj,t(sj,t)lj,t(sj,t), tr1)dPj,t Li t = ¯J j=1 Nj,t Ω max(min(ωj,t(sj,t)lj,t(sj,t − tr1), tri − tri−1), 0)dPj,t∀i = 1, ..., n τ0 l,t = Gt + subsidyt + ∆Dt − Υ1 J j=1 Nj,t − τc,1Ct − τk,1rtAt − n i=0 Li tτi l n i=0 Li t τi l,1 = mi ∗ τ0 l,1 27 / 39
- 28. Fiscal closures within pension system GO BACK To keep pension system balanced government may adjust: contribution rate τ benefits bj (as a tax on benefits) J j= ¯Jt Nj,t(1 − τb,t)bj,t = τt ¯wtLt and subsidyt = 0 28 / 39
- 29. Fiscal closures outside pension system, subsidyt = 0 GO BACK consumption tax, τc,t labor tax, τl,t Tt = τl,t(1 − τt)wtLt + τk,trtAt + τc,tCt + Υt J j=1 Nj,t Gt + subsidyt + rtDt = Tt + ∆Dt smoothing tax adjustments with public debt part of the costs of the reform shifted to the future generations fiscal rule ∀ tax ∈ {l, c} τtax,t = (1 − )τfinal tax + τtax,t−1 + D D Y t − D Y final debt in the final steady state the same as in the initial steady state 29 / 39
- 30. Profile of average consumption for τk closure other closures in line with Gourinchas & Parker (2002, Econometrica) 30 / 39
- 31. Profile of average labor for τk closure other closures 31 / 39
- 32. Profile of average savings for τk closure other closures 32 / 39
- 33. GO BACK τk debt + τk progression τ τl debt + τl τb τc debt + τc 33 / 39
- 34. GO BACK τk debt + τk progression τ τl debt + τl τb τc debt +τc 34 / 39
- 35. GO BACK τk debt + τk progression τ τl debt + τl τb τc debt +τc 35 / 39
- 36. Capital GO BACK 36 / 39
- 37. Labor GO BACK 37 / 39
- 38. GO BACK τk debt + τk progression τ τl debt + τl τb τc debt +τc 38 / 39
- 39. Model solving GO BACK Gauss-Seidel iterative algorithm Guess an initial value for k = K/(zL) and compute prices Solve individual problem and aggregate it to find new K and L , thus k iterate until convergence Consumer problem (backward policy function iterations) implicit tax to reduce state space, Butler (2002) policy function iterations with picewise linear interpolation within period problem solved with Newton-Raphson given initial distribution at age j = 1, transition matrix for idiosyncratic productivity and the policy functions compute the distribution in any successive age j. aggregation done with Gaussian quadrature Transition path, goes between the initial and final steady state 39 / 39