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Empathy in Education
Engagement, Values and Achievement
Bridget Cooper

Continuum International Publishing Group
The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane
11 York Road Suite 704
London SE1 7NX New York NY 10038
www.continuumbooks.com
© Bridget Cooper 2011
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission
in writing from the publishers.
Bridget Cooper has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
EISBN: 978-1-4411-2808-9
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cooper, Bridget.
Empathy in education: engagement, values and achievement / BridgetCooper.
p. cm.
Summary: “A thorough exploration of the role empathy plays in learning
throughout all levels of education and its crucial relationship to motivation,
values development and achievement”– Provided by publisher.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4411-0144-0 (hardback)
1. Affective education. 2. Motivation in education, 3. Academic
achievement. I. Title.
LB1072.C66 2011
370.15’4–dc23
2011016508
Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India
Printed and bound in Great Britain

To my parents, Kathleen and James Carle, who taught my brothers
and sisters and me how to love

Contents
List of Figures ix
Acknowledgements xi
Introduction 1
Part 1: Empathy, Morality and Learning: An Historical Background
Chapter 1: Empathy: An Historical Perspective 7
Chapter 2: Empathy and Morality: The Relationship 16
Chapter 3: The Nature and Significance of Empathy in Education 27
Part 2: New Understandings of Empathy in Learning
Relationships and the Significance of Context
Chapter 4: A New Classification of Empathy in Learning
Relationships 47
Chapter 5: The Benefits of Empathy in Teaching and
Learning Relationships 102
Chapter 6: Constraints on Empathy in Learning Relationships 128
Chapter 7: Modelling Empathy and Values in the Classroom 159
Chapter 8: Empathy and Students with
Particular Needs: Transformative Learning 176
Part 3: Wider Implications: Empathy beyond the School
Chapter 9: The Life-long Learner: Emotional Engagement as
the Essence of Learning through the Life Course 191
Chapter 10: Affect, Technology and Learning 205
Chapter 11: Empathy in Management, Systems and Organizations 215
Chapter 12: Wider Values and Creativity 228

Contents
viii
Chapter 13: Issues in the Education and Training of Professionals 240
Chapter 14: Wider Implications and Future Work 249
Bibliography 259
Appendix 273
Index 275

List of Figures
Figure 4.1 Characteristics of fundamental empathy 50
Figure 4.2 Characteristics of profound empathy 61
Figure 4.3 Characteristics of functional empathy 90
Figure 5.1 Effects of empathy 103
Figure 5.2 How empathy supports values, engagement
and achievement 121
Figure 6.1 Constraints on empathy 129
Figure 8.1 Profound empathy in interaction 186
Figure 8.2 Interaction in larger groups 186

Acknowledgements
With great thanks, especially to all the excellent teachers, student teachers
and students who gave of their precious time be interviewed and observed,
and to the educational institutions that participated in the research
referred to in this book.
Great thanks also to my family and friends, who have been so tolerant,
supportive and insightful throughout my research career, and to the staff
and students in the institutions where I have worked, the Open University,
Leeds Metropolitan University, the Universities of Leeds and Sunderland
and beyond, who have supported and encouraged my endeavours.

Introduction
In an era when differences of race and religion, the extremes of wealth and
poverty, and the dilemma of global warming dominate our news headlines,
never has it been so necessary to develop the quality of empathy, to heal a
fractured and fearful global society. Such healing requires understanding
and empathy. Understanding comes with experience and education, and
empathy can be part of that education. This book discusses the nature of
empathy and its role in the learning process throughout all phases of edu-
cation and its crucial relationship to motivation, and values development
and achievement, impacting society from the micro to the macro. The area
of affective or emotional issues in learning and its importance in moral
development was often neglected by academics and policy-makers in the
later twentieth century but became increasingly topical around the turn
of the new millennium. This book combines evidence from neuroscience,
psychology and other educational research, including substantial evidence
from a doctoral thesis which considers the intrinsic nature of affect and
empathic human relationships in learning. This thesis was conducted to
address a gap in the research on moral development in schools. Though
the book draws on research from around the world, much of the detailed
primary research was based in the United Kingdom context between 1996
and 2010.
The book is divided into three parts. Part One looks at the historical
background to empathy as a concept and its relationship to morality and
learning. Part Two looks at more recent understanding about empathy,
is based largely on empirical research and considers the significance of
context to the quality of empathy. It offers a detailed study of empathy
in teaching and learning, which sheds light on the learning process. Part
Three considers the significance of empathy beyond schools, as part of
lifelong learning, its role in the design and use of technology, in manage-
ment and organizations, its contribution to wider values and to creativity.
Also considered is the role of empathy in teacher education and the contin-
ued training of professionals, and, finally, the wider implications for caring
services, other organizations and possible future research.

2
This book will complement the many extant books on emotional intelli-
gence in education and provide much-needed balance to the strong empha-
sis on mechanistic learning, curriculum and cognition that has dominated
the understanding of learning theory. It considers affective issues in learn-
ing in compulsory, further and higher education and its relationship to
the use of new technology and artificial intelligence in the learning proc-
ess. Consequently, it has wider implications for the development of human
understanding and values in a global society.
Academics have often avoided research on affective issues because of
its complex, intangible nature, despite its centrality to human function-
ing. Educational researchers have tended to cling to the less challenging
research domains, the concrete, the measurable, the cognitive and the cur-
riculum, which are more easily understood and funded by policy-makers
and have consequently built steadily and profoundly on each other’s lim-
itations. Ignorance about the value of qualitative research in education
has compounded this distortion. Periodically, leading academics call for
increased research into values and affect in education, but the response
has been severely limited by the prevailing culture of the market and dom-
inance of statistical analysis, combined with a reluctance to adequately
challenge the nineteenth-century classroom model. Interestingly, affect
and the interaction between cognition and affect was often more readily
explored in artificial intelligence and technology and neuroscience than
in traditional educational circles, and this book incorporates aspects of
that research.
This book is needed to divert educationalists from the prevailing focus of
research and to enable affective aspects of education to be fully grounded
and explored through the current and potential research base. Although
practitioners and academics have recognized the dearth of emphasis on
affect in education and begun to remedy it through publicising strategies
to develop emotional and social intelligence, and managers have been
encouraged to utilize affect in their organizations (Goleman, 1996; Alimo-
Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe, 2005), in education emotional education has
become another add-on to the existing curriculum and to management
strategies. The significance of the intrinsic nature of emotion in all human
interaction is not fully considered and the area has not been adequately or
profoundly theorized in terms of the teaching and learning process, and
the constraints of existing systems. This book aims to fulfil that need.
Politicians in the UK have called for personalization and pleasure in
learning, as well as the promotion of good citizenship, but still advocate an
intensive rigid curriculum in large, one-size-fits-all classes and lectures,

Introduction 3
which can only intensify as the post-banking crisis cuts take further bites
out of education funding. The conservative-dominated coalition in 2010
promised to relieve teachers of some of the bureaucracy under which
they had previously laboured, which stifled autonomy and creativity,
but real funding for more humane classrooms through improved staff/
student ratios was not promised and funding for the arts, creativity and
drama rapidly disappeared in schools and universities. The dichotomy
between rhetoric and reality in education has been clearly exposed by
researchers such as Alexander (2004) and, sadly, too many researchers
collude and comply with government policy priorities and inconsisten-
cies, in order to obtain favour for the scarce funding for educational
research. This book highlights the inherent contradictions in rhetoric
and practice, drawing together available research on affect in learning
and teaching and uniting the complementary evidence from psychology
and neuroscience. It provides both a historical base and incorporates
current research, including significant original research by the author,
which questions basic assumptions about our education systems and the
nature of educational research. This research, in turn, will enable pro-
fessional educators to have confidence in investigating affective issues in
the future.
The aim of the book is to extend profundity and breadth in educational
thinking, not only by reviewing and discussing the literature but by devel-
oping theory through the voice and practice of expert practitioners, whose
understanding about teaching and learning has enormous implications
for educational theory, policy and practice. In this regard, the detailed
research into teaching and learning in Part Two will be naturally under-
stood by classroom teachers, for whenever it has been presented in part at
conferences, it has been eagerly received, most especially by people who
have daily contact with students and student teachers. One head teacher at
a conference where I presented some of this research said, ‘Thank you for
reminding us what teaching is all about.’
This book questions the Victorian and monetarist approaches to educa-
tion, which we would argue restricts esteem and slows down the learning
and moral development of students in every phase of education. There
must be no misapprehension about the nature of empathy or emotion
in learning. It does not represent a sentimental or woolly approach, but
is fundamental to every aspect of how human beings relate to and learn
from each other. In this sense, it should be a central focus of educational
research in the coming years if we are to move human society forward both
in learning and cohesion.

4
Some of the arguments are controversial and challenge some accepted
wisdoms on issues around inclusion, secondary schools and university edu-
cation. It naturally challenges approaches to education that consider the
short-term financial issues before the significance of learning longer term
and, therefore, society’s longer-term good. For the good of the planet, we
must harness the potential of all of humanity, not just a small proportion
of it. I sincerely hope that readers enjoy this book, as well as build upon its
thinking.

Part One
Empathy, Morality and Learning:
An Historical Background

Chapter 1
Empathy: An Historical Perspective
What Is Empathy?
Dictionary definitions of empathy reveal the ambiguity that pervades the
concept throughout the literature. The following definition is not atypi-
cal, stating that empathy comes from the German word Einfühlung and
describes it as: ‘the power of mentally identifying oneself with (and so fully
comprehending) a person or object of contemplation’ (Brown, 1993, 808).
The associated adjectives are ‘empathic’ and ‘empathetic’, both of which
are generally used by authors. This definition also explains that empathy
implies feeling with someone rather than for them, and implies a subjec-
tive position rather than an objective one, an idea carefully articulated by
Noddings (1986). This research specifically examines empathy shown for
people, not objects, though the latter is occasionally touched upon when
it illuminates the discussion about empathy shown for people. To a certain
extent, some of the earliest discussions of empathy (Lipps, 1897; Vischer,
1872) were more interested in an ability to grasp the aesthetic rather than
to understand the ‘other’ in human terms.
The concept of ‘fully comprehending’ others immediately raises the ques-
tion of how one could possibly know everything about a separate human
being, with all the complexity that concept entails, and some research has
specifically focused on the accuracy of empathy (Ickes, 1997). Nevertheless,
there exists a well-documented and researched concept of empathy from
the last century which describes a sense of understanding between peo-
ple – an area of common ground, a sharing of feeling and emotion, an
ability to feel and see things through the eyes of others – an understanding
that, while it is hard to define and measure, is too important for human
relationships to ignore (Aspy, 1972; Deutsch and Madle, 1975; Feschbach,
1975; Gladstein,1983; Rogers, 1975; Schantz, 1975).
Psychologists frequently attempt to measure empathy, and do so in a
variety of ways. Empathy is not a neat, concrete concept which necessarily

8
permits highly objective evaluation, but its complexity must be understood
in as many diverse ways as possible because of its centrality to human inter-
action and to teaching and learning. Whatever the complexity of empathy
some aspects of it are mathematical, in as much as deeper levels of empathy
require individual attention, time, and frequency of interaction. Profound
empathy, as identified in the research and explained in Part Two of this
book, is dependent upon knowing the other person in some detail, which
does not happen instantly; otherwise, as Carse (2005) points out, wrong
motivations and beliefs may result. Hence, the immediate conditions in
which people are able to interact, and the emotional capacity of individu-
als, both facilitate and constrain the development of empathy.
Empathy may not be strictly a human quality. It is possible that other liv-
ing creatures possess a certain degree of empathy (Goleman, 1996; Ickes,
1997). There are also different types and degrees of empathy, and empathy
is often linked to emotional contagion, that is, the tendency to ‘catch’ the
‘emotions’ of others, in the literature. Hill et al. (2010) recently proposed
a mathematical model for the spreading of emotion, which they compared
to the spreading of an infectious disease, and Barsade (2002) considers the
effect of emotional contagion on groups. According to scientific research,
the possibility of a common universal atomic origin (Capra, 1997) may
mean that our ability to feel at one with each other and with our environ-
ment may be more fundamental to our chemistry than we presently under-
stand. The neurons in the human body transmit electrical signals, charged
by our senses, to create feelings that are reinforced and strengthened by
the brain. Anyone who has attended a cup final at Wembley Stadium or a
concert at Royal Albert Hall will recognize the power and reality of shared
and heightened emotions. When a football commentator describes the
atmosphere as ‘electric’, perhaps he is nearer to the truth than we real-
ize. When we sense the feelings of others, mirror neurons in the brain
trigger off similar emotions within us, which is a possible mechanism for
empathy (Preston and de Waal, 2002). Many thinkers have linked height-
ened awareness involved in empathy to spirituality and creativity (Fryer,
1996; Hay, 1997; Noddings, 1986; Nye, 1998). In contrast, the ‘group-think’
aspect of empathy, in which group members relate much more closely to
their own group than to another, can also have negative effects for outsiders,
as evidenced by the famous warders and guards experiment (Haney et al.,
1973) , in which students participated in a role play experiment which had
to be swiftly terminated because the ‘warders’ treated the ‘prisoners’ so cru-
elly and the terrifying outcomes brilliantly depicted in The Crucible (Miller,
1953), an allegory of McCarthyism, in which a group of young women in

Empathy: An Historical Perspective 9
the Salem witch trials, in a state of high emotion, contribute to the arrest
of a man for witchcraft. However empathy is most often explained more
directly in terms of its role in human relationships which is discussed in
detail below.
All major philosophers from Aristotle onward discuss the human capac-
ity for other-centredness and the importance of one’s relationships with –
and ability to understand the feelings of – fellow humans, and this capacity
repeatedly recurs in discussions of ethics and morals. Aristotle included
the emotions in his arguments about virtue and morality, explaining that
one should take pleasure in virtue and that it should lead to happiness
and well being (Benn, 1998). According to Karl Marx, man can reach his
human potential not as an individual but only as a social being, in his rela-
tions with his fellow man and woman. At the heart of his critique of capital-
ism is the denunciation of individualism, and naked self-interest (Marx and
Engels, 1888). This human relationship is not just rational or functional,
but is sensual and personal and makes us complete. He wrote to his wife:
‘but love of the beloved, and more particularly of you my beloved, makes a
man, a man again’ (Fischer, 1973, 26).
Marx (in Fischer, 1973) writes of man acquiring the world through his
senses, and Macmurray (1935) discusses the importance of emotions and
sensitive awareness, of employing the senses for the sheer joy they deliver
to us, rather than merely utilizing them for narrower intellectual or func-
tional purposes. He sees the intellect as subordinate to the emotions, and
self-centred rather than other-centred: ‘Intellectual awareness is egocen-
tric. It uses the senses as its instrument. But the direct sensual awareness
has its centre in the world outside, in the thing that is sensed and loved for
its own sake’ (Macmurray, 1935, 43).
The implication that intellectual awareness is more egocentric has
interesting implications for morality and will be discussed later. However,
Macmurray sees the application of sensual sensitivity, and awareness of
other human beings, as the roots of human communion and religion,
whereas Marx believed the supreme form of human integration and inter-
action was communism. The greater good is implicit in both concepts.
Hay (1997) links Marx’s concept of the species-being to the idea of spir-
itual awareness, and both of these to a sense of heightened awareness and
sensitivity. Hay also suggests that this awareness, which Noddings (1986)
calls ‘receptivity’ and Watson and Ashton (1995) call ‘openness,’ is actu-
ally a physical state. These descriptions begin to portray this concept not
just as a mental state, but also increasingly as a neuro-biological state or
process.

10
Sympathy or Empathy?
At times, philosophers have used the word ‘sympathy’ in a sense similar
to the first definition of empathy above, and Hume (1739), for example,
particularly emphasizes the importance of sympathy to man’s moral devel-
opment. The dictionary offers a range of definitions. The one below seems
quite close to the empathy described by Aspy and Rogers later in this sec-
tion: ‘Concordance or harmony of inclinations or temperament, mak-
ing people congenial to one another, mutuality or community of feeling’
(Brown, 1993, 3185). This is not dissimilar to Hume’s description, which
stated that we have a natural propensity: ‘to sympathise with others and to
receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments’ (Hume, 1739,
316). However, all these definitions are open to interpretation, since the
very personal and sensual interaction suggested in empathy is not easily
defined or measured.
The Significance of Empathy
Empathy as a concept was avidly researched and discussed in the 1960s and
early 1970s and, given its intangible nature, has been differently described
as a quality, an ability, a state and a concept. The influence of Rogers on the
role of empathy in counselling and education was significant and wide-
spread. His definition below seems to show a long-term and developmental
understanding of empathy:
The way of being with another person, which is termed empathic, has
several facets. It means entering the private perceptual world of the
other and becoming thoroughly at home in it. It involves being sensi-
tive, moment by moment, to the changing felt meanings which flow in
this other person, to the fear or rage or tenderness or confusion or
whatever, that he/she is experiencing. It includes communicating your
sensings of his/her world as you look with fresh unfrightened eyes at ele-
ments of which the individual is fearful. It means frequently checking
with him/ her as to the accuracy of your sensings and being guided by
the responses you receive. You are a confident companion to the per-
son in his/her inner world. By pointing to the possible meanings in the
flow of his/her experiencing you help the person to focus on this useful
type of referent, to experience the meanings more fully, and to move
forward in the experiencing. Perhaps this description makes clear that

being empathic is a complex, demanding, strong yet subtle way of being.
(Rogers, 1975, 4)
Summarizing some of the other research findings on empathy in ther-
apy, he argued that empathy at an early stage in a relationship predicts
later success in that relationship. Experience, but not brilliance, improves
empathy, which is able to counteract feelings of ‘alienation,’ ensuring peo-
ple value themselves and are able to open up to others (Rogers, 1975, 5–6).
Rogers interchanges the term ‘empathy’ with ‘sensitive understanding’
and explains how this understanding enables even very disturbed patients
to feel more normal and human, but adds that lack of understanding by a
therapist can make the patient feel worse. He sums up by saying: ‘[A] finely
tuned understanding by another person gives the recipient his person
hood, his identity. Empathy gives that needed confirmation that one does
exist as a separate, valued person with an identity’ (Rogers, 1975, 7).
In the moment of interaction or contemplation, the empathic person
has a real sense of accepting and understanding the other. This can be
conveyed to the recipient of empathy, and some common area of feeling
or understanding is reached, forming a ‘mutual bond’ (Dixon and Morse
cited in Aspy, 1972). Absorption, what Noddings (1986) calls ‘engrossment,’
signifies this mutual bond. Listening attentively in conversation, receiving
the messages the other wants to send, responding to them, and feeling for
them evokes the empathy involved in a caring relationship:
Caring is largely reactive and responsive. Perhaps it is even better char-
acterised by receptive. The one-caring is sufficiently engrossed in the
other to listen to him and to take pleasure or pain in what he recounts.
Whatever she does for the cared-for is embedded in a relationship that
reveals itself as engrossment and an attitude that warms and comforts
the cared for. (Noddings, 1986, 19)
For Rogers and Aspy, empathy is a common human quality, potentially
developed and improved by training. Aspy developed training in empathy
for student teachers (Rogers, 1975). Hargreaves (1972) called for empathy
training in the UK to ensure ‘caring’ teachers. Empathy training has been
conducted in Italy, for example (Francescato, 1998), and Black and Phillips
(1982) showed the training to have some effect, although for the more
empathic student teachers it did not, suggesting that teacher selection may
be more important than training. In their study, empathy was also negatively
correlated with an authoritarian approach, an implication of which could

12
be that the tough-minded approach often dominating the management of
education and caring services could counteract an empathic approach by
those who work directly with students and clients. This raises some inter-
esting issues, which will be discussed in Chapter 13. If empathy develops in
early family relationships, as Goleman (op. cit., 1996) suggests, can train-
ing really help to develop empathy or does training only create superficial
changes? Could more emphasis on empathic interaction early in caring
relationships enhance empathy in professional caring interactions?
Other early research (Hogan, 1975; Feschbach, 1975; Shantz, 1975) posits
different types and aspects of empathy, separating cognitive and affective
aspects, for example, and using different measures. This research suggests
that different aspects are affected by both genetics and early experience,
and that only some aspects can be affected by training. However, other
researchers felt that different aspects could not be measured in isolation
(Iannotti, 1975). Hogan (1973) agreed with Rogers’s early contention that
overuse of empathy could lead to identification with the other, which could
be harmful rather than beneficial.
There is some consensus that, on the whole, it is easier to empathize with
someone similar to oneself. Consequently, in general, young people find
it easier to empathize with other young people, boys with boys, girls with
girls, and ethnic group with ethnic group (Rogers, 1975; Schantz, 1975).
Children can learn pro-social behaviours but require empathy to enact
them, especially boys (Roberts and Strayer, 1996). Goleman (1996) sug-
gests that the receptivity needed for empathy cannot occur if the person
trying to empathize is already too emotional. If one is angry, for example,
one will not be receptive enough to receive, and mimic in their own body,
the signals from someone else, which would help them to understand how
the other is feeling. The flooding of the brain with one emotion can coun-
ter the ability to tune into other emotions. Psychologists such as Bowlby
(1951) describe the problem with anger destroying receptivity.
Damasio (1996) argues that emotions are vital to complex learning
and decision-making. An inability to tune into appropriate emotions can
impair this learning. This concept has some backing in research in artificial
intelligence (Hase et al., 2001), where emotions in learning and decision-
making have been a vibrant area of research (Belavkin, 2001; Davis, 2001;
Frankel and Ray, 2001; Macas et al., 2001; Moffat, 2001; Moldt and von
Scheve, 2001; Paiva, 2000; Picard, 1997; Sloman, 2001) and is discussed in
Chapter 10.
The influence of Rogers’s and others’ work on ‘empathy’ and its perti-
nence to teaching, learning, and human growth and development, whether

in the academic, personal or ‘moral’ sphere, has permeated educational
thinking world wide (Brandes and Ginnis, 1990; Pike and Selby, 1988).
It still holds great significance in the area of pastoral education, special
needs and also multicultural education, where perhaps a higher degree of
empathy is needed simply because of the diversity of pupils with particular
needs, or for pupils from different regions, races and cultures. These issues
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. Empathy can be accepting and
understanding of difference, and perhaps is central to understanding val-
ues formation.
In the last 20 years, however, research in neuroscience, in personal and
social and values development, and in artificial intelligence, seems to be
reaffirming the significance of the role of emotions in learning and devel-
opment. Winkley (1996) discusses the ability of babies to respond to emo-
tion in others, and how the neural networks in the brain grow when the
baby feels accepted and loved. The works of Damasio (1996) and Goleman
(op. cit., 1996) are typical summaries of research into brain development
and link the emotional, the cognitive and physical as never before. They
show how our abilities to make judgements and so called ‘rational’ deci-
sions are inextricably linked to our inner feelings and physical processes,
each feeding back to the other in different ways. This rejection of Cartesian
dualism and revival of the significance of emotion recognizes the unified
nature of mind and body, and of the intrinsic role of the emotions in the
learning and decision-making process.
Damasio (1999) explains the significance of intense interaction and
engagement in learning, where the senses are focused on the object or
person of interest. He emphasizes the role of the human’s own sense of
body and self, in relation to the world he perceives and experiences. At
each interaction, a human recreates his image of self (body and brain)
in the mind. With each positive interaction, the sense of self is continu-
ally reinforced and updated, and the person is encouraged to open up
more, explore more and learn more. Negative interaction causes the brain
and body to retract and protect itself. With positive multi-sensory interac-
tion, the brain and body absorb the feedback and information and become
more engrossed and engaged, and better able to understand. This absorp-
tion and engagement applied to people resembles Noddings’s concept
of ‘engrossment’ (Noddings, 1986) When one empathizes, one becomes
engrossed in other people, absorbing and assessing feedback from oth-
ers and responding to that feedback. Empathy appears to involve learning
intensely about others in multiple respects and sharing both their cogni-
tive and emotional responses, in turn creating an internal mental model of

14
them which relates closely to one’s own understanding and concept of self.
Damasio (1999) explains that the universality of emotion in human beings
significantly implies an ability of people world wide to relate to each other
at these deep levels of understanding.
Conversely, certain types of brain damage can reduce the links between
emotional and rational thinking, and, in turn, reduce the ability to cre-
ate an internal representation of the outer world. This can make it more
difficult for people to experience the world as others do, hampering the
ability to understand the effects of their actions on others, often result-
ing in less inhibited and more antisocial behaviour (Damasio, 1996, 1999;
Goleman, op. cit., 1996; Sacks, 1985; 1996;. Even verbal aggression can seri-
ously damage the brain and its capacity to learn because negative emotions
create grooves in brain tissue which interrupt normal pathways (Maclean
Hospital, 2001). This neurological research tends to reconfirm the impor-
tance of positive interaction and affect in the learning process and in the
development of a sense of self, a concept advocated by Rogers and others
many years previously. Watt (2000), like Damasio (1999), argues that emo-
tion is central to consciousness.
The work of authors like Goleman and neuroscientists like Damasio has
resulted in a greater appreciation of the affective dimension generally and
further research on empathy by a wide range of academics, from statisti-
cal measurement and testing through qualitative studies to purely philo-
sophical discussions. Verducci (2000) explains her interpretation of the
complexity and variety of empathy’s historical meanings and the scepti-
cism of many regarding its nature. Lopez et al. (2001) examines empathy’s
relationship to parental discipline, correlating it positively with females as
do many other studies and negatively with strong parental corporal pun-
ishment. Eklund et al. (2009) show the effect of prior similar experience
on the depth of empathy and, again, the increased empathy felt by women
and by older participants. Cotton (2002) summarizes a range of attributes
of empathy, along with advice for nurturing it, and also argues that higher
empathy scores are associated with higher scores in critical higher-order
thinking.
Empathy involves paying close attention to non-verbal as well as verbal
cues, and, according to Mehrabian (1971), non-verbal cues constitute more
than 90 per cent of communication. A smile, for example, can be seen
and can have an effect at seventy yards (Greenfield, 2002). This aspect of
empathy and the ability to recognize facial expression, in particular, and
early development of empathy in infants is an interesting area of research.
Researchers have found, for example, that even at four months of age,

infants are able to respond to and discriminate between the emotional
displays of others. A summary of this research can be found in Hutman
and Geffen (2009).
Empathy enables individuals to understand the emotions of others, and
to assess and respond to others’ motivations, which is vital in effective
teaching and learning. The current focus on research increasingly reveals
the fundamental importance of emotions, as understood intuitively by
Hume (1739) and recorded by Darwin (1872) in such detail, so long ago.
According to Salovey et al. (2008): ‘there is wide agreement that emotions
are the primary sources of motivations . . . they arouse, sustain and direct
human action . . . and provide individuals with information which shapes
their “judgements, decisions, priorities and actions,”’ (534–535). Isen
(2008) summarizes research into the effects of positive affect and argues
that it promotes ‘flexibility, problem-solving, innovation and improved
attention deployment’ (568). These and many other attributes influenced
by positive affect are central to learning; emotions also have a powerful
impact on memory.
More recently, researchers and authors have favoured the term ‘emo-
tional intelligence’, which perhaps encompasses a greater range of aspects
than empathy, while others prefer the concept of ‘emotional literacy’. We
must be wary of the term ‘intelligence’, however, because its history has
often influenced people to believe that this feature is in some way fixed.
Knowing about the plasticity of the brain, even after major trauma, we
realize that the brain learns and develops dynamically, even when its func-
tions seemed to have been drastically curtailed, by developing new blood
vessels and neurons which help to regenerate damaged areas of the brain.
Relevant aspects of neuroscience are discussed in relation to education
and empathy later in Chapter 3. A very useful resource, referred to above,
which summarizes much current research on affective issues and emotion,
is The Handbook of Emotions, edited by Lewis et al. (2008). The book is regu-
larly updated.

Chapter 2
Empathy and Morality: The Relationship
In addition to the importance of empathy in learning and interaction, it
is also highly significant in the development of moral values. It is vital to
understand this relationship, since, outside the family, young people spend
the most time with teachers and lecturers, who have considerable opportu-
nity to influence their values.
Moral Development and the Significance of Empathy
There is a wealth of literature on moral development, the best known and
most detailed being the works of Hoffman (1970; 2000; 2008), Hogan
(1973; 1975), Kohlberg (1984), and Piaget (1932), and, more recently, in the
feminist tradition, Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1986). Understanding
about moral development is also being illuminated by neuroscience, which
is beginning to add weight to the significance of affect in learning and
moral decision-making (Damasio, 1996, 1999, 2003; Goleman, 1995).
Educationalists are increasingly making the connections between these
ideas (Cooper, 2002, 2010; Narvaez and Vaydich, 2008).
Although psychologists exhibit different approaches to studying the con-
cept of moral development, similar understandings emerge. The literature
on values education echo these understandings. Though the importance
of rules, rewards and punishments, and the early formation of habits are
widely acknowledged, many theorists describe the growth from the egocen-
tric child, with unabashed self-interest, to the social being, who is able to see
the world through the eyes of others. A child’s growing awareness of both
the child’s own needs and the need of others leads to a sense of the greater
good of family, friends, community and, ultimately, humankind. Empathy
is most powerfully developed in infancy and early childhood (Leal, 2002)
when moral values can also be internalized (Roe, 1980), although the abil-
ity to understand outside oneself is a gradual process. Piaget (1932) writes

Empathy and Morality: The Relationship 17
of the small child: ‘his activity is unquestionably egocentric and egotistic.
The social instinct in well-defined form develops late’ (cited in Wood, 1988,
26). Hoffman (1970; 2000; 2008) has conducted a lifetime’s work on empa-
thy and strongly emphasizes the ability to understand the feelings and view-
points of others as an important factor in moral development:
A fourth process of moral development builds upon the child’s potential
for pro-social affect, mainly the capacity for empathy. . . . Specifically,
the taking of reciprocal roles, in which the person alternately affects oth-
ers and is affected by them in similar ways, may heighten his sensitivity
to the inner states aroused in others by his own behaviours, i.e. having
been in the other person’s place helps him to know how the latter feels in
response to his own behaviour. (Hoffman, 1970, 346–347)
Kohlberg produced an elaborate representation of the developmental
stages of moral judgement, a representation which required a person to
put himself into the shoes of others sufficiently to come to moral judge-
ments about increasingly complex ethical problems (Hersch et al., 1979).
However, Kohlberg’s theory (1984) came under considerable criticism
from feminists. His original studies, completed on males only, leave many
questions on moral development unanswered. Gilligan (1982) criticized
Kohlberg’s developmental stages because he only researched what individu-
als say about desirable behaviour, and not how they actually act. Kohlberg’s
stages are of moral judgement or reasoning, not of moral action, and
there can be a world of difference between the two. Kohlberg’s theory also
suggested that women could not reach higher stages of moral reasoning.
However, if men have higher levels of moral reasoning, as Kohlberg sug-
gests, they appear not to be translated into moral conduct. The gender
statistics of crime and imprisonment alone would suggest a divide between
thinking and doing; for example, males represent some 92 to 94 per cent
of British prisoners (Maguire et al., 2002). People might reason intellectu-
ally with extensive concern about the long-term implications for others,
but the question is, do they actually conduct themselves with the same con-
cern, and how can good conduct be encouraged? How do we encourage
individuals to want to do good things, that is, encourage ‘the will of the
individual to do right’ (SCAA, 1996b, 9)?
Gilligan (1982) argues that women perceive moral issues differently than
do men, due to having a very different psychological and emotional make-
up. From an early age, men are governed by rules and principles, whereas
women base their moral decisions on individual contexts and relationships.

18
This idea is explored in depth by Noddings (1986), whose feminist approach
to ethics has considerable resonance for the research discussed in Part Two
of this book. She argues that decisions should be based not on a principle
but, rather, on the individual contextual nature of the moral issue. Rigid
principles are not open to development, and in some circumstances may
be inappropriate. Ultimately, moral judgements are made by individuals
who take personal responsibility for their decision. This is arguably more
difficult than simply abiding by rules, which can, in effect, deny personal
responsibility. In order to achieve the most appropriate outcomes, the deci-
sions that people make in their lives and relationships must be based on
rich and specific information. This rich information can only be acquired
through a deep understanding of one another’s perspective and the long-
term implications of decisions. The concept of empathy is at the heart of
Noddings’s concept of ethics (1986).
Piaget’s developmental stages (1932) present a child increasingly aware
of the effects of their actions on others, but people who commit violent
acts seem not to have moved through these stages. In this respect, the-
ories of attachment (Bowlby, 1951) or attunement and development of
empathy, suggested by psychologists like Hoffman (2008), have consider-
able credence in relation to moral development. These theories suggest
that empathy can be nurtured from birth, but, equally, children who are
deprived of love and attachment with significant others could mature with
less empathy and a greater potential to commit immoral acts. If it is true
that such people are potentially redeemable later in life, as Rutter (1981)
and Docker-Drysdale (1990) suggest, it is perhaps equally feasible for oth-
ers to lose a previous ability to empathize. Perhaps people can become less
moral through experience, perhaps in relationships, institutions, cultures,
periods or in climates where concern for others is limited, or perhaps when
peoples’ lives or families are under threat. The primary research shown
later in Part Two suggests this is perhaps the case.
Hogan explains the child’s need for rules and early socialization, but
states that without an ability to understand the feelings of others, rule
followers are likely to be stuffy rule-bound, pedantic prigs, like Piaget’s
moral realists (Wood, 1988, 26) and that empathy is very important to
morality:
[T]hus when a person acts from a moral viewpoint, he tries to consider
the implications of his actions for the welfare of others. The disposition
to take the moral point of view is closely related to empathy or role tak-
ing. (Hogan, 1973, 222)

The problems with rules, emerge as part of the concept of functional
empathy, which is used in most classrooms and is identified and discussed
in Part Two.
Hogan’s reasoning coincides with principles of moral reasoning devised
by Haydon (1997b), in that a moral stance requires a determination to con-
sider the implications of one’s actions on the well-being of others and that
an individual also requires an empathetic disposition in order to consider
the other’s perspective. This raises the question of how that disposition is
acquired, and so we return to the question of developing, ‘the will to do
good’. An empathic disposition appears to help motivate and control our
actions and must, therefore, play a significant role in the development of
morality.
Hogan (1973) believes children must have experienced empathic treat-
ment themselves if they are, in turn, to develop empathy. He also says
that a comparative absence of repression or denial is necessary to develop
empathy, with its openness to inner experience, intuition and a willingness
to take note of non-verbal cues. Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) link the
process of induction in discipline to empathy. Understanding is developed
more explicitly by explanations as to why actions are appropriate or not,
as opposed to commands to ‘do’ or ‘don’t do’ this, without explanation.
Telling a child he must not hit another because it will hurt or upset the other
helps the child to see the other’s point of view and to understand the pain
or sadness generated by his actions. If empathic treatment by others helps
to develop empathy and this, in turn, supports moral decision-making,
then the people who live and work with young people must demonstrate
empathy if they are to promote moral attitudes and empathic behaviour in
their young charges. Goleman (1995) argues for the importance of empa-
thy in all walks of life and suggests that research shows that empathy is a
particular strength of females. However, his concept of empathy does not
fully explore different types or degrees of empathy. Does the empathy of a
care worker, for example, differ from that of a car salesman?
The link between empathy and morality is illuminated by consider-
ing children whose feelings for both themselves and others are not nur-
tured. These children are likely to develop into less morally aware adults.
Recently, the illumination of the phenomenon of child abuse has exposed
emotional cruelty towards children on a massive scale. The development
of individuals with a history of maltreatment and, consequently, a limited
ability to see the perspective of the other, is well documented, as can be
seen in the child psychology research of people like Rutter (1981; 1992),
and Winnicott (1984). Some of the most damaged young people have

20
suffered early deprivation, and without some later therapeutic relationship
have great potential for violence. Docker-Drysdale (1990), a consultant psy-
chologist, describes such children as ‘unintegrated’ and explains, ‘Most
violence, apart from single isolated acts, springs from these unintegrated
people’ (132). Carers can provide children with the primary experience
they have been deprived of, often at a very young age, through forming
close individual relationships: ‘[C]hild care workers can learn how to pro-
vide emotional experience, without which the deprived child remains
an incomplete person’ (13). In a chapter on managing violence, Docker-
Drysdale points to communication as one of the key factors: ‘By helping
them to communicate, by listening and responding in an appropriate way,
we may enable them to contain their feelings by transposing them into the
symbols we call words’ (Docker-Drysdale, 1990, 132).
The significance of lack of empathy can also be seen in studies of crimi-
nals, and the families of criminals, who have committed acts which provoke
moral outrage, such as violent attack, sexual abuse or murder. A study of
parents and children suggested that a lack of empathy could be associated
with the abuse of children (Rosenstein, 1995). Increasingly, neuroscience
is also illuminating this issue. Goleman describes what he calls ‘life without
empathy: the mind of the molester, the morals of the sociopath’ (1995,
106) and shows the links between both lack of empathy and violent crime
and neural irregularity. For instance, when words fail to trigger emotional
reactions in psychopaths,
their brains do not show the distinctive patterns in response to emo-
tional words, and they do not respond more quickly to them, suggesting
a disruption in circuits between the verbal cortex and the limbic brain
which attaches feeling to it. (Goleman, 1995, 109)
Goleman discusses the work of Hare (1995), a psychologist, who suggests
that since psychopaths do not show a fear response to predicted pain, they
lack concern about punishment for what they do, ‘and because they them-
selves do not feel fear, they have no empathy – or compassion for the pain
and fear of their victims’ (110). Goleman reflects less about what causes
the damage in the brain circuits, but does not believe in concept of the
‘criminal gene’ (110).
If violence is perceived by society as a key ‘moral’ problem, and
extremely callous events trigger fears of moral crisis, then identifying
and understanding such young people and adults and providing them
with appropriate primary emotional experience should be high on the

political agenda. Schools might have a valuable role to play in addressing
this problem. If emotional development is given more focus in educa-
tional policy and practice, it might support moral development, allow-
ing people to understand their own feelings and those of others when
conducting their lives.
A number of organizations and initiatives emerged in the 1990s which
attempted to support the emotional development of young people such
as ‘Antidote’, ‘Re-membering Education’, ‘A Place To Be,’ and various
mentoring and counselling schemes in schools. Goleman’s successful
publication triggered off a plethora of research across many disciplines
into emotional intelligence. More recently, for example, emotional liter-
acy has been instituted as part of the curriculum in UK schools (DFES,
2005; 2006; 2007a) and has been evaluated (DCFS, 2008). This was an
encouraging change of thinking, although the provision of resources to
support this specialized area was limited, as was the time given to needy
children. More appropriate provision such as smaller ‘nurture groups’,
where children receive intensive personal support over longer periods of
time, requires more extensive funding but can be extremely helpful for
children with extensive social and emotional needs.
Empathy and Morality
For Noddings (1986), the concept of empathy appears central to any dis-
cussion of ‘caring’. She explains why knowing how the other feels could
lead to appropriate action being taken:
Apprehending the other’s reality, feeling what he feels as nearly as pos-
sible, is the essential part of caring from the view of one caring. For if I
take on the other’s reality as possibility and begin to feel as reality, I feel
also that I must act accordingly. (Noddings, 1986, 16)
The importance of the empathic approach is that it engenders what SCAA
and other moral educators wanted to see – not just principles and rules but
the will for action. Noddings again:
We also have aroused in us the feeling ‘I must do something’. When we
see the other’s reality as a possibility for us, we must act to eliminate
the intolerable, to reduce pain, to fill the need, to actualise the dream.
(Noddings, 1986, 16)

22
By consciously recognizing others’ sentiments and feeling for them, we are
encouraged to act not for ourselves, but on their behalf.
Unlike Goleman, who does not always clearly make distinctions about
who benefits from empathy, Noddings clearly explains that the beneficiary
of an empathic approach is ‘the other,’ and her approach is similar to that
of Murdoch (1970), who believes that responding in a concerned way in
the form of ‘loving attention’ is at the heart of morality. From Noddings
(1986), we gain this idea of empathy as ‘receptivity’, to be open to some-
one’s feelings and feel ‘with’ someone, to share a feeling, an understand-
ing. Empathy can occur even with people for whom we have had previously
less feeling, and Noddings gives an example of sudden insight into a per-
son’s emotions after having heard an account of an incident in his life.
Hesten (1995) explains how Heathcote, an expert in drama in education,
also emphasizes the important role of empathy, which she believes ena-
bles the sharing of common human experiences and emotions. Heathcote
refers to what she calls the ‘Brotherhood’s code’, whereby simple expe-
riences in our own lives have similar or parallel experiences in the lives
of others, enabling us to understand them. She explained this code as:
‘Jumping sideways through time and across social strata, hanging on all
the while to one constant element in the situation’. The predicament of
Cinderella with her cruel sisters, for example, can represent at one level ‘all
those who [suffer] at the hands of their siblings’ (Section 3.3.1). A similar
internal feeling and significance of an experience can be felt by any indi-
viduals although in different contexts.
Gilligan (1982) believes the male psyche tends to develop differently
than does the female psyche. Because of the gender difference, boys tend
to separate from mothers as people and role models, whereas for girls the
relationship and role model is more likely to be continuous. As a conse-
quence, relationships are viewed differently and girls are more likely than
boys to emerge from childhood with more ‘empathy’ and a sense of con-
nectedness built into their personality, the boys having been obliged to
relinquish that connection. But the ability of boys to separate themselves
from others more easily might also be an important survival mechanism. If
empathy is closely related to receptivity, then our brains could not possibly
‘receive’ and feel about everyone we might interact with; we couldn’t possi-
bly respond to each and every person without considerable stress. Equally,
in times of emotional turmoil or threat, the separation mechanism could
be vital to the protection and survival of our families and ourselves.
Noddings (1986) urges that we try to remain open to our feelings, and
through this to connect to the feelings of others, but suggests that if we

risk damage by others, we must withdraw and protect ourselves. The capac-
ity to make good decisions about when and whether to open up or close
down is important, but if we close down for too long, we may find ourselves
unable to reopen the doors, even when we wish to do so. Trust lost is hard
to retrieve. Young people who have been denied warmth, love and human
contact for long periods at an early age might find it more difficult to con-
nect to other human emotions at a later stage (Maclean Hospital, 2001).
This is in part due to lack of development of connections in the brain and
substantiates Winkley’s argument (1996) about nurture producing brain
growth. Psychologically, if no sense of self has been created through posi-
tive interaction with others and no self-esteem has been nurtured, how then
can a child reproduce that process with others? Habitual abuse, neglect,
rejection, and negative or deceitful relationships may leave a child with no
sense of self-worth, negative emotions, and a permanently defensive nature
incapable of opening up to and seeing worth in others.
The descriptions of empathic caring by Noddings, however, differs from
the empathy described by Goleman (1995), who believes that emotional
communication facilitates human relationships; this can be seen in ani-
mals as well as in humans. However, Goleman makes no real distinction
between the empathy of a salesman and a teacher, though they might,
in fact, be very different. A salesman might possess short-term empathy,
consciously manipulating the other simply for his own monetary gain in a
very functional manner, while the other may be empathizing over the long
term, for the benefit of the other. Koseki and Berghammer (1992), whose
work is discussed next, make this distinction, and the difference has moral
significance, since they clearly distinguish different types of empathy, some
of which are more closely related with morality than others. Goleman also
describes abused individuals who may be particularly receptive to the emo-
tions of others as a means of protecting themselves, ‘in what amounts to a
post-traumatic vigilance to cues that have signalled threat’ (102).
Different Forms of Empathy
The work of Koseki and Berghammer (1992) is important in this regard, for
they identify different levels of empathy, which relate differently to moral
development. They see empathy developing through different stages, with
the most advanced stage being moral or adaptive empathy which is ‘char-
acteristic of a responsible leader who considering the interest of his group
is capable of self-denial’ (202). They believe this quality can be nurtured

24
and enhanced as young people mature. They call this quality ‘moral’ or
‘adaptive’ empathy and believe its strength lies in a long-term view of the
other’s development: ‘Moral or adaptive empathy is always long-lasting, is
directed towards some goals in the future and transforms the situation by
finding and executing an adequate solution to it for the people concerned’
(Koseki and Berghammer, 1992, 202).
They distinguish between this and less-advanced forms of empathy, in
which people are aware of the other’s feelings when it suits them – for
example, to beat an opponent or to close a sale. They describe this as ‘cog-
nitive’ empathy, which is used with a specific goal in mind and is of a lesser
order than moral empathy. Again, this has resonance with Macmurray’s
previous description of the senses being used instrumentally for egocentric
purposes. Koseki and Berghammer (1992) also describe a purely ‘affective’
empathy, an even more basic level, where the display of emotion by one
person simply creates similar feelings in another; for example, a 2-year-old
may cry when a playmate cries.
Moral or adaptive empathy is of a higher order of emotions, where con-
cern for and understanding of the other is a long-term phenomenon. The
aim of empathy is to bring about a positive long-term result for the person
being observed, to continue to be aware of their history and to envisage
their future. This type of empathy is highly personal and involves a close
attachment to the other (Koseki and Berghammer, 1992). This advanced
attached level is more like the receptivity and engrossment described by
Noddings, and seems to encompass the motivations of the person and,
to some extent, the will to behave morally. The ability to envisage long-
term consequences for another seems to involve combining the imagina-
tion with feeling, and encourages a person to act on behalf of the other, so
creating the ‘will to do good’.
Morality and Empathy in Wider Society
In a global society, people experience a much greater range of beliefs and
values than their more isolated predecessors ever did, and they need to
find common ground while accepting difference. When values conflict,
moral dilemmas can occur. Haste (1997) considers different concepts of
how one might influence moral development in education but points out
the varying moral values and stances taken by different races and cultures:
for instance, some cultures stress family loyalty and others family honour.

Davies et al. (1997) in a symposium looking at a multi-nation study of citi-
zenship, suggest loyalty to one’s country might also be a more important
aspect for people of some nationalities and groups. None of these, how-
ever, seem incompatible with the concept of empathy, but the empathy is
reserved for a limited or particular group of people, and is similar to the
description of the gangster mentality (Goleman, 1995), where great empa-
thy can be shown to family while simultaneously evoking total callousness
to others. It is possible that deeper empathy for one group may curtail
the empathy for another, suggesting a more competitive empathy, like the
lower cognitive level described by Koseki and Berghammer (1992).
Compliance with genocide or mass murder and atrocities in periods of
war reveals how usual levels of morality and empathy for others can dis-
solve, revealing fragility under pressure. The Good Person of Setzuan, a play
by Brecht (1965), suggests that morals decline in alienating environments
and the female heroine must, consequently, invent a tougher, male alter
ego to survive in the harsh climate in which she lives, echoing Gilligan’s
view of the differing male and female morality. However, Haste (1997)
also describes examples of people with extraordinary moral courage dur-
ing periods of war who were prepared to risk their own lives to save those
of others, strangers as well as family. Their moral attitudes seem to be so
strongly formed that adverse environments and personal threats do not
affect them. Some people at least seem able to resist external effects when
acting out their values.
But, the question remains: could different climates, economic, social or
educational, similarly alter the morality and empathy of human beings?
According to Marx and Engels (1888), capitalism destroys human rela-
tionships and creates alienation, changing the relationships from one of
person-to-person to one of exchange of commodities and produces the
‘I-it’ relationship described by Clark (1996), which destroys community.
In money-driven climates, people must curtail their feelings and empathy
from their fellow humans in order to maintain profit. According to Koseki
and Berghammer (1992), the level of empathy shown in a competitive situa-
tion is manipulative and of a lesser order than that required for the highest
moral development. The morals of the market place in society, and increas-
ingly in education, may produce a competitive climate in schools in which
the moral development of young people is poorer because the models of
empathy and morality they experience are not sufficiently advanced. If
empathy dissolves alienation, as Rogers suggested (1975), then nurturing
empathy could counterbalance the negative effects of competition.

26
If life experiences and social and economic situations can affect moral
attitudes and behaviour, understanding how to ensure positive moral expe-
riences in positive moral climates seems all the more urgent. Perhaps the
school experiences and environment, where young people spend so much
of their early lives, have a powerful influence in this respect.

Chapter 3
The Nature and Significance of
This chapter traces the theoretical understanding about emotion, empa-
thy and morality in the learning process and in educational institutions
and considers the significance of the role of emotional engagement, from
birth onwards.
How Does Empathy Relate to Morality in Education?
How does this understanding about empathy and morality relate to schools
and their links to the wider community? Goleman (1995) clearly makes
connections:
Schools have a central role in cultivating character by inculcating self-
discipline and empathy, which in turn enable true commitment to civic
and moral values. In doing so, it is not enough to lecture children about
values; they have to practice them, which happens as children build the
essential emotional and social skills. In this sense, emotional literacy
goes hand in hand with education for character, for moral development,
and for citizenship. (286)
In recent years, educators have increasingly expressed the importance of
the emotions and the development of empathy as part of moral develop-
ment in education. As head teacher of an inner-city primary school, Brown
(1996) stressed the need for empathy when trying to understand parents,
children and communities.
Educational literature on special needs and on pastoral care has made
evident the importance of emotional support and growth fostered by empa-
thy (Lang et al., 1994; 1998). Cross (1995) writes: ‘The emotional develop-
ment of children must continue to be a central concern for mainstream

28
education’ (7). Several educationalists who take pastoral development and
the whole child seriously have continually stressed the need for affective
education (Lang et al., 1998; Best, 2000), a concept supported by a long
tradition of transformative and holistic person-centred education advo-
cated by people such as Freire, Froebel and Montesorri. Best (1998) argues
that emotions have been largely neglected in British mainstream educa-
tion. In the United States, such ideas are encapsulated in the character
and person-centred education developed from the work of Carl Rogers
(1975). In Europe, attitudes towards affective education vary from country
to country, but the search continues for common understanding (Lang
et al., 1994). However the dominance of a mechanistic, curriculum-based
approach to education in the eighties and nineties, both in the UK and
more widely, which has generally continued into the new millennium, has
largely ignored the whole-person approach (Priestley, 2000; McCarthy,
2000), which relates closely to an empathic approach.
However, no one ever seems to discuss exactly how this quality of empa-
thy can be utilized in teacher education and, subsequently, pupil develop-
ment. Children are told they must value and understand and feel as others
do, and raise others’ self-esteem, but how this is actually accomplished in
the classroom and how those skills are fostered, both in teachers and in
pupils in the system, is never clearly delineated. More traditional educa-
tionalists often doubt the value of increasing people’s self-esteem. Nicholas
Tate, one-time leader of The Values Council in the UK, voices his perspec-
tive: ‘My initial reaction is often hostile, on the grounds that for a lot of the
time what many of us need is a stronger sense of our own lack of self-worth’
(Tate, 1997). Woodhead (1997), then chief inspector of schools, voiced a
similar view. However, Winnicott’s (1984) accounts of unintegrated chil-
dren in treatment, that is, those deprived of good enough maternal care
in their first year of life, cited below by Docker-Drysdale (1990), do not sit
comfortably alongside such views. These young people, and others with
little more hope, are eventually educated in schools. Are we to believe they
need a stronger sense of lack of their own self-worth?
In hostels B and C, where children lie about on the floor, cannot get up,
refuse to eat, mess their pants, steal whenever they feel a loving impulse,
torture cats, kill mice and bury them so as to have a cemetery where
they can go and cry, in these hostels there should be a notice: visitors
not admitted. The wardens of these hostels have the perpetual job of
covering naked souls, and they see as much suffering as can be seen in a
mental hospital for adults. (Docker-Drysdale, 1990, 132)

The Nature and Significance of Empathy in Education 29
Promoting Values through Teaching
Methodology and Curriculum
The educational literature suggests ways in which teachers can foster self-
worth and empathy in their pupils, through activities, resources, struc-
tures and methods of teaching. Heathcote uses drama as a medium in
her teaching and encouraged and trained other teachers to use it, as well.
Hesten’s thesis (1995) on Heathcote explains the centrality of empathy to
Heathcote’s teaching method, quoting Heathcote:
Drama is about man’s ability to identify. It doesn’t matter whether you are
in the theatre or in your own sitting room. What you’re doing if you are
dramatising is putting yourself in somebody’s shoes: Man’s ability with
which we are born, of just putting ourselves instantly in somebody else’s
shoes and having a total picture of how it must feel to be feeling like that
person right now. We have as yet not done much about harnessing this to
the education of our children but everybody uses this. We don’t know how
young they are when they begin to use this. It is just about time we said to
ourselves – ‘Can we use this in the classroom situation?’ (Hesten, 1995, 4)
According to Brighouse and Tomlinson (1991), drama can address the
understanding of difference in values which concerned Taylor (Bottery,
1987), and very recent research shows the powerful effects of drama
(DICE, 2010). Similarly, the arts and humanities, story and narrative can
develop empathy through engaging the emotions, which are universal
(Vandenplas–Holper, 1998), and through those emotions explain the
moral (Winston, 1998). Laurence (2005) also argues for the power of
music in developing empathy.
Techniques such as ‘circle time’ (Moseley, 1997) are increasingly used in
UK primary schools, and research in Italy has shown the effectiveness of
supporting the use of such techniques (Francescato, 1998). More recently,
programmes such as ‘You Me Us’ (Rowe and Newton, 1995) and the ‘Moral
Education in Secondary Schools Project’ (Rowe, 2000) have been devised,
along with activities in the UK Citizenship Curriculum. One of the elements
prescribed for teaching in the Citizenship curriculum is ‘the diversity of
national, regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United Kingdom
and the need for mutual respect and understanding’ (DFES, 2007b, 81),
although this inevitably raises the question of how young people develop
an ability to demonstrate mutual respect, particularly if they have never
experienced it.

30
Some of these curricular activities are often based on a more rational or
cognitive Kohlbergian or Piagetian model, and do not address the promo-
tion of emotional development. It is debatable the extent to which curricu-
lar activities, carried out in classes of thirty with an over-stretched teacher,
could support the basic moral development and caring interaction for the
very needy young people present in most class groups. Considering affec-
tive education in Germany, Fess (1998) calls precisely for more considera-
tion for such needy students.
Extracurricular groups, where teachers and pupils interact on a more
informal and personal level, can be very beneficial (Hirst, 1974; Straughan,
1988). Extracurricular programs often involve community activities, where
pupils go out into the community and other community members come
into school, in order to enable people to encounter other perspectives and
learn from and about one another. Some see youth work as the best vehicle
for open discussions (Brown et al., 1986). Others suggest the use of coun-
sellors (Cross, 1995).
Gardner (1993) suggests the approach of ‘masters’ and ‘apprentices’,
although staff–student ratios in state schools never seem to be quite low
enough for this quality of provision. Often, these suggestions approach
relationships and understanding of self and others in a less formal way,
typically taking place away from the formal curriculum, improving ratios
of adults to pupils, changing power relationships, and increasing inter-
action time and understanding. Fielding (2004; 2007) makes a case for
person-centred education and the importance of more equal relationships
in school.
The ‘Hidden Curriculum’ and the Modelling of
Empathy and Morality in Schools
An important aspect of developing empathy and moral values is the mod-
elling of values by way of the ‘hidden curriculum’. These are the more
subtle messages that pupils receive about how they and others, the envi-
ronment and learning are valued and understood through the human
relationships in schools, the behaviour of teachers, and the systems and
the structures which shape behaviours. Hersch et al., (1980) believe
the hidden curriculum often has a more powerful effect on a child’s
moral development than does the formal curriculum, and according to
Kohlberg (1984), the hidden curriculum offered real opportunities for
moral learning.

This is clearly acknowledged by the SCAA discussion documents in
1993:
Values are inherent in teaching. Teachers are by the nature of their pro-
fession ‘moral agents’ who imply values by the way they address pupils
and each other, the way they dress, the language they use and the effort
they put into their work. Procedures for giving praise, appointing offic-
ers, rewarding and punishing all give messages about what qualities are
valued. Policies about admissions, especially regarding children with
special needs, are equally indicative of values. (SCAA, 1993, 8)
Koseki and Berghammer (1992) suggest that empathy is innate and can be
modelled and nurtured both at home and in school: ‘Parents and educa-
tors can by means of reinforcements and by giving good models, conserve,
strengthen and increase in quality the child’s empathic concern, an innate
ability’ (203).
However, Noddings argues strongly that it takes time for real caring rela-
tionships to develop, not only through the taught curriculum but through
the normal conversations and interactions which take place between peo-
ple (1996). Sometimes these may be lengthy conversations, but other times
they may be simple interactions that affirm and recognize pupils as valued
people and their importance should not be underestimated:
[A]ffirming a pupil is often a question simply of a nice, natural smile, a
quick word of encouragement, a touch of humour, or an idea to think
about, conveying the notion that we do care about the child for his or her
own sake. (Watson and Ashton, 1995)
According to Klein (1987), such ‘off-task’ interaction is more likely to
enhance liking and feeling of community than would purely task-related
engagement. Face-to-face interaction is more likely to produce positive
sentiments between people. Relationships and a sense of community are
destroyed by the ‘I-it relationship’, which reduces other people to the status
of objects (Clark, 1996). Also, according to Klein, to maximize good rela-
tionships, interaction should be frequent. While schools have the potential
for frequent interaction over long periods of time to develop positive rela-
tionships between teachers and pupils and parents, much of the time in
school is ‘on-task’ and in formal classroom situations where large groups of
students and the curriculum are being ‘managed’. This is potentially less
conducive to nurturing good relationships.

32
Personal interaction appears to be central to the hidden curriculum and
to the research needed on values:
Tolerance and understanding will be achieved most effectively by per-
sonal contact, and in the absence of that, by a skilful use of literature
and by the teacher’s encouragement of sensitive relationships within the
classroom and the school. The fostering of these positive attitudes in the
children will then extend, we hope, outside the school into the wider
community. (Blackham, 1976, 55)
The manner in which teachers treat each child sets an example to the oth-
ers in the class. Rutter et al. (1979) and Bandura (1969) believe that pupils,
like sons and daughters, tend to copy adult behaviour. A consequence is that
they also adopt attitudes and values of adults they respect. Kyriacou (1986)
explains the importance of modelling for how pupils approach learning
generally. McPhail et al. (1978) consider the relationships modelled in the
classroom to be of great importance and make the distinction between
what is said and what is done and, as importantly, what is not done:
What is said about moral education and what is practised may have little
in common and the practice is everything for children. All communi-
cations verbal and non-verbal are value laden and even the voluntary
absence of communication expresses a value position, tells other people
how you value them. (1)
It is the practice of doing good things, of actually taking another’s needs,
feelings and interests into consideration as well as one’s own which con-
cerns us first and foremost. (5)
According to McPhail, we learn moral values through how significant peo-
ple in our lives treat others and us: ‘morality is contagious – something we
pick up from being around considerate others’ (56). In this sense, moral-
ity reproduces itself in others in a similar way to the emotional contagion
described in chapter 1 and perhaps this speaks volumes for the emotional
rather than rational nature of moral education.
The personal, social and moral, and academic appear to be continu-
ally inter-linked. The work of people like Rogers (1975), which grew out
of counselling, influenced, and was in turn influenced by, education and
teacher education and led the drive to humanize education epitomized by
people like Aspy in the United States. They recognized the affective aspect
in human relationships, relating it to excellence in teaching and learning,

but also to the development of better human beings who felt valued, with
higher levels of self-esteem, who could also value others. This linking of
personal growth, including moral development, with the teaching and
learning process produced fruitful insight for the detailed research out-
lined in Part Two. Human relationships, as in the work of Aspy (1972),
seem to be central to moving students forward in a variety of ways, one
success feeding off of and stimulating the other:
The most important component of a humane classroom is the climate
created by the teacher. Specifically, the classroom should have a supply
of meaningful learning experiences and the teacher should maintain
facilitative levels of empathy (understanding), congruence (genuineness)
and positive regard (valuing toward her students). (118)
In Aspy’s research (1972), such classrooms proved to be measurably more
conducive to achievement. In relation to literacy development alone, Aspy
said:
And I am happy to say that many of the remedial reading teachers that I
know are finding that their best results occur when they set aside the text
book for a while and relate to their child as a human being. (2)
Pring (1997) also voices this link between academic, personal and moral
development, extolling the values of learning and how the drive towards
knowledge and understanding embodied many of the virtues which we
might seek as people:
Education in this respect is essentially a transaction between the teacher
on one hand, participating in a public though changing tradition of
understanding and appreciation, and the learner, on the other, delib-
erating about conflicting values, struggling for answers to difficult ques-
tions. (Pring, 1997, 8)
The idea that personal, emotional, moral and academic growth are all
interlinked is frequently evident in the discourse on successful schools
(Brighouse and Tomlinson, 1991; Gray, 1990; Hargreaves, 1972; Mortimore,
1988; Rutter et al., 1979).
As McLaughlin (1994) explains, the contagious nature of values can
involve a chain reaction embedded within the environment. If a child
must feel valued to value, and must experience empathy to demonstrate

34
it themselves, there is also the suggestion that the transmission of values
partially reflects how teachers themselves feel valued. Aspy (1972) agreed.
Teacher morale in the UK, for example, has been a major concern since
the 1980s, perhaps signified by the regular departure of 50 per cent of
teachers from the profession within the first five years of their service. If
teachers feel undervalued and misunderstood, how can they transmit a
sense of value to students? Yet, the evidence cited by SCAA in Chapter 2
above suggests that many teachers are able to do just that. Perhaps their
reserves of personal security are so great that they can overcome the
adverse effects on their own esteem evoked by their working conditions.
Perhaps they demonstrate in peacetime the extraordinary moral courage
that Haste (1997) describes occurring in wartime, although interestingly,
Chater’s (2006) analysis of the impact of inspection on teachers suggested
that they actually felt they were, indeed, at war.
Systems and Structures Modelling Morality
According to Bottery (1990), values are always embedded in the way of life
of educational institutions and are central to the life of the school. Kohlberg
believes that restructuring the school environment could allow for greater
democratic participation in the school’s governing process by the students
(1984, 135). Hersch et al. (1980) consider the structures and climate in
schools to be very influential as part of the ‘hidden curriculum’:
Even if the teacher introduced concepts like democracy, justice, respect
for others, and human rights, if the classroom and school structures con-
tinued to model and enforce authoritarian social relations, no effective
learning could take place. Children needed to live the moral ideals they
were expected to master intellectually. (21)
European research (Campos and Menezes, 1998) backs this theory.
Structures such as school councils help students to take active part in
decision-making. With moral education, engaging on a daily basis with
teachers and other pupils in relationships and decision-making processes,
which value and understand different points of view, is more essential to
learning than being ‘told’ what to do in an arbitrary manner. Such moral
opinions must be voiced, but in the course of events, where they have con-
text and meaning, not in isolation, where they become one more set of facts
to be memorized. Instruction can be rejected as easily as it is delivered,

and unrelated knowledge can be difficult to transfer (Gardner, 1993). In a
sense, moral development is essentially no different from any other learn-
ing where existing schemata are assessed and amended through dialogue
and interaction (Bennett and Dunne, 1994). However, the existing moral
schemata of some students may be too disturbing for some teachers to
explore and could make moral development in school exceedingly diffi-
cult to achieve.
Management and leadership, therefore, are crucial to the creation of
an environment where empathy and morality can flourish; senior staff are
also role models for staff and students and they set up and control school
structures and influence teaching practice and school policies. This idea is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.
The Role of Empathy in Teaching and Learning
The intense empathic relationships described by Rogers (1975) in
Chapter 1 are those of counsellors in one-to-one relationships. However,
though support teachers may spend periods of one-to-one time with
pupils, most teachers do not. The possibility of deep personal relation-
ships in classes of thirty is much less practicable. The concept of enter-
ing every private individual’s perceptual world is not realistic for anyone,
much less for the class teacher in crowded state schools, who, though
aiming to know individuals, will inevitably have to prioritize their time
and energy while having to manage the whole class and deliver the pre-
scribed curriculum.
In addition, the role of the teacher is different from that of a counsellor.
The counsellor may listen to and help clients explore their own under-
standing, but the counsellor’s role does not necessarily include advising
clients what to do next. Though the teacher needs to assess students’ feel-
ings and understanding, they also have a specific obligation to develop
their students’ learning. Listening alone is not enough; they must also pro-
vide the ‘scaffolding’ (Wood, 1988) and a framework to allow students to
extend their knowledge of elements beyond themselves. This involves giv-
ing and sharing, suggestion, interaction and communication on the part
of the teacher about matters external to the students’ personal situation,
while taking into account the students’ feelings and responses. Vygotsky
(1986) makes clear the profound limitation in the psychology of learning
by the long-standing separation of the affective and cognitive, which he
believes were integrated.

36
Vygotsky’s ‘zone of proximal development’ (1978) combines both emo-
tional and cognitive aspects, and they are interlinked. This makes the teach-
er’s task complex. If a teacher is unable to scaffold learning in this complex
way, encompassing emotional as well as cognitive responses to learning, the
pupil may flounder in internal confusion. A certain amount of intervention
is vital to move students on at sufficient pace, to help motivate them in their
tasks and thinking. Assessment must be both emotional and academic. Like
the neuroscientists (Damasio, 1996), Dewey also rejected Cartesian dualism
(Biesta and Vanderstraeten, 1997) and saw interaction as a transaction in
which both the organism and the environment were implicitly involved.
Aspy (1972) conducted considerable research into empathy in teaching,
and utilized various scales which he believed identified empathy in class-
rooms, by noting characteristics visible in teacher/pupil interactions. The
ability of teachers to ‘understand’ their pupils’ experiences was demon-
strated by the teachers’ voice tone and the extent to which their responses
acknowledged, echoed and elaborated students’ feelings. The stronger
the feelings articulated, and the less controlled and subdued the teachers’
voice tone and comments, the more empathic they were considered to be.
Teachers who gave mixed or inconsistent messages, for example saying one
thing and doing another, could make students feel insecure. In conjunction
with empathy, Aspy also identified other related factors to be significant in
humane classrooms – authenticity, genuineness, respect for students and
holding the students in positive regard. These additional characteristics
resonate with the work of Koseki and Berghammer (1992) and add to the
purely communicative aspects of empathy. It makes more explicit the affec-
tive context and the depth and authenticity of the empathy.
Aspy’s scale, however, seems to assume no difference between the indi-
vidual pupils and the class as a group. Judging a teacher’s empathy with one
group may possibly be different from judging it with another. If the teacher
has to spend much of the time on overt classroom management because of
the nature of the group, or because of individuals within the group, would
the teacher’s observed characteristics be the same? If one or more difficult
pupils made the teacher angry, for example, then according to Goleman
(1995), then the teacher would be less able to be receptive and empathic to
their pupils. It is likely that empathy may be dependent on various factors
involved in the context of the interaction, not just on the teacher them-
selves. Goleman also raises the issue of people who demonstrate empathy
and strong relationships within their group and family, but can show no
empathy to another individual or a rival group. Can teachers demonstrate
different levels of empathy to different individuals or groups?

Rogers and Aspy became convinced of the importance of empathy in
teaching and learning as well as in therapy, in both personal and academic
development. They believe that just as the client in psychotherapy finds
that empathy provides a climate for learning more about himself, so stu-
dents in the classroom of an understanding teacher find themselves in a
climate conducive to learning both about themselves, others and new sub-
ject matter.
The literature on successful classroom practice often includes the
importance of relationships and the concept of empathy (Kyriacou, 1986;
McManus, 1989). Kyriacou (1986) considers eight key classroom qualities
for effective teaching, and identifies the underlying importance of empa-
thy for all of them:
The third observation concerns the importance of teachers being able to
see the progress of a lesson from the pupil’s perspective, and make the
appropriate decisions and modifications to the lesson while it is happen-
ing. This quality of social sensitivity is an important contributory factor
to all eight of the qualities considered in this study. (113)
Empathy seems vital to assessment, as well. According to Drummond
(1993), seeing things from the child’s perspective ensures thorough assess-
ment, and if teachers are to meet the needs of their pupils effectively,
then continuous formative assessment, both emotional and academic, is
vital to future progress. Without it, inappropriate judgements could be
made about what can be achieved, and inappropriate teaching may result.
A child with low self-esteem, for example, may need extra support and
structure. A teacher’s understanding of the emotional state of the child
can be as important to learning as any other factor. Empathy is important
in the development of the sense of self and positive human interaction,
which seems to be vital in the educational process (Purkey, 1970). This
psychological sense of self relates closely to the neurological sense of self
described earlier (Damasio, 1999). Exploration and openness occur when
the learner feels positive and safe in his interactions.
Excellence in teaching and learning has often been associated with the
quality of the teacher/pupil relationships and the school and classroom
ambience (DES, 1989). According to Vygotsky (1978), the highest levels of
cognitive development are embedded in social relations, and, according to
Anning and Edwards (1999), these relations and the context in which they
are embedded are vital to students feeling valued and making meaning. In
pre-schools, Siraj-Blatchford and Sylva (2004) identify ‘sustained shared

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Empathy In Education Engagement Values And Achievement Bridget Cooper