Hardware Hacking Chronicles: IoT Hacking for Offence and Defence

HARDWARE HACKING CHRONICLES
IOT HACKING FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE
Fatih Ozavci
Managing Consultant – Context Information Security

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Fatih Ozavci, Managing Consultant
VoIP & phreaking
Mobile applications and devices
Network infrastructure
CPE, hardware and IoT hacking
Author of Viproy and VoIP Wars
Public speaker and trainer
 Blackhat, Defcon, HITB, AusCert, Troopers
May'16

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Subscriber services and IoT
Hardware hacking chronicles
Hacking broadband devices
Hacking office devices
Improving defense and offense
May'16

May'16
Everything is connected
Broadband services
Smart modems
IPTV equipment
Office devices
3g/4g modems
IP phones
Keyboards & mouse
Why should we evolve?
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6May'16
Broadband & 3G/4G
IPTV/Satellite Broadcasting & VoD
Home & Office Equipment

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Combining testing skills
Design reviews do not show business
logic issues
Tech must be tested for various
perspectives
Traditional tests do not cover
Devices’ firmware and hardware
Management in a protected network
Very limited days for testing
May'16

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Testing methodology must be flexible
Various devices – ARM vs MIPS, Phone vs Modem
Various OSes – Android vs Linux vs VxWorks
Testing must always focus on the device’s roles
May'16

Configuration
Edit & Re-Upload
May'16
Secret Handshake
to Enable Telnet
Physical
Interfaces
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Weaknesses are already known
Configuration dump for credentials
Editing the conf to enable a feature
Vulnerabilities are public and easy
Telnet authentication bypass
Sagem: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/17670
Netgear:
https://wiki.openwrt.org/toh/netgear/telnet.console
E.g. admin password leak
wget http://1.1.1.1/password.html -t 1 -q -O - | grep pwd
May'16

Console Debugging
TX, RX, GND, V
May'16
Debugging On-Chip
Debug TDI, TDO,
TCK…
Access to Flash
Read/Write Data
SCK, MOSI, MISO...
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May'16
Bus Pirate
Bus Blaster
Shikra
HydraBus
Jtagulator
GoodFet/GreatFet
Logic Analyser
SOIC8/16 Clips
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Usually 4 PINs
TX, RX, GND, Voltage
Provides device access
Bootloader, console access
Real-time debugging
Access without a password
May'16

Find the ground
Find the voltage
Set the target voltage
Try to send/receive
TX vs RX
Various baud rates
Analyse the output
Jtagulator
May'16 20

Debugging and logging
Intercepting boot
sequence
Boot parameters
CFE access
Getting console access
E.g. Netgear CG3100D
May'16 22

May'16
Stop the boot process
UART/Serial connection
Possibilities
Re-flash for OpenWRT
Get information
 Credentials?
Dump the firmware
Eg. Sagemcom 3864v2
ADSL & NBN
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Debugging standard
Everything depends on the vendor
Device or system testing
Daisy-chained JTAG
TDI (Test Data In)
TDO (Test Data Out)
TCK (Test Clock)
TMS (Test Mode Select)
TRST (Test Reset)
May'16

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Internal communication interface
Direct connection to the flashes
Logic signals
SCLK : Serial Clock
MOSI : Master Output, Slave Input
MISO : Master Input, Slave Output
SS : Slave Select
May'16
Image: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial_Peripheral_Interface_Bus

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Broadband, IPTV, Satellite…
Devices are
connected to the infrastructure
managing by service provider
in the consumer promises
Relying on vendors for security
Default configuration
Legacy or unpatched software
Management interfaces
May'16

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Various vendors in a pool
Device provisioning
Software & configuration
management
Call centre connections
Generic information in the wild
Custom software (e.g OpenWRT)
Bypassing controls is common
BYOD on subscriber services
May'16

Call Centre
May'16 32
Service Provider
ACS SIP
Provisioning Pool
BYOD
TR-069
DOCSIS RADIUS

May'16 33
IPTV STB
DVB STB
VOD
Streaming
DRM WEB
Services
VOD, Licenses, Keys, Billing
VOD, Licenses, Keys, Billing
CLOUD
SERVICE PROVIDER
ACS
BROADCAST
RADIUS
TR-069

May'16 34
Service Provider
ACS SIP
TR-069 / DOCSIS
RADIUSVOIP (SIP + RTP)
PSTN
PSTN
Service Provider
MSAN/MGW
Distributor
VOIP (SIP + RTP)
MANAGEMENT

May'16 35
3G Telecom Network
3G SIP
IPSEC VPN RADIUS
3G
3G
3G
Femtocell Pool
Base Station
TR-069

May'16 36
Debugging
Gathering
Information
Attacking
Server
Service network
Clients connected
ACS
TR-069
Modem
ACS on Modem TCP/7676
ACS on Server TCP/443
ACS Connection Intercepted
Modified Attacking ContentOriginal Content

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Dumping device memory
X.509 certificates for IPSEC Auth
PINs, passwords and config data
Broadcasting and DRM keys
Dump device firmware
Reverse engineering, exploit dev
Driving a consumer device
Fake base station, billing bypass
Altering VoD content, security bypass
May'16

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Backdoors on devices are common
Open source, distribution, vendors…
Expensive to replicate the attack
Red teaming engagements
Putting a Raspberry Pi in everything
Collecting keyboard & mouse input
Human factor pen-testing
Sending backdoored devices
May'16

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3G/4G Modems
 WiFi models with services and features
 USB models require drivers
 Internal storage and card reader
Unauthorised access via services
Firmware operations
 Dumping and reversing the firmware
 Backdooring the firmware
Using their shelves for USB duckies
May'16

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Keysweeper by SamyKamkar
Arduino/Teensy based sniffer
Sniffing Microsoft Wireless Keyboard
Mousejack by Bastille Security
RF keyboard & mouse receivers
Force pairing vulnerability
Force pairing a remote keyboard
May'16

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Efficient for persistent access
Raspberry Pi, Arduino
Can fit in many devices
Find a suitable device to backdoor
Find a power source
Find a network connection
Solder and connect the pieces
Broadcast the network connected
Advanced implants take time
May'16

May'16 43
RJ45 Connection Pins

May'16 44
Speaker Power
Patch the Cat5 cable

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Enforcing vendors to
Disable physical interfaces
Use encryption and access keys
Follow a security standard
Network isolation for subscribers
Tailored research for
Vendor product vulnerabilities
CPE management services
Backdoor analysis
May'16

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Devices are IN SCOPE
Think different and combine skills
Everything is a target
Home automation, CCTV, phones…
Testing service operator networks
Test services through devices
Extract information from devices
Access and fuzz tests through
devices
May'16

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Focuses on all components
Devices, infrastructure, software…
Focuses on exploitable issues
Combines various disciplines
Embedded systems, mobile, network…
Closes the gap between offense
and defense
May'16

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Context Information Security
http://www.contextis.com
AusCERT
https://www.auscert.org.au
IoT Security Wiki
https://iotsecuritywiki.com
May'16

Hardware Hacking Chronicles: IoT Hacking for Offence and Defence

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