ENHANCED THREE TIER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR WSN AGAINST MOBILE SINK REPLICATION ATTACKS USING MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION SCHEME

International Journal of Wireless & Mobile Networks (IJWMN) Vol. 5, No. 2, April 2013
DOI : 10.5121/ijwmn.2013.5207 81
ENHANCED THREE TIER SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE FOR WSN AGAINST MOBILE SINK
REPLICATION ATTACKS USING MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
Linciya.T1
and Anandkumar. K.M2
1
P.G Scholar, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Easwari Engineering
College, Chennai, India
linciya.thomas@gmail.com
2
Assistant Professor (Sl.Gr.), Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Easwari Engineering College, Chennai, India
kmanandmss@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Recent developments on Wireless Sensor Networks have made their application in a wide range
such as military sensing and tracking, health monitoring, traffic monitoring, video surveillance and so on.
Wireless sensor nodes are restricted to computational resources, and are always deployed in a harsh,
unattended or unfriendly environment. Therefore, network security becomes a tough task and it involves
the authorization of admittance to data in a network. The problem of authentication and pair wise key
establishment in sensor networks with mobile sink is still not solved in the mobile sink replication attacks.
In q-composite key pre distribution scheme, a large number of keys are compromised by capturing a
small fraction of sensor nodes by the attacker. The attacker can easily take a control of the entire network
by deploying a replicated mobile sinks. Those mobile sinks which are preloaded with compromised keys
are used authenticate and initiate data communication with sensor node. To determine the above problem
the system adduces the three-tier security framework for authentication and pair wise key establishment
between mobile sinks and sensor nodes. The previous system used the polynomial key pre distribution
scheme for the sensor networks which handles sink mobility and continuous data delivery to the
neighbouring nodes and sinks, but this scheme makes high computational cost and reduces the life time of
sensors. In order to overcome this problem a random pair wise key pre distribution scheme is suggested
and further it helps to improve the network resilience. In addition to this an Identity Based Encryption is
used to encrypt the data and Mutual authentication scheme is proposed for the identification and
isolation of replicated mobile sink from the network.
KEYWORDS:
Wireless Sensor Network, Pair wise Key Establishment, Random Key Pre distribution, Mobile Sink, ID
Encryption, Mutual Authentication Scheme.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent development in electronic and computer technologies made the way for
emergent of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). The WSN consists of wide distributed sensors
to monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound, pressure, etc. and
to pass their data through the network to a destination. The advancement of wireless
communication technologies and rooted computing, are being widely adapted into many
applications through sensor networks and many active researches on related subject are being
carried out. Several sensor nodes are connected to build the wireless sensor networks. The large
number of small autonomous devices are embedded in the sensors which are interconnected to

82
form a sensor network. The WSN make use of a number of sensor nodes within or neighbouring
the area of event to not only collect and integrate but also process and relay the information.
Sensor nodes are equipped with integrated sensors that has the capability to process the
collected data and for short range radio communication. The randomly deployed sensor nodes in
the area of scrutiny collect the sensor data in typical application scenarios.
In application such as military sensing and tracking, environment monitoring,
patient monitoring and tracking, smart environment, etc are sensed by the deployed sensor.
Those sensors are interconnected to form the sensor network and are deployed in hostile
environment where they are prone to different malicious attack. There are various attacks in the
WSN. For example, messages can me spoofed during the transit and then the copy of the
message can be sent to the recipient in the altered form. One can also intrude with a node and
alter its behaviour. The types of counter measures can be addressed by different types of attacks.
The most formidable attack in wireless sensor network is the replication attack. The
attacker compromises a node and uses its secret cryptographic key materials to effectively
colonize the network with the clones of it. Foe collects all the credentials like keys, identity etc
once the node has been captured. Those captured credentials are reprogrammed by the attacker
and the nodes are replicated using those credentials in order to eavesdrop the transmitted
messages or compromise the functionality of the network. The replication attack is carried in
two ways: mobile sink replication attack and stationary access node replication attack. There are
some solutions available for stationary access point replication attack compare with mobile sink
replication attack. Many important functions of the sensor network such as routing, resource
allocation, misbehaviour detection, network resilience, throughput etc are remarkably injurious
by replication attack. The above problem of replication attack can be solved through polynomial
pool pr distribution scheme.
There are number of key pre distribution schemes for solving the problem of
authentication and pair wise key distribution which do not exhibit desirable network resilience.
The breach of security in one node makes the entire sensor network unsafe. The new security
challenge for data collection is by avocation of pair wise key establishment and authentication
in the mobile sinks. In the basic probabilistic and q-composite key pre distribution schemes, the
attacker gain the control of entire network by deploying a replicated mobile sink preloaded with
some compromised keys. Those compromised keys can be achieved by an attacker by obtaining
large number of keys by capturing a small fraction of nodes.
To handle the afore-said problem, we use pair wise key pre distribution scheme
that provide authentication and pair wise key establishment amid sensor nodes and Mobile Sink.
To expedite the study of a new security technique, a general three-tier security agenda is
established for authentication and pair wise key establishment, based on the polynomial pool-
based key pre distribution scheme.
In polynomial pool-based key pre distribution scheme both mobile sink and
stationary access point generates the separate subset of keys which results in the high
computational cost. In order to overcome this problem Random pair wise pre distribution
scheme is used to reduce the computational cost and provides security against the replication
attacks in the proposed system. In Random pair wise pre distribution scheme only mobile sink
generates a key with key identifiers and broadcasted to stationary access point and sensor node.
Fig 1 represents the system architecture of the prospective system.

83
Fig 1. System Architecture
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous work
on related topics and Section 3 gives the models and assumptions. Section 4 describes proposed
Random Pair wise Pre distribution in detail. Section 5 discusses the encryption algorithm.
Section 6 discusses the analysis results and Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORKS
A comprehensive literature review was carried out on node replication attacks and other
security issue in static and mobile wireless sensor networks. This literature survey revealed
versions mathematical and operational methods for solving the problems. The key management
problem is a progressive research area in wireless sensor networks. Eschenauer and Gilgor [4]
proposed a probabilistic key pre distribution scheme which helps to bootstrap the initial trust
between the sensor nodes. The discriminative distribution and countermanding of keys to
sensor nodes and node re-keying without substantial computation and communication
capabilities are briefly explained in this scheme. For the random subset of keys from a large key
pool before deployment, the probabilistic key pre distribution scheme is used. As an outcome,
two nodes have assured a prospect to share at least one key after deployment.
The characteristic of network connectivity and security can be poised by key
management scheme. The core idea is the sensor node randomly picks a set of keys from a key
pool before deployment, so that any two sensor nodes had a certain prospect to share at least
one common key. The problem existing in this key pre distribution is the probability of
establishing a common key between communicating nodes, and the ability to tolerate
compromised nodes is highly dependent on the memory available on the sensor nodes. In other
words, these schemes still require each node to be assigned a large number of keys for a high-
performance WSN, and some solutions for this problem focus on pre deployment knowledge,
post deployment knowledge, the state of the sensors, and overlapping key strings. However,
these solutions are not quite viable since their key sharing mechanism is not enough to be
efficient. One of the most important information is the signal range of the sensor node that
might significantly improve the performance of the key sharing mechanism however, this is not
exploited in these schemes.

84
Liu et al.[3] The sensor nodes are communicated securely with each other using
cryptographic techniques by enabling bi variate key polynomial. This is one of the most primary
security services. The resource constraints of the sensor nodes makes it not feasible for sensors
to use key polynomial scheme. The scheme assures a direct key established between any two
neighbour sensors in any deployment group. Better trade-off is achieved between
communication overhead, network connectivity and security against node capture compared to
the existing key pre-distribution schemes. Ultimately, it also supports dynamic node addition
after the initial deployment of the nodes in the network.
Chan et al. [2] further unmitigated this proposal and developed two key predistribution
schemes: the q-composite key predistribution scheme and the random pairwise keys scheme. In
q-composite key predistribution scheme two sensor nodes are required to compute compute a
pairwise key from the shared q predistributed keys. In random pairwise keys scheme pair of
sensor nodes are randomly picked and assign each pair a unique random key. Comparing to the
basic probabilistic key predistribution scheme the above schemes improved the security. They
developed a general scaffold for pairwise key establishment using the polynomial-based key pre
distribution protocol [5] and the probabilistic key distribution in [6] and [7]. Tolerating not more
than t compromised node, where the value of t was limited by the memory available in the
sensor nodes can be carried in this scheme.
Amar Rasheed et.al [1] developed for group key pre distribution. The pair wise key
establishment in the context of sensor networks is the ultimate aspiration. This system is
unreservedly secure and t-collusion resistant. The network resilience is significantly improved
to the mobile sink replication attack. The small fraction of preselected sensor nodes are called
as sensor nodes. In this new security agenda, stationary access nodes act as an authentication
access point to a network to elicit the sensor node to transmit the collected to the mobile sink.
The data request message from the mobile sink to sensor node is transmitted through stationary
access node. These data request will elicit the sensor node to transmit the data from sensor node
to mobile sink through stationary access point.
3. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
3.1 Network Model
We consider a sensor networks, where a large number of sensor nodes are randomly
distributed in the two dimensional area and remain stationary after deployment, and all of them
have similar capabilities and equal significance. One sink which has the mobility named as
mobile sink which collects the data from all other sensor nodes. Each sensor node sends its data
packets to sink nodes through access point. For the secure data transmission we go three tier
security scheme.
3.2 Three Tier Security Scheme
The two separate polynomial pools are used in three tier security scheme: the mobile
polynomial pool and the static polynomial pool. For data gathering from the sensor through the
mobile sink the polynomials from mobile polynomial pool are used. To gain access to the
network for the sensor’s data gathering, an attacker needs to compromise at least a single
polynomial. For key setup between the sensor nodes and stationary access nodes the
polynomials from static polynomial pool are used.
Afore mention to deployment, The subset of polynomials from the mobile polynomial
pool is picked by each mobile sink. The randomly selected sensor nodes called stationary access
nodes carry a polynomial from the mobile polynomial pool. These nodes acts as the

85
authentication point for the network which triggers the sensor node to transmit the data. The
data request is transmitted to sensor node from the mobile sink through stationary access node.
This data request will initiate the sensor node to transmit the collected data. Every stationary
access node may share a mobile polynomial with a mobile sink. The subset of polynomials from
both static and mobile polynomial pool is randomly picked by stationary access point and
sensor node. The main benefit to use separate pools is the mobile sink authentication is
autonomous of the key distribution scheme used to unite the sensor network
3.2.1 Key Discovery between a Mobile Sink and a Sensor Node
To establish a direct pair wise key between sensor node u and mobile sink v, a sensor
node u needs to find a stationary access node a in its neighbourhood, such that, node a can
establish pair wise keys with both mobile sink v and sensor node u. Fig 2 shows a direct secure
path establishment between nodes u and v, mobile sink v sends the pair wise key to node a in
message encrypted and authenticated with the shared pair wise key ;a between v and a. If node
a receives the above message and it shares a pair wise key with u, it sends the pair wise key to
node u in a message encrypted and authenticated with pair wise key; u between a and u.
Fig 2. Direct Key Establishment
Fig 3 illustrates that the mobile sink and the sensor node will have to establish a pair
wise key with the help of other sensor nodes using indirect key discovery. To establish a pair
wise key with mobile sink u, a sensor node v has to find a stationary access node a in its
neighbourhood such that node a can establish a pair wise key with both nodes u and v. If node
(a) establishes a pair wise key with only node v and not with u. As the probability is high that
the access node a can discover a common mobile polynomial with node v, sensor node u needs
to find an intermediate sensor node i along the path u - i - a - v, such that intermediate node i
can establish a direct pair wise key with node (a).

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Fig 3. Indirect Key Discovery through Intermediate Stationary Access Node
Fig 4 shows that the mobile sink and the sensor node will have to establish a pair
wise key with the help of other sensor nodes using indirect key discovery. To establish a pair
wise key with mobile sink u, a sensor node v has to find a stationary access node a in its
neighbourhood such that node a can establish a pair wise key with both nodes u and v. If node
(a) establishes a pair wise key with only node v and not with u. As the probability is high that
the sensor node a can discover a common mobile polynomial with node v, sensor node u needs
to find an intermediate sensor node i along the path u - i - a - v, such that intermediate node i
can establish a direct pair wise key with node (a).
Fig 4. Indirect Key Discovery through Intermediate Stationary Node

87
4. RANDOM PAIR WISE KEY PRE DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we first list phases for pair wise key setup in Random Key Pre distribution
(RKP) schemes
A. Phases in Random Key Pre distribution Schemes
Four main phases for key setup in RKP schemes are presented as follows.
1. Key pre distribution phase:
A mobile sink has a polynomial pool.
• generate a large key pool of size ;
• different keys for each sensor from the key pool to form a key ring are
selected randomly;
• In the memory of the sensor the key ring is loaded.
• Each sensor is loaded with unique node identifier or key identifier.
2. Sensor deployment phase:
Sensors are erratically picked and uniformly dispersed in a large area. Typically, the
average number of neighbors of a sensor is much smaller than the total number of
deployed sensors.
3. Key discovery phase:
Two steps are involved in the key discovery phase. In the first step, each sensor
attempts to discover shared key(s) with each of its neighbors. To accomplish this, the
sensor can broadcast its key ring identifier to its neighbours. After the first step of the
key discovery phase, the sensor knows all its neighbors. The set of all neighbors of
sensor is represented by Wi and | Wi|=n’. The set of neighbours of sensor i who share at
least one key with the sensor i is represented by Ri. Thus, we have Wi = Qi ∪ Ri and
|Qi|+| Ri|= n’. In the second step, every sensor i broadcasts its set Qi. Using the sets
received from neighbors, a sensor can build a key graph based on the key-share
relations among neighbors.
4. Pair wise key establishment phase:
If sensor shares at least one key with a given neighbor, the shared key(s) can be used as
their pair wise key(s).
In the proposed system the random pair wise key is used for the security and for reducing the
computational cost. Figure 5 shows the functional architecture for the three tier security scheme.
Sensor nodes collect the data from the remote area and send to the mobile sink. The data that are
collected from sensor node is forwarded to access point which in turn sent to mobile sink. For
secure transmission of data we generate keys from the polynomial pool. The key is generated in
sensor node then it encrypt the collected data using the generated key and transfer it to the
mobile sink.

88
Fig 5. Functional Architecture of the Proposed System
For the encryption of the data using the key ID based encryption algorithm is used. For
the ID based encryption algorithm its essential for the private key generator which is to be
located in the base station from which the master key to be stored in the mobile sink.
5. ID BASED ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
ID-based public key infrastructure involves a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC),
and users. The basic operations consist of Set Up and Private Key Extraction. KGC runs BDH
parameter generator to generate two groups G1,G2 and a bilinear pairing e: G1 × G1 → G2.
Itchooses an arbitrary generator P ε G1 and defines two cryptographic hash functions:
H1 : {0,1}*
→G1,
H2 : {0,1}*
→G2.
• Set Up: KGC chooses a random number s ε Zq
*
and set Ppub=sP . Then the KGC
publishes system parameters params={G1,G2,q,P,Ppub,H1,H2}, and keep s as master-key.
• Private Key Extraction: An identity information ID to KGC is submitted by the user.
The user’s public key is computed by KCG as QID=H1(ID) and reversion private key as
SID= sQID.
The holder of private key SID to decrypt a message sent to her under the public key QID.
Let m denote the message to be encrypted.
• Encryption:
Compute U=rP where r ε RZq
*
. Then compute
V = m H2(e(Ppub,rQID)) (1)
Output the cipher text (U,V)
⊕

89
• Decryption:
Decryption is performed by computing
V H2(e(U,SID)) = V H2(e(rP,sQID)) (2)
= V H2(e(sP,rQID)) (3)
= V H2(e(Ppub,rQID)) (4)
= m
The node ID is used for the creation of the private key and public key for the secure
transmission of data from the sensor node to the mobile sink. Hence ID based encryption
algorithm is adhibited for the encryption and decryption of the data.
6. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
Challenge–response authentication is an authentication process by verifying an identity
using the required authentication information. This authentication information is usually a value
and that are to be computed in response for inevitable challenge. Challenge–response
authentication helps to crack the problem of exchanging session keys for encryption. This is
chiefly effective for man-in-the-middle attack, because without knowing the secret the attacker
will not be able to derive the session key. Through this protocol we are able to state things other
than the secret value. Every challenge–response sequence is unique to ensure a challenge by
employing a cryptographic nonce in the authentication protocol.
Mutual authentication is percolated using a challenge–response handshake in both
directions. Mutual authentication is the process to authenticate the both ends of transmission
that is authentication between sender and receiver. This is the basic function for both private and
public communication. It is also known as two-way authentication where two parties
authenticating each other suitably. It refers to a one node authenticating themselves to another
node and that node authenticating itself to the first node in such a way that both parties are
assured of the others' identity.
Mutual authentication scheme is anticipated in this paper for identifying the replicated
mobile sink. Figure 6 describes the pseudo code for mutual authentication scheme. Mobile Sink
(MS) sends mobile sink challenge (MSC) to the Access point (AP). AP generates the challenge
and Access point response (APR) calculates the hash function using APC, MSC and the random
number. If MS receives is not equal to null then MS calculates the estimated value using APC
and APR. If the estimated value equal to APR then mobile sink response (MSR) evaluates the
hash function using APC, MSC and random number. If AP receives MSR and AP is not equal to
null then AP calculates the estimated value using MSC and MSR. If the estimated value equals
to MSR then MS is authenticated as a trusted node or else MS is the replicated node.
⊕ ⊕
⊕
⊕

90
Fig 6. Pseudo code for Mutual Authentication Scheme
7. RESULT ANALYSIS
The proposed scheme has been implemented and analysed in the network simulator
NS2. The possible outcomes when there is a change in the key size is to be determined. The
various sets of key size is given and the change of key size broadcasted from mobile sink to
stationary access node and stationary access node to sensor node is to be determined. Table 1
shows the calculation of broadcasting the key from the mobile sink to stationary access node
and stationary access node to sensor node.
Table 1. Calculation of Broadcasting the Key of Various Size
Size of Key
Generated in
Mobile Sink
Size of Key
Broadcasted to
Stationary Access
Node
Size of Key
Generated in
Stationary Access
Node
Size of Key
Broadcasted to
Sensor Node
5 4 5 4
10 9 10 9
20 19 20 19
30 29 30 29
40 39 40 39
If the key size is larger it should be stored in a disk file which can be discovered by
someone else. Thus large key size is not only convenient to use but also it is a security risk. It
considerably takes longer time to encrypt and decrypt messages and broadcast the generated
key. So it is convenient to use the smaller key size. The key size used in this project is 4 (32
bit). Thus the following analysis shows that as the size of the polynomial pool increases the
probability of sharing the key size also increases

91
The key is generated in the static polynomial pool and it is broadcasted to the sensor
node. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 represent the sharing of the key from static polynomial pool to the
stationary access node and sensor node.
Fig 7. The probability that a sensor and stationary access node share a static polynomial
versus the size
Fig 8. The probability that a sensor and stationary access node share a static polynomial
versus the size .
7. CONCLUSIONS
The security performance of the three tier scheme can be carried out by strengthening
the authentication mechanism between stationary access nodes and sensor nodes. We used the
one-way hash chains algorithm in conjunction with the static polynomial pool-based scheme.

92
The network resilience is significantly improved to the mobile sink replication attack using
random pair wise key pre distribution compared to single polynomial pool-based key pre
distribution approach. The use of key pools and stationary access nodes that carry polynomials
from the mobile pool of the network will inhibit an attacker from collecting sensor data, by
deploying a replicated mobile sink. The proposed key distribution scheme reduces the
computational cost in the nodes.
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[2] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song(2003), “Random Key Pre-Distribution Schemes for Sensor
Networks,” Proc. IEEE Symp. Research in Security and Privacy.
[3] D. Liu, P. Ning, and R.Li(2003) ” Establishing Pairwise Keys in Distributed Sensor Networks,”
Proc. 10th ACM Conf. Computers and Comm. Security, pp. 52-61.
[4] L. Eschenauer and V.D. Gligor(2002) “A Key-Management Scheme for Distributed Sensor
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[5] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song(2004), “Key Distribution Techniques for Sensor Networks,”
Wireless Sensor Networks, Kluwer Academic, pp. 277-303.
[6] D. Liu and P. Ning,(2003) “Location-Based Pairwise Key Establishments for Static Sensor
Networks,” Proc. First ACM Workshop Security Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks.
[7] A. Rasheed and R. Mahapatra(2009), “A Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Heterogeneous
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[8] T. Gao, D. Greenspan, M. Welesh, R.R. Juang, and A. Alm,(2005) “Vital Signs Monitoring and
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[16] A. Rasheed and R. Mahapatra,(2007) “An Energy-Efficient Hybrid Data Collection Scheme in
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Authors
T.Linciya received B.Tech- Computer Science and Enginering (2011) from
Kalasalingam University, Srivillputhur and persuing M.E- Computer
Science and Engineering in Easwari Engineering College, Chennai. The
current project is regarding Three tier security scheme.
Anandkumar K.M. received the B.E. degree in the year 2000 from
Bharathiyar University and M.Tech in the year 2006 from
Dr.M.G.R.University and currently doing the research in Anna University,
Chennai. He is an assistant professor in the Department of Computer
Science and Engineering, Easwari Engineering College, Anna University,
Chennai. His main research interests focus on Pervasive Computing,
Wireless Sensor Networks and Healthcare applications. He published many
papers in National and International Conferences. He is an active lifetime
member of ISTE and CSI in India.

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