From poverty to_empowerment_indias_imperative_for_jobs_growth_and_effective_basic_services_full_report

McKinsey Global Institute
February 2014
From poverty to
empowerment: India’s
imperative for jobs, growth,
and effective basic services

Copyright © McKinsey & Company 2014
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From poverty to
empowerment: India’s
imperative for jobs, growth,
and effective basic services
Rajat Gupta
Mumbai
Shirish Sankhe
Mumbai
Richard Dobbs
London
Jonathan Woetzel
Shanghai
Anu Madgavkar
Mumbai
Ashwin Hasyagar
Bengaluru
February 2014

More than two decades have passed since India embarked on major economic
reforms—and although official poverty rates have declined sharply since
then, millions of Indians continue to face significant deprivation in terms of
quality of life and access to basic services. India’s youthful and increasingly
vocal population is demanding more, and today the country’s leaders have an
opportunity to set higher aspirations. Not all of the options being considered are
feasible in the face of India’s current economic slowdown, however, and even
well-conceived plans seem beset by execution challenges.
Yet there is a set of choices India can make to accelerate the process of
bringing acceptable living standards to the vast majority of its population in
the relatively short time span of a decade. This path, if adopted, could have
profound consequences for the nation’s future economic growth and human
development. We believe it is within India’s grasp to ensure that all of its citizens
can fulfil their inherent rights to food, shelter, health care, basic dignity, and
economic opportunity.
In this research, MGI presents a new analytical measure, the Empowerment Line,
to assess what constitutes a meaningful, economically empowered standard
of living. We also introduce the Access Deprivation Score, a tool to measure
the availability of basic services across different parts of India. Our research
analyses recent history to understand what successfully drove improvements in
living standards in the past—and it looks ahead to quantify the relative potential
of various growth strategies that can create a better quality of life for the average
Indian citizen by 2022. We highlight critical reforms that are precursors to
achieving these outcomes and draw on more than 350 case examples to present
a host of innovations that can be used to deliver affordable basic services to the
poor more effectively.
This year-long research effort was led by Anu Madgavkar, a senior fellow of
MGI, along with McKinsey directors Shirish Sankhe and Rajat Gupta and
MGI directors Richard Dobbs and Jonathan Woetzel. Ashwin Hasyagar
managed the project team, comprising Subhashish Bhadra, Tarun Bhambra,
Subramanian Chidambaran, Azeez Gupta, Liesbeth Huisman, Mekala Krishnan,
Resham Mansharamani, Rahul Nath, Rafael Rivera, Joy Sharma, and Matt Stone.
Shishir Gupta and Sunali Rohra added urbanisation insights, and Rishi Arora
and the analytics team of McKinsey Knowledge Centre provided economic data
modeling support. MGI senior editor Lisa Renaud provided editorial support,
while Marisa Carder, Margo Shimasaki, and Joanne Willis provided graphic design
support. We thank the MGI communications and operations team (Tim Beacom,
Deadra Henderson, Julie Philpot, Gabriela Ramirez, and Rebeca Robboy) and
the McKinsey India External Relations team (Aparna Malaviya, Lotika Mehta,
Fatema Nulwala, and Ava Sethna) for their contributions.
Preface

We offer special thanks to Noshir Kaka, McKinsey’s India managing director,
and Adil Zainulbhai, former chairman of McKinsey in India, for their thoughtful
guidance and continuous support. We are grateful to many other McKinsey
colleagues who contributed their expertise to the project: Jozef Bardik,
Urs Binggeli, Marco Breu, Chinezi Chinjioke, Simon Goeller, Andrew Grant,
Tom Herbig, Maya Horii, William Jones, Alok Kshirsagar, Gautam Kumra,
Diaan‑Yi Lin, Barnik Maitra, Ramesh Mangaleswaran, Mona Mourshed,
Liane Ong, Vijay Sarma, Vikram Shivram, Jacqueline Tan, Mourad Taoufiki,
Vipul Tuli, Mandar Vaidya, and Ramya Venkatraman.
This report reflects the insights and guidance of our distinguished academic
advisory group. We sincerely thank Richard N. Cooper, the Maurits C. Boas
Professor of International Economics at Harvard University; Subir Gokarn, director
of research of Brookings India and former deputy governor of the Reserve
Bank of India; and Vijay Kelkar, chairman of the India Development Foundation,
former chairman of India’s Finance Commission, and former finance secretary,
Government of India.
We are indebted to many experts in the fields of economics, development, law,
public policy, and governance for their generous contribution of thought and
insight in the course of our research. While our views have been independently
formed and articulated in this report, we benefitted greatly from the variety of
perspectives we gathered from them.
We are grateful to distinguished leaders in government who shaped our
understanding of issues and prioritisation of solutions: Montek Singh Ahluwalia,
deputy chairman of the Planning Commission of India; Arun Maira and
B. K. Chaturvedi, members of the Planning Commission of India; Rakesh Mohan,
India’s executive director at the International Monetary Fund; Nandan Nilekani,
chairman, Unique Identification Authority of India; S. Ramadorai, adviser to the
Prime Minister, National Council on Skill Development; and Soli Sorabjee, former
attorney-general of India.
We deeply appreciate the contribution of several eminent global academicians
who kindly shared their perspectives with us: Sabina Alkire, director, Oxford
Poverty & Human Development Initiative, Oxford Department of International
Development; Abhijit Banerjee, Ford Foundation International Professor of
Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and co-founder of the
Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab; Peter Timmer, Thomas D. Cabot Professor
of Development Studies, Emeritus, at Harvard University; and Ashutosh Varshney,
Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences and
director of the Brown-India Initiative at Brown University.

We would like to thank officials from central and state governments who shared
their insights and experiences with us: K. Desiraju, secretary, Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare, Government of India; J. Satyanarayana, secretary,
Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India;
Madhav Lal, secretary, Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises,
Government of India; B. K. Gairola, mission director of e-Governance, Department
of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India; Dinkar Gupta,
additional director-general of police, Government of Punjab; B. B. Mahajan,
former secretary for food, Government of India; and Vini Mahajan, principal
secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Punjab.
We benefitted greatly from gathering the views of experts in the fields of
development, social transformation, governance, and law: Ramesh Chandran,
director, Governance and Public Policy Initiative, Centre for Policy Research;
Mirai Chatterjee, director of Social Security of the Self Employed Womens
Association and member of the National Advisory Council; Zeena Johar, CEO,
SughaVazhvu; Smita Kaushal, CFO, Akanksha Foundation; Rajiv Lochan,
director, SughaVazhvu; M. R. Madhavan, president and co-founder, PRS
Legislative Research; Zia Mody, founder and managing partner, AZB;
Bibhu Prasad Mohapatra, senior fellow and director, India Development
Foundation; Nachiket Mor, Director, Central Board of the Reserve Bank of India
and Chairman of the Reserve Bank of India Committee on Comprehensive
Financial Services for Small Businesses and Low-Income Households;
Parth Shah, founder president, Centre for Civil Society; and Bahram N. Vakil,
founder and managing partner, AZB.
We conducted discussions with leading economists and researchers and would
like to thank them for their valuable input: Poonam Gupta, senior economist,
World Bank; Rana Hasan, principal economist, Asian Development Bank;
Rajat Kathuria, director and chief executive, Indian Council for Research on
International Economic Relations; Reetika Khera, assistant professor, Humanities
and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi; Kalpana Kochhar, chief
economist, South Asia, World Bank; David Kucera, senior research economist,
International Labour Organisation; Santosh Mehrotra, director-general, Institute
of Applied Manpower Research; Arup Mitra, professor, Institute of Economic
Growth; Ajit Ranade, chief economist, Aditya Birla Group; Shekhar Shah,
director-general of the National Council of Applied Economic Research; and
Rajesh Shukla, former director of the National Council of Applied Economic
Research-Center for Macro Consumer Research.
Finally, we offer our sincere thanks to the more than 30 leaders of private- and
social-sector companies, foundations, funds, and other organisations who
generously shared their time and expertise in interviews. All references to specific
companies in this report, however, are from public sources.

This report contributes to MGI’s mission to help business and policy leaders
understand the forces transforming the global economy, identify strategic
locations, and prepare for the next wave of growth. As with all MGI research,
we would like to emphasise that this work is independent and has not been
commissioned or sponsored in any way by any business, government, or other
institution. We welcome your emailed comments on the research at
MGI@mckinsey.com.
Richard Dobbs
Director, McKinsey Global Institute
London
James Manyika
San Francisco
Jonathan Woetzel
Shanghai
February 2014

From poverty to_empowerment_indias_imperative_for_jobs_growth_and_effective_basic_services_full_report

680 million Indians
cannot meet their essential needs
580 millionpeople can be economically
empowered by 2022
115 millionadditional non-farm jobs
needed over the next decade
¾ of the potential
impact will come from jobs
and productivity growth
46% of basic services
are not within reach for the
average household
~50% of public
spending on basic services
does not reach the people
70% increase
needed in agricultural
yields over the next decade
50% of public social spending
is needed for health care, water, and
sanitation, up from 20% today

Contents
Executive summary 1
1. The Empowerment Line: A new measure of poverty in India 29
2. What keeps India poor 45
3. Understanding the Empowerment Gap 65
4. Access to basic services: The patterns of deprivation 83
5. Reforms and governance to move India from poverty
to empowerment 101
6. Revitalising India’s job creation engine 123
7. Raising productivity on India’s farms 151
8. Increasing public spending on basic services 173
9. Improving the effectiveness of basic service delivery 181
10. The way forward 203
Appendix: Technical notes 209
Appendix A: Estimating the Empowerment Line 209
Appendix B: Estimating the value of public spending on basic
services reaching the people 213
Appendix C: Calculating Access Deprivation Scores and
determining district archetypes 216
Appendix D: Constructing scenarios 220
Appendix E: Framework for strengthening accountabilities 224
Appendix F: Major government programmes 225
Bibliography 227

1
Long considered an immutable fact of life in India, extreme poverty is finally in
retreat. India launched its first wave of economic reforms in the early 1990s,
resulting in a decline in the official poverty ratio from 45 percent in 1994 to
37 percent in 2005. Over the next seven years, a period in which India achieved
the fastest rate of economic growth in its history and also implemented a number
of policies aimed at helping the poor, extreme poverty declined rapidly to
22 percent of the population, or some 270 million people.
This is an achievement to be celebrated—and yet now is an opportune time to
set higher aspirations. The government’s poverty line sets a fair benchmark for
extreme poverty, but it counts only those living in the most abject conditions.
Even a cursory scan of India’s human development indicators suggests more
widespread deprivation in terms of quality of life and access to basic services.
Above and beyond the goal of eradicating extreme poverty, India can address
these issues and create a new national vision for helping more than half a billion
people build a more economically empowered life.
This topic has been the subject of a national debate that has stretched well
beyond academic and policy circles. To advance the thinking around this issue,
the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) has created a new analytical framework—
one rooted in sound economic methodology and utilising published government
data—to define a minimum acceptable standard of living. The result is the
Empowerment Line, a holistic measure of income-based deprivation, which this
report applies to the Indian context.
While India’s official poverty line focuses on extreme poverty, the Empowerment
Line poses an entirely different question: what is the level of consumption
required for an individual to meet the necessities of human development? To
answer this, we estimate the cost of fulfilling eight basic household needs (food,
energy, housing, drinking water, sanitation, health care, education, and social
security) at a level sufficient to achieve a decent, if modest, standard of living
rather than just bare subsistence.
In applying this metric for 2011–12, we find that 56 percent of India’s population
lacks the means to meet their essential needs. By this measure, some 680 million
Indians are deprived—more than 2.5 times the population of 270 million below the
official poverty line. Hundreds of millions have exited extreme poverty, but their
lives are still marked by a continuous struggle to achieve a modicum of dignity,
comfort, and security. The Empowerment Gap, or the additional consumption
required to bring these 680 million people to the level of the Empowerment Line,
equates to 4 percent of GDP. The cost of bridging this gap is seven times higher
than the cost of eliminating poverty based on the official poverty line.
The Empowerment Line is a measure of individual consumption, yet the ability or
willingness to spend money is not wholly sufficient to guarantee a decent quality
of life. In addition to having sufficient income, households need physical access
Executive summary

2
to affordable basic services of acceptable quality. Their own purchasing power
can meet some needs, such as food and energy, but they also require access
to community-level social infrastructure such as health clinics and schools.
Therefore, to complement the Empowerment Line, we introduce a second
parameter to measure this: the Access Deprivation Score (ADS), which captures
the availability of basic services at the national, state, or even the district level.
The ADS metric reveals that, on average, Indian households lack access to
46 percent of the basic services they need.
In seeking solutions, a look at the past is revealing. Three-quarters of the
reduction in the Empowerment Gap achieved from 2005 to 2012 was due to
rising incomes, while one-quarter was due to increased government spending
on basic services. The contribution of rising incomes could have been even
higher, however, if India had created non-farm jobs at a faster pace and boosted
agricultural productivity—and the recent economic slowdown has stalled further
progress on these fronts. Although government spending on basic services
increased rapidly during this period, its impact was also dampened by inefficient
programme delivery. In fact, by our estimates, half of what was spent did not
produce better outcomes for the poor. India’s ability to further increase social
spending is also coming under pressure, as slowing economic growth limits the
available fiscal resources.
If India’s recent weak economic momentum persists in the coming decade, in
what we have termed the “stalled reforms scenario”, some 470 million people, or
36 percent of India’s population, would remain below the Empowerment Line in
2022 and as much as 12 percent would remain below the official poverty line.
But our research outlines a more ambitious yet economically sound path of
“inclusive reforms”—one based on a vision for delivering a better life to the
average Indian citizen by 2022. This scenario can be achieved by launching a
virtuous cycle of job creation and productivity growth that raises incomes and
generates resources for public spending; it also involves making the delivery of
basic services more effective. This has the potential to leave 100 million people
(7 percent of the population) below the Empowerment Line in 2022, and just
17 million (1 percent of the population) below the official poverty line. All told,
more than half a billion Indians could cross the threshold of consumption required
for an economically empowered life. Access to basic services, too, would vastly
improve, with access deprivation falling from 46 percent in 2012 to just 17 percent
in 2022.
Merely increasing government subsidies can achieve only a fraction of this goal,
however. Our estimates indicate that as in the past, almost three-quarters of
the potential impact of raising people above the level of the Empowerment Line
depends on unlocking investment, job growth, and productivity. More public
spending alone, without addressing issues of waste and inefficiency, is likely to
deliver at most 8 percent of total potential impact.
The importance of this message cannot be overstated. Government spending is
critical to ensure access to basic services, but simply channelling more money
into the same programmes without addressing their operations and outcomes
will deliver very little. It is within India’s grasp to bring the share of the population
below the Empowerment Line to single-digit levels and virtually eradicate
extreme poverty by 2022—but doing so will require policy makers at all levels
of government to focus on an agenda that emphasises job creation, growth-

3From poverty to empowerment: India’s imperative for jobs, growth, and effective basic services
oriented investment, farm sector productivity, and more innovative delivery of
social programmes.
While the framework and funding would fall to the central government, many of
the specific initiatives that would make this agenda a reality can be implemented
at the state level. The only requirements are political will and a relentless focus on
results—and with these building blocks in place, India could realise its long-held
goal of providing all its citizens with basic dignity and economic opportunity.
The Empowerment Line reveals that 56 percent of
India’s population lacks the means for a minimum
acceptable standard of living
A new and more holistic measure of income deprivation, the Empowerment Line
is an estimate of the minimum economic cost for a household to fulfil eight basic
needs: food, energy, housing, drinking water, sanitation, health care, education,
and social security (Exhibit E1). This research calculates the level of consumption
required to meet these needs in India, assuming that infrastructure and access
points are available at an efficient cost. This measurement can form the basis for
a new national vision of a better standard of living for all citizens.
Exhibit E1
SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Eight basic services contribute to a minimum acceptable standard of living
Food
Energy
Housing
Drinking
water
Sanitation
Health care
Education
Social
security
Basic
services
Access to clean cooking fuel and
electricity for lighting needs,
based on minimum energy
consumption levels
215 (rural) or 275 (urban)
square feet of acceptable
housing
litres per capita per day of
piped water supply2
Sanitary latrine in rural households, and
underground sewerage with wastewater
treatment in urban households
Access to an essential basket
of primary, secondary, and
tertiary health-care services
Access to primary education
and secondary education
(substitutable with vocational
training) for all children
based on accepted norms
Insurance to cover income
loss based on 2%
premium-to-coverage ratio
1 Protein and fat norms for adults.
2 Drinking water encompasses water for household uses as well as for personal consumption.
2,100 (urban) or 2,400 (rural)
calories, including 60 grams protein
and 40 grams fat, per capita per day1
In looking at what constitutes an acceptable living standard, the Empowerment
Line considers human development and applies externally defined norms to set
the standards for each basic need. Overall, the Empowerment Line’s minimum
standards of consumption are approximately 1.5 times higher than those implicit
in the official poverty line. Consumption requirements for health (including drinking
water and sanitation) and education are 5.5 and 3.8 times higher, respectively,
reflecting the minimum cost of meeting these essential needs. After taking
into account the value of government spending on basic services that already

4
reaches the people, we calculate India’s Empowerment Line at Rs. 1,336 per
capita per month, or almost Rs. 6,700 for a family of five per month.1
As of 2012,
the consumption levels of almost 680 million people across both urban and
rural areas of the country fell short of this mark. This far outstrips the 270 million
Indians below the official poverty line.
At a more detailed level, the Empowerment Line is set some 38 percent higher
for urban India than for rural India. Based on this benchmark, 171 million urban
residents (or 44 percent of the urban population) were below the Empowerment
Line, compared with 509 million rural residents (or 61 percent of the
rural population).
The Empowerment Line reveals that the challenge of improving people’s lives
in a fundamental and more lasting way is much greater than the challenge of
eradicating official poverty. The Empowerment Gap, or the difference between
each person’s current consumption and the levels called for in the Empowerment
Line, is about Rs. 332,000 crore ($69 billion) per year, or 4 percent of GDP. This is
seven times larger than the Rs. 50,000 crore ($10 billion) poverty gap (that is, the
difference between the current consumption of India’s officially poor and the level
implicit in the government’s poverty line, shown in Exhibit E2).
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Percentile of population (%)
Official poverty line
874
Empowerment Line
1,336
1 The Empowerment Gap and the poverty gap are defined as the aggregate differential between actual private
consumption expenditure and the consumption requirements of the Empowerment Line and the poverty line, respectively.
2 Using average exchange rate of $1 = INR 48.0769 for April 2011–March 2012.
The Empowerment Gap, at Rs. 332,000 crore ($69 billion),
is seven times larger than the poverty gap
Exhibit E2
Average monthly consumption expenditure
INR per capita per month, 2011–12, in 2011–12 prices
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 68th round; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Below Empowerment Line
56% (680 million people)
Below poverty line
Poverty gap1
INR 50,000 crore ($10 billion)2
Empowerment Gap1
But the challenge of bridging the Empowerment Gap is more complex than simply
raising public spending by an additional 4 percent of GDP. In reality, it will require
investing substantially more in order to fill gaps in infrastructure and access to
basic services over a sustained period of time—and these basic services will have
to be operated more effectively to extend their benefits to the maximum number
of people. We estimate that on average, Indians lack access to 46 percent of
the services they need and that just 50 percent of government spending actually
reaches the people.
1 All Empowerment Line figures are given in 2011–12 prices.

Rising incomes drove three-quarters of India’s past
reduction in the Empowerment Gap, while more
government spending drove the rest
From 2005 to 2012, the head count of people below the Empowerment Line fell
by 183 million, as India’s economy grew at a rapid pace of 8.5 percent per year.
Rising personal incomes associated with economic growth produced three-
quarters of the drop in the Empowerment Gap. The remaining one-fourth was
driven by an expansion of public spending on basic services. Even for those
below the official poverty line, who typically reap greater benefit from public
spending, rising incomes drove 66 percent of the reduction in the Empowerment
Gap. But both of these trends could have delivered much more impact.
Despite rapid GDP growth, the majority of India’s labour force remains engaged
in low-productivity activities. Almost 60 percent of those who live below the
Empowerment Line derive most of their livelihood from agriculture, but India’s
land productivity is just half that of other emerging Asian countries. A faster shift
of labour from farm to non-farm jobs (matching China’s pace) could have lifted
100 million more people above the Empowerment Line from 2005 to 2012. Today
there are too few job opportunities outside the farm sector, a factor that limits the
economic opportunities available to women in particular. In fact, just 57 percent
of India’s working-age population participates in the labour force—well below the
norm of 65 to 70 percent in other developing countries.
India’s labour productivity also lags due to the high prevalence of unorganised
and sub-scale businesses.2
Enterprises with fewer than 49 workers accounted
for 84 percent of India’s manufacturing employment in 2009, compared with
70 percent in the Philippines, 46 percent in Thailand, and a mere 25 percent in
China. Tiny enterprises in India, across both manufacturing and services, typically
have just one-eighth the productivity of larger enterprises with more than 200
workers (Exhibit E3).
Meanwhile, government spending on basic services rose at 11 percent per year
in real terms, faster than GDP, from 2005 to 2012, but it did not fully translate
into benefits for the poor. Our estimates, based on published government
data, indicate that approximately half of India’s total public spending on basic
services did not produce the desired results, with much of it lost to inefficiency or
corruption (Exhibit E4). Some 35 percent of India’s food subsidy, for instance, did
not reach consumers, and the poorest population segments received less than
40 percent of the subsidy intended for them despite the fact that they account for
80 percent of the hunger gap.
Apart from leakage and waste, the quality of services is also lacking. State-run
schools and health centres produce weak learning and health outcomes—in
fact, our analysis of relative efficiency across India’s states indicates that the
same outcomes could have been achieved with half the level of spending on
education and about one-third of the spending on health. These inefficiencies
represent a tragically lost opportunity: if subsidies and social programmes had
been 75 percent effective in reaching the poor, approximately matching the level
2 Enterprises in the government, public sector, private limited or public limited companies,
cooperative societies, and other enterprises employing more than ten workers, are
considered organised enterprises in India.

6
of effectiveness already achieved in India’s best-performing states, an additional
85 million people (7 percent of the population) could have moved out of extreme
poverty from 2005 to 2012.
Exhibit E3
Businesses with
5–49 employees2
India’s manufacturing sector is characterised by a glut of
sub-scale, low-productivity enterprises
Share of manufacturing employment by firm size, 2009
%
SOURCE: Asian Development Bank, Key indicators for Asia and the Pacific, 2009; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Both manufacturing and services businesses.
2 Productivity data is only for small enterprises (i.e., 5–49 employees) and does not include micro enterprises
(i.e., 1–4 employees).
NOTE: Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
Businesses with
200+ employees
6
8
6
13
23
11
23
29
42
52
200+ employees
50–199 employees
1–49 employees
Thailand
25
China
46
Indonesia
84
70
India
65
Philippines
13.1 31.113.112.414.0
1.5 15.15.72.33.2
Value add per worker, 20051
$ thousand per year
Exhibit E4
Currently, some 50 percent of public spending on basic services does not
reach the people because of inefficiencies in governance and execution
36
47
51
52
64
Health, family welfare,
drinking water,
and sanitation
Fuel
Education
(until secondary)
MNREGA2
Food1
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office; government fiscal statistics; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Public spending on basic services, 2012
100% = INR 570,000 crore
Spending
reaching
the people
Inefficiencies
and leakages
50
50
Estimated efficiency/effectiveness of government spending
% of spending that typically reaches the people
INR 285,000 crore not reaching
the intended beneficiaries
1 For people below official poverty line, only 36% of food subsidy reached the intended beneficiaries in 2009–10.
2 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act.

While health care is a critical gap across the board,
hunger is a dominant issue for the poorest and
housing is a growing need in urban areas
Because the poor cannot be painted with a single brush, the Empowerment Line
offers a more nuanced view of how deprivation is experienced. We define three
segments of the population according to their depth of poverty (Exhibit E5). Some
57 million Indians are classified as “excluded”; they are the poorest of the poor,
unable to afford minimal food, shelter, and fuel. An additional 210 million are
“impoverished”, with consumption above bare subsistence levels but still below
the official poverty line. Just above the official poverty line, some 413 million
Indians are “vulnerable”. They have only a tenuous grip on a better standard of
living; shocks such as a lost job or a bout of illness can easily push them back
into extreme poverty.
There are three distinct segments below the Empowerment Line
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 68th round; Oanda; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
India’s population and Empowerment Gap by segment, 2011–121
%
1 The Empowerment Gap is defined as the aggregate differential between actual private consumption expenditure and the
Empowerment Line.
3 Monthly per capita expenditure.
1.9x
1.4x
2.6x
Ratio of Empowerment
Line to average MPCE3
17
4634
38
100% =
Excluded
Impoverished
Vulnerable
Empowered
Empowerment Gap1
INR 332,000 cr.
($69 billion2)
17
0
Population below the
Empowerment Line
1.2 billion
5
44
Exhibit E5
The needs of all three segments are critical to address. The excluded are in
desperate circumstances and require immediate help. The impoverished, who
represent almost half of India’s Empowerment Gap, would benefit from better
management of existing programmes targeted to those below the official poverty
line. Finally, designing policies to address the needs of the vulnerable segment will
become increasingly important over time, as more people exit extreme poverty
but find themselves stuck in the ranks of the vulnerable.
Health care, clean drinking water, and sanitation are critical gaps for all of these
groups, whether in urban or rural India. These basic services make up the largest
share (39 percent) of the cumulative Empowerment Gap of Rs. 332,000 crore
($69 billion). However, the pattern of needs varies by segment. The most urgent
unmet needs of the excluded and impoverished are hunger and health, while
health, education, and housing are major issues for the vulnerable. Urban Indians,

8
while less prone to being impoverished or excluded, are almost as likely to fall into
the vulnerable category as rural residents, and affordable housing is a significant
unmet need for them.
Apart from income-based deprivation, India’s people
also lack access to 46 percent of the basic services
they require
When it comes to the availability of social services, geography is destiny for
those below the Empowerment Line. Patterns of deprivation are more complex
and multi-dimensional than what is implied by income or consumption measures
alone. Even for households of similar income levels, the actual experience of
poverty varies dramatically based on where they live. The availability of well-
run social infrastructure and free or low-cost services in the vicinity of the poor
is a crucial determinant of their quality of life. MGI has constructed the Access
Deprivation Score (ADS) to capture this factor. It supplements the income-based
measure of the Empowerment Line by highlighting geographical gaps in access to
basic services.
Using the ADS, we map India’s 640 districts into five distinct archetypes based on
their relative levels of access to schools, health centres, drinking water, sanitation,
and improved energy sources (Exhibit E6). The ADS for each district measures
the extent to which these basic services are absent relative to the aspired levels
of coverage. Nationwide, the gap is 46 percent, but the range is wide: people
living in the Most Deprived Districts may lack access to almost 60 percent of
basic services, while those in the Least Deprived Districts lack access to about
34 percent.
Based on cross-sectional data for 640 districts in 2010, we find that residents of
India’s more prosperous districts are more likely to be able to afford household-
level services that they can purchase themselves (by building toilets in their
homes, drilling tube wells, or using liquefied petroleum gas-based cooking stoves,
for instance). However, the positive effect of income is muted when it comes
to education and health care. In India’s largest and most crowded cities (which
are classified as Community Services–Deprived Districts), residents have higher
purchasing power, but that does not mitigate the difficulty of obtaining affordable
medical care and quality education. The expansion of social infrastructure has not
kept pace with growing population density.
The utilisation of health and education services, as measured in the ADS,
seems to go hand in hand with greater levels of grassroots community
involvement, especially by women. In fact, some of the poorest districts by
income fare significantly better on access to health care and education than
would be expected at their income levels if they also post stronger indicators for
women’s empowerment.

Exhibit E6
Each of India’s districts falls into one of five categories based on
the extent and pattern of deprivation found there
SOURCE: Census 2011; District-level Health Survey, 2007–08; District Information System for Education, 2009–10;
National Sample Survey Office survey, 2011–12; India state of forest report 2011, Ministry of Environment and
Forests; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Access Deprivation Score: distance of each district from the point of no deprivation.
Most Deprived
126 districts
27% population share
Average ADS1: 59 percent
Household Services Deprived
177 districts
Average ADS: 49 percent
Moderately Deprived
127 districts
Community Services Deprived
59 districts
Least Deprived
151 districts
2011
India can bring more than 90 percent of its people
above the Empowerment Line in just a decade by
implementing inclusive reforms
We have developed two scenarios to see how rapidly India can raise people to
the standards of living implied by the Empowerment Line. The first, which we
call “stalled reforms”, assumes that no bold policy measures are taken and that
slow economic growth continues. The second considers an alternative path of
“inclusive reforms”.
In the stalled reforms scenario, poverty is likely to maintain its grip on a large
share of India’s population. India’s economic engine has been sputtering since
2011, and there has been a growing sense of legislative and administrative
paralysis. In the absence of major reforms, the scenario assumes that India’s GDP
grows at just 5.5 percent from 2012 to 2022 and that the effectiveness of social
spending remains unchanged.
In such a scenario, some 470 million Indians (36 percent of the population) would
remain below the Empowerment Line in 2022, and 12 percent of the population
would still be trapped below the official poverty line. At this rate, the goal of
eliminating extreme poverty would not be reached until the mid-2030s. The lack
of decisive reforms also makes it unlikely that India would convincingly address
gaps in access to social infrastructure. Lower GDP growth implies lower fiscal

10
resources, limiting public spending for basic services. As a result, India’s access
deprivation would only come down to 26 percent by 2022.
The path of inclusive reforms envisages a far more positive alternative, one in
which the nation takes steps to stimulate investment, job creation, and farm
productivity, as well as dramatically improve the delivery of basic services. These
reforms could potentially allow India to achieve an average GDP growth rate of
7.8 percent between 2012 and 2022. This could lift 580 million people above
the Empowerment Line, leaving 100 million (7 percent of the population) below
it in 2022 and 17 million (just 1 percent) below the official poverty line—virtually
eliminating extreme poverty in just a decade.
The higher GDP growth inherent in the inclusive reforms scenario generates
more tax revenue that can be ploughed back into spending for basic services—
and it simultaneously ensures that India meets its fiscal objectives more quickly.
To achieve this goal, India will need to increase its investment rate from nearly
36 percent of GDP since 2005 to an average of 38 percent over the next
ten years. The combination of higher investment, faster economic growth, and
increased tax revenue could allow India to bring its fiscal deficit to 6 percent of
GDP from 2017 onward while enabling a moderate but steady increase in social
spending, in line with GDP growth, that could bring access deprivation in basic
services down from 46 percent to just 17 percent. Although these goals are
aspirational, they are feasible based on successes already demonstrated by
India’s better-performing states.
FOUR CRITICAL ELEMENTS ARE KEY TO THE PATH OF
INCLUSIVE REFORMS
The inclusive reforms scenario hinges on four key elements (Exhibit E7):
ƒƒ Accelerating job creation. India needs reforms that unlock the economy’s
potential to add 115 million non-farm jobs by 2022 (about 40 million more than
the stalled reforms scenario would generate). This would absorb the expected
growth of 69 million in the working-age population, raise the labour force
participation rate by some 2 to 3 percentage points, and reduce the share of
farm jobs from 49 percent of total employment in 2012 to 37 percent in 2022.
Construction will need to be the biggest contributor, adding some 50 million
jobs. The manufacturing sector will need to accelerate growth to create some
21 million to 27 million jobs, while some 35 million to 40 million jobs will need
to come from the services sector.
ƒƒ Raising farm productivity. Increasing investment in agricultural infrastructure,
research, and extension services can help raise the average farm yield per
hectare from 2.3 tonnes in 2012 to about 4.0 tonnes in 2022. This would bring
India’s yields in line with those in other emerging Asian countries. Gains in
agricultural productivity would also accelerate the transition of labour to more
productive non-farm jobs.
ƒƒ Increasing public spending on basic services. India cannot fully realise
the potential of its human capital until its population has wider access to
affordable basic services. In absolute, real terms, public spending on social
services needs to nearly double from Rs. 570,000 crore ($118 billion) in
2012 to Rs. 1,088,000 crore ($226 billion) in 2022 to fill critical gaps in social
infrastructure. This entails an annual real growth rate of about 6.7 percent in

public spending for basic services (which is actually lower than the 11 percent
annual rate of increase from 2005 to 2012). If India can achieve the higher
rates of economic growth assumed in the inclusive reforms scenario, this
would continue to represent about 6 percent of GDP. The share allocated
to health, water, and sanitation services, however, needs to increase from
21 percent in 2012 to nearly 50 percent of total social spending in 2022. Just
as expanding access to primary education was given top priority in the past
decade, India needs a concerted push to build more extensive health-care
infrastructure in the decade ahead.
ƒƒ Making basic services more effective. The impact of higher public spending
on basic services is magnified if more of that spending reaches its intended
beneficiaries. The inclusive reforms scenario assumes that the nation as
a whole can raise the effectiveness of social spending from 50 percent to
at least 75 percent by 2022, matching the levels already demonstrated by
India’s best-performing states. If India increases funding for basic services
Exhibit E7
Pursuing inclusive reforms in four key areas can achieve faster GDP growth
and unprecedented poverty reduction
3.9
2.8
2.3
10
9
8
7
6
5
0
Inclusive
reforms
Stalled
reforms
2022E201720133
7
36
56
1
12
22
2012 2022E
Stalled reforms
2022E
Inclusive reforms
Increase farm productivity
Yield (tonnes per hectare)
Create new non-farm jobs
Million
Increase public spending on basic services
INR thousand crore, 2012 rupees
Improve effectiveness of public spending
%
BPL2
BEL1
2.0%
p.a.
5.5%
p.a.352
312
237
+75
+115
1,088
771
570
3.1%
p.a.
6.7%
p.a. 75
5050
25
p.p.
7.8%
5.5%
Compound annual
growth rate
Four areas of reform 2012 2022E Stalled reforms 2022E Inclusive reforms
GDP growth rate
%
Faster poverty reduction and GDP growth
Head-count ratio
% of population
1 Below Empowerment Line.
2 Below official poverty line.
3 GDP growth of 5% in 2012–13 based on provisional estimates.

12
but does not improve on this current performance, nearly Rs. 545,000 crore
($113 billion) of social service spending will fail to reach intended beneficiaries
in 2022, up from about Rs. 285,000 crore ($59 billion) today. Best practices
and innovative examples from around the world (and from pilot programmes
within India itself) show how this can be done. Some of the most promising
strategies include forming partnerships with the private and social sectors,
mobilising community participation, and using technology to streamline and
monitor operations.
While all four of the levers are essential, a surge in job creation would make the
largest potential contribution to poverty reduction. In fact, job growth in non-farm
sectors combined with productivity growth in agriculture would directly contribute
to lifting more than 400 million people above the Empowerment Line, or more
than 70 percent of the total impact in the inclusive reforms scenario. The impact is
even more pronounced for the vulnerable segment, but even for the impoverished
and the excluded, jobs and productivity growth are the most powerful drivers
of higher living standards (Exhibit E8). Raising public spending alone, without
improving the effectiveness of delivery, would contribute less than 10 percent of
the potential impact across segments.
6
41
6
1834
Exhibit E8
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office, 68th round; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Productivity improvements and public provision of basic services
contribute in different proportions based on the poverty segment
1
5
3
4
822
7
56
9
4
10
25
% of population Contribution to
poverty reduction
Impoverished
and Excluded
Below the official
poverty line
Vulnerable
Above the official
poverty line but
below the
Empowerment
Line
Overall
Below the
Empowerment
Line
Population
share, 2012
Create new
non-farm jobs
Increase farm
productivity
Increase public
spending on
basic services
Improve
effectiveness
of public
spending
Population
share, 2022E
59% 41%
84% 16%
74% 26%

India needs to create 115 million non-farm jobs
through cross-cutting reforms and targeted public
investment
India needs 115 million new non-farm jobs over the next decade to accommodate
a growing population and to reduce the share of agriculture in employment. The
manufacturing and construction sectors can form the backbone of this effort, as
these sectors are well-suited to absorbing lower-skilled labour moving out of farm
jobs (Exhibit E9). Labour-intensive services—such as tourism, hospitality, retail
trade, and transportation—will also need to add 35 million to 40 million jobs.
The government can catalyse job creation by rebalancing its spending pattern
to increase public investment in the economy. The subsequent uptick in growth
and investor sentiment would crowd in private investment. Put together, the
overall investment rate would rise from an average of 36 percent since 2005 to an
average of 38 percent over the next decade in the inclusive reforms scenario.
Exhibit E9
India’s industrial sector will need to lead the way on
job creation, especially in construction and manufacturing
Incremental job creation in inclusive reforms scenario, 2012–22E
Head count, million
3
Construction1
Manufacturing1
Others1,2
80
50
27
1 Calculated assuming 80 million new industry and 35 million new services jobs.
2 Includes mining and quarrying, electricity, gas, and water supply.
Compound annual
growth rate
Total 95
Agriculture 20
Services 35-40
Industry 75-80 5.6%1
2.4%1
-0.9%
1.9%
3.8%
3.9%
7.4%
Almost half of the required jobs will need to be generated for the workforce in
states with particularly difficult starting conditions (including challenges with the
quality of education, which exacerbates skills shortages, as well as low levels of
urbanisation). Uttar Pradesh’s labour force, for example, will need some 23 million
non-farm jobs (approximately one-fifth of the national requirement), although the
state is largely rural and organised enterprises account for only 9 percent of its
employment. Some 11 million workers from Bihar will need to be absorbed into
the non-farm sector in an even less advantageous climate. India’s job-creation
strategy must provide broad-based reforms that invigorate job growth both in
these regions and across the entire country.

14
As China moves up the value chain, India and other emerging economies with
low labour costs have an opportunity to capture a larger share of labour-intensive
industries by integrating domestic manufacturing with global supply chains.
But today an array of barriers limits the ability of Indian businesses—both large
and small—to invest and become more competitive, scale up, and create jobs.
Revitalising India’s job-creation engine will require decisive reforms and a laser
focus on implementation in six high-priority areas:
ƒƒ Accelerate critical infrastructure for power and logistics. Infrastructure
gaps, especially in power and transportation, hinder economic growth,
particularly in manufacturing. For better execution of projects, the government
could establish a high-level National Infrastructure Delivery Unit in the prime
minister’s office to build an integrated view of the country’s infrastructure
needs, coordinate across ministries and functions, set and monitor schedules,
and address bottlenecks. This unit could work with the Cabinet Committee on
Investment to expedite infrastructure projects. A State Chief Minister’s Office
could also set up a State Infrastructure Delivery Unit for the same purpose.
ƒƒ Reduce the administrative burden on businesses. Complex and archaic
regulations pose a significant cost, especially for micro-, small, and medium-
sized businesses, discouraging both investment and their move into the formal
economy. India can reduce this burden in a phased manner, starting with
quick wins that require simple changes in administrative rules and procedures
rather than new legislation. In the medium term, the rollout of e-government
platforms and “one-stop shops” supported by automated government
processes can be accelerated, with more fundamental improvements such as
selective outsourcing to private-sector providers and extending the Right to
Public Services laws to business services as the third phase.
ƒƒ Remove tax and product-market distortions. India’s many taxes result in
high compliance costs, and differences across states and sectors balkanise
the national market, harming the ability of businesses to achieve economies
of scale. If implemented, the proposed goods and services tax, a harmonised
consumption tax across nearly all goods and services, represents a step
towards reducing complexity and lowering the tax burden. In addition to
cross-cutting tax reform, India can spur growth by removing tax and duty
distortions in individual sectors—especially those that will be the most
significant sources of non-farm job creation, such as garment manufacturing
and tourism.
ƒƒ Rationalise land markets. In 2013, India enacted the Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, which was intended to create a
framework to deal fairly with the displaced. However, inefficient land markets
remain a major impediment to economic growth, as property rights are
sometimes unclear and the process for land acquisition is time-consuming.
India can reinforce property rights by demarcating land holdings through
geospatial surveys and providing standardised title to landowners through
digitising records, as Karnataka has done. Similarly, restrictions on monetising
land can be loosened or eliminated to facilitate private transactions for major
projects and encourage the farm to non-farm shift.

ƒƒ Take phased steps to make labour markets more flexible. At least 43
national laws—and many more state laws—create rigid operating conditions
and discourage growth in labour-intensive industries. But ironically, they
secure rights for only a tiny minority of workers. India can make its labour
market more flexible in a phased manner, and states that have begun this
process have higher job-creation rates on average than those that have not.
A multitude of rules that restrict terms of work and work conditions can be
simplified or eliminated. In the medium term, India could rationalise laws
governing dismissal, pairing this with measures to reinforce income security
for the unemployed.
ƒƒ Help poor workers build skills with government-funded mechanisms.
Vocational education is needed most acutely by the poorest workers—
those with little or no education and those who live in rural areas. There are
278 million Indians of working age in these segments, but they are under-
served. Providers such as IL&FS Skills have built effective models that focus
on providing low-cost delivery, fostering interactive learning, and teaching skills
that are in demand. The government can scale up this approach by giving
poor workers vouchers that can be redeemed for vocational training with
accredited providers that are subject to monitoring and certification. Workers
in informal sectors and the self-employed (for example, caregivers, cooks,
nursing aides, hairdressers, shop assistants, plumbers, and electricians)
can raise their incomes through skill building. Short training courses of a few
months’ duration, along with certification systems, could help.
INVESTMENT IN “JOB-CREATION ENGINES” CAN PROMOTE
MORE GEOGRAPHICALLY BALANCED GROWTH AND BE SELF-
SUSTAINING
Along with making broad-based reforms to improve the business environment,
India can invest in stimulating specific “job-creation engines”. Our research finds
that investing in 70 to 100 sites, such as industrial townships or service hubs,
tourism circuits, and food-processing parks, can add 11 million incremental jobs
within a decade, and many more as these sites grow in scale. To be successful,
they would need to be located in areas with potentially high competitive
advantages (where natural endowments, traditional skills, and some base of
entrepreneurs already exist, for example)—and there are hundreds of such
locations in India across most states.
These job-creation engines would need to be seeded by public investment in
infrastructure and services, including reliable and low-cost power, road and
rail connections, and affordable housing and schools for workers’ families. By
our estimates, launching 35 industrial townships over a decade could require
capital expenditure for infrastructure averaging some Rs. 30,000 crore ($6 billion)
annually for the first eight years, after which cash flows turn positive. (Launching
tourism circuits or food-processing zones is significantly less capital-intensive.)
Such investments can be self-sustaining, yielding internal rates of return to
the government in excess of 25 percent per year and generating funds for
additional investment. Creating thriving new job centres across the country would
encourage more geographically balanced economic growth, raising the share
of population in small and medium-sized cities. This could alleviate some of the
pressures on basic services in India’s largest cities.

16
India can raise farm yields by rebalancing investment
and making targeted reforms in the agricultural sector
Focusing on the productivity of the agricultural sector to lift the incomes of
smallholder farmers is one of the most direct routes to addressing rural poverty.
Yet agriculture has not kept pace with growth in India’s broader economy.
Today the nation’s yield per hectare is half the average of China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand. But India has the capacity to raise its yield growth from
2.0 percent, its historical level, to 5.5 percent annually over the next ten years—
and this can raise approximately 10 percent of the nation’s population above the
Empowerment Line.
A range of technical levers can help to achieve productivity gains of this
magnitude. These include fertiliser and manure use to improve the quality of the
soil, more efficient water management (for example, through decentralised water
harvesting and micro-irrigation), research-driven improvements in seed quality,
technology-based “precision farming”, better market access, and improved post-
harvest logistics to reduce crop waste (Exhibit E10).
By 2022, India can increase farm yields to 4 tonnes per hectare,
which would be comparable to current yields in other emerging economies
Exhibit E10
Yield
Tonnes per hectare
SOURCE: UN Food and Agriculture Organization; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Includes post-harvest infrastructure and rural roads.
4.00.30.4
0.20.3
0.5
2.3
Yield target,
2022E
Market
access1
Precision
farming
Seed qualityIrrigationSoil fertilityYield,
2012
India
Other
countries,
2011–12
+72%
7.4
5.5
5.0
4.2
3.7
3.1
ChinaVietnamMalaysiaIndonesiaMexicoThailand
In the past, India’s spending on agriculture has focused on input and output
price support rather than investment in agricultural infrastructure, scientific
research, and extension services (which educate farmers on new technologies
and best practices). In 2010–11, the government spent Rs. 86,000 crore
($18 billion) on input subsidies (primarily fertiliser), but less than half that amount
(Rs. 34,000 crore, or $7 billion), on building storage and irrigation systems, as
well as scientific research and extension services. Along with rebalancing this
investment profile, policy makers can focus on reforms in nine high-priority areas
of the agriculture sector:

ƒƒ Enable private trade by reforming APMC acts. India’s agricultural produce
market committees (APMC) place severe restrictions on private trade in farm
produce. APMC reform could introduce a greater degree of competition and
enable farmers to obtain sufficient value for their output. Some states have
excluded certain agricultural products from APMC coverage, but these are
piecemeal solutions at best. The Model APMC Act issued by the central
government in 2003 facilitates private trade in more comprehensive way, but
the states have varying track records for implementation. To create a sense
of accountability and urgency for state-level reforms, India can strengthen
transparency and awareness among farmers by keeping a digital record
of the prices and quantities at APMC auctions; organising annual krishi
mahotsav gatherings; and improving direct interaction among farmers, traders,
corporations, bureaucrats, and the agriculture minister. A greater role for
the private sector, including modern retail, can also enable the agricultural
produce market to flourish.
ƒƒ Use technology for better price discovery. Poor price information reduces
farmers’ bargaining power with traders and prevents them from selling
their product in the most lucrative market if multiple options are available.
Fee-based price dissemination services can help: Esoko, which operates
across Africa, provides automatic and personalised price alerts and buy and
sell offers by SMS to farmers. In India, IFFCO Kisan Sanchar Ltd. provides
information on market prices via voice messages in local languages.
ƒƒ Rationalise price supports for agricultural produce. The government’s
minimum support price for a wide range of crops distorts the efficient
allocation of resources. For example, it deters farmers from diversifying to
higher-value crops such as fruits and vegetables, which are six times as
productive per hectare as cereals. The government can rebalance minimum
support prices to reflect consumer preferences and the true cost of
production, within fiscal boundaries. The creation of an independent regulatory
agency to set support prices within a fixed fiscal framework, responsive to
consumer needs and preferences, could help.
ƒƒ Introduce hybrid public-private crop insurance programmes. Only
17 percent of India’s farmers are insured. The National Agriculture Insurance
Scheme, the government’s flagship crop insurance programme, needs to
become more responsive to their needs. A hybrid model, such as the one
that prevails in France (where private-sector companies offer crop insurance,
with premiums subsidised by the government) could boost utilisation. With the
introduction of competition, market forces, and better administration, public
insurance providers would be forced to respond by improving technology and
introducing new products and pricing strategies.
ƒƒ Provide financial incentives to adopt new technology. More can be done
to encourage farmers to adopt the latest technologies. Under the National
Mission on Micro Irrigation, for example, the central government funds
40 percent of the cost of a micro-irrigation system, while the state government
contributes 10 percent. Andhra Pradesh has set up special‑purpose vehicles
for micro-irrigation subsidies.

18
ƒƒ Overhaul the public extension network and enhance private-sector
participation. A holistic approach to extension across various divisions and
departments has been successful in some states. In Gujarat, for example,
krishi raths (mobile vehicles) visit village after village to share information
on agricultural best practices. Fee-based private extension services (such
as those offered by Mahindra Subhlabh Services Ltd.) can boost extension
support to medium-size and large farms with the capability to pay. Public
extension will need to play an important role for poor farmers and those
in remote geographies, and the focus will need to shift to mobile-based
innovations (such as disseminating weather forecasts, new seed information,
and improved farming tips through phones).
ƒƒ Improve farmers’ access to credit. Regional disparities in access to credit
can be addressed by complementing commercial bank lending with channels
such as cooperative banks. Technology and delivery innovations such as
business correspondents (third-party, non-bank agents who extend banking
services right to people’s doorsteps) can be deployed in areas with low
conventional banking penetration. Targets can be set on the basis of cropped
area and level of technology to ensure more equitable access to capital.
ƒƒ Reform land markets and create an institutional framework to promote
leasing. Land markets in several parts of rural India are dysfunctional, as
mentioned above. Creating more modern and comprehensive landownership
records is a crucial first step in addressing this issue. The leasing market
could also be strengthened by the introduction of public land banks that allow
absentee landowners to “deposit” their land and receive rent for its use. Small
and marginal farmers could be encouraged to borrow and cultivate the land,
knowing that they have secure tenancy for a fixed period. This would utilise
more arable land and allow farmers to increase their output.
ƒƒ Integrate governance of agriculture at a grassroots level. Gujarat has
achieved an impressive agricultural turnaround, and at its core is good inter-
ministerial coordination. But in most of India, the organisational bureaucracy
overseeing the farm sector is overwhelming, with separate ministries for
agriculture, chemicals and fertilisers, food processing, water resources,
and rural development at the centre, and an even greater multiplicity of
authorities at the state level. A formal structure such as a Delivery Unit could
be considered to coordinate ministries and departments. Similarly, agricultural
missions could empower a team of bureaucrats and domain experts to make
decisions and allocate financial support.
Public spending will need to increase by
about 7 percent per year to expand access
to basic services
Access to basic services remains extremely weak and fragmented across most
of India. To bridge the gaps, India would need to increase social spending by
6.7 percent per year in real terms (as compared to 11 percent annual growth
between 2005 and 2012). Total public spending for basic service would
need to almost double, rising from Rs. 570,000 crore ($118 billion) in 2012 to
Rs. 1,088,000 crore ($226 billion) in 2022. The pace of economic growth will

determine whether government revenue will be sufficient to support this increase.
Under the inclusive reforms scenario, this higher level of spending would continue
to represent about 6 percent of GDP in 2022, approximately the same as at
present. In the stalled reforms scenario, however, maintaining funding for basic
services at 6 percent of GDP would mean that only about 70 percent of the
required amount of spending would be possible due to fiscal constraints.
Much of the incremental spending in the inclusive reforms scenario will need
to be channeled into health care, clean drinking water, and sanitation, where
deprivation is deep and broad-based (Exhibit E11). These services account
for about 39 percent of the Empowerment Gap. In addition, our cross-district
analysis indicates that improvements in access to health care are not very
responsive to increases in individual income, thus necessitating higher public
spending. Health care, drinking water, and sanitation would require up to
49 percent of total social spending in 2022, an increase from 21 percent in 2012.
Future allocation decisions should consider the areas with the most serious gaps,
both in terms of geography (building health centres in the Most Deprived Districts,
for instance) and in terms of recipients (targeting nutritional support to reach
more of the bottom three deciles of the population by income, who feel the need
most acutely).
Public spending on basic services needs to almost double, with more
resources allocated to health care, drinking water, and sanitation
Exhibit E11
Public spend on basic services
%; INR thousand crore, 2011–12 rupees
SOURCE: Indian Public Finance Statistics; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Not accounting for inefficiencies and leakages.
Per capita1
INR per month
1,088
Health care
Drinking water and sanitation
Education
Food
Energy
Social security
Housing
2022E
40
9
23
11
9
4
3
2012
571
15
6
42
13
14
7
4
390 662
+517
(+91%)

20
India can transform the delivery of basic services,
matching the results already achieved in its best-
performing states
Providing all Indian citizens with the basic services they need will require not only
an increase in public spending but also fresh thinking about the best ways to
deploy resources to achieve maximum results.
One key initial step in making social spending more effective is selecting the
right delivery model. There are two main types: in-kind transfers, in which the
government provides the service, and financial transfer models, in which the
government transmits benefits directly to consumers and enables them to go
directly to the service provider of their choice. To deliver nutritional support, for
instance, the government can provide in-kind aid as it does through the Public
Distribution System (PDS), which is relatively well-managed in some states (such
as Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh) but not in others (such as Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar). Or it can give consumers electronic transfers that can be redeemed at a
variety of shops (the model employed by Oportunidades, Mexico’s successful
conditional cash transfer programme). Each model can be successful if the right
enablers are in place.
Above all, India’s public services need an uncompromising push for better
outcomes. The focus must shift from simply spending more to spending more
effectively. Bringing the entire nation up to the standards already achieved in
the best-performing states for food and fuel subsidy distribution, health, and
education services would result in a 50 percent increase in the effectiveness of
national social spending (Exhibit E12).
Exhibit E12
At a national level, India can match the effectiveness of spending on
basic services currently achieved by its best-performing states
36
47
5152
65
Health, family
welfare,
drinking water,
and sanitation
EnergyEducation
(until secondary)
MNREGAFood
Food Education
33
36
61
80
Health care
24
34
56
78
40
54
68
89
16–20
11–15
6–10
Top 5 states
Current estimated
efficiency/effectiveness of
government spending, 2012
% of spend reaching people
We set a modest target of 75% efficiency in 2022, based on best-performing states

External agents—from the private and social sectors—can inject new thinking and
new operational approaches to basic service delivery. They can be deployed in a
variety of ways, whether by having an outside entity run an entire system funded
by the government (for example, public-private partnership schools in which the
government provides infrastructure while management is handed over to third
parties) or by contracting out specific parts of the process (for example, utilising
nongovernmental organisations to run some parts of government health-care
systems). In all these approaches, it is critical to have clear and airtight contracts,
service-level agreements, and stringent monitoring by the government and
other stakeholders.
Engaging local communities, especially women, can have a dramatic effect on
improving public services. India is starting to see encouraging developments on
this front. In Chhattisgarh, gram panchayats (village councils) are monitoring food
subsidy recipients. Cooperatives and women’s self-help groups in Tamil Nadu are
running fair price shops, the point of contact for subsidised food distribution. This
kind of involvement transforms the poor from beneficiaries to active participants in
the system.
Continuous measurement and tracking of key metrics can make a big difference
to the effectiveness of any service provider. Pratham, the largest educational
NGO in India, has implemented a systematic national measurement process to
evaluate children’s learning outcomes, which is creating pressure on schools to
improve performance. In Maharashtra, villagers are using pictorial report cards
to track doctor and nurse absenteeism and audit the availability of medical
supplies. Technology is one the most promising avenues for transforming the
delivery of services. SMS-enabled systems are being used to build stronger
communication with beneficiaries, while digital checks and balances (using simple
computerisation, electronic transfers of funds, or RFID tracking tags and smart
cards) can help guard against corruption.
India also needs a more dynamic and creative approach to augmenting human
resources; social franchising models, for example, can transform community
members into “basic service entrepreneurs”. SughaVazhvu, a health-care service
provider in rural Tamil Nadu, operates clinics run by local health extension
workers and people with degrees in traditional medicine. CARE Rural Health
Mission provides primary health care in Andhra Pradesh using local workers who
are trained as ”village health champions” and equipped with electronic devices to
connect with professionally trained doctors.
Today a host of interesting ideas, models, and experiments are being tried around
the world and across India. Based on an analysis of more than 350 case studies,
we have identified a range of promising approaches to redesigning the delivery of
basic services, with a focus on three critical areas: food and nutrition, education,
and health care, all highlighted below.
FOOD AND NUTRITION: SIMPLE INTERVENTIONS CAN
SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION
Hunger is a daily reality for India’s impoverished and excluded segments, who
rely on subsidised cereals for food security. The government-run PDS manages
an elaborate machinery for procurement, storage, and distribution, and there is
ample scope to improve its efficiency. India could consider selectively moving
from its physical food transfer model to one involving cash transfers in cities, thus

22
providing consumers with greater choice and also potentially reducing waste
and leakage in the supply chain. However, in rural areas, there are significant
challenges to rolling out cash transfers at present due to low penetration of
banking services and of private food shops that stock cereals in bulk quantities.
The physical transfer of subsidised grain through government channels is likely
to continue to be an important channel of subsidy delivery in such parts of
the country.
The state of Chhattisgarh has shown that simple interventions, such as
computerising and regularly updating beneficiary lists, can yield considerable
results. Communities are actively involved: fair price shop management has
shifted from private dealers to community-based organisations such as gram
pachayats, women’s self-help groups, and cooperatives. The government sends
SMS alerts to villagers to inform them when shipments of grain are on the way,
converting entire communities into watchdogs. Similarly, surprise checks and
audits by the Tamil Nadu government are proving helpful to monitor irregularities
in food distribution across the supply chain.
Beyond increasing the overall calorie consumption of the poor, it is crucial
to diversify their diet to combat widespread micronutrient deficiencies. New
manufacturing technologies can fortify food items with vital micronutrients—
and a variety of creative approaches can be used to deliver these to the poor.
Widely consumed local staples such as rice, oil, and salt are potent vehicles for
micronutrients, and the Philippines and Bangladesh, for example, have launched
large-scale production of golden rice, which adds beta carotene that the body
converts to vitamin A. Enriched foods can be integrated into existing nutritional
programmes, through the PDS, maternal centres, or school meals. For-profit
companies and NGOs can also play a role. For example, Britannia has developed
iron-fortified Tiger biscuits that are distributed by the Naandi Foundation to
150,000 schoolchildren in Hyderabad, and fortified yogurt is distributed house to
house by local “Grameen ladies” in the Grameen Danone Bangladesh project.
EDUCATION: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES CAN PRODUCE
BETTER LEARNING OUTCOMES
India’s education system is ripe for innovation, and our case studies have
yielded a number of interesting ideas and models that could play a role in
improving primary and secondary schools. Outcome-oriented educational
systems, such as US charter schools, can promote greater accountability for
performance. Performance pay for teachers has also proven to be effective. The
use of vouchers (currently being piloted by the Centre for Civil Society in Delhi,
Uttarakhand, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) introduces competitive pressure on
participating schools to improve performance in order to gain enrolment share.
Hiring teachers from the local community enables them to better connect with
the students and puts reputational pressure on the teacher to deliver. Some
communities may not have a sufficient pool of potential teachers, but this can be
overcome through focused training and ongoing support.
School leaders can be powerful change agents. Africa’s Bridge International
Academies, for example, employs a franchise model through which each school’s
manager is responsible for its performance, with salaries and bonuses linked
to outcomes. Bridge also extensively trains and supports school leadership
and management with detailed standard operating procedures for financial and
operational management, dashboards, and tracking of performance metrics.

This model incorporates the use of mobile phones, tablets, and customised text
messages to reduce the costs of teaching, training, assessments, outreach,
and school management. Bridge has lowered costs by 80 percent through this
“academy in a box” approach.
New digital learning tools could play a role in transforming teacher training
and student engagement. Standardised high-quality content (such as Khan
Academy’s video tutorials) can allow students to follow lectures at their own
pace at home, giving teachers leeway to help each student in a tailored way in
the classroom. In Brazil, Minas Gerais has pioneered the use of technology to
generate assessments regularly and chart each student’s progress.
HEALTH: TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION TO BRIDGE
HUMAN RESOURCE GAPS CAN EXPAND ACCESS
India’s 12th Five Year Plan set out the objective of universal health coverage, but
the nation is starting with wholly inadequate health infrastructure and a shortage
of trained medical professionals. Given the magnitude of the current gaps, there
is ample room—and a strong need—for multiple models to proliferate, and many
of them can complement the existing government system.
One of the most urgent priorities is training more skilled health-care professionals
at all levels. SughaVazhvu, as mentioned above, solves this problem by tapping
into the large human resources pool of alternative medicine practitioners and
offering them a three-month training and certification programme, supported
by strong protocols. Overseas, Zambia’s home-based care model for HIV/AIDS
and tuberculosis has mobilised teams of community nurses and health workers
to care for patients at home and train family members to provide additional care
themselves, thus relieving some of the pressure on the overburdened formal
health-care system. A standardised approach to diagnosis and adherence to
treatment protocols is vital to maintain standards of care and address a lack of
highly trained practitioners.
Using the latest in technology has a direct impact on improving outcomes. For
example, Mexico’s Medicall Home provides remote care to people in rural areas
through the use of mobile phones. Healthpoint Services offers video-conferencing
services with urban doctors in more than 70 health points (micro-clinics) in
Punjab. The new Swasthya Slate (health tablet) has been introduced in India
to perform diagnostic tests (such as blood pressure or blood sugar readings)
remotely, at a fraction of the cost of traditional diagnostics. Operation ASHA
has treated more than 30,000 tuberculosis patients in India and Cambodia and
prevented millions of additional cases. Its eCompliance tracking system verifies
patient enrolment and treatment against records from government labs, hospitals,
and medicine warehouses. A portable biometric identification system using
fingerprints is employed every time the patient receives a dose of medication, and
programme managers receive a text message to follow up whenever a patient
misses a dose.

24
Better governance is the key to implementing
inclusive reforms
A failure to execute well on vital programmes has prevented India from achieving
its full economic potential. The government’s performance in all its roles—from
regulatory oversight to providing services to businesses and citizens—is too often
marked by inefficiency, unresponsiveness, or even outright corruption. Today,
however, there is growing conviction across India that the time has come to
demand greater accountability.
The problem of poor governance can be overcome by efforts on two parallel
tracks: building stronger institutional capabilities and strengthening systems
to ensure accountability in the public sector. Institutional capabilities can be
improved by creating appropriate organisational structures, attracting the right
talent to government roles, managing performance, and streamlining processes.
Accountabilities can be strengthened by creating multiple checks and balances—
whether democratic, reputational, legal, or regulatory—for government agencies
and institutions. Six promising ideas, outlined below, can set this process
in motion:
ƒƒ Empowered agencies for high-priority initiatives, given operational
flexibility but held strictly accountable for outcomes. These agencies
(led by externally recruited “change agents” or high-performing civil servants)
can be set up with a specific mandate—perhaps building a health-care or
drinking water system or creating a tourism circuit. The Unique Identification
Authority of India, for example, is a quasi-independent agency mandated to
issue personal identification numbers to citizens; it has significant flexibility in
running its operations while reporting to a high authority. Such empowered
agencies in the central and state governments, focused on the most important
priorities, could dramatically improve outcomes and governance in focus
areas. Similar efforts, with “chief executive”–style leadership, have been
employed in Singapore, the United Kingdom, Chile, and elsewhere.
ƒƒ Public transparency. The Right to Information Act was an important start on
the journey to greater public transparency. The next steps are more voluntary
government disclosure (by, for instance, putting draft policies and legislation
online for public debate) and a massive digitisation effort to get government
data into open, shareable form. The imperative for more openness and
transparency in government can be strengthened by extending the Right to
Public Services, now enacted in 17 states, to a host of citizen and business
services. Using this framework, performance metrics can be defined and
ongoing feedback loops (such as digitised public scorecards at the state, local
authority, and specific desk/office levels) can be instituted.
ƒƒ Decentralisation. Through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in
1992, India sought to devolve powers to gram panchayats. In several areas,
such as the PDS in Chhattisgarh, panchayats have played a constructive
role. Giving them substantial independence in revenue and expenditure,
greater autonomy over how to implement programmes, and more training can
strengthen their capabilities; the same point applies to local bureaucracies.

ƒƒ Talent and performance management in government. Performance
management systems can ensure that public officials fulfil their duties.
Government commissions on administrative reform have pointed out
that India’s bureaucracy tends to be more focused on internal processes
than on results. To reverse this, bureaucrats should have incentives for
good performance and penalties for consistently poor performance.
Teacher absenteeism in public schools, for instance, can be reduced if the
consequence is strict disciplinary action. Senior bureaucratic positions can be
filled through a competitive application-based process, even from within the
civil service, to create incentives for delivering outcomes.
ƒƒ A robust anti-corruption framework. India ranked 94th among 174 countries
in Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. Mass
protests against corruption culminated in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act of
2013. While the impact of this move remains to be seen, more can be done
(such as establishing whistle-blower protection). International best practices,
such as the model set by Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against
Corruption, can be used as a template in India.
ƒƒ Simplifying laws and building legal and judicial capacity. Speedy access
to justice at a reasonable cost is critical to empowering households and
enterprises economically. To achieve this, India would need to increase the
number of courts and judges, review a host of archaic laws, and build greater
institutional capacity in its legal and regulatory arms. This will create an
ecosystem in which citizens can claim their rights.
CENTRAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
AND CITIZENS CAN ALL PLAY A PART IN MAKING IT HAPPEN
Pursuing an agenda of inclusive reforms will require considerable political will
and a laser focus on implementation and outcomes—but it holds the promise of
tangibly improving the lives of more than half a billion Indians.
Political leaders at the central and state levels can shape a new agenda
focused on the four priorities outlined here: job creation, growth in farm yields,
expanded access to basic services (especially health, water, and sanitation)
through moderate spending increases, and more effective basic service delivery.
Engaging civil society as well as the private sector and the social sector will be
crucial to building a broad national consensus around this approach.
Once the strategic direction is set, the central government can drive momentum
by making funding commitments that match these national priorities and putting
the enablers in place that will support broad economic growth: infrastructure
for power and logistics, the right taxation structure, investment in job-creation
engines, and measures that expand financial and digital inclusion.
For their part, state governments could start implementing various reforms
and governance ideas almost immediately. Many of them do not require
new legislation and can be achieved by simplifying and rationalising existing
procedures and programmes. Chief ministers can further critical initiatives in their
own states by bringing “change agents” into government, defining and monitoring
outcomes clearly, and creating implementation offices that are charged with
tracking progress and breaking through departmental silos.

26
The government’s efforts to create a business climate that is more conducive
to growth will be critical to building greater confidence among the companies,
investors, and entrepreneurs who ultimately will have to drive most of the job
creation and productivity gains that can raise incomes. It will also be important
to find ways to work with the private sector—along with the social sector and
NGOs—to bring in innovations and new operating models that can better
deliver basic services. And above all, citizens can do their part by exercising
their voices in the demand for greater accountability that can push through
comprehensive reforms.
* * *
Fulfilling the fundamental rights of all Indians to economic opportunity and basic
dignity is a daunting challenge in the face of such overwhelming need. But if the
central and state governments adopt an agenda built around inclusive reforms,
convert it into well-designed programmes, and follow through with execution,
India could be poised to make unprecedented gains in living standards. In the
decade ahead, the world’s largest democracy will prove to be a crucial testing
ground in the fight to eradicate extreme poverty worldwide. But the nation can
set its aspirations even higher—and if they are met, the result could be a profound
and historic step forward in India’s economic and human development.

29
The once-elusive goal of eliminating extreme poverty is finally within the world’s
reach—and 2030 appears to be a realistic target date, given the unprecedented
momentum of the past two decades. There is undeniable progress to celebrate,
but above it looms a hard question: is ending extreme poverty enough to achieve
a decent standard of living and sense of dignity for the poor?
This question has particular urgency in India, the world’s largest democracy and
home to one-third of the world’s poor. While the nation has made encouraging
progress in reducing poverty, its human development indicators suggest that
there is no room for complacency—and in fact, it is time to set higher aspirations
for delivering a better standard of living to all citizens. To achieve this vision over
the next decade, policy makers need a more comprehensive benchmark to
measure the gaps that must be closed and better target available resources.
MGI has created the Empowerment Line as a new and more holistic measure of
poverty and deprivation in India. We calculate what it would take for an Indian
household to fulfil its essential needs and then compare these benchmarks to
actual consumption data to determine the degree to which these needs are
going unmet.
In applying this standard for 2011–12, we find that 56 percent of the population,
or 680 million Indians, lack the means to achieve a minimum acceptable quality
of life. This total is some 2.5 times the official poverty count of 270 million—and it
implies that providing better living standards to India’s entire population will be a
much stiffer challenge than the goal of eradicating extreme poverty.
The Empowerment Line begins with the simple premise that every household
in India should be able to attain a fundamental sense of economic security,
opportunity, and dignity.3
Setting a benchmark for consumption based on a
package of basic needs reveals the dimensions of today’s problem and provides
a framework for designing interventions that could deliver on the vision of a better
quality of life for the majority of India’s citizens.
From 1981 to 2010, the world lifted some 700 million
people out of extreme poverty
It is helpful to view India’s progress on poverty reduction in a global context. In
the past three decades, the world has made unprecedented strides in lifting large
populations out of “extreme poverty”. This terminology refers to people living on
less than $1.25 a day, a benchmark set by the World Bank Group and commonly
3 In economic development, “empowerment” is the concept of expanding the narrow options
currently available to the poor and increasing their ability to fulfil their potential. See, for
example, Empowerment and poverty reduction: A sourcebook, World Bank, May 2002.
1. The Empowerment Line:
A new measure of poverty
in India

30
used for international comparisons.4
In 1981, 1.9 billion people, or 52 percent of
the population of developing economies, struggled to survive on even less. By
2010, however, that number had fallen to 1.2 billion, or 21 percent.5
The pace of improvement has been accelerating. From 1981 to 1990, just
29 million people exited extreme poverty, hardly registering a dent in the ranks
of the world’s extremely poor. In the following decade, that number rose to
167 million people. Momentum grew sharply from 2000 to 2010, when 527 million
people were lifted from extreme poverty.6
But these gains have been uneven. In fact, China accounts for 94 percent of the
world’s progress, having reduced its extreme poverty head count by 678 million
from 1981 to 2010 (Exhibit 1). As the nation’s remarkable economic rise unfolded,
China’s GDP per capita grew by an average of 10 percent per year. Meanwhile,
the number of people in extreme poverty fell by 168 million in the rest of East Asia
and by 62 million in South Asia (including India); these are substantive gains but
on a far smaller scale than China’s transformation. Sub-Saharan Africa actually
added more than 200 million to the ranks of the extremely poor over these
three decades.
China accounted for 94 percent of the decline in extreme poverty
between 1981 and 2010
SOURCE: World Bank; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Exhibit 1
205
330
395
414
468 470
315
249
Other
Sub-Saharan
Africa
India
China
1993 2005 2010
1,912
395
430
835
1,389
157
459
654
1,215
1,938
468
212
1981
Population below the $1.25-per-day poverty line
(in purchasing power parity, at 2005 international prices)
Million
-219
Total change
1981–2010
+209
-35
-678
4 In this chapter’s discussion of global poverty, the “extremely poor” are those living below
the World Bank Group’s $1.25-a-day line (at 2005 international prices). Within India
itself, however, we use the terms “officially poor” and “extremely poor” to refer to the
population below India’s official or national poverty line (which is estimated based on the
recommendations of the Tendulkar Committee and is sometimes referred to as the Tendulkar
poverty line).
5 The global estimates of extreme poverty discussed in this section are from World Bank
Group data.
6 Throughout this report, “lifting populations out of poverty” refers to reducing the poverty head
count, which accounts for population growth as well as people exiting poverty.

The positive shift in trajectory since 2000 has been apparent across regions,
however, raising hopes that the rest of the world could someday match China’s
rapid gains. From 2000 to 2010, East Asia (excluding China) raised 113 million
people from extreme poverty, posting gains three times faster than in the previous
decade. South Asia (including India) also raised 113 million from extreme poverty
from 2000 to 2010, marking the first decade in which the number of people living
below the $1.25-a-day line did not increase. Even though 37 million people were
added to the ranks of extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa during this period,
this represents less than half of its net additions in the preceding decade.
The world may be poised to eliminate extreme
poverty in the next 15 years
The goal of eliminating extreme poverty was enshrined as one of the eight
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the United Nations. Working
from the starting point of 1990, when 43 percent of the developing world’s
population was living on less than $1.25 a day, the MDGs set an intermediate
target of cutting this proportion in half by 2015. The rapid progress achieved after
2000 met this benchmark even faster than envisaged, as the share had dropped
to 21 percent by 2010.
This positive momentum has prompted the world to consider adopting a more
ambitious goal for the future. In June 2013, the World Bank Group set new targets
to reduce the global rate of extreme poverty to single-digit levels by 2020 and to
virtually eliminate it by 2030.
Several studies indicate that realising this goal is possible. A recent World Bank
report found that even in a pessimistic scenario, global poverty would fall from
19 percent in 2012 to 12 percent by 2027—but a more hopeful outlook would
reduce it to 9 percent by 2022 and 3 percent by 2027, lifting nearly one billion
people out of extreme poverty well before 2030.7
Other studies have also
found that based on “optimistic” economic growth assumptions (in line with the
International Monetary Fund’s economic forecasts), it would be possible to reduce
the global rate of extreme poverty to about 4 to 5 percent of the population in
developing countries by 2030 (Exhibit 2).8
India is home to one-third of the global population living below the $1.25-per-day
line—and as a result, much of the world’s hope for eliminating extreme poverty
now rests there. If India can implement effective policies over the next decade to
raise living standards, it can turn the tide in the global fight against poverty.
7 Martin Ravallion, How long will it take to lift one billion people out of poverty? World Bank
policy research working paper number 6325, January 2013. The more optimistic scenario
assumes that over the next decade developing economies maintain the faster trajectory of
economic performance and poverty reduction they have achieved since 2000.
8 See Peter Edward and Andy Sumner, The future of global poverty in a multi-speed world:
New estimates of scale, location, and cost, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
working paper number 111, June 2013; Laurence Chandy, Natasha Ledlie, and Veronika
Penciakova, The final countdown: Prospects for ending extreme poverty by 2030, Brookings
Institution policy paper number 2013–04, April 2013; and Homi Kharas and Andrew
Rogerson, Horizon 2025: Creative destruction in the aid industry, Overseas Development
Institute, July 2012.

32
1,215 1,309
305
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2030E2020E2010200019901980
6462
Exhibit 2
Extreme poverty is forecast to fall to approximately
9 percent globally by 2030
Population of developing economies below
$1.25-per-day poverty line1 (in purchasing power parity,
at 2005 international prices)
Million
SOURCE: World Bank; Peter Edward and Andy Sumner, The future of global poverty in a multi-speed world, 2013;
UN Population Division; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Forecasts use survey methodology and include two economic growth scenarios and three income distribution scenarios.
2 Simple average of six scenarios.
3 Based on medium variant population forecast.
Extreme poverty rate3
% of population in
developing economies
19%
4%
21%
9%
Forecasts
India contributed to the world’s progress by halving
the share of people in poverty from 1994 to 2012
India has made significant strides in reducing poverty: the share of people
living below the government’s official poverty line dropped from 45 percent to
37 percent during the post-reform period of 1994 to 2005, even as the absolute
number remained static at about 400 million.9
From 2005 to 2012, India’s GDP grew at a more rapid clip of 8.5 percent per
year. Suddenly, India was among the ranks of the fastest-growing developing
economies in the world—and simultaneously, the government made a strong
commitment to faster poverty reduction through increased spending on social
welfare programmes. India also endeavoured to create a rights-based framework
for development through the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (MNREGA) in 2006, the Right to Education Act in 2009, and, most
recently, the National Food Security Act in 2013.10
This confluence of events ought to have yielded tremendous benefits for
India’s poor. And indeed, from 2005 to 2012, India’s pace of poverty reduction
accelerated. The share of the population below the official poverty line fell from
37 percent in 2005 to 22 percent in 2012—the fastest rate of poverty reduction
9 Throughout this report, we refer to periods in the Indian context based on accounting year
conventions in India. Thus 1994 refers to the accounting period 1993–94, running from April
1, 1993, to March 31, 1994.
10 See Appendix F for a list of major government programmes.

India has achieved since the economic reforms of the early 1990s—as an
impressive 137 million people rose above this threshold (Exhibit 3).
Since 1994, India has halved the share of those in extreme poverty
SOURCE: Planning Commission of India; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Exhibit 3
Head-count ratio of people below India’s official poverty line
%
22
30
37
45
2004–05 2009–10 2011–121993–94
India’s total population
Million
890 1,090 1,190
407 354404 270
1,230
Population below India’s
official poverty line
Million
Even as we acknowledge this achievement, it is time to question whether
exiting poverty is enough to guarantee a decent life. Answering this requires
an understanding of the extent and nature of the needs—both met and
unmet—of India’s people. It requires exploring whether achieving the official
poverty benchmark enables the poor to obtain nutrition, health, education, and
economic security.
India’s official poverty line does not fully account for
human development, making a more holistic measure
necessary
India’s human development indicators show that deprivation extends well beyond
the 22 percent of Indian who live below the official poverty line. Forty percent of
the nation’s children under the age of 3 suffer from malnutrition. Fifty percent of
its households have no access to improved sanitation facilities. Seventy percent
of those between the ages of 15 and 65 have only a primary school education—or
no education at all. These statistics are symptomatic of the broader issue of poor
living standards experienced by a significant portion of India’s population. India’s
human development indicators do not compare favourably to those of several
other countries at similar or lower levels of income (Exhibit 4).

34
Exhibit 4
A number of countries with lower incomes than India
have achieved better human development indicators
SOURCE: United Nations Development Database; World Bank Group; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
2010
Worse than India
Better than India
1 2011 data.
GDP
per
capita1
$
Children under 5
who are
underweight
%
Mean years
of education
(adults)
DPT immunisation
among 1-year-olds
%
Population
with improved
sanitation
%
699 39
732 41
816 16
878 28
1,083 14
1,196 16
1,261 31
1,408 20
1,485 23
1,543 43
3.2
4.8
7.0
5.8
4.5
5.0
4.6
5.5
5.2
4.4
85
98
93
93
80
92
81
93
77
83
34
54
29
32
51
48
59
73
31
34India
Nigeria
Vietnam
Laos
Cameroon
Senegal
Cambodia
Kenya
Bangladesh
Nepal
A focus on these aspects of poverty led MGI to consider whether there is a way
to create a more comprehensive measurement using the currently available
government data sets and estimates of what it would take for the average Indian
household to meet its full range of fundamental human development needs.
The result is the Empowerment Line, which is an expenditure-based poverty
measure—one that takes into account what constitutes a “minimum acceptable
standard of living” as defined by the ability to meet eight basic needs.
In addition, poverty goes beyond incomes and the affordability of basic services—
it also involves lack of access to those services. This is especially relevant in
education and health care, which depend on shared social infrastructure such
as schools and hospitals. For example, India has only 1.3 hospital beds per
thousand people, well below the world average of 3.0 and the recommended
norm of 3.5 set by the World Health Organization. The shortage of medical
facilities is compounded by absenteeism among doctors, nurses, and other
health-care professionals. Even in India’s cities, where the density of hospital
beds is much higher, it is often difficult to obtain affordable health care. Poor
human development outcomes reflect weak levels of access to basic services,
compounded by much of the population’s inability to afford these services even
where they are available.
Effective poverty reduction that can lift human development requires addressing
the issue from both of these angles (see Box 1, “The need to measure poverty
beyond expenditure and income”). Therefore, to complement the Empowerment
Line’s focus on household purchasing power, we also build an assessment
of availability of basic services and social infrastructure from a geographic
perspective, using more current district-level (rather than household-level) data.
See Chapter 4 for more on MGI’s Access Deprivation Score.

Box 1. The need to measure poverty beyond expenditure and income
Where there is deprivation, there are barriers to the advancement of human
development, which economists Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen defined for
the United Nations Development Programme as “a process of enlarging people’s
choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and
healthy life, to be educated, and to have access to resources needed for a decent
standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human
rights and personal self-respect”. Designing a rigorous economic metric that can
integrate this multitude of aspirations is no easy task.
Expenditure-based (or income-based) poverty measures view deprivation through
a single lens: consumption expenditure (or income). But this approach has proved
inadequate in capturing the multiple deprivations that are part and parcel of a life
lived in poverty, including education, health care, drinking water, and housing, all
of which are fundamental to the concept of human development.1
Someone living
above the poverty line in terms of expenditure may still be deprived if he cannot
access medical care, is illiterate, or finds it difficult to get safe drinking water despite
the ability to pay. The limitations of expenditure-based metrics have prompted
researchers and scholars to develop alternate measures of poverty.
The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), a household survey-based assessment
devised by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), is a strong
push in this direction. It was developed to complement the $1.25-a-day measure
created by the World Bank Group. The MPI goes beyond the traditional focus on
expenditure or income to reflect the multiple deprivations that a poor person faces
in three key areas: education, health, and living standards.2
It takes into account ten
indicators (such as child mortality, school enrolment, and access to electricity) and
arrives at a measure of poverty that captures the hardships experienced by the poor.
Based on the MPI, 1.6 billion people worldwide (or 31 percent of the population
in the 104 countries analysed) lived in poverty in 2013. This is far higher than the
1.2 billion people (or 21 percent of the developing world’s population) living in
extreme poverty as defined by the $1.25-a-day line. Just over half (51 percent) of
those considered poor by the MPI benchmark live in South Asia and 29 percent
in sub-Saharan Africa. The MPI identifies at least 400 million people who are not
“extremely poor” but are poor in the practical and tangible sense of doing without
the basics.
The MPI was estimated for India in 2005–06 (based on National Family Health
Survey data). It indicated that 48.5 percent of India’s people were deprived on
multiple indicators—compared with government figures showing that 37 percent
of the population was officially poor in 2004–05. This suggests that India’s official
poverty count, which stood at just 22 percent of the population in 2012, may also fail
to measure the true extent of deprivation. Unfortunately, the OPHI has not been able
to update India’s MPI since 2006 due to limitations in the current data sets available.
1 Sudhir Anand and Amartya Sen, “Concepts of human development and poverty: A
multidimensional perspective”, in Human development papers 1997, United Nations
Development Programme.
2 Sabina Alkire and Maria Emma Santos, Multidimensional poverty index, Oxford Poverty and
Human Development Initiative, July 2010.

The Empowerment Line reveals that 680 million
Indians lack minimum acceptable standards of living
MGI’s Empowerment Line is a new metric that takes into account the needs
of hundreds of millions of citizens who are above the threshold of the official
poverty line but continue to face multiple deprivations. We start by defining an
economically empowered household, in the Indian context, as one that is able
to fulfil eight basic needs at a minimum acceptable level: food, energy, housing,
drinking water, sanitation, health care, education, and social security. Meeting
these requirements would guarantee a decent if modest quality of life.
Using the cost-of-basic-needs approach, MGI’s Empowerment Line is an
expenditure-based measure of poverty that builds on the thinking of leading
welfare economists (see Box 2, “The cost-of-basic-needs approach”).11
We
estimate the cost to each family of obtaining the goods and services required to
meet these needs, assuming that infrastructure and access points are available
at an efficient cost. We then subtract the estimated value of public goods and
services that are already being delivered to them, free of cost.12
This formula
yields the Empowerment Line, or the level of private household consumption
needed to achieve minimum acceptable standards of living (Exhibit 5).
11 See Jonathan Haughton and Shahidur R. Khandker, Handbook on poverty and inequality,
World Bank, 2009, and Martin Ravallion, Poverty lines in theory and practice, Living
Standards Measurement Study working paper number 133, World Bank, 1998.
12 Where goods are partially subsidised by the government (as in the case of subsidised food),
we subtract the subsidised component.
36
Box 2. The cost-of-basic-needs approach
Between poverty and empowerment lies a continuum of incomes and
expenditures. Poverty lines aim to define in a relatively precise yet simple
way the threshold of income, consumption, or well-being above which a
person is no longer “poor”, in order to shape policy responses.
The cost-of-basic-needs approach employed in the Empowerment Line
estimates the normative cost of a minimum threshold of consumption across
the most basic human needs. First used in a study of poverty in York,
England, by Seebohm Rowntree in 1899, the cost-of-basic-needs method
has the advantage of anchoring the definition of poverty in the day-to-day
economic realities of the poor. But it does elicit some criticism, since it
requires some judgment to define what constitutes “basic needs” and the
minimum amount of consumption across each one to no longer be “poor”.
It is also difficult to use this approach to make consistent comparisons over
time, given incomplete pricing data and changes in what constitutes the
appropriate bundle of goods and services that make up basic needs.
Nevertheless, the cost-of-basic-needs approach can more accurately
assess the extent of unmet needs and guide programmes that attempt to
bridge these gaps. The Empowerment Line we propose for India is a starting
point that can be further refined in terms of the essential components of
a “minimum acceptable standard of living”. Richer data can also be used
to identify regional price variations and better estimate the cost of service
delivery in different parts of India.

37From poverty to empowerment: India’s imperative for jobs, growth and effective basic services
154
128
96
221
221
82
1,336
580
203
106
16
Effective public spend
on basic services
208
Normative
consumption required
1,544
617
232
195
30
Food
Health3
Energy
Education2
Housing
Social security
Other1
Empowerment Line
The Empowerment Line calculates the cost of meeting eight basic needs,
minus the value of government services that reach the people
Exhibit 5
Normative consumption requirement and Empowerment Line
INR per capita per month, 2011–12; 2011–12 prices
1 Includes clothing, footwear, travel, entertainment, communication, and domestic appliances.
2 Includes costs of primary education and secondary education (or vocational training).
3 Includes health care, drinking water, and sanitation.
1414
89
2529
37
To estimate the number of people who live below the Empowerment Line, we
use the National Sample Survey Office’s (NSSO) household consumption survey,
which is also the base data set used by the government to estimate the number
of people living below India’s official poverty line.13
The Empowerment Line thus presents a more holistic picture of deprivation in
India using the most current and credible data sets available, and we believe it
can serve as a helpful starting point for a larger debate on how India can finally
break the grip of poverty.
Determining India’s Empowerment Line at the national level, as well as for urban
and rural India, involves the three steps outlined below, which are described in
further detail in Appendix A.
STEP 1: THE COST OF MEETING EIGHT BASIC NEEDS IS
ESTIMATED AT RS. 1,544 PER CAPITA PER MONTH FOR THE
AVERAGE INDIAN
We prioritise eight basic needs as core elements: food, energy, housing, drinking
water, sanitation, health care, education, and social security (Exhibit 6). We
also make a modest allowance for additional consumption such as clothing,
transportation, communication, and recreation. We include only consumption
13 The accuracy of the NSSO surveys has been widely debated. However, we have used
statistics from the NSSO, as it is the most accurate and extensive household-level
expenditure database available. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Arvind Panagariya
and Megha Mukim, A comprehensive analysis of poverty in India, World Bank, Policy research
working paper 6714, December 2013, or Surjit S. Bhalla, Inclusion and growth in India: Some
facts, some conclusions, London School of Economics Asia Research Centre working paper
number 39, 2011.

38
requirements in the basket, while acknowledging that issues such as the
expectation of physical security or the right to self-expression are essential parts
of human development but are harder to quantify in economic terms.
Exhibit 6
Eight basic services contribute to a minimum acceptable standard of living
Food
Energy
Housing
Drinking
water
Sanitation
Health care
Education
Social
security
Basic
services
2,100 (urban) or 2,400 (rural)
calories, including 60 grams protein
and 40 grams fat, per capita per day1
Access to clean cooking fuel and
electricity for lighting needs,
based on minimum energy
consumption levels
square feet of acceptable
housing
litres per capita per day of
piped water supply2
Sanitary latrine in rural households, and
underground sewerage with wastewater
treatment in urban households
Access to an essential basket
of primary, secondary, and
tertiary health-care services
Access to primary education
and secondary education
(substitutable with vocational
training) for all children
based on accepted norms
Insurance to cover income
loss based on 2%
premium-to-coverage ratio
1 Protein and fat norms for adults.
2 Drinking water encompasses water for household uses as well as for personal consumption.
For each basic need, we define minimum acceptable standards of consumption
in physical terms, at an individual or a household level, using goals and norms
established by the Indian government and expert bodies. Physical standards of
consumption in food, for instance, set the requirements of 2,400 calories per
day for an individual in rural areas and 2,100 in urban areas (validated for the
carbohydrate, fat, and protein mix and for gender, ages, and occupations). For
energy, we use estimates of the value of minimum non-discretionary rural and
urban fuel consumption per person. For housing, we take a minimum space of
215 square feet for rural areas and 275 square feet in urban areas. For water,
government estimates indicate that individuals in rural areas require at least
70 litres per day and urban individuals require 135 litres per day to cover both
personal consumption and household uses. For sanitation, we assume every rural
household should have access to a latrine, and every urban household needs
access to sewerage and a solid waste management system. For health care, we
use the cost of providing universal coverage, which is estimated by constructing
a package of basic health-care interventions. Educational needs are pegged at
a minimum of primary and secondary schooling for all children (with vocational
training as an acceptable substitute for the high school component). See
Appendix A for details on the various sources used.
For each component of consumption, we develop estimates of a normative cost
(that is, the cost at which each need can be met), assuming there are efficient
models of delivery available to all households. We develop variations of these
costs for urban and rural areas and for each state. We add the cost of each
element together to arrive at the total economic cost of achieving a minimum
acceptable standard of living.

Using this methodology, the national average normative consumption required
to meet the minimum acceptable standard of living is Rs. 1,544 per capita per
month (in 2011–12 prices). For a family of five, this would mean a cost of living of
Rs. 7,720 per month. The average normative consumption required in urban India
is Rs. 1,922; in rural India, it is Rs. 1,420.
STEP 2: THE VALUE OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES REACHING
THE PEOPLE IS ESTIMATED AT RS. 208 PER CAPITA
PER MONTH
Part of an individual’s normative cost of living may be borne by the government.
Hence, we lower the total cost of an acceptable standard of living by the amount
of public spending on these goods and services that actually reaches the people.
The public spending for each basic need is the total of expenditure by India’s
central and state governments towards addressing that need (for example, the
money spent to subsidise food and fuel, run health-care centres and schools, or
pay wages under MNREGA). In 2012, India’s annual government spending on the
eight basic services in our basket totalled Rs. 570,000 crore14
($118 billion)—or
Rs. 390 per capita per month.15
Not all this spending translated into benefits delivered to citizens, and the
Empowerment Line is adjusted to reflect only the portion that did. This share
is estimated using data from the government’s National Sample Survey for
food, fuel, and employment guarantee wages, and government statistics on
health and education outcomes vs. spending across India’s states. Overall,
we estimate that just half of government spending—or Rs. 208 per capita
per month16
—helps people achieve their basket of eight essential needs (see
Chapter 2 and Appendix B for further details). We deduct this adjusted amount
of public spending from the normative consumption requirement to reach the
Empowerment Line.
STEP 3: AT RS. 1,336 PER CAPITA PER MONTH, THE
EMPOWERMENT LINE IS MORE THAN 1.5 TIMES THE
OFFICIAL POVERTY LINE
The nationwide Empowerment Line is estimated at Rs. 1,336 per capita per
month ($27.80 in 2011–12 prices). A family of five would need about Rs. 6,700 per
month of private consumption to reach this threshold.17
The Empowerment Line’s minimum standards of consumption are more than
50 percent higher than those implicit in the official poverty line (Exhibit 7). Food
costs are 23 percent higher, for example, although food accounts for a smaller
share (43 percent) of the consumption embedded in the Empowerment Line than
its share (54 percent) to meet the official poverty line. Non-food elements, notably
health and education, are given greater weight in the Empowerment Line basket
of consumption than in that of the official poverty line.
14 One crore is equal to ten million.
15 There are two types of public spending: substitutes for private expenditure (such as electricity
subsidies or the cost of running a school) and spending that boosts private incomes (such as
cash transfers through work programmes). Because of the empirical difficulty of separating
out the two, we include both types of public spending.
16 The estimated average government spending on basic services that reaches a person in the
bottom seven deciles of the population by expenditure.
17 All Empowerment Line figures are given in 2011–12 prices.

40
The Empowerment Line is more than 50 percent higher than the official
poverty line, with substantial variation in requirement by service
SOURCE: Report of the Expert Group to Review the Methodology for Estimation of Poverty, Planning Commission, 2009;
McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Exhibit 7
Official poverty line and Empowerment Line
INR per capita per month, 2011–12; 2011–12 prices
1 Subcomponents calculated based on Tendulkar poverty estimation methodology used in 2004–05.
2 Includes clothing, footwear, travel, entertainment, communication, domestic appliances, etc.; corresponding category in
official poverty line does not include travel.
3 Corresponding category in official poverty line includes travel costs.
4 Includes primary and secondary education costs; corresponding category in official poverty line includes all education
costs.
5 Includes health care, drinking water, and sanitation; corresponding category in official poverty line includes health care
only.
107
128
185
221
106
Food
874
Health5
Energy
Education4
Housing3
Social security
Other2
Empowerment
Line 2011–2012
1,336
580
203
82
16
Official poverty
line 2011–20121
472
37
28
46
0
1.2x
1.8x
3.8x
1.2x
5.5x
1.2x
Ratio of Empowerment Line
to official poverty line
1.5x
As expected, there are significant variations across urban and rural India,
reflecting different physical norms and costs of living. The urban Empowerment
Line is set at Rs. 1,692 per capita per month, and the rural Empowerment Line is
estimated to be Rs. 1,228.
680 million PEOPLE LIVE BELOW THE EMPOWERMENT
LINE, 2.5 TIMES THE OFFICIALLY POOR
As of 2012, almost 680 million people (56 percent of India’s population) had
consumption levels below the Empowerment Line. This is 2.5 times the number of
Indians who fall below India’s official poverty line—and it indicates that a majority
of citizens lack the ability to meet their basic economic needs.
The cost of bridging the gap between the population’s current consumption
and the levels called for in the Empowerment Line in 2012 was about
Rs. 332,000 crore ($69 billion) per year or about 4 percent of GDP. We call this
the “Empowerment Gap”—and it is seven times the cost of bridging the poverty
gap, or the difference between the current consumption of India’s officially poor
and the consumption level implicit in the official poverty line (Exhibit 8).

0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Percentile of population (%)
Official poverty line
874
Empowerment Line
1,336
1 The Empowerment Gap and the poverty gap are defined as the aggregate differential between actual private
consumption expenditure and the consumption requirements of the Empowerment Line and the poverty line, respectively.
The Empowerment Gap, at Rs. 332,000 crore ($69 billion),
is seven times larger than the poverty gap
Exhibit 8
Average monthly consumption expenditure
INR per capita per month, 2011–12, in 2011–12 prices
Below Empowerment Line
Below poverty line
Poverty gap1
Empowerment Gap1
Urban India is home to 171 million people below the Empowerment Line, while
the remaining 509 million live in rural areas. However, the depth of deprivation,
as measured by the per capita Empowerment Gap as a proportion of the
Empowerment Line, shows that people below the Empowerment Line are equally
disadvantaged regardless of whether they live in urban or rural India (Exhibit 9).
1,171
1,692
Per capita
Empowerment
Gap2
521
(31%)
MPCE of BEL
population1
Empowerment
Line
859
Per capita
Empowerment
Gap2
370
(30%)
MPCE of BEL
population1
Empowerment
Line
1,228
The per capita Empowerment Gap is similar in urban and rural India
on a relative basis
Exhibit 9
1 MPCE = Monthly per capita expenditure, average; BEL = Below Empowerment Line.
2 The Empowerment Gap is defined as the monetary value of the difference between actual private consumption
expenditure and the consumption requirements of the Empowerment Line.
Empowerment Line and per capita Empowerment Gap, 2012
INR per month
BEL population
%
Million
44
171
61
509
Urban Rural

42
The Empowerment Line therefore magnifies the economic challenge of alleviating
poverty by a factor of seven. Bridging the Empowerment Gap will be significantly
more challenging than simply raising public spending by an additional 4 percent
of GDP, however. In reality, it will require investing substantially more in order to
fill gaps in social infrastructure and access to basic services over a sustained
period of time—and these services will need to become more effective to ensure
that the maximum number of people can derive real benefit from them. As we will
discuss in greater detail in the chapters that follow, we estimate that on average,
Indians currently lack access to 46 percent of the services they need and that just
50 percent of government spending actually reaches the people.
* * *
India has made tangible strides in alleviating extreme poverty, but even
the millions who have risen above the official poverty threshold continue to
struggle for a basic sense of security and dignity. The Empowerment Line, as
a new measure of what constitutes a minimum acceptable standard of living,
quantifies their needs and creates a framework for addressing their aspirations
for a better life. In magnifying the challenges facing India’s policy makers, this
framework also points to the need for a broader set of solutions beyond a simple
increase in subsidies.

45
Since independence, poverty reduction has been the focus of successive
governments in India, as encapsulated in the 1971 Garibi hatao (“Abolish poverty”)
campaign. Yet the cost-of-basic-needs lens adopted by the Empowerment Line
highlights the fact that the vast majority of Indians still do not have minimum
acceptable living standards. They lack both adequate incomes and access to a
range of effectively delivered basic services.
To understand what keeps India poor, a look at the recent past is revealing.
Productivity growth that led to rising incomes and private consumption has driven
the major share of recent poverty reduction. However, its impact could have been
greater if India had created more and better non-farm jobs and raised agricultural
yields faster. Public spending on basic services, the other lever, contributed
much less to poverty reduction. Not only has India under-invested in critical
areas such as health care, but across all areas, just half of what is spent actually
reaches the people. Addressing these shortcomings is critical to solving India’s
poverty challenge.
Some three-quarters of past reduction in the
Empowerment Gap was due to rising incomes
Productivity growth is the key to raising incomes and living standards. This
is evident when we look back in time to identify factors that led to past
improvements in the Empowerment Gap. Between 2005 and 2012, India’s share
of people below the Empowerment Line fell from 78 percent of the population to
56 percent. During the same period, the Empowerment Gap fell by 44 percent,
from Rs. 597,000 crore in 2005 to Rs. 332,000 crore in 2012 (in 2011-12 prices).
This progress was driven by two factors: rising incomes and personal
consumption on the one hand, and rising public spending on basic services on
the other. To quantify the impact of the first lever, we rely on NSSO estimates of
the per capita private consumption of people who were below the Empowerment
Line in 2005, adjusting for population growth in the seven years to 2012. To
quantify the second lever, we rely on published fiscal data, assuming constant
effectiveness of spending over this period.
Based on these broad estimates, we conclude that rising incomes and private
consumption growth contributed an estimated 74 percent of the reduction in the
Empowerment Gap achieved from 2005 to 2012 (Exhibit 10). Increased public
spending had a much smaller effect, driving 26 percent of the reduction in the
Empowerment Gap for those below the Empowerment Line in 2005. Its impact
was greater for the poorest segments of the population, contributing 30 to
35 percent of the improvement experienced by those below the official poverty
line, though rising incomes drove the bulk of the impact for them, too.
2. What keeps India poor

46
About 75 percent of recent reduction in the Empowerment Gap was
attributable to higher incomes, the rest to more public spending
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office, household consumption survey, 61st (2005) and 68th (2012) rounds; McKinsey
Global Institute analysis
Exhibit 10
Empowerment
gap, 2011–12
332
Additional public
spend reaching
the people1
111
Private
consumption
growth due to
higher incomes
321
Gap (2011–12)
holding per capita
consumption
constant
764
Impact of increase
in population
168
Empowerment
gap, 2004–05
597
Share of past poverty reduction
%
For below
Empowerment Line
For below poverty line
2674
3466
1 Public spending reaching the people is about 20% of monthly per capita expenditure for the population below the
Empowerment Line in 2012.
Empowerment Gap from 2004–05 to 2011–12
INR thousand crore, 2011–12 prices
The contribution of private consumption to the narrowing of the Empowerment
Gap was high due to productivity growth. As India experienced rapid GDP growth
of 8.5 percent annually from 2005 to 2012, household incomes increased.18
But
more broad-based economic growth driven by additional non-farm job creation
could have reduced the Empowerment Gap to an even greater extent.
India has raised public expenditure on social welfare programmes aggressively
since 2005, but the impact has been muted—in large part because much
of that spending never reached its intended beneficiaries. An estimated
Rs. 285,000 crore ($59 billion), or some 50 percent of public resources meant for
improving the lives of average citizens, did not actually reach the people as real
benefits in 2012, as we will discuss in further detail later in this chapter.
Broad-based income gains were limited by weak
non‑farm job creation
Improvements in productivity—both within individual sectors and due to the
movement of labour into higher-productivity sectors—lead to higher incomes.
Although India has made strides on this front, the most meaningful productivity
improvements have been concentrated in capital- and skill-intensive sectors.
Three factors have contributed to a relatively poor productivity performance in
the broader economy: the slow pace of non-farm job creation, a high share of
unorganised and sub-scale enterprises, and a skills shortage in the labour force.
18 Government employment guarantee programmes may have also had an indirect impact on
household consumption due to an increase in rural minimum wages, but the impact is hard to
quantify, and we have not disaggregated this component of total consumption growth.

NON-FARM JOB CREATION HAS BEEN INADEQUATE,
RESULTING IN LOW PRODUCTIVITY
Nearly half of India’s workforce (and 60 percent of the “working poor”19
) is
employed in agriculture—but the sector’s labour productivity is one-third to half
the levels in unregistered manufacturing20
and construction, which are themselves
among the lowest-performing sectors in the economy (Exhibit 11).
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
Share of employment
%
10095908580757065605550
Productivity per worker
INR thousand per year, in 2004–05 prices
40353025 45151050 20
Banking and insurance
Real estate and business services
Transport, storage, and communications
Public administration and defence
Trade, hotels, and restaurants
Unregistered manufacturing
Construction
Agriculture
Registered manufacturing
Exhibit 11
More than half the workforce is concentrated in agriculture,
where productivity is far below that of other sectors
Services
Industry
Agriculture
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 66th round; Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation;
Productivity and employment by sector, 2010
Other services
Utilities
Mining
Job growth in non-farm sectors has a doubly favourable impact on poverty
reduction. These higher-productivity jobs offer workers higher wages—and they
also raise the labour productivity of those left on farms, as fewer workers are
employed per unit of land. But India’s shifting of labour out of agriculture has
moved too slowly to have a great impact on poverty reduction. India created just
65 million non-farm jobs in the past decade (China, by comparison, generated
120 million non-farm jobs over this period). This was just enough to keep pace
with growth in India’s labour force, but not enough to move workers out of
agriculture. In addition, India’s labour force participation rate remains low by
international standards (see Box 3, “India’s missing female workforce”).
19 The “working poor” are defined as employed persons with monthly household consumption
expenditure below the official poverty line.
20 The registered sector of manufacturing covers all factories employing ten or more workers
and using power; those employing 20 or more persons but not using power; and bidi and
cigar establishments registered under the Bidi and Cigar Workers’ Act of 1966 employing ten
or more workers using power and 20 or more workers but not using power.

48
Box 3. India’s missing female workforce
Just 57 percent of India’s population participates in the labour force—well below
the levels of 65 to 70 percent seen in other developing economies (Exhibit 12).
A major factor behind this anomaly is the notable dearth of Indian women in
the workplace. A smaller share of women works outside the home in India than
in virtually any other nation in the world (only Pakistan and a few countries in
the Middle East and North Africa have lower shares). Just 40 percent of India’s
women in their prime working years (ages 25–54) were economically active in
2010, compared with 88 percent of women in China and 73 percent in Brazil. This
is not just a rural phenomenon: only 24 percent of women of prime working age in
India’s cities have jobs, compared with around 65 percent in urban China.
Between 2005 and 2010, women’s participation in the workplace actually fell
from an already low 42 percent to just 32 percent. The general trend of slow
job creation, which stymied both men and women seeking better employment
opportunities, is potentially one factor behind this. Women from the poorest
and most unskilled segments of the population are more likely to be driven to
work by necessity, and they often turn to agriculture, low-skill retail trade, and
construction. At slightly higher income and education levels, such work may
become unappealing, resulting in a drop in women’s labour force participation
in the absence of more attractive options. Other drivers could also be at work,
including poor workplace security and a scarcity of opportunities involving better
and safer jobs in medium-skilled services and light manufacturing.
India has a lower labour force participation rate than many other countries,
due to the low participation of women
Exhibit 12
Male
SOURCE: International Labour Organisation; National Sample Survey Office survey, 66th round; McKinsey Global Institute
analysis
1 Defined as ratio of number of persons in the labour force in a cohort to the total population of the cohort.
Female
Labour force participation rate, 20101
%
Share of
≥15-year- olds
%
55+
25–54
15–24
98
67
54 61
97
56
56
96
62
72
93
54
89
52
46
55+
25–54
15–24 22
40
23 25
88
63
40
82
40
28
73
55
34
75
50
57 74 72 70 64
41
58
40
62
97
71
67
47
96
58
56
18
3234
55
26
62
62
95
6062
India China Thailand Brazil
United
StatesAge Indonesia MalaysiaMexico

When workers leave the farm, it can have a direct positive impact on their
incomes. At current average productivity levels, an agricultural worker could
become two to three times as productive in a non-farm job, even in unorganised
manufacturing or construction. He would be five times as productive if he could
acquire the right training and obtain a job in the retail trade sector, in a restaurant
or hotel, or in another low- to medium-skill service sector (such as security
services or chauffeuring). That worker’s productivity would be ten times as high
with a job in formal manufacturing.
The importance of this shift is hard to overstate. If India had created 50 million
more non-farm jobs from 2005 to 2012 (assuming these jobs had the same
average productivity as the construction sector and that overall labour force
participation remained constant), the results would have been significant. The
higher earnings associated with this shift could have lifted 100 million more
Indians above the Empowerment Line.
Chapter 6 contains a more in-depth discussion of the structural barriers that
inhibit non-farm job creation in India. These include inadequate infrastructure,
inefficient land markets, the administrative burden and excessive red tape facing
businesses, tax and product-market distortions, inflexible labour laws, and a
shortage of workforce skills.
PRODUCTIVITY IS low due to the PREVALENCE OF
UNORGANISED AND sub-SCALE ENTERPRISES
Non-farm sectors in India’s economy have the potential to increase wages, but
they face multiple barriers to productivity growth. The potential income growth
of workers on the whole is dampened by the large share of employment in
unorganised enterprises.21
A low-skilled worker who moves from agriculture
to retail trade or light manufacturing, for example, would typically work in a
small, unorganised enterprise. The average labour productivity of unorganised
enterprises is estimated to be less than one-fifth that of enterprises in the
organised sector due to their small scale of operation, low levels of investment
in technology and capital, inefficient supply chains, and limited market access.
Employees in the unorganised sector have a lesser degree of job security and
less promising future prospects.
The share of employment in the organised sector varies significantly by state,
with the more prosperous states having created a greater share of jobs in
organised sectors. While organised sector employment was about 14 percent of
total employment nationally in 2010, its share for Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and
Kerala was close to 21 to 22 percent; for highly urbanised Goa, it was as high as
58 percent. At the other end of the spectrum, just 5 percent of Bihar’s workforce
was employed in the organised sector, while the share in Uttar Pradesh and
Madhya Pradesh was close to 9 percent.
21 Enterprises in the government, public sector, private limited or public limited companies,
cooperative societies, and other enterprises employing more than ten workers are considered
organised enterprises.

50
India’s pace of job creation in organised enterprises has lagged behind what
is needed to accommodate population growth and make substantial income
gains. From 2005 to 2010, 65 million jobs were created, but just 20 percent
(or 13.5 million ) were in the organised sector—and most came from the
government’s rural employment guarantee programme, or MNREGA (Exhibit 13).
While these jobs did raise rural incomes, they actually lowered overall productivity
in the construction sector during this period.
Exhibit 13
Job growth in the organised sector has been led by rural construction,
which is characterised by low productivity
All India
65.8
52.3
Rural
28.8
22.4
Urban
37.0
29.9
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 61st and 66th rounds; Central Statistical Organisation; McKinsey Global
Institute analysis
Total
13.5
6.4
7.1
Other
4.5
0.4
4.1
Real
estate and
business
services
1.1
0
1.0
Public
admin-
istration
1.3
0.6
0.8
Con-
struction1
6.6
5.4
1.2
30
33
6
8
12
14
Organised sector employment,
2005 and 2010
Million
2010
2005
Share of total
employment
%
Incremental organised sector employment
by industry, 2005–10
Million
Rural
Urban
1 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) contributed to about 75% of increase in
construction employment between 2005 and 2010; however, construction productivity fell by 2.1% per annum.
The extremely small scale of enterprises lowers overall productivity in the
manufacturing sector. Enterprises with fewer than 49 workers account for
84 percent of India’s manufacturing employment. In sectors such as metals,
machinery, and textiles, about two-thirds of the workforce is employed in
unorganised enterprises that are typically small in size, but this share is as high
as 85 to 95 percent for more labour-intensive sectors such as wood and wood
products, apparel, and tobacco products. Extremely small units are far less
productive than larger enterprises: across manufacturing and services, a worker
in a unit employing more than 200 workers would produce 8 times the value
and earn 4.5 times more than a worker in a unit with fewer than 49 employees
(Exhibit 14).
Very small enterprises are typically the first rung up the economic ladder for
low-skill workers coming out of agriculture or entering the workforce for the
first time. In the absence of employment opportunities being created by larger
companies, many workers tend to set up their own shops (small kirana stores or
tea shops, for example) or tiny manufacturing units (engaging in businesses such
as tailoring). Alternatively, they may find work in similar establishments set up by
family members. These jobs can play a significant role in poverty reduction, but

only if they provide the sustained growth in productivity and income required to
raise a family’s standard of living above the Empowerment Line. India seems to be
doing an inadequate job of enabling these small businesses to grow in both scale
and efficiency.
Economies of scale are positively correlated with higher productivity
and wages
Exhibit 14
SOURCE: Key indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2009, Asian Development Bank, August 2009; McKinsey Global Institute
analysis
Productivity by firm size, 2005
Value add per worker per year, 2005 $
13,089
5,223
1,450
200+
50–199
5–49 587
1,361
2,699
+803%
Number of
employees
Average annual wage
$
A LACK OF SKILLS CONTRIBUTES TO LOW
WORKFORCE PRODUCTIVITY
Education and skills are critical components of productivity, and India faces
enormous challenges on this front. While significant strides have been made
in expanding primary education over the past decade, almost 70 percent of
India’s working-age population (ages 15 and above) is not educated beyond
primary school. Even more startling, nearly 50 percent of the prime working-age
population (ages 25 to 54)—or some 200 million people—has had no education at
all. Seventy-five percent of the uneducated who are employed in rural India work
on farms.
India has been expanding vocational education, but its progress pales in
comparison to the sheer size of the labour force that could benefit from training.
While 44 million workers have received formal or informal vocational training, this
is only 9 percent of the labour force. Even in the states with the most extensive
training options, no more than 20 percent of the workforce has been able to
take advantage of these opportunities; the share of workers who had received
vocational training was only 19 percent in Kerala and 18 percent in Goa in 2010.22
In the poorer states of Bihar and Jharkhand, the corresponding numbers were
1 percent and 3 percent, respectively.
22 National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) survey, 66th round.

52
Agricultural yields are only about half the levels of
many peer countries
Productivity is the driving force behind economic growth, and yet nearly half of
India’s vast labour force is engaged in low-productivity agricultural work. Because
of the sheer weight of this sector in the Indian workforce, agriculture will have to
be front and centre in any broad-based poverty reduction programme. While no
poor country has ever successfully reduced poverty through agricultural reforms
alone, very few have achieved it without increasing agricultural productivity as
part of a broader plan.23
The nation’s yield per hectare is half the average level for China, Vietnam,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Exhibit 15). Consequently, farm incomes
are low and climbing slowly. Farm worker productivity grew at 3.2 percent per
year between 2000 and 2010, far below the rates posted by manufacturing and
services, where labour productivity over this period grew by 5.6 and 5.7 percent
per year, respectively. The agricultural sector also reports under-employment
of about 20 percent, meaning that those employed in agriculture are not
productively occupied for 20 percent of their time.24
Exhibit 15
Indian crop yields are significantly lower than Asian averages
SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
Malaysia
Vietnam
Thailand
Indonesia
India
China
20110520009590851980
Indian yields started at a lower level and are not
catching up with those of other countries
Yields in India are below Asian yields
for all food grains except wheat
Yield of select food grains, 2012
Indexed to world average
Millet
Wheat
Rice
Lentils
Maize
India
China
Asia 1
United States
World
average
1 Including India.
2x world
average
Agricultural land yield
Tonnes per hectare
23 Growth and poverty reduction: The role of agriculture, UK Department for International
Development, December 2005.
24 NSSO Employment Survey, 66th round. This is based on the usual principal and subsidiary
status (UPSS) approach and includes workers who had work in household enterprises or
regular employment. It includes person days not worked for such issues as attending to
domestic duties, educational institutions, or being unavailable for work due to disability or
sickness (casual workers).

In Chapter 7, we discuss some of the underlying issues in India’s farm sector that
contribute to keeping yields low. For instance, India’s farms have highly variable
levels of input intensity in terms of fertiliser, manure, water, and improved seeds.
Sowing and harvesting are undertaken with little knowledge of modern methods
and practices. Farmers have weak market access for their produce because of
issues as diverse as archaic laws, inadequate roads and storage infrastructure,
and low dissemination of price-related information.
Many of the barriers to raising yields reflect a long-term pattern of investment
in the agricultural sector. Over the past 20 years, government support to
Indian agriculture has emphasised input and output price supports more than
infrastructure, scientific research, and extension services. In 2010–11, the
government spent Rs. 86,000 crore ($18 billion) on input subsidies (primarily
fertiliser and irrigation), but only Rs. 34,000 crore on building agricultural
infrastructure such as storage, expanded irrigation systems, research, and
extension services. Input subsidies have been consistently growing 2 to 3 percent
faster than productive investment in the past decade. This has slowed the pace of
yield improvement on India’s farms.
Despite rapid overall growth, public spending is
insufficient in critical areas such as health care, water,
and sanitation
Public spending is needed to address both lack of access to services and the
inability of the poor to afford these services even where they are available. It
has played a critical role in helping the poorest segments of the population
survive—and yet we estimate that it drove just a quarter of the reduction in the
Empowerment Gap achieved between 2005 and 2012.
India has ramped up social spending in recent years (Exhibit 16). Between
2008 and 2012, government spending on the basket of eight basic services
increased at a compound annual growth rate of 20 percent in nominal terms
(about 11 percent in real terms), while nominal GDP grew at 17 percent per year.
By 2012, annual government spending on the eight basic services in our basket
of core needs totalled Rs. 570,000 crore ($118 billion)—or nearly one-quarter of
India’s annual state and central expenditure.
Spending has grown faster in some areas than in others. Between 2008 and
2012, the food subsidy programme grew by 24 percent per year in nominal
terms. Spending on India’s flagship social security scheme, the Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) programme, also
accelerated in the past three years, posting 31 percent annual growth.25
These
programmes are designed to combat hunger and provide the poor with a social
safety net in the absence of better employment opportunities.
25 MNREGA entitles one adult member of every rural household to 100 days of unskilled
manual labour per year within 5 km of the household’s village. The people are to be
employed in the creation of durable assets and public works that would benefit the
household. If the government is unable to create employment, it is obligated to pay an
unemployment allowance.

54
Approximately 23 percent of public spending goes to basic household
services; this has risen faster than GDP
Exhibit 16
Overall
2,467 ($513)
100%
Other
100 ($21)
4%
Interest
payments
408 ($84)
17%
Infrastructure
660 ($137)
27%
Security and
administration
728 ($151)
30%
Basic services
570 ($118)
23%
▪ Food subsidy
▪ Fuel subsidy
▪ Education (up
to secondary)
▪ Health care
▪ Drinking water
and sanitation
▪ Housing
▪ Social security
▪ Railways
▪ Telecom
▪ General economic
services
▪ Irrigation
▪ Power and public
works
▪ Industry and
minerals
▪ Defence
▪ Border roads
▪ Fiscal and
administrative
services
▪ Organs of
state, pension
▪ Local bodies
▪ Fertiliser subsidy
▪ Response to
natural calamities
▪ Scientific
research
All-India (central and state) spending, 2011–12
INR thousand crore ($ billion), 2011–12 prices
Government (central and state) fiscal expenditure
INR thousand crore
2,600
2,200
1,800
1,400
1,000
600
200
0
Other
Interest
payments
Infrastructure
Security and
administration
Basic services
08–0903–042000–01
SOURCE: Indian Public Finance Statistics, 2013; national and state budget documents; International Monetary Fund;
1 Data for 2011–12 reflects revised estimates.
NOTE: Data for 2001–02 and 2002–03 were not available, so their values have been calculated by interpolating along the
graph. Values differ slightly from calculations for 2009–10 shown previously, as this takes into account only fiscal
expenditures; tertiary education is also included in basic services here. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
Nominal
GDP
9 15
9
17
7
13
16
16
16
9
20
20
19
14
17
2011–121
Compound annual
growth rate, %
But India also needs more water systems, affordable housing, a more extensive
health-care network, and well-equipped public schools. Based on various
measures of access to such infrastructure (Exhibit 17), we estimate nationwide
access deprivation of 46 percent in 2011—that is, on average, people in India
lack access to 46 percent of the services they need to fulfil their requirements for
an acceptable standard of living. (See Chapter 4 for further detail on the Access
Deprivation Score, which has been calculated at the district and state levels as
well as at the national level.) The gaps are caused by inadequate public spending
in some areas (notably health care, water, and sanitation) as well as ineffective
spending across all areas.

Exhibit 17
On average, Indians do not have access to 46 percent of basic services
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
SOURCE: Census 2011; District-Level Health Survey, 2007-08; District Information System for Education, 2009–10;
Access to basic services relative to norms
Based on these parameters and others, we calculate the Access Deprivation Score (ADS) for India as 46 percent,
meaning that on average, Indians do not have access to 46 percent of basic services
Sub-
centres
Primary
health centres
Community
health centres
District
hospitals
Students per
classroom
Pupils per
teacher
Enrolment
Electrification
Modern fuel1
Toilet
penetration
Piped water in
the community
Health care
Per capita
Education
Ratio
Energy
%
Water and
sanitation
%
1 LPG penetration used as a proxy.
NOTE: For each service, the placement of the orange rule indicates relative levels of deprivation. Proximity to the centre of
the circle indicates greater deprivation, while proximity to the outer circumference indicates less deprivation (that is,
greater access).
The health-care gaps are significantly higher in rural areas, setting the stage for
poor human development outcomes. The density of hospital beds in rural India,
for example, was only 0.3 per thousand people in 2010, while the corresponding
number in urban India is 3.4 (almost in line with the World Health Organization
guideline of 3.5). The lack of health-care facilities creates an extreme hardship
for residents of places such as Salehpur, a village in the Fatehpur district of Uttar
Pradesh. Its population of almost 6,000 makes do without access to any primary
health centre, registered medical practitioner, or drugstore—a situation that can
turn minor ailments into misery and any medical emergency into a life-threatening
event. This is only one example of a situation that affects villages across rural
India.26
26 Anurag Kumar et al., “Poor medical care in rural areas of Uttar Pradesh: Perceived reasons
and strategies for improvement”, International Journal of Life Sciences Biotechnology and
Pharma Research, volume 1, number 3, July 2012.

56
Public provision of basic services is essential in remote areas where private
markets cannot function economically. It can draw synergies from the existing
government administrative infrastructure and also act as a check on the market
power of private players. Effective public spending has a strong correlation
with human development outcomes in education and health in a cross-country
comparison (Exhibit 18).
Public spending on education and health shows a strong correlation
with better outcomes
SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators; United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Reports; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Exhibit 18
1 The education component of the human development index is driven by mean years of schooling and expected years of
schooling.
2 The health component of the human development index is driven by life expectancy.
Education component
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0
Public spend in education
% of GDP, 2009
6.56.05.55.04.54.03.53.02.52.01.51.00.50
China
Vietnam
India
Bangladesh
S. Africa
Ghana
Chile
Brazil
Pakistan
Colombia
Indonesia
Thailand
Mexico
Argentina
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5
Health component
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0
Public spend in health care
% of GDP, 2010
Philippines
India
Bangladesh
Venezuela
Cambodia
Chile
Brazil
Nepal
Pakistan
Colombia
Indonesia
Vietnam
China
Thailand
Mexico
Argentina
0.70
y = 0.28 + 0.075x y = 0.70 + 0.039x
Countries with higher spending on education have
better outcomes in education indicators1 …
… and similarly, higher spending on health
drives better results on health indicators2
Human development index, 2010
Correlation: 0.71 Correlation: 0.74
India’s public expenditure on health care, which was equivalent to 1 percent of
GDP in 2010, is extremely low by international standards. This level is far below
the 3.1 percent, 4.1 percent, and 4.2 percent shares spent by Mexico, South
Africa, and Brazil, respectively. A shortage of medical facilities, resources, and
trained medical personnel results in poor health outcomes across the board.
Some 56 percent of births in rural India and 24 percent in urban India are
unassisted by any health-care personnel, and 25 percent of rural children and
16 percent of urban children are not taken to health facilities when they have
acute respiratory infections or fevers.27
This is a case in which lack of investment
directly translates into human suffering.
Per capita public spending on basic services varies widely among states. In
education, for example, Kerala spent about Rs. 6,900 per annum for each child
enrolled in primary school in 2009–10, while Uttar Pradesh spent just Rs. 2,600
per child (the national average was Rs. 4,200). Per capita public health-care
spending in 2004–05 was about Rs. 100 per year in Bihar, but almost Rs. 360
in Kerala and Rs. 744 in Himachal Pradesh. These variations have resulted in
different levels of access to health care and education—and have produced
different outcomes.
27 District Level Household and Facility Survey, DLHS-3 (2007–08), International Institute for
Population Sciences.

Half of the total public spending on basic services is
not reaching the people
We estimate that almost half of India’s government spending on basic
services fails to translate into real benefits (Exhibit 19)—implying that nearly
Rs. 285,000 crore ($59 billion) does not reach the people (see Appendix B for
details). Aspiring to full effectiveness may be unrealistic, but if even 75 percent of
India’s social spending reached its intended beneficiaries, it could have brought
an additional 85 million people (7 percent of the population) out of official poverty
and 70 million people above the Empowerment Line between 2005 and 2012.
Reform is essential to eradicating extreme poverty, as the poorest segments of
the population are deprived of urgently needed lifelines due to the “leaky bucket”
of service delivery (see Box 4, “The leaky bucket of the PDS”).
Exhibit 19
Currently, some 50 percent of public spending on basic services does not
reach the people because of inefficiencies in governance and execution
36
47
51
52
64
Health, family welfare,
drinking water,
and sanitation
Fuel
Education
(until secondary)
MNREGA2
Food1
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office; government fiscal statistics; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Public spending on basic services, 2012
100% = INR 570,000 crore
Spending
reaching
the people
Inefficiencies
and leakages
50
50
Estimated efficiency/effectiveness of government spending
% of spending that typically reaches the people
INR 285,000 crore not reaching
the intended beneficiaries
1 For people below official poverty line, only 36% of food subsidy reached the intended beneficiaries in 2009–10.
2 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act.
Consider the government’s effort to combat hunger. Some Rs. 77,000 crore
($16 billion) was spent in 2012 to deliver subsidised grains to the poor. But
our analysis of data from government household consumption surveys reveals
that just 55 percent of the grain distributed (by tonnage) and 65 percent of the
monetary value of the subsidy benefit reaches any household at all—rich or poor.
The rest leaks away: some of the grain spoils in storage or transit, while some is
sold on the open market at higher prices rather than at subsidised prices.

58
Box 4. The leaky bucket of the PDS
Since independence, India’s government has made
food security a national priority—and that commitment
eventually led to the establishment of the Public
Distribution System (PDS). Under the PDS, every
household is entitled to a certain amount of food grain
every month through a network of nearly 500,000 fair
price shops (FPS). The shops are stocked by a central
agency called the Food Corporation of India. The
PDS has evolved over the years, transforming from a
universal to a targeted system in the late 1990s. With
the passage of the National Food Security Act of 2013,
it is expected to become a near-universal system.
The logistical challenges of the programme, which
allocated nearly 48 million metric tonnes (MMT) of grain
for distribution in 2010, combined with a weak focus on
its governance, results in severe inefficiencies, such as
the following:
ƒƒ Stagnant central issue price and differentiated
pricing. The central issue price (the price at which
food grain is sold to beneficiaries) has not been
revised since the early 2000s. In the absence of
any adjustments, the value of the subsidy per
family has increased over the years as economic
costs of procurement and distribution have shot
up—between 2005 and 2012, this increase was
57 percent for wheat and 63 percent for rice. The
lower price for families below the poverty line
creates a strong incentive for FPS owners to sell
their subsidised grain to consumers above the
poverty line at a higher margin.
ƒƒ Poor targeting. The government machinery to
identify beneficiaries is also problematic. States
either run the risk of excluding the needy (more than
40 percent of households below the government
poverty line in Assam were excluded, for example)1
1 Planning Commission of India, Performance evaluation of
Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), 2005.
or wind up implementing a universal system (as in
Tamil Nadu).
ƒƒ Inefficient delivery. Most FPS owners incur losses
because of low margins and a lack of support
services such as doorstep delivery and credit.
This creates an opportunity for corruption, which
becomes easier given poor performance-monitoring
mechanisms.2
ƒƒ Lack of transparency. The system is largely
opaque. The movement and distribution of grain is
mostly not tracked, and it is lucrative for everyone
along the supply chain to divert it to the open
market. In Bihar, for instance, only 55 percent of the
FPS have registers that are available for inspection,
and only 25 percent of targeted beneficiaries agree
with the entries made in their ration cards by the
shop manager.3
As a result of these issues, across the country, only
26 MMT of food grain (55 percent of the 48 MMT
allocated) reached the people, while the rest either
spoiled during transit or was diverted for sale to the
open market. Even the share that did make it through
was afflicted with targeting problems, as families below
the official poverty line received only 34 percent of their
entitlement by weight.
Some states, however, have shown the way by
turning around the PDS. Tamil Nadu, for instance,
has consistently achieved efficiency of more than
90 percent by creating a robust tracking and audit
system. Chhattisgarh has also reformed the system by
pursuing computerisation and community involvement.
These examples show that with greater political will, the
PDS can achieve its true potential (see Chapter 9 for
more discussion on this topic).
2 Ibid.
3 Reetika Khera, “Revival of the Public Distribution System:
Evidence and explanations”, Economic and Political Weekly,
volume 46, number 44–45, November 2011.

The hunger gap exacts its heaviest toll on the officially poor, and from their
perspective, the effectiveness of the food subsidy programme is even lower. In
2010, their subsidies accounted for less than 40 percent of the total received
by all beneficiaries (and just one-fourth of the total subsidy allocated by the
government), despite the fact that they account for 80 percent of the nation’s
nutrition gap. The officially poor received just 36 percent of the subsidy benefit
intended for them in 2010 (Exhibit 20). The rest of the subsidies allotted to them
were consumed by households at higher income levels (who may not have been
eligible for the subsidised grain in some states) or, for the most part, leaked
out of the subsidised food distribution chain altogether. This poor performance
underscores the inherent inefficiencies in the current design and implementation
of the food subsidy programme.
Food subsidies are not efficiently targeted, as households above the
poverty line receive more than their share
Exhibit 20
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 66th round; Food Corporation of India; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Population covered under the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), which included the poorest of the poor.
2 Below India’s official poverty line.
Subsidy through PDS to AAY1 and BPL2 households Subsidy through PDS to households above the
official poverty line
Public Distribution System (PDS) subsidies, 2009–10
INR crore
12,708
33,163
34,846
Subsidy
received by
beneficiaries
Subsidy worth
of offtake
Subsidy worth
allocated
20,917
14,209
17,440
Subsidy
received by
beneficiaries
Subsidy worth
of offtake
Subsidy worth
allocated
+20%-64%
To create a social safety net, the government spent Rs. 38,000 crore ($8 billion)
on the MNREGA programme for the rural poor in 2012. Based on data from
government consumption surveys, we estimate that just 52 percent of this money
actually reached rural workers.

60
In education, the government spent an estimated Rs. 237,000 crore ($49 billion)
on primary and secondary schooling in 2012. The effectiveness of this spending
is more difficult to quantify, as benefits received by households from government-
run schools are not reported in household consumption surveys. Instead, we
examined relative effectiveness across India’s states, which vary greatly in terms
of education spending per capita and educational outcomes (Exhibit 21; see also
Box 5, “India’s return on public education spending”). By comparing all states
against the top performers (those states that delivered the highest learning
outcomes per rupee of spending), we estimate that just 51 percent of India’s
aggregate educational spending actually translated into real learning outcomes
that parents should expect. If all states were equally effective, the same outcomes
could arguably be achieved with half the spending level.
The ineffectiveness of Indian schools—both public and private—is well
documented.28
In the context of the large commitment of public funding and
the high reliance of poor families on the public education system, raising the
effectiveness of government-run schools becomes all the more imperative.
Exhibit 21
There is a wide variation in spending across states and
in learning outcomes at a particular level of spending
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
0
Average public spending per enrolled child, 2005–10
INR
West Bengal
Uttarakhand
Uttar
Pradesh
Tripura
Tamil Nadu
Sikkim
Rajasthan
Punjab
Odisha
Nagaland Mizoram
Meghalaya
Manipur
Maharashtra
Learning outcomes1
Kerala
Karnataka
Jharkhand
Jammu and Kashmir
Himachal
Pradesh
Haryana
Madhya
Pradesh
Goa
Chhattisgarh
Bihar
Assam
Arunachal
Pradesh
Andhra
Pradesh
Gujarat
SOURCE: Analysis of budgeted expenditures, 2005–08 and 2008–11, Ministry of Human Resources Development; Annual
status of education report (rural) 2012, ASER Centre; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Simple average of ASER 2012 scores across three groups of primary students (Std 1–2, Std 3–5, and Std 6–8).
PRIMARY EDUCATION
EXAMPLE
Best fit curve
y = -4E-07x2 + 0.0085x + 34.03
R² = 0.4661
Similarly, the government spent Rs. 118,000 crore ($25 billion) on health care,
water, and sanitation in 2012. To evaluate the effectiveness of this spending, we
adopted a similar approach as in education—that is, comparing health outcomes
across India’s states relative to their level of public spending per capita on health
infrastructure and services (see Appendix B for details). Based on this analysis,
we estimate that just 36 percent of public spending on health services translated
into real health outcomes. In other words, the same health outcomes could be
achieved with a little over one-third of current spending.
28 Annual status of education report (rural) 2012, ASER Centre, January 2013.

Box 5. India’s return on public education spending
The best way to measure the efficiency of any spending would be to trace
the flow of money across the value chain to the end consumer. However,
in areas such as education and health care, this analysis can prove quite
difficult without running financial audits. One approach to solving this
problem is based on the concept of the efficiency frontier (or the productivity
possibility frontier) and uses a technique called data envelopment analyses
(see Appendix B for full details on the methodology).
Using this method, we calculate the efficiency of translating education
spending into learning outcomes across various states. The best-performing
states of Andhra Pradesh and Goa came in at greater than 90 percent
efficiency levels. Punjab, Tripura, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and
Kerala had efficiency levels of more than 60 percent. Among the worst-
performing states are Bihar, Rajasthan, and Assam, whose efficiency levels
were 35 percent or less. The mean efficiency level across all states was
51 percent.
The low efficiency of the Indian education system is not news to anyone
who has tracked how it functions today. According to recent findings, more
than half the children in class 5 are unable to read at even the class 2 level.1
In the 2009 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–
Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD–PISA) study, India
placed near the bottom of international rankings.
The three core issues contributing to poor outcomes are:
1. Poor teacher training, motivation, and support structures. Classroom
instruction is at the heart of the issue, and most Indian teachers are not
trained to take a child-centred approach to curriculum. Teachers are not
always well-qualified and do not receive high-quality training, and high
rates of teacher absenteeism disrupt the learning process.2
Despite high
primary school enrolment, many students are not actively engaged, and
attendance levels are uneven across states.
2. Inadequate assessment and monitoring processes. At present,
no effective mechanisms are in place to provide a realistic picture
of learning outcomes. Processes for measuring teacher and school
performance are similarly lacking. The ASER survey of student learning
outcomes, conducted by Pratham, is today the only holistic assessment
methodology available in India.
3. Low levels of accountability and capability in school leadership and
management. A lack of accountability for school administration and
performance in both public and private schools results in substandard
outcomes. There is an urgent need to develop better leadership and
administrative capabilities among school management.
2 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor economics: A radical rethinking of the way to
fight global poverty, PublicAffairs, 2011.

62
A number of reports and field studies have documented the weaknesses in
India’s public health system. For example, 26 percent of sub-centres do not have
electricity, 52 percent of primary health centres do not have computers, and
32 percent do not have lab technicians; the number of surgeons at community
health centres is only 28 percent of required staffing levels.29
In addition, the
system faces issues such as absenteeism—one study found that the absentee
rate of health workers in India is 43 percent30
—and poor qualifications among
health-care professionals. Another impediment is breakdowns in the quality of
care such as delivery of the wrong medication.31
* * *
Productivity gains and income growth have proved to be the most powerful forces
to raise India’s people above the Empowerment Line. But multiple symptoms
of low productivity in the Indian economy—including inadequate non-farm jobs,
the prevalence of small businesses outside the organised sector, and a lack of
skills and education among poor workers—have held back broad-based growth
in incomes. The continued weight of the agricultural sector, where crop yields
remain low in comparison to those of peer countries, has been a drag on poverty
reduction. The other side of the equation is public spending on basic services,
which has increased in recent years but often fails to reach the poor or to fill
critical gaps in infrastructure. In the chapters that follow, we take a more detailed
look at how these issues manifest themselves for different segments of the
population and in various regions of India.
29 Rural health statistics in India 2012, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of
India, April 2012.
30 Jishnu Das et al., “In urban and rural India, a standardized patient study showed low
levels of provider training and huge quality gaps”, Health Affairs, volume 31, number 12,
December 2012.
31 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight
global poverty, PublicAffairs, 2011.

65
Designing more effective and better targeted policy responses to reduce
poverty requires a deeper understanding of the unmet needs of those below
the Empowerment Line—and of the ramifications of those needs for hundreds
of millions of households.
The Empowerment Gap comprises unmet needs for the eight basic services
considered essential for a minimum acceptable standard of living. Assessing the
gap through a service-by-service lens reveals that while food dominates much of
the public debate on poverty, there are vast unmet needs in health care, drinking
water, and sanitation. There are also gaps in areas such as decent affordable
housing, particularly in urban India, that limit the options available to the poor.
The poor cannot be painted with a broad brush. The needs of those in the most
abject poverty may not be the same as those of people on the verge of rising
above it or to those of people who have just crossed this threshold but are still
short of achieving a minimum standard of living. Two groups—which we call
the “excluded” and the “impoverished”—are below the government’s official
poverty line. They include the poorest of the poor and those who are just above
bare minimum subsistence levels. In addition, a third segment, the “vulnerable”,
comprises those who have exited extreme poverty but continue to face other
types of deprivation and insecurity. And though poverty is often considered a
predominantly rural phenomenon, the Empowerment Line focuses equally on
urban poverty.
Understanding these different faces of deprivation can shed light on the most
critical needs confronting each segment of people who struggle below India’s
Empowerment Line. For the excluded and impoverished, hunger remains an
overwhelming issue, but health care, drinking water, and sanitation are key gaps
for all three segments. Housing and education are also pressing unmet needs for
the vulnerable.
A service-by-service view: Health and food make up
60 percent of the Empowerment Gap
To understand the unmet needs of the poor, we compare their consumption of
each service with the requirements of the Empowerment Line, corroborating this
with physical evidence of deprivation. In reality, the mix of consumption chosen
by each household depends on individual decisions and trade-offs.32
Yet such a
comparison is useful to understand the broad dimensions of unmet needs.
32 The estimation of the Empowerment Line does not weight each need based on preferences
that may vary across households. The estimated Empowerment Gap by service simply
illustrates the rough order of magnitude of the problem.
3. Understanding the
Empowerment Gap

66
Poverty and hunger go hand in hand, but there are also critical gaps in health
services (a category that encompasses health care, water, and sanitation),
education, and housing. Health and food alone account for almost 60 percent of
the Rs. 332,000 crore ($69 billion) Empowerment Gap (Exhibit 22). And the gap is
not simply a matter of economic value: in many cases, the quality of consumption
is also a major issue in areas such as education, health care, drinking water,
and housing.
Health and food account for approximately 60 percent of the
Empowerment Gap
Exhibit 22
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 68th round; McKinsey Global Institute
Empowerment Gap by service and sector, 2011–12
%; INR thousand crore ($ billion1)
1 Using average exchange rate of $1 = INR 48.0769 for April 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012.
21
18
19
32
9 17
Other
Health2
Food
Education
Housing
Fuel
Total
332
($69)
-1
39
20
7
Rural
226
($47)
-1
40
25
10
Urban
107
($22)
-1
37
9
1
100% =
HEALTH (INCLUDING HEALTH CARE, DRINKING WATER, AND
SANITATION) IS THE LARGEST GAP ACROSS INDIA
This category accounts for the largest share (almost 40 percent) of the
Empowerment Gap across the nation as a whole, an observation that holds true
for both rural and urban India. Those below the Empowerment Line are able to
spend less than one-fourth of what is required to obtain adequate sanitation,
drinking water, and health-care services.
Government spending on these services came to about Rs. 118,000 crore
($25 billion) in 2011–12, which is only Rs. 81 per capita per month. Most Indians
must depend on their own private resources to obtain medical care—and
because the poor have limited budgets, their consumption of health-care services
is far lower than needed (see Box 6, “Disparities in health care: The haves and the
have-nots”). Because doctors and hospitals are more scarce in rural areas than in
cities, the rural poor, in particular, forgo preventive care, live with many untreated
ailments, or sometimes resort to consulting untrained practitioners. Almost half
of the private doctors in the Udaipur district of Rajasthan, for example, do not

Box 6. Disparities in health care: The haves and the have-nots
India’s average spending on health care was actually 21 percent higher than the
normative spending level of Rs. 1,507 per year in 2009–10—and yet health care
constitutes India’s largest basic service gap. This may appear to be contradictory,
but the gap is caused by large disparities in spending by different population
segments and highly varying access to medical facilities and services across
different regions (Exhibit 23). Three factors are at work:
1. Low share of public spending. India’s government contributed only
27 percent of the nation’s total health-care expenditure, which compares poorly
to peer countries such as Brazil (where public spending is 44 percent of the
total), Indonesia (40 percent), and Bangladesh (37 percent).
2. Wide geographical disparities. Health-care spending differs dramatically
from state to state. For example, total health spending per person in Kerala
was about Rs. 3,700 per year in 2005—nearly seven times as much as health
spending per person in Jharkhand. While India spends more than the normative
requirements on average, spending levels are below requirements in several
populous states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Delhi.
3. Inequality of private spending. Private household spending accounts for
more than 70 percent of total health spending—and the richest 20 percent of
households make almost half of total out-of-pocket health-care expenditures
in India. Urban households on average spend 75 percent more than rural
households. These gaps imply that a large part of the population remains
deprived of quality health care.
Average per capita spending on health care meets the required level
but is mainly driven by private spending by the wealthiest households
Exhibit 23
SOURCE: World Bank; High Level Expert Group report on universal health coverage for India, 2011; National Sample
Survey Office survey, 66th round; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Based on the average across states of the minimum expenditure required for a package of basic primary, secondary, and
tertiary care (High Level Expert Group) to ensure universal health coverage; health spending per capita estimated by
World Bank.
2 Private spend includes spending by households, firms, employers, NGOs, and international entities. The graphs on the
right show spending by households on a per capita basis; the quintiles are based on number of households.
Normative
per capita
spending
requirement,
2009–10 =
INR 1,5071
Private spend2
Public spend
1,820
73
27 700
1,224
Rural
Urban
Health spending, 2009–10
More than 70% of per capita health-care
expenditure is private
Total health-care spending per capita
%; INR per capita per year
Most private spending is by the wealthiest households
Private health-care spending by households2
INR per capita per year
205
372
585
1,007
2,787
Bottom quintile
60–80%
40–60%
20–40%
Top quintile
+75%
x13.5

68
have medical degrees, and one-third have no college education whatsoever.33
The situation is not much better for the urban poor; in the slums of Delhi, for
instance, a study documented that only 34 percent of doctors had formal
medical degrees.34
Limited access to clean drinking water and decent sanitation contributes to health
complications and is an additional driver of deprivation, particularly in rural India.
In Odisha, for example, around 39 percent of rural households send someone at
least half a kilometre to fetch drinking water. One in four rural families across India
sources its water from untreated taps and uncovered wells.35
Even where there
is access to drinking water, per capita consumption is lower than recommended
levels. Poor-quality water can cause illness, and insufficient monitoring of water
quality can fail to address lurking problems. Of 936,000 water delivery points in
India, only 372,000 were tested for contamination in 2013. According to a report,
diarrhoeal diseases account for 1 in 6 deaths annually among Indian children
below age 5.36
Despite sustained efforts over the past decades, access to improved sanitation is
another major issue. India’s Total Sanitation Campaign has facilitated construction
of more than 64 million toilets since 1999 and focused on changing behavioural
patterns to adopt improved sanitation through the Nirmal Gram Puraskar (now
Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan) programme. Despite these efforts, 70 percent of rural
households still have poor or no access to toilets; even in areas that have wider
access to constructed toilets, usage is low (just 50 percent in rural Andhra
Pradesh, for example).
NUTRITION IS THE SECOND-LARGEST GAP
India runs one of the largest food subsidy programmes in the world—in fact,
the government directed Rs. 77,000 crore ($16 billion) in spending to this effort
in 2011–12. Despite this emphasis, hunger remains a daily fact of life for many
Indians. Food constitutes roughly one-fifth of the nationwide Empowerment Gap
and is the second-largest driver of the gap in rural areas (after health).
The lowest three deciles of the rural population by income and the lowest
decile of the urban population consume at least 20 percent fewer calories than
the minimum normative requirement.37
Indeed, the poorest decile of the rural
population consumes as little as two-thirds of the minimum calorie requirement
(Exhibit 24). Moreover, the poor tend to rely on a cereal-dominated diet, as
cereals are cheap and filling. A diversified diet including fats, milk, eggs, fruits,
and vegetables is out of reach for many: only 55 percent of women consume milk
33 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, “Improving health care delivery in India”, presented at
Angus Deaton Festshrift in Princeton, NJ, in September 2009.
34 Jishnu Das and Jeffrey Hammer, “Money for nothing: The dire straits of medical practice in
Delhi, India”, Journal of Developmental Economics, volume 83, issue 1, May 2007.
35 Census of India, 2011.
36 IMIS Reports of the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, Government of India,
December 2013.
37 The minimum calorie requirements were first recommended by the Alagh Committee in 1979
and have been reinforced by the activity-based calorie norms set by the Indian Council of
Medical Research and the current mix of occupations in rural and urban areas. The gap
in protein and fat was seen to be less than the calorie gap (in terms of the unmet need as
a percent of the requirement). So any effort to bridge the calorie gap through a greater
consumption of the food basket is assumed to bridge the gap in proteins and fat.

or dairy on a weekly basis, only 40 percent eat fruit at least once a week, and
only 32 percent eat eggs at least once a week.38
As a result, many Indians do not
consume enough vital micronutrients and suffer from chronic malnourishment.
With diets low in vitamin D, vitamin A, iron, and iodine, the poor have a high
incidence of ailments such as anaemia, night blindness, diabetes, and stunted
growth (Exhibit 25). One study found that 79 percent of children ages 6–35
months were anaemic, while 45 percent of children under 3 years were stunted.39
Hunger affects both rural and urban areas
Exhibit 24
Estimated calorie consumption by income decile and type, 2011–12
Kcal per capita per day
2,08263 37
30–40% 2,15361 39
20–30% 2,21759 41
10–20% 2,31157 43
Top 10% 2,583
72 28
80–90% 1,79669 31
70–80% 1,88767 33
60–70%
90–100% 1,641
65 35
50–60%
1,956
2,02664 36
40–50%
51 49
Cereal
Non-cereal
1,88858
50
2,26346 54
2,48539 61
42
56 44
1,98654 46
2,06452 48
2,16050
1,60567 33
1,72762 38
1,81560 40
1,944
108
96
92
90
87
82
84
79
75
118
108
76
103
98
95
90
93
86
82
68
Recommended
daily consumption
Rural
Calorie sufficiency
% of recommended
Calorie sufficiency
% of recommendedUrban
2,400 2,100
Exhibit 25
India has a high prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies
SOURCE: World Health Organization; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
5
3
8
4
4
4
4
7
7
12
South Africa
Russia
Pakistan
Mexico
Malaysia
China
Brazil
Bhutan
Bangladesh
India
Vitamin A deficiency
% of pregnant women
with night blindness
Iron deficiency
% of non-pregnant women of
reproductive age with anaemia
Iodine deficiency
% of school-age children with urinary
iodine <100 micrograms per litre
26
20
28
21
30
20
23
55
33
52
29
56
64
9
57
16
0
14
43
31
38 Third National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3), 2005–06.
39 Ibid.

70
THE EDUCATION GAP IS REFLECTED IN HIGH SECONDARY
SCHOOL DROPOUT RATES AND POOR LEARNING OUTCOMES
Primary and secondary education constitutes about one-fifth of the nationwide
Empowerment Gap, and the issue affects rural and urban areas more or less
evenly. This is despite the fact that government expenditure on education has
grown rapidly to become the largest component of spending on basic services
(Rs. 237,000 crore, or $49 billion, in 2011–12). Primary schools have been
built and expanded across rural and urban India, and enrolment now exceeds
90 percent. These represent tangible steps towards progress.
Yet India’s households are not able to spend enough to ensure that all poor
children receive a quality education. On average, people below the Empowerment
Line spend less than half of the estimated level required to ensure decent
schooling, after taking into account the value of education provided free to them
by the government. This gap is partly explained by the fact there are still too few
secondary schools to provide full access. High dropout rates at the upper primary
and secondary levels imply that many children over the age of 12 don’t benefit
from the educational system; the net enrolment rate for upper primary school is
only 64 percent.40
Furthermore, the gap is both quantitative and qualitative, as educational
outcomes are extremely weak. National surveys have documented extensively
that many Indian students are not acquiring basic skills in reading and math. One
report found that only 12.4 percent of class 8 students in rural India were able to
read class 1 text, only 25.7 percent knew basic subtraction, and only 20 percent
could even recognise numbers from 10 to 99.41
Without these foundational skills,
children cannot cope in higher grades and tend to drop out. Girls, especially, are
more likely to drop out at the secondary level because of family apprehensions
regarding travelling some distance away from the home. When these factors are
considered together, it is clear that India’s poor do not have the resources or the
access to ensure that their children receive a high-quality education.
HOUSING IS THE SECOND-LARGEST GAP IN URBAN AREAS,
THOUGH ALSO SIGNIFICANT IN RURAL INDIA
Housing ranks as the next significant gap—and in urban areas, it is the second-
largest gap after health. India’s government spending on affordable housing was
Rs. 22,000 crore, or $4.5 billion, in 2011–12. The unmet need is vast: on average,
urban Indians below the Empowerment Line spend less than one-fifth of what is
required for decent affordable housing. There is a sharp divide among income
groups in terms of access to housing and basic services. Legal, mortgage-
holding ownership of housing has become unaffordable, and rental markets
are underdeveloped, a situation that has forced millions of the urban poor into
untended, unsafe housing.42
While the Census of India estimates that only
17 percent of urban households are in slums, the reality is that most low-income
urban households face dismal housing choices.
In rural areas, too, housing is a serious problem, though the relatively higher
deprivation in food, health, and education dwarfs the housing issue in contribution
40 District Information System for Education, 2012–13.
42 Report of the working group on urban strategic planning, 12th five year plan, Ministry of
Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India, October 2011.

terms. While 92 percent of urban Indians lived in pucca structures during
2008–09, this was true of just 55 percent of rural households; the remaining
households were in either semi-pucca structures (28 percent) or katcha structures
(17 percent). Just 31 percent of rural houses were found to be in “good” condition
(meaning the structure did not require any immediate repair) versus 51 percent in
urban India.43
THE ENERGY GAP IMPERILS PERSONAL SAFETY AND ERODES
THE QUALITY OF LIFE
Energy constitutes a smaller share of the poverty gap in financial terms (just
some 7 percent), but it remains a significant issue in rural India. Although rural
electrification has been a major government priority, just 50 percent of rural
Indians have access to connections today, and the actual supply of electricity
through these connections is erratic.
As a result, the rural poor rely mainly on traditional sources (such as fuel wood,
dung, and crop residue) for their cooking and lighting needs. These pose a
significant health risk to households, especially to the women and children who
are often responsible for gathering fuel.44
Kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG), and electricity, which are considered modern sources of energy, accounted
for almost 70 percent of energy use by urban households in 2005, but for less
than 12 percent of energy use in rural India.45
The energy gap permeates the daily
life of the poorest segments: they are not able to work after dark, and women are
unsafe after dusk.
The Indian government supports the energy requirements of the poor by
providing subsidised kerosene (through the Public Distribution System, or PDS)
and subsidised LPG (which is used for cooking, predominantly in urban areas). It
also provides a subsidy for domestic consumption of electricity, which varies by
state. Government spending on these three subsidies was about Rs. 79,000 crore
($16 billion) in 2011–12, or Rs. 54 per capita per month. Despite the poor state
of rural electrification, the energy gap does not add up to much in economic
terms simply because the rural population depends on traditional and alternative
sources of fuel.
SOCIAL SECURITY IS VIRTUALLY ABSENT FOR
MOST WORKERS
The poor have little sense of financial security. Unexpected events that disrupt
their income sources threaten to push them deeper into poverty. Formal social
security programmes are all but negligible; in a financial crisis, most poor people
rely on family, caste, and community networks for help. Formal retirement
43 A pucca structure is one with walls and roof made of materials such as cement, concrete,
oven-burnt bricks, hollow cement and ash bricks, stone, stone blocks, jack boards (cement
plastered reeds), iron, zinc or other metal sheets, timber, tiles, slate, corrugated iron, asbestos
cement sheet, veneer, plywood, artificial wood of synthetic material and polyvinyl chloride
(PVC) material. A katcha structure’s walls and roof are made of non-pucca materials such
as unburnt bricks, bamboo, mud, grass, leaves, reeds, or thatch. In a semi-pucca structure,
either the walls or the roof but not both are made of pucca materials. Housing condition and
amenities in India, 2008–09, National Sample Survey Office, 65th round, Ministry of Statistics
and Programme Implementation, Government of India, 2010.
44 Shahidur R. Khandker, Douglas F. Barnes, and Hussain A. Samad, “Are the energy poor also
income poor? Evidence from India”, Energy Policy, volume 47, August 2012.
45 India Human Development Survey (IHDS), 2005.

72
coverage through programmes such as the National Pension Scheme covers only
about 12 percent of the working population. The government’s rural employment
guarantee programme (MNREGA) has extended a social safety net to about
50 million rural families by providing the guarantee of 100 days of employment per
year to one working member of each rural household. Government spending on
this programme in 2011–12 was about Rs. 38,000 crore ($8 billion).
A segment-based view: Three distinct groups live
below the Empowerment Line
We define segments of the population based on their relative levels of poverty and
the size of the gap they would have to bridge in order to cross the Empowerment
Line (Exhibit 26).
Subsistence
Line: Rs. 624
Absolute minimum that
needs to be spent on food,
energy, and housing
Empowerment
Line: Rs. 1,336
Spending needed to access
eight basic services, at an
acceptable level of quality
Poverty Line:
Rs. 874
India’s official poverty line
Exhibit 26
India’s population can be segmented into four groups on the basis of
different consumption thresholds
Poverty segments and thresholds of consumption, per capita per month1
Empowered
539 million
44% of population
Vulnerable
413 million
34% of population
Impoverished
210 million
17% of population
Excluded
57 million
5%
1 Adjusted for public spending reaching the people
ƒƒ 57 million Indians are “excluded”. The poorest of the poor make up
approximately 5 percent of India’s population. This segment lacks even the
barest minimum subsistence levels of the three most basic needs (food,
energy, and housing). Although nearly 60 percent of their total spending
goes towards purchasing food, they are able to consume only around 1,600
calories per day, lower than even the bare minimum requirement to support
a sedentary lifestyle.46
The average excluded household would need to raise
its consumption almost 2.6 times to reach the minimum standards of the
Empowerment Line.
46 Madhura Swaminathan, “The new poverty line: A methodology deeply flawed”, Indian Journal
of Human Development, volume 4, number 1, January–June 2010.

ƒƒ 210 million are “impoverished”. The impoverished constitute approximately
17 percent of India’s population. They are below the official poverty line,
but above the barest levels of subsistence that define the excluded. Their
consumption would need to rise more than 1.9 times, on average, to get
them to minimum standards of the Empowerment Line. Substandard housing
options and limited access to health care are issues that dominate the daily
lives of the impoverished.
ƒƒ 413 million are “vulnerable”. Some 34 percent of India’s population falls into
the vulnerable category (Exhibit 27). Vulnerable households need a smaller
push to achieve minimum living standards: on average, if they were able to
raise their incomes to 1.4 times current levels, they would move over the
Empowerment Line. But this gap makes all the difference in families being
forced to do without even basic health, sanitation, education, and social
security. The vulnerable have only a tenuous grip on a better standard of living.
Small shocks to their livelihoods (a lost job or one bout of ill health or injury, for
example) can push their families back into the ranks of the officially poor.
The vulnerable segment is the largest population below the Empowerment
Line and accounts for some 40 percent of the total Empowerment Gap
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 68th round; Oanda; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
India’s population and Empowerment Gap by segment, 2011–121
%
1 The Empowerment Gap is defined as the aggregate differential between actual private consumption expenditure and the
Empowerment Line.
1.9x
1.4x
2.6x
Ratio of Empowerment
Line to average MPCE3
17
4634
38
100% =
Excluded
Impoverished
Vulnerable
Empowered
Empowerment Gap1
INR 332,000 cr.
($69 billion2)
17
0
Population below the
Empowerment Line
1.2 billion
5
44
Exhibit 27
The needs of all three segments are critical to address. The fact that millions are
still excluded and face such desperate circumstances is unconscionable; they
must be helped in the immediate term. The impoverished represent almost half
of India’s Empowerment Gap and would benefit from the better management of
existing programmes that are targeted at the population below the official poverty
line. Finally, designing policies to address the needs of the vulnerable segment
will become increasingly important over time. While economic empowerment is
within reach for many of the vulnerable, an almost equally large impoverished
population is poised to move into the ranks of the vulnerable. As a result, the
vulnerable segment shrinks more slowly than the other segments. From 2005 to
2012, the head count in the vulnerable category fell by only 39 million, even as

74
the impoverished segment fell by 71 million and the excluded fell by 73 million
(Exhibit 28). In the future, the nature of poverty can be expected to shift towards
vulnerability as incomes continue to rise.
Significant progress has been made in shrinking the share of the population
below the Empowerment Line
Exhibit 28
Population below
Empowerment Line
%
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 61st, 66th, and 68th rounds; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Population profile by poverty segment
Million
78 66 56
Excluded
Impoverished
Vulnerable
Empowered
2011–12
1,219
57
210
413
539
2009–10
1,186
97
257
430
403
2004–05
1,104
130
281
452
241
-73
Total change,
2005–12
-71
-39
+298
Urban Indians are almost as likely as rural Indians to
be vulnerable
India’s official poverty line indicates that the urban population is only half as poor
as the rural population. By contrast, the Empowerment Line highlights the rising
issue of urban poverty.
We observe that one-fifth of those below the official poverty line (53 million
people) live in urban areas, while fourth-fifths (214 million ) live in rural areas.
India’s villages not only house more of the officially poor, but their residents are
also poorer in relative terms: 26 percent of India’s rural population is below the
official poverty line vs. 14 percent of India’s urban population.
However, urban Indians are almost as prone as their rural counterparts to falling
into the vulnerable category (Exhibit 29). The national Empowerment Line of
Rs. 1,336 per capita per month is a weighted average of a rural line of Rs. 1,228
and an urban line of Rs. 1,692. This difference is primarily driven by the higher
cost of living in India’s cities. When applying these differentiated benchmarks,
30 percent of India’s urban population is considered vulnerable, approaching the
35 percent of the rural population in similar straits—revealing that city dwellers,
like rural residents, face ongoing struggles to achieve minimum standards of living
once they have exited official poverty.

As Indians continue to migrate from the countryside to the city, the urban
population is likely to grow from 31 percent of all Indians to 40 percent or more
by 2030.47
Policy interventions will need to focus on a growing pool of the
urban poor.
The prevalence of vulnerability is about the same in urban and rural areas
Exhibit 29
Urban
Rural
Total 1,219539 413 210 57
Excluded 45
Impoverished 169
Vulnerable 295
Empowered 323
Excluded 12
Impoverished 42
Vulnerable 118
Empowered 217 56
11
3
20
5
39
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 68th round, McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Population by sector and segment, 2011–12
Million
Share of total sector
(urban/rural) population
%
35
30
Each segment has distinct unmet needs
The most urgent unmet needs of the excluded and impoverished are hunger and
health—but health, education, and housing are major issues for the vulnerable
(Exhibit 30).
Extreme malnourishment prevails among the poorest of the poor. In fact, food
accounts for almost half of the value of unmet needs of the rural excluded, and
one-third of the unmet needs of their urban counterparts. Compounding the
effects of chronic malnourishment, this segment has a shockingly high health
gap; the excluded can spend only about 10 percent of what is needed for basic
health care, clean drinking water, and sanitation, in both urban and rural areas.
For the impoverished, the nutrition gap is not as overwhelming as for the
excluded, but hunger is still a stark reality. Households in this segment survive
on just 70–80 percent of the minimum calorie requirements. The health gap
for the impoverished is almost as glaring as that of the excluded segment; the
impoverished are able to consume just 15 percent of the minimum level of health
care. For the urban impoverished, affordable housing is in short supply, and many
live in slums.
47 India’s urban awakening: Building inclusive cities, sustaining economic growth, McKinsey
Global Institute, April 2010.

76
Nutrition is not a major issue for the vulnerable segment; instead, health, housing,
and education represent the major gaps. In urban India, health and housing
account for more than two-thirds of the deprivation facing the vulnerable, while
health accounts for half of the unmet needs of the rural citizens in this segment.
Their spending on health services is less than a third of the normative level, and
their housing expenditures are one-fourth of the normative level.
Health is a significant gap across all segments; food is an urgent issue for
the impoverished and excluded
Exhibit 30
Consumption gap by segment and service, 2011–12
INR per capita per month
149
136
79
72
60
196
187
100
38
36
32
158
Vulnerable
278
138
24
25
Impoverished
477
160
163
46
Excluded
638
173
285
63
Vulnerable
415
184
-20 -7
Impoverished
724
216
161
23
Excluded
910
227
292
46
Consumption gap
% of Empowerment Line
elements
66 53 30 63 47 27
Urban Rural
Population by segment
Million
12 42 118 45 169 295
Health1
Food
Education
Housing
Energy
* * *
Since 56 percent of India’s population is below the Empowerment Line, it is
critical to take a more granular view of how poverty is experienced by those at
different income levels. When the gaps are examined in greater detail, it becomes
clear that while nutrition remains one of India’s large unmet needs, especially for
the excluded and the impoverished, it is only part of the story. There are critical
gaps across the board in health care, drinking water, and sanitation, as well as
distinct issues facing the rural poor and the urban poor. These deprivations shape
every aspect of daily life for the poor. Hundreds of millions of households face
hard choices and limited prospects—and India cannot realise its full economic
potential until it maximises this human potential. That also requires providing the
entire population with schools, hospitals, toilets, energy, and other basic services.
However, as discussed in the next chapter, India’s poor face a severe lack of
access to these services in their daily lives.

Examining the faces of poverty:
Sketches of six lives
While poverty has to be addressed at the policy level, it also has to
be understood at the individual level. To underscore the human toll of
poverty, we have created a series of composite sketches to illustrate
how the issues facing the poor play out in the lives of millions of
families across rural and urban India.
The rural excluded: Fending off hunger
and living without health care
For the poorest residents of rural India, hunger
is a matter of daily survival. Consider the story of
Gurang, who lives in Odisha’s Koraput district. In
addition to growing a meagre crop of rice on the
acre of land he owns, he collects seasonal fruits
such as jamun, amla, and mango; he also gathers
bamboo and sal leaves to sell to basket makers
in the local market to supplement his income. The
PDS shop gives him less than half his entitlement
of grains.
Through the summer months, the produce dries
up, and he incurs debts from the local moneylender
to keep his family fed. They survive on wild tubers,
leaves, and seeds from the forest, and finally just
by cutting down consumption to the bare minimum
(rice, salt, and black tea twice a day). During a
recent drought, Gurang had to sell off his goats to
maintain even this level of subsistence.
One son helps Gurang in farm and forest work;
the other two work with their wives at brick kilns
in neighbouring Andhra Pradesh for six months a
year. A ray of hope came to Gurang in the form of
the MNREGA employment scheme, which gives
him 30 days of work a year, but payments were
delayed and wound up amounting to less than
what he thought he was owed.
The villagers consult the local medicine man when
minor ailments strike. But last year, Gurang’s
grandson fell desperately ill with malaria; Gurang
put him on his back and walked 30 kilometres
to the nearest district hospital. Luckily, the child
survived, but two others in his village succumbed.
Despite these hardships, Gurang thinks he is better
off than his father’s generation, which lacked even
a district hospital.
The urban excluded: Life at the margins of
india’s cities
For rural subsistence farmers, India’s cities hold the
promise of economic opportunity—but many urban
migrants find that they have simply traded one life
of poverty for another. Shakeel, for example, came
to Kanpur from his village in eastern Uttar Pradesh
ten years ago. His family worked as sharecroppers,
but a prolonged drought decimated their harvests.
With no help forthcoming from their landlord, they
moved to the city in search of work. Shakeel’s
cousin worked as a waste-picker there and
introduced him to the trade.
Today Shakeel and his family of five live with his
parents in a shanty made of plastic and tarpaulin
sheets. Behind his house runs a nallah, or drain,
which doubles as a sewer and toilet. Lighting
comes from a wire pulled from the local electricity
distribution box. For these privileges, Shakeel must
pay Rs. 500 a month to the local dada, or don.
78

Shakeel spends nine hours a day at the landfill
picking through rags, plastic waste, bottles, and
paper; he carries each day’s finds on his back
to sell to the waste collector. Negotiations with
the waste collector leave him feeling cheated
sometimes, but since he owes the man money,
he has no choice but to accept the price being
offered. Shakeel earns about Rs. 100 per day,
barely enough to feed and clothe his family. Waste-
picking is harsh and dirty work, and Shakeel
often contends with dog bites and cuts from
broken glass. But treating these wounds at the
government hospital, even if they become infected,
is out of the question. Although he would be
entitled to free treatment, Shakeel hasn’t the time
and worries that missing even half a day of work
will leave his family with nothing to eat. He longs
for a permanent job that could provide them with
more security.
The rural impoverished: The worsening
plight of farming families
Drought, soil depletion, and a lack of rural
infrastructure are exacerbating the hardships facing
India’s farming families. Consider Mathurabai
and her husband, Bablu, who live with their five
children on one acre of rocky land in the drought-
prone tract of Dewas district in Madhya Pradesh.
Bablu works the land as best he can, though
rainfall is scarce and groundwater has been drying
up. Mathurabai looks after the family’s livestock:
three cows and eight goats that give them milk to
drink and sell, as well as dung for fuel. Veterinary
services are not easy to come by; three years ago
they lost half their livestock to disease. Watering
the animals, taking them out to graze, and milking
them is hard work, and Mathurabai walks at least
two hours a day in search of fodder. With the soil
and vegetation eroding on the local common lands,
she is forced to range farther each year.
When rainwater is available, Bablu grows chillies,
cabbages, and onions. The village is connected to
the nearest large town by only a kutcha road; to sell
milk and vegetables at the district headquarters,
he must carry them 12 kilometres. The village
was connected to the electricity grid in 2009, but
supply is erratic, and villagers use kerosene to light
their houses.

80
To compound matters, the village hand-pump is
defunct, so the family now collects water from a
polluted river a few kilometres away. Diarrhoea and
cholera are rampant in the village, and took the
life of one of Mathurabai’s children last year. The
secondary school is too far away, so her eldest two
children have dropped out, but the younger two
attend the village primary school. Mathurabai and
her husband never went to school at all, so she
takes pride that her children are learning to read
and write and hopes that this will provide them with
the tools for a better life.
The urban impoverished: A lack of options
for those with little education
A lack of skills training limits the employment
options available to the poor—and even the meagre
earnings they manage to cobble together are
often eroded by corruption. Nilmani, a vegetable
vendor in Imphal, Manipur, is a case in point. After
her husband died of tuberculosis a few years ago,
she was left with no income to feed her family
and pay off the debts she incurred for his final
medical treatment.
Vegetable vending was the only occupation open
to her, as it requires virtually no skills and very little
capital. Nilmani leaves for work from her one-room
shanty at 4:30 a.m., while her three children are
asleep. She buys vegetables from the wholesale
market, investing Rs. 2,000 of working capital per
day, which she finances through a moneylender.
She brings the vegetables back home and cleans
and sorts them by 6 a.m. Then Nilmani goes to
the market, where she occupies a slot between
a fruit seller and a tea stall to sell her vegetables.
Vending earns her a profit of about Rs. 150 per
day, but she is harassed by police and municipal
authorities, who threaten to make her move out of
her pavement slot. To stave them off, she pays an
average of Rs. 30 each day in bribes.
Nilmani is not back home until 8 p.m., after the
evening shoppers disperse. Her older daughter has
studied up to class 10 in the government school
and has learned how to sew; she earns a little
by sewing clothes for local women and manages
the home for the younger two children while her
mother is away all day. Nilmani’s son dropped out
of school, as he couldn’t pass the exams and she
had no money for extra tuition. She sent him off to
work with her sister’s husband, a signpost painter,
to learn a trade. She is hopeful he will one day set
up his own business or perhaps join her selling
vegetables, a business she could expand if she
borrows more money to buy a pushcart.
The rural vulnerable: Hoping that luck
holds out
Those who have risen just above the official poverty
line have a tenuous hold on a better life. That is
the case for Ramanna, who runs a small business
manufacturing cycle seat covers in the Srikakulam
district of Andhra Pradesh. While most people in
his village cultivate paddy and peanuts to make a
living, Ramanna has been luckier: he landed work
as a tailor’s assistant for a few years and learned a
skill. Then he managed to get a loan for Rs. 20,000
from a cooperative society. With this, he bought an
industrial stitching machine and a few hand tools
and set up his business. His workshop occupies
300 square feet of his home; Ramanna and his
family live in the remaining 300 square feet. He
even employs an assistant, a 19-year-old village
youth who is keen to work and learn a trade, just
as Ramanna did some years ago.
But Ramanna’s stitching machine needs power.
Although his village has access to electricity, it
typically works for only four to five hours a day.
Ramanna makes a profit of some Rs. 5,000 each
month—enough to keep his family fed and his three
children in school—but the erratic power supply
limits his ability to earn more.

Life could have been much harder for Ramanna,
though. A few years ago, a fire broke out in his
workshop and destroyed his machines and
supplies. Having no insurance, he now had no
income, and debts to repay. For six months,
the family survived on rice and thin daal while
Ramanna did odd jobs to make ends meet. Finally,
his wife sold her only assets—two gold bangles her
parents had given her when she got married—to
repay their debts and rebuild the business. Today
Ramanna is relieved that tough times are behind
him and hopes to install a generator for a more
reliable source of power that will allow him to take
more orders and grow his business.
The urban vulnerable: Depending on the
kindness of employers
Lata is a domestic worker in Mumbai’s prosperous
Worli area. Her husband lost his job as a mill
worker 15 years ago and never found another
steady occupation. His odd jobs don’t pay the
bills, so Lata became the breadwinner, along
with her daughter, who dropped out of school to
join her. They perform domestic chores for four
households—cleaning homes, washing clothes,
and doing basic cooking. Wages are high in that
part of the city, so Lata and her daughter earn
Rs. 8,000 per month, just enough for the basics
for their family and her husband’s parents back in
the village.
She lives in a one-room semi-permanent structure
with brick walls and a corrugated iron roof in a
slum bordering the sea. The inside has some of
the hallmarks of middle-class success: a television,
an LPG stove, and a wall of shining steel pots and
pans. But the toilet is shared, and Lata must stand
in line for 45 minutes a day and pay the local dada
for water from a municipal tap. Preparing her house
cost her Rs. 30,000 a few years ago, and Lata
repays Rs. 1,000 per month to a moneylender.
Despite the hardships, Lata is lucky that her work
brings her into contact with well-off, modern India.
She and her daughter get two decent meals a day
at their employers’ homes, and when she needed
an emergency operation last year, one of her
employers paid to have it done at a well-regarded
hospital. She borrowed from another to get her son
admitted into a private college in the town close
to their village. She hopes he will one day land an
office job, but she worries about her daughter’s
prospects, as she is unable to afford a course that
would allow her to fulfil her dream of becoming a
beautician. She also worries that the support she
has enjoyed from her employers will end one day,
leaving her with few options as she ages.

83
When it comes to the availability of basic services, geography is destiny for India’s
poor. Even for households of similar income levels, the actual experience of
poverty varies dramatically based on where they live.
The eight basic needs addressed by India’s Empowerment Line can be satisfied
in different ways. Nutrition, water, and energy needs, for instance, can be met
if households gain more purchasing power. But others—particularly education
and health—require better shared infrastructure (such as schools and hospitals)
and more effective delivery of public services. It is therefore vital to take a
realistic look at how India’s geographies are equipped to provide the basics for
their populations.
We have created the Access Deprivation Score to quantify the availability of
services in each region. Using this tool, India’s 640 districts can be mapped into
five distinct categories. This approach allows us to make comparisons at both
the district and state levels. Combining insights about the intersection of income-
based poverty with gaps in social infrastructure can enable policy makers to tailor
their responses and allocate resources more effectively.
Access-based measures are needed to complement
the Empowerment Line
While the Empowerment Line measures households’ ability to afford a set
of basic services, we also need metrics that capture the ease or difficulty of
actually obtaining those services. For example, consider a family of four in rural
India with a household income of Rs. 5,000 per month. This family is above the
Empowerment Line, which implies that they can afford a minimum acceptable
standard of living—but they still face deprivation. The nearest primary health
centre is probably more than five kilometres away, and when they travel there
for medical care, there is no certainty that a doctor will be available. Their
daughter is not continuing her education, as she would have to travel more than
ten kilometres to the nearest secondary school. And despite their willingness to
spend money on electricity, their power supply doesn’t work for more than three
hours a day.
This example illustrates how the willingness or ability to spend money is not, in
itself, sufficient to guarantee a household’s quality of life. Incomes need to be
complemented by physical access to affordable basic services of an acceptable
quality. Assessing and widening access across India is crucial in any effort at
poverty alleviation.
4. Access to basic services:
The patterns of deprivation

84
The Access Deprivation Score (ADS) measures
access to the basic services required for an
empowered life
The Empowerment Line indicates that 56 percent of the population is not
able to afford a minimum acceptable standard of living. To complement this
understanding with an assessment of the current availability of basic services, we
have constructed the Access Deprivation Score (ADS).
The ADS is based on access to six basic services (health care, education,
drinking water, sanitation, housing, and energy) that are part of the consumption
bundle that makes up the Empowerment Line. To arrive at the ADS, access is
measured using nine variables such as school enrolment, immunisation rates,
the use of oral rehydration solution (ORS) as a proxy for basic medical care,
electrification, and access to LPG for cooking (Exhibit 31; also see Appendix C for
a detailed description of the individual indicators and how they are measured).
The nine variables are combined to reach the overall ADS for a particular district.
Zero ADS represents the point of “no deprivation”, or universal access to services.
On the other end of the spectrum, an ADS score of 100 percent represents
the point of complete deprivation, or the complete absence of any of these
basic services.
What would an ADS of zero, or universal access, look like? For a district with a
population of one million, this would translate into 200 sub-centres, 33 primary
health-care centres, and eight community health centres (as per government
health-care norms). This would allow all families in the district to utilise basic
health-care services such as immunisation and oral rehydration solution as
treatment for diarrhoea. Every child between the ages of 6 and 16 would be
enrolled in a primary or secondary school. Each and every household would
occupy housing of good or adequate quality (as defined by the Census of India),
and every household would have access to electricity, modern cooking fuels
such as LPG or smokeless choolahs (cooking stoves), improved sanitation,
and drinking water within the home. These goals are aspirational, but they set
benchmarks against which India can monitor progress.
The ADS has been calculated at a district level to provide a more granular
understanding of access deprivation, as state and national averages tend to
mask sharp variability across regions. By calculating the ADS for each of India’s
640 districts, we can pinpoint areas of extreme need, compare districts, and
aggregate results at the state and national levels.

The Access Deprivation Score (ADS) helps to evaluate access to various
basic services at several levels of aggregation
Exhibit 31
Overall
basic
services
Access Deprivation Score
Two types
of basic
services
Community services deprivation score Household services deprivation score
Six basic
services
Health-care deprivation score
Education deprivation
score
Housing
depriva-
tion score
Water
and
sanitation
depriva-
tion score
Energy deprivation
score
Nine
dimensions
ORS1
usage
during
diarrhoea
Extent of
full immu-
nisation
Health
infra-
structure
with
regard to
HLEG2
norms
Net
enrolment
ratio
Education
infra-
structure
with
regard to
norms
Good or
liveable
housing
Drinking
water and
sanitation
Electricity
usage
LPG3
usage
1 Oral rehydration solution.
2 High Level Expert Group.
3 Liquefied petroleum gas (used as cooking fuel).
The average Indian household lacks access to
46 percent of basic services, but this varies widely
even within each state
The nationwide ADS is 46 percent—that is, on average, Indians do not have
access to 46 percent of the basic services they need. Bihar has the highest level
of deprivation with an ADS of 62 percent, while at the other extreme, Himachal
Pradesh has the lowest level of access deprivation (among states with at least ten
districts) with an ADS of 28 percent.
Even within states, individual districts exhibit wide variations (Exhibit 32). In
Madhya Pradesh, for example, Singrauli district has an ADS of 65 percent
(implying that it is more deprived than the average district of Bihar), while Bhopal
district has a dramatically lower score of 34 percent. Examining deprivation at the
district level allows us to better pinpoint critical gaps in social infrastructure.

86
Bihar
62
0.04
Uttar Pradesh
57
0.05
Jharkhand
54
0.05
Meghalaya
46
n/a
Tripura
40
n/a
Manipur
38
n/a
Sikkim
30
n/a
Mizoram
30
n/a
Exhibit 32
India has wide disparities in access to basic services, and
variations within states are as high as variations between states
SOURCE: Census 2011; District-Level Health Survey, 2007–08; District Information System for Education, 2009–10;
Standard
deviation1
Standard deviation between states2
State
ADS
Highest
district ADS
Lowest
district ADS
5 states with highest
inter-district variance
Access Deprivation Score (ADS), 2011 (%)
706560504540 553025200 35
0.09
1 Standard deviation calculated only for states with at least ten districts.
2 Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland have data limitations and hence are not part of the state list.
Assam
48
0.06
Odisha
47
0.05
Rajasthan
46
0.05
Arunachal Pradesh
46
0.06
West Bengal
45
0.06
Chhattisgarh
45
0.05
Delhi
41
0.02
Gujarat
40
0.05
Andhra Pradesh
40
0.04
Karnataka
40
0.04
Maharashtra
38
0.05
Tamil Nadu
33
0.05
Kerala
33
0.04
Uttarakhand
33
0.04
All India
46
0.21
Madhya Pradesh
49
0.07
Haryana
39
0.08
Jammu and Kashmir
37
0.08
Nagaland
36
0.09
Punjab
31
0.06
Himachal Pradesh
28
0.04
26
Goa n/a

Basic services are grouped into two types to help
understand the patterns of access deprivation
To better understand the patterns of deprivation at the district level, we segment
the basic services into two types.
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL BASIC SERVICES
Of the six basic services used to construct the ADS, we classify drinking water,
sanitation, energy, and housing as household-level services (that is, the final
point of service delivery is ideally within the premises of the home). Based on
cross-sectional data for the 640 Indian districts in 2011, we find that districts with
higher average monthly per capita expenditures have lower levels of deprivation in
household services (Exhibit 33).
Exhibit 33
Access to household-level services improves with higher incomes;
no such effect is seen for community-level services
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 2011–12; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
Household services deprivation score1
%
Monthly per capita expenditure
(average for district)
INR
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
Community services deprivation score2
%
Monthly per capita expenditure
(average for district)
INR
R2 = 0.05R2 = 0.66
District-level data, 2011
1 Household services deprivation score = distance of each district from the point of no deprivation in household services.
2 Community services deprivation score = distance of each district from the point of no deprivation in community services.
As their incomes (and hence their consumption expenditures) increase, people
are in a better position to meet their own needs for household-level services. A
slum dweller who lives in an informal shanty may have to make do with a shared
water tap and a community toilet, but if she could afford it, she could move into
a pucca building with water supply and toilet in her own home. Similarly, a rural
farmer could improve the quality of his home, upgrading from mud and thatch to
cement and bricks; he could also install a personal tube well for water supply and
a personal pit-based toilet if he could afford them.
It is important to note that while the point of service delivery might be at the
household level, the government nevertheless has a substantial role in providing
the supporting infrastructure by, for example, laying sewerage networks for
sanitation, building pipe and purification systems for drinking water, and enabling
the infrastructure for electricity generation and transmission.

88
COMMUNITY-LEVEL BASIC SERVICES
We classify health-care services and education as community-level services.
In these cases, the point of service delivery is usually shared by a group of
households or the community at large. Families need well-run schools and health
centres within a reasonable radius of their homes to access these services.
Based on cross-sectional data for all 640 districts in 2011, we find that there is no
correlation between average monthly per capita expenditures and deprivation in
community-level services (see Exhibit 33 on the previous page).
The benefits of education and health care for an individual are felt by the entire
community, but market mechanisms for supplying these services often fail to
work effectively, even in communities with higher incomes. This underscores
the fact that investment in this type of infrastructure is a public good, and
the government usually has a strong role in either providing these services or
enabling a functional market for them.
India’s 640 districts can be grouped into
five categories
India is a country of great size and diversity, and some of its states are as
populous as entire countries (Uttar Pradesh is comparable to Brazil, Maharashtra
to Mexico, and West Bengal to Vietnam, for instance). Even individual districts are
fairly large administrative units; Thane district, for example, is more populous than
Greece. This underscores the need for a more detailed view of deprivation across
these districts.
Examining the access to household and community services that prevails in each
district yields five broad categories (Exhibits 34 and 35).
Exhibit 34
Each of India’s districts falls into
one of five categories
SOURCE: Census 2011; District-Level Health Survey, 2007–08; District Information System for Education,
2009–10; National Sample Survey Office survey, 2011–12; India state of forest report 2011, Ministry of
Environment and Forests; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Most Deprived
126 districts
27% of population
769 persons per sq. km.
Household Services Deprived
177 districts
18% of population
Moderately Deprived
127 districts
26% of population
Community Services Deprived
59 districts
15% of population
Least Deprived
151 districts
14% of population
2011

Exhibit 35
Access deprivation varies greatly across district categories
Forests; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Household services deprivation score = distance of each district from the point of no deprivation in household services.
2 Community services deprivation score = distance of each district from the point of no deprivation in community services.
4 Based on Census 2011 data for “dilapidated houses”. Other categories are “good” and “liveable” houses, which may
include slums.
5 ADS is a weighted sum of squares of service-level deprivations, not the simple average.
6 Proportion of total population below the Empowerment Line (BEL), 2011–12.
Averages
Categories
HDS1
(%)
CDS2
(%)
ADS
(%)
MPCE3
(Rs)
Most
Deprived
62 56 59 1,083
Household
Services
Deprived
57 39 49 1,177
Moderately
Deprived
41 41 41 1,653
Community
Services
Deprived
20 46 37 2,761
Least
Deprived
38 31 34 1,855
All-India
average
46 44 46 1,627
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
CDS
%
HDS
%
2011
Districts
Category
Average deprivation scores by basic service Other indicators
Household services Community services
Overall
ADS5
Urbanisation
%
BEL head-
count ratio6
%Energy
Sani-
tation
Drinking
water Housing4
Health
care Education
Most
Deprived
82 76 15 8 67 32 59 14% 72%
Household
Services
Deprived
71 74 32 6 48 15 49 16% 68%
Moderately
Deprived
52 52 18 5 50 18 41 34% 53%
Community
Services
Deprived
25 21 8 3 54 25 37 75% 32%
Least
Deprived
48 45 14 4 35 20 34 29% 47%
All India 59 57 18 5 53 23 46 31% 56%
MOST DEPRIVED DISTRICTS: HIGH DEFICITs IN
ALL SERVICES
India’s 126 Most Deprived Districts, which are heavily concentrated in Uttar
Pradesh and Bihar, have extremely weak access to all types of services and
are home to about 230 million of the 680 million Indians who are below the
Empowerment Line. Their deprivation scores for energy (82 percent) and
sanitation (76 percent) are considerably higher than the national averages of 59
and 57 percent, respectively. Similarly, their average health-care deprivation score
is 67 percent, well above the national average of 53 percent.

90
The pervasive and deep nature of deprivation in these districts is indicative of their
extreme income-based poverty. Their average monthly per capita expenditure,
Rs. 1,083, is the lowest among the five categories of districts. Just 14 percent of
the population of these districts lives in urban settlements that might offer greater
job opportunities; 60 percent rely for their livelihood on agriculture, which has only
moderate productivity despite high input intensity.
HOUSEHOLD SERVICES–DEPRIVED DISTRICTS: MODERATE
DEFICITS IN HEALTH AND EDUCATION, HIGH DEFICITS IN
OTHER AREAS
Around this belt of extreme deprivation lies an equally poor region that seems to
have partially overcome the challenges of poverty. These 177 districts—largely
concentrated in Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, and the
Northeast—have better access to community services than the Most Deprived
Districts. They are home to about 140 million of the 680 million Indians below the
Empowerment Line.
These districts have an average monthly per capita expenditure of just Rs. 1,177,
so their household-level consumption of basic services is almost as low as that
of the Most Deprived Districts. Yet this category performs significantly better
in terms of access to community-level services. Health-care deprivation is
48 percent, lower than the national average of 53 percent, and considerably lower
than the average of 67 percent for the Most Deprived Districts. At 15 percent, the
education deprivation is the lowest among the five district archetypes.
MODERATELY DEPRIVED DISTRICTS: MODERATE DEFICITS IN
ALL SERVICES
The 127 Moderately Deprived Districts tend to match the national average for
both incomes and access to basic services. They are home to 25 percent of
India’s population below the Empowerment Line—in line with their share of the
overall population.
Substantial parts of India’s most prosperous and urbanised states (Haryana,
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh) fall into this
category. Eighty-four of India’s 200 largest cities (including Meerut, Bhubaneswar,
Madurai, Patiala, and Vadodara) are in these districts. Many are in the nation’s
interior, and without coastlines, they lack opportunities for port-based trade and
related development.
With an average monthly per capita expenditure of Rs.1,653, their private
consumption is 40 to 53 percent higher than that of the Household Services–
Deprived and Most Deprived Districts, respectively. Though they are 34 percent
urban, twice the urbanisation rate of the Most Deprived and Household Services–
Deprived Districts, their share of non-farm jobs and the level of workforce
skills are only somewhat better. Their share of jobs in the organised sector, at
13 percent, is roughly equal to the national average. Many of these districts could
drive the future growth of the Indian economy, but they seem to be struggling to
build momentum for job creation.

COMMUNITY SERVICES–DEPRIVED DISTRICTS: MODERATE
DEFICITS IN HEALTH AND EDUCATION, LOW DEFICITS IN
OTHER AREAS
India’s largest cities are included among these 59 districts. The juxtaposition
of high-rises and slums is symptomatic of their unique challenges. Mumbai, for
example, is a major business centre—where 42 percent of the population resides
in slums. Incomes are not the issue: while one-third of the population in these
59 districts is below the Empowerment Line, this is much lower than the national
average of 56 percent. Four-fifths of the labour force in these districts has already
transitioned out of agriculture, and income levels are high enough for people to
afford many basic services on their own. Deprivation scores on services bought
directly by households, such as drinking water, sanitation, electricity, and cooking
fuel, are less than half the national average.
But access to community services for these 59 districts is only at the national
average level—a level of deprivation far higher than is warranted by the relative
prosperity and superior access to household-level services that these citizens
enjoy. This could reflect the impact of very high population density (more than
twice the national average) and also the necessity for greater citizen awareness
and engagement. India’s megacities urgently need to address shortcomings
in spending, infrastructure, and local governance in order to fulfil their
citizens’ aspirations.
LEAST DEPRIVED DISTRICTS: LOW DEFICITS IN HEALTH AND
EDUCATION, MODERATE DEFICITS IN OTHER areaS
People living in the 151 Least Deprived Districts have relatively good access
to both types of services. These districts are concentrated in the prosperous
and better developed northern and southern parts of the country (Kerala, Tamil
Nadu, coastal Maharashtra, southern Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, and
Uttarakhand). They are 29 percent urban, with an average monthly per capita
expenditure of Rs. 1,855—both significantly lower than these indicators in the
Community Services–Deprived Districts. Yet these areas enjoy better access
to health care and education than the more urbanised Community Services–
Deprived Districts. Population growth and access to health care and education
infrastructure have moved broadly in line with each other.
Thirty-three of India’s largest 200 cities are in these districts, but 25 (including
Bathinda, Salem, Rohtak, and Palakkad) have populations below 500,000,
allowing them to achieve economies of scale without the infrastructure strains and
overcrowding that plague India’s megacities. This raises the question of whether
a more diffused and distributed form of urbanisation, with greater numbers of
smaller urban centres, could work in favour of households.
Five insights from these patterns of deprivation point
to potential solutions
The categories described above lead to five key insights and implications for
policy makers about how to address gaps in access to the fundamental services
that are part of a minimum acceptable standard of living. Because an individual
state may have districts with widely varying levels of social infrastructure, policy

92
makers will have to take these starting points into consideration (see Box 7,
“Developing archetype-specific strategies”, near the end of this chapter).
1. HIGHER INCOMES, BOTH FARM AND NON-FARM, LEAD TO
LOWER LEVELS OF OVERALL DEPRIVATION
The Most Deprived and Household Services–Deprived Districts are the nation’s
poorest. By contrast, the Community Services–Deprived and Least Deprived
Districts have significantly higher agricultural yields and shares of non-farms
jobs, which correlate strongly with citizens’ ability to secure basic services at the
household level (Exhibit 36). They, along with the Moderately Deprived Districts,
have higher-quality jobs than poorer districts, and a greater share of those jobs
are in organised sectors.
Productivity growth (both within the agricultural sector and in other sectors) can
raise incomes and expand access to basic services at the household level in the
poorest districts. Achieving this will involve focusing on structural issues that can
boost farm productivity and enable the smooth transition of labour from farms to
non-farm sectors with higher wages.
Exhibit 36
The richer districts have higher farm yields
and better-quality non-farm jobs
1,083 1,177 1,653 1,8552,761
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 2009–10, 2011–12; Bhalla and Singh, Growth of Indian agriculture:
A district-level study, 2010; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Access Deprivation Score
%
0 = No deprivation
59 49 41 3437
% of labour force
with secondary or
tertiary education
% of labour force
with primary
education
Skills, 2009–10
Agricultural
labour
productivity
INR thousand
per worker,
2010
Non-farm jobs % of total jobs,
2009–10
Job quality % of organised
sector jobs,
2009–10
Average monthly per capita
expenditure
INR
Variables
23
30
19
141320
All-India average
< All-India average
Average
> All-India average
79
4546
364048
33
141311
714
34
303232
2630
49
3633
293135
NOTE: Not to scale.
Most
Deprived
Household
Services
Deprived
Moderately
Deprived
Least
Deprived
Community
Services
Deprived

2. INCREASED INCOMES DO NOT GUARANTEE THE
AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNITY-LEVEL SERVICES
With increasing incomes and purchasing power, people are able to afford better
housing, sanitation, drinking water, and fuel for cooking and lighting, reducing
deprivation scores for household services. But higher income levels do not
automatically imply improved community-level services and infrastructure (see
Exhibit 33, earlier in this chapter).
Improving access to quality education and health care will require increased
and more effective public spending, along with active community participation.
Productivity and wage improvements do, however, have an indirect impact on
community-level basic services by broadening the government’s revenue base to
fund such programmes.
3. URBANISATION, THROUGH ITS INCOME EFFECT, RESULTS
IN LOWER HOUSEHOLD DEPRIVATION
The more economically prosperous categories of districts are also the most
urban, as cities afford better access to jobs with higher wages. In fact,
India’s cities have been its engines of non-farm job creation, and millions of
migrants have flocked to urban areas from the countryside in search of better
opportunities. The attendant higher incomes reduce household-level deprivation,
but urbanisation does not seem to have any correlation with improved access to
community-level services (Exhibit 37).
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
MPCE1
INR
Urbanisation2
%
Exhibit 37
Through higher incomes, urbanisation leads to
lower levels of household-level deprivation
National Sample Survey Office survey, 2011–12; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
R2 = 0.44
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Household services deprivation score
%
Urbanisation
%
R2 = 0.63
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Urbanisation
%
Community services deprivation score
%
R2 = 0.00
1 Monthly per capita expenditure, average for district, 2011–12.
2 Based on Census 2011.
District-level data
Most Deprived
Household Services
Deprived
Community Services
Deprived
Least Deprived
Moderately Deprived

94
4. RAPID URBANISATION WITHOUT COMMENSURATE
INVESTMENT DEPRIVEs PEOPLE OF ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE AND EDUCATION
India’s nine megacities (Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, Bengaluru, and five others
with populations of more than four million ) are among the Community
Services–Deprived Districts. They have the nation’s highest number of schools
per square kilometre, but due to extremely high population density, their per
capita penetration is the lowest (Exhibit 38). This may be why Community
Services–Deprived Districts have lower average net enrolment rates than the
Least Deprived Districts. Even the prevalence of basic health-care practices is
lower than in the Least Deprived Districts, despite the physical concentration
of services created by urbanisation. In Mumbai district, for example, only
54 percent of children with diarrhoea were treated with oral rehydration solution,
significantly less than the average of 61 percent in Himachal Pradesh—a state
where all districts fall into the Least Deprived category. Based on current trends,
it is also expected that the Community Services–Deprived Districts will continue
to experience high population growth in the next ten years, underscoring the
urgency of addressing social infrastructure issues in India’s megacities.
Exhibit 38
High population density in Community Services Deprived and
Most Deprived Districts strains health and education infrastructure
Forests, Government of India, February 2012; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Projected population growth rate, 2012–22E
%
Population density
Persons per square kilometre
Most
Deprived
Household
Services
Deprived Moderately
Deprived
Community
Services
Deprived
Least
Deprived
214
71
148
200
124
40
59
63
47
98
6,224
4,364
5,153
6,786
3,981
1,123
3,395
2,174
1,543
3,063
Size of bubble =
urbanisation (%)
Most Deprived
Household
Services Deprived
Moderately
Deprived
Community
Services Deprived
Least Deprived
Government health-care centres and hospitals
Per thousand
square kilometres
Per million
population
Schools
Per thousand
square kilometres
Per million
population

Urbanisation levels in Moderately Deprived Districts are similar to those in the
Least Deprived Districts, but they are concentrated in a few larger cities. This
seems to adversely affect per capita access to health care and education in
Moderately Deprived Districts. These services need to be scaled up rapidly, with
increased public investment directed to health care in particular.
More broadly, job creation policies can be recalibrated to promote growth across
a greater number of urban centres to help facilitate the transition from farm to
non-farm jobs. This will alleviate the growing pressure on all types of infrastructure
in India’s megacities.
5. SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT AND IMPROVED GOVERNANCE GO
HAND IN HAND WITH BETTER ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICES
The Household Services–Deprived Districts have significantly lower gaps in
community-level infrastructure for health and education than their counterparts
at similar income levels, the Most Deprived Districts. Similarly, the Least Deprived
Districts and the Moderately Deprived Districts have comparable income levels,
but the Least Deprived have better access to community services. Interestingly,
the two groups of districts with greater access also have better sex ratios;
women are more educated and aware; and child marriage is less prevalent. The
government apparatus also works much better in such districts, as shown in
the better performance of the MNREGA and PDS programmes. For example, in
2011–12, families below the official poverty line in Household Services–Deprived
Districts purchased 18 kilograms (kg) of food grain on average, compared with
only 14 kg in the Most Deprived Districts (Exhibit 39). While the cause-and-effect
relationship is unclear, the correlation of women’s empowerment with improved
local governance and access to basic services is evident.
When they become panchayat members, women have been seen to take the lead
in organising immunisation drives and health camps in their villages.48
In places
with more progressive attitudes towards gender, women have taken a more
visible role in the non-farm sectors of the economy and have better utilised public
welfare measures. Women can be effective advocates for their own families’
welfare, and when they have greater levels of education and autonomy, they are
powerful drivers of improved health and education outcomes for their children—
and for the wider community. To achieve substantial improvements in the delivery
of public services, citizens will have to claim their basic rights and insist on
accountability and good governance.
48 Leela Visaria and Meera Bhat, “Public provisioning of health and decentralisation in Gujarat”,
Economic and Political Weekly, volume 46, number 49, December 2011.

96
Exhibit 39
At similar income levels, more socially empowered
districts are seen to have better governance and
improved access to basic services
SOURCE: Census 2011; District-Level Health Survey, 2007–08; National Sample Survey Office 2011–12; MNREGA
website; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
956921
< All-India average
Average
> All-India average
NOTE: Not to scale.
Cultural
factors
Gender
equality
Health
aware-
ness
4945
982959
6359
14
24
7367
31
40
48
31
Most
Deprived
Household
Services
Deprived
Moderately
Deprived
Least
Deprived
49
59
34
41
Monthly per capita
expenditure
INR
-17%
-17%
MNREGA
effective-
ness
PDS
effective-
ness
3
1
18
14
Social and
cultural
attitudes
Governance
variables
6
5
20
16
Variables
Prevalence of child
marriage among
females, 2007–08
(%)
Sex ratio, 2011
(females per
1,000 males)
AIDS awareness
among women,
2007–08 (%)
Female literacy
rate, 2011 (%)
Access
Deprivation Score
%
0 = no deprivation
% of applicant
households getting
100 days’ work,
2012–13
Monthly offtake by
BPL (below official
poverty line)
households
(kg/month)
1,083 1,177 1,653 1,855

Box 7. Developing archetype-specific strategies
Districts within states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,
Himachal Pradesh, and Odisha tend to fit one main
archetype. In most states, however, districts fall into
multiple categories, reflecting their different levels
of access, incomes, community participation, and
governance—and this diversity of starting points calls
for a variety of interventions tailored to these realities.
West Bengal, for instance, has districts that match each
archetype (Exhibit 40).
Its Most Deprived Districts (such as Maldah, Uttar
Dinajpur, and Murshidabad), which are concentrated
in North Bengal, include some of the poorest in the
entire country and have the highest Access Deprivation
Scores. They also rate poorly for gender equality
and the effectiveness of government systems. The
state’s Household Services–Deprived Districts have
the lowest monthly per capita expenditures, resulting
in household deprivation of 61 percent—but greater
gender equality and more effective government
services in these highly tribal districts have contributed
to better access to community-level services. The two
Community Services–Deprived Districts (Kolkata and
its neighbouring district of North 24 Parganas) have
the lowest household deprivation scores, driven by
higher incomes, but population density is straining
community-level infrastructure. The only Least Deprived
District in West Bengal, Darjeeling, is a tourist hub with
the best social and governance indicators, along with
strong agricultural yields and a high share of jobs in
organised sectors.
Taking a one-size-fits-all approach to the design of
economic development policies and social programmes
is unlikely to yield the most effective results given these
widely varying conditions. Each district archetype
presents its own set of challenges. Some desperately
need job creation and productivity improvements,
while others require a strengthening of governance
and expanded social infrastructure. These disparate
needs call for a more nuanced approach from state and
central governments.
Exhibit 40
West Bengal has districts belonging to each of the five archetypes
Monthly per capita
expenditure
INR
81.674.071.063.166.1
1 Below the Empowerment Line.
NOTE: Not to scale.
Most
Deprived
Household
Services
Deprived
Moderately
Deprived
Community
Services
Deprived
Least
Deprived
Economic
Gender and cultural
Governance
26.424.3
10.67.5
16.2
970941947957952
727065
4646
15.2
7.39.110.0
4.5
11.0
2.32.02.81.3
1,236 1,163 1,418 1,6852,591
National Sample Survey Office survey, 2009–10, 2011–12; Bhalla and Singh, Growth of Indian agriculture:
A district-level study, 2010; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Agriculture
Agricultural yield, 2010
(INR thousand per
hectare)
Non-farm
% of organised sector
jobs, 2009–10
Gender equality
Sex ratio, 2011 (females
per 1,000 males)
Health awareness
AIDS awareness among
women, 2007–08 (%)
PDS effectiveness
Purchases by BEL1
households, 2011–12
(kilograms per month)
MNREGA effectiveness
% of applicant
households getting
100 days’ work, 2012–13

98
* * *
Within India, and even within its constituent states, are significant disparities in
access to basic services. Parts of India have surged ahead of others, thanks
to economic growth, new attitudes towards gender equality and community
engagement, and the strength of local governance. All of these factors are
critical to achieving the objective of bringing millions up to acceptable living
standards. To raise incomes, India needs a surge of non-farm job creation,
especially in the organised sector, along with higher agricultural productivity.
This has to be accompanied by a push to fill in the existing gaps in education
and health infrastructure and by a concerted effort to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of basic services. The Empowerment Line and the Access
Deprivation Score are tools that provide a comprehensive and nuanced view of
how poverty is experienced across India to assist policy makers as they allocate
resources and design appropriate responses. Building on those insights, the
chapters that follow will outline a series of potential reforms that could form the
basis of a new approach to delivering higher living standards—one that addresses
both the income and infrastructure sides of the equation.

101
Poverty reduction was recognised as the main goal of an independent India even
before independence. The National Planning Committee formed by the Indian
National Congress in 1936 declared that the objective of policy should be “to get
rid of the appalling poverty of the people”—and the process of fulfilling that goal is
now gaining momentum.
From 1994 to 2005, the share of the population below the official poverty line
declined from 45 percent to 37 percent. Between 2005 and 2012, robust annual
GDP growth of 8.5 percent coincided with an almost 11 percent real increase in
spending for basic services—and as a result, the official poverty rate fell further, to
22 percent. During this period, India successfully reduced the number of people
below the Empowerment Line by 183 million.
This research considers what it would take to achieve an even more ambitious
goal in the decade ahead. The “inclusive reforms” scenario explored here is
predicated on India’s adoption of a bold reform agenda that supports higher
and more broad-based growth targets. We project that this path could leave just
100 million Indians, or 7 percent of the population, below the Empowerment Line
by 2022. In addition, the reforms proposed here would have benefits that extend
beyond those below the Empowerment Line. India’s entire population would
benefit from higher economic growth, a better business climate, more extensive
social infrastructure, and more responsive governance.
This scenario focuses on the potential for bringing at least an additional
580 million people above the Empowerment Line. But in aiming for the higher
minimum standard of living inherent in the Empowerment Line, we do not lose
focus on ending extreme poverty. If India can accelerate its annual rate of extreme
poverty reduction by 20 percent, only about 1 percent of its population would be
left below the official poverty line by 2022.
Achieving that goal is not a foregone conclusion, however. If current economic
growth rates hold and no major reforms are undertaken, India will fall well short
of these aspirations. Some 470 million Indians, or 36 percent of the population,
would likely remain below the Empowerment Line in 2022. This would include
about 165 million Indians, or 12 percent of the population, remaining below the
official poverty line. This chapter compares the two potential paths and identifies
the policy issues that must be tackled to truly empower the majority of Indians.
5. Reforms and governance
to move India from poverty
to empowerment

102
Without wide-ranging reforms, 470 million Indians
might remain below the Empowerment Line in 2022
After a period of robust growth, India’s economic engine has been sputtering.
GDP growth dropped from 9.3 percent in 2010–11 to 5 percent in 2012–13.49
At
the same time, a rising fiscal deficit and the persistence of government inefficiency
have called into question whether a rapid expansion in public spending on basic
services is actually sustainable.
India’s 12th Five Year Plan (2012–17) noted that the nation ran the risk of being
mired in a “policy logjam”—one in which growth is hampered by the absence of
decisive reforms that could boost investment and productivity across sectors,
improve legislative and administrative functioning, and more effectively execute
government programmes. In response to the economy’s recent sluggishness
and the negative outlook for job creation and public finances, the government
has been adopting a set of near-term and relatively easily implemented measures
to encourage investment, curb the current account deficit, and improve investor
confidence. But restoring higher long-term growth will require India to make a
serious commitment to deeper reforms—a challenging prospect in the current
environment. In this context, it is important to envision the outcomes that would
result over the next decade if long-standing structural barriers in the Indian
economy go unaddressed.
In this “stalled reforms” scenario, slow job creation and sluggish productivity
growth in both farm and non-farm sectors would persist. A lower tax revenue
base would constrain the government’s ability to spend on basic services, and
service delivery would remain inefficient. In this hypothetical scenario, India would
average just 5.5 percent annual GDP growth from 2012 to 2022, based on a
continuing poor investment climate, the absence of a strong industrial revival,
limited uptick in services or agricultural sector productivity, and no decisive
moves to improve government functioning.
The consequences of slower growth are dismaying: about 36 percent of India’s
population could remain below the Empowerment Line in 2022, with 12 percent
of the population still trapped below the official poverty line. At this rate, the goal
of removing extreme poverty would not be reached until the mid-2030s. Access
deprivation would remain at 26 percent in 2022, as fiscal resources would be
inadequate to build all the basic services people need.
The stalled reforms scenario presents sobering implications for India’s future.
First and foremost, it would be a humanitarian failure for so many to lack the
basics in a nation that will likely be the third-largest economy in the world in
terms of incremental GDP between 2012 and 2022.50
At another level, persistently
high deprivation amid rising inequality could be a recipe for social, political,
and financial instability. Fortunately, India does have the option to choose a
better path.
49 GDP growth rates at factor cost in constant 2004–05 prices; provisional estimates of GDP
used for 2012–13 (GDP growth was revised to 4.5 percent in estimates released on 31
January 2014). Data from Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
50 According to forecasts from IHS Global Insight, the countries with highest incremental GDP
between 2012 and 2022 will be China, the United States, and India.

Reforms in four key areas can bring 580 million
people above the Empowerment Line and virtually
eliminate extreme poverty by 2022
India can and must do better. This report considers an alternative scenario in
which India adopts crucial reforms that can enable faster growth, rising incomes,
and more effective public services (Exhibit 41). The inclusive reforms path
focuses on stimulating job creation and productivity growth across the economy
(with particular emphasis on the most labour-intensive sectors). Rising incomes
would support higher tax revenue that enables increased social spending, and a
concerted push for more efficient delivery by the government machinery would
make such spending yield greater results.
Exhibit 41
Pursuing inclusive reforms in four key areas can achieve faster GDP growth
and unprecedented poverty reduction
3.9
2.8
2.3
10
9
8
7
6
5
0
Inclusive
reforms
Stalled
reforms
2022E201720133
7
36
56
1
12
22
2012 2022E
Stalled reforms
2022E
Inclusive reforms
Increase farm productivity
Yield (tonnes per hectare)
Create new non-farm jobs
Million
Increase public spending on basic services
INR thousand crore, 2012 rupees
Improve effectiveness of public spending
%
BPL2
BEL1
2.0%
p.a.
5.5%
p.a.352
312
237
+75
+115
1,088
771
570
3.1%
p.a.
6.7%
p.a. 75
5050
25
p.p.
7.8%
5.5%
Compound annual
growth rate
Four areas of reform 2012 2022E Stalled reforms 2022E Inclusive reforms
GDP growth rate
%
Faster poverty reduction and GDP growth
Head-count ratio
% of population
1 Below Empowerment Line.
2 Below official poverty line.
3 GDP growth of 5% in 2012–13 based on provisional estimates.

104
With an emphasis on investment that boosts human capital and engages
more workers in more productive jobs, India’s GDP has the potential to grow
at an average of 7.8 percent per year through 2022, significantly higher than
the average 5.5 percent growth in the stalled reforms scenario. (See Box 8,
“Investment to sustain job and productivity growth,” for more on India’s
investment needs.) By pursuing the path of inclusive reforms, India could have
just 100 million, or 7 percent of the population, below the Empowerment Line by
2022. In addition, the goal of eliminating extreme poverty could be nearly fulfilled,
with just 17 million people (about 1 percent of the population) remaining below
the official poverty line. As poverty recedes, some 580 million Indians could enjoy
better living standards and wider economic opportunities.
Box 8. Investment to sustain job and productivity growth
To fuel the growth in jobs and productivity that we have envisaged, India
would need to increase the level of investment in the economy—and deploy
that investment judiciously among sectors.
India’s growth acceleration in the last decade was accompanied by a
steep increase in the investment rate.1
From a starting point of 24 percent
of GDP in 2000–01, the investment rate climbed steadily before peaking
at 38 percent in 2007–08. With the onset of the global economic crisis, it
dropped slightly, before recovering to reach 36 percent in 2012–13.
This broad trend, however, masks variation across sectors. The decline
during the global economic crisis was caused solely by a slowdown in
India’s industrial investment (which dropped from 67 percent of industrial
GDP in 2007–08 to 52 percent in 2008–09). Agriculture and services,
by contrast, each saw a 2–3 percent uptick in investment rates. To re-
ignite growth, India would need to broaden investments in sectors across
the economy.
We estimate that India would need to increase its level of investment from
36 percent of GDP in 2011–12 to an average of 38 percent of GDP over the
next decade. The public sector can provide the initial impetus, gradually
drawing in private capital. Public investment would need to increase from
8 percent of GDP in 2011–12 to nearly 9 percent over the next ten years.
This, along with an improving economic climate, would lead to an increase
in private corporate investment from nearly 11 percent of GDP in 2011–12 to
an average of 13.5 percent over the next ten years. Investment levels would
need to increase for all sectors, but in particular, both industrial and services
investment will need to rise by 1–2 percent of sectoral GDP.
1 The investment rate is defined as gross capital formation (GCF) divided by gross
domestic product at market prices (GDPmp)

The inclusive growth scenario hinges on four key elements:
1. Creating 115 million new non-farm jobs. To realise the productive potential
of its large and relatively young population, India needs a surge of non-farm
job creation. India’s working-age population is projected to grow by 131 million
between 2012 and 2022—and at the current labour force participation rate,
the nation will need 69 million new jobs just to accommodate population
growth (assuming all new entrants will be employed in the non-farm sector, as
the agricultural sector is already characterised by underemployment and low
productivity). In addition, the labour force participation rate can improve by 2
to 3 percentage points, necessitating an additional 26 million jobs. Moreover,
India needs to continue shifting workers from agriculture to other sectors. To
overcome the current 20 percent underemployment rate in agriculture and
to bring India closer to China’s proportion of farm employment in 2010, India
would need to reduce agriculture’s share of the workforce from 49 percent in
2012 to 37 percent by 2022—a shift that will require 20 million additional non-
farm jobs. All told, India will need to add 115 million non-farm jobs over the
decade (Exhibit 42). However, in the stalled reforms scenario, India is likely to
generate just 75 million new non-farm jobs, falling short of this goal by about
40 million. This would be only marginally higher than the 65 million jobs that
India created from 2000 to 2010—too few to keep pace with rising labour force
growth and the goal of lowering reliance on agriculture. The inclusive reforms
scenario focuses on filling this gap by unleashing growth and job creation in
labour-intensive sectors, not just the knowledge- and capital-intensive sectors
that have been India’s traditional strengths. Construction and manufacturing
(as well as retail trade, transportation, and tourism) will be central to this effort.
(See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of what it will take to create these
non-farm jobs.)
35220
26
69
237
Non-farm
jobs, 2022E
Farm to
non-farm
shift3
Change in
labour force
participation
rate2
Change in
working-age
population1
Non-farm
jobs, 2012
India can create 115 million additional non-farm jobs by 2022,
but the stalled reforms scenario will fall 40 million short
Exhibit 42
Non-farm job potential (inclusive reforms)
Million
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office survey, 68th round; United Nations Population Division; McKinsey Global Institute
analysis
1 Working-age population, defined as 15 years and above, assumed to grow at 1.4% per annum based on demographic
profile.
2 Labour force participation rate assumed to rise by 2.6 percentage points.
3 Share of farm sector in total employment assumed to fall from 49% to 37%.
40
115
Non-farm
job creation
gap
Stalled
reforms
75
Non-farm
jobs,
2012–22E
+115

106
2. Raising agricultural yield by 5.5 percent per year. India’s agricultural
yield stood at 2.3 tonnes per hectare in 2012—about half the average
yield produced by other developing countries in Asia. In the past decade,
agricultural yields have increased by about 2 percent annually, but the
inclusive reforms scenario projects productivity growth of 5.5 percent per year.
That would bring India’s output to almost 4 tonnes per hectare by 2022, much
closer to the Asian average (Exhibit 43).51
Improvement of this magnitude
is possible if India’s farms boost their yields by increasing the intensity and
quality of inputs such as water, seeds, and fertiliser. Farming practices can
be improved through better know-how and training. In addition, India can
revamp post-harvest infrastructure and market access by establishing cold
storage, improving rural roads, and undertaking regulatory reforms to liberalise
the procurement and marketing of agricultural produce. (See Chapter 7 for a
detailed discussion of ideas to improve agricultural yield and productivity.)
By 2022, India can increase farm yields to 4 tonnes per hectare,
which would be comparable to current yields in other emerging economies
Exhibit 43
Yield
Tonnes per hectare
SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
4.00.30.4
0.20.3
0.5
2.3
Yield target,
2022E
Market
access1
Precision
farming
2012
India
Other
countries,
2011–12
+72%
7.4
5.5
5.0
4.2
3.7
3.1
ChinaVietnamMalaysiaIndonesiaMexicoThailand
3. Expanding access to affordable basic services through concerted
public spending. India’s population needs many more points of access to
affordable health care, drinking water, sanitation, education, and energy—
and this is particularly important for those below the Empowerment Line,
who are currently deprived on too many of these fronts. The poor will also
need financial support to improve their ability to afford a more balanced and
nutritious diet, to obtain better housing, and to provide a safety net against
loss of income. As a result, public spending on these services would need
to almost double in real terms (or a growth rate of 6.7 percent per annum
compared with 11 percent per annum between 2005 and 2012), rising from
51 This is close to the target production growth of 5.4 percent identified by the Planning
Commission working committee on agriculture for the 12th Five Year Plan (2012–17).

Rs. 570,000 crore ($118 billion) in 2012 to Rs. 1,088,000 crore ($226 billion) in
2022 (Exhibit 44). The composition of this spending also needs to shift, with
the share directed to health care, drinking water, and sanitation rising from
21 percent to nearly 50 percent. The pace of economic growth will determine
whether government revenue will be sufficient to support this increased
social spending.
Exhibit 44
Per capita1
INR per month
100% = 1,088
Health care
Education
Food
Energy
Social security
Housing
2022E
40
9
23
11
9
4
3
2012
100% = 571
15
6
42
13
14
7
4
390 662
+517
(+91%)
4. Improving the effectiveness of basic service delivery. India’s delivery
of basic services is hampered by governance issues and corruption. As
discussed in Chapter 2, we find that on average, no more than 50 percent of
public expenditure actually delivers better living standards for Indian citizens
(see Appendix B for the methodology used to arrive at this estimate). To
realise the true potential of India’s social programmes, a greater share of every
rupee spent by the government needs to reach the people it is intended to
benefit. The inclusive reforms scenario sets a higher bar, adopting as national
benchmarks the levels of effectiveness already achieved by India’s better-
performing states. By this standard, we estimate that India can raise the
average effectiveness of services across all major areas of spending to about
75 percent (Exhibit 45). The inclusive reforms scenario assumes that the right
combination of strong political will, government reforms, and innovation in
service delivery can achieve improvements of this magnitude across India.
The stalled reforms scenario, by contrast, maintains a status quo in which the
quality and efficiency of public services remains poor. It assumes no change in
the effectiveness of spending—which means that an estimated $113 billion of
social service spending in 2022 would fail to reach its intended beneficiaries.

108
(See Chapter 9 for an in-depth discussion of improving the effectiveness of
basic service delivery.)
Exhibit 45
At a national level, India can match the effectiveness of spending on
basic services currently achieved by its best-performing states
36
47
5152
65
Health, family
welfare,
drinking water,
and sanitation
EnergyEducation
(until secondary)
MNREGAFood
Food Education
33
36
61
80
Health care
24
34
56
78
40
54
68
89
16–20
11–15
6–10
Top 5 states
Current estimated
efficiency/effectiveness of
government spending, 2012
% of spend reaching people
We set a modest target of 75% efficiency in 2022, based on best-performing states
Job creation and productivity growth drive most of
the potential poverty reduction impact
By pursuing the four strategies outlined above, India could achieve
unprecedented progress against poverty. The number of people below the
Empowerment Line could decline twice as fast on an annual basis as it did
from 2005 to 2012, and the number below the official poverty line could fall
20 percent faster.
The majority of this impact stems from broad-based job creation in labour-
intensive manufacturing, construction, and services as well as productivity-led
growth in agriculture. This would directly contribute to lifting more than 400 million
people above the Empowerment Line, generating some three-quarters of the total
impact in this scenario (Exhibit 46).
Within this jobs and productivity engine, the creation of 115 million non-farm jobs
drives the largest share of poverty reduction. This element has the ability to bring
the proportion of people under the Empowerment Line down by 25 percentage
points, which is the equivalent of raising more than 300 million people above
it. The construction sector could be the single largest contributor to this effect,
if we make the assumption that construction productivity will improve but only
marginally at 0.8 percent per annum until 2022 (given the likely influx of low-skill
labour from agriculture).

6
41
6
1834
Exhibit 46
Productivity improvements and public provision of basic services
contribute in different proportions based on the poverty segment
1
5
3
4
822
7
56
9
4
10
25
% of population Contribution to
poverty reduction
Impoverished
and Excluded
Below the official
poverty line
Vulnerable
Above the official
poverty line but
below the
Empowerment
Line
Overall
Below the
Empowerment
Line
Population
share, 2012
Create new
non-farm jobs
Increase farm
productivity
Increase public
spending on
basic services
Improve
effectiveness
of public
spending
Population
share, 2022E
59% 41%
84% 16%
74% 26%
Even with robust non-farm job creation, an estimated 37 percent of India’s
workforce will still be employed in the agriculture sector in 2022. Those workers
will be the least productive in the economy, and hence additional focus is
needed on households that are dependent on agriculture. Bringing India’s per-
hectare yields in line with those of other Asian countries could reduce poverty by
10 percentage points, raising nearly 125 million people above the Empowerment
Line. Raising agricultural productivity will also contribute to non-farm job creation
in areas such as infrastructure and logistics, food processing, and related
services, which will enable farmers to transition to other sectors of the economy
and create a more vibrant rural non-farm sector.52
Raising public spending on social infrastructure to fill in gaps in access, as well
as providing subsidy support to aid consumption, is the next lever we consider.
The doubling of public spending on basic services, along with initiatives to
make that spending more effective, has the potential to contribute 26 percent of
the total poverty reduction impact described in the inclusive reforms scenario,
raising some 150 million people above the Empowerment Line. However, more
government spending alone, without these accompanying improvements in
52 Manoj Jatav and Sucharita Sen, “Drivers of non-farm employment in rural India: Evidence
from the 2009–10 NSSO Round”, Economic and Political Weekly supplement, volume 48,
numbers 26–27, June 2013.

110
delivery and the prevention of leakage, would generate only about 8 percent of
total impact.
Delineating the relative contribution of each of these levers to the poverty
reduction targets is a broad exercise, of course, and expressing this impact in
terms of the number of people affected is somewhat artificial. In reality, many
rural families derive income from both farm and non-farm occupations, as well
as through remittances from urban family members who are mostly employed
in non-farm sectors. Similarly, incomes of urban workers may well increase as
a result of farm growth, due to the multiplier effects of the agricultural sector on
demand for farm inputs and consumption. But these rough estimates do serve a
purpose in illustrating the central role of economic reforms and job creation in any
poverty reduction effort.
Similarly, while the relative contribution of public spending on social services
to poverty reduction is valid in consumption terms, it does not fully capture the
importance of government provision of social services. Virtually everyone raised
above the Empowerment Line in the inclusive reforms scenario would benefit
from better access to affordable health care, clean drinking water, sanitation,
and quality education; almost half would benefit from food, energy, and housing
subsidies. The wider provision of these services would build better human capital
in the long run and make economic growth itself more sustainable.
The poorer the household, the greater the need for
more effective public spending
For the entire population below the Empowerment Line, almost half the impact
achieved in the inclusive reforms scenario stems from the creation of non-farm
jobs, and an additional 21 percent is derived from growth in farm yields. Within
this population, however, the vulnerable are more likely to have slightly better
education than India’s impoverished or excluded segments, making them better
positioned to benefit from employment opportunities in manufacturing and
services. As a result, nearly two-thirds of the potential economic empowerment of
this segment comes from non-farm employment and productivity growth.
For the impoverished and excluded segments of the population, however, the
picture is different. Jobs and agricultural growth are still critical levers, delivering
nearly 60 percent of the total impact of poverty reduction. However, increased
and more effective public provision of social services has the potential to deliver
a substantial 40 percent of total poverty reduction impact among these groups.
Their ability to raise their own incomes to pay for higher consumption is weaker.
For these segments, the government plays a critical role in delivering the basics
of health, education, water and sanitation, food, housing, and energy. Reforms to
make social spending more effective are a matter of urgency to improve the lives
of the impoverished and excluded segments of the population.

Inclusive reforms generate adequate resources to
spend on basic services while also reducing the
fiscal deficit
We estimate that the Indian government will need to increase public spending
on basic services by 6.7 percent per annum, reaching Rs. 1,088,000 crore (in
2012 real rupees) by 2022. For this growth in spending to be achievable and
sustainable without compromising on fiscal stability, the government will need
adequate revenue. We have assumed a combined (state and central) fiscal deficit
target of 6 percent to be reached by 2016–17. In this context, it is important to
note that India had a high fiscal deficit of nearly 9 percent in the early 2000s
that was reduced to about 4 percent in 2007–08. However, it shot back up
to 9 percent in 2009–10 in the wake of the global financial crisis and was at
7 percent in 2012–13, bringing back the imperative to rein it in.
In the stalled reforms scenario, lower improvements in productivity across the
board lead to lower tax buoyancy and constraints on government resources. As
a result, public spending on basic services can grow at just 3 percent per annum
until 2022, reaching Rs. 771,000 crore by 2022 (or 30 percent lower than the
target we assume for expanded access).
The higher GDP growth inherent in the inclusive reforms scenario generates
more tax revenue, enhancing the ability of the government to undertake greater
spending on basic services—even as India meets its fiscal objectives more
quickly. This scenario allows India to adhere to its fiscal consolidation road map
from 2017 onward, with steady increases in basic service spending to reach the
target levels.
The inclusive reforms scenario has the additional benefit of reducing the need
for public spending on basic services. The benefits of higher GDP growth in the
inclusive reforms scenario reach a larger number of workers, leading to faster
growth in income for the majority of households. This enables many more to
afford the essentials out of their own pockets rather than relying on subsidies.
We estimate that public expenditure on services such as food, fuel, housing, and
social security can be reduced by 55 percent, thus freeing government resources
that could be redirected to building health-care networks and schools or to
productivity-enhancing infrastructure development.
INDIA’S NATIONWIDE ACCESS DEPRIVATION SCORE CAN BE
REDUCED FROM 46 percent TODAY TO 17 percent IN 2022
Currently, the average Indian is deprived of access to 46 percent of basic
services—and that number soars up to 59 percent for the Most Deprived
Districts, which are concentrated in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (see Chapter 4). But
by committing to a steady increase in public social spending—and ensuring that
resources are not wasted or diverted—the government can dramatically expand
access to the basics (Exhibit 47).
In the stalled reforms scenario, India is able to fund only 70 percent of the
required public spending on basic services. In the absence of reforms, the
effectiveness of public spending remains at 50 percent. As a result, India’s
nationwide Access Deprivation Score (ADS) drops to 26 percent by 2022—a clear
improvement over the current level of 46 percent, but well below India’s potential.

112
The inclusive reforms scenario expands access by providing greater financial
resources and improving the efficiency of service delivery. By 2022, public
spending of Rs. 1,088,000 crore ($226 billion) at 75 percent efficiency can bring
India’s ADS down from 46 percent in 2012 to 17 percent.
Exhibit 47
Effective public spending can significantly improve
access to basic services across all areas
1 LPG penetration is taken as a proxy.
2 ADS is a population-weighted average of district-level access deprivation score.
greater access).
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Sub-
centres
Primary
health centres
Community
health centres
District
hospitals
Students per
classroom
Pupils per
teacher
Enrolment
Electrification
Modern fuel1
Toilet
penetration
Piped water in
the community
Health care
Per capita
Education
Ratio
Energy
%
Water and
sanitation
%
Access to basic services
Current levels
Potential levels in 2021–22
(inclusive reforms)
Access Deprivation Score2
0.17
0.26
0.46
2012 2022E
Stalled
reforms
2022E
Inclusive
reforms
-63%
Improved governance is crucial to reshaping
India’s future
India’s track record of poor governance has been well documented and widely
discussed, and it is a major factor that has prevented the nation from achieving
its full economic potential. Large companies and small businesses alike generally
view government bureaucracy as an impediment to their expansion. Despite an
overhaul of the “licence raj” system of the 1970s, procedural formalities and a lack
of transparency continue to constrain growth.
The poor, who rely on the government as a lifeline for basic services, feel the
failures of governance most acutely. If the teacher at the only government-run
school in a remote village leaves his classroom unattended, the students have
no other means to obtain an education. A whopping 91 percent of government
health centres in Assam do not have electricity, for example, while 75 percent in
Jharkhand do not have a regular water supply.53
53 Rural health statistics in India 2012, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of
India, April 2012.

But encouraging signs are emerging. The public is beginning to demand better
performance: grassroots movements are agitating for new laws or improved
government functioning, and citizens are turning out to vote in larger numbers.
This is an opportune time for India’s leadership to address the governance issue
head-on by taking a twin-track approach—one that strengthens government
accountability while simultaneously building institutional capabilities. Doing so
will give those in public service the ability, tools, and incentives to execute on
their mandates.
STRENGTHEN ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ACROSS ALL
GOVERNMENT ROLES
A breakdown in performance can often be tied to lack of accountability. Many
government officials in service delivery roles do not feel the need to increase
efficiency because there is rarely a consequence for not doing so. Similarly,
politicians who engage in corrupt practices would be less likely to do so if they
were certain of legal or electoral punishment for such behaviour. Therefore,
any approach to strengthening accountability needs to be focused on creating
a system of checks and balances that can drive performance and impose
consequences for failures. A framework for approaching this issue (detailed in
Appendix E) can apply different types of accountability to various government
roles. Exhibit 48 illustrates a few ideas that are relevant in the Indian context. They
may apply to both government divisions and private players involved in public
service delivery.
Strengthening accountability is only one part of the equation, however. It is
equally important to ensure that the public sector develops adequate capabilities
for the most optimal outcome.
ENHANCE INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITY
Government organisations are complex entities, and bringing about change
is usually a challenging and slow process. But it is possible to make internal
improvements by reconsidering current configurations through three lenses:
structure (the very design of the government unit and its role within the broader
context of government), people (the application of the right talent to the right task
as well as systems to manage that talent effectively), and processes (the day-to-
day functioning of the organisation).
Structural weaknesses in India’s public administration have been well
documented.54
These include, for example, the proliferation of ministries and
departments (partly the outcome of coalition politics) with illogical divisions
of work, weak coordination, and no integrated approach even on closely
related subjects.
India’s government recruits talented individuals, but there is scope to strengthen
the talent pool and to better manage it. Often, expert skills are not available
for initiatives such as developing public-private partnerships; implementing
technology-related transformations; or drafting laws, rules, and regulations
unambiguously. These needs can be filled by hiring “change agents”—midcareer
professionals who may work in government for a short period of time, as opposed
54 Organisational structure of government of India, Second Administrative Reforms Commission,
Thirteenth report, April 2009.

114
to an entire career, and can bring deep expertise and a different working style
to a particular government function. Beyond broadening the talent pool, there
is a pressing need to institutionalise comprehensive, relevant, and ongoing
training programmes.
Another critical requirement is to implement more robust performance
management systems at all levels. Government commissions on administrative
reform have pointed out that India’s bureaucracy tends to be focused more on
internal processes than on results.55
This is natural in an environment where
government functionaries are judged on their adherence to procedures as
opposed to their effectiveness. Outcomes are not well monitored, and few, if
any, positive or negative consequences are attached to them. The Sixth Central
Pay Commission (2006-08), however, made recommendations to introduce
55 Refurbishing of personnel administration: Scaling new heights, Second Administrative
Reforms Commission, Tenth report, Government of India, 2008.
A range of interventions can strengthen accountability
Exhibit 48
NOT EXHAUSTIVE
Regulatory Transactional
Degree to
which the
customer is
satisfied
Institutional
Alignment of
bureaucratic
and political
structures
Democratic
Responsive-
ness to the
will of the
people
Legal
Legality of behaviour
Reputational
Societal and peers’
expectations of
performance
Rules and
procedures
set by
regulations
Source of accountability
Government
roles
Policy
making
Regulatory
oversight
Service
delivery
Dispen-
sation
of justice
Consti-
tutional
rights
Decentral-
isation
Robust
anti-
corrup-
tion laws
and body
Manda-
tory
public
hearings
on regu-
lations
Empowered
agencies for high-
priority initiatives
with operational
flexibility and strict
accountability for
outcomes
Right to
public
services
laws
Citizen
score-
cards
Outcome-
based
budgets and
performance
appraisals
Involvement
of private
players
across
supply chain
of service
delivery
E-publi-
cation of
judg-
ments
Customer
satisfaction
monitoring
Right
to
infor-
mation
laws
Outcome-based
memorandums of
understanding
between:
 PM/CM and
ministries
 Ministers and
executive heads
 Heads of
regulatory/
independent
agencies (based
on their
respective
governing
charters)
Participa-
tory
budgeting
Right to
recall
Electoral
funding
laws

performance-related salary incentives in government departments. This type
of approach, combined with recent measures to implement a results-based
framework of performance management, could be an important early step in
this journey.
Even with the right structure and people in place, a government ministry’s ability
to get things done boils down to its day-to-day functioning and processes. Many
government arms do not use technology to streamline processes, but those
that do have demonstrated impressive results (see Box 9, “Process redesign
through technology”). For instance, Tamil Nadu has re-engineered its entire public
distribution system value chain by using technology to monitor the movement
of food grain and creating an effective system of surprise checks. These
interventions are not foolproof, but they do represent steps forward in the drive for
more efficiency in government processes.
Box 9. Process redesign through technology
Like most other states, Karnataka had a cumbersome and often inaccurate
approach to managing land records. The manual and decentralised system
could be easily manipulated by village accountants. Farmers were often
subject to harassment and even extortion while changing ownership of land
or obtaining certification for crop loans. Errors that crept into the system
led to problems in managing land taxes and revenue, legal disputes, and
inaccurate crop and insurance data collection.
In response, the government decided to digitise all land records in the state.
The magnitude of the task was enormous, involving more than 20 million
manually managed land records on nearly 6.7 million farmers with an
average land holding of 0.6 hectares. But the government poured resources
into the task; it ultimately took 20,000 person-months to collate and verify
the data and then upload it onto a digital platform. After the process was
completed, the manually maintained system was invalidated and more than
six million farmers were given copies of digital land records. A network of
supporting infrastructure was created in more than 30,000 villages across
the state, managed through biometric identification and passwords.
The transition has greatly benefitted both farmers and the administration.
Farmers can now obtain land records at the click of a button or through
a touchscreen for a minimal fee of Rs. 15, which is sufficient to make the
system sustainable. Digitisation has also allowed banking systems and the
judiciary to access updated and reliable land records as needed. Through
judicious use of information and communications technology, the process of
land ownership management has been significantly improved for the benefit
of all stakeholders.

116
At all levels and across its many institutional arms, India’s government can
execute its mandates more effectively by looking for ways to enhance institutional
capabilities. Exhibit 49 offers an illustrative list of ideas.
Multiple interventions can strengthen institutional capacity
Exhibit 49
NOT EXHAUSTIVE
Government
roles
Structure
Redesign organisation
and role to enhance
performance
People
Change mix of capabilities and better manage
talent
Process
Streamline processes to
deliver more efficiently
Source of institutional capacity
Policy
making
More focus on
expertise at
various levels
(e.g., drafting rules,
framing legislation,
case judgment
writing)
Delegation of policy
making to expert
sub-groups
Dispensation
of justice
Specialised courts with specialised talent to
expedite proceedings (e.g., commercial courts)
Regulatory
oversight
Cells that remove
bottlenecks and
coordinate
execution (e.g.,
delivery units, using
National Development
Council to engage
states)
Empowered
agencies with
operational flexibility
but accountability for
outcomes (e.g., state-
level economic
agencies for tourism,
health-care missions)
Performance
incentives for
bureaucrats along
with performance
management
framework
Lateral entry for civil
servants to diversify
experience base and
bring in experts
Greater investment
in training for civil
servants at all levels
Service
delivery
Greater use of
technology in
government, in
conjunction with
process streamliningLeverage private-sector capabilities
SIX STARTING POINTS FOR A NEW APPROACH
TO GOVERNANCE
To put the principles of enhancing institutional capabilities and strengthening
external accountability into practice, we have identified the following six key
elements that could form the basis of a reform agenda for governance in India:
ƒƒ Empowered agencies for high-priority initiatives, given operational
flexibility but held strictly accountable for outcomes. Empowered
agencies, led by externally recruited “change agents” or high-performing civil
servants, can be set up with the specific mandate of building a particular
service infrastructure (such as health care or drinking water) or delivering
a certain job creation target (such as creating tourism circuits). These
agencies can also be cross-functional Delivery Units (see Box 10, “Delivery
Unites for better implementation and outcomes”) that drive coordination and
implementation of critical government missions across multiple government
departments. They would be backed by and accountable to statutory
boards headed by the highest authority (for example, the prime minister
at the central level or the chief minister at the state level). These agencies
would be governed by the “tight-loose” principle—that is, they should be
held strictly accountable for outcomes but should have flexibility in methods,
operating models, and partnerships with external agents (as opposed to the

“loose-tight” approach predominant today). They would be given adequate
funding, and their progress on utilisation of funds and outcomes would
be subject to the highest standards of transparency and public scrutiny,
including by independent regulatory bodies and civil society. (The Unique
Identification Authority of India, for example, is a quasi-independent agency
that is mandated to issue personal identification numbers to citizens, and
it has significant flexibility in running its operations while reporting to the
Planning Commission.)
ƒƒ Transparency in public information and service effectiveness. Raising
public consciousness through transparency is critical to strengthening
accountability. The Right to Information Act (2005) was an important step
forward for India—and the next stage could be a massive digitisation effort
to get government data into shareable form that is much more accessible
to a broad base of users. India has already made progress on this front: the
government’s Public Information Infrastructure project, for instance, seeks
to create open public data by improving connectivity and providing a single
Box 10. Delivery Units for better implementation
and outcomes
Delivery Units are widely used in countries around the world to ensure that
the targets set by the government are met. These quasi-independent bodies
focus on a limited number of priority areas, set targets, and offer support to
public and private players, all while adopting a results-oriented approach.
For instance, the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) was established by
the United Kingdom in 2001 to focus on strategic goals spanning health
care, education and skills, home office, and transportation, among others.1
Chile has used the Delivery Unit model effectively to focus on such
objectives as attracting investment and creating jobs. It has set hard targets
for measuring success (such as increasing investment to 28 percent of GDP
by a given year). This target is then translated into key activities (for instance,
streamlining the process to open a business, simplifying building codes,
developing a database of registrars and notaries) that require support and
coordination among various government bodies. The Delivery Unit then acts
as a facilitator for the relevant government departments and monitors their
progress against the action plan.
In India, other structural solutions have been attempted with varying
degrees of success. The Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor Development
Corporation (DMICDC) is a state-controlled special-purpose vehicle that
convenes various central and state-level government agencies (such as
the Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board) along with private investors
and companies to marshal and coordinate infrastructure investment. The
DMICDC reports to a steering committee headed by the finance minister but
retains significant control over its day-to-day operations.
1 The unit was discontinued in 2010. The UK government subsequently created
the Efficiency and Reform Group within the Cabinet Office, headed by a “chief
operating officer” who is focused on improving the way government operates and
eliminating waste.

118
platform for applications. Voluntary government disclosure (for example,
putting draft legislation and cabinet notes online for public debate) could also
usher in greater transparency. Digital infrastructure initiatives are gathering
momentum and need to be extended deep into the semi-urban and rural parts
of the country by accelerating government initiatives such as the National
Optical Fibre Network, which plans to connect all settlements with populations
exceeding 500. Greater government disclosure and more open data could
enhance accountability through moves such as creating public scorecards at
the state, local authority, and specific desk/office levels. In addition, a rights-
based approach to service delivery can be institutionalised and streamlined to
reduce administrative burden. The Right to Public Services, now enacted in 17
states, could be strengthened and adopted at the central level.
ƒƒ Decentralisation of funds, functions, and functionaries. India’s sheer size
and diversity heighten the challenge of governance. National policies have
to be designed to work as well in the disadvantaged areas of Bihar as they
do in more prosperous Kerala, despite huge gaps in factors such as literacy.
As discussed in Chapter 4, community participation (especially by women)
goes hand in hand with better access to basic services—and to enable
this in such a diverse country, programmes need to be more decentralised.
Through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1992, India sought
to devolve powers to gram panchayats. But a serious effort needs to be made
to strengthen the financial autonomy of local governments as well as to clearly
demarcate their functions and train local staff resources.56
ƒƒ Talent and performance management for government employees. Robust
performance management systems are needed to ensure that public officials
fulfil their duties. The aims of the institution should be clear, accountabilities
should be fixed, plans should be created and tracked, and regular
performance reviews should be instituted. Senior bureaucratic positions can
be filled through a comprehensive application-based process, even from within
the civil services. Most important, bureaucrats and government employees
should have incentives for good performance and penalties for consistently
poor performance. Teacher absenteeism in public schools, for instance, can
be reduced if the consequence is strict disciplinary action.57
Officials would
need periodic training to enable them to function in the new environment, and
technology can provide the tools for both training and performance tracking.
ƒƒ A robust anti-corruption framework. Corruption has been a persistent
problem in India, which ranked 94th among 174 countries in Transparency
International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. Mass protests against
corruption culminated in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act of 2013. While the
impact of the law remains to be seen, more can be done and needs to be
done in areas such as whistle-blower protection. International best practices
can be used as a template in India (see Box 11, “Hong Kong’s anti-corruption
framework,” for one such example).
56 India’s Thirteenth Finance Commission report noted, “The transfer of funds, functions and
functionaries to local bodies consistent with the XI and XII Schedules of the Constitution has
met with limited success so far. The traditional theology that funds and functionaries will
follow functions does not appear to have worked”.
57 Karthik Muralidharan and Michael Kremer, “Public and private schools in rural India”, in
School choice international: Exploring public-private partnerships, Rajashri Chakrakbarti and
Paul Peterson, eds., MIT Press, 2009.

ƒƒ Simplification of laws and expansion of judicial capacity. Access to
speedy justice at a reasonable cost needs to be ensured. Complex laws,
some of which are relics from the colonial past, need to be reviewed and
greatly simplified. There is also potential to reform current procedural laws
to expedite the judicial process, and hence reduce the burden on the court
system. Simultaneously, India needs more courts, staffed with an adequate
number of judges. Capacity building is needed in India’s legal and regulatory
arms to enable these institutions to react to changes in society.
This is by no means a complete discussion of governance challenges and
solutions for India. However, it highlights some of the key guiding principles and
most promising themes to explore as the nation seeks to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the public sector.
Box 11. Hong Kong’s anti-corruption framework
Because corruption touches on every aspect of government, there are
many strategies for removing opportunities for it to occur and putting
penalties in place as deterrents. Hong Kong, which overcame a long
history of intractable graft to achieve a ranking of 14th in the Transparency
International index, is a useful example to consider as India looks for ways to
minimise corruption.
First, Hong Kong gave teeth to legal accountability. In 1974, the government
established a strong anti-corruption body, the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC), which reported to the city’s chief executive.
The ICAC retained full operational control of its mandate to investigate
corruption and make arrests, although the power to prosecute remains
with the Department of Justice. In 2012, 245 individuals were prosecuted
for corruption and 221 were convicted. Moreover, whistle-blowers are
given significant protection: in especially sensitive cases, the ICAC
facilitates changing the identities of witnesses and relocating them during
investigations and judicial proceedings.
Second, the ICAC has attempted to end a culture of complacency
towards corruption by reinforcing reputational accountability. It has
a proactive community outreach strategy to promote the principle of
government integrity, including mobile vans for anti-corruption exhibitions
and e-learning resources. The ICAC has also developed model codes of
conduct for businesses to adopt to foster an anti-corruption mindset in the
private sector.

* * *
India’s recent pace of economic growth is not generating enough jobs to make
rapid gains against poverty, while poor governance has eroded the nation’s
potential. By choosing the path of reform, however, India has the opportunity
to set off a virtuous cycle of economic growth and increased public spending
on basic services that will deliver higher living standards even as it achieves the
country’s fiscal targets. Taking a fresh approach to regulation and accountability
can push this effort forward. The chapters that follow will outline more specific
proposals for reform in each of these areas, including ideas that strengthen the
capacity and incentives for government to deliver the kind of sweeping change
that India requires.

123
Non-farm job creation and productivity growth are fundamental to India’s effort to
raise living standards. But India’s current pace of job creation is not sufficient to
make rapid progress. Maintaining the status quo would create at best 75 million
jobs—far short of the 115 million needed to absorb population growth, boost the
labour force participation rate, accelerate the shifting of labour out of agriculture,
and lift a large population above the Empowerment Line.
To jumpstart job creation, India will need to improve its business and investment
climate, especially for labour-intensive manufacturing, construction, and services.
This needs to be addressed from multiple angles, but the most critical reforms
relate to speeding the delivery of infrastructure, cutting much of the red tape that
constrains businesses, removing tax and product-market distortions, making
land markets more functional, making labour laws more flexible, and expanding
vocational training to millions of unskilled workers. India’s state and central
governments can implement these ideas in stages, starting with procedural and
administrative changes that do not require new legislation.
Along with these cross-cutting reforms, India can deploy public investment
to create specific “job creation engines”, such as industrial clusters, tourism
circuits, and food-processing parks. These initiatives can expand the options
available to India’s poorest citizens—and because they catalyse economic growth
and increase public revenue, these projects can be fiscally self-sustaining. By
developing some 70 to 100 job creation engines, India can generate an estimated
11 million jobs for medium- and low-skilled workers within a decade. The
government can also realise returns of more than 20 percent per year through
tax revenue and land monetisation, providing funding for additional job creation
and social spending in the future. Creating job centres across the country could
bring new opportunities to rural districts that have yet to fully share in the benefits
of India’s recent economic growth. India’s megacities are straining to absorb
an unprecedented wave of migration from the countryside, and encouraging
more geographically balanced development could alleviate some of these
growing pressures.
India needs to add 115 million new non-farm jobs
by 2022
India cannot meet its aspirations for poverty reduction without a surge of job
creation in higher-productivity sectors to reduce the overall share of agriculture
in employment. In the inclusive reforms scenario outlined in Chapter 5, the share
of those below the Empowerment Line falls from 56 percent in 2012 to just
7 percent in 2022—and just over half of that impact comes from creating more
non-farm jobs.
6. Revitalising India’s
job creation engine

124
Four priorities can set the stage for such large-scale impact:
ƒƒ Accelerating the farm to non-farm shift. The shift of labour out of farmwork
has immense potential to improve incomes. In 2010, for example, a worker
in registered manufacturing was approximately 14 times as productive as a
farmworker. Workers in the trade and hospitality sector were five times as
productive as those in agriculture, and those in construction were three times
as productive. However, approximately half of India’s labour force is employed
in agriculture.
ƒƒ Raising the share of organised enterprises. In 2010, registered
manufacturing firms exhibited five times the productivity of unregistered
manufacturing enterprises.58
Yet unorganised enterprises engage
approximately 70 percent of India’s non-farm workforce.
ƒƒ Achieving greater economies of scale for tiny and small enterprises. In
2005, companies with more than 200 employees were approximately eight
times as productive as companies with 5 to 49 employees. But 84 percent of
India’s manufacturing enterprises employ fewer than 50 workers, compared
with just 25 percent in China.59
ƒƒ Building a more skilled and trained workforce. In the most labour-intensive
sectors (such as trade, light manufacturing, and construction), a worker can
reap a 35 to 55 percent increase in daily wages by attaining secondary and
higher education. Yet 70 percent of India’s working-age population has only
primary education—or no schooling at all.
THE INVESTMENT RATE NEEDS TO RISE IN ORDER TO
SUPPORT A HIGHER JOB CREATION TARGET
From a starting point of 237 million non-farm jobs in 2012, India’s goal in the
inclusive reforms scenario would be to add 115 million non-farm jobs over the
next decade. This level of job creation will absorb a working-age population that
is forecast to expand by 15 percent by 2022. It would also allow the labour force
participation rate to rise by 2.6 percent while reducing the share of farm jobs
by 12 percentage points, from 49 percent to 37 percent of total employment
(bringing India closer to China’s share of non-farm jobs in 2010). But meeting this
target requires improving on past performance: only 65 million new non-farm jobs
were created in the decade between 2000 and 2010.
India will not be in a position to deliver on this potential without concerted
efforts to encourage investment. We estimate that the economy’s investment
rate will need to rise to an average of 38 percent over the coming decade.60
After averaging 35.9 percent from 2005 to 2010, the investment rate briefly
touched 38 percent in 2007–08 before falling in the wake of the global economic
slowdown. This dip needs to be reversed, particularly in the industrial sector. In
the inclusive reforms scenario, the capital formation rate in both the industrial
sector and in services will need to rise by 1 to 2 percent of sectoral GDP over
58 We have used registered manufacturing as a proxy for organised manufacturing,
as productivity information is available for registered manufacturing and not for
organised manufacturing.
59 Asian Development Bank, “Enterprises in Asia: Fostering dynamism in SMEs”, in Key
indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2009, August 2009.
60 Defined as the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP at market prices.

the 2005–10 average. Improving the business and investment climate as well as
committing public funding to seed job engines around the country will be critical
to moving private capital off the sidelines.
MANUFACTURING AND CONSTRUCTION ARE PIVOTAL
SECTORS FOR JOB CREATION
We estimate that some three-quarters of the incremental non-farm job creation
will need to come from the industrial sector (Exhibit 50), which must create jobs at
a brisk annual clip of about 5.6 percent. Construction and manufacturing will be
crucial sources of employment in this scenario.
Exhibit 50
India’s industrial sector will need to lead the way on
job creation, especially in construction and manufacturing
Incremental job creation in inclusive reforms scenario, 2012–22E
Head count, million
3
Construction1
Manufacturing1
Others1,2
80
50
27
1 Calculated assuming 80 million new industry and 35 million new services jobs.
2 Includes mining and quarrying, electricity, gas, and water supply.
Compound annual
growth rate
Total 95
Agriculture 20
Services 35-40
Industry 75-80 5.6%1
2.4%1
-0.9%
1.9%
3.8%
3.9%
7.4%
The construction sector has the potential to create about 50 million of the
115 million non-farm jobs India requires. While it needs to generate the most jobs
in absolute terms, this represents a moderation in the recent rate of employment
growth in construction. After averaging 9.2 percent growth from 2000 to 2012, the
sector needs to sustain job growth of 7.4 percent from 2012 to 2022. The surge
in construction jobs during the past decade was largely driven by the MNREGA
programme. We assume this trend will stabilise in the future, with greater growth
in construction jobs outside MNREGA, in response to higher investment in
infrastructure, residential housing, and commercial construction.

126
The manufacturing sector has the potential to create some 21 million to 27 million
jobs in the inclusive reforms scenario. This represents a doubling in the rate of
growth of manufacturing jobs (from 2 percent annual growth in the past to about
4 percent from 2012 to 2022). An expanding manufacturing sector has long been
recognised as an engine of development that can raise incomes, living standards,
and productivity.61
Food processing, textiles and garments, leather, wood, and
furniture making are the most labour-intensive types of manufacturing. Their
employment declined from 42.6 million in 2005 to 39.7 million in 2010, as they
were hit harder by the global economic slowdown than knowledge- and capital-
intensive industries. But global trends may set the stage for reversing this trend.
China’s aging population and movement of labour up the value chain to more
knowledge-intensive work is opening opportunities for other countries to capture
larger shares of the global economy’s labour-intensive jobs. Already, Vietnam,
Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Cambodia are experiencing growth in labour-
intensive industries, because of the cost advantages these nations now offer.62
In
this context, India can respond by creating the investment and business climate
necessary to boost its own share of global manufacturing jobs by becoming a
larger player in global supply chains.
The inclusive reforms scenario envisions some 35 million to 40 million new
jobs being created in the services sector by 2022 (up from 28 million from
2000 to 2010). Industries such as retail and wholesale trade, hospitality, and
transportation have been the mainstays of India’s employment growth in the
past, and that role will continue. But their potential for job creation can be even
greater. Services can benefit from rising household incomes and increased
economic activity in the industrial and agricultural sectors as well as growing
export demand.
JOB CREATION NEEDS TO BE MORE
GEOGRAPHICALLY BALANCED
Almost half of the required jobs are needed for the labour force in states facing
particularly difficult hurdles (Exhibit 51). For example, despite outward migration,
Uttar Pradesh will need to absorb 23 million new workers into non-farm jobs by
2022 (approximately one-fifth of the national target). Yet the state is more rural
than others and has a lower share of jobs in organised enterprises (only 9 percent
vs. the 14 percent national average). Bihar will need to provide 11 million new
workers with non-farm jobs but must do so with even less advantageous
starting conditions.
61 Manufacturing the future: The next era of global growth and innovation, McKinsey Global
Institute, November 2012.
62 The world at work: Jobs, pay and skills for 3.5 billion people, McKinsey Global Institute,
June 2012.

Exhibit 51
Approximately 45 percent of the need for non-farm jobs
will be in states with particularly poor starting conditions
State-level non-farm job creation requirement in inclusive reforms scenario1
%; million jobs, 2012–22E
SOURCE: Census of India; National Sample Survey Office, 66th and 68th rounds; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Based on demographic changes and forecasts of net migration.
Urbanisation
rate, 2011–12
%
Organised jobs
share, 2010
%
Non-farm jobs
share, 2010
%
All-India
average
14
8.9
5.0
9.0
11.4
8.1
10.7
47
44.3
38.1
31.1
39.1
35.5
25.8
32
22.4
11.4
27.8
16.9
14.2
23.6
20
10
7
3
3
2
Uttar
Pradesh
Bihar
Madhya
Pradesh
Odisha
Assam
Chhattisgarh
Rest of
India
44%
(50 million)
56%
(66 million)
A more balanced and diffused pattern of urbanisation can help India create jobs
in the regions where they are needed. Beyond its megacities, India needs to
cultivate a vibrant set of small, emerging cities with thriving local economies that
are well connected with other parts of the country (see Box 12, “India’s urban
‘missing middle’”). Many more of India’s small towns (those with populations just
above or below half a million, for example) can be developed into job creation
centres through focused programmes to build infrastructure and link their
economic activities to wider markets. One idea, explored later in this chapter,
involves building industrial clusters, on a brownfield or greenfield basis, to capture
agglomeration effects. This could create 1.5 million to 2 million additional jobs by
2022, and a total of 4 million to 4.5 million jobs by 2030.

128
Box 12. India’s urban “missing middle”
The task of generating and sustaining 115 million additional non-farm jobs by
2022 cannot fall exclusively to India’s megacities or its villages. It is a nationwide
challenge—and also a nationwide opportunity to focus on developing an
expanding tier of mid-sized cities. Today India’s urban population is concentrated
in its largest cities or in those with fewer than half a million residents. Only
27 percent of the urban population lives in middle-tier cities (those with
populations between 0.5 million and 4 million ). By contrast, nearly 50 percent
of urban residents in China live in middle-tier cities (Exhibit 52). A large share
of India’s 115 million new non-farm jobs will be created in urban areas, but
accommodating these new urban workers in India’s existing megacities will
prove exceptionally challenging and expensive, pointing to the need for a broader
approach to urbanisation over the coming decades.
Less than a third of India’s urban population is found in
the middle tier of cities vs. nearly 50 percent in China
Exhibit 52
Urban population distribution by size of city
Head count, million
SOURCE: Census of India; Insights India; Insights China; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
73
193
50
103 193Total 38892
Towns
(<0.5 million)
Small cities
(0.5–1 million)
30
Medium cities
(1–4 million)
Large cities
(4–10 million)
42
Megacities
(>10 million)
221
115
163
107
336 163 691192
85 12
32
17
24
India China
Top-tier cities
Middle-tier cities
Bottom-tier cities
% of total
urban
population
13
11
19
8
50
15
% of total
urban
population
Indian policy makers can hasten the development of this urban “missing
middle” by encouraging the development of industry clusters (or “agglomeration
economies”), which allow companies to reduce their cost base by co-locating
with suppliers, competitors, and customers.1
1 Michael Porter, “Location, competition, and economic development: Local clusters in a global
economy”, Economic Development Quarterly, volume 14, number 1, February 2000; Joseph
Cortright, Making sense of clusters: Regional competitiveness and economic development,
Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, March 2006.

Six cross-cutting reforms are critical to broad-based
job creation and can be implemented relatively quickly
Both job creation and labour productivity growth follow investment, so the
process of identifying and removing barriers to investment is critical to meeting
India’s growth challenge. Discussions with policy makers and business leaders
inside and outside India point to a number of key impediments: infrastructure
bottlenecks, administrative red tape, tax distortions, dysfunctional land markets,
overbearing labour regulations, and a shortage of skills in the workforce.
We focus on a set of six reforms to address these concerns. These can improve
the country’s attractiveness to investors, and also improve the returns to labour
(without deterring investment). These six priorities address the most cross-
cutting barriers to job creation across a wide range of sectors and geographies.
Beyond this list, a host of policy reforms are required at the individual sector
level, and although they are not the focus of our current research, this is not
meant to minimise their importance in ensuring that India’s economy is vibrant
and growing.
1. IMPROVE THE EXECUTION AND PRODUCTIVITY OF
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
Infrastructure bottlenecks, especially in power and transportation, hinder
economic growth, particularly in manufacturing. States such as Delhi, Tamil Nadu,
and Kerala, which have more extensive infrastructure in terms of roads, power,
and household amenities such as modern fuel, drinking water, and sanitation,
also tend to create more organised sector jobs with higher wages. This is a
virtuous cycle: better infrastructure enables job creation, which in turn provides
governments with the resources to invest in additional infrastructure.
India has a widely acknowledged infrastructure deficit that the government has
sought to correct through substantial increases in planned investment. The
infrastructure investment target quadrupled in real terms from the 10th Five Year
Plan to the 12th Plan to address historic shortfalls. However, outlays often fail to
translate into the expected outcomes (Exhibit 53). The 11th Plan, for example,
called for capacity additions at major ports—but the actual expansions were
63 percent below the original target and 35 percent less than the revised target.
In the power sector, the government initially aimed to add 79 gigawatts (GW) of
capacity, but only 55 GW were realised. Most other infrastructure sectors, with
the exception of railway lines and rail electrification, fell short of delivering on
their investment.
There are many reasons behind this kind of disappointing performance. Foremost
is poor coordination between various ministries and departments, which has
frequently led to delays in project implementation due to land acquisition
difficulties, slow environmental clearances, inadequate fuel supply linkages for
approved power plants, and lack of an integrated approach to planning. In sectors
where private investment is encouraged, such as power, the rates of return
on major projects are sometimes unattractive.63
And both public and private
infrastructure providers are not often held accountable for project management.
63 Sun-Joo Ahn and Dagmar Graczyk, Understanding energy challenges in India: Policies,
players, and issues, International Energy Agency, 2012.

130
India needs to accelerate the delivery of infrastructure and maximise the capital
productivity of each project.64
Two main strategies can be employed: more
rigorous oversight of projects through a Delivery Unit approach, and greater
focus on capital efficiency through use of non-traditional sources of financing and
optimisation of existing assets.
Exhibit 53
Infrastructure spending has been growing, but
build-out targets are almost consistently missed
Infrastructure investment, 2006–07 prices
INR thousand crore
SOURCE: Planning Commission of India; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Ports
Capacity addition
(million tonnes
per annum)
Roads
Thousand
kilometres
Electricity
Gigawatts
Railways
Thousand
kilometres
Irrigation
Additional
irrigation potential
(million hectares)
2,056
871
Eleventh
Five-Year
Plan
919
4,099
1,935
Tenth
Five-Year
Plan
Twelfth
Five-Year
Plan
5562
79
66
7979
11
1616
101111
185
285
497
316347347
222
56
10
33
6
55
4
65
9
55
7
Original target
Revised target
Actual
1 National Highways Development Project.
2 Major and Medium Irrigation.
NOTE: Not to scale. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
Capacity
installation
Village
electrification
NHDP1
Widening and
strengthening
Major ports
New lines
Gauge
conversion
Doubling
Railway
electrification
MMI2
Minor
Minor ports
-30%
-16%
-32%
-5%
-63%
-9%
-47%
-54%
-36%
-33%
+10%
+29%
64 For a discussion of this issue in a global context, see Infrastructure productivity: How to save
$1 trillion a year, McKinsey Global Institute, January 2013.

Establish a National Infrastructure Delivery Unit to ensure the right
mix of projects and accelerate project execution
To maintain an integrated view of the country’s infrastructure needs and ensure
that large projects are efficiently conceived and speedily executed, the Indian
government could establish a high-level National Infrastructure Delivery Unit, or
NIDU. This office would serve as a permanent institutionalised form of support to
the existing Cabinet Committee on Investment, which aims to fast-track critical
investment projects.
The NIDU would take primary responsibility for coordinating the various arms
of government and entities involved in project implementation. In this role, the
NIDU would plan for critical linkages across ministries and functions, set and
monitor schedules, and facilitate implementation. The appointed head of the
NIDU, reporting to the prime minister, would be specifically accountable for
infrastructure outcomes and empowered to resolve bottlenecks. The NIDU’s
performance targets would be framed in an outcomes-based memorandum of
understanding with the prime minister that holds the organisation accountable for
the overall performance of the project portfolio against timelines and budgets.
For projects above a certain size, the NIDU would also have the mandate to
evaluate feasibility and contain costs. This approach has proven successful in
South Korea, where the Public and Private Infrastructure Investment Management
Centre (PIMAC) is responsible for selecting which infrastructure projects are to
go forward on the basis of reasonable technical and economic risks. PIMAC
develops a detailed methodology and procedures for the pre-feasibility studies
that inform its project reviews. Before 1999, when the first predecessor to PIMAC
was established, 97 percent of proposed infrastructure projects were approved
by the government, and the average cost overrun was 122 percent. Since then,
only slightly more than half of proposed projects have been approved, and cost
overruns have dropped 81 percentage points.
Pursue multiple avenues for greater capital efficiency
of infrastructure
India can explore greater use of non-traditional sources of infrastructure financing.
One such approach is using land and development rights as a currency. For
example, the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA)
is developing a 553-acre site at Bandra-Kurla as a secondary commercial
centre. Instead of taking the traditional approach, in which the government
provides infrastructure, the MMRDA sells land to private developers, who are
then responsible for building infrastructure on it. The incremental land value
appreciation from the presence of infrastructure is expected to compensate for
the cost. In a similar vein, the Faria Lima Urban Operation in São Paulo, Brazil,
has focused on selling development rights above specific density thresholds to
finance public infrastructure in the area.
India can also explore strategies to extract greater value and maximise the
capacity of its existing infrastructure assets. One way of doing this is through
privatisation with appropriate monitoring of outcomes. In Jamshedpur, water
distribution is managed by a private company, which has resulted in better
performance across the board. In 2007, the Jamshedpur water distribution
company employed 5.6 staff per 1,000 connections vs. the national average of
7.4. Water supply duration was 12 hours a day, 2.8 times the national average
of 4.3 hours. The company has been able to reduce non-revenue water to

132
13 percent (as opposed to 32 percent in India as a whole) by investing in plastic
pipes for last-mile distribution, installing meters at regular intervals to detect leaks,
and incentivising employees to improve overall collections.
2. REDUCE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN, ESPECIALLY FOR
MSMEs, THROUGH GOVERNMENT PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS
India imposes a heavy administrative burden on businesses. This represents a
significant cost, especially for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs),
and it discourages many from entering the formal economy. According to the
World Bank’s 2014 Ease of Doing Business indicators, India ranks 134th out of
189 countries, while the average ranking for emerging Asia is 101 and the overall
average ranking for a cross-section of emerging markets is 73.
Many elements contribute to India’s poor showing. For example, it takes some
1,400 days to enforce a contract in India, as opposed to 500 days in the average
Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development (OECD) country.
Getting a construction permit requires 35 procedures in India (vs. 16 in South
Asia on average). To start a business in India, the minimum capital required is
approximately 125 percent of GDP per capita, compared with the 15 percent
average in South Asia and the 10 percent average for OECD countries. Resolving
insolvency in India typically takes 4.3 years, and the recovery rate is 26 cents
on the dollar; the averages in OECD countries are 1.7 years and 71 cents on
the dollar.
India has many opportunities to reduce the administrative burden on businesses
by adopting international best practices (Exhibit 54). To improve the process of
enforcing contracts, for instance, a specialised commercial court could be set
up to expedite proceedings, a reform that 90 countries have put into practice. To
facilitate cross-border trade, 134 countries have instituted risk-based inspections
that call for customs officials to inspect only the most suspicious cargo. In 160
countries, the government allows companies to self-assess their tax burden
and relies on targeted audits to deter tax avoidance and fraud. These process
improvements, among others, are not in place in India.
A road map for administrative reform could be implemented relatively easily
by India’s state and central governments, starting with quick wins to improve
business sentiment in the near term and building support for more robust
reforms in the medium to long term. Because of the complexity of India’s
regulatory environment, the near-term priority should be to add transparency
to regulations and inspections—specifically, the inspectorates responsible for
various regulations, penalties, and the rights of businesses during an inspection.
The Philippines has created transparency by requiring its government offices
to post an informational billboard that lays out which services are offered, the
documents and fees required, a step-by-step explanation of the process, the
time required to render the service, and the name of the official in charge.
A number of government interactions can also be easily streamlined by, for
example, allowing self-assessment for corporate taxes (with an appropriate level
of auditing to ensure compliance) and instituting risk-based customs inspections
for trade cargo. Many of these changes can be accomplished through changes in
administrative rules and procedures rather than legislation.

Many countries have implemented various best practices
to reduce the administrative burden on businesses
SOURCE: World Bank, Doing business 2014; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Exhibit 54
57
30
31
47
62
18
51
41
98
107
73
134
151
160
96
99
36
17
90
Cadastre information available
online
Safety regulations for electricians
Reduced security deposits
Specialized commercial court
Streamlined approval process
Single government window
Risk-based inspections
Electronic filing of complaints
Self-assessment allowed
Electronic submission
and processing
One-stop shop
One-stop shop
No minimum capital requirement
Distribution of credit information
from retailers, utilities, banks
Clear definition of directors’ duties
Access to corporate documents
before trial
Access to corporate documents
during trial
Regulation of related-party
transactions
Expedited procedures
Common best practices Number of countries
Emerging market
examples
Ease of doing business
sub-components
Enforcing contracts
Dealing with
construction permits
Starting a business
Paying taxes
Trading across borders
Getting electricity
Registering property
Protecting investors
Getting credit
Bangladesh
Chile
Georgia
Turkey
Vietnam
Pakistan
Colombia
Ghana
Malaysia
Botswana
Kenya
China
Argentina
Mexico
Cambodia
Nepal
Azerbaijan
Liberia
Brazil
In the medium term, India could move towards electronic platforms for most
business-related interactions with government—including paying taxes, submitting
documentation, and registering a company. At the back end, this implies the need
to streamline overlapping or cumbersome government processes. Transparency
and simple work-flow improvements can go hand in hand; a digitised file tracking
system that allows business owners to know exactly which desk is holding
up their case also allows each ministry and department to monitor its pace of
decision making.
The government’s national vision for e-governance, launched in 2006, has
31 Mission Mode Projects across a wide range of public services such as
passport services, e-procurement, digitisation of land records, and a national
citizen database. It also has eight technology support components to help set
up the required infrastructure. Now the focus needs to shift to accelerating
implementation. These programmes can be effective if they clearly identify their
execution activities and milestones and if they are led by empowered, focused

134
leaders and teams held accountable for delivery. Other countries have adopted
a similar approach: Germany’s Federal Employment Agency appointed an IT
executive with more than 30 years of experience as chief information officer;
he created a centralised IT project management function that provided training
and execution guidelines for critical projects. Every project had a manager who
was held accountable for meeting project milestones and budgets and was
also empowered to make the necessary decisions to achieve outcomes within
boundaries set by the steering committee.65
Moreover, the cost of doing business could be decreased by eliminating the
requirement for paid-in minimum capital when starting a company, reducing the
security deposit to get an electricity connection, and establishing a specialised
commercial court to expedite proceedings (see Box 13, “Cutting red tape:
Lessons from Colombia and Latvia”, for details on Colombia’s reforms in the
early 2000s).
Government departments will also improve performance if they are subject to
greater external accountability. The extension of India’s Right to Public Services
laws to business-related services nationwide would make government officials
liable for the time it takes to render a service to an enterprise. Customer
65 Transforming IT: A German success story, McKinsey on Government, Autumn 2011.
Box 13. Cutting red tape: Lessons from Colombia and Latvia
Easing the path for startups and reducing the burden of inspections are two particularly crucial areas for
administrative reform. Colombia and Latvia have undertaken these steps, and their results illustrate the potential
benefits for the overall economy.
In Colombia, setting up a business used to be a byzantine task. In 1999, registering a business required 45
forms and 17 procedures at ten different locations, resulting in a setup time of 57 days at a cost of some $500.
To eliminate the hassle, the Colombian government created a “one-stop shop” to consolidate virtually all of these
procedures. The relevant government agencies were housed in a single office, replicated across many locations.
A digital central business registration database was established to issue a single tax identification number on the
spot to a new business. The time required to register a new business fell by 95 percent; it now takes just three
days, requiring two procedures in two locations. As a result, Colombia has seen a surge in start-up activity. Annual
new business registrations climbed from 34,000 in 2006 to 58,000 in 2011—a 70 percent increase in five years.1
In Latvia, the heavy burden of inspections on businesses was a legacy of the country’s Soviet past. In the late
1990s, many businesses complained that overbearing inspections—often accompanied by the expectation of
bribes—were their top concern about the country’s business environment. As part of a broad reform programme,
the Business Environment Improvement Effort, the Latvian government decided to standardise its inspection
reports and procedures in all locations to create greater transparency. Most importantly, a central website was
created to publicise the new procedures and aggregate other information, such as a company’s rights during
an inspection and the appeals process. According to one study, the probability of a small firm undergoing an
inspection fell by some 20 percent in just two years, while the probability of a fine being imposed fell by some
80 percent.2
1 How many stops in a one-stop shop? A review of recent developments in business registration, World Bank, December 2009;
“Colombia: Sustaining reforms over time”, World Bank, Doing business 2013, October 2012.
2 Jacqueline Coolidge, Lars Grava, and Sanda Putnina, “Case study: Inspectorate reform in Latvia 1999–2003”, World Bank
background paper prepared for World development report 2005, 2004.

satisfaction could be monitored through, for example, real-time SMS feedback
after an interaction; all government offices could be required to publicly display
their customer satisfaction score for the previous week or month. India could
introduce a rigorous, independent scoring process to measure the business
environment across states, with full disclosure to the public.
3. REMOVE TAX AND PRODUCT-MARKET DISTORTIONS
India’s tax system is a messy tangle of central and state levies that serve to
undermine competitiveness. The sheer variety of taxes—and their considerable
differences across states and sectors—results in high compliance costs. It also
balkanises the national market into smaller state markets, harming the ability of
businesses to achieve economies of scale.
The proposed goods and services tax (GST), a harmonised consumption tax
across nearly all goods and services, represents an important step towards
reducing complexity and lowering the tax burden. A study commissioned by
the 13th Finance Commission suggests that by broadening the tax base, a GST
of 12 percent would generate as much revenue as today’s value-added taxes
of 20.5 percent.66
The tax could have other positive effects, such as reducing
the differential in taxation across states and sectors, leading to a more efficient
allocation of investment, and lowering the barriers to trade between states within
India. Concerns from states about revenue loss can be mitigated by guaranteeing
protection of revenue and creating a ring-fenced fund to support this.
In addition to cross-cutting tax reform, India can improve industry
competitiveness and encourage enterprises to scale up and enter the formal
economy by removing distortions in individual sectors—especially those that will
be the most significant sources of non-farm job creation. By way of illustration, the
textiles subsector is relatively low-skill and labour-intensive, which makes it well
suited to absorbing many former agricultural workers and raising their incomes.
But the textile market is distorted by excise duties on man-made fibers (which
do not apply to cotton textiles); import duties on raw wool, wool top, nylon staple
fiber, and polypropylene staple fiber; and duties exceeding 25 percent on textile
machinery, including excise, octroi, and sales tax.
The construction sector, too, is beset by a plethora of duties that undermines
project economics. The Planning Commission estimates that 20 to 30 percent
of the cost of an infrastructure project is composed of direct taxes on material
and equipment, with an additional 15 to 20 percent of the project cost going to
indirect taxes. The excise tax on cement, for example, ranges from 46 percent to
61 percent; construction equipment incurs import duties as well as excise duties;
and moving material and equipment across state lines typically also incurs taxes.
4. RATIONALISE LAND MARKETS BY REFORMING LAND
RECORDS AND ENCOURAGING NEW MODELS OF ACQUISITION
Land markets are a barrier to growth in India for three primary reasons. First,
inaccurate and outdated records mean titles are not clearly held, private
transactions are hampered, and dispute resolution in the judicial system is
extremely slow. Second, laws impose restrictions on the sale, lease, and
66 Rajesh Chadha, Moving to goods and services tax in India: Impact on India’s growth and
international trade, National Council of Applied Economic Research working paper number
103, 2009.

136
conversion of agricultural land. Third, land transaction prices are often under-
reported to avoid stamp duty, which creates uncertainty around the true market
price for land.
In the absence of an efficient private market for land, the backers of major
infrastructure and industrial projects have pursued the government-driven
land acquisition process, which historically has been viewed as unjust to the
displaced. The recently passed Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Bill of 2013 intends to make the process fairer and more remunerative for
landowners. The consent of 70 to 80 percent of landowners is now required
before the government may step in to acquire a tract of land. The process must
now compensate both landowners and other affected families, such as those who
have earned a living from the land, and both groups are entitled to a rehabilitation
and resettlement award. To correct for uncertainty around land prices, which are
artificially depressed, compensation is based on the recorded market value but
with an effective multiplier of two in urban areas and four in rural areas.
The new framework could make the process of land acquisition more difficult
and time-consuming. However, it remains an open question whether it will
actually undermine major investment and therefore the country’s economic
growth. For one, more generous compensation as well as rehabilitation and
resettlement stipulations may diminish the frequency and intensity of protests over
land acquisition. Second, a one-person authority is being set up to adjudicate
disputes, which holds the promise of expediting proceedings. The need for such
a mechanism is undeniable, though its effectiveness remains to be seen.
At the same time, the private land acquisition process must be facilitated. For this,
India needs more robust, transparent, and efficient land markets, and three key
reforms would help address their structural challenges.
First, India needs to reinforce property rights, primarily by demarcating land
holdings through geospatial surveys and providing standardised title to
landowners. Technology has been leveraged, for example in Karnataka, to digitise
paper land records and create a software mechanism to control changes to the
land registry. Second, many restrictions on monetising land (especially agricultural
land) can be loosened or eliminated, as they prevent private transactions for major
projects and undermine the farm to non-farm shift.
Third, alternative models for land acquisition that create less disruption to existing
landowners can be explored. For example, Gujarat uses a land pooling and
readjustment scheme for planning infrastructure in peri-urban areas. Under this
framework, all holdings of land in a large area are proactively pooled and their
borders readjusted to make way for public infrastructure such as roads. All of
the landowners in the pooled area lose a proportionate amount of land, but they
also all benefit from the appreciation in value that results from infrastructure
provision and they are not displaced in the process. This kind of scheme requires
strong urban planning capabilities, including the foresight to plan infrastructure
well ahead of demand, but it also avoids the time-consuming nature of
land acquisition.

The Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation has adopted an
intermediate model. When the company acquires land, it returns 15 percent of
the land to the displaced original owners after the land is developed so they
can share in the financial upside. However, the returned landholdings tend to
be different from the landowners’ original holdings, and thus resistance to land
acquisition remains an issue.
5. MAKE THE LABOUR MARKET MORE FLEXIBLE THROUGH
INCREMENTAL REFORMS
India’s constitution stipulates that the government should “endeavour to secure …
to all workers … work, a living wage, [and] conditions of work ensuring a decent
standard of life”. At least 43 national laws—and many more state laws—touch on
the labour market, regulating the terms of work, hiring and dismissal practices,
and the working environment. Ironically, this web of legal restrictions has
managed to secure rights for only a tiny minority of workers who are employed
in the organised sector. More than 85 percent (including agricultural workers) still
lack any form of job security or protection from income loss.
Despite effectively protecting so few, India’s labour laws are onerous by
international standards. The OECD assessed 43 countries (including nine non-
OECD nations) and found that India had the second-strictest set of laws regarding
protection of permanent workers from individual dismissal.67
The procedural
inconvenience and difficulty of dismissing a worker is considered especially
burdensome in India. The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, for example, stipulates
that in industrial establishments with 100 or more employees, businesses must
obtain government permission for retrenchments, layoffs, and closures. In the
event of dismissal, a worker has up to three years to file an unfair dismissal claim,
and court proceedings usually take three to four years on top of that.
As a firm expands its staff, various labour laws phase in and the average cost
per worker increases with each additional regulation that comes into force. The
Factories Act of 1948 phases in when a manufacturing enterprise employs its
tenth worker (if it uses electricity) or its 20th worker (if it does not). Businesses are
subject to the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act of 1970 once they
employ 20 or more contract labourers. Both the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947
and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946 apply to industrial
businesses with 100 or more employees.
The size profile of the country’s manufacturing enterprises reflects the economic
cost of labour laws that give firms incentives to stay small. In 2009, 84 percent of
India’s manufacturers employed fewer than 50 workers, as opposed to 70 percent
in the Philippines, 65 percent in Indonesia, and 25 percent in China. Across all
sectors, India’s largest companies (those with more than 200 employees) exhibit
approximately the same level of labour productivity as large enterprises elsewhere
in Asia, but its smallest enterprises are only 25 to 65 percent as productive as
their small-scale peers in nearby countries. This points to an artificial glut of small-
scale, less productive enterprises in India, likely caused by structural barriers to
enterprise growth, such as labour laws (Exhibit 55).
67 OECD, “Protecting jobs, enhancing flexibility: A new look at employment protection
legislation”, OECD Employment Outlook 2013, 2013.

138
Exhibit 55
Businesses with
5–49 employees2
India’s manufacturing sector is characterised by a glut of
sub-scale, low-productivity enterprises
Share of manufacturing employment by firm size, 2009
%
SOURCE: Asian Development Bank, Key indicators for Asia and the Pacific, 2009; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Both manufacturing and services businesses.
2 Productivity data is only for small enterprises (i.e., 5–49 employees) and does not include micro enterprises
(i.e., 1–4 employees).
Businesses with
200+ employees
6
8
6
13
23
11
23
29
42
52
200+ employees
50–199 employees
1–49 employees
Thailand
25
China
46
Indonesia
84
70
India
65
Philippines
13.1 31.113.112.414.0
1.5 15.15.72.33.2
Value add per worker, 20051
$ thousand per year
India is not alone in facing a labour market with excessive regulations. In 2012,
both Spain and Mexico passed labour reforms aimed at reducing the regulatory
compliance costs facing businesses and spurring them to increase hiring. Spain
made it easier and less costly to fire workers by more precisely defining what
constitutes fair dismissal and capping severance payments. At the same time,
hiring was encouraged by introducing one-year probationary periods for new hires
(with no right to severance during that time) and subsidies for hiring the long-term
unemployed and young people.68
In Mexico, similar thinking led to a set of reforms
that included probationary periods for new hires and caps on the accumulation of
back wages in unfair dismissal proceedings.
Though labour reform is widely perceived to be difficult to implement, some of
India’s states have started down this road—and those states where labour laws
are more flexible for employers have a greater prevalence of organised sector
non-farm jobs (Exhibit 56).69
These states also experienced greater organised
sector non-farm job creation from 2005 to 2010, resulting in a higher-productivity
mix of jobs.
India can substantially improve labour flexibility by phasing in a reform agenda
that builds on early successes before addressing the more ambitious and
politically controversial issues (Exhibit 57).
68 The 2012 labour market reform in Spain: A preliminary assessment, OECD, December 2013.
69 See, for example, OECD Economic Surveys, India, 2007; Gupta et al., “Big reforms but small
payoffs: Explaining the weak economic growth in Indian manufacturing”, Indian Policy Forum,
2009; and Cain et al., Trade liberalization and poverty reduction: Evidence from Indian states,
Columbia Program on Indian Economic Policies, working paper 2010-3, 2010.

21.6
30.8
27.4
Inflexible-
law states2
Flexible-
law states1
1.6
4.5
2.7
23.2
35.3
30.1
Exhibit 56
States with relatively pro-employer labour laws have a greater
share of organized sector non-farm jobs than other states
Organised sector non-farm jobs in states with flexible vs. inflexible labour laws
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office, 61st and 66th rounds; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Organised sector non-farm
job share, 2010
% of total non-farm jobs
Organised sector non-farm
job share, 2005
% of total non-farm jobs
All-India
average
1 Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu.
2 Assam, Bihar, Kerala, Odisha, Punjab, West Bengal.
12.09.2 2.8
Change in organised
sector non-farm jobs
share, 2005–10
Percentage points
A stepwise reform agenda for the labour market can
attract investment and improve the returns to labour
SOURCE: Expert interviews; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Exhibit 57
▪ Launch a single, user-friendly
website that consolidates all
labour regulations, organised
by type of enterprise
▪ Clarify which inspectorates
are responsible for which
regulations, penalties per rule,
and rights of business during
inspections
▪ Remove restrictions on
female work at night, daily
work hours, and weekly work
hours
▪ Remove requirement of
government approval and
union consultation for changes
in terms of work
▪ Streamline excessive
regulations related to working
environment (e.g., wall
painting, lighting, spittoons,
crèches)
Catalyse enterprise growth
Create transparency
Make life simpler for MSMEs
▪ Remove requirement of
government approval for
retrenchment in the case of
industrial enterprises with
100+ employees
▪ Reduce time for filing of
unfair dismissal claim from
three years to three months
ILLUSTRATIVE
First, the government can create greater transparency about the scope and
enforcement of labour laws. A single website that consolidates all labour
regulations at both the national and state levels, organised by enterprise size
and sector, could quickly lower the cost of ensuring compliance—especially
for less sophisticated MSMEs that are unsure which labour laws apply to them.
Similarly, greater transparency about enforcement (spelling out, for example,
which inspection units are responsible, penalties per regulation, and the rights of
a business during an inspection) would reduce opportunities for corruption.
Second, a series of legislative reforms could make life simpler for MSMEs,
where the vast majority of Indians work. Regulations that restrict the terms of
work—including, for example, limits on women working at night, daily work
hours, and weekly work hours, as well as the requirement to obtain government
approval before changing an employee’s standing orders—hinder the flexibility
that small businesses need to survive. Furthermore, excessive regulations
related to the working environment can be streamlined. Rules related to the
provision of spittoons, the type of lighting, and the quality of wall painting,

140
among many others, can be simplified or entirely eliminated. Doing away with
arcane regulations can reduce the scope for bribe taking during inspections
and may remove disincentives for many unorganised businesses to enter the
formal economy.
The third set of reforms should focus on catalysing formal employment. The
major impediment in this regard is the high cost of firing, which likely deters
hiring in the first place. Industrial establishments with 100 or more workers must
seek government permission to dismiss workers. This hinders the expansion of
India’s manufacturing sector and undermines competitiveness, as enterprises
choose to stay small and forgo economies of scale. India could eliminate the
government’s role in firing decisions entirely and instead set out rules defining
what constitutes “fair” retrenchment, as Spain has recently done. Moreover, India
allows three years to file an unfair dismissal claim, in contrast to, say, Turkey,
which allows up to one month for a worker to file a grievance after notification of
dismissal; Austria allows only two weeks. Bringing this time period in line with
international norms would lessen the risk a business takes on by hiring a worker.
Any increase in the flexibility to fire should be paired with measures to reinforce
income security in case of unemployment. India’s current policies are poorly
suited to the task. Severance is 15 days’ pay for each year of service, while
the unemployment insurance scheme pays out 50 percent of an employee’s
previous wage for six months. However, both are available only to workers who
were employed in formal enterprises, who make up only some 15 percent of
the workforce.
One approach to addressing this gap in the informal economy could be direct
unemployment assistance, in which the government provides a fixed stipend to
the unemployed. In Argentina, for example, the government provides a stipend of
150 pesos per month, which is less than the minimum wage, for one unemployed
head of a household with children. In Germany, unemployment assistance is
conditional, requiring the unemployed person to register with the government-run
job placement agency and actively seek work.
This model could be adopted in India, but only after the country’s system
for employment matching and placement improves. Today most low- and
medium-skilled job seekers in India find employment through networks of
labour contractors and through family, caste, and community connections.70
These networks are a natural response to the high degree of informality in the
job market. But as the job market formalises, the capabilities of employment
exchanges will have to be beefed up. Today India has some 1,200 employment
exchanges, but their placement rate is around 1 percent annually.71
By contrast,
Egypt’s Ministry of Manpower and Immigration has one employment office for
approximately every 180,000 people in the working-age population and manages
to make some 40,000 job placements per month. Approximately half of Egypt’s
job seekers claim to have found employment through the agency.72
70 Arvinder Singh, “Labour mobility in China and India: The role of Hukou, caste and
community”, in China and India: Learning from each other—Reforms and policies for
sustained growth, Jahangir Aziz, Steven Dunaway, and Eswar Prasad, eds., International
Monetary Fund, September 2006.
71 Employment exchange statistics 2012, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government
of India.
72 Amina Semlali and Diego Angel-Urdinola, Public employment services and publicly provided
ALMPs in Egypt, World Bank, 2012.

6. BUILD SKILLS FOR POOR WORKERS THROUGH A
GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED SYSTEM
Many of the poor do not benefit from economic growth because they lack the
skills required to obtain a job—but if they do manage to acquire skills, the impact
on their personal incomes can be dramatic. An illiterate worker who moves
from agriculture into light manufacturing can, with appropriate training, realise a
40 percent increase in wages. Similarly, a literate worker who has completed only
primary education can expect 70 percent higher wages by moving from the farm
into heavy manufacturing after having acquired the relevant skill set.
Ensuring a well-trained workforce is a particularly acute challenge in India
because most businesses are small and operate outside the formal economy;
they are therefore unlikely to provide the same training opportunities as larger,
better-established firms. The government’s efforts to address this issue have
included initiatives such as the National Skill Development Corporation. Most
of the progress to date has been around developing models for workers in
urban areas and those with a minimum education level (typically class 12 or
graduates). To make economic growth more inclusive, however, vocational
education providers need to engage the poorest workers, those with lower levels
of education (perhaps no schooling at all or only primary education), and those
who live in rural areas (Exhibit 58). Some 278 million Indians of working age are
in these segments, but they are under-served. While some organisations, such
as Odisha’s Gram Tarang, are beginning to cater to these segments, India could
more actively pursue and scale up promising models that address the widespread
need for training and skill development.
Geographic
focus
Urban
Rural
NTTF
TalentSprint
EduBridge
Centum Learning
Globsyn
Career Launcher
Dr. Reddy’s
Foundation
LAQSH
IJT
BASIX
Gram
Tarang
GRAS
Academy
CAP
Foundation
Pratham
Yuva
Parivartan
IL&FS
Skills
International
Association
for Human
Values
Technable
Empower
iStar
LabourNet
Everonn Skill
JobCorp
Laurus
Edutech
GOLS
TMI Input &
Service
India Institute
of Gems
& Jewellery
India Institute of
Skill Development
Exhibit 58
There is a major gap in vocational training offerings
in rural areas for those with little education
Focus of various vocational education providers in India
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office, 66th round; expert interviews; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
NOT EXHAUSTIVE
Labour force size, 2010
(million)
Segments with largest
supply-demand mismatch
No schooling/primary Secondary
Level of education (of pupils trained)
Tertiary
56
278
32
55
23
12

142
Short training courses and certification systems could help workers improve
their skills (and thus their incomes). There are proven ways to do this, and these
can be identified and scaled up. An Andhra Pradesh–based NGO has trained
more than 50,000 young people for the retail and hospitality industries in three-
month programmes, for example, while an NGO in western India uses mobile
vans to offer 15-day programmes in skilled trades like plumbing to some 100,000
rural students.
IL&FS Skills, a public-private partnership, trained some 9,000 aspiring workers
and achieved an 85 percent placement rate in 2012, and its model has many
of the elements required for success. IL&FS Skills directly targets poor, less
educated rural youth, training dropouts for jobs in textiles, leather, welding,
fitting, and construction; it teaches high school graduates the skills for retail,
hospitality, electrical and appliance repairing, and machine tooling. Its delivery
model emphasises low cost of operation, interactive learning, and teaching
skills that are in demand. The company uses a standardised curriculum that is
delivered through a portable multimedia platform called the K-Yan. Classroom
instruction on the K-Yan is paired with hands-on experience in simulated work
environments. Industry partnerships with some 1,000 employers ensure the
relevance of the curriculum and secure placements for enrollees. The Ministry
of Rural Development pays the tuition of participants, but there is no stipend to
participants to defray the opportunity cost of their time spent in training. For a
poor individual supporting a family, this might be a major barrier; the government
can play an important role in filling this type of gap and creating incentives for
skills development.
Many such social sector and private enterprises could provide “earn-as-you-
learn” skill-building programmes to poor workers, training millions of people
over a decade. The money for such courses could be given as government
grants to trainers once workers are certified, or workers could get vouchers that
allow them to choose among providers. Some programmes could evolve into
marketplaces that link certified trainees with employers willing to pay for quality.
Training programmes also need an increased focus on entrepreneurial skills to
enable trainees to start their own enterprises. This could catalyse the growth of
hundreds of vocational training organisations, subject to quality monitoring and
certification by government-approved agencies. Existing programmes can be
repurposed for this effort. For example, the funds used by the MNREGA scheme
to provide unskilled manual work for at least 100 days a year to rural workers can
be channeled into skills development. Such an initiative could leave poor rural
workers with durable and long-lasting means to improve their own standards
of living.
Building focused “job creation engines” can create
11 million jobs and generate revenue to plough back
into infrastructure and social services
In addition to critical reforms that improve the business and investment climate
in a broad-based way, India can seed new “job creation engines” across the
country. Mumbai, New Delhi, Bengaluru, and other major urban centres have a
significant role to play in generating additional non-farm jobs, but they will not
be able to meet the challenge alone. Even after accounting for net migration,

more than 50 million non-farm jobs (out of a total requirement of 115 million ) will
need to be created for the labour force in six large, mainly rural states, including
23 million for Uttar Pradesh alone.
Three targeted government interventions to build job creation engines—industrial
townships, tourism circuits, and food-processing parks—could make a notable
contribution towards more geographically balanced growth.
Industrial townships provide tailor-made infrastructure that supports a cluster of
companies in similar industries (in this case, manufacturing, though they can also
be developed around financial services, education, medical services, technology,
or other types of innovation). Their proximity creates efficiencies, knowledge
transfer, and higher labour productivity, attracting investment and creating jobs.
Tourism circuits are clusters of tourist attractions, supplemented by hotels,
restaurants, and recreational activities and connected by road, rail, and air links.
They need to have reliable power supplies, clean drinking water and sanitation,
and local populations skilled at meeting tourists’ demand for goods and services.
The tourism sector is labour-intensive, creating jobs that are well suited to those
moving up from the lower rungs of society and causing positive spillover effects in
the informal economy.
Finally, agro-based industries, such as food-processing parks, not only bring
industry to rural areas, but also improve farmers’ access to the broader market,
increasing their incomes.
If these three interventions are approached correctly, we estimate that they
could create some 11 million non-farm jobs by 2022, bridging approximately
25 to 30 percent of the job creation gap between our inclusive reforms and stalled
reforms scenarios.
To bring these to fruition, India’s government would need to make concurrent
investments in infrastructure (power, roads, water, and sanitation), basic services
(schools, hospitals, and affordable housing), and sector-specific needs (for
example, beach development and tourist attractions to support tourist circuits).
These investments can be self-sustaining for the government, as returns (in
the form of tax receipts and land monetisation) can be re-invested in additional
job creation. However, each of these initiatives will require a well-considered
approach to ensure that resources are not squandered.
INDUSTRIAL TOWNSHIPS
India cannot meet the non-farm job creation challenge without a significant
ramp-up in manufacturing employment. A series of geographically dispersed
industrial townships, both greenfield and brownfield, can enhance the reach of
this sector and broaden job opportunities. If programmes to create or strengthen
35 industrial townships could be launched over the next eight years, some
1.7 million jobs could be created by 2022, including 400,000 manufacturing jobs
and 800,000 construction jobs (Exhibit 59). In steady state, reached around 2030,
the townships could support approximately 4.2 million jobs with an average salary
of Rs. 450,000 per annum (2011–12 rupees).

144
Exhibit 59
A portfolio of industrial townships can create approximately 1.7 million
non-farm jobs by 2022
Economic profile of 35 industrial townships1
1 One launched in 2014, two in 2015, three in 2016, four in 2017, and five every year thereafter to 2022; 17 brownfield and
18 greenfield.
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
-60
37
-5
-41
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
2025
2.8
24
2.4
23
2.0
2022
1.7
21
1.3
20
0.9
19
0.7
18
0.5
17
0.3
16
0.2
15
0.1
2014
0
Cash flows
INR thousand
crore,
2011–12
rupees
Jobs
Million
Revenue
Opex
Capex
Net
cash flow
Construction
Indirect
Direct
Creating a large number of industrial townships will require significant investment
in infrastructure. A single greenfield industrial township of 55 square kilometers
might require Rs. 14,000 crore (2011–12 rupees) of capital expenditure over
18 years, with approximately half in the first five years of development. This would
go into building hard assets such as power, sewage, water, and roads as well
as social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals. Despite this large capital
outlay (plus rising operating costs as the city grows), the township can achieve
returns of about 25 percent to the government, largely from tax revenue. Cash
flow becomes positive in the sixth year of the project, and nominal payback to the
government happens in the ninth year. These assumptions are similar in the case
of brownfield townships.
If these assumptions hold across 35 industrial townships launching between
now and 2022, capital expenditure for infrastructure would average about
Rs. 30,000 crore annually for the first eight years, and the internal rate of return of
the portfolio of industrial townships would be about 25 percent. Aggregate cash
flow would turn positive in 2023, and nominal payback would occur in 2026.
Building 35 industrial townships by 2022 is an ambitious aspiration. Some of
these would likely fall under India’s new National Investment and Manufacturing
Zone (NIMZ) framework, which requires a minimum of 50 square kilometers
of contiguous land. By way of comparison, under the government’s Special
Economic Zone policy, multi-product zones were required to use at least 10
square kilometers of contiguous land, and only 15 such zones have been initiated

since the policy took effect in 2005, a rate of approximately two each year.73
Our
scenario, by contrast, calls for launching one industrial township in 2014, two
in 2015, and then ramping up to five per year by 2018 and every year thereafter
to 2022.
For the scheme to work, the right enablers must be in place. First and foremost,
the locations that are chosen must have inherent attractiveness to manufacturing
firms. Site selection should be driven by basic competitiveness and the likelihood
of achieving critical mass. Focusing on brownfield industrial clusters (that is,
strengthening infrastructure in existing clusters of industrial activity) is a good
strategy to capitalise on current hubs of skills and entrepreneurship. The
Foundation for MSME Clusters has already identified more than 1,000 such
clusters in India, some of which are located in states with large non-farm job
creation needs (Exhibit 60). Targeted government investment in high-quality
transportation and power infrastructure, as well as social infrastructure, could
accelerate their development.
Exhibit 60
More than 1,000 existing industrial clusters could be
ramped up with targeted government investment
Distribution of industrial clusters
Number
SOURCE: Foundation for MSME Clusters; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
21
21
22
24
27
27
27
28
33
36
37
39
39
47
48
54
76
88
91
Other 372
Utensils
Pharmaceuticals
Auto components
Furniture
Paper products
Leather
Jewellery
Mustard oil
Stone
Foundry
Bricks
Plastic products
Agricultural implements
Footwear
Garments
Engineering equipment
Food processing
Textiles
Rice mills
Non-farm job creation
requirement by 2022
>10 million
7–10 million
3–7 million
<3 million
Second, beyond infrastructure investment, a policy framework must be in place
to guarantee that the sectors in question become more competitive; it will need
to include more flexible administrative rules and the removal of product-market
distortions, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Without inherent competitiveness
in place, government investment in infrastructure alone will not yield a thriving
manufacturing sector.
Third, these government investments should be executed through formally
constituted, highly empowered and accountable special purpose vehicles
73 The new manufacturing policy in 2011 established a framework for National Investment and
Manufacturing Zones. These are state government-led initiatives in which the government is
responsible for land acquisition. They do not offer the financial incentives of earlier Special
Economic Zones, but they do have the scope to streamline such tasks as environmental
clearances and master planning.

146
(SPVs), with adequate funding, headed by extremely competent private- or
public-sector leaders, and backed by the chief minister (or in the case of multi-
state programmes, the prime minister). As in the NIMZ framework, the state
government should take the lead in identifying and acquiring land and constituting
an SPV to spearhead the zone. The SPV would be responsible for developing
a master plan for the zone, engaging a developer, obtaining environmental
clearances, promoting investment, and acting as the agent of the central
government in monitoring and enforcing national labour laws within the zone. The
central government’s key responsibilities would include providing clearances,
ensuring major connecting infrastructure to the zone, offering financial support
to private-sector developers of internal infrastructure, and auditing the SPV’s
regulatory oversight mechanisms from time to time.
Because SPVs for industrial townships would be proposed and driven by state
governments, it will be important to share best practices across states and
zones. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion currently has a “mentor
group” of government and manufacturing industry representatives to monitor
and support individual NIMZs. This concept could be expanded to entail a best-
practices council across all industrial township SPVs. The Delhi-Mumbai Industrial
Corridor Development Corporation is expected to play a similar role for the NIMZs
within its purview.
In addition, the SPVs in control of these projects will have a significant
concentration of power—and that underscores the importance of building in
transparency and accountability. State governments can apply the “tight-loose”
principle to monitoring the SPV (that is, setting “tight” performance targets
for key metrics, along with consequences for missing them, while giving only
“loose” operational guidance that allows the SPV considerable operational
autonomy). This would allow SPVs to experiment with the best approaches to
delivering a world-class industrial township while still being held accountable for
overall delivery.
TOURISM CIRCUITS
Tourism can play a significant role in “pro-poor” economic development in that
it employs a large number of people and requires skills that are relatively easily
acquired. To date, however, India has been unable to harness the job creation
potential of tourism. China, for instance, has nearly 40 percent more tourism
jobs per capita than India, while Thailand has nearly 110 percent more. We
estimate that creating five well-defined tourism circuits in India would require a
government outlay of about Rs. 2,000 crore (2011–12 rupees) over five years,
which would yield returns of some 28 percent to the government and generate
some 7.7 million jobs by 2022. This investment would focus on developing tourist
attractions such as museums, convention centres, theme parks, and beach
facilities, as well as hard infrastructure such as parking and roads. While tourism
can generate a considerable number of jobs, they tend to be relatively low
paying, with an average salary of about Rs. 80,000 per annum (2011–12 rupees).
This is significantly lower than in manufacturing, but still more remunerative
than farmwork.
The key to unlocking this job and value creation is ensuring that government
investment attracts a significant number of additional tourists, entices them to
stay longer and spend more money, and strengthens the links between tourism
and other sectors. To accomplish this, the investment must be focused on areas

with unique natural and cultural endowments. Take Odisha as an example:
despite unique offerings such as the Konark Sun Temple (a UNESCO World
Heritage site) and Bhitarkanika National Park, the state still has plenty of scope
to expand its tourism sector, as it currently draws less than 1 percent of foreign
visitors to India (vs. 25 percent who visit Maharashtra and 17 percent who visit
Tamil Nadu). We estimate that the number of tourism jobs in the region could
grow from 0.4 million in 2012 to 1.9 million to 2.4 million by 2022, representing
a 400 to 550 percent increase (Exhibit 61). Approximately half of the job growth
comes from increasing the number of visitors by 12 percent annually, in line with
the targets set in the 12th Five Year Plan. The other half comes from increasing
total spending per tourist (by increasing both the length of stay and average
spending per day) and creating indirect jobs.
Odisha can increase its number of tourism jobs
by 400 to 550 percent
Exhibit 61
Total tourism-related jobs in Odisha, 2012–22E
Thousand
SOURCE: Statistics of Government of India; Odisha Department of Tourism; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
373
2,415
510
1,905
478
1,054
Accommodation
Food and beverage services
Transport
Shopping
Indirect jobs
+550%Total jobs 2012
Increase number of domestic and
foreign tourists by 12% per year
from 2012 to 2022
Increase total spend per tourist
by increasing length of stay by
30% for domestic visitors and
average daily spend by 10–30%
Subtotal jobs 2022E
Increase strength of backward
integration such that ratio of
direct to total employment
increases from 0.58 to 1.0
Total jobs 2022E
Creating a tourism circuit would entail increasing the intrinsic attractiveness for
tourists, ensuring readiness for tourist inflow, and developing a distinctive value
proposition. A priority circuit with a high density of historical, cultural, or natural
landmarks needs to be branded. Investment in infrastructure such as roads,
hotels, and other tourist facilities is needed, and social awareness campaigns,
especially for hygiene, sanitation, and public safety should also be undertaken.
The tourism sector will require liberalisation in procedures such as taxation
structure and visa application for tourists. Finally, following up on the initial
investment with a well-crafted international marketing plan will be critical.
India can also do more to ensure that tourism supports other sectors. According
to the World Travel and Tourism Council, India creates 0.58 indirect jobs per 1
direct tourism job. By comparison, Thailand creates 1.12 indirect jobs for each
tourism job; in China, that number is 1.80, and in Indonesia it is 2.04. Enhancing
the links between tourism and other sectors is an important priority for policy
makers. One approach to this is to promote local sourcing as an opportunity for
distinctiveness. The government of Jamaica, for example, organises meetings

148
of hoteliers (who mostly represent large international chains) and local business
people such as farmers and craftsmen to encourage procurement from domestic
suppliers. Strategies like local sourcing mandates could be considered but
may not be wholly effective; in the multi-brand retail sector, many international
retailers have avoided the Indian market because of a perception that meeting
the country’s local sourcing regulations may be challenging. Instead, the
government and businesses, through their corporate social responsibility efforts,
can collaborate to improve capabilities and competencies on the supply side, for
example, by training local producers and vendors to form more organised and
reliable supply chains.
FOOD-PROCESSING PARKS
If executed well, food-processing parks can have a sizeable impact on job
creation and agricultural productivity. We estimate that 30 food parks could create
one million jobs by 2022 at an average salary of some Rs. 300,000 per annum
(2011–12 rupees). Moreover, the annual incomes of 1.5 million farming households
would grow by 20 to 80 percent. The government’s investment requirement,
mainly in rural infrastructure such as roads that improve market access, would be
approximately Rs. 3,400 crore (2011–12 rupees) over five years, yielding a return
of more than 30 percent.
While the 12th Five Year Plan calls for the creation of 30 mega–food-processing
parks, only two are currently operating. Eleven others have been granted approval
and are in the process of acquiring land or being constructed.
A number of issues have hindered progress. First, since there is limited land
aggregation in India’s agricultural sector, food processors incur high transaction
costs in interacting with many small farmers. A lack of rural infrastructure makes
the “catchment area” of a food-processing park relatively small and limits the
availability of supply. In addition, because the legal system moves slowly, binding
contracts cannot be enforced, eroding trust between small-scale farmers and
industry, two groups that have often been at cross-purposes.
For government investment in food-processing parks to succeed, a number of
enablers will need to be in place, including the land market reforms discussed
earlier in this chapter. A major push to develop rural infrastructure, especially
roads, could help to expand the catchment areas, making project economics
more attractive.

* * *
Relations between industry and government have long had an adversarial edge
in India, with many business feeling stifled by regulation and red tape. But India’s
leadership can hit the reset button and redefine this relationship for a new era.
Rather than taking a prescriptive approach that tightly manages industry, policy
makers can adopt a new mindset—one focused on facilitating a competitive
market environment that allows businesses to thrive. By sweeping away arcane
regulation and antiquated procedures, India can build a more efficient engine of
job creation. Combining a bold reform agenda with forward-thinking investments
in job creation engines of the future could generate opportunities for millions of
Indians to obtain better jobs, attain a better livelihood, and reach the next rung on
the economic ladder.

151
Agriculture has a central role to play in poverty reduction. Despite a recent
wave of urban migration, some 68 percent of India’s population is still rural.
Even our inclusive reforms scenario, which includes faster non-farm job
creation, envisions that at least 37 percent of India’s entire workforce will still be
engaged in agriculture by 2022. Focusing on the productivity and performance
of the agricultural sector to lift the incomes of smallholder farmers, wage-
earning labourers, and small agro-based enterprises is the most direct route to
addressing rural poverty.
There is great scope for improvement, as agriculture has not kept pace with
recent growth in India’s broader economy. The sector made profound strides
starting immediately after independence and sustained a wave of momentum in
the wake of the Green Revolution. Since then, however, its productivity growth
has stagnated—and there is growing concern that current practices and policies
are depleting the soil and the water supply. Today the nation’s crop yields
remain well below potential due to a number of structural factors: low investment
in agricultural infrastructure, research, and extension services; an inefficient
land ownership model; and market distortions that discourage productivity-
enhancing investment.
Bringing India’s yields in line with those of other emerging Asian countries could
reduce the population below the Empowerment Line by 10 percentage points,
raising over 125 million above the line. In addition, the ripple effects of agricultural
growth are felt beyond the farm sector. As farmers obtain higher incomes, their
demand for consumer and durable goods increases, which bolsters India’s
expanding manufacturing and service sectors.
India has the capacity to achieve 5.5 percent annual yield growth over the next
ten years, but significant structural reforms are needed to realise this potential.
The keys will be focusing on inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, and water;
working with farmers to implement more efficient practices; expanding rural
access to credit; reforming land markets; and improving agricultural logistics
and infrastructure. Underpinning the entire process will be a unified method of
governing India’s agricultural bureaucracy and making it support farmers in a
more coordinated way.
Raising agricultural productivity is essential for
reducing rural poverty
Although agriculture accounts for a diminishing share of India’s GDP, it remains
the backbone of the rural economy, providing almost three-quarters of rural
employment and generating more than half of rural household income in 2004–05
(Exhibit 62). However, the sector’s productivity per worker is 60 percent lower
than that of construction and 75 percent lower than that of manufacturing. As a
7. Raising productivity on
India’s farms

152
result, the contribution of agriculture to rural net domestic product (NDP) was only
39 percent in 2005, despite the heavy concentration of labour and land in the
sector.74
Agriculture is a critical element of the rural economy
Exhibit 62
SOURCE: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey, 2004–05;
National Council of Applied Economic Research, 2004–05; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
6
42
52
Agriculture
Industry
Services
However, a large share of
household income in rural areas
is from agriculture
Source of household income
24
37 39
Agriculture’s contribution to
value added is much lower than
its employment share
Source of NDP1
14
14
73
Most of the rural workforce
is employed in agriculture
Employment share
Rural areas, 2004–05
%
1 Net domestic product = GDP – depreciation.
A large body of academic research has highlighted the vital role of agricultural
productivity in reducing poverty in developing countries. China’s experience, for
example, shows that a growth spurt in agriculture can drive a steep reduction
in poverty—and in China’s case, it also generated demand and capital to drive
a boom in town and village enterprises (see Box 14, “Reducing poverty through
agricultural reforms: The Chinese example”). The levers used by China at that
time are not entirely relevant to India today (for instance, India does not have
the collectivised and planned model of farming prevalent in China in the 1970s,
and it was the unshackling of this model that drove much of China’s agricultural
progress). However, with nearly 70 percent of active workers in the excluded and
impoverished segments and more than 60 percent in the vulnerable segment
engaged in farmwork, India needs its own set of reforms to improve farmers’
incomes and generate demand and employment in the rural non-farm economy.
Raising productivity benefits the entire rural ecosystem associated with
agriculture, including smallholders, wage-earning labourers, and related
businesses. In addition, the ripple effects of agricultural growth are felt beyond
the farm sector.75
For instance, as farmers obtain higher incomes, their demand
for all types of consumer goods (such as toiletries and packaged foods) and
durable goods increases—and growth can be swift because of low initial
penetration. Demand for farm inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides, and tractors
also stimulates the manufacturing sector; revenue for agricultural equipment grew
by 16 percent annually between 2008 and 2012.
74 Similar estimates of NDP or GDP breakdown in rural India are not available for later years.
75 Kate Schneider and Mary Kay Gugerty, “Agricultural productivity and poverty reduction:
Linkages and pathways”, The Evans School Review, volume 1, number 1, Spring 2011.

Box 14. Reducing poverty through agricultural reforms:
The Chinese example
China and India were at a similar stage of development
in 1977, with per capita incomes around $190 per year.
Agriculture dominated both economies. But their paths
diverged in 1978, as China began to implement a series
of economic reforms that unleashed high growth and
rapid poverty reduction. Given the large size of the
agricultural labour force, this sector was a central focus.
China discarded collective ownership and management
of farms in favour of the household responsibility
system to improve incentives for individual households
to boost yields. Centrally mandated targets for yield,
output, and sown area that existed prior to the reforms
were eliminated. Procurement prices were enhanced
through an 18 to 22 percent increase in quota prices,
though the government also scaled back its role in
procurement and promoted free trade in agricultural
markets. These reforms were further strengthened
after 1984, when the fertiliser market was liberalised,
a direct income transfer to farmers was started, and
a new agricultural lease law provided greater tenancy
security.1
1 Ashok Gulati and Shenggen Fan, eds., The dragon and the
elephant: Learning from agricultural and rural reforms in China
and India, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.
As a result of these reforms, annual agricultural growth
between 1978 and 1984 was 7.1 percent, compared
with an average of 2.5 percent during the previous
decade. Despite a mild deceleration in industrial growth
from 10.3 percent to 8.2 percent in this period, China’s
official poverty rate declined sharply, from 33 percent in
1978 to 15 percent in 1984.
Agricultural growth had ripple effects in other parts of
the economy. Increased agricultural incomes boosted
consumption demand (which grew 2 to 3 percent more
than investment demand in this period). The household
savings rate also increased, from 2.5 percent to
14.3 percent, thus creating a pool of productive capital
that could be used to fund new businesses. Together,
this enabled the proliferation of town and village
enterprises, which created 67 million non-farm jobs in
this period. In 2009, of 99 million people employed in
the manufacturing sector, 65 million were employed in
rural town and village enterprises.
India’s crop yields are well below Asian averages
India is an agricultural powerhouse, producing more than 405 million tonnes of
land-based produce every year—up sharply from 1980, when production stood at
192 million tonnes. The total land under cultivation has not increased significantly
over that period, so the increase is driven almost exclusively by a 2.1 percent
compound annual growth in yield. This phenomenon occurred across crop
categories, including coarse cereals and rice (for which the area under cultivation
actually declined between 1998 and 2009). But land is growing increasingly
scarce as industry, infrastructure, and urban areas expand, and without the ability
to increase the area under cultivation, India will have to focus on productivity to
ensure food security and increase farming incomes.
Despite the substantial improvements achieved in recent decades, Indian yields
(with the exception of wheat) are 10 to 50 percent lower than Asian averages.
The difference between peer country yields and the Indian yield across all crops
has widened over the past three decades (1980–2011). This “yield gap” has
grown from 1.5 to 5.1 tonnes per hectare (t/ha) with China, from 1 to 3.2 t/ha with
Vietnam, and from 1.6 to 2.8 t/ha with Malaysia.

154
After registering robust growth from the 1950s to the 1980s, yield improvements
began to stagnate in the 1990s. Yields actually fell for some product categories,
such as pulses and cotton during the Ninth Five Year Plan (1998–2002) and
wheat during the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002–07). Growth in agricultural yields
revived during the 11th Five Year Plan (2007–12) due to an uptick in private-sector
investment (which rose from 11 percent of agricultural GDP in 2007 to 17 percent
in 2011). These results are also due to an increase in public investment that began
in 2003, with higher expenditure on research and extension (educating farmers
on best practices). India does have some positive current momentum, but a more
concerted push will be required to sharply accelerate growth in yields.
Beneath the national trends lie significant interstate differences. Punjab and
Haryana, the proverbial wheat bowls of India, have food grain yields of 4.3 t/
ha and 3.9 t/ha, respectively—but the third-ranked state, Tamil Nadu, comes
in 44 percent lower. These differences can be explained to a large extent by
the intensity of inputs such as irrigation, tractors, and fertilisers as well as
the availability of credit, all of which are much higher in Punjab and Haryana
(Exhibit 63). Yields have stagnated in these two agricultural powerhouses,
however, and new areas of growth are emerging. In the last decade (2000–
10), annual yield growth was highest in Chhattisgarh (9.0 percent), Odisha
(6.8 percent), Gujarat (6.5 percent), Karnataka (6.2 percent), and Tamil Nadu
(5.8 percent).
Exhibit 63
Interstate variations in yield point to the intensity of inputs as a key factor
SOURCE: Department of Agriculture and Cooperation; IndiaStat,com; Sharma, India’s agricultural development under the
new economic regime, 2011; Golait, Current issues in agriculture credit in India, 2007; Singh, “Estimation of a
mechanisation index”, 2005; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Haryana
2,495
3,878
Punjab 4,339
Uttar
Pradesh
2,102Bihar
Rajasthan 1,316
1,297Odisha 5
15
54
30
7
11
73
49
31
84
33
84 244
184
225
170
62
57
Food grain yield,
2011–12
Kilograms per
hectare
Fertiliser use,
2011–12
Kilograms per
hectare
Farm credit,
2000–01
Hundred INR per
hectare GCA2
Irrigated land,
2011–12
% of NSA1
State
4
13
16
31
61
71
Tractor intensity,
2003–04
Tractors per
thousand hectares
1 Net Sown Area.
2 Gross Cropped Area.
India has the potential to increase yields by about
70 percent over the next ten years by focusing on
technical levers
India’s current average crop yield of 2.3 t/ha will have to rise to 4 t/ha to match
the yields achieved elsewhere in Asia. This represents a sharp increase of
72 percent, but it appears to be a reasonable target, as it involves raising lower-
performing states to the yield levels already achieved in the best-performing

Indian states today. Bridging this gap will require interventions at each stage
of the agriculture value chain (Exhibit 64). Input intensity will have to rise, while
sowing and harvesting need to be better timed and more efficient. Finally, markets
need to be made more competitive, and farmers need to be equipped to respond
to market signals. This transformation will have to be backed by an expansion
of credit, stepped-up research and extension services, land tenure reforms, and
price support.
Exhibit 64
Boosting growth in rural areas requires a focus on all aspects of the
agriculture value chain
Technical levers Enablers
Soil fertility
Irrigation and
water
management
Seed quality
Precision
farming
Post-harvest
management
Credit
Research and
extension
Land tenure
and
governance
Market access
Price support
Input
Farm
Market
+72%
4.00.3
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.5
2.3
Yield target,
2022E
Market
access1
Precision
farming
2012
India yield
Tonnes per
hectare
Some 60 percent (or 1 tonne per hectare) of the improvement can be driven by
input-related factors: fertiliser and manure use to improve the quality of the soil;
better water management through decentralised water harvesting and efficient
use of existing irrigation channels; and research-driven improvements in seed
quality. So-called precision farming, which involves tailoring the use of seeds,
fertiliser, equipment, and practices based on highly site-specific conditions and
applying inputs to the soil at the correct time, can be expanded through improved
extension services, resulting in 22 percent of the yield improvement. Finally, post-
harvest logistics and better market access can be improved by expanding cold
storage capacity and building a more extensive network of rural roads. This could
reduce crop waste by 50 percent, improving yields by about 18 percent. Three of

156
these factors—soil fertility, water management, and post-harvest management—
are discussed in greater detail below.
Some Indian states are already moving ahead with interventions in multiple areas.
Gujarat, for example, clocked 8.2 percent annual growth in agricultural GDP
over the last decade, largely driven by investment and reforms along with better
governance of public functions in the agricultural sector (see Box 15, “Gujarat’s
agricultural turnaround”).
SOIL FERTILITY: PROMOTE INCREASED USE OF THE
RIGHT FERTILISERS
Soil is the very basis of farming, delivering both nutrients and water to crops.
India’s soil, however, has low levels of nitrogen and phosphorus, two important
macronutrients, as well as rapidly declining levels of potassium. Increased use of
fertiliser—and use of the right fertilisers—is vital to prevent further soil degradation
and ensure that crops can thrive.
Despite 4.2 percent compound annual growth in fertiliser use per hectare of
cultivated land, Indian farmers use only about one-third the amount of fertiliser
per hectare as Chinese farmers. Each year’s crop cycle further depletes the
soil, drawing out more nutrients that need to be restored through the use of
fertiliser and manure. In 2008–09, for example, 8.0 million tonnes of nitrogen,
Box 15. Gujarat’s agricultural turnaround
Semi-arid lands kissing the Thar Desert do not have the
look of an agricultural powerhouse. But this is precisely
what Gujarat has become since the early 2000s. The
drought of 1999–2000 was felt severely in the state.
However, the recovery from that setback has been
striking, as agriculture and allied sectors have grown by
an unprecedented 8.2 percent annually.
The hallmark of the Gujarat agriculture miracle has been
prioritisation at the top echelons of the government
and a high degree of coordination of government
interventions at the state and grassroots levels. Since
2005, the state government has brought together
farmers, scientists, officials, and ministers at the
annual krishi mahotsav (agricultural conclave). This is
followed by a month-long mass contact programme,
in which krishi raths (agricultural department vehicles
touring the state) visit every village to share knowledge
and distribute kits to select farmers to promote new
technology adoption through demonstration. Since
functionaries from different departments visit the
village at the same time, farmers receive holistic
extension services.
Water management is at the centre of agricultural policy
in Gujarat, including creation of canal irrigation potential
through the Sardar Sarovar Project as well as a focus
on community-based decentralised sources. Micro-
irrigation has been promoted through subsidies, and as
a result, the area under micro-irrigation increased from
nearly 20,000 hectares in 2003–04 to 140,000 hectares
in 2009–10. The government also ensured availability
of improved cottonseeds to farmers by imposing a
price ceiling and created incentives for the use of
phosphorus- and potassium-based fertilisers.
Gujarat has also made a strong push to create the
necessary agricultural infrastructure, including feeder
lines to deliver electricity to farms and roads to connect
almost all villages. The research and extension network
was overhauled by splitting the monolithic Gujarat
Agricultural University into four smaller institutions,
with a renewed focus on sharing knowledge with
farmers. Gujarat was also one of the first states to
enact agricultural produce market committee reforms
that promote freer trade. By leveraging the strengths of
privatisation while providing adequate financial support
to farmers, Gujarat has been able to script a major
turnaround in its agricultural sector.

phosphorous, and potassium were added to India’s soil—but 17.7 million tonnes
were removed (Exhibit 65).
Fertiliser use in India is below recommended levels and
below that of other Asian countries
Exhibit 65
SOURCE: State of Indian agriculture 2012–13, Ministry of Agriculture; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, FAOSTAT; World Bank; Fertiliser Association of India; Prasad, “Fertilisers and manures”, 2012;
Fertiliser use, 2011
Kilograms per hectare
162
179182
311
548
ThailandIndiaIndonesiaVietnamChinaMalaysia
1,097
1.0
1.5
5.5
7.0
3.0
7.7
Potassium
(K)
Phosphorus
(P)
Nitrogen
(N)
Removal
Addition
-29%
-50%
-86%
Addition and removal of
nitrogen, phosphorus, and
potassium fertilisers, 2008–09
Million tonnes
Along with increasing overall use of fertilisers, there is a need to rebalance the mix
of fertilisers applied to Indian soils. Due to extensive government price controls
in favour of urea/nitrogen-based fertilisers, Indian farmers used less phosphorus
and potassium fertilisers in 2011–12 than the levels recommended to achieve the
correct proportions.
Over-reliance on chemical fertilisers alone has proved to be both insufficient and
unsustainable, so fertilisers should be supplemented with organic manure to
preserve micronutrient balance in the soil. India has an annual unused manure
potential of 9.1 million tonnes, drawn primarily from crop residue, animal dung,
and rural compost.76
Putting this material to use can significantly address
the nutrient imbalance in Indian soils while also contributing to the long-term
sustainability of agriculture.
WATER MANAGEMENT: INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS
OF EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE AND IMPROVE
RAINFALL MANAGEMENT
Water is the lifeblood of agriculture—so it is no surprise that the immediate
focus of policy makers after independence was to create access to irrigation for
Indian farmers. (The Bhakra Dam was described as the “new temple of resurgent
India” by Jawaharlal Nehru.) Coverage of irrigation networks has increased from
20 million hectares (M Ha) in 1950 to 63 M Ha in 2010—but according to the
Planning Commission, India has nearly exhausted its long-term canal irrigation
potential of some 70 M Ha. Today the focus of water management policy has to
76 State of Indian agriculture 2012–13, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, 2013.

158
shift to increasing the effectiveness of existing canals and creating decentralised
rain-based irrigation channels.
The current efficiency of surface water irrigation in India is estimated at only 35
to 40 percent.77
These systems can be more fully maximised by involving farmers
to a greater degree in the operation and management of irrigation services to
ensure better timing and higher effectiveness. Studies have noted that farmers
who own or manage irrigation services engage in more multi-cropping, sow more
high-yield variety seeds, use more fertiliser per hectare, and ultimately produce
higher output per hectare.78
Also, micro-irrigation methods such as drip irrigation
and sprinkler irrigation have resulted in much higher water-use efficiencies of 70
to 80 percent.
Even if India can realise its full canal irrigation potential, approximately half of
its farmland will be dependent on rainfall. Rainfed areas were identified as a
focus area in the 12th Five Year Plan (2012–17). They are the prime growing
areas for coarse cereals, pulses, cotton, and oilseeds, among other crops. In
several of these regions, rainfall is sufficient for supplemental irrigation, but it is
concentrated in a few months of monsoon downpours. Installing simple rainwater
harvesting infrastructure (in the form of check dams and dug-out pits) in 28 M Ha
of high-rainfall areas can improve yields by 125 percent to 2.7 t/ha, almost
matching the irrigated land yield of 3.1 t/ha (Exhibit 66).
Exhibit 66
Rainfall management can be used to provide
supplemental irrigation to crops in rainfed areas
3.1
2.7
1.2
Current
irrigated
yield
PotentialExisting
SOURCE: Sharma et al., ”Converting rain into grain: Realising the potential of rainfed agriculture in India,” 2010; Planning
Commission 12th Five Year Plan Working Group on Rainfed Agriculture; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Potential yield improvements
Tonnes per hectare
Key assumptions
▪ 28 million out of 79 million
hectares (35%) rainfed area
identified as high potential
▪ 25% of surplus rainfall can be
captured by building rainfed
irrigation infrastructure (e.g.,
dug-out ponds, check dams)
Net sown
area
45%
5%
50%
Canal
irrigated
63
Canal
irrigation
possible
8
Canal
irrigation
not
possible
71
Million hectares
High
potential
for rainfed
irrigation
28
Other
rainfed
areas
51
+125%
2010
Rainfed today
77 A. Narayanamoorthy, The potential for drip and sprinkler irrigation in India, International Water
Management Institute, 2006.
78 M. Dutta and M. Bezbaruah, “Institutional factors behind effectiveness of Irrigation: A study in
the Brahmaputra Valley in Eastern India”, presented at International Association of Agricultural
Economists annual meeting in Queensland, Australia, August 12–18, 2006.

POST-HARVEST MANAGEMENT: IMPROVE STORAGE AND
BUILD ACCESS TO MARKETS
A large part of India’s farm output is perishable, and as fruits and vegetables
assume a greater role in the crop mix, this share will only increase. Today, India
produces more than 350 million tonnes of perishables every year, including
fruit, vegetables, milk, and meat. Yet 10 to 20 percent of the nation’s agricultural
output goes to waste every year because of insufficient storage capacity
and difficult access to markets. India’s cold chain storage infrastructure lags
behind world standards: its cold storage capacity is only 0.09 cubic metres per
person, compared with 0.30 in Brazil and 0.27 in Japan (Exhibit 67). There is a
pressing need to expand this capacity by adding facilities such as refrigerated
warehouses.79
India’s cold storage infrastructure is inadequate
SOURCE: India as an agriculture and high value food powerhouse: A new vision for 2030, McKinsey & Company and
Confederation of Indian Industry, April 2013
Exhibit 67
Production
Million metric tonnes, 2011–12 Wastage
Million tonnes
6
128
232
MeatMilkFruits
and
vegetables
Wastage (by weight) is as high
as 10 percent for all fruits and
vegetables combined
India’s cold chain infrastructure
capacity lags behind world
standards
Refrigerated warehouse capacity
per capita
Cubic metres
% of
commodity
wasted
United
States
0.09
Germany
0.30
India
0.26
Brazil
0.27Japan
0.35
1
6
1
5
Tomatoes
Potatoes
Oranges
Bananas
10
10
20
17
India produces over
350 million tonnes of
perishables every year
Rural roads have a strong effect on agricultural output and incomes, as they
determine farmers’ ease of access to markets. They streamline the time required
to deliver produce and perishables, and they increase the ability of rural farmers
to travel to towns where customers and suppliers are located, credit is available,
and pricing and market information can be obtained. The government’s Pradhan
Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana initiative aims to eventually provide all-weather roads
that connect all rural villages with more than 500 residents. But to bring all states
up to the road density of the five most agriculturally productive states, India would
have to construct 50 percent more rural roads than the initiative’s targets.
79 See India as an agriculture and high value food powerhouse: A new vision for 2030,
McKinsey & Company and Confederation of Indian Industry, April 2013.

160
The technical levers will need to be supported by nine
“enabler” ideas to achieve agriculture’s full potential
Especially in the past 20 years, government support to Indian agriculture has
emphasised input and output price support rather than investment in scientific
research and extension services that can put the latest knowledge and
techniques into the hands of farmers. In 2010–11, central and state governments
spent Rs. 86,000 crore ($18 billion) on input subsidies (primarily fertiliser and
irrigation), but only Rs. 34,000 crore on building agricultural infrastructure such as
storage, expanded irrigation systems, research and extension. There is no trend
towards rebalancing this divergence, with input subsidies consistently growing
2 to 3 percent faster than productive investment in the last decade (Exhibit 68).
While price supports are important bulwark against hunger and poverty, there
is also a pressing need to build the long-term capacity and productivity of
India’s farmers.
13
Government support to agriculture has emphasised input subsidies over
investment in productive assets
Exhibit 68
SOURCE: Planning Commission, 2012; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Does not include electricity subsidy accruing to agriculture and subsidy to indigenous urea production.
2 A part of the food subsidy is actually a consumer subsidy rather than a producer subsidy, but a breakdown is unavailable.
Public expenditure on subsidies and investments in agriculture
INR thousand crore
0
30,000
60,000
90,000
120,000
Output support
(food subsidy2)
Input subsidy1
 Fertiliser
 Irrigation
Gross capital formation
 Research and
extension
 Post-harvest
infrastructure
 Irrigation
infrastructure
2010–112008–092006–072004–052002–03
21
17
Compound
annual
growth rate
%
Apart from rebalancing government expenditures on agriculture, the sector
needs structural and administrative changes to create an environment of real
competition and enable farmers to operate effectively within a new framework.
The nine-point agenda below can help to set these changes in motion.
1. ENABLE PRIVATE TRADE BY REFORMING APMC ACTS
One of the biggest constraints to a flourishing agricultural market in India is the
distortionary role played by the government, and the most visible symptoms of
the problem are the agricultural produce market committees (APMC), markets
set up by state governments in which traders are licensed to buy farm produce
from farmers. The APMC system, which was established to protect farmers from
the market power of local landlords and merchants, has itself become a market
distortion. The role of middlemen is strengthened by APMC acts that place severe

restrictions on private trade, while providing middlemen with significant political
clout to engage in collusive behaviour and thwart modern capital from entering
agricultural marketing (see Box 16, “APMC and the government’s changing role in
agricultural markets”).80
Margins have been increasing for middlemen, which squeezes both farmers and
retailers—in fact, one report found that farmers receive 15 to 40 percent higher
prices when middlemen are not present.81
Despite a substantial increase in the
government’s minimum support prices, the prices actually received by farmers
have not kept pace, especially in Bihar, West Bengal, and other states where the
central government does not directly procure much of the food grain it needs for
the public distribution system and to maintain buffer stocks.
APMC reform could introduce a greater degree of competition and enable farmers
to obtain sufficient value for their produce. While the Model APMC Act issued by
the central government in 2003 addresses these concerns by enabling private
trade, fostering quality control, and enhancing transparency, much of the actual
implementation of agricultural policy falls to the states—and their embrace of
reform has been slow and incomplete, leading to wide regulatory disparities.
Haryana, for example, has implemented only provisions pertaining to contract
farming, while Andhra Pradesh has set the licensing fee for private players so high
that it discourages small farmers and traders. Some states, such as West Bengal,
have made no move towards APMC reforms, while others such as Bihar have no
APMC Act at all. But it is clear that better-performing states such as Punjab also
have more efficient APMC markets.
80 Ramesh Chand, “Development policies and agricultural markets”, Economic and Political
Weekly, volume 47, number 52, December 2012.
81 Final report of committee of state ministers in charge of agriculture marketing to promote
reforms, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, January 2013.
Box 16. APMC and the government’s changing role in agricultural markets
To protect farmers from powerful moneylenders
and traders, various state governments introduced
agricultural produce market committee (APMC) acts
that created a government-supported network of
mandis (markets) where prices would be determined
through auctions. Traders in these mandis needed a
government licence to operate and generated revenue
through commissions paid by farmers and retailers. All
sales and purchase could occur only at these mandis.
However, the APMC system has become a breeding
ground for abuse. The market power exerted by the
middlemen or arhatiyas often results in collusive and
exploitative behaviour. Auctions are frequently not held,
and the tax on transactions that is supposed to be
used for developing the mandi infrastructure is diverted
elsewhere. The limited supply of licences opens up
scope for corrupt practices in obtaining them. Hence,
the system promotes rent-seeking behaviour that leads
to farmer exploitation.1
This led to calls for reevaluation of the government’s
role in the agricultural market, culminating in the Model
APMC Act in 2003. It has several provisions to increase
private trade, but the government will still have a large
role to play in facilitating this, as shown in state-level
innovations. In Punjab’s Apni Mandis, for instance,
farmers sell directly to buyers or consumers, with the
APMC of the area providing all necessary facilities
including space, water, shade, counters, and balances.
In Karnataka’s Raitha Santhe, farmers sell directly to
consumers under the management of gram panchayats
or local authorities.
1 Ramesh Chand, “Development policies and agricultural
markets”, Economic and Political Weekly, volume 47, number
52, December 2012.

162
To expedite state-level reforms, farmers will need greater accountability from
state governments. Information transparency can help: conducting computerised
recording of prices and quantities of APMC auctions can add the kind of
transparency that reduces corruption. Similarly, farmer producer organisations
can be strengthened by annual krishi mahotsav gatherings. Greater direct
interaction among farmers, traders, corporations, bureaucrats, and the agriculture
minister can strengthen democratic accountability and give farmers a greater
voice in pushing for APMC and other reforms in their respective states. In
addition, private players can enable better price discovery through an expansion
of modern retail.
2. LEVERAGE TECHNOLOGY TO ENSURE BETTER
PRICE DISCOVERY
When a farmer brings his produce to the APMC market, he is often forced to
sell it at whatever price is offered; taking the produce back to his village is too
expensive. In addition, farmers are often simply unaware of the price at which
their produce is sold to consumers, which increases their willingness to accept
low offers by middlemen and traders. Better price information thus benefits
farmers in two ways: it increases their bargaining power with the trader, and it
allows the farmer to sell his product in the most lucrative market if multiple options
are available in the vicinity.
Technology can bridge this information asymmetry in a cost-effective manner.
Almost 70 percent of Indian villages are connected with mobile phone service,
which enables real-time price discovery. Fee-based price dissemination services,
such as Africa’s Esoko (see Box 17, “Technology for price dissemination”), give
farmers new bargaining power that can substantially improve their incomes.
These services are becoming available in India but have achieved only limited
scale to date due to lack of awareness among farmers. Pricing information could
be an important component in the government’s extension services and form the
cornerstone of farmer-industry interactions.
Box 17. Technology for price dissemination
Esoko is a fee-based data dissemination service
operating in more than 16 African countries. Farmers
enrolled with Esoko receive automatic and personalised
price alerts, buy and sell offers, and bulk SMS. To
enable farmers to use new technology, they are trained
on how to interpret the alerts and operate a mobile
messaging platform. Armed with more information,
farmers demand, and receive, higher prices. More
than 60 percent of farmers using Esoko leverage this
information to negotiate prices, and they typically
command prices that are 7 to 11 percent higher than
those paid to farmers who do not use Esoko.1
Farmers
1 Market information systems for rural farmers: Evaluation
of Esoko MIS—Year 1 Results, New York University Abu
Dhabi Center for Technology and Economic Development,
March 2013.
can also decide to sell their produce in a market that
offers a higher price.
Similar technology-based services have been launched
elsewhere. Drumnet in Kenya has established rural
information kiosks to provide free information to local
farmers about prices of commodities. In India, IFFCO
Kisan Sanchar Ltd. provides information on market
prices via voice messages in local languages. The
private sector is also entering this area in a significant
way. ITC Limited runs a network of e-Choupal computer
stations in rural areas of India; trained farmers run these
Internet-enabled kiosks where other farmers can obtain
price information, get tips on farming practices, and
place orders for agricultural inputs.

3. REBALANCE PRICE SUPPORTS TO REMOVE
MARKET DISTORTIONS
To protect farmers from fluctuations in the prices of agricultural produce, the
government provides a minimum support price (MSP) for a wide range of grains
and other cash crops. However, the existing system distorts the market in two
ways. First, it does not cover all types of crops, notably fruits and vegetables.
Second, the ratio of price support to the actual cost of production differs by crop
type (it is as high as 140 percent for wheat and as low as 70 percent for certain
types of pulses; Exhibit 69). This deters farmers from diversifying to higher-value
crops such as fruits and vegetables, which are six times more productive per
hectare than cereals or pulses, leaving an overwhelming focus on rice and wheat.
As a result, pulses saw a price increase of 16–18 percent per annum between
2005 and 2012, compared with a 9–10 percent increase in the prices of non-PDS
wheat and rice (based on NSSO consumption surveys).
Rationalising MSPs, especially in food grains, would remove these distorting
effects. But price support today is often a political decision; MSPs have even
become campaign issues. India can move to a more objective system, governed
by strong accountability, by creating an independent regulator or agency to set
appropriate support levels within a fixed fiscal framework. This agency would also
have an explicit mandate to ensure an optimal balance between different types of
agricultural output based on consumer preferences and costs of production.
Minimum support prices need to be rebalanced between
crop categories
Exhibit 69
SOURCE: Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices; Ministry of Agriculture; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1 Includes explicit costs (e.g., labour, seeds, irrigation, fertilisers, manure), imputed rent, imputed wages, and opportunity
cost of labour; all cost of production is for Andhra Pradesh, except wheat (which is for Haryana).
Cost of production1 of select food grains, 2010–11
INR thousand per quintal
104 69 73 109 141
Wheat
0.8
1.1
Paddy
0.91.0
Urad
4.0
2.9
Tur (Arhar)
4.4
3.0
Moong
3.0
3.2
Minimum support
prices (MSP)
Cost of production
Ratio of MSP
to cost of
production
%
Crops covered under MSP
▪ Bajra
▪ Barley
▪ Copra
▪ Cotton
▪ Gram
▪ Groundnut
▪ Jowar
▪ Jute
▪ Maize
▪ Masur
▪ Moong
▪ Mustard
▪ Niger seed
▪ Paddy
▪ Ragi
▪ Safflower
▪ Sesamum
▪ Soybean
▪ Sugarcane
▪ Sunflower
▪ Tur (Arhar)
▪ Urad
▪ Wheat
4. REFORM THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAMME
Farmers face several types of risks, such as drought and pests, that can easily
sap their incomes and force them into poverty. To provide safeguards against
these risks, the government has instituted crop insurance programmes—but
only 17 percent of farmers participate (and most of that participation involves
compulsory insurance). The existing National Agriculture Insurance Scheme,
the government’s flagship crop insurance programme, suffers from issues

164
such as delayed payments and a mismatch of premiums and risk levels across
geographies. Additionally, it has crowded private insurers out of the market.
It is worth considering a hybrid model such as the one that prevails in France.
There, private-sector companies offer crop insurance with government-subsidised
premiums. Because the private companies receive the full amount, they compete
for customers and usher in market forces and better administration. In this model,
public insurance can continue but public providers would be forced to respond
to the new and more competitive environment. That could lead to improvements
such as greater introduction of technology, a new methodology for “threshold
yield” calculation, and packaging various types of crop insurance.
5. PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
It often takes new technology to promote efficient use of scarce resources such
as water, but the high initial cost prevents adoption by small and marginal farmers
unless the government provides economic incentives. Under the National Mission
on Micro Irrigation, for example, the central government funds 40 percent of
the cost of a micro-irrigation system, while the state government contributes
10 percent.
But more can be done in this regard, especially by state governments, to
encourage farmers to adopt the latest innovations. Some states—notably Gujarat
and Andhra Pradesh—have set up special purpose vehicles to promote micro-
irrigation by setting and directing the flow of subsidies. This could be replicated
by other states, even in areas beyond irrigation such as sowing, harvesting, and
fertiliser application. New technology adoption should be on the agenda for every
state’s department of agriculture, with committees of officials and experts set up
to identify high-potential ideas and set economic incentives accordingly.
6. OVERHAUL THE PUBLIC RESEARCH AND EXTENSION
NETWORK AND ENHANCE PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTICIPATION
India’s spending on agricultural research was equivalent to 0.4 percent of
agricultural GDP in 2009, coming in below the levels in Brazil (1.8 percent) and
sub-Saharan Africa (0.6 percent). This translates into relatively little knowledge
being created for a country of India’s size—and in addition, the repository of
existing knowledge is not being effectively disseminated to farmers (Exhibit 70).
The public extension network, due to its large size, is considered less efficient
than the private extension network. The Department of Agriculture has 751
extension workers per million farmers, fewer than the 926 available from private
farmer associations and the 1,078 employed by producer cooperatives.
Among the steps that could achieve greater effectiveness are improving
coordination among individual research institutions, increasing the engagement
of farmers in extension services, and enhancing private-sector participation. A
holistic, unified approach to extension has been extremely successful in Gujarat,
where krishi raths (vehicles touring the state) visit village after village to share
information on agricultural best practices and provide a host of other services.
Fee-based private extension services (such as those offered by Mahindra
Subhlabh Services Ltd.) are an effective alternative to public extension for
medium-sized and large farms with capability to pay. However, public extension
will need to play an important role for poor farmers and those in remote
geographies. The government has historically used television and radio (such
as the Krishi Darshan TV show) to get information to farmers, but the focus now

needs to shift to mobile innovations. Weather forecasts, new seed information,
and tips on improved farming practices can be disseminated to farmers
through phones.
Public investment in agricultural research and extension is both inadequate
and ineffective
SOURCE: India as an agriculture and high value food powerhouse, McKinsey & Company and Confederation of Indian
Industry, 2013; Francisco and Bordey, Productivity growth in Philippine agriculture, 2000; Fact sheet on
extension services, Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services, 2012; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Exhibit 70
Public spending on agricultural research
% of agricultural GDP, 2009
Extension manpower adequacy
Extension workers per million farmers
1.8
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.5
1.1
Pakistan
Nepal
India
China
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Latin America
Brazil
926
19
16
751
Philippines
3,571
China and
Vietnam
2,463
Producer
cooperatives
1,078
Farmer
associations
Krishi Vigyan
Kendra
Directorate of
Extension
Department of
Agriculture
Public
extensions
Private
extensions
Other
countries
7. IMPROVE FARMERS’ ACCESS TO CREDIT AND ELIMINATE
REGIONAL DISPARITIES
Though agricultural credit has met overall targets in the past decade, it is
inefficiently and unevenly allocated. The north and south receive some two-
thirds of agricultural credit, although these regions are home to only 39 percent
of gross cropped area and 43 percent of gross irrigated area. The central and
east regions, by comparison, are starved of access to capital. While this might
be driven by differences in the capacity to absorb borrowing, the role played
by better financial infrastructure in the north and south cannot be overlooked.
(Branch penetration in the east is 30 percent of per capita norms set by CRISIL,
the credit rating agency, while it is 55 and 41 percent in the south and north,
respectively.82
) Moreover, most agricultural credit is released in March, a non-
critical month for agriculture, in order to meet annual targets, and even this credit
is directed to large farmers, especially in western, northern, and eastern India
(Exhibit 71).
These disparities can be addressed by complementing commercial bank lending
with a greater role for institutions (such as cooperative banks) or individuals with
better local knowledge. Currently, almost three-quarters of agricultural credit is
provided by commercial banks, so there is a case for strengthening cooperative
banks through recapitalisation, changes in the governance structure, and targeted
training programmes. Also, technology and delivery innovations such as business
correspondents (third-party, non-bank agents who extend banking services right
to people’s doorsteps) will have to be deployed to provide credit to areas with low
82 CRISIL inclusix: An index to measure India’s progress on financial inclusion, CRISIL,
June 2013.

166
levels of conventional banking penetration. Targets could be set on the basis of
cropped area and level of technology to ensure more equitable access to credit.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Cooperatives
Commercial
banks
MarchJanuaryOctoberJulyApril
Exhibit 71
India needs to remove inefficiencies in the distribution of
agricultural credit
SOURCE: Nirupam Mehrotra, “Agriculture credit: The truth behind the aggregate numbers”, Economic and Political Weekly,
2011; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
15
27
16
2019
7
1314
27
38
EastCentralWestNorthSouth
Share of credit
Share of GCA1
58
5149
43
30
All-India
average
48
SouthCentralEastNorthWest
Remove inter-regional disparity
▪ East and Central receive less credit
than their shares of cropped area
Set monthly targets
▪ Maximum credit flows to agriculture in
March—a lean period for agriculture
▪ Cooperative bank lending more
attuned to crop cycles
Focus on small and marginal farmers
▪ Share of small and marginal farmers
in operational land holdings increased
from 81% in 1991 to 86% in 2007
▪ Their share of credit in the same
period decreased from 54% to 48%
Region share, 2007
%,
Peak crop season
Share of small farmers in credit, 2007
%
Share of annual lending, 2007
%
1 Gross Cropped Area.
8. REFORM LAND MARKETS TO PROMOTE LEASING
Given India’s high population density, land is a precious resource. But its
ownership is often murky and contentious (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of this
issue). Due to inadequate records of land ownership and complicated tenant-
owner relationships, markets in parts of rural India are dysfunctional. There are
significant interstate differences in policies related to the leasing of agricultural
land—and states that have more rural land under lease also have higher
agricultural productivity (Exhibit 72).
Creating more modern and comprehensive land ownership records is a crucial
first step. The leasing market could also be strengthened by the introduction of
public land banks. Under such a scheme, absentee landowners could “deposit”
their land at a land bank operated by a credible financial institution or the local
panchayat, for instance, and receive rent for its use. Small and marginal farmers
could be encouraged to borrow and cultivate the land, knowing that they have
secure tenancy for a fixed period. This will utilise more arable land and allow
farmers to increase their output.83
83 12th five year plan, Planning Commission, Government of India.

Exhibit 72
A more active rural land market is associated with higher
agricultural productivity
SOURCE: Tajamul Haque, Impact of land leasing restrictions on agricultural efficiency and equity in India, 2011; Ministry of
Statistics and Programme Implementation; Planning Commission; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
% rural land leased, 2003
Assam
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Jammu
and
Kashmir
Odisha
Maharashtra
Himachal
Pradesh
Madhya
Pradesh
Bihar
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Haryana
Punjab
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Gujarat
West Bengal
Food grain yield, 2011
Thousand kilograms per hectare
4.5
4.0
9. INTEGRATE GOVERNANCE OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
AT A GRASSROOTS LEVEL
At the core of the Gujarat turnaround described earlier in this chapter was
good inter-ministerial coordination—but for the most part, the organisational
bureaucracy overseeing India’s farm sector is overwhelming. India currently
has several ministries that set policies for agriculture and related sectors. At the
centre, there are separate ministries for agriculture, chemicals and fertilisers,
food processing, water resources, and rural development. This multiplicity of
authorities is even more acute at the state level: Bihar, for instance, has separate
ministries for agriculture, water resources, rural development, revenue and land
reforms, minor irrigation, rural development, animal husbandry and fisheries,
sugarcane, and rural works.
To bring these departments together, a formal structure such as a secretariat
or a delivery unit at both the central and state levels could be considered. This
secretariat would organise monthly meetings on issues that require clearances
or action from multiple departments. Coordination can also take the form of
agricultural missions. These missions can empower a team of bureaucrats and
domain experts to make decisions and allocate financial support. They can be
closely monitored based on key performance indicators such as the number of
farmers reached and productivity improvements achieved.

168
Strengthening the rural non-farm sector will need
to go hand in hand with agricultural productivity
improvements
Rising agricultural incomes create new demand for non-farm goods, leading
to positive ripple effects throughout the rural economy. The rural non-farm
sector can be an engine of growth, offering wider employment opportunities to
farmworkers and playing a role in alleviating poverty.
This has been one of the fastest-growing areas of the Indian economy since the
1980s. From 1993 to 2004, value added in the rural non-farm sector grew at
7.2 percent annually, while the overall non-farm sector grew at 6 percent and the
farm economy grew at only 1.8 percent. To build on this momentum, India will
have to focus on rural infrastructure in the form of reliable and cheap electricity,
roads, and schools that can deliver better education and skills.
Building a more dynamic rural non-farm sector will involve creating jobs both at
later stages of the agriculture value chain and in non-agricultural sectors that can
provide these regions with greater diversification. Adding value to agricultural
output could be as simple as enabling milling enterprises to flourish; farmers
can find employment in non-peak seasons by grinding wheat into flour after
harvesting. Nearly 10 percent of manufacturing sector value added occurs in
food-related industries, and this activity can be scaled up in rural areas. Building
food-related logistics and supporting services (such as decentralised storage
infrastructure, quality and grading operations, and disaggregated markets) will
generate wage-paying jobs in India’s villages.
For a highly agricultural country such as India, food exports can be a source of
foreign exchange and also an opportunity for farmers to extract better prices
for their produce. Exports also hedge against the risk that increasing yields
might bump up against the limits of domestic demand, resulting in falling prices.
However, agriculture’s share of India’s total exports has fallen from 15 to 8 percent
over the past decade. Creating a geographically dispersed network of labour-
intensive food-processing parks can support the goal of increasing agricultural
exports while simultaneously adding more non-farm jobs to the rural economy
(see Chapter 6).
Of all the interventions needed to create non-farm employment, the development
of workforce skills is particularly important for the rural non-farm sector.
Currently, only 37 percent of the agricultural labour force is educated (and only
8 percent has attained secondary education or higher). The ability of the non-
farm sector to absorb unskilled labour is limited, so it will be vital to improve rural
access to secondary and vocational education. Both the non-farm and farm
sectors require adequate access to capital (see Box 18, “Financial inclusion and
poverty reduction”).

Box 18. Financial inclusion and poverty reduction
Financial inclusion can open new opportunities for the poor by providing
capital for farm investment, small businesses, and needs such as education
and health care. But more than 40 percent of India’s households do not have
access to banking services—and that share is as high as 55 percent in the
case of Assam and Bihar. The poor suffer a “double economic disadvantage”:
only 34 percent in the lowest quartile have cash savings, and even among
those, only about half have access to banks.1
Access to more sophisticated
financial products such as life insurance is of course even lower for this group.
Several government committees have proposed reforms to increase financial
inclusion. In 2009, the Raghuram Rajan Committee recommended allowing the
entry of private, well-governed, deposit-taking small finance banks; liberalising
regulation so that a wide range of banking correspondents (local agents) can
extend financial services; allowing banks that undershoot their priority sector
obligations to buy priority sector loan certificates issued by other banks in
lieu of direct credits; and freeing lending rates. In 2013, the Committee on
Comprehensive Financial Services for Small Businesses and Low Income
Households outlined a road map for creating a universal electronic bank
account for every Indian by 2016; access within a 15-minute walking distance
to cash deposit and withdrawal services; a credit-to-GDP ratio of at least
10 percent in each district; and universal access to products that manage risks
related to commodity prices, longevity, disability, or death of livestock.
Technology is expected to play a significant role in financial inclusion,
especially in the Least Deprived and Community Services–Deprived Districts
that have mobile penetration exceeding 70 percent. Even for districts with
low mobile penetration, a kiosk banking model using an online system can be
effective. Policies that reduce the cost of Internet access will be essential. For
example, it has been suggested that for broadband to achieve widespread
adoption, the cost of access should go as low as Rs. 200 ($3.50) per month.2
Beyond the need to develop low-cost channels, banks need to mitigate risks in
lending to the poor; the agricultural non-performing assets of the State Bank of
India, were as high as 9 percent of agricultural assets, for instance. The ability
of the poor to take and repay loans is limited by low agricultural productivity,
lack of local value addition, inadequate market linkages, high risk, the
unorganised nature of non-farm employment, and their lack of health care and
education, among other factors.3
Microfinance, provided by private companies,
has had only a limited impact; more than 80 percent of poor borrowers use
the money for consumption, including nearly 12 percent who use it merely to
repay loans. To improve access to credit on a more sustainable basis, broader
reforms are necessary, such as in human development, electricity, rural roads,
land reforms, irrigation, and post-harvest infrastructure. These reforms, along
with access to finance, will create a long-term trend of poverty reduction.
1 A hundred small steps: Report of the Committee on Financial Sector Reforms, Planning
Commission, Government of India, 2009.
2 Rajat Kathuria and Mansi Kedia, India: The impact of Internet, ICRIER, 2012.
3 Recommendations of the Committee on Financial Inclusion, Government of India, 2008.

170
* * *
At the time of independence, the goal of making India self-sufficient in terms
of food production seemed insurmountable. Yet focused efforts, eventually
culminating in the Green Revolution, met that goal. Today India needs a
comparable jolt of reforms and better governance in its agriculture sector to
achieve real economic empowerment. By rationalising markets and ensuring
that poor farmers have better access to markets, pricing information, and inputs,
India can boost its yields to match the levels achieved by other Asian economies.
Growth in agricultural productivity is a uniquely powerful tool for fighting poverty—
one capable of generating wider ripple effects, as it stimulates job growth in
manufacturing and service sectors and keeps food costs low to the benefit of the
poor throughout India.

173
Despite the economic strides of the past decade, the majority of India’s citizens
continue to live with some form of deprivation. Medical care is not available in
many of the poorest villages. Millions live in dangerously substandard housing
without a reliable supply of clean drinking water, light, or basic sanitation.
Children leave primary school without acquiring basic skills and may not have the
opportunity to continue with secondary education. And hunger continues to be a
daily reality for the poorest segments of Indian society.
Access to basic services remains extremely weak and fragmented across India,
as noted in Chapter 4. At an aggregate level, India’s citizens lack access to
about 46 percent of the basic services they need. But India has the opportunity
to greatly expand social infrastructure and meet more than 80 percent of the
population’s needs. The path to achieving this depends on steadily increasing
public spending on basic services at 6.7 percent per year in real terms so that
current spending levels are doubled by 2022. The inclusive reforms scenario,
which is predicated on more robust economic growth, provides the nation with
the fiscal resources to support an increase of this magnitude. The stalled reforms
scenario, by contrast, allows India to achieve only some 70 percent of this
spending target.
As the government devotes more resources to basic services, committing to
the right mix of spending will be critical. Our assessment suggests that India will
need to direct substantially more funding towards health care, drinking water, and
sanitation, doubling their share of total public expenditures on basic services. By
contrast, the share of public spending allocated for education, food, energy, and
the MNREGA programme could be reduced over time, even though spending on
these priorities would grow in absolute terms.
Boosting public funding for basic services can deliver about 10 percent of the
total impact of bringing people above the Empowerment Line in the inclusive
reforms scenario. But increased spending is only part of the solution. It is also
critical to make that spending more effective and ensure that a greater share of
it produces real outcomes for its intended beneficiaries, a point we explore more
fully in Chapter 9.
8. Increasing public spending
on basic services

174
Public spending on basic services needs to grow by
about 7 percent per year in real terms
India’s public spending on all basic services grew at about 11 per annum in real
terms (nearly 20 percent in nominal terms) from 2005 to 2012, rising from about 5
to 6.4 percent of GDP. But this increase followed many years of underinvestment.
As a result, many regions still have significant gaps in social infrastructure. An
inadequate health-care system—with too few hospitals, health centres, and well-
trained medical professionals—is one of India’s most acute challenges.
At an aggregate level, India’s people lack access to about 46 percent of the basic
services they need. But India can substantially fill many of those gaps in the span
of just a decade. The higher growth inherent in the inclusive reforms scenario will
generate the fiscal resources to reduce access deprivation to 17 percent by 2022.
This can be accomplished through a combination of greater spending on building
access plus measures to improve the effectiveness of service delivery (Exhibit 73).
0.17
0.26
0.46
2022E
Inclusive
reforms
2022E
Stalled
reforms
2012
Exhibit 73
Increased social spending, delivered more
effectively, can significantly improve access
to all basic services
1 LPG penetration is taken as a proxy.
2 ADS is a population-weighted average of district-level access deprivation score.
greater access).
Sub-
centres
Primary
health centres
Community
health centres
District
hospitals
Students per
classroom
Pupils per
teacher
Enrolment
Electrification
Modern fuel1
Toilet
penetration
Piped water in
the community
Health care
Per capita
Education
Ratio
Energy
%
Water and
sanitation
%
Access to basic services
Current levels
Potential levels in 2021–22
(inclusive reforms)
Access Deprivation Score2
-63%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
On the spending side of the equation, we estimate that government funding for
basic services will need to grow by about 6.7 percent per year in real terms from
2012 to 2022. This implies a near-doubling of public spending on basic services,
from Rs. 570,000 crore in 2012 ($118 billion) to Rs. 1,088,000 crore ($226 billion)
in 2022.84
Per capita spending would rise from Rs. 390 in 2012 to Rs. 662
in 2022.
84 These figures are in 2012 rupees.

In the inclusive reforms scenario, this level of government spending on basic
services would equate to about 6 percent of GDP in 2022—about the same as
its share in 2012. This path would allow India to contain its combined (centre
and state) fiscal deficit and converge to the recommended 6 percent fiscal deficit
target by 2017, even as it ramps up social spending. The stalled reforms scenario,
by contrast, would fall short. Because the government would receive less tax
revenue in a lower-growth scenario, it would be able to commit only about
70 percent of this level of spending—and as a result, access deprivation would
remain at 26 percent by 2022.
In a perfect world, India would meet 100 percent of the population’s needs.
But it is important to set clear-eyed aspirations: India is constrained not only by
availability of fiscal resources but also by its capacity to execute rapidly, train
the requisite manpower, and introduce systemic changes to make every rupee
of spending count. The first step to maximise the social impact of increased
spending is to direct funding to the services and geographies that require it
the most.
The share of public spending allocated to health care,
drinking water, and sanitation needs to double
Two guiding principles drive the allocation of public spending between basic
services. First, government spending needs to be directed to services in which
the existing level of deprivation is high. Second, public funding is urgently
needed in areas that require the government to build out social infrastructure
on an equitable basis—specifically, the community-level services of education
and health.
For other types of basic services, private markets can function effectively,
and public spending is needed only to cover a part of the affordability gap.
For instance, we estimate that energy subsidies would need to rise by only
some 2.2 percent per year, from Rs. 79,000 crore ($16 billion) in 2012 to
Rs. 99,000 crore ($21 billion) by 2022 (in 2011–12 prices). They would eventually
account for 9 percent of total public spending on basic services in 2022. Food
subsidies would need to rise by just 5 percent per year, from Rs. 77,000 crore
($16 billion) in 2012 to Rs. 124,000 crore ($26 billion) by 2022 (in 2011–12 prices).
They would reach 11 percent of total public spending in 2022 (based on spending
estimated under the National Food Security Act of 2013). However, the timing of
this spending might vary by service; public spending on food, for instance, will
need to be increased rapidly to nearly Rs. 120,000 crore by 2017 to meet the food
security act’s provisions, while electricity will need a more gradual increase.
Spending on health care, drinking water, and sanitation, by contrast, would
need to double in terms of their share of total spending (Exhibit 74). These
are areas in which the country faces severe deprivation: nearly 60 percent of
households do not have toilets, and nearly 55 percent do not have drinking water
inside their homes. The existing public health-care infrastructure is inadequate,
leaving millions unable to obtain medical treatment when they need it. India’s
share of public spending in health care is extremely low compared with that of
other countries, and the wealthiest population segments account for most private
health-care expenditure. These factors add up to poor health outcomes at a
national level—and untold human suffering.

176
Exhibit 74
Per capita1
INR per month
1,088
Health care
Education
Food
Energy
Social security
Housing
2022E
40
9
23
11
9
4
3
2012
571
15
6
42
13
14
7
4
390 662
+517
(+91%)
The district-level assessment of access to services in Chapter 4 revealed that
health care does not seem to be as responsive to rising incomes as access to
food, energy, or housing. Instead, it will take a step change in public spending
to bridge the gaps. We estimate that health-care spending would need to grow
by about 18 percent per year, from Rs. 84,000 crore ($18 billion) in 2012 to
Rs. 434,000 crore ($90 billion) in 2022 (in 2011–12 prices). This would allow India
to build out the primary health-care network and to train and hire the requisite
number of doctors and other medical professionals to fulfil the recommended
targets for density of hospital beds and health-care workers.
Spending on drinking water and sanitation would need to grow by some
12 percent per year to ensure that these services are accessible to more
than 90 percent of the population. This implies raising annual spending on
these services from Rs. 34,000 crore ($7 billion) in 2012 to Rs. 103,000 crore
($21 billion) by 2022 (in 2011–12 prices).
By contrast, education spending would need to grow only marginally—by
0.5 percent per year in real terms, from Rs. 237,000 crore ($49 billion) in 2012
to Rs. 249,000 crore ($52 billion) in 2022. Access deprivation in education is
much lower, at about 25 percent, reflecting the fact that the government has
already made education a high priority. The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), a
centrally funded scheme to build primary schools, was launched in 2000 in a bid
to ensure universal access to primary education. Central government budgets
allocated approximately Rs. 126,000 crore in nominal terms to SSA from 2005
to 2012 cumulatively. As a result of this push, the number of primary school-age

children who are not in school dropped from 16.9 million in 2001 to 1.4 million in
2012.85
Future capital outlays for education will be focused on maintaining primary
schools and building more secondary schools to absorb an influx of students
as the dropout rate falls. The quality of education is still a major problem, as
we note in Chapter 3, but based on the experience of education experts, our
estimated operating cost per student would be broadly sufficient to improve
learning outcomes.
See Appendix D for more detail on the methodology used to estimate the future
public spending needed to bridge the gaps in each of these services.
Incremental government spending should be
concentrated in regions with higher levels of
deprivation
Families living in one of India’s Most Deprived Districts on average lack access
to 59 percent of basic services, while in the Least Deprived Districts, only
34 percent of basic needs go unmet. Addressing these sharp geographical
inequalities will require a fundamental rebalancing of government funding and
resources—one that takes into account current levels of deprivation in basic
services at the district level.
If funds were allocated strictly on the basis of current gaps in access to basic
services and population density, states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and
Jharkhand, which receive about 20 percent of central government funding,
would collectively need almost 40 percent of future funding. At the same time,
states with the best levels of current access (Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal
Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Goa, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu) would require
smaller amounts to ensure full access. Of course, each state’s share of central
government spending should be informed by other factors, such as the state’s
capacity to utilise funding effectively to achieve better outcomes for its citizens
and its own revenue from state-level taxes. The present structure of central
transfers reflects these two concerns, thus ensuring that states have an incentive
to improve their performance, while also protecting economically weaker states.86
If India hopes to eventually provide full access to all basic services, public funding
cannot simply be allocated equally to all districts. As discussed in Chapter 4, even
within states, there are wide variations in both income-based poverty and the
adequacy of social infrastructure. Districts within the same state may vary sharply
in terms of overall access to basic services, and the size of the gaps may differ
by service. Careful consideration of specific needs at the district level will have to
be central to any successful allocation formula. Using a formula based on Access
Deprivation Scores alone, for instance, the eight Most Deprived Districts of
Jharkhand should receive 39 percent of the state’s funds, while the 11 Household
Services–Deprived Districts should receive only 32 percent. Using the same lens
on a national level, the 126 Most Deprived and 177 Household Services–Deprived
Districts would require nearly 55 percent of funding support.
85 World Bank estimates.
86 For a richer discussion, refer to Report of the committee for evolving a composite
development index of states, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, September 2013.

178
This is a simplified illustration that would need to be supplemented with other
considerations. The cost of building social infrastructure would vary by service
(building a health-care network will probably be more expensive than building
schools) and by geography (installing a sanitation system in an urban area will
probably be more expensive than building one in a rural village). That being said,
our simulation of allocations based purely on access deprivation underscores the
fact that spending patterns need to be revisited.
* * *
Building a system that delivers higher-quality basic services to the entire
population is a critical foundation for more equitable growth. To widen access to
vital services, public spending on basic services would need to double by 2022—
and the pace of economic growth will determine whether government revenue
will be sufficient to support this increase. India will also need to reconsider
its funding formula with an eye towards directing more resources to meet
urgent needs for health care, drinking water, and sanitation and giving greater
allocations to the districts with the most critical gaps. Building out this type of
social infrastructure would benefit the entire population, not just those below the
Empowerment Line. But the solution is not just to spend more; India also needs
to spend more effectively. Chapter 9 discusses strategies for ensuring that these
services are efficiently delivered to the intended beneficiaries rather than being
wasted or diverted, and it highlights new and innovative models that could serve
as templates.

181
Providing all Indian citizens with health care, education, and basic dignity will
require not only an increase in public spending but also fresh thinking about the
best ways to deploy resources to achieve maximum results.
One key initial step in making basic services more effective is selecting the
right delivery model—whether in-kind services by the government, public-
private partnerships (PPPs), or cash transfers. The second step is to make
service delivery more effective through a greater openness to innovation and
better operating practices. These transformations may involve bringing private-
and social-sector players into the delivery process or engaging communities
(especially women) as active participants. Above all, India needs a relentless focus
on performance measurement and monitoring, which is now easier to achieve
through the power of technology.
This chapter discusses cross-cutting ideas that have the potential to transform
India’s model of basic service delivery, with special focus on new approaches
in food, education, and health care. These collectively account for 70 percent
of current public spending on basic services and about 74 percent of the
future spending we estimate by 2022. They also account for 78 percent of the
Empowerment Gap and hence represent critical opportunities for improving the
lives of millions of households.
Based on our analysis of more than 350 case studies from around the world,
we have identified a range of promising interventions and potential solutions.
These ideas are relevant not just for India’s government, but also for the social
entrepreneurs, funding agencies, philanthropists, and companies that could bring
a greater degree of innovation and investment to bear in the effort to build better
basic services for the poor.
India should become at least 50 percent more
efficient in the delivery of basic services
India’s government spent Rs. 570,000 crore ($118 billion) on basic services in
2012, but we estimate that, on average, half of this money did not translate into
real benefits for the intended recipients. The inclusive reforms scenario (described
in Chapter 5) involves all Indian states matching today’s best-performing states in
their ability to translate public funding into effective basic services for the poor. If
they can achieve this, the average nationwide efficiency of public spending would
improve from 50 percent in 2012 to about 75 percent in 2022.
9. Improving the effectiveness of
basic service delivery

182
As detailed in Chapter 8, India needs to increase public spending in order to
widen access to critical basic services, most notably in health care, drinking
water, and sanitation—and, given this imperative, it is all the more critical that
this additional funding produce maximum results. The current efficiency rate
of 50 percent translates into about Rs. 285,000 crore ($59 billion) of annual
spending (2011–12) on basic services that leaks away—but if India increases
spending without substantially improving this performance over the next decade,
it could find itself wasting about Rs. 545,000 crore ($113 billion) of annual social
spending by 2022.87
India’s food subsidy programme achieved average nationwide efficiency of
65 percent in 2012. In other words, more than one-third of the value of the
subsidy allocated by the government did not reach the intended beneficiaries;
food grain was either wasted or sold in the open market. The three poorest
deciles of the population received just 36 percent of the subsidy allocated to
them in 2012, despite accounting for 80 percent of the hunger gap. Several large
Indian states were less than 30 percent efficient, with Bihar at only 19 percent.
If India’s entire food subsidy delivery system could match the results achieved in
the five best-performing states, the national efficiency level would rise to about
90 percent. However, we make a more modest assumption of improving national
efficiency to about 75 percent. Achieving this would translate directly into better
nutrition: the poorest people in Bihar, for example, would receive an average of
12–14 kgs of food grain per month, two and a half times the amount they received
in 2012.
In education, the issue is a lack of effectiveness—that is, government spending
yields far weaker learning outcomes than it could. Compared with the results
achieved by the best-performing states (as measured by the Annual Status of
Education Report, or ASER assessments), the average Indian state achieved just
51 percent of the learning outcomes warranted by its level of spending on primary
and secondary education in 2012. In the inclusive reforms scenario, we assume
that all states can match the effectiveness of the current best performers in
education (with allowances made for their different starting points). Currently, 40
to 50 percent of primary school students in the weakest-performing states pass
the ASER evaluation, but it is feasible to set a goal of improving their pass rate
to 70 to 80 percent by 2022, as well as improving their net enrolment ratios by 5
to 10 percentage points. Similarly, the low effectiveness of health-care spending
needs to be addressed across states.
Two broad channels are important in delivering
public spending
Making social services effective starts with choosing the most appropriate
delivery model, whether the government acts as the service provider or whether
the state facilitates the creation of a private market (Exhibit 75). Around the world,
a variety of approaches have been adopted, and there is evidence that each can
work if the right preconditions or enablers are in place. There is no one-size-
fits-all prescription for success, but there is a need to think through the options
systematically and choose the right delivery model for different basic services in
87 In 2011–12 rupees and U.S. dollars.

different parts of India. A programme that works for rural Uttar Pradesh may not
work for urbanised Karnataka.
Exhibit 75
Several modes of delivery are available for all basic services
Basic
service
Mode of benefit distribution
Benefits through
producers
Benefits to consumers
In-kind transfer Cash transfer Voucher Insurance
Food Fortified food
production
Midday meals
in schools;
Public Distribution
System (PDS)
Conditional cash
transfer instead of
PDS in urban areas
Food vouchers
Education Subsidised low-cost
private/PPP1
schools in urban/
rural areas
Government-owned
schools with
private/social
management
Conditional
scholarships for
girls and women
Skills vouchers
system
with accredited
providers
Add-on benefits
with life insurance
covers, e.g.,
Shiksha Sahyog
Yojana
Health Subsidised low-cost
NGO-run
secondary and
tertiary care
centres
Government-run
health-care
institutions.
Network of
anganwadi workers
and nurses
Health vouchers for
BPL2 families
through Sambhav,
a scheme for
reproductive health
services
Micro-insurance for
hospitalisation, e.g.,
Rashtriya Swasthya
Bima Yojana
Fuel Viability gap
funding for rural
power and solar
devices
Kerosene subsidy
under the PDS
LPG subsidy
Drinking
water and
sanitation
Low-cost models in
partnership with
private sector/
NGOs
Infrastructure
development
through schemes
such as Total
Sanitation
Campaign
Community grants
through Nirmal
Gram Puraskar
Housing Viability gap
funding/incentives
for affordable
housing
Construction of low-
cost houses under
Jawaharlal Nehru
National Urban
Renewal Mission
Financial
assistance for BPL2
households under
Indira Awaas
Yojana
Social
security
MNREGA for rural
workers. Old
age/disability
pension, family
benefit scheme
Micro-pension with
self-contribution
1 Public-private partnership.
2 Below the official poverty line.
Among the range of delivery models available, two deserve particular attention:
ƒƒ In-kind transfers. The government can run shops for food distribution,
operate schools and health facilities, and deliver water and sanitation
through state-run programmes. Despite challenges of making the public
sector efficient, some government-run systems around the world have been
very successful. South Korea’s state-run school system, for instance, built
facilities and raised enrolment and graduation rates, then shifted its focus to
improving the quality of education; more recently, it has increased investment
in technology and allowed schools greater operating autonomy. As a result,
South Korea now ranks among the top five countries globally on various
parameters of educational outcomes.88
A well-run in-kind transfer needs
the public sector to have strong execution capabilities and a commitment to
quality, accompanied by a clear focus on measuring outcomes and tracking
progress. Governments also need to be supportive of reforms that attract the
right talent and institute the best operating practices within government-run
basic service systems.
88 Beyond Korean style: Shaping a new growth formula, McKinsey Global Institute, April 2013.

184
ƒƒ Cash transfers. Governments can transfer benefits in multiple forms,
including cash, bank account transfers, or mobile money. Many governments
around the world have implemented conditional cash payments—that
is, families enrolled in these programmes receive monetary benefits in
exchange for complying with conditions such as preventive health checkups,
supplemental nutrition, or school attendance. Bolsa Familia of Brazil and
Oportunidades of Mexico are two examples of well-run conditional cash
transfer programmes (see Box 19, “Poverty reduction through direct cash
transfer: Brazil’s Bolsa Familia”). Such programmes can be successful in
conjunction with widespread digital and banking penetration, the ability to
convert financial benefits into real benefits painlessly (for example, to withdraw
cash easily or pay for goods through electronic means), and few supply-
side barriers. Cash transfers also need a clear and convincing methodology
for enrolling beneficiaries; the metrics for determining eligibility need to be
transparent, easily verifiable, and simple to implement.
Three broad strategies can transform service delivery
From an analysis of more than 350 case studies, three broad strategies emerge
as effective approaches to achieving better outcomes.
1. MOBILISE EXPERTISE FROM THE PRIVATE AND
SOCIAL SECTORS
Most of India’s current social welfare programmes follow the government-
as-service-provider model, which can limit their capacity and incentives
for innovation and experimentation. But the government can transform its
performance by injecting new thinking and new operational approaches from
the private and social sectors. Outright privatisation of services is not required;
external agents can be deployed in a variety of ways, whether by having an
outside entity run an entire system funded by the government or by contracting
out specific parts of the process. For-profit organisations, NGOs, aid agencies,
philanthropic organisations, and corporate social responsibility initiatives from
private-sector companies can all play an active role in providing funding, shaping
goals, delivering services, and monitoring outcomes.
Box 19. Poverty reduction through direct cash transfer: Brazil’s Bolsa Familia
Though its per capita income is nearly eight times
that of India, Brazil is characterised by widespread
economic inequality and significant poverty. In 2003,
the Brazilian government launched Bolsa Familia as a
flagship programme to assist poor families.
Today, the programme covers all families below the
national poverty line of $57 per capita per month
(50 million people, or more than a quarter of the
population). Families receive an average of $36 a month
(the amount varies by number and age of children).
In return, families must ensure that their children are
immunised and go to school; those under age 6 and
pregnant women get periodic medical checkups. If
beneficiaries do not comply with these conditions, the
cash transfers are either suspended or terminated.
The programme requires close coordination among
government departments. The state-owned bank,
Caixa Econômica Federal, issues an electronic card to
each family. Every month, an amount is credited against
the card by the treasury after the Ministry of Social
Development verifies the beneficiary list. Beneficiaries
can use the card to withdraw cash within 90 days from
any of 32,000 points across the country—and typically,
the money goes to ensure that food is on the table.

Successful examples that already exist across India could serve as a template
for other regions. In nine of India’s states, for example, the NGO Akshaya
Patra provides midday meals in public schools, covering 1.3 million children. A
PPP focused on skills training for the rural poor involves the state government
compensating the IL&FS training organisation on a per-pupil basis for every
person to whom it provides vocational training.
Addressing India’s serious gaps in education and health care will require
engagement from the private and social sectors. The Municipal Corporation of
Greater Mumbai, for instance, runs the Mumbai Schools Excellence programme
with UNICEF and partners such as Akanksha, Muktangan, and Naandi. Its
mission is to improve school management, teacher training, and learning
outcomes in 148 municipal schools with 45,000 students. Student learning
outcomes in the Mumbai Schools Excellence programme have improved from
a baseline average of “52 out of 100 on a simple test” to “80+ out of 100 on a
similar test” as measured by both schools and external third-party assessments.89
To institutionalise such initiatives, the government can develop a PPP policy to
allow collaborations among local governments, private schools, and education-
management organisations. PPP schools can be granted sufficient autonomy
and exemptions from rigid regulatory or legal requirements if they are held
accountable for specified learning outcomes.
A similar approach would be beneficial in health care, where there is a great need
for innovative models to proliferate. The importance of forging effective PPPs
is even more acute given the magnitude of the problems with access, quality,
and affordability.
2. INVOLVE COMMUNITIES, ESPECIALLY WOMEN
It is no accident that those communities where citizens (especially women) feel
empowered to express their needs and shape solutions have better access to
social services and enjoy development outcomes (see Box 20, “Involving NGOs
and empowering women to advance human development: The Bangladesh
example”). Local knowledge can improve policy making and design, and the cost
of delivering services can be reduced if communities contribute (for example,
by providing the land and labour to build a sanitation system). Because they are
closest to the problems, local communities are also best positioned to track
progress and effectiveness. They can apply democratic pressure to policy makers
and service providers to deliver on their promises, and local vigilance can reduce
opportunities for corruption.
India is starting to see encouraging developments on this front. In Chhattisgarh,
gram panchayats (village governing bodies) monitor food subsidy recipients. In
health projects around the country, local women are being trained as accredited
social health activists. Cooperatives and women’s self-help groups in Tamil Nadu
are running fair price shops, which are the point of contact for subsidised food
distribution. Local community members meet with officials in Balangir, Odisha, to
discuss the effectiveness of government programmes. This kind of involvement
transforms the role of the poor from beneficiaries to active participants in
the system.
89 Prachi Windlass, “Education in India: Mumbai’s School Excellence Program tackles school
turnaround at a massive scale”, Michael & Susan Dell Foundation blog, June 6, 2013.

186
Box 20. Involving NGOs and empowering women to advance human development:
The Bangladesh example
Bangladesh and India share a common history and a
common burden of widespread poverty. Bangladesh
faces enormous hurdles: it has three times the
population density and half the per capita income of
India. Its combined spending for education and health
care were equivalent to 3.6 percent of GDP in 2010,
well below India’s at 4.3 percent. Yet the country
has overtaken India in several human development
indicators on the back of a nationwide effort to
empower women (Exhibit 76).
Both the government and NGOs have contributed
to this transformation. In the past few decades, the
Bangladesh government has emphasised women’s
empowerment through education and has launched
several programmes in association with international
agencies. One example, funded by the International
Development Association, raises girls’ enrolment by
providing a tuition stipend to female students in senior
secondary schools; it also delivers higher-quality
education by focusing on teacher training, performance
incentives, and school infrastructure. To benefit from
this scheme, female students must remain unmarried,
maintain 75 percent attendance, and perform well at
school. As a result of this initiative, girls’ enrolment
rose from 1.1 million in 1991 to 3.9 million in 2005, and
girls’ completion rates in senior secondary schools
increased from 39 percent in 2001 to 63 percent in
2008. The government also ran a successful population
control programme in the 1980s that has reduced
the fertility rate through education and advice on
contraceptive use.
NGOs are also playing an important role in women’s
empowerment. For instance, BRAC (formerly the
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) runs its
own primary schools in remote locations and also
educates women in basic health-care practices.
Microfinance institutions such as Grameen Bank have
increased the economic role of women within the
household and have provided microloans to aspiring
female entrepreneurs.
Bangladesh’s example shows that if the entire
nation comes together for a cause such as
women’s empowerment, it is achievable. Today
entire communities in Bangladesh are beginning to
realise dividends in the form of improved health and
education outcomes.
Exhibit 76
Bangladesh has improved health outcomes through social transformation
SOURCE: World Bank; International Development Association; Asian Scientist; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
27
59
41
56
96
72
55
35
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
701961 20109080 2000
Fertility rate
Births per woman aged 15–49
54
4
2010
1970
Bangladesh has seen significant social
transformation in recent years
Women’s empowerment
NGOs promote women’s inclusion through programmes
aimed at increasing school enrolment and vocational skills
Women in
labour force
% of women
>15 years old
Primary school
enrolment,
female
%
Fertility decline
Since 1980, the government has led population policy
interventions through education and awareness building
Despite lower health spending, Bangladesh
performs better than India on a number of metrics
Per capita health spending
$ per capita per year
Under-5 mortality rate
Per 1,000 births
DPT1 immunisation rate
% of children aged
12–23 months
Access to improved sanitation
% of population
1 Diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus.
98
56
2010
1980

3. ACTIVELY MONITOR PERFORMANCE
Continuous measurement and tracking of key metrics can make a big difference
to the effectiveness of any service provider. An objective measurement of learning
outcomes, for example, can raise pressure on schools to improve teaching
standards. Pratham, the largest educational NGO in India, has implemented
a systematic and deep national measurement process to evaluate children’s
learning outcomes.
Technology is arguably one the biggest levers for improving performance. India
is likely to become the world’s second-largest base of Internet users by 2015,
and about three-fourths of new users will be mobile-only.90
As penetration
grows, India will be able to use this platform to create information transparency
and monitor services in new ways. Already, SMS-enabled systems are building
stronger communication with beneficiaries and real-time feedback loops. Digital
checks and balances using simple computerisation, electronic transfers of funds,
and more sophisticated devices such as RFID tracking tags and smart cards are
powerful means of preventing graft, corruption, and diversion in the distribution
of benefits.
Food and nutrition: Simple interventions can
significantly reduce hunger and malnutrition
Hunger is widespread among India’s impoverished and excluded segments.
The bottom three deciles of the rural population and bottom-most decile of the
urban population by income consume less than 80 percent of the recommended
calorie intake. Beyond overall consumption levels, it is crucial to diversify the diet
of the poor, who tend to rely on a cheap and filling cereal-rich diet lacking in fruit,
vegetables, milk, eggs, and meat. High levels of micronutrient deficiencies have
led to widespread prevalence of anaemia, goiter, and osteoporosis.
For the poor, cereals account for about 20 percent of private expenditure on food
and provide 60 percent of calorie and protein intake. India has achieved sufficient
production of cereals to feed its population; production has kept pace with
demand and is expected to do so in the future. But now substantial structural
reforms are required to raise supply, reduce costs, and stabilise the prices of
vegetables, fruit, and other forms of diversified nutrition. Implementing reforms to
bring a more affordable and varied diet to the poor is critical, but these are likely
to be longer-term solutions.
In the immediate time frame, the poor continue to rely on subsidised cereals for
food security. India’s National Food Security Act, enacted in 2013, guarantees
subsidised food grains to 75 percent of the rural population and 50 percent
of the urban population; the “poorest of the poor” households (previously
identified under the Antyodaya Anna Yojana scheme) are eligible for greater
entitlements. Eligible beneficiaries are to be identified by individual states based
on a socioeconomic caste census methodology that assesses deprivation across
multiple indicators, or methodologies chosen by the states themselves.
The estimated cost of food subsidies was approximately Rs. 77,000 crore
($16 billion) for the year 2011–12, based on government estimates. But the current
90 Online and upcoming: The Internet’s impact on India, McKinsey & Company, December 2012.

188
share of subsidy reaching the poorest is approximately 36 percent. Innovating
to create efficient channels of food and nutrition distribution is certainly an
immediate and high-priority issue for India.
BOTH PHYSICAL FOOD TRANSFERS AND CASH TRANSFERS
CAN WORK, DEPENDING ON STARTING CONDITIONS AND
CONSUMER PREFERENCES
Countries around the world have experimented with different models of food
subsidy distribution—through physical transfers, food vouchers, and conditional
cash transfers. At present, in-kind transfers through the PDS are the dominant
model in India, though there are other forms of nutritional support, such as school
midday meals and feeding programmes in the government-sponsored Integrated
Child Development Services.
Where private food distribution and banking infrastructure are well developed
(in cities, for example), India could consider selectively moving from its physical
food transfer model to one involving cash transfers to provide consumers with
greater choice and also potentially reduce waste and leakage in the supply chain.
A randomised intervention in Delhi that provided unconditional cash transfers
for food assistance found that food security did not decline with the use of this
model; in fact, households had better opportunities to incorporate other nutritious
options into their diets beyond cereals.91
It should be noted, however, that the
excluded segment (the poorest 5 percent of the urban population), who are the
only urban residents with a significant calorie gap, typically lack access to any
financial services. For an urban cash transfer model to work, the poorest of the
poor need access to bank accounts or other money solutions.
In rural areas, there are significant challenges to rolling out cash transfers at
present. These regions typically have low penetration of both banking services
and of private food shops that stock cereals in bulk quantities. If the poor
received a fixed sum in lieu of physical food transfers, their food security could be
at risk if the price of food grains spiked in certain seasons. A survey of consumers
in rural areas of nine states indicated a strong preference for government-run
ration shops to provide actual food grain.92
The physical transfer of subsidised
grain through government channels is likely to continue to be important in such
parts of the country.
Based on various studies and discussions with experts, we find that the optimal
mode of benefit transfer depends on the starting situation of a particular region
(Exhibit 77).
91 Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Robert Lensink, and Bhupesh Yadav, Cash or food security
through the Public Distribution System? Evidence from a randomized controlled trial in Delhi,
India, October 2012.
92 Reetika Khera, “Revival of the Public Distribution System: Evidence and explanations”,
Economic and Political Weekly, volume 66, numbers 44–45, 2011.

The optimal mode of benefit transfer depends on market conditions
and realities on the ground
Exhibit 77
Key factors dictating the choice
Physical/in-kind
food transfer
Cash
transfer
Food markets
Efficient private markets, providing regular and easy access to food 
Stable and predictable food prices 
Seasonal variation in food availability 
Geographical variations in food availability 
Infrastructure
Well-functioning government food transfer system (infrastructure
and administration) 
Availability of basic financial infrastructure (banks, post offices,
correspondents) 
Mechanisms for fraud prevention and resolving grievances  
Social factors
A population with the awareness and education to make sound
nutritional choices 
Low likelihood of emergencies causing food shortages 
THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (PDS) CAN BE MADE
MUCH MORE EFFICIENT
If the PDS remains the dominant model of food subsidy support in India in the
medium term, its reform is a top priority. Nearly one-third of India’s production
of rice and wheat is procured by the government at minimum support prices,
and most of this finds its way into the PDS. Grain is transported and stored
by the Food Corporation of India and then distributed by the states through a
network of more than 400,000 fair price shops (FPS). Food grain from the PDS
accounted for nearly 20 percent of calorie intake for the poorest decile of Indians
nationwide in 2012. Unfortunately, leakage and waste in the system in 2009–10
amounted to as much as 60 to 80 percent in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and about
65 percent for the poorer segments (people below the official poverty line) of the
population nationwide.
The potential for PDS reform has been studied in great depth. Exhibit 78
synthesises ten key ideas that could address the current problems. These fall
into three categories: integrating technology into the supply chain, reforming
mechanisms for identifying those who are below the official poverty line (since
they are the key beneficiaries under the current system of food transfer), and
supporting FPS.

190
Exhibit 78
Simple interventions can help transform the PDS
Key ideas implemented
SOURCE: Puri, “Reforming the Public Distribution System: Lessons from Chhattisgarh”, 2012; Deb, “Public distribution of
rice in Andhra Pradesh: Efficiency and reform options”, 2009; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
7
8
9
10
6
4
5
1
2
3
Supporting fair price shops
(FPS)
Door delivery of food grain
to FPS
7
Sale of non-PDS items in
FPS
8
Off-take of monthly quota in
instalments from FPS
9
Credit facilities to FPS
through cooperative banks,
instead of cash down
payment
10
Ration cards with photos6
7
7
7
7
4
4
4
3
2
Leveraging technology
Computerised allocation of
food grain to fair price shops1
1
Use of Web portal for
addressing citizen grievances
2
Use of GPS and SMS for
monitoring vehicles carrying
grains and dispatch/arrival of
grains
3
Reforming identification
mechanisms
Digitisation of ration cards4
Involvement of gram
panchayats in identifying those
below the poverty line; public
display of beneficiary lists
5
6
5
6
6
5
6
>80%
60–80%
40–60%
<40%
PDS efficiency Technology-
based
reforms
PDS interventions by states with effectiveness greater than 60%
1 Government- or privately run shops that are entrusted with distributing food grain to consumers.
Even simple interventions can yield significant benefits, as the state of
Chhattisgarh has shown. To improve transparency about who is eligible for
subsidised food, the name of the head of household, the type of card that
person holds, and the purchase price of rice to which the household is entitled
is painted outside each house in the village. In some villages, a list of all ration
cardholders (beneficiaries) is painted outside the ration shop. Beneficiary lists
are computerised and regularly updated. The movement of food grain is tracked
and stored in a computerised database for accounting and monitoring purposes.
Communities are actively involved: FPS management has been shifted from
private dealers to community-based organisations such as gram pachayats,
women’s self-help groups, and cooperatives. The government sends SMS alerts
to villagers to inform them when shipments of grain are on the way, converting
entire communities into watchdogs who help prevent misuse. Similarly, surprise
checks and audits by the Tamil Nadu government help monitor irregularities
across the supply chain (Exhibit 79).

Exhibit 79
Tamil Nadu has established a robust auditing system for the PDS by
combining simple technology with surprise audits
SOURCE: Media reports; Mahendran, A study on customer satisfaction on food delivery mechanism of universal PDS in
Tamil Nadu (India), 2013; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Warehouse
Fair price
shop (FPS)
Consumers ▪ Online complaints register: consumers can register complaints
against FPS owners online
▪ Handheld billing machines with mobile data service (GPRS):
real-time monitoring of sales and stock
▪ SMS-based monitoring of FPS: daily stock levels of all
commodities communicated to department officials
▪ Surprise checks: randomised audit/checking of FPS (1.51 lakh
raids in five years resulting in 691 suspensions)
▪ Controlled routes: charts display route, commodities, and
destination; if deviation is noticed, any elected representative can
check the truck
▪ Online warehouse monitoring system: all transactions are
captured online, and use of electronic weighing machines is
mandatory
▪ Special vigilance wing: to prevent diversion of PDS
commodities, especially to other states
These innovations can be used almost anywhere, by anyone. They need only
very simple technology (mobile phones and basic computerisation) and the will to
engage citizens. They are equally relevant to food distribution systems run by aid
workers in Africa and those managed by government agencies in rural Jharkhand,
next door to Chhattisgarh.
FIVE BEST PRACTICES CAN SIGNIFICANTLY COMBAT
MICRONUTRIENT-LINKED DEFICIENCIES
Apart from providing macronutrients, India’s government has focused on
programmes to increase consumption of six essential micronutrients (iron, folic
acid, vitamin A, iodine, vitamin D, and zinc). There are two broad approaches
for delivering micronutrients: fortifying food items and providing supplemental
packets. Innovative implementation can save considerable resources; it has been
estimated that these interventions could work for only $600 million per year (less
than 4 percent of food subsidy spending in 2010).93
We examined more than 60 innovative models (20 Indian and 40 international) in
food and nutrition. From the 32 most promising models, we found a set of best
practices for micronutrient delivery, based on their applicability and potential to be
scaled up across India (Exhibit 80).94
93 Susan Horton et al., Scaling up nutrition: What will it cost? World Bank, 2010.
94 Models with the same features but implemented in different geographies were
not considered.

192
We examined 32 nutritional programmes employing innovations in
technology, awareness building, and delivery
SOURCE: Literature review; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
Exhibit 80
1 Micronutrient Initiative, an organization working in food fortification across the world.
2 Global Association for Improved Nutrition, an organization working in nutrition across the world.
3 Includes the Micronesian, Melanesian, and Polynesian island groups.
Sources of Innovation
Country Model Technological Awareness Delivery
India Bhavishya Alliance
Britannia (Naandi)
Doodh Sanjivani, Gujarat
Double fortified salt (MI1)
Mumbai Maternal Nutrition Project
Municipal Corporation of Delhi
Oil (Cargill)
Rice (Abbott)
Rice, school (Naandi)
Solid Bano
Sprinkles
Tamil Nadu community program (MI1)
Zinc (MI1)
Bangladesh Golden rice
Grameen Danone
Sprinkles
Bolivia GAIN2
China UNICEF
Colombia School programme
Ecuador GAIN2
Germany Germany community programme
Haiti Medika Mamba
Kenya Insta porridge
Mexico Liconsa
Nigeria MI1
Pacific Region3 Pacific community programme
Philippines Golden rice
Poland Food labels
South Africa UNICEF
Uganda HarvestPlus
United States Hawaii school programme
Global Micronutrients (Heinz)

A study of these 32 models yields the following five best practices:
ƒƒ Use technology to add micronutrients to locally produced foods. Widely
consumed local staples such as rice, oil, and salt are potent vehicles for
micronutrients. The Philippines and Bangladesh have launched large-scale
production of golden rice, which adds beta carotene (which the body converts
to vitamin A), while Uganda and Mozambique have begun to grow orange-
fleshed sweet potatoes with added vitamin A. Mexico’s Liconsa project
provides children from low-income families with low-cost milk fortified with
vitamins A, C, B12, and D, iron, zinc, and folic acid.
ƒƒ Ensure that fortified foods meet local cultural norms and appeal to
local tastes. The item must be a tasty staple of the local community, leading
to easy adoption. For example, green leafy vegetables, fruit, and milk are
combined into savoury snacks like samosas that are cooked fresh each day
and distributed to maternal centres in Mumbai as part of the Mumbai Maternal
Nutrition Project.
ƒƒ Integrate micronutrients with government food transfers such as PDS
and school meals. Micronutrient-enriched foods can be featured in child
nutrition and midday meal programmes. For example, in Hawaii, distribution
is carried out as part of the National School Lunch Program, the Summer
Food Service Program, the Afterschool Snack Program, the School Breakfast
Program, and the Special Milk Program.
ƒƒ Involve the private sector and local communities. The production and
distribution channels of for-profit companies and NGOs can be used to
increase the delivery of nutrition. For example, Britannia has developed special
5-mg iron-fortified Tiger biscuits being distributed by the Naandi Foundation
to supplement school feeding programmes in Hyderabad for close to 150,000
children. “Shakti Doi”, or fortified yogurt, is distributed house to house by local
“Grameen ladies” in the Grameen Danone Bangladesh project.
ƒƒ Educate and build awareness through multiple channels. Schools,
hospitals, nutritional delivery services, local community organisations, mass
media, and social media can help raise awareness about nutritional needs
and cultivate better habits. In Tamil Nadu, for example, there has been a
holistic use of government nutrition delivery programmes (the Integrated Child
Development Services), health delivery services (primary health centres),
and “women’s working groups”, which mentor families from a nutritional
perspective. A variety of communications strategies, such as flash cards for
the primary target group of mothers, mothers-in-law, and fathers, and popular
films, pamphlets, and street plays deliver messages more broadly.

194
Education: Innovative approaches can improve
learning outcomes
A basic assessment of India’s education system shows that the quality of
instruction is the biggest issue, followed by access. The net enrolment ratio is
91 percent for primary schools, but lack of effective engagement in classrooms
contributes to a high dropout rate at the upper primary level, where the net
enrolment ratio drops to 64 percent. By the upper secondary level, the ratio is
just 36 percent.95
Assessment scores reinforce these concerns about quality.
Students from the perceived best-performing states of Tamil Nadu and Himachal
Pradesh had lower scores in math, science, and reading in the Programme for
International Student Assessment 2009 than China, the United States, Malaysia,
Brazil, Indonesia, and virtually all other countries that participated in the OECD
testing programme.
Improving quality and access will require extensive focus on three key
performance areas: teaching, performance assessment, and school leadership.
Teachers are vital to the success of any education intervention—but in India,
they often lack training and incentives. Providing them with better motivation,
tools, and support is paramount. Basic standardised assessment procedures
are completely missing at the elementary school level, especially in government
schools; implementing systems to measure current performance and areas for
improvement is critical. Finally, strengthening school leadership is vital to make
sure that each unit in the huge education superstructure can be more effective.
We examined 100 interventions in education (30 Indian and 70 international),
shortlisting 22 models that are particularly relevant to India (Exhibit 81).96
Examining these models yields six promising ideas and practices for improving
primary and secondary schools in India. Operators of low-cost private schools
have the flexibility to implement some of these ideas. The government can do
its part by removing regulatory barriers that may prevent widespread adoption
of all best practices and by embracing these ideas in its own government-run or
PPP schools.
ƒƒ Create incentives that reward schools and teachers for outcomes. While
the success of the charter school movement is still uneven in the United
States, it is a model with interesting potential applications in India. Charter
schools have to fulfil pre-determined goals and learning outcomes in order
to be re-authorised; this leads to greater accountability for performance—
and the best charter schools may outperform standard public schools by
25 to 30 percent. One method that is increasingly being adopted around
the world to boost learning outcomes is performance pay for teachers.
One study of incentive programmes adopted in the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh found that bonuses had a large and significant impact on learning
outcomes.97
Another approach being piloted by the Centre for Civil Society
in Delhi, Uttarakhand, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh is the use of vouchers;
this introduces competitive pressure on participating schools to improve
performance in order to gain enrolment share.
95 District Information System for Education 2012–13.
not considered.
97 Karthik Muralidharan, Long-term effects of teacher performance pay: Experimental evidence
from India, September 2011.

Innovative educational models can effectively reach low-income children
Exhibit 81
Primary
location
Developing
countries
Developed
countries, but
expanding in
developing
countries
Spectrum of service delivery
Holistic delivery Supplementary models
Pratham
India
BRAC schools
Bangladesh
Bridge International
Academies
Kenya
Satya Bharti schools
India
Azim Premji
Foundation
India
AID India
India
Eklavya
India
Escuela Nueva
Project
Vietnam
Minas Gerais
Assessment System
Brazil
Khan Academy
United States
Gyanshala
India
Naandi NEST
Centres
India
Central Square
Foundation
India
Centre for Civil
Society
India
Educational
Initiatives
India
Kaivalya Education
Foundation
India
Charter schools
Global
Kunskapsskolan
School System
Sweden
Jordan Education
Initiative
Jordan
ARK
United Kingdom
School voucher
system
Sweden
STIR Education
United Kingdom
ƒƒ Recruit local teachers and administrators to increase accountability to
the community and lower costs. Hiring from the local community enables
teachers to better connect with students; it also puts reputational pressure
on the teacher to deliver. Some communities may not have a sufficient pool
of potential teachers with the right capabilities, but this can be overcome
by organising focused training “boot camps” and providing extensive
support. Gyanshala in India and BRAC in Bangladesh have both tapped
local community members to provide high-quality education at a low cost. A
typical BRAC teacher would be a female community member with ten years
of schooling who is provided with an initial 12-day training course to reinforce
the basics of teaching and subsequently participates in monthly subject-based
refresher courses.
ƒƒ “Flip” the classroom through blended learning. Traditionally teachers are
forced to spend too much time delivering lectures and are able to spend too
little time in one-on-one interactions with students, helping them practice
problem solving. Today, standardised high-quality content is available that
enables students to listen to content lectures on their own time, at their own
level, and at their own pace. Once the students have done this new form of
“homework”, they can solve traditional homework problems in class, giving
teachers leeway to spend individual time and help each student with their
own questions. Technology can be a breakthrough tool in this regard, with
video tutorials developed for both teachers and students. Khan Academy,
for example, has developed more than 4,000 videos across a wide variety of
K–12 subjects. Its videos and personalised assessment systems can support

196
classroom instruction and allow students to absorb material at their own pace.
The Azim Premji Foundation has already dubbed 38 Khan Academy videos in
Hindi, Tamil, and Kannada, with plans to complete more in the coming years.
ƒƒ Frequently assess and share results. With standardised assessments in
place at various levels, data analytics can track progress and weaknesses at
the district, school, teacher, and student levels. Currently, Indian teachers are
supposed to develop their own assessments, mark them, and communicate
to students. As a result, assessments have functioned only as an end-of-
year stage gate. In Brazil, Minas Gerais has pioneered the use of technology
to generate assessments regularly, monitor performance, and chart each
student’s trajectory, weak points, and areas for focus. Khan Academy
takes this to another level: it has introduced modular assessments with a
“100 percent right” philosophy. A student will take an exam after every module
and will have to demonstrate 100 percent proficiency (while being allowed to
take computer-generated exams as many times as desired) to ensure that the
concept is truly understood before the student moves on. A comprehensive
assessment system also helps to involve parents and families. In India,
Pratham’s ASER is a powerful survey initiative that has brought national
attention to the need for assessments. Government investment in technology
could enable regular and easy-to-manage assessments as a public good.
ƒƒ Empower and support school leadership. School principals can be thought
of as CEOs (with commensurate capability, training, and incentives) running
the school, rather than as senior teachers promoted to carry out administrative
duties. Under Bridge International Academies’ franchise model, school
managers are responsible for school performance; their salaries and bonuses
are linked to this performance (see Box 21, “Low-cost quality education
through innovation: Bridge International Academies”). Bridge also extensively
trains and supports school management with detailed procedures for financial
and operational management, dashboards, and tracking of performance
metrics. This enables principals to devote more time to overseeing teachers
and engaging with parents. In India, the Azim Premji Foundation and the India
School Leadership Institute are investing in taking school leaders to the next
level through high-level training and development.
ƒƒ Focus on cost-effective expansion using technology and existing
resources. Building widespread access while containing costs is the need
of the hour. Any rupee saved is a rupee spent on educating a child. A
heightened focus on cost saving can reduce capital and operating expenses.
One successful approach is to maximise existing resources: Pratham in India
and BRAC in Bangladesh, for instance, have partnered with governments to
use public infrastructure for their teaching programmes. This has removed
the need for heavy investment to reach scale while ensuring that the most
underprivileged children are given easy access.

Box 21. Low-cost quality education through innovation: Bridge International Academies
Kenya’s per capita income is nearly half of India’s, and
its human development indicators are comparable
or lower. But Kenya is making remarkable strides in
education, thanks to the efforts of several development
organisations and innovative private-sector initiatives
such as Bridge International Academies.
A for-profit chain of primary schools, Bridge
International Academies operates 134 schools in
Kenya and has educated more than 50,000 students
from disadvantaged backgrounds. To keep schooling
affordable but maintain high quality, Bridge has lowered
costs by 80 percent through its “academy in a box”
approach. This model incorporates the use of mobile
phones, tablets, and customised text messages to
reduce the costs of teaching, training, assessments,
outreach, and school management. Technology also
creates highly standardised operating procedures
across schools. To address a shortage of qualified
teachers, the company hires and intensively trains
secondary school graduates instead of government-
certified teachers, with no compromise on quality. It
also greatly reduces the capital expenditures involved
in building new schools by using simple methods and
affordable materials such as iron sheeting and wooden
frames. As a result, spending per student by Bridge is
estimated to be much lower than at most other schools.
The learning outcomes achieved by Bridge Academies
have been consistently higher than those achieved by
Kenya’s government-run schools. For instance, reading
fluency is 120 percent higher than at government
schools, and math abilities are higher by nearly
30 percent. This model could be particularly relevant
to India, where quality teachers are in short supply,
administrative costs are high, and the community is not
engaged in the education process.
Health care: New models for expanding effective,
affordable care
The Indian health-care system faces multiple problems. Chief among them is
poor access to primary and preventive health care, accompanied by the growing
incidence but poor detection and treatment of chronic ailments.
India’s 12th Five Year Plan acknowledged these limitations and set out the
objective of universal health coverage, under which “each individual would
have assured access to a defined essential range of medicines and treatment
at an affordable price, which should be entirely free for a large percentage of
population”. The basic care package it outlines includes primary and preventive
care delivered through primary health centres and sub-centres as well as basic
secondary health care delivered through secondary centres and district hospitals.
This goal needs to be viewed in the context of the starting point: extremely
inadequate health infrastructure and human resources.
Unlike food and education (particularly primary schooling), where a minimum level
of access is already present, India is at an early stage of its journey in health care.
The goal should be to build adequate physical infrastructure and human resource
capacity, as was done for primary schools over the past decade.
Market-driven solutions of adequate quality are not likely to proliferate in
underserved rural areas without substantial help and involvement from the
government. At the same time, government-only systems are often inefficient
and face major challenges in developing trained health-care workers without
substantial support and involvement from the private and social sectors and
local communities.

198
A government-financed effort to build the health-care network using a PPP or
contracting model that actively engages external agents and communities in
different elements of health-care delivery, with widespread use of technology,
could produce better outcomes. This is an opportunity for India to make bold
choices in designing a health-care system that works.
We examined more than 200 models (18 Indian and 188 international) to look
for insights and inspiration to address these issues, shortlisting 20 models with
particular relevance to India.98
Scalability is a big issue in health care, and it is
difficult to ascertain if these models will succeed in the future, but each of them
shows promise (Exhibit 82).
Approaches from innovative health-care programmes around the world
can be scaled up across India
Exhibit 82
Primary
location
Rural areas
Urban poor areas
Health services
Preventive cure and primary care1
(not including emergency services)
Chronic disease2
focus
Saúde da Familia
Brazil
Chunampet Rural
Diabetes Prevention
Project
India
YMCA Diabetes
Prevention Program
United States
HIV/AIDS home-
based care
Zambia
Presbyterian
Healthcare Services
United States
DiabetIMMS
Mexico
Health
Management
and Research
Institute
India
Medicall Home
Mexico
Greenstar Social
Marketing
Pakistan
Living Goods
Uganda
HealthKeepers
Network
Ghana
Lady Health
Workers
Pakistan
Behvarz Village
Workers
Iran
SughaVazhvu
HealthCare
India
First Care Rural
Health Project
India
CARE Rural
Health Mission
India
Smile on Wheels
India
Arogya Ghar
India
Healthpoint
Services India
India
Mobile Medics
Healthcare
India
1 Refers to services that are the first point of consultation for patients within the health-care system (does not include
ancillary models).
2 Refers to conditions or diseases that are persistent or have long-lasting effects. Common chronic diseases include
diabetes, cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and HIV/AIDS.
not considered.

Given the magnitude of India’s current health-care gaps, there is ample room—
and a strong need—for multiple models to proliferate, and many of them can
complement the existing government system. As we looked at these models, the
following insights emerge:
ƒƒ Build human resource capacity through focused training. There is a
strong need to focus on developing more skilled health-care professionals at
all levels. SughaVazhvu, currently focused on providing primary and preventive
care in rural Tamil Nadu, offers one interesting approach. It taps into the large
Ayurveda, Siddha, and Unani talent pool of 750,000 registered practitioners
qualified in different forms of alternative medicine. They receive a three-month
training and certification programme to provide health services as physicians
and are supported by strong protocols for detection and treatment. In
addition, the programme trains someone from each community to assist the
physician as a health extension worker who facilitates screening, follow-up
visits, and community engagement activities. Another notable example is the
Health Management and Research Institute (HMRI), which provides mobile
and remote health services in Andhra Pradesh; it has trained almost 24,000
rural medical practitioners. Overseas, Zambia’s home-based care model for
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis has mobilised teams of community nurses and
health workers to care for patients at home and train family members to
provide additional care themselves, thus relieving some of the pressure on the
overburdened formal health-care system. In Malawi, RapidSMS allows health
workers to enter a child’s data from automated basic diagnostic tests that
use a feedback loop system to instantly alert field monitors to their patients’
nutritional status. This system strengthens local ownership of the surveillance
programme through a two-way information exchange at a much lower cost
than traditional data collection systems. Pakistan’s Greenstar Social Marketing
has trained more than 24,000 health-care providers who now earn a living by
providing birth control consultation, guidance, and sales of basic products to
families out of a network of 80,000 retail outlets.
ƒƒ Engage with the community. Given the high degree of trust involved in health
care, almost all successful models focus on building relationships with the
community. In return, the community provides human resources, facilities,
cooperation, and valuable information on local health needs. In Iran, Behvarz
village health workers undergo an extensive two-year training programme
and earn incentives if they can lower the rate of illnesses reoccurring in
their communities. In India, Chunampet Rural Diabetes Prevention Project,
a successful model of chronic disease detection and treatment, focused on
engagement through various approaches (an extensive awareness campaign;
training of health-care workers to detect symptoms and refer patients to
clinics; and treatment delivered at the patient’s doorstep). CARE Rural Health
Mission trains local workers as “village health champions” (VHC) who can
deliver some primary care and basic services in homes across 50 villages
while also focusing on patient compliance with treatment regimes. Each VHC
is equipped with electronic devices that connect with doctors if more complex
cases arise.

200
ƒƒ Use technology to augment the system. Using the latest medical
technology has a direct impact on improving outcomes, but even simple use
of computers, mobile phones, and tablets can go a long way in streamlining
operations and overcoming constraints (see Box 22, “OpASHA: Transforming
tuberculosis treatment”). For example, Medicall Home in Mexico provides
remote care to people in rural areas through the use of mobile phones.
Arogya Ghar in India creates a database of symptoms and diseases to provide
better diagnosis in the future. Healthpoint Services offers video-conferencing
services with urban doctors in more than 70 health points (micro-clinics) in
Punjab. SughaVazhvu provides each patient with a bar-coded identity card
that a physician can use to track medical records. New products are being
developed to transform the delivery of basic services, such as the Swasthya
Slate (health tablet), which is being used in India to perform diagnostic tests
(such as blood pressure or blood sugar readings, haemoglobin, heart rate, and
ECG monitoring) remotely, at a fraction of the cost of traditional diagnostics.
ƒƒ Emphasise systems and protocol. Standardised approaches to diagnosis
and adherence to treatment protocols are vital to maintaining standards of
care and addressing the shortage of highly trained practitioners. Medicall,
for example, uses standard telemedicine clinical protocols for diagnosis
(developed by the Cleveland Clinic in the United States) and outlines criteria
for escalating to urgent or non-urgent referrals. Strong protocols have been
designed by SughaVazhvu in partnership with the University of Pennsylvania.
Box 22. OpASHA: Transforming tuberculosis treatment
India has the highest burden of tuberculosis in the world, with an estimated
two million cases annually (over 20 percent of global incidence).The World
Health Organisation estimates that nearly 300,000 Indians die of TB
every year.
Operation ASHA is revolutionising new approaches to fight TB—and doing
so at one-nineteenth the cost of conventional treatment. Operating in
India and Cambodia, it reaches out to 6.1 million people in 3,000 slums
and villages. The programme has treated more than 30,000 tuberculosis
patients in both countries and prevented millions of additional cases. Its
eCompliance tracking system verifies patient enrolment and treatment
against records from government labs, hospitals, and medicine warehouses.
A portable biometric identification system using fingerprints is employed
every time the patient receives a dose of medication, and programme
managers receive a text message to follow up whenever a patient misses a
dose. Local semi-literate youth are recruited as counselors and assigned to
canvas slums and villages to spread awareness, administer treatment, and
follow up in case of lapses. They ride from village to village on motorcycles
providing TB medication and collecting sputum samples for testing and
diagnosis. Additional TB centres have been located in the homes and offices
of local micro-entrepreneurs, and homemakers in order to expand the
programme’s reach.

* * *
The delivery of basic services is uniquely challenging in a nation of 1.2 billion
people with pressing needs. Limited budgets and a shortage of skilled human
resources magnify the difficulties of extending vital services to city slums
and remote villages alike. But a wave of innovation and a greater sense of
accountability in the public sector can overcome these hurdles. India has the
opportunity to achieve a 50 percent improvement in the efficiency of public
spending on basic services, but a business-as-usual approach will not be enough
to make rapid gains of this magnitude. Fresh solutions, from simple process
improvements to the introduction of technology, can ensure that every rupee
spent delivers more impact. Many of these ideas can be readily applied—and if
governments at all levels are willing to take bold action, these reforms can have
an immediate impact on India’s human development.

203
It is a harsh reality that 680 million Indians lack the means to achieve minimum
acceptable standards of living. If India’s recent slowdown in economic growth
continues, it is likely that some 470 million of them would remain below the
Empowerment Line in 2022, and 12 percent of the population would remain
trapped in extreme poverty. Beyond the economic and political implications of
these numbers, they represent millions of lives spent in hardship.
India can and must do better—and today there is an opportunity to change those
outcomes. Looking ahead to 2022, it is possible to create much better odds
that the average Indian family can meet their essential economic needs. The
path of inclusive reforms has the potential to bring the share of those below the
Empowerment Line to 7 percent by 2022 and come close to eradicating extreme
poverty by bringing it down to less than 1 percent of the population.
Unleashing the level of productivity growth and job creation needed to raise
living standards, however, will require deep reforms that remove barriers to
competitiveness and investment. Policy makers can set this process in motion
by focusing on infrastructure, the administrative and regulatory burden facing
businesses, tax and product market reforms, land market reform, labour market
flexibility, and vocational education. These changes can set off a virtuous cycle of
growth that generates more revenue, enabling India to meet its fiscal targets even
as it ploughs additional funding back into social infrastructure.
The first step towards this goal is focusing political will on the four major priorities
outlined in this report: creating jobs, raising farm yields, expanding access to
basic services (especially health care, water, and sanitation) through moderate
spending increases, and delivering basic services more efficiently. The central
government can set an agenda that advances these national priorities, with
funding commitments to match, and can put in place the enablers that will
support broad economic growth: infrastructure for power and logistics, the right
taxation structure, investment in job-creation engines, and measures that expand
financial and digital inclusion.
While action is needed at the central level, much of the innovation and leadership
can come from India’s states, which have the ability to start implementing various
reforms and governance ideas almost immediately. State governments can, for
example, select four to six high-priority initiatives based on their most urgent
needs and then harness the energy and resources needed to see them through—
whether the goal is creating one million jobs in the tourism sector or improving the
PDS efficiency rate by 20 percentage points.
10. The way forward

204
In some areas, states may need to frame new investment programmes.
For example, the initiatives for job creation would vary based on the natural
resources, competitive advantages, skills, and capital available in each region; it
may be textiles or leather complexes in one region, education or IT service hubs
in others, tourism or agro-processing zones elsewhere. The state government
would need to develop master plans for these undertakings, each with a strong
business case. In other areas, the states can start implementing ideas rapidly,
especially those that involve simplifying and rationalising existing procedures
and programmes. These may include reforming the PDS, reducing the red
tape hindering businesses, modernising land records, or creating coordinated
agricultural missions.
Another key element will be changing the focus of public servants from process
and procedures to achieving meaningful outcomes; this will involve establishing
the right metrics for success and continuously monitoring progress towards
those goals. One approach could involve setting up an implementation office to
support each chief minister in establishing targets with concrete milestones and
ensuring results. This office would enable top leadership to monitor progress
through weekly reports and daily interventions. It would also ensure a high level
of disclosure and public transparency. Each state government could, for example,
publicise its targets and give a “report card” to the people every quarter on
progress towards outcomes within each priority area. Such models have been
successful in other countries in accelerating critical national missions such as
rural drinking water and schooling.99
Governments at every level have a role to play in spurring job creation and
delivering basic services. Some of these potential themes are relevant for the
central government, some for the states—and still others may have areas of
overlap that require partnership and coordination. Exhibit 83 summarises the
broad ideas for reform outlined in this report and offers a breakdown of how these
lines could be drawn.
The government’s efforts to create a business climate that is more conducive
to growth will be critical to building greater confidence among the companies,
investors, and entrepreneurs who ultimately will have to drive most of the job
creation and productivity gains that can raise incomes. It will also be important
to find ways to work with the private sector—along with the social sector and
NGOs—to bring in greater innovation and new operating models that can better
deliver basic services. And above all, citizens can do their part by adding their
voices to the growing public call for greater accountability that can push through
comprehensive reforms.
99 Eoin Daly and Seelan Singham, “Jumpstarting Malaysia’s growth: An interview with Idris Jala”,
The McKinsey Quarterly, October 2011.

Both central and state governments can advance inclusive reforms
Exhibit 83
Most relevant to
Priority Key themes Centre State
Accelerating
non-farm job
creation
Building critical infrastructure for power and logistics  
Reducing the administrative burden on businesses 
Removing tax and product-market distortions  
Rationalising land markets 
Taking phased steps to make labour markets more flexible  
Helping poor workers build skills with government-funded mechanisms 
Investing in job-creation engines  
Improving farm
productivity
Enabling private trade by reforming APMC acts 
Using technology for better price discovery 
Rationalising price supports for agricultural produce  
Introducing hybrid public-private crop insurance programmes  
Providing financial incentives to adopt new technology  
Overhauling the public extension network and enhancing private-sector
participation 
Improving farmers’ access to credit  
Reforming land markets and creating an institutional framework to promote
leasing 
Integrating governance of agriculture at a grassroots level 
Increasing public
spending on
basic services
Increasing spending at about 7 percent per annum over the next 10 years  
Rebalancing spending to focus on health care  
Taking into account current levels of access deprivation when allocating
spending by district  
Improving the
efficiency of
public spending
Reforming the Public Distribution System 
Launching pilots for cash transfers in urban areas 
Improving delivery of micronutrients  
Innovating to improve learning outcomes 
Integrating technology and human resource innovations in health care 
Key governance
themes
Setting up empowered agencies for high-priority initiatives, with operational
flexibility but strict accountability for outcomes  
Creating public transparency through greater government disclosure and
technology in government  
Decentralising funds, functions, and functionaries  
Introducing talent development and performance management in government  
Building a robust anti-corruption framework  
Simplifying laws and building legal and judicial capacity  

206
* * *
Today a new generation of Indians is increasingly unwilling to accept anything
less than a decent standard of living for all. They aspire to build a nation where all
citizens can fulfil their inherent rights to food, shelter, health care, basic dignity,
and economic opportunity. The priorities and approaches outlined in this report
can provide the building blocks for a new reform agenda, and India’s central and
state governments could move rapidly to advance these goals. With sufficient
political will, a commitment to good governance, and a more innovative approach
to service delivery, India can shape a future without the scourge of poverty—a
future in which the poor are finally empowered to realise their own economic and
human potential.

209
These technical notes provide detail on some of the definitions and
methodologies used in this report. We address the following points:
A. Estimating the Empowerment Line
B. Estimating the value of public spending on basic services that reaches
the population
C. Calculating Access Deprivation Scores and determining district archetypes
D. Constructing scenarios
E. Framework for strengthening accountabilities
F. Major government programmes
Appendix A: Estimating the Empowerment Line
To construct the Empowerment Line, we first estimate the economic cost per
capita (the “normative spending requirement”) of a minimum acceptable level of
consumption across eight basic services: food, health care, education, sanitation,
drinking water (including water for domestic use, such as ablutions), housing, fuel,
and social security. In addition, there is a residual category, “others”, that captures
other consumption requirements essential to ensuring a minimum decent
standard of living (e.g., clothing, footwear, communication, and entertainment).
We then subtract current public spending on these basic services that is
estimated to reach the population (an approach detailed in Appendix B) to
arrive at the minimum acceptable level of per capita consumption needed for
a citizen to be considered economically “empowered”. After accounting for
current government spending, the national Empowerment Line is approximately
13 percent less than the normative spending requirement for 2011–12 (Exhibit A1).
The National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) conducts consumption surveys that
detail the monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of households across the
country. These MPCE estimates are “net” of the benefits that people receive;
for example, they take into account the money that people spend in buying
subsidised rice from the Public Distribution System. Thus, to estimate the extent
of poverty in relation to a normative line and to the MPCE metrics, we need to
subtract the current public spending on basic services that are already reaching
the people.
Appendix: Technical notes

210
The average Indian requires INR 1,544 per month to achieve an acceptable
minimum standard of living; after adjusting for government subsidies,
the All-India Empowerment Line is INR 1,336 per month
Exhibit A1
1,420
1,922
221
30
154
96
45
30
195
157
617
1,544
Rural
Urban
Total
Others4
Social security
Fuel3
Housing
Drinking water
Sanitation
Education2
Health1
Food
1,228
1,692
221
16
128
82
45
30
106
127
580
1,336
1 Adjustment for value of subsidies in sanitation and drinking water is included under health, since they form part of the
government health budget.
2 Includes elementary and secondary education.
3 Includes under recoveries by oil marketing companies.
4 Includes clothing, footwear, travel, entertainment, communication, domestic appliances.
Total monthly expenditure per capita required for
a minimum acceptable standard of living, 2011–12
INR
Normative spend Empowerment Line
ADS =
a1
2 + a2
2 + a3
2 … + a9
2
√
9√
Estimates of normative spending requirements were done for each state (and
across both rural and urban parts of the state). The national Empowerment Line is
calculated by taking the population-weighted average of Empowerment Lines for
each state at the rural and urban levels (e.g., rural Odisha, urban Maharashtra).
To ensure that the Empowerment Line is relevant in the Indian context, we
have relied on externally determined benchmarks across basic services. For
example, our water benchmarks (70 litres per capita per day in rural areas and
135 litres per capita per day in urban areas) are drawn from the work of the High
Powered Expert Committee on Urbanisation to the Planning Commission and the
Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation.
The following methodologies for determining normative costs were applied to
each basic service:
ƒƒ Food: The minimum requirements of 2,400 calories per day for a rural resident
and 2,100 per day for an urban resident were first recommended by the Alagh
Committee in 1979. We validated these using activity-based calorie norms set
by the Indian Council of Medical Research and the current mix of occupations
in rural and urban areas. The current daily requirements are estimated to be
around 2,300 to 2,400 calories per day for an average individual in rural areas
and about 2,000 to 2,100 calories for an average individual in urban areas,
so we have retained the norms set by the Alagh Committee. The normative
cost of food required to meet these calorie requirements was estimated

by taking the ratio of rupees per calorie for those at the official poverty line
and multiplying that by the minimum calorie requirements. For example, in
Chhattisgarh, the average person living in a rural area at the official poverty
line consumes 2,207 calories at a cost of Rs. 286 per month.100
To consume
the target of 2,400 calories, an individual would need to spend an average
of Rs. 311 per month. We also recognise that in addition to calories, people
require other macronutrients. To this end, we estimated the gap in protein and
fat consumption against benchmarks set by the Council of Medical Research;
these were proportionately less than the calorie gap. For a typical poor person
deficient in calories, protein, and fat, any effort to bridge the calorie gap
through a greater consumption of the food basket is assumed to bridge the
gap in protein and fat consumption as well.
ƒƒ Drinking water: This actually refers to water used for all domestic purposes,
including drinking, washing, and cleaning. For rural areas, the Department
of Drinking Water and Sanitation estimates an individual should have access
to 70 litres per day. We use the per capita monthly cost of piped water
supply, according to official statistics, and index the cost by state on the
basis of an index of construction costs. For urban areas, the High Powered
Expert Committee on Urbanisation to the Planning Commission estimates
an individual should have access to 135 litres of water per day. We estimate
the per capita monthly cost of piped water supply, including investment
and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, by state using an index of
construction costs.
ƒƒ Sanitation: For rural areas, we estimate the amortised annual capital cost
and O&M cost of providing a household latrine in both general and hilly
states, based on assumptions provided under the Indian government’s
Total Sanitation Campaign. This is then converted into a per capita monthly
cost and is indexed by state according to our construction index. For urban
areas, based on assumptions used by the High Powered Expert Committee
on Urbanisation to the Planning Commission, we estimate the per capita
investment cost for sewerage and solid waste management as well as per
capita O&M costs for each, which is likewise indexed by state according to our
construction index.
ƒƒ Housing: A rural house has been assumed have a plinth area (interior space
plus walls) of 20 square metres or 215 square feet, based on norms used
in the Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY). For rural areas, we estimate the amortised
annual capital cost (based on estimated used for capital cost in IAY) and
O&M cost of providing a house in both general and hilly states, which is then
converted into a per capita monthly cost. This is indexed by state according
to our construction index. For urban areas, we used estimates of the cost of
an average house by three tiers of cities based on population (the bigger cities
having, on average, more expensive housing) plus the annual operating cost of
a dwelling. In estimating the cost of a house, the land cost, construction cost,
and a profit margin for the developer have been assumed. These assumptions
were first highlighted in an earlier report by MGI on urbanisation.101
100 National Sample Survey Office, 68th round.
101 India’s urban awakening: Building inclusive cities, sustaining economic growth, McKinsey
Global institute, April 2010.

212
ƒƒ Education: The normative spending requirement on education is determined
through a bottom-up cost estimate for providing a “quality” education for each
child, with infrastructure-related “quality” determined by adherence to Right
to Education norms on pupil-teacher and student-classroom ratios. The cost
includes the teacher salary, classroom costs, equipment costs, and other
expenses. These are developed for primary and secondary schools in both
rural and urban areas. The cost per child is then indexed by state according
to the wages of salaried employees (to reflect the likely differences in teacher
salaries) as an indexing factor. Based on multiple expert and practitioner
interviews, and McKinsey’s experience working with Indian schools, this level
of expenditure is seen to be sufficient to deliver learning outcomes at a par
with the nation’s better-functioning schools.
ƒƒ Health care: We use the estimates of the cost of providing universal health
coverage as developed by the National Commission for Macroeconomics
and Health in 2005. These are provided for both “general category” states
and “special category” states. Both estimates are adjusted according to the
cost inflation index cited by High Level Expert Group on Universal Health
Care to the Planning Commission. The cost of providing universal health
coverage was estimated by constructing a package of basic health-care
interventions, including, for example, outpatient treatment for childhood and
maternal diseases, vector-borne diseases, and tuberculosis; basic health-care
services provided at community health centres, such as inpatient treatment
for hypertension and major surgeries; secondary care at district hospitals for
cancer and cardiovascular disease; and other treatments.
ƒƒ Fuel: We use Khandker’s estimates of the minimum monthly per capita cost
of energy for both rural and urban populations.102
This is indexed on the
basis of relative electricity costs by state for those in the relevant deciles of
consumption. As part of this effort, we have not made any judgments on the
sources of fuel but only on the amount of money that needs to be set aside for
fuel-related expenses.
ƒƒ Social security: On the basis of a benchmarking of public and private social
security and insurance programmes, we estimate a premium-to-coverage ratio
of 2 percent. Coverage in this case is the normative spending requirement for
the eight basic services plus others.
ƒƒ Others: Consumption of all other items is measured for those at the official
poverty line and held constant for the purposes of the Empowerment Line.
This is a conservative assumption, as households above the poverty line
(but below the Empowerment Line) are likely to allocate a greater amount of
their consumption budget to other items beyond the basket of eight essential
services due to their higher spending power, but we retain the minimum
acceptable standard at the level of the official poverty line for this element
of consumption.
102 Shahidur Khandker, Douglas F. Barnes, and Hussain A. Samad, “Are the energy poor also
income poor? Evidence from India”, Energy Policy, volume 47, August 2012.

Appendix B: Estimating the value of public spending
on basic services reaching the people
India’s public spending on basic services was about Rs. 570,000 crore
($118 billion) at current prices in 2012. This was calculated based on information
published annually as part of the Indian Public Finance Statistics by India’s
Ministry of Finance. Estimating how much of this spending actually reaches
the people by way of benefits is crucial to determining the effectiveness of
public spending.
In an ideal scenario, the best way to estimate the efficiency of public spending
would be to look at the flow of money across the physical value chain up to the
end consumer. In the absence of a financial audit that reveals this information and
given the limitations of available data, we relied on estimates. These approximate
calculations and estimates point to the broad extent of inefficiencies in public
spending on basic services.
We use the terms “efficiency” and “effectiveness” interchangeably. We typically
use “efficiency” whenever we can estimate the amount of money spent vs. the
amount that reaches the people (or the end customer), as with food and fuel
subsidies and the MNREGA programme. We typically use “effectiveness” when
we compare spending levels against outcomes and assess whether outcomes
achieved are commensurate with the level of spending on the basic service (e.g.,
in education and health care). We combine both “efficiency” and “effectiveness”
estimates to arrive at the overall efficiency of public spending (that is, the value
of goods reaching the people as a percent of the total public spending on basic
services). Below we describe our methodology for arriving at these estimates for
food and nutrition, fuel, education, health, MNREGA, and housing.
food and nutrition
Public spending on food can broadly be categorised into spending on the Public
Distribution System (PDS) and spending on other nutrition schemes (such as
midday meal schemes or nutrition schemes for women and children). In total,
the government directed Rs. 77,000 crore ($16 billion) to food and nutrition in
2011–12. We use the estimated efficiency of the PDS, which accounted for about
85 percent of spending on food and nutrition in 2009–10, to estimate the value of
spending reaching the people.
For PDS efficiency, we estimated the annual worth of subsidies allocated to the
PDS channel. This is done by multiplying the quantity of food grain, in weight,
that is allocated to the PDS and the economic cost per unit weight of the
grains allocated; both figures are provided by the Food Corporation of India.
The allocated subsidy, in effect, is the input into the PDS channel. We then
calculate the economic worth of grains received by citizens, based on the NSSO
consumption survey for 2009–10. The ratio of the economic worth received by the
people to the amount allocated to the PDS is the estimated efficiency of public
spending on food.
It is important to note that these efficiency estimates do not include the potential
to reduce costs further (and hence reduce the economic cost per unit of grain
delivered) via improved operational efficiencies in the Food Corporation’s
supply chain.

214
Energy
We consider public spending on sources of fuel that are used by households
for cooking and lighting (kerosene, electricity, and liquefied petroleum gas, or
LPG). We have not considered diesel subsidies in this calculation, as petrol and
diesel represent a miniscule proportion of fuel used for cooking and lighting (they
account for 0.2 percent of expenditure in rural areas and 0.3 percent in urban
areas).103
In addition to the subsidies covered by the Indian Public Finance Statistics,
we have added under recoveries by the oil companies for kerosene and LPG,
as reported by the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell of India’s Ministry of
Petroleum and Natural Gas and for electricity as reported by the Power Finance
Corporation.104
All together, energy subsidies for households were about
Rs. 79,000 crore ($16 billion) in 2011–12.
Kerosene sold through the PDS accounted for about 43 percent of public
spending on fuel in 2009–10 (including under recoveries). Its efficiency is
estimated based on an approach similar to that for food grains, highlighted in
the food and nutrition section above. The efficiency of spending on LPG (which
accounts for 38 percent of public spending) and electricity (19 percent) was
harder to estimate due to a lack of reliable and complete information. As a result,
the efficiency of delivering kerosene is used as the proxy for other sources of fuel.
Education
The government spent an estimated Rs. 237,000 crore ($49 billion) on primary
and secondary schooling in 2011–12. The effectiveness of this spending is difficult
to quantify, as benefits received by households from government-run schools are
not reported or captured in surveys. Therefore, we examined relative effectiveness
across India’s states, which vary greatly in terms of education spending per capita
and educational outcomes.
Our approach to measuring the efficiency of educational spending is based on
the concept of the “efficiency frontier” (or the “productivity possibility frontier”).
There are multiple techniques for using this concept; the approach we found
most relevant (one that has commonly been used in the context of expenditure
analyses) is data envelopment analysis (DEA). It does not involve statistical
estimation but uses linear programming (or some other form of mathematical
programming) methods to characterise a set of efficient observations and
estimate efficiency based on the degree to which inefficient elements deviate from
the most efficient ones.105
In a general sense, education provision is efficient if it makes the best possible
use of available “inputs” (in this case, spending). Inefficiency would mean either
that learning outcomes could be improved without increasing spending or that
spending could be reduced without affecting learning outcomes (provided that
more efficiency is assured).
103 Energy sources of Indian households for cooking and lighting, National Sample Survey Office,
66th round, Government of India, 2012.
104 The loss to oil companies because of the difference in international prices of refined products
such as diesel and petroleum, and the price at which they are sold in the Indian market.
105 See Aleksander Aristovnik, An analysis of the efficiency of education spending in Central
and Eastern Europe, 2011; and Key education indicators on social inclusion and efficiency,
European Research Associates, October 2006.

To measure the relative efficiency of states in education using the DEA approach,
we used elementary education as being representative of the efficiency in the
system. We found that a “one-input and one-output” assumption was optimal
given the sample size and the need to ensure stability of the results.106
We use
two variables to create the input metric: spending as a percentage of GDP,
weighted with average years of schooling in the state. Two variables are used to
create the output metric: net enrolment rate weighted with learning outcomes.
The learning outcomes are measured based on an average pass percentage of
students in classes 1–8 (that is, passing ASER tests for relevant learning levels).
Based on these, we arrived at the efficiency of education across various states
and found that the mean efficiency is 51 percent.
Health
Public spending on health includes health care, drinking water, and sanitation,
and it came to Rs. 118,000 crore ($25 billion) in 2011–12. The DEA approach used
to calculate the efficiency of education spending (described above) was also used
here.107
In this context, the input metric used was spending as a percentage of GDP,
weighted by infrastructure density (defined as the number of health sub-centres,
primary health centres, community health centres, and district hospitals per
capita). For the output, we used the infant mortality rate as the indicator.
An alternate input variable was also used: spending as a percentage of GDP,
weighted by human resources density (defined as the number of doctors and
physicians per capita).
Using the “one-input and one-output” DEA for health spending results in an
average efficiency of 34 to 38 percent across all states. The mean efficiency was
36 percent.
MNREGA
The MNREGA, or Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act, aims “to provide 100 days of guaranteed wage employment in a financial
year to every rural household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled
manual work”.108
In 2011–12, some Rs. 38,000 ($8 billion) crore was spent on
this programme.
106 Miguel St. Aubyn et al., Study on the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending on
tertiary education, Economic papers 390, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs, European Commission, November 2009.
107 This approach has been employed, for example, in studies such as Isabelle Joumard,
Christophe André, and Chantal Nicq, Health care systems: Efficiency and institutions, OECD
Economics Department working paper number 769, May 2010; and Laura Asandului and
Puiu Fatulescu, Measuring the efficiency of EU health systems using data envelopment
analysis, 2012.
108 Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India.

216
To estimate its efficiency, we looked at the wage component of MNREGA
spending, which is typically in the range of 65 to 70 percent of total MNREGA
spending. We then looked at the average wage paid to individuals and the
number of days of work created under the MNREGA scheme to arrive at an
estimate of money reaching the households. Both these variables are obtained
from the National Sample Survey for 2009–10. The efficiency of MNREGA
spending, or the ratio of money reaching the targeted beneficiaries to the wage
component of MNREGA, is about 52 percent.109
Appendix C: Calculating Access Deprivation Scores
and determining district archetypes
Calculation of Access Deprivation Scores
There are several ways to aggregate the level of access to different basic services
across states and districts.110
We have created the Access Deprivation Score
(ADS), which uses six of the eight basic services in the consumption bundle
that makes up the Empowerment Line (health care, education, drinking water,
sanitation, housing, and energy). We do not include food, because access is
virtually universal and consumption is determined by factors that are not easily
quantifiable (for instance, Tamil Nadu and Kerala have low per capita calorie
consumption, probably driven by their low share of manual labourers). Nor do we
include social security, as access is sparse and data on the programmes are not
generally available at a district level.
The ADS represents the rough percentage of basic services to which an average
citizen of the district lacks access. A higher ADS implies greater deprivation—that
is, an ADS of 100 percent would imply complete deprivation in basic services,
while an ADS of 0 percent implies no deprivation. The average citizen of the
Araria district in Bihar, with an ADS of 67 percent, for example, lacks access
to 67 percent of the basic services and is worse off than a citizen in the Shimla
district of Himachal Pradesh with an ADS of 24 percent.
Along each of nine metrics, we use the percentage of households that lack
access. For instance, we use the percentage of households lacking access
to good or satisfactory housing. For education and health infrastructure, we
use well-accepted per capita norms to arrive at deprivation scores. Across all
the indicators, if the access metrics are better than norms, we assign a zero
deprivation score.
The nine metrics used to calculate the ADS are as follows:
ƒƒ Oral rehydration solution (ORS) usage: The percentage of children who had
diarrhoea in the two weeks before the survey and did not receive ORS. For
instance, 18 percent of the surveyed children in the Meerut district of Uttar
Pradesh who needed ORS treatment had received it; hence, ORS deprivation
109 This approach was highlighted by economist Surjit S. Bhalla in his article written with Sunil
Jain, “More bang for the buck from non-NREGA work”, Financial Express, February 24, 2011.
110 For other studies examining these differences across various regions of India, see Report of
the Committee for Evolving a Composite Development Index of States, Ministry of Finance,
Government of India, September 2013; and Bibek Debroy and Laveesh Bhandari, eds.,
District-level deprivation in the new millennium, Konark, 2003.

in Meerut is 82 percent. The data are drawn from the District-Level Health
Survey (DLHS), 2007–08.
ƒƒ Immunisation rate: The percentage of children between the ages of 12 and
23 months who are fully immunised with BCG (which prevents tuberculosis),
three doses each of DPT (which protects against diphtheria, pertussis, and
tetanus), polio, and measles. For example, 79 percent of surveyed children
in the Patiala district of Punjab are fully immunised, which translated into
immunisation deprivation of 21 percent. The data are drawn from the DLHS,
2007–08.
ƒƒ Health infrastructure: The ratio of per capita availability of subcentres,
primary health centres, community health centres, and district hospitals in
a given district to the norms recommended by the National Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health, 2005, for a given population. We have used the
norms for plains, which is one sub-centre for 5,000 residents, one primary
health centre for 30,000 residents, and one community health centre for
1.2 million residents. Data are drawn from the Rural Health Survey 2011, which
also provides data for urban health infrastructure.
ƒƒ Enrolment ratio: The average of the non-enrolment ratio at the primary and
upper primary levels. For example, if 10 percent of primary-age students
and 30 percent of secondary-age students in a district are not enrolled, the
enrolment ratio deprivation is 20 percent. The data are drawn from India’s
District Information System for Education (DISE), 2009–10.
ƒƒ Pupil-teacher ratio and student-classroom ratio: The average student-
classroom ratio (SCR) and pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) at the primary, upper
primary, secondary, and higher secondary levels, compared with the most
stringent Right to Education norm of 30 each. Based on principal component
analysis, these metrics were seen to be correlated and hence have been
combined by taking a simple average of the two. For example, if both ratios in
a district are 40, then the deprivation score is 25 percent. The data are drawn
from DISE, 2009–10.
ƒƒ Electricity usage: The percentage of households in a district that do not have
access to electricity. For example, 62 percent of households in the Varanasi
district of Uttar Pradesh use electricity, so electricity deprivation there is
38 percent. The data are drawn from the Census 2011.
ƒƒ LPG usage: The percentage of households in a district that do not use
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking. LPG is taken as a proxy for modern
cooking fuels. If alternatives such as smokeless Chulhas (cooking stoves) are
available at a similar cost, they should be an acceptable substitute. As an
illustration, 44 percent of households in the Visakhapatnam district of Andhra
Pradesh use LPG for cooking, making LPG deprivation there 56 percent. The
data are drawn from the Census 2011.
ƒƒ Drinking water and sanitation: Average of the percentage of households that
do not have access to a toilet facility and the percentage of households that
do not have access to drinking water within or near their homes. Based on
principal component analysis, the two metrics on drinking water and sanitation
were seen to be correlated and hence have been combined by taking a simple
average of the two. For instance, 6 percent of households in the Bangalore

218
district of Karnataka do not have access to drinking water inside or near their
homes, while 4 percent do not have toilets inside their homes. Hence, drinking
water and sanitation deprivation there is 5 percent. The data are drawn from
the DLHS, 2007–08.
ƒƒ Housing: The percentage of households living in dilapidated housing, or
houses that are not classified as “good” or “acceptable” according to the
census definition. For instance, 84 percent of households in the Murshidabad
district of West Bengal live in good or acceptable housing, which makes the
district’s housing deprivation 16 percent. The data are drawn from the Census
2011. It must be noted, however, that urban slums are not necessarily labeled
dilapidated for the purpose of the census.
Since the overlap between the deprived households along each of the nine
dimensions is unknown, we use a sum-of-square method to aggregate them. We
combine these nine metrics using the following formula:
1,420
1,922
221
30
154
96
45
30
195
157
617
1,544
Rural
Urban
Total
Others4
Social security
Fuel3
Housing
Drinking water
Sanitation
Education2
Health1
Food
1,228
1,692
221
16
128
82
45
30
106
127
580
1,336
1 Adjustment for value of subsidies in sanitation and drinking water is included under health, since they form part of the
government health budget.
2 Includes elementary and secondary education.
3 Includes under recoveries by oil marketing companies.
4 Includes clothing, footwear, travel, entertainment, communication, domestic appliances.
ADS =
a1
2 + a2
2 + a3
2 … + a9
2
√
9√
where a1, a2, a3 … a9 are the deprivation scores along each of the
nine dimensions.
Geometrically, the ADS represents the “distance” of a district from the point
of no deprivation—in economic terms, this gives a relative sense of the effort
or distance that a district must cover to completely remove deprivation. Most
importantly, by using a sum-of-squares methodology to aggregate the nine
metrics, we assume imperfect substitutability between different basic services (for
example, good health-care infrastructure cannot compensate for poor electricity
usage). For instance, a 25 percent deprivation in both health care and education
results in a lower deprivation score than 20 percent deprivation in health care
and 30 percent deprivation in education—that is, the greater the divergence, the
higher the deprivation score.
The ADS reflects India’s uneven development. Consider the case of Madhya
Pradesh, India’s fourth-most-deprived state. Singrauli, Madhya Pradesh’s most
deprived district, has an ADS of 64 percent (worse than the average district of
Bihar)—but the state capital of Bhopal has a dramatically lower ADS of 34 percent
(better than the average in Karnataka and Maharashtra states).
Determining dISTRICT aRCHETYPES
To draw insights from the ADS, we grouped districts into five clusters based on
their access to basic services, using the nine metrics. We used 584 of India’s
640 districts for the clustering, omitting some because data are unavailable; Rural
Health Survey (RHS) 2011 data were unavailable for all of Arunachal Pradesh, for
example. The other districts were then assigned to one of the clusters.

After the selection of the metrics, the following steps are carried out:
ƒƒ District plotting: We mapped each district to a point in a nine-dimensional
Euclidean space, with each dimension reflecting its relative deprivation along
that metric. For example, the Gorakhpur district in Uttar Pradesh occupied a
point (0.75, 0.53, 0.55, 0.51, 0.12, 0.57, 0.78, 0.08, 0.41) that implies that the
district has a deprivation of 75 percent for ORS, 53 percent for immunisation,
55 percent for health infrastructure, and so on. Compared to this, the Hisar
district in Haryana occupied a point (0.75, 0.44, 0.32, 0.29, 0.0, 0.12, 0.66,
0.05, 0.30) that represents lower deprivation along virtually all dimensions.
ƒƒ K-means clustering: We carried out statistical clustering based on the
k-means methodology. The inputs into the statistical program were the
desired number of clusters “k” and the estimated centroids of each of the
“k” clusters. Every district is then assigned to the centroid closest to it in a
nine-dimensional Euclidean space. Subsequently, the centroid of each of the
clusters is recalculated, and this process is repeated until the centroids are
stable. After observing the results for different values of “k”, we chose k = 5
because further increasing the number of clusters did not yield significantly
different results.
ƒƒ Allocation of other districts: The remaining 56 districts, for which data are
only partially available, are assigned to the cluster that is closest to them along
the dimensions for which data are available. For instance, if only electricity
and sanitation scores are available for a district, we calculate distance from
the centroids of the clusters only for these two basic services and assign the
district to the cluster nearest to it.
Each of the clusters can thus be imagined as a sphere in a nine-dimensional
space (Exhibit A2 presents a simplified two-dimensional illustration of
the process).
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Basic service Y
% deprivation
Basic service X
% deprivation
Access Deprivation Score and clustering can be understood
by visualising them in a two-dimensional space
Exhibit A2
District
Clustering ADS
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Basic service Y
% deprivation
Basic service X
% deprivation
(0.5, 0.5)
(0.75, 0.25)
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3

220
Appendix D: Constructing scenarios
We have created a simulation based on several interconnected models to project
the future performance of the Indian economy. The objective of the model
is to create two snapshots of the Indian economy in 2022 based on certain
assumptions around investment levels and productivity, yielding contrasting
“stalled reforms” and “inclusive reforms” scenarios. The components of the model
are described below.
Investment REQUIREMENT
The investment model projects the investment that the government and private
sector need to undertake to sustain the GDP growth implicit in each scenario,
by considering the historical incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) of each
sector. Based on the ICOR ratios, we estimate the gross fixed capital formation
(GFCF) required for each sector, given its GDP at factor cost (GDPfc). We then
arrive at the investment rate111
by using constant multiples (used by the Planning
Commission) of GFCF to gross capital formation (1.099) and GDPfc to GDP
at market prices (0.93). Based on our estimates, India needs to increase its
investment from 36 percent of GDP over 2005–10 to an average of 38 percent in
the next decade to achieve the inclusive reforms scenario. In the stalled reforms
scenario, both the need and ability to spend are lower due to a lower GDP
growth rate and thus lower tax revenue. In this case, investment would drop to
34 percent of GDP.
Productivity Growth and Job Creation
Based on historical growth rates and sector-specific interventions, we estimate
that the Indian economy can grow at 7.8 percent over the next decade. For
this growth to be inclusive (that is, to achieve the inclusive reforms scenario), it
will need to involve significant job creation in the industrial sector, even as we
anticipate continued high productivity growth in the services sector. We assume
an aggressive 6 percent annual growth in agriculture, led by increasing yields
per hectare. For the industrial and services sectors, we assume rates of growth
similar to those experienced from 2000 to 2010. However, we assume a change in
the composition of growth towards more labour-intensive sectors. This results in
lower average productivity growth in manufacturing and construction than would
have been the case in a path led by growth in knowledge- and capital-intensive
sectors. In the inclusive reforms scenario, we estimate that the industrial sector
can create 75 million to 80 million new jobs, while the services sector can create
35 million to 40 million jobs (Exhibit A3).
In the stalled reforms scenario, however, job creation is assumed to be much
slower, with the industrial sector contributing about 50 million new jobs and the
services sector about 25 million.
111 Investment rate is defined as the ratio of gross capital formation (GFC) to GDP at market
price. Since investment is an expenditure item, it is expressed in terms of market price, not
factor cost.

Exhibit A3
In the inclusive reforms scenario, high growth can result in an additional
80 million industrial and 35 million services sector jobs
10.1
7.8
6.3
6.3
8.6
7.6
7.6
8.3
9.2
8.3
7.3
6.0
Mining and quarrying
Agriculture and allied
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas, and
water supply
Construction
Transport, storage,
and communication
Trade, hotels, and
restaurants
Banking and insurance
Real estate and
business services
Public administration
Other services
Total
New jobs2012
227
3
58
2
49
22
51
4
3
11
33
464
2022E1
207
4
86
3
100
31
62
8
7
11
41
558
Employment
Million workers
-20
Industrial 80
Services 35
Annual GDP growth, 2012–22E
%
1 Estimates are for high industrial growth scenario.
Subsidy Projection
We estimate that public spending on basic services needs to almost
double in real terms, rising from Rs. 570,000 crore ($118 billion) in 2012 to
Rs. 1,088,000 crore ($226 billion) in 2022. We arrived at these estimates after
evaluating existing government spending and setting realistic targets for each
service, taking into account expected population growth.
Once the target level of access for each basic service is set, we have estimated
the cost of meeting those goals using a combination of published reports and
expert interviews.
ƒƒ Health care: We estimated what it would cost to build out the network of
primary health-care infrastructure and hire the requisite number of doctors
and health-care workers to meet national levels of bed density and health-care
worker density recommended by the High Level Expert Group on Universal
Health Coverage, constituted by the Planning Commission of India in 2005.
We estimate the broad cost of building and operating a primary care network
based on the current tiered health-care structure of the government, although
the actual shape and design of the network could vary in the future (perhaps
on a state-by-state basis). We further assume that the government absorbs
the entire cost of building adequate health-care density, although the mix of
state-run and privately run network points could take different forms, with the
government providing financial support in different ways. The assumption that
the build-out of health-care system should be heavily underwritten or financed
by the government reflects the urgency of the need as well as evidence

222
pointing to the fact that across countries, national health outcomes tend to be
heavily correlated with per capita public spending, not private spending.
ƒƒ Education: The cost of education has been estimated by assessing the cost
of building the physical infrastructure for primary and secondary schools and
hiring sufficient teachers to reach targeted secondary school enrolment rates
of 100 percent in urban areas and 70 percent in rural areas by 2022 and
primary school enrolment rates of 100 percent in urban areas and 90 percent
in rural areas. This translates into a need for one million additional primary
school classrooms and 280,000 additional secondary school classrooms,
assuming the student-classroom ratio is 30 for primary and 40 for secondary,
and pupil-teacher ratio is maintained at 30 for both levels. We assume that
the government would fund the build-out and operating costs of about
55 percent of the new schools required (which would maintain the current mix
of private and public schools) and continue to pay for public schools already
in operation.
ƒƒ Fuel: To build estimates of the government spending required to improve
energy access, we focus on two basic types of energy supply: electricity for
lighting and LPG for cooking (although other sources of fuel, such as solar-
powered smokeless Chulhas, would be acceptable if they were available at
similar or lower cost). We estimated the cost of government support for fuel
usage by keeping the current subsidy per unit of improved energy constant
(using electricity, LPG, and kerosene subsidies as proxies) but accounting for
higher numbers of improved energy users and higher consumption per user in
future. For LPG and kerosene, provision has been made for depreciation of the
rupee and an increase in the price of crude oil.
ƒƒ Food: In keeping with the provisions of the National Food Security Act of
2013, we account for 5 kg of subsidised food grain consumption per capita
(and 7 kg per capita for the population covered under the Antyodaya Anna
Yojana scheme for 50 percent of households in urban areas and 75 percent
in rural areas). Holding constant the economic cost of food grain procurement
and distribution (as reported by the Food Corporation of India in 2012), and
in keeping with the new issue price set by the food security act, we arrive
at a subsidy of Rs. 18 per kg for rice and Rs. 14 per kg for wheat. Based on
published reports, we also make provisions for other expenses such as setting
up state food commissions, intrastate transportation, and maternity benefits.112
We are agnostic about the actual distribution of this subsidy; if, for example,
through a future process of self-selection, only the poorest three deciles of the
population opt for food subsidies, then we would assume that the budgeted
amount remains the same but is shared by a smaller group and meets their
needs to a fuller extent.
ƒƒ Drinking water and sanitation: In drinking water and sanitation, where there
is an existing government financial support programme, we keep the per
person public service expense or subsidy constant and account for increased
access. For sanitation, we expect the government to target subsidy support to
the poorest 25 percent of the population. For drinking water, we use the cost
estimates of the Planning Commission to account for improved drinking water
112 For more details of the methodology, refer to Prachi Mishra, “The National Food Security Bill:
Incremental financial and distributional implications, 2013–14 to 2015–16”, Economic and
Political Weekly, volume 48, number 39, 2013.

coverage to reach 92 percent of the population by 2022—95 percent for urban
areas and 90 percent for rural areas.
ƒƒ Housing and social security: There are existing programmes for housing
(Indira Awaas Yojana and JNNURM, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban
Renewal Mission) and social security (MNREGA). We have assumed that
these programmes remain unchanged and grow at their historical rates to
account for growth in population. For housing, this implies that we have kept
rural spending constant while increasing urban spending at an annual rate of
7 percent. For MNREGA, we have accounted for the increase in number of
rural households from 180 million in 2012 to 200 million in 2022.
Fiscal constraints
The fiscal constraint model broadly projects the revenue and capital receipts and
expenses of the government for the next ten years and the level of borrowing
this is likely to imply. The model makes allowance for productive investments
required to sustain the rate of GDP growth in each scenario, and the basic service
spending that can be achieved while reducing the central plus state government’s
fiscal deficit linearly from 8.2 percent in 2012 to 6 percent by 2017. The model
accounts for government borrowing to fund the deficit and links the interest
payments with the size of government debt.
Inclusiveness outcomes
The inclusiveness model projects the monthly per capita expenditure for each
decile of the population in 2022 based on the distribution of jobs and productivity
growth for each sector, leading to income growth and potential consumption
growth for each decile based on historical wage-productivity correlations
(Exhibit A4).
Exhibit A4
By 2022, only 7 percent of the population will be below
the Empowerment Line in the inclusive reforms scenario
SOURCE: National Sample Survey Office, 68th round; Indian Public Finance Statistics; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
5,050
2,580
2,018
1,722
1,518
1,349
1,208
1,082
956
774
1,544
90–100
80–90
70–80
60–70
50–60
40–50
30–40
20–30
10–20
Bottom 10
11,238
4,601
3,549
3,188
2,907
2,659
2,338
2,240
1,987
1,488
1,544
ESTIMATES
Monthly per capita expenditure1
INR, 2011–12 rupees
% of
population
2012 2022E Inclusive Reforms
Empowerment Line
1 Includes public spend on basic services, at 50 percent efficiency in 2012 and 75 percent efficiency in inclusive reforms.

224
Appendix E: Framework for strengthening
accountabilities
Multiple agencies and institutions carry out the government’s agenda—and
they all need to feel accountable to other stakeholders. A system of checks and
balances can drive performance and impose consequences for failures. This
is valid both for the government’s divisions and for private players involved in
governance (for example, as a service provider). The process of strengthening
accountability can take multiple forms (Exhibit A5).
In an environment of good governance, each government
role is subject to various checks and balances
Exhibit A5
NOT EXHAUSTIVE
“Web of accountability”
Government
Transactional
Reputational
Reputational
Reputational
Institutional
Legal
Institutional Institutional
Regulatory
Legal
Legal
Legal
Democratic
Accountable to
Policy making
Regulatory
oversight
Dispensation
of justice
People
Service delivery
Several types of accountabilities can be imposed:
ƒƒ Legal accountability: The government can enact laws that mandate certain
behaviour from public officials or private service providers, including the right
to judicial remedy. For example, the Right to Public Services has been enacted
in several states such as Madhya Pradesh, where a bureaucrat may be
personally penalised Rs. 250 per day if a service is not rendered promptly.
ƒƒ Reputational accountability: Reputational accountability induces better
performance through the disinclination of an institution or individual to be
viewed negatively by peers or the public at large. Reputational accountability
can be enhanced by creating more transparency on government functioning
and its outcomes; the citizen scorecards pioneered in Bengaluru in the 1990s
represent one potential approach.
ƒƒ Institutional accountability: Government functionaries feel subject to
review by those in political power—and this can be a double-edged sword.
Accountability to political leadership can be counterproductive and degenerate
into a loose, personality-based system rather than one driven by outcomes
that are transparent and clearly communicated. The recent decision from

India’s Supreme Court to grant bureaucrats a “minimum assured tenure” is an
attempt to insulate public-sector workers from political interference.
ƒƒ Regulatory accountability: An independent, well-managed regulatory
authority can be a powerful source of accountability for private service
providers or public functionaries. For instance, banks in India feel accountable
to the Reserve Bank of India.
ƒƒ Transactional accountability: Many functions of the government are
“services” provided to businesses and citizens. As in the case of market-driven
service providers, public-sector providers should feel greater accountability
to their “customers”. Promoting private participation is an effective way of
introducing competitive pressure to improve customer orientation; allowing
private telecom companies to serve consumers, for instance, has improved
the accountability felt by the state-owned telecom provider.
ƒƒ Democratic accountability: In a democracy, the ultimate accountability is the
will of the people, and any agency derives its mandate from the democratic
process. For democratic accountability to be strengthened, the foundations
of electoral reform are critical. India has made strides in this regard, as the
independent Election Commission has helped ensure free and fair elections to
a great extent. But much more can be done. Activist movements in India are
focusing on several areas, including providing more transparency in electoral
funding and introducing the right to recall.
Appendix F: Major government programmes
The government of India runs multiple programmes to deliver basic services,
especially to poor households. The following is a list of such programmes referred
to in this document:
ƒƒ Right to Information Act (RTI): In force since 2005, the act allows any citizen
to request information from a public authority, under certain safeguards. The
information must be provided within 30 days; if it is not, the concerned citizen
can seek redress from the chief information commissioner.
ƒƒ Right to Education Act (RTE): Enforced in 2010, the act makes education a
fundamental right of every child between the ages of 6 and 14. It also specifies
minimum infrastructure norms in elementary schools and reserves 25 percent
of seats in private schools for students from economically disadvantaged
segments. Among other things, it mandates that no child be held back or
expelled until the completion of elementary education.
ƒƒ Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA):
Launched in 2006 in 200 districts of India, the programme was expanded to
all districts in 2008. It entitles one adult member of every rural household to
100 days of unskilled manual labour per year within 5 km of the household’s
village. The people are to be employed in creation of durable assets and public
works that would benefit the household. In case the government is unable to
create employment, it is obligated to pay an unemployment allowance.

226
ƒƒ Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY): Aimed at families below the official poverty line
in rural areas, the scheme provides financial assistance worth Rs. 35,000
(in plains) or Rs. 38,500 (in hills) for the construction of the house. Sanitary
latrines and smokeless challah are required to be constructed along with
each IAY house, for which additional funds are provided from the Total
Sanitation Campaign.
ƒƒ National Food Security Act: Enacted in 2013, the act entitles the poorest
75 percent of the rural population and 50 percent of urban population to
subsidised food grains. Coarse grains, rice, and wheat are to be provided
at Rs. 1, Rs. 2, and Rs. 3 per kg, respectively. While the “poorest of the
poor” (also known as “priority” households) will receive 35 kg of grain per
household per month, others (“general” households) will receive 5 kg per
capita per month. The programme also provides for free meals for pregnant
women, lactating mothers, and certain categories of children. In case these
entitlements are not received, the state government is mandated to provide a
food security allowance.

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www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/multimedia/
Reimagining India: Unlocking the potential of Asia’s next superpower
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