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Efficient Bytecode Analysis:
Linespeed Shellcode Detection
Georg Wicherski
Security Researcher
Anatomy of a Shellcode

• Little piece of Bytecode that gets jumped to in an exploit
  – Direct overwrite of EIP on the stack
  – Sprayed on the Heap and called as a function pointer
  – Allocated by small ROP payload and jumped to by last gadget
      • Minus Zynamics Google, they do ROPperies


• Usually some requirements because it is delivered inline
  – Null byte free, because it terminates a C-String
  – rn free, because it often is a delimiter in network protocols
  – ...



            Decoder Stub               Encoded Shellcode
Shellcode Decoder Structure

  jmp getpc                   ; jump to GetPC

  start:                      ; GetPC 2: ebp = EIP
    pop ebp
    push 42                   ; load counter = 42
    pop ecx
    push 23                   ; load key = 23
    pop edx

  decrypt:
    xor byte [ebp+ecx], dl    ; unxor one byte
    loop decrypt              ; repeat until ecx = 0
  jmp payload

  getpc:
    call start                ; GetPC 1: push EIP to stack
  payload:
GetPC Sequences

• call $+5, pop r32
  – Push return address for function call onto stack
  – Use stack access to read back the return address

• fnop, fnstenv [esp+0x0c], pop r32
  – Use a floating point instruction, address will be stored in floating point
    control aread
  – Save floating point control area on stack
  – Read back the instruction address from stack


• Structured Exception Handling
  – Windows specific, trigger an exception
  – Get address of exception instruction in exception handler
Existing Detection Approaches

• Static / Statistical Approaches
   – e.g. Markov Chains for Bytecode (Alme & Elser, Caro 2009)
       • Trained with shellcode / non-shellcode data
       • Measures likelyhood of certain instructions following each other
   – Can only detect the decoder and therefore tend to be either false positive
     or false negative prone (weighting, training data, ...)

• GetPC Sequences + Backtracking + Emulation (libemu)
   – Identify possible GetPC sequences in data
   – Build up tree of possible starting locations by disassembling “backwards”
       • A problem on its own on the x86 CISC architecture
   – Software x86 emulation to weed out (the many) false positives
libscizzle

• Identification of possible GetPC sequences
   – A little less strict than libemu in terms of triggering combinations


• Brute force possible starting location around sequence
   – Efficient emulation allows this performance wise


• Use efficient sandboxed hardware execution for verification
   – No, this is not virtualization, no VT involved
   – Yes, it is secure, so we do not get owned (trivially)




       http://code.mwcollect.org/projects/libscizzle
x86 Segmentation vs. Paging


     Segment           Virtual   Physical
Code Execution / “Emulation”

• Disassemble guest code
   – Stop on any privileged or (potentially)
     execution flow modifying instruction
   – This is roughly equivalent to “basic
     blocks”
   – Segment register access is considered
     a privileged instruction ;)

• Execute one basic block at a time
  within the guest segment
• Emulate all other instructions
   – Conditional jumps, calls, ...
   – Abort analysis on any privileged
     instructions

• Exception: backwards short jumps
Evaluation: Performance

$ ./libscizzle-test < urandom.bin
[*] Filtering / scanning over 32.0 MiB of data took 105 ms.
[*] Verifying 700 shellcode candidate offsets...
[*] Verification over 32.0 MiB of data took 217 ms.
[*] Everything over 32.0 MiB of data took 322 ms.


• 99.38 Mib / sec, 795 MiB / sec on my presentation laptop, single core
• About 1000x faster than libemu, a lot faster than Markov Chains

• This is fast enough to do it inline at GigaBit speed on a commodity
  server, think IPS
• Real world data has usually better properties than purely random data
Evaluation: Success Rate

• False Positives: none.
   – If it is detected, it resembles valid
     shellcode
   – Random data might resemble valid
     shellcode but this is a philosophical
     problem then, highly unlikely.

• False Negatives: none so far
   – Tested on a lot of public shellcodes
     (tricky Metasploit ones,
     egghunters)
   – Used during CTFs for testing
     libscizzle, detected everything
        • DefCon, ruCTFe, ...

• Manual evasion possible
Questions?




             Thanks for your attention!
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Efficient Bytecode Analysis: Linespeed Shellcode Detection

  • 1. Efficient Bytecode Analysis: Linespeed Shellcode Detection Georg Wicherski Security Researcher
  • 2. Anatomy of a Shellcode • Little piece of Bytecode that gets jumped to in an exploit – Direct overwrite of EIP on the stack – Sprayed on the Heap and called as a function pointer – Allocated by small ROP payload and jumped to by last gadget • Minus Zynamics Google, they do ROPperies • Usually some requirements because it is delivered inline – Null byte free, because it terminates a C-String – rn free, because it often is a delimiter in network protocols – ... Decoder Stub Encoded Shellcode
  • 3. Shellcode Decoder Structure jmp getpc ; jump to GetPC start: ; GetPC 2: ebp = EIP pop ebp push 42 ; load counter = 42 pop ecx push 23 ; load key = 23 pop edx decrypt: xor byte [ebp+ecx], dl ; unxor one byte loop decrypt ; repeat until ecx = 0 jmp payload getpc: call start ; GetPC 1: push EIP to stack payload:
  • 4. GetPC Sequences • call $+5, pop r32 – Push return address for function call onto stack – Use stack access to read back the return address • fnop, fnstenv [esp+0x0c], pop r32 – Use a floating point instruction, address will be stored in floating point control aread – Save floating point control area on stack – Read back the instruction address from stack • Structured Exception Handling – Windows specific, trigger an exception – Get address of exception instruction in exception handler
  • 5. Existing Detection Approaches • Static / Statistical Approaches – e.g. Markov Chains for Bytecode (Alme & Elser, Caro 2009) • Trained with shellcode / non-shellcode data • Measures likelyhood of certain instructions following each other – Can only detect the decoder and therefore tend to be either false positive or false negative prone (weighting, training data, ...) • GetPC Sequences + Backtracking + Emulation (libemu) – Identify possible GetPC sequences in data – Build up tree of possible starting locations by disassembling “backwards” • A problem on its own on the x86 CISC architecture – Software x86 emulation to weed out (the many) false positives
  • 6. libscizzle • Identification of possible GetPC sequences – A little less strict than libemu in terms of triggering combinations • Brute force possible starting location around sequence – Efficient emulation allows this performance wise • Use efficient sandboxed hardware execution for verification – No, this is not virtualization, no VT involved – Yes, it is secure, so we do not get owned (trivially) http://code.mwcollect.org/projects/libscizzle
  • 7. x86 Segmentation vs. Paging Segment Virtual Physical
  • 8. Code Execution / “Emulation” • Disassemble guest code – Stop on any privileged or (potentially) execution flow modifying instruction – This is roughly equivalent to “basic blocks” – Segment register access is considered a privileged instruction ;) • Execute one basic block at a time within the guest segment • Emulate all other instructions – Conditional jumps, calls, ... – Abort analysis on any privileged instructions • Exception: backwards short jumps
  • 9. Evaluation: Performance $ ./libscizzle-test < urandom.bin [*] Filtering / scanning over 32.0 MiB of data took 105 ms. [*] Verifying 700 shellcode candidate offsets... [*] Verification over 32.0 MiB of data took 217 ms. [*] Everything over 32.0 MiB of data took 322 ms. • 99.38 Mib / sec, 795 MiB / sec on my presentation laptop, single core • About 1000x faster than libemu, a lot faster than Markov Chains • This is fast enough to do it inline at GigaBit speed on a commodity server, think IPS • Real world data has usually better properties than purely random data
  • 10. Evaluation: Success Rate • False Positives: none. – If it is detected, it resembles valid shellcode – Random data might resemble valid shellcode but this is a philosophical problem then, highly unlikely. • False Negatives: none so far – Tested on a lot of public shellcodes (tricky Metasploit ones, egghunters) – Used during CTFs for testing libscizzle, detected everything • DefCon, ruCTFe, ... • Manual evasion possible
  • 11. Questions? Thanks for your attention!