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Jarrod Overson
Director of Engineering at Shape Security
HOW CREDENTIAL STUFFING IS EVOLVING
And where do we go from here?
cre·den·'al stuff·ing
/krəˈden(t)SHəl ˈstəfiNG/
The tes'ng of previously breached username
and password pairs across sites to find
accounts where passwords have been reused.
CREDENTIAL STUFFING
Photo by Nine Köpfer on Unsplash
Who am I?
And should you trust me?
• Director of Engineering at Shape Security
• Google Developer Expert.
• Old school video game hacker.
• @jsoverson everywhere
Why credential stuffing is evolving
How credential stuffing has evolved
Where do we go from here?
1
2
3
Jarrod Overson
Why credential stuffing is evolving1
The same reason anything evolves. Incentive + adversity.
If there are no defenses in place, the cost is nearly zero.
valuecost
Jarrod Overson
Any defense increases the cost by forcing a generational shift.
valuecost
Generation 1
Jarrod Overson
Enough defenses will tip cost/value in your favor
valuecost
Generation 1
Generation 2
Generation 3
Jarrod Overson
The cost of entry for all technology decreases over time.
valuecost
All technology gets cheaper as it becomes better understood and more generalized.
Jarrod Overson
While the value of successful attacks only goes up.
valuecost
Jarrod Overson
MANUAL WORK AUTOMATION
Sufficient when
value is high
Can’t scale when
value is reduced
Can’t scale when
cost is increased
Sufficient when
value is low
CREDENTIAL STUFFING: A HOW-TO GUIDE
1 Get Credentials
2 Automate Login
3
4
Defeat Existing Defenses
Distribute Globally
1. Get Credentials
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses
4. Distribute
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
$0
2.3 billion credentials
$0-50
For tool configuration
$0-139
For 100,000 solved
CAPTCHAs
$0-10
For 1,000 global IPs
100,000 ATO attempts can be tried for less than $200 USD
<$0.002
per ATO attempt.
Jarrod Overson
$2 - $150+
Typical range of account values.
The rate of return is between 100% and 150,000%+
0.2% - 2%
Success rate of a typical credential
stuffing attack.
$0.002
Cost per individual attempt.
Value * Success Rate
Cost
– 100% = Rate of Return
1
2
3
Why credential stuffing is evolving
How credential stuffing has evolved
Where do we go from here?
Before Modern Era
Generation 0: Basic HTTP requests with common tools
SentryMBA
• Performs basic HTTP requests.
• Extensible and highly configurable.
• Tailored towards specific attack use cases.
Early defense: IP Rate limiting.
0k
50k
100k
Iteration 1 : Rotate through proxies
How Credential Stuffing is Evolving - PasswordsCon 2019
How Credential Stuffing is Evolving - PasswordsCon 2019
Defense: Text-based CAPTCHAs
Iteration 2: Use CAPTCHA Solvers.
Defense: Dynamic sites and JavaScript heavy defenses.
Iteration 3: Scriptable WebViews
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:1337
Connection: keep-alive
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/
*;q=0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_5) AppleWebKit/537.
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/39.0.2171.95 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
GET / HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/534.34 (KHT
like Gecko) PhantomJS/1.9.8 Safari/534.34
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept-Language: en-US,*
Host: localhost:1337
Defense: Header Fingerprinting & Environment Checks
Modern Era
Iteration 4: Scriptable Consumer Browsers
Selenium & Puppeteer
Selenium is a free, open source testing tool
that scripts popular browsers.
Puppeteer is a Google project that
automates Firefox and Chromium based
browsers.
Browser Fingerprinting
High-entropy data points are collected to
produce an acceptably unique fingerprint.
Data points like screen size, fonts, plugins,
hardware profiles, et al.
This identifies the source of traffic even
when tunneling through proxies.
Defense: Browser Fingerprinting
Iteration 5: Randomizing Fingerprint Data Sources
FraudFox & AntiDetect
FraudFox is a VM-Based
anti-fingerprinting
solution.
AntiDetect randomizes
the data sources that are
commonly used to
fingerprint modern
browsers.
Behavior Analysis
Naive bots give themselves away by
ignoring normal human behavior.
Humans don't always click in the upper left
hand corner and don't type out words all at
once.
Capturing basic behavior can make naive
automation easy to knock down.
Defense: Behavior Analysis for Negative Traits
Iteration 6: Human Behavior Emulation
Browser Automation Studio
BAS is an automation tool that
combines CAPTCHA solving,
proxy rotation, and emulated
human behavior.
Validating Fingerprint Data
Good Users don't lie much.
Attackers lie a lot. They use a
handful of clients but need to
look like they are coming from
thousands.
Those lies add up.
Defense: Browser Consistency Checks
Iteration 7: Use real device data
Using Real Values
Bablosoft's Fingerprint
Switcher allows a user to cycle
through a real browser's
fingerprintable data points,
reducing the number of lies
present in the data.
This keeps going but the direction is clear.
We're calling these Imitation Attacks
Imitation attacks indicate sophisticated fraud from dedicated adversaries.
The aim is to blend in and bypass risk & automation defenses.
Not all automation is an imitation attack, not all imitation attacks are automated.
The end goal is perfect emulation of humans and their environments.
1
2
3
Why credential stuffing is evolving
How credential stuffing has evolved
Where do we go from here?
The value in our accounts is not going away.
As we raise the cost of credential stuffing there is greater incentive to diversify attacks.
Valid Accounts
Credential Stuffing ???
Genesis is an early example of what's next.
Malware that resides on the victim to scrape account and environment details.
Thousands of infections and growing.
Advertises the high profile accounts the bot has already scraped.
Regularly updates its records with newly acquired accounts.
Each bot and its data is sold as one unit
$
Photo
Bot detail page
Bots have hundreds of scraped resources and accounts.
Genesis can generate the fingerprints of your exact target.
This bypasses many risk-scoring mechanisms that look for activity from new devices.
Select the fingerprint you are looking for
And load it into the Genesis Security Plugin
Voila! You are now your target.
93970994-EC4E-447B-B2BD-DE2F4215A44E
Malware that scrapes, learns, imitates, and proxies through its victim is next
We've started seeing the signs in ad fraud.
This is a human problem, not a technical problem.
Advanced credential stuffing is sophisticated fraud. It is more than simple
automation. Fraud teams aren't staffed for this, they need help.
Imitation attacks are designed to blend in. Look deeply even if you think you don't
have a problem.
Attackers are economically driven. We need to attack the economics. Every defense
will fail if the value is still there.
There are no silver bullet solutions against humans. (Except literal silver bullets, but...)
THANK YOU
Jarrod Overson
@jsoverson on twitter, medium, and github.

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How Credential Stuffing is Evolving - PasswordsCon 2019

  • 1. Jarrod Overson Director of Engineering at Shape Security HOW CREDENTIAL STUFFING IS EVOLVING And where do we go from here?
  • 2. cre·den·'al stuff·ing /krəˈden(t)SHəl ˈstəfiNG/ The tes'ng of previously breached username and password pairs across sites to find accounts where passwords have been reused. CREDENTIAL STUFFING Photo by Nine Köpfer on Unsplash
  • 3. Who am I? And should you trust me? • Director of Engineering at Shape Security • Google Developer Expert. • Old school video game hacker. • @jsoverson everywhere
  • 4. Why credential stuffing is evolving How credential stuffing has evolved Where do we go from here? 1 2 3
  • 5. Jarrod Overson Why credential stuffing is evolving1 The same reason anything evolves. Incentive + adversity.
  • 6. If there are no defenses in place, the cost is nearly zero. valuecost Jarrod Overson
  • 7. Any defense increases the cost by forcing a generational shift. valuecost Generation 1 Jarrod Overson
  • 8. Enough defenses will tip cost/value in your favor valuecost Generation 1 Generation 2 Generation 3 Jarrod Overson
  • 9. The cost of entry for all technology decreases over time. valuecost All technology gets cheaper as it becomes better understood and more generalized. Jarrod Overson
  • 10. While the value of successful attacks only goes up. valuecost Jarrod Overson
  • 11. MANUAL WORK AUTOMATION Sufficient when value is high Can’t scale when value is reduced Can’t scale when cost is increased Sufficient when value is low
  • 12. CREDENTIAL STUFFING: A HOW-TO GUIDE 1 Get Credentials 2 Automate Login 3 4 Defeat Existing Defenses Distribute Globally
  • 14. 1. Get Credentials 2. Automate Login CREDENTIAL STUFFING
  • 15. 1. Get Credentials 2. Automate Login CREDENTIAL STUFFING
  • 16. 1. Get Credentials 2. Automate Login 3. Defeat Defenses CREDENTIAL STUFFING
  • 17. 1. Get Credentials 2. Automate Login 3. Defeat Defenses CREDENTIAL STUFFING
  • 18. 1. Get Credentials 2. Automate Login 3. Defeat Defenses 4. Distribute CREDENTIAL STUFFING
  • 19. $0 2.3 billion credentials $0-50 For tool configuration $0-139 For 100,000 solved CAPTCHAs $0-10 For 1,000 global IPs 100,000 ATO attempts can be tried for less than $200 USD <$0.002 per ATO attempt. Jarrod Overson
  • 20. $2 - $150+ Typical range of account values. The rate of return is between 100% and 150,000%+ 0.2% - 2% Success rate of a typical credential stuffing attack. $0.002 Cost per individual attempt. Value * Success Rate Cost – 100% = Rate of Return
  • 21. 1 2 3 Why credential stuffing is evolving How credential stuffing has evolved Where do we go from here?
  • 23. Generation 0: Basic HTTP requests with common tools
  • 24. SentryMBA • Performs basic HTTP requests. • Extensible and highly configurable. • Tailored towards specific attack use cases.
  • 25. Early defense: IP Rate limiting. 0k 50k 100k Iteration 1 : Rotate through proxies
  • 28. Defense: Text-based CAPTCHAs Iteration 2: Use CAPTCHA Solvers.
  • 29. Defense: Dynamic sites and JavaScript heavy defenses. Iteration 3: Scriptable WebViews
  • 30. GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:1337 Connection: keep-alive Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/ *;q=0.8 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_5) AppleWebKit/537. (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/39.0.2171.95 Safari/537.36 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch GET / HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/534.34 (KHT like Gecko) PhantomJS/1.9.8 Safari/534.34 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Connection: Keep-Alive Accept-Encoding: gzip Accept-Language: en-US,* Host: localhost:1337 Defense: Header Fingerprinting & Environment Checks
  • 32. Iteration 4: Scriptable Consumer Browsers Selenium & Puppeteer Selenium is a free, open source testing tool that scripts popular browsers. Puppeteer is a Google project that automates Firefox and Chromium based browsers.
  • 33. Browser Fingerprinting High-entropy data points are collected to produce an acceptably unique fingerprint. Data points like screen size, fonts, plugins, hardware profiles, et al. This identifies the source of traffic even when tunneling through proxies. Defense: Browser Fingerprinting
  • 34. Iteration 5: Randomizing Fingerprint Data Sources FraudFox & AntiDetect FraudFox is a VM-Based anti-fingerprinting solution. AntiDetect randomizes the data sources that are commonly used to fingerprint modern browsers.
  • 35. Behavior Analysis Naive bots give themselves away by ignoring normal human behavior. Humans don't always click in the upper left hand corner and don't type out words all at once. Capturing basic behavior can make naive automation easy to knock down. Defense: Behavior Analysis for Negative Traits
  • 36. Iteration 6: Human Behavior Emulation Browser Automation Studio BAS is an automation tool that combines CAPTCHA solving, proxy rotation, and emulated human behavior.
  • 37. Validating Fingerprint Data Good Users don't lie much. Attackers lie a lot. They use a handful of clients but need to look like they are coming from thousands. Those lies add up. Defense: Browser Consistency Checks
  • 38. Iteration 7: Use real device data Using Real Values Bablosoft's Fingerprint Switcher allows a user to cycle through a real browser's fingerprintable data points, reducing the number of lies present in the data.
  • 39. This keeps going but the direction is clear. We're calling these Imitation Attacks Imitation attacks indicate sophisticated fraud from dedicated adversaries. The aim is to blend in and bypass risk & automation defenses. Not all automation is an imitation attack, not all imitation attacks are automated. The end goal is perfect emulation of humans and their environments.
  • 40. 1 2 3 Why credential stuffing is evolving How credential stuffing has evolved Where do we go from here?
  • 41. The value in our accounts is not going away. As we raise the cost of credential stuffing there is greater incentive to diversify attacks. Valid Accounts Credential Stuffing ???
  • 42. Genesis is an early example of what's next. Malware that resides on the victim to scrape account and environment details.
  • 43. Thousands of infections and growing.
  • 44. Advertises the high profile accounts the bot has already scraped.
  • 45. Regularly updates its records with newly acquired accounts.
  • 46. Each bot and its data is sold as one unit $
  • 48. Bots have hundreds of scraped resources and accounts.
  • 49. Genesis can generate the fingerprints of your exact target. This bypasses many risk-scoring mechanisms that look for activity from new devices.
  • 50. Select the fingerprint you are looking for
  • 51. And load it into the Genesis Security Plugin Voila! You are now your target. 93970994-EC4E-447B-B2BD-DE2F4215A44E
  • 52. Malware that scrapes, learns, imitates, and proxies through its victim is next We've started seeing the signs in ad fraud.
  • 53. This is a human problem, not a technical problem. Advanced credential stuffing is sophisticated fraud. It is more than simple automation. Fraud teams aren't staffed for this, they need help. Imitation attacks are designed to blend in. Look deeply even if you think you don't have a problem. Attackers are economically driven. We need to attack the economics. Every defense will fail if the value is still there. There are no silver bullet solutions against humans. (Except literal silver bullets, but...)
  • 54. THANK YOU Jarrod Overson @jsoverson on twitter, medium, and github.