Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc cosac - 2016 - final

Enumerating software security design
flaws throughout the SSDLC
John M. Willis
Turnaround Security, Inc.
October 5, 2016
23rd International Computer Security Symposium
and
8th SABSA World Congress
Killashee House
Naas, Ireland
© 2016 Turnaround Security, Inc., All Rights Reserved

Speaker Background
• Security architect/engineer with a history of electronics engineering,
programming, and configuration management.
• First computer was a wire-wrap Z80 board programmed in assembly.
• Nowadays, seeks to build security in by coming up with new and
different ways of doing things.
• Long list of security certifications including:
• Stanford University, Advanced Computer Security Professional
• Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional (CSSLP)
• CISSP-ISSAP (Information Systems Security Architecture
Professional)
2

Acknowledgments
• Mike Willis has helped by creating the prototype Ruby application
code for the Qt-based GUI that uses neo4j-core to interface to the
Neo4j database
• An un-named esteemed Informatics professor who highly
recommended we use Neo4j
3

Theory
By employing the methodology/tool described here, we should:
• Be able to establish order where there is currently chaos regarding
the identification and satisfaction of security requirements
• Not only in the solution space—but throughout the Secure Software
Development Life Cycle (SSDLC) as well.
4

This is a Work In Progress
• Will provide background information
• Reason for creating – lack of security engineering formal discipline
• Initial Proof of Concept, Prototype
• Specify requirements for an application security requirements
modeling tool
• Mock-ups for screens
• Progress to-date on screens
• Progress on graph database backend
• Path forward to include community developed requirements and
threat libraries
• Low level technical security requirements/controls—not at code level
(almost, though) 5

This Tool Will Go from This …
• Add web user TLS connection during the architecture and design
process
OR
• Add web user TLS connection to mitigated Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
threat modeling finding
6

To This … Summary of Requirements for TLS Connection
- Key distribution - Behavior when security attributes expire
- Secure back-end connections - Define & maintain roles
- Confidentiality, integrity & availability - Associate users with roles
- Replay protection - Provide reliable time stamps
- Error recovery - Scope session security attributes
- Authentication failure behavior - Limit concurrent sessions
- Permitted pre-authentication actions - Inactivity lock/unlock behavior
- Prevent & detect authentication forgery - Inactivity session termination
- Prevent & detect use of copied
authentication data
- Segmentation of different types of
communication (e.g., user vs. admin)
- Different privileges of local vs. remote
users
- Specify which endpoints initiate
connection
- Limit authentication feedback - Deny session based on attributes
- Control who can change security
attributes
- Force re-authentication when needed
- Key destruction 7

What Makes it Different &Who Would Use It
• This tool would facilitate capture of detailed architecture and design
requirements during the solution phase of a project, and enable
testing and documentation of those requirements
• Facilitate enumeration of requirements using a user configurable
library of hierarchical security requirements packages, and
standardized Threat Model taxonomy with mitigating controls.
• The requirements library and taxonomy could be community
developed
• Initially, security architects / engineers and consultants would use the
tool
• Ultimately, it should be simple enough for developers to use
8

Brief History of Security Engineering
• Once upon a time there was a lot of interest in Security Engineering
as a scientific discipline even in the commercial sector
• Then, COTS products began to evolve and they filled a gap—whether
completely or not
• Build vs. Buy cost trade-off considerations
• Business pushed back and dropped support for applying full Security
Engineering (except perhaps with Defense security)
• As a result, at least in non-research circles, we do the best we can
with the COTS products we are given – leaving gaps that may or may
not be addressed
• Security Engineering as a formal discipline does not exist
9

Requirements & Security
• Operating Environment / Concept of Operations
• Business Requirements
• Security Functional Requirements
• (Security) Non-Functional Requirements
• Drivers:
• Users
• Law/Regulations
• Organizational Policy
• Risk Assessments are performed inconsistently, at varying levels of
depth – or not at all
• Not everyone includes misuse and abuse cases
10

Solution Space Security Engineering Challenges
• Code has vulnerabilities originating from various sources
• About 1/3rd of all Common Weaknesses and Enumerations (CWEs) fall
into the category of Design Errors – This is significant
• Nonfunctional security requirements often do not get translated into
real/documented technical security design features, or controls
• Security design features have their own dependencies
• Threat Modeling approaches are often subjective and may or may not
uncover the above
• Relevant technical security controls often do not get considered in
Unit, Integration or QA test cases
11

Common Criteria
Security Functional Requirements
• Common Criteria is an international framework for certifying that
products are secure within a specific environmental context
• This talk has nothing to do with certifying products
• It has a detailed list of 134 Security Functional Requirements
• These requirements have dependencies on each other
• We are repurposing these requirements as a starting point for a
standardized security requirements library
12

Uncommon Body of Knowledge – Modeling Research
• We have had code generation from CASE tool models for decades, yet
today only 4% of code is automatically generated using these tools
• UMLsec has been around for at least 10 years, but requires significant
effort to utilize properly (XML with security expressed in equation
form), and coverage is limited
• A significant body of research exists for reusing the Common Criteria
Security Functional Requirements (CC SFRs)
• There has been work to integrate the CC SFRs and UMLsec
• Security patterns and pattern languages exist at various levels of
abstraction for architecture as well as for design. Use is limited to very
large organizations
• There is a distinct lack of integration & automation between modeling
tools & techniques used at various stages of the development lifecycle
13

Modeling Capabilities vs. OWASP Top 10
Source: Why Model Driven Security will not secure your Web Application Hochreiner, et al. Journal of Wireless
Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable Applications, volume: 5, number: 3, pp. 44-62 14

Current State of Insecurity Engineering
• There is no commonly accepted complete standard security
engineering maturity model (merge SSE-CMM, now ISO/IEC
21827:2008, & BSIMM). Then there’s NIST SP 800-160 (Draft)
• Misuse/abuse cases not always specified, not complete in coverage
• Security pattern modeling is still early-stage and there are few, if any,
open source UML repositories (do you know of any?)
• Security engineering modeling needs to flow from architecture &
design pattern models in order to achieve significant adoption
• There is little SDLC end-to-end modeling integration even for systems
engineering tools… everything is market-driven…
• Different tools/methods exist in various stages of maturity
• A number of tools/methods are inexact, incomplete, and must be
applied in a subjective manner to be effective (e.g., Threat Modeling)
• Threat Modeling is a Best Practice that is not widely implemented 15

Architect / Design / Solution Space Activities
• Design of security functionality and features to implement non-
functional security requirements
• A Security Architect &/or Engineer should be on board to allocate &
develop technical security controls for all requirements
• Control requirements should accompany security architecture and
design patterns
• Technical security requirements that are addressed need to be
captured for testing and documentation purposes
• Need a formal discipline for the security engineer to follow
• Security engineering methods, which must be well defined, need to
be applied consistently and completely – there needs to be a formal
discipline
16

Unit, Integration & QA Testing of Security
Testing should have the following inputs for test planning and test case
design:
• Requirements
• Need to be complete—including requirements enumerated during
the architecture and design phase
• We cannot rely on the Requirements document to provide
everything we need
• Security Architecture & Design Patterns
• Threat Model
• Security Assessment
These should always be included, so we do not have gaps
17

How to Establish Order from Chaos
• Identify key factors
• Identify those which are highly variable
• Characterize (describe) these highly variable key factors as well as
contributing variables
• Control the factors that affect variability
18

Variables to Capture, Characterize & Control
• Identify what information assets you are trying to protect
• Technical security controls flowing from Requirements
• Allocation of design to technical security controls, including nonfunctional
security requirements (solution space)
• Design phase Threat Modeling and resulting mitigations (lead to new
technical security controls) (solution space)
• Mitigations from Security/Risk Assessments (from various SSDLC phases)
19

Variables to Capture, Characterize & Control
(cont’d)
• Security requirements dependencies
• Risk-Benefit Analysis of each security requirement
• Which technical security controls should be implemented?
• Which technical security controls are being, or should be, tested?
Doing so will facilitate determining which technical security controls are
missing from our design in a reproducible manner
20

Reusing Common Criteria (CC)
Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)
• There is an established body of literature pertaining to the reuse of
Common Criteria Security Functional Requirements. This is a good
starting point
• Dependencies exist between different SFRs, so this helps us expand
what we think our controls are into something more comprehensive
• But where do we start?
• Dan Wu doctoral thesis SFR Reusable Packages. Security Functional
Requirements Analysis for Developing Secure Software, Doctoral
Thesis, Dan Wu, May 2007
• Security Tactics and Goals. Preschern, C. 2012. Catalog of Security
Tactics linked to Common Criteria Requirements.
21

TLS Use Case
• From this point forward, we will provide examples of security
functional requirements relating to implementation of Transport
Layer Security (TLS)
22

SFR Reusable Packages – Security Requirements
Packages
23

Security Requirements Packages (cont’d)
24
Source: Wu, D. (2007). Security Functional Requirements Analysis
for Developing Secure Software (Doctoral dissertation)
SFR Packages for Integrity

Security Tactics & Goals – Authenticate Users
25

Security Tactics & Goals – Confidentiality
26
Source: Preschern, C. 2012. Catalog of Security Tactics linked to
Common Criteria Requirements.

Security Tactics & Goals – Integrity
27

CC SFR Dependency Tables (example)
28
Source: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC v3.1), Revision 2, Part 2:
Security functional components.

STRIDE Based Threat Modeling
29Source: Adam Shostack. Threat Modeling: Designing for Security. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014

Spoof Client Threat Tree (Partial)
30
Source: Adam Shostack. Threat Modeling: Designing for Security. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014
(B-1)

Codifying Standard Threat Model (Example)
Spoof.Client
Spoof.Client.AuthenticationUI
Spoof.Client.AuthenticationUI.LocalLogin
Spoof.Client.AuthenticationUI.PrivilegedAccess
Spoof.Client.AuthenticationUI.RemoteSpoof
Spoof.Client.BackupAuthentication
Spoof.Client.BackupAuthentication.ChainedAuthentication
Spoof.Client.BackupAuthentication.InformationDisclosure
Spoof.Client.BackupAuthentication.KnowledgeBasedAuthentication
Spoof.Client.InsufficientAuthentication
Spoof.Client.InsufficientAuthentication.DowngradeAuthentication
31
Spoof.Client.InsufficientAuthentication.NullCreds
Spoof.Client.InsufficientAuthentication.PredicatbleCreds
Spoof.Client.NoAuthentication
Spoof.Client.ObtainCredentials
Spoof.Client.ObtainCredentials.ChangeManagement
Spoof.Client.ObtainCredentials.FederationIssues
Spoof.Client.ObtainCredentials.Storage
Spoof.Client.ObtainCredentials.Storage.at3rdParty
Spoof.Client.ObtainCredentials.Storage.atClient
Spoof.Client.ObtainCredentials.Storage.atKDC
Spoof.Client.ObtainCredentials.Storage.atServer
Spoof.Client.ObtainCredentials.Transit
Spoof.Client.OtherAuthenticationAttack
Derived from Source: Adam Shostack. Threat Modeling: Designing for Security. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014

Standardizing Threat Mitigations (Example)
32Source: Adam Shostack. Threat Modeling: Designing for Security. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014
(B-1)

Standardized Tool-Based Threat Modeling
• Context needed in certain cases (External Entity, Process, Data Flow,
Data Store, Security Requirements Package selection & options)
• Tool should know what type of connection it is based on context (e.g.,
TLS for a web app)
• Define a standardized taxonomy (e.g., using Threat Trees), codify
them, along with mitigations based on context
• Define your model – start somewhere and build from there
• Always ensure all attacks are accounted for when you are performing
your threat modeling
33

Proof of Concept
• Very rough shell script version
• Threat Modeling – concern about a web application user login and
man-in-the-middle attack -- recommended mitigation of SSL (TLS)
• Does not include navigation via Threat Tree to select mitigation
• User authentication, confidentiality of password and integrity of data
are the applicable Goals/Tactics (Security Requirements Packages)
• For illustrative purposes, we’re not going to show the Requirements
document as a source of input
34

Proof of Concept – Threat Modeling Input
Enter Project Name: POC
Enter Location Reference: userLogon1
Select Location Type [1]:
1 - External Entity
2 - Process
3 - Data Flow
4 - Data Store
1
Security Requirements Packages to Apply
1 - Authenticate Users: Robust authentication mechanism
2 - Authenticate Users: Protected authentication session
3 - Authenticate Users: Protected authentication session: Session Termination
4 - Authenticate Users: Protected authentication session: Limit Access
5 - Maintain Data Confidentiality: Protected confidentiality of transmitted data
6 - Maintain Integrity: Protected integrity of externally transmitted data
Enter list of goals (numbers separated by space): 1 2 3 4 5 6
Generating list of requirements... 35

Requirements Output
Result is 26 unique Common Criteria Security Functional Requirement
statements, e.g.:
• FCS_CKM.2: The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key distribution method [assignment:
cryptographic key distribution method] that meets the following:
[assignment: list of standards].
• FCS_CKM.4: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic
key destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
• TSF = TOE (Target of Evaluation) Security Functions 36

All TLS SFRs Primary SFRs Secondary SFRs Tertiary SFRs
FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITT.1
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_UIT.2
FDP_UIT.3
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.3
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_SAE.1 FMT_SMR.1, FPT_STM.1 FIA_UID.1
FPT_ITC.1
FTA_LSA.1
FTA_MCS.1 FIA_UID.1
FTA_MCS.2 FIA_UID.1
FTA_SSL.1 FIA_UAU.1
FTA_SSL.3
FTA_TSE.1
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_TRP.1 37

Summary of Requirements for TLS Connection
- Key distribution - Behavior when security attributes expire
- Secure back-end connections - Define & maintain roles
- Confidentiality, integrity & availability - Associate users with roles
- Replay protection - Provide reliable time stamps
- Error recovery - Scope session security attributes
- Authentication failure behavior - Limit concurrent sessions
- Permitted pre-authentication actions - Inactivity lock/unlock behavior
- Prevent & detect authentication forgery - Inactivity session termination
- Prevent & detect use of copied
authentication data
- Segmentation of different types of
communication (e.g., user vs. admin)
- Different privileges of local vs. remote
users
- Specify which endpoints initiate
connection
- Limit authentication feedback - Deny session based on attributes
- Control who can change security
attributes
- Force re-authentication when needed
- Key destruction 38

What We Demonstrated
• For a given component type (reusable security function), you can
specify applicable groupings of security requirements (SRPs)
• Each SRP can be configured as a set of detailed requirements
• They can include dependent requirements
• We can associate Threat Modeling mitigations to standardized
requirements packages—and their dependencies
• We can expand the list of requirements for later use
39

Requirements for a Complete Tool
The high-level re-entrant workflow concept to be used throughout the
Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SSDLC) includes:
• Build the security model –
• Direct input of instance of security component
• Select component by way of threat model taxonomy
• Expand the requirements utilizing a configurable library of Security
Requirements Packages, plus their dependencies
• Design status check-off of items already addressed, or inherited
• Enter level of effort and risk scoring data and provide a Risk-Benefit
Analysis ranking
40

Requirements for a Complete Tool (cont’d)
• Risk decision step to fix or accept risk, documenting any risk
acceptance justification
• Document any items deferred
• Generate list of security requirements changes to be addressed, and
update design status as fixed
• Output list of all security requirements implemented, or being
implemented, for documentation and testing purposes
• Output list of implemented, inherited, and deferred security controls
in desired format (ISO or NIST)
41

Create Model
Builder
Expand
Requirements
Design
Status
Risk-
Benefit-
Analysis
Risk
Decision
Requirements
Change
Checklist
Finalize
Requirements
Output Test
Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
42
Select Application Type
Desktop
Mobile
Server
Web Application Name
Demo

Create
Model
Builder
Expand
Requirements
Design
Status
Risk-
Benefit-
Analysis
Risk
Decision
Requirements
Change
Checklist
Finalize
Requirements
Output Test
Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
New
ComponentUser Server
Component Type
User
Server
TLS
Many more to follow…
Input Mode
Threat Model
Direct
42
Component Name
userLogon1

Location
External Entity
Process
Data Flow
Data Store
Create
Model
Builder
Expand
Requirements
Design
Status
Risk-
Benefit-
Analysis
Risk
Decision
Requirements
Change
Checklist
Finalize
Requirements
Output Test
Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
New
ComponentUser Server
Component Name
userLogon1
Spoof Client
Obtain credentials
Authentication UI
No authentication
Other authentication attack
Insufficient authentication
Backup authentication
Obtain Credentials
Transit
Change management
Federation issues
Storage
Mitigation
SSL
IPsec
TLS
Other
Input Mode
Threat Model
Direct
43

Create
Model
Builder Expand Requirements Design
Status
Risk-
Benefit-
Analysis
Risk
Decision
Requirements
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Requirements
Output Test
Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
44
Component Type:
TLS
Used by:
userLogon1
userLogon2
The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [assignment:
attributes]. [FTA_TSE.1]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow
control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection: transmit, receive] user data in a manner
protected from unauthorised disclosure. [FDP_UCT.1]
control SFP(s)] to be able to recover from [assignment: list of recoverable errors]
with the help of the source trusted IT product. [FDP_UIT.2]
control SFP(s)] to prevent the [selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use] of user
data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
[FDP_ITT.1]

Create
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Requirements Design Status
Risk-
Benefit-
Analysis
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Requirements
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Requirements
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Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
42
Security Functional Requirement
Component Type: TLS; Used by: userLogon1, userLogon2
Already Implemented
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [assignment: identified
authentication mechanism(s)]. [FIA_UAU.4]
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions [assignment: list of
conditions under which re-authentication is required]. [FIA_UAU.6]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information
flow control SFP(s)] to be able to recover from [assignment: list of recoverable
errors] with the help of the source trusted IT product. [FDP_UIT.2]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information
flow control SFP(s)] to prevent the [selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use]
of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
[FDP_ITT.1]
Y
Y

Create
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Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
42
Risk LOE Ranking
The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on
[assignment: attributes]. [FTA_TSE.1]
M $ 50,000 10
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or
information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection: transmit,
receive] user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
[FDP_UCT.1]
H $ 20,000 50
information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to recover from [assignment:
list of recoverable errors] with the help of the source trusted IT product.
[FDP_UIT.2]
L $ 30,000 3
information flow control SFP(s)] to prevent the [selection: disclosure,
modification, loss of use] of user data when it is transmitted between
physically-separated parts of the TOE. [FDP_ITT.1]
M $ 30,000 17

Create
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Status
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Requirements
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Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
42
Risk LOE Ranking
Fix
Decision
M $ 50,000 10
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s)
and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to
[selection: transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected
from unauthorised disclosure. [FDP_UCT.1]
H $ 20,000 50 Yes
and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to recover
from [assignment: list of recoverable errors] with the help of
the source trusted IT product. [FDP_UIT.2]
L $ 30,000 3
and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to prevent the
[selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use] of user data
when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of
the TOE. [FDP_ITT.1]
M $ 30,000 17 Yes

Create
Model
Builder
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Design
Status
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Risk Decision
Requirements
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Requirements
Output Test
Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
42
Risk LOE Ranking Fix Decision
M $ 50,000 10 Defer
and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection:
transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure. [FDP_UCT.1]
H $ 20,000 50 Yes
from [assignment: list of recoverable errors] with the help of the
source trusted IT product. [FDP_UIT.2]
L $ 30,000 3
and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to prevent the [selection:
disclosure, modification, loss of use] of user data when it is
transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
[FDP_ITT.1]
M $ 30,000 17 Yes
Defer Until
Release 2.3

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Security
Controls
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Risk LOE Ranking Accept
M $ 50,000 10 Defer
and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to
[selection: transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected
from unauthorised disclosure. [FDP_UCT.1]
H $ 20,000 50 Yes
from [assignment: list of recoverable errors] with the help of
the source trusted IT product. [FDP_UIT.2]
L $ 30,000 3 No
M $ 30,000 17 Yes
Enter Justification
Not critical. Can re-initiate
session

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Security
Controls
42
Component Type: TLS; Used by: userLogon1,
userLogon2
Affected Component(s)
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control
SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be
able to [selection: transmit, receive] user data in a
manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
[FDP_UCT.1]
accessControl.java
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control
SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to
prevent the [selection: disclosure, modification, loss
of use] of user data when it is transmitted between
physically-separated parts of the TOE. [FDP_ITT.1]
ldap.java

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Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
42
TBD: Outputs requirements that are
implemented, or are being implemented, as
well as those that have been deferred

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Requirements
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Security
Controls
42
TBD: List all requirements –
• previously implemented (for regression testing
purposes)
• those that are being newly implemented (new
test cases needed)

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Requirements
Output Security
Controls
42
NIST
and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection:
transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure. [FDP_UCT.1]
SC-8, SC-8(1)
SC-8, SC-8(1)

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Requirements
Output
Security
Controls
42
Library
Maintenance
Select Library
Component Type
Security Requirements Packages
Threat Tree
Threat Mitigations
Select Action
Import
Export
Edit

What Makes This Approach Unique
• Assists in enumerating requirements by applying standardized
Security Requirements Packages, then expanding the requirements
based on well-defined dependencies
• Includes chosen or default mitigations from a standardized Threat
Model taxonomy & generates more detailed security requirements
and controls
• Enables Risk-Benefit Analysis of each security requirement/control
• Facilitates generating documentation needed for testing and
compliance purposes
57

Benefits of Such a Methodology/Tool
• Enable characterizing security variables so that they may be
controlled, which is the key to establishing order from chaos
• Provide a way of enumerating design flaws, errors and omissions—
which may account for 1/3rd of vulnerabilities (CWEs)
• Enable enumeration of security functionality
• Identified in the solution space
• Not detailed in the original Requirements Document
58

Benefits of Such a Methodology/Tool (cont’d)
• Facilitate decision-making using Risk-Benefit Analysis of each
technical security control, generating acceptance of risk
documentation and record of deferred items
• Enable us to generate details needed to implement enumerated
requirements—for design and coding changes, plus unit, integration,
and QA testing
• Provide details for system security plans in ISO and NIST formats
• Integrate with systems engineering modeling tools via SysML
59

Theory – Did we come close to proving?
• Enable establishing order where there is currently chaos
regarding the identification and satisfaction of security
requirements during software development?
• Is this approach part of what is needed to establish security
engineering as a formal discipline?
• Does it solve a real problem? Which one?
60

Future of this Tool
• Basic functionality in prototype
• Support for requirement decision-making dialogues, context inputs
• Enable tailoring and completion of requirements language
• Provide support for configurable standardized Threat library &
associated mitigations
• Make freely available as an online service
• Open up Security Requirements Packages and Threat Library for
community development
• Three phases of development:
• Standalone/online (open source/funding/partners ?)
• Shared / Systems Roll-up / Performance Testing / Enterprise version
• SysML-capable / Integration with other tools 61

Wrap-Up
• Does this make sense?
• Is it useful?
• Who would use it?
• Who would buy it?
• Who would invest in it?
• If open sourced, would anybody really work on it?
• Should support for architecture and design patterns be included?
• If so, when? Scope? For requirements only?
• Questions & Discussion?
62

Contact Info
John M. Willis
Turnaround Security, Inc.
554 N Frederick Ave #244
Gaithersburg MD 20877 USA
(240) 720-7678
John.M.Willis@TurnaroundSecurity.com
LinkedIn.com/in/johnmwillis
63

Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc cosac - 2016 - final

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