![Introduction
The study of development refers to standards that characterize innovative capacity, industrial
competitiveness and economic performance of rich countries. Development policies therefore
aim at bringing countries out of a state of “underdevelopment”, which must itself be defined in
relation to these standards: widespread poverty, low production potential coupled with high
population growth, insufficient promotion of natural resources, survival of an economic and
social status described as “archaic”, disjointedness of the productive apparatus due to the
coexistence of a modern extrovert sector and a traditional survival sector, etc. The question of
the constitution of an economic system is paramount: the model, the structure and pace of
economic development are schematically determined by political architecture.
With this in mind, economic development is one of the most studied subjects in international
economics. The fundamental differences are rooted in the mismatch between two fundamental
economic approaches: liberal and interventionist. Development issues fuel a debate of great
political acuity that itself refers to an ideological and theoretical debate. Indeed, the
requirements and effects of globalization have propelled reflections on the legitimacy of an
active economic policy based on innovation to the front of the stage [UZU 10c, UZU 10d, UZU
10e]. The fact is that a proactive role of the State would result in, according to the predominant
neoliberal approach, extensive and unjustified interventionism, which is a stark contrast to the
context of globalization.
In fact, liberal principles and speeches advocating the neutrality of economic policy were
developed around the 1980s with the supremacy of monetarist approaches and then, to some
extent, embodied in the Washington Consensus, while Keynesian-inspired regulations were
already “well-softened”. Recently, liberally-inspired approaches have been developed, which
in fact singularly relativize the end of Keynesianism. Today, the idea of the State is still valid,
even if its role is challenged in many politico-economic discourses. Indeed, from what the
advent of globalization suggests, it is probably unable to consider the organization and
development of the world on the basis of a simple interstate system. Hence the recurrent idea
of global economic governance, which underpins that worldwide regulation is no longer
reducible to the exclusive and independent regulation of States, which, as we shall see in this
book, reduces the leeway of development stakeholders.
Therefore, at a time when the world economy is mutating and sources of competitiveness are
constantly changing, would it be wise to admit that globalization inexorably leads to the
substitution of market forces for State interventions in favor of the economy? Otherwise, will a
strong foundation for the active role of the State against the hegemony of the liberal approach
that underlies globalization be found in recent economic theories (endogenous growth, post-
Keynesian growth, neo-institutionalistic growth, etc.)? And so, with reference to theoretical
developments as well as recent economic policy practices, what room for maneuver do States
actually have to face the challenges of a globalized economy? Is the activation of innovation
potential of the South an economic modernization that would allow these countries to](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-13-320.jpg)
![beneficially integrate transnational processes of economic growth?
These legitimate questions, which relate to both theoretical and practical reflections,
encourage us to analyze the main elements they raise in the debate on the economic role of
active innovation policies in the context of globalization. Our goal is to show that recent
development, and seemingly paradoxically, economic policy is nothing other than the
implementation of a renewed debate on the proactive role of the State.
The term globalization refers both to: the strong integration of national economies into the
international flow of capital and goods; and the establishment of international institutions
(International Monetary Funds (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO)), a set of
rules that ensure freedom of cross-border activities of companies. A transnational legal
regulatory framework will tend to fall into place as the result of tensions and political
compromises between States. This framework is based on the immutable principle in a market
economy where capital must be valued at all times and by all means (financial, commercial
and regulatory) with a view to improve potential profit-making. It is now a highlight of
globalization that challenges the active and voluntary nature of national economic policies and
weakens the role of the State in the development process.
But a certain awareness of the challenges of globalization, and the opportunities and
constraints it creates at all levels, seems to be renewing the debate on development issues.
Within the context of this debate, there are some for which a global governance system would
be the best answer, if not the only answer, to solving the proliferation of interests and
conflicting objectives. They rely on arguments drawn from different theoretical approaches
(which we will present later) to legitimize this intermediate system between the State and the
global market. While for others, the global governance system would be the legitimation of a
legal and institutional framework whose true aims are far from achieving the need for new
development of the economy and global society. They, in turn, rely on theoretical arguments,
but also on historical and recent events, questioning the validity of liberal policies advocated
by international institutions. They relate the global governance system to an organizational
mode that favors the interests of powerful economies and that embodies the supremacy of
decision-making powers of multinational corporations and financial markets [UZU 10b].
While it may be theoretically and logically sustainable, this system seems a priori unable to
achieve its objective of improving overall performance. Behind this inefficiency, multiple
dysfunction problems loom, leading to a crisis of global governance system goals where the
global governance system is itself linked to a crisis of legitimacy of recommended actions and
stakeholders involved in the decision-making process [UZU 10a, UZU 10b, UZU 10c]. Our
goal here is not to propose “ready-made” solutions to this problem, but rather to highlight the
gaps in global governance that, until now, have separated us from the perspective of a
harmonized, diverse and accelerated development. This analysis will form the first chapter of
this book.
The second chapter of this book is dedicated to the study of the main track that developing
countries could take to strengthen their economies when confronted with the demands of
globalization. The ability to innovate, in fact, allows an economy to improve its performance](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-14-320.jpg)
![Box 1.1. Building economic indicators to measure “development”
Economic, technical and social progress always go hand in hand for many economists.
The increase of gross domestic product (GDP) and, consequently, the creation of material
wealth translate the improvement of living conditions of the population into quantitative
terms. One can compare the GDP of several countries, initially expressed in national
currency, in two ways: current exchange rates or purchasing power parity (PPP). To
calculate the latter, we use a standard basket of goods then calculate the conversion rate,
which is the ratio of the prices of this basket between currencies.
But an increase in GDP does not necessarily indicate improved well– being of the
population because its calculation is based on a set of accounting policies. V
olunteer
work, domestic work or informal economy is not considered in GDP. Hence the concern
over the last thirty years is to contruct new indicators that are qualitative rather than
quantitative.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) proposed replacing GDP per
capita by a composite indicator, the human development index (HDI), which aims to
reflect three aspects of economic and social development: (1) life expectancy; (2) level of
education; (3) access to the necessary resources to live decently. The level of human
development is therefore measured using three indicators: life expectancy at birth (health);
knowledge (education); standard of living (adjusted real GDP per capita). The average of
the three indices is calculated. The composite index has a value between 0 and 1. A
country is classed as developed if its HDI is greater than 0.8; developing countries are,
therefore, countries with an HDI of less than 0.8.
The United Nations retain three criteria for defining the least developed countries
(LDCs): GDP per capita of less than 900 US dollars; delay in the areas of health,
education and nutrition; economic vulnerability: lack of economic diversification,
importance of production and export of agricultural products, political instability, etc.
Out of all economic take-off models with structural adjustment policies, economic
development concerns are perennial [UZU 10a]. The concept of “good governance” renewed
the debate on development and the wealth of nations by giving institutions prominent attention.
Thus, this chapter’s objective is to show how institutions, and thus the “good governance”, can
play an important role in development. As we are aware that we cannot have foresight without
a retrospective, we will first look back at theories that marked the development economics up
until the 1990s. Subsequently, we will present, by shedding light on works of new institutional
economics, the relationship between good governance, global governance and economic
development in order to introduce the issue of innovation in proactive economic policies.
1.1. The era of economic interventionism](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-17-320.jpg)
![Development economics dates from the post-war years. On an international level, the
decolonization process affected Asia and Africa; the Bretton-Woods institutions were
established; the United Nations addressed issues of growth in backward countries, for their
industrialization and their need to stabilize prices of raw materials; new regional institutions,
such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), processed
regional integration and import substitution strategies. In fact, “developmentalism” (theories
about the necessary development of so-called underdeveloped countries), which was formed
after the Second World War, mainly drew its references from the economic history of
industrialized countries. Therefore, development theories from the time incorporated two
major assumptions, besides the paradigm of modernization: the idea that faster growth could
only result from the expansion of industrial activities and the idea of voluntarism or
intervention in the process of State allocation of resources, “to correct the market laws that had
previously distributed industry unevenly throughout the world” [ASS 02, p. 11].
For three decades, development economists correlated the development of Southern countries
with state intervention. Theories of economic take-off, which were developed in the 1950–
1960s and critical theories of dependence, formalized in the 1970s, focused on state initiative
and interstate relations on a global level.
1.1.1. Impasses of economic take-off theories
During the first 20 years of its existence (1950–1960), development economics followed the
reference model of so-called developed countries to the letter. The dominant post-war Anglo-
Saxon economic thinking was in fact Keynesian, or classico-Keynesian. This constituted a
reconnection with traditions of classical economic thinking. The dominant economic policies
at the time thus gave state activism an undeniable role in the fight against unemployment and
achieving growth. At that time, the structuralist approach that developed an analysis in terms of
structural parameters (dependence resulting from the primary specialization, etc.) seemed to
polarize controversies on development economics, which firstly addressed the problems of
underdevelopment to then develop appropriate trajectories.
Underdevelopment was perceived as a series of obstacles for change (lack of capital and
entrepreneurs, population pressure, agrarian predominance, weak capacity to innovate). From
this point of view, for economic take-off theorists, in order to engage in the path of
development, it was appropriate to break the vicious circle of underdevelopment and deploy a
sustained and much-needed effort to create enough revenue and thereby increase domestic
savings; the latter, by financing new investments, would be able to maintain rapid growth. For
A. Lewis [LEW 58], “the central problem of economic theory is to understand the process by
which a community that was previously saving and investing 4–5% or less of its income, turns
into an economy where voluntary saving is about 12–15% or more of its income”. Indeed, the
first theories of development, formulated in the 1950s, advocated the image of the Marshall
plan: large international financial transfers to third world countries, to enable them to
accumulate the necessary capital for a critical investment threshold in order to initiate
accelerated industrial modernization [SAW 87].](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-18-320.jpg)
![According to Rostow [ROS 60], take-off is a transitional phase of about twenty years after
which growth moves toward maturity and then to mass consumption and finally, to a more
moderate growth. This theory was criticized for several reasons: vagueness of the
periodization, imprecision about details for setting up favorable conditions for take-off,
excessive trust in the power of a “centralized and efficient” State [BIE 06]. Moreover,
colonization was positively perceived as having laid the foundation for turning a traditional
society to a modern society.
Ultimately, in the tradition of the classical economists (Smith, Ricardo and Malthus), the
development economics of the 1950s focused on accumulation and reproduction. Insofar that
capital was the factor preventing economic development, priority was given to the savings
rate, the investment rate and the choice of techniques in line with the availability of two main
production factors: labor and capital. Development thus became evidence of finance. From this
financial injection, economists expected to break the vicious circle of poverty ([NUR 53]
according to which poverty fuels poverty), to accelerate the massive transfer of labor from
agriculture to industry (Lewis theory), to initiate industrial growth [ROS 43] and, more
generally, to trigger the transition of the society toward the industrial era.
The path that was taken allows us to distinguish between liberal Anglo-Saxon economists who
assimilated the role of the State to optimal allocation of resources in an open economy, and
European heterodox economists, who recommended increased state intervention in a protected
industry. Indeed, the central idea of the latter was that third world States should opt for
selective voluntary public investment [PET 98, pp. 14–20] in favor of industrial sectors that
were considered strategic in terms of economic benefits. This gave rise to a range of theories:
(1) ripple effects [HIR 74], (2) growth poles [PER 59], (3) industrializing industries [DES
71]. However, despite the enormous differences between these theories, they focused on one
main idea: “The developmentalist voluntarism of the state elites in the third world then seemed
both obvious and unequivocal to solve the issue of socioeconomic development without any
political problem” [PET 98, p. 15]. Indeed, these theorists were overly trusting in the State and
showed no skepticism toward it. Therefore, the question was not to know whether the State
was effective or not.
That said, in the community of development economists, only the Swede Myrdal [MYR 57]
raised the question of the nature of the State in poor countries as a possible obstacle for
development. He insisted, therefore, on the risk of the existence of a State either too soft to
conduct efficient policies, or too authoritarian or too corrupt to carry out appropriate policies
for redistributing the fruits of growth. However, this warning against the deviant political
behavior of the leaders was overshadowed by mainstream economists who threw these
political issues out of the economic field.
In the end, the development economics in the 1950s was based on the principle of rationality of
the State in the long-term. Indeed, the rationalist ideal that has dominated Western thinking
since the 19th century greatly influenced the first nationalist elite of the Third World borne
from the independence movements. The “dependency theory” was then a reaction against the
“structuralist” reformist current and against the evolutionary patterns, which it generally](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-19-320.jpg)
![equated with liberal thinking. It mainly criticized the “compradores” elites, who equated their
interests with those of the elites of industrialized countries. It also denounced the dominant
discourse on state voluntarism as “neutral”. Such thinking, influenced by the Latin American
current and especially by the thinking of Prebisch [PRE 49], saw capitalism as the determining
factor of underdevelopment and usually rejected the modernization agenda for a break with the
international market in favor of import substitution by local production.
Underdevelopment was no longer defined as a developmental delay but rather as a product of
the dynamics of capitalism on a global scale [AMI 73]. There was unequal exchange between
developed and underdeveloped countries [EMM 69]. The development economics was a
prisoner from birth of the context of international relations at the time. Thus, the specialization
of such countries in the production of poorly developed raw materials quickly attracted the
attention of UN experts. It gave rise to the publication of a report written by R. Prebisch in
1949 [PRE 49]. This document discussed the difficulties faced by third world countries in
transforming and adding value to their natural resources locally. Moreover, as the prices of the
natural resources tended to decline compared to manufactured goods, the report radically
challenged the specialization model based on the comparative advantages.
The inclusion of structural aspects in the analysis of Southern economies was of utmost
importance. Underdevelopment was not analyzed as a natural phenomenon, but rather as a
historical situation related to the disintegration of productive structures and dependency
phenomena maintained in the international economy. Indeed, the gap between elasticities and
the limited number of products exported by the periphery was the origin of the secular
deterioration of terms of trade. In this context, “dependency” economists made a series of
recommendations to break the vicious circle of underdevelopment. Thus emerged strategies
proposed to replace imports with local production. The focus of development on the domestic
market and state intervention should have allowed a reversal of the trend toward unequal
development between the center and the periphery. However, the stagnation of Latin American
economies, and all countries that adopted the import substitution strategy, were the source of
early criticism. Some authors, like Furtado, blamed the failure or perversion of these policies
on the unfavorable integration of these countries into international trade: “More subtle and
insidious forms of dependence, infiltrated in our financial and technological circuits, came to
replace the supervision previously practiced by external markets on the regulation of our
productive activities” [FUR 95, p. 63].
Despite the relevance of their analysis, which gave the study of structures a prominent role,
these theories either underestimated or overestimated the role of the State. On the one hand,
indeed, the place given to the State for correcting market imperfections and for designing
public policies seemed significant. But the question of the behavior of the elite was hidden or
overshadowed. For example, analyses by S. Amin [AMI 73] completely ignored the role of
politics. The latter was reduced to an instrument in the hands of foreign interests. And so, the
State, in this framework, was a puppet structure. Moreover, Furtado, by allowing the State to
play an important role remained aware of the risk of perversion of development strategies in
the context of the proliferation of coups d’état. As such, the advent of a new ruling class driven
by the search for individual interests began. This is in line with the recent analyses by Stiglitz,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-20-320.jpg)
![for whom the distribution of wealth in some developing countries is not determined by careful
trade-offs between equality and efficiency: “It is not defined under the principles of social
justice; it is the result of brute force. Wealth is power, and this power allows the ruling class to
keep the wealth” [STI 06, p. 198]. Thus, we find ourselves at the heart of the institutional
performance paradigm.
1.1.2. The crisis of the interventionist State
The 1929 crisis gave rise to a particular echo in analyses by John Maynard Keynes (1883–
1946). The leading thread of his ideas was that for market economies experiencing sustainable
endogenous imbalances, the onus shifts to the State to support growth and stimulate the
economy to achieve full employment. Its intervention should be done via economic policies for
boosting demand and by committing to additional public expenditure, corresponding to the
regulatory function of the State. Concomitantly, to avoid a return to protectionism, the Bretton-
Woods agreements adopted the principle of progression toward international liberalization
through cooperation between external policies. And to avoid returning to unemployment and
the inequalities of the 1930s, they left a margin of freedom for internal policies of full
employment and the welfare State [COU 03].
Thus, after the Second World War, the States strengthened their role in the economy. The
priority was to correct market failures, especially macroeconomic ones: boost growth,
promote full employment and external balance, ensure price stability, improve living
standards, etc. At the time, international exchange began to intensify, but growth depended
mainly on the dynamics of domestic markets. This heightened the importance of the nation-State
through a high degree of political, social and economic interactions that occurred internally.
The trend was therefore toward national integration: consolidation of the welfare State in the
first half of the 20th Century strengthened the legitimacy of the central government and,
consequently, justified its massive intervention in the economy.
The global economy changed dramatically in the 1970s, in response to the changing practices
of policy makers, who, under the pressure of circumstances and public opinion, increased
interventions in the economy: external deficits and international debt, stagnation and inflation
(stagflation), corporate bankruptcies, spiraling unemployment, etc. More generally, an area of
economic “turbulence” occurred, but which supporters of the liberal theory were slow to name
“crisis” [HUM 95]. Since then, Keynesian-inspired regulations have been “dampened” after
more than thirty years of economic and interventionist practice.
It was the welfare State system that created a context of international crisis, conducive to
neoliberal discourse, in the early 1980s. This was triggered by a slowdown in growth,
growing imbalances, practice of social assistance and especially “hysterical” public spending.
The arguments of liberal economists undermined the welfare State, first in England, then in the
United States and then finally, triggering a liberal wave that gradually spread to many countries
that, for the most part, also became supporters of “less State intervention”. The problem was
simple: as a good policeman, the State must intervene to create and enforce conditions for
effective competition through market transparency. Public or private monopoly, substitution of](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-21-320.jpg)
![development, the State had to seek macroeconomic stabilization and refrain from interfering
negatively with market rules.
1.2.1. Structural adjustment programs
Structural adjustment programs were set up to overcome the interventionist State crisis, which
was manifested by a marked deterioration of internal and external balances, a result of
unsustainable protectionist, inflationist and fiscal policies, particularly in Latin America, but
also in varying forms in Africa and Asia. The second oil crisis worsened the situation, which
struck developing countries more heavily than developed countries, which benefited from the
recycling of petrodollars. The higher interest rates on international financial markets and
deteriorating terms of trade resulted in widespread and widening imbalances. In the early
1980s, most developing countries faced the problem of international insolvency and cessation
of payments.
Sitting on their role as funders, the Bretton-Woods institutions advocated national economic
policy guidelines for liberalizing their economies toward hypothetical deleveraging. SAPs
were presented as a therapy of liberal inspiration, strengthening market mechanisms,
improving productive and commercial efficiency and reducing the discretionary power of the
State.
To begin with, the priority was given to the consolidation of public finances and the easing of
bureaucratic apparatuses, at a time when the level of demand was considered to be too high,
the investment and consumption were based too heavily on imports, the inflation was too high,
the weight of debt was too heavy, the economic competitiveness was too weak and the
economies were not export-oriented enough. Interventionist economic policies were
considered responsible for causing distortions. It was then necessary to enhance economic
efficiency and ensure non-inflationary growth through the withdrawal of the State in favor of
the free operation of market mechanisms.
In the logic of the IMF and the World Bank, the SAPs should have been twofold: stabilization,
then the adjustment of structures. The IMF’s actions corresponded to the first part, being more
focused on monetary and financial aspects and presented as short-term stabilization policies of
demand and recovery of a viable balance of payments. The actions of the World Bank rather
corresponded to the second part, being more oriented toward the structural policy of supply
management and modification of the conditions of production.
The “stabilization” was based on measures that were as diverse as reducing public spending,
slowing the increase in money supply by limiting credits to the economy, raising the interest
rates, subordinating wage developments to productivity growth, devaluating the currency, etc.
It was the typical policy mixes recommended by the international financial institutions,
particularly the IMF before theorizing and advocating the practice of monetarism in an open
economy. Let us recall that the monetarist current was born in the late 1940s, driven by M.
Friedman [FRI 53, FRI 69] as a reaction against Keynesian preference for fiscal policy.
Monetarist theories proposed a restriction of State intervention and believed that inflation was
due to an excessive volume of money circulating in the economy; hence the need to implement](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-23-320.jpg)
![a monetary policy that restricted the money supply.
The “structural adjustment” aimed to create the conditions for stable and sustainable economic
recovery to ensure balanced growth via liberalization of productive, financial and business
systems: gradual liberalization of imports, prices and interest rates, easing of public control
over private national and foreign investment, restriction of direct government support to
companies through the liberal percept trade not aid, withdrawal of the State from the
productive fabric by massive privatization of public corporations, etc.
Indeed, perceived by the liberal approach and the agency theory as a means for achieving
specific interests, the public company was subjected to strong criticism, on behalf of the
superior efficiency of coordination mechanisms by the market: public production did not
maximize public interest, but rather private interests, at the expense of economic and social
waste. This notion of “waste” highlighted the distortions that State intervention could create
and it was then recommended that economic policy be neutral and that liberalism be the rule. In
this sense, laisser-faire, market regulatory mechanisms and the benevolence of the invisible
hand were to ensure optimal operation of the economic system.
It was according to this same logic of minimum State that fiscal and financial reforms
increased and the privatization process was accelerated over the past three decades in
developing countries but also in the United States, Europe and in former socialist countries.
The results have not matched expectations: in the late 1980s, the mandated treatment plunged
developing countries into recession. Long-term development needs were side-lined. A number
of developing country governments continued to implement the SAP, most for fear of
suspension of loans and financial isolation, rather than for conviction of their merits or their
success. At the end of the 1980s, the World Bank [WOR 87, p. 2] itself recognized that for
many developing countries, “the adjustment proved to be a more lengthy process than was
envisioned”. The SAPs were thus criticized for having too strict a vision of conditionality, but
in reality, and at least until the early 1990s, there were a lot of loans and very few adjustments.
Despite the mixed results, for international financial institutions the neutral economic policy
and the logic of a lesser State were still desirable in the long-term; the problem lies deep in the
configuration, the rhythm and the steps toward liberalization. It was apparently around this
logic that the ten commandments of the “Washington Consensus” were founded, as formalized
in 1989 (see Box 1.2).](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-24-320.jpg)
![located. In this expression, Williamson defines “Washington” as Washington politics of
Congress, as senior officials of the administration and technocratic Washington of the
international financial institutions, of governmental economic agencies, of the Federal Reserve
Board and of think tanks [WIL90]. His philosophy remained the same as that of the SAPs:
strict budgetary discipline, strict monetary policy, openness to international trade. The idea
was that the revival of economies, often ossified by bloated administrations, should be carried
out by a supply policy: encouraging private investment and consumption with tax concessions
and lower rates of direct taxation.
1.2.2. Failure of the “minimum State”
In the early 1990s, Latin American States, like many other developing countries, made the
Washington Consensus their cause. Clift [CLI 03] pointed out that this held some of its
promises: stronger budgets, lower inflation and debt ratios, an influx of foreign investment and
a recovery in growth. At the same time, unemployment rose and poverty remained endemic,
while the opening markets exposed these countries to the collateral effects of globalization,
including the influx of speculative financial capital, which was higher than foreign direct
investment (FDI).
On a theoretical level, but also in practice, the Washington Consensus was quickly challenged.
According to Stiglitz [STI 98], the framework offered too few instruments, a restrictive vision
of development and senseless marginalization of the role of the State. Moreover, it has often
been held that the withdrawal of the State from its role as producer via massive privatizations,
combined with deregulation and liberalization of FDI (if these reduce the budget deficit and
boost growth), induces the strengthening of economic dependence of countries whose
production bases and innovation systems are weak [STI 02, BER 04, UZU 05]. Moreover,
Rodrik [ROD 98] showed that the liberalization of capital flows does not lead to more
sustained growth and development because of their volatile financial capital that sought
immediate payment.
Financial liberalization was supposed to attract international investment capital in areas where
the comparative advantage of a particular Southern country was identified and thus enabled the
country to benefit from non-debt-generating funding. But not only this, because the opening and
strengthening of attractiveness vis-à-vis the FDI were a factor of technology transfer from the
North to the South and a means for reducing unemployment. However, capital flows proved to
be highly concentrated and volatile, mostly corresponding to speculative investments (not to
actual investment). This was where financialization of the global economy resided and
created a kind of dichotomy between the real and financial spheres. And we do not take
unnecessary risks on considering that international institutions contributed by advocating and
imposing liberal policies based on the primacy of the opening of the capital account. Many
economists now belatedly note that the sequencing of reforms matters enormously and that
countries should first strengthen state control. Paradoxically, the institutions of this global
governance [UZU 10c] had the greatest difficulties facing these markets as they were unable to
predict or explain the upheavals and movements that were contrary to the classical theory of
liberalism that had inspired them so.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-26-320.jpg)
![Indeed, despite progress over more than half a century in the understanding of economic
processes, and despite efforts from the IMF and other international stakeholders for effective
governance of globalization, worldwide crises have been more recurrent and, in some ways,
more serious. The financial crises that have erupted over the past decade are representative
examples, such as those that occurred in Asia (1997), Latin America (Mexico, 1995;
Argentina, 2002), in Russia and in 2008 in the United States followed by the rest of the world.
Violent and costly crises aggravated poverty and inequality, relatively and to varying degrees,
to the point that we can today speak of a “globalization” of poverty. Each time, these were
opportunities to renew questions and revive reflections on the role, architecture and efficiency
of the global accumulation framework, which was neither capable of stabilizing the global
economy, nor effectively preventing and mitigating crises. Stiglitz’s [STI 02] reflections on this
topic always proved to be valid: when a country is in crisis, not only have the IMF funds and
prescriptions failed to stabilize the situation, but in many cases, they made them worse. It is
indisputable that the IMF failed in its original mission to promote global stability and was not
more “brilliant” in the new tasks it set, for example to guide the transition of ex-socialist
countries toward a market economy.
Financial globalization required mature financial systems, but not only this, as state regulation
was also imperative for measuring the risks of capital mobility. The failures of globalization
were due to the supremacy given to the private sector in the recommended model of
development, gradually confining the crucially important role of the State to mere regulatory
functions. It was not surprising then, that the influence of the private sector extended
increasingly, and by default, in areas where State authority was weakened.
Indeed, developing countries were led to practice pro-cyclical policies as prescribed in the
Washington Consensus but which, in fact, worsened their situation: “Countries of the
developing world have been asking why the United States, when faced with an economic
crisis, is in favor of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, whereas when these countries
themselves are in the same situation, they are required to do exactly the opposite” [STI 02, p.
308]. Developing countries were not in a position to counter the commandments of consensus.
The restructuring undertaking became so complex that they often seemed politically and
socially untenable. The need to eliminate all barriers to trade, investment and currency
transactions was sharply opposed to the idea that these countries had to protect, consolidate or
strengthen their economies. In the late 1990s, the results turned out to be different from what
Williamson had expected, that the IMF and the World Bank had promised, what the States had
hoped for and that econometric models had predicted. Was it because the liberal precepts on
which the Consensus was based were poorly adapted to the real requirements of the context
and national conditions? Or was it because there was a misinterpretation of the ten
commandments?
In the second half of the 1990s, ten middle-income countries experienced serious financial
crises with consequences such as the decline of exports, accelerated deindustrialization,
massive loss of employment, etc. The Asian crisis was a clear example, having occurred due
to the excessive trust in the market and commitment toward deregulation based on the
“minimum State”. On the other hand, China and India, who experienced sustained economic](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-27-320.jpg)
![growth, only gradually opened up and maintained a proactive economic policy. Chile having
led an ultra-liberal economic policy in the 1970s, its performances thereafter were the result of
a turn around to more economic voluntarism from the mid-1980s. These countries adopted
counter-cyclical policies: support for exports, strengthening the system of education and
research and control of short-term capital inflows.
1.3. The era of “good governance”
After the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, it appeared that the consensus raised more problems
than it solved. A “post-consensus” seemed to be emerging, in which the idea of a minimum
State was put into perspective, at least regarding the pace of its withdrawal, the distribution of
the fruits of growth and, ostensibly, the central role of institutions. In its 1997 annual report, the
World Bank inflected its position by stating that a “good governance” was imperative for the
proper functioning of the market. Rogoff [ROG 02] considered that the negative effects of the
consensus were due to “bad governance” and poor conduct of economic policies. Rodrik
[ROD 03] proposed to expand the Washington Consensus, focusing in this case on good
governance.
The failure of the structural adjustment policies was interpreted by the World Bank as a lack of
institutional capacity in some countries, so it directed its programs to what it called “the good
governance”. Therefore, the policy made a remarkable entry into the discourse of international
institutions. In fact, in addition to the emphasis on the implementation of the programs, it was
also about understanding the nature of the institutions that embodied these programs. Thus
“good governance” could, a priori, refer to the inclusion of political behavior in development.
That is to say, political cost was highlighted in the new theories of development.
According to the new discourses, those States with a rational institutional architecture were the
most capable to promote development. Institutionalism thus burst into the debate on
development. From then on, the focus was on the institutional deficit that afflicted developing
countries. In other words, if some theoretical receipts did not prove to be effective at the
empirical level, it was because the institutional architecture of the economies in which they
were applied was lacking. In this section, we propose to trace the outlines of a new
development model by placing the question of institutions at its center. The a priori that
governs this analysis emphasizes that the existence of good quality institutions is both the result
and the cause of economic prosperity. However, regardless of causality, increasingly abundant
empirical research shows that institutions have an important effect on determining the
allocation of production resources and income distribution [ROD 05].
1.3.1. Institutions, “good governance” and development
In the 1990s, the dominant paradigm of development economics changed. The symbolic
failures of all States (planning) and all markets (minimal State) led to a metamorphosis of
development economics. The theory of “good governance” took over. This theory assumed that
there was a strong complementarity between democracy and the market, in the sense that](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-28-320.jpg)
![political and economic systems were mutually reinforcing each other [FIT 04]. The issue of
institutions became crucial. The report of the World Bank in 1991 was indicative of these
changes: the poor performance of certain countries was explained by the quality of
“institutions”. The institutional deficit experienced by the economies of developing countries
was put forward to explain the gap in the economic performance with the North. In essence,
development was not only conditioned by factor endowments. The institutional component
explained a part.
The concept of “good governance” is now ubiquitous in economic analysis. Proponents of this
concept present it as a healthy alternative to power abuse in its current manifestations, a cure
for all ills of contemporary society and especially the optimal way to ensure development in
countries suffering from endemic underdevelopment. Its adoption by international institutions
has allowed us to highlight some changes in the status of the State in economic theory of
development. Bad development results from bad governance.
Williamson [WIL94] was considered the father of new institutional economics based on the
assumption of bounded rationality and opportunism of agents. He distinguished between
different types of institutions, such as the market, the hierarchy and the hybrid forms. The
central idea of the new institutional economics was that institutions mattered significantly in
economic processes and could be analyzed using neoclassical theory tools. The inclusion of
institutions thus represented a major advance in liberal theory.
D. North [NOR 90] perceived institutions as the rules. He considered that there were two
kinds of institutions: formal rules (constitutional rules, rules of property rights and contracts)
and informal rules (standards and practices). The definition of institutions developed by North
was meaningful insofar as institutions were seen as the rules of play of a society or, more
formally, the constraints defined by men to shape their interactions. In this way, institutions
ensured that the rules were respected in a context where different types of transactions
occurred repeatedly. They had characteristics of public goods that the market could not supply
efficiently. It is in the logic of minimizing transaction costs, in the control of opportunistic
behavior within a relationship or in the reiterated balance that the explanation for the
emergence and functionality of institutions can be found. Institutions are then based on power.
Furthermore, if the idea of a combination of institutional architecture and economic
performance seemed common to several economists, North insisted that it was incentives that
served as a mediator between institutions and economic performance. Institutional framework
determines the behavior of stakeholders; similarly, stakeholders will be the source of
institutional change. The organizations and stakeholders that emerged seized the opportunities
created by the institutional framework. If this rewarded speculation, speculative organizations
would appear; if it rewarded innovation, innovative businesses would be created and systemic
innovation would begin.
For the World Bank, governance is “the set of rules governing the exercise of authority in the
name of an electorate comprising of selecting and replacing those who exercise this authority”
[WOR 09] and good governance is to exercise this authority by respecting the integrity, rights
and needs of everyone in the State. Also according to the World Bank, relations of good](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-29-320.jpg)
![governance in a framework based on two universal values can be considered: social inclusion
and responsibility. The idea is that insufficient quality of governance blights the economic,
social and human development; which explains the economic delay in Southern countries
compared with Northern countries.
Good governance applied to developing countries required, according to the World Bank, the
development of education and infrastructure, environmental protection and equitable
distribution of resources as the necessary conditions for markets to function properly. A system
of laws was necessary to regulate the liberalization of the markets of product, capital and labor
in order to avoid the excess of capital flight and the increase of illegal and informal activities.
Then, institutional reform was needed to better monitor the economy and enlist all economic
stakeholders (political, business and trade unions) in the decision-making process. Finally, the
tax system should ensure the proper distribution of income. But it also had to ensure that the
poor “have access to assets”: instruction, ownership titles, microcredit, land reform, etc. It
was not a question of returning to the hypertrophied, corrupt and expensive State, but rather
moving toward an “astute State”. Institutional reforms aimed to implement a good decision-
making process through the adoption of good policies.
Let us note however that the concept of governance is generally (on a theoretical level) and
particularly (by examining the facts) questionable. It is imbued with a strong dose of
authoritarianism [UZU 10c, UZU 10d]. Indeed, if one refers to the question of institutions as a
common infrastructure (“common good”) to all agents of a national economy, governance and
democracy do not necessarily go together. In this case, “democracy” (deliberative) is not
linked to any “common destiny” or legitimacy given to citizens’ acts as individuals, but it
results from the intervention of “stakeholders”: dialogue of governments with economically or
financially powerful forces (firms, banks, etc.) or with influence (lobby groups, unions,
religions, etc.). The “moral” perspective of a “common good” is then substituted by a
“political” perspective of the definition of “good”. These institutions that are formed by power
relationships (of conflict and cooperation) create an economic development trajectory on
which all stakeholders of the economy operate (or must operate to avoid exclusion).
Ultimately, from the World Bank’s approach, liberal thought tried to promote a model of
organization of developing economies based on the idea that democracy and the market are not
mutually exclusive. Therefore, the two complement each other. From this perspective, the State
was expected to play an increasingly significant role in development through the establishment
of an infrastructure and institutional basis. This explains the importance that researchers of
development economics and stakeholders of the international community give to the topic of
institutions. According to these stakeholders, it is the principle of effectiveness that guides the
selection of institutions. But this principle of effectiveness is itself defined by the power
relations that create the overall framework for the governance of the global economy.
1.3.2. “Development” in global governance
The growing assertion of failures of liberalism (concretized by rather mixed results of the
SAPs and the applications of the Washington Consensus), combined with the needs of new](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-30-320.jpg)
![role seemed to be more crucial and decisive than ever? Or should we work on the concept of
an “astute State” more accurately? The fact is, as we will see later, the new challenges of
globalization call on us to reflect on a new development model. If open borders and economic
liberalism are the two pillars on which the system of global governance rests, the achievement
of this “new development model” should lead economists and political scientists to rethink
future economic policies.
1.4. The system of “global governance” under scrutiny
Without supreme regulatory power, globalization and its constraints and challenges may result
in unpredictable functioning of the global economy due to conflicts of interest between rival
state entities. Fear of economic and political conflict has been used to justify the introduction
of a global governance system [MAR 03]. The integration of national economies into
globalization is entrusted to international institutions that are deemed to be exempt from state
control. Transnationalist theses add to this, demonstrating internal–external continuity and
depriving the State of its latest capabilities against the necessary emergence of a supra-State
regulation system.
Hidden behind the global governance goals, the problem of relevance of development policy
implementation is emerging. Well-defined post-war guidelines (prepare and organize open
trade, finance development, conduct proactive industrial policies, etc.) were replaced by a set
of goals that do not seem to fulfill a unified vision of the future, even as economic integration
(openness to international flows of goods and capital) and the dismantling of State power
(economic liberalization, predominance of international treaties) have become an end in itself.
This encourages us to see globalization as a process that inevitably leads to the difficulty for
States to set goals and develop ways to achieve them: industrial choices, innovation policies,
integration of FDI in a diversification program of economic activities, etc.
1.4.1. Global governance as a substitute for economic voluntarism
How does the astute State differ from the minimum State and how is it more apt to promote
rapid, equitable and environmentally responsible development? In fact, expenditure,
operations, administrations, prerogatives, staff, aids to the productive sector, etc., are steadily
decreasing. Consolidation and deleveraging remain the primary objectives of economic
policies promoted by international institutions. From this perspective, the role of the State in
the process of economic development seems weakened. Without any real economic policy
instrument (currency being subjected to international rules and fluctuations; regulatory
framework being drawn externally), the vast majority of developing (and even middle-income)
countries are not masters of their own economy. Their bargaining power with major
international companies in terms of technology transfer, employment, and reinvestment of
profits or protection of infant industries is reduced. With national control measures of flows of
investment or goods becoming obsolete, national governments are unable to control their
economy. The problem is therefore a political issue.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-33-320.jpg)
![unequivocal message about the effects of trade liberalization on development. According to
standard economic theory, the international division of labor and specialization of national
economies in production, for which they have an abundance of capital or labor, are not only
beneficial to a particular country but to the whole world. Through the relative price mechanism
of goods and factors, costs would drop and people’s living standards would improve. The free
movement of goods and that of capital is the necessary and sufficient condition for reaching
global welfare. But history shows that there are impoverishing and discriminating
specializations. It is also an assertion argued by the structuralist approach: it questions modes
of insertion into the global economy as the primary and sufficient condition to trigger a
sustained and consistent development process. The determining factor for development cannot
be external demand for primary products. But historical conditions for development of the
world market meant that developing countries were enrolled in the international division of
labor as exporters of raw, agricultural and mining materials and as importers of industrial
products and/or consumption. If the terms of trade deteriorate (as is regularly the case over a
long period), these countries have to borrow in order to finance imports of food and industrial
products, compounding their external deficit and, consequently, their external debt.
This reality explains the results of the study by the Philippine sociologist Walden Bello [BEL
02] looking back at thirty years of economic liberalism. According to the study, 80% of loans
from the World Bank have benefited a limited number of developing countries to access
financial markets. These loans prove, moreover, to be ineffective if we consider that the World
Bank itself estimated a 70% failure rate of its projects in poor countries. Indeed, the
application of the liberal principles of global governance does not clearly result in better
global allocation of production resources. Countries that show the most advanced development
and adequate attractiveness policies (see the emerging countries: Brazil, India, China, South
Africa, etc.) are those that structurally host the largest volume of foreign investments and have
an important place in international trade. Countries with major transport, telecommunications
and energy infrastructure, where scientific and technical potential is the richest, and with large
solvent markets, etc., are the ones that attract global firms.
The more production and innovation systems are developed on a national basis, the more the
economy in question is able to integrate the global logic of the operation of large companies.
The liberalization of capital markets, positive interest rates, and the facilities and “national
treatment” granted to internationalized companies open new perspectives for financing
development. But according to the UN Conference on Development (UNCTAD), in the 1990s
and early in this century, 90% of FDI in developing countries have gone to a small group of
“emerging economies”, against about 50% before the outbreak of the debt crisis (late 1970s).
The LDCs received 1%. These countries, unattractive for FDI and dependent on volatile
private capital, are forced to contract multilateral loans packaged with reforms causing deeper
imbalances; yet they still face another problem of the global governance system, namely the
constant fall of official development assistance (ODA).
The virtuous cycle of investment and growth is closely linked to profound changes in the
economy and, in particular, to the development and diversification of industry. Even during the
debt crisis, East Asian economies continued to rely on industry and high value-added](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-35-320.jpg)
![technology-intensive services, through protecting high-technology sectors, rising up the value
chain in some sectors (for example, microelectronics) and investing in the development of
services (such as banking, insurance and engineering). However, most Latin American
countries experienced deindustrialization and African economies went through a “premature
deindustrialization” (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1. Share of manufacturing in GDP by region, 1960-2017 (in %)
Source: [KOZ 04]
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2017 (projection)
Sub-Saharan Africa 15.3 17.8 17.4 14.9 14.9 13.6 13.0
West Asia and North Africa 10.9 12.2 10.1 15.6 14.2 14.6 15.1
Latin America 28.1 26.8 28.2 25.0 17.8 16.8 16.2
South Asia 13.8 14.5 17.4 18.0 15.7 15.1 14.9
East Asia (excluding China) 14.6 20.6 25.4 26.8 27.0 27.4 27.2
China 23.7 30.1 40.6 33.0 34.5 32.3 31.9
Developing countries 21.5 22.3 24.7 24.4 22.7 21.9 20.9
Developed countries 28.9 28.3 24.5 22.1 18.9 17.6 17.2
The consequences of systematic deregulation are symptomatic of the constraints and paradoxes
in the new world order and of the inability of major stakeholders of global governance to
manage it effectively and globally. The first structural responses to financial crises that
regularly cross the global economy show, in fact, a return to protectionism in major countries
and blocks of Northern countries and simultaneously, a reconfiguration of the financial sphere.
Protectionism is to encourage producers operating in the country itself over others, either
through limiting the entry of foreign products into the national territory by quotas or hard-to-
reach standards (health, labor, environmental, etc.), or through artificially enhancing the
competitiveness of local products by duties on imported goods or subsidies to local producers.
According to the World Bank, since the 2008 financial crisis, protectionist measures have been
increasing, as well as a rise in anti-dumping measures to prevent the entry of foreign products
at excessively low prices. The stimulus packages launched since 2009 (financing of transport,
communications and energy infrastructures, bank debt redemption, continued low interest rates,
etc.) in major industrialized countries accentuate these protectionist tendencies.
For example, the European Union and the United States routinely resort to protectionism in
order to protect and increase the export capacity of their businesses. This is the case for
industrial agriculture into which these two protagonists pour a billion dollars per day to
support it. This worsens the global nutrition problem due to the low purchasing power of the
populations (mostly agrarian) in LDCs. The European Union and the United States demand that
their manufactured goods and agricultural products, as well as their service companies, freely
penetrate the markets of the world. But at the same time, they are the first to require the
protection of intellectual property; 90% of patents are held by Western firms. The limitation of](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-36-320.jpg)
![knowledge flow creates a lasting superiority of the North over the South.
However, new financial strategies guide development policy toward the management of debts
at the expense of growth. Helped by rating agencies who decide on the reliability of
borrowers, financial institutions spot the most fragile States and speculate on government
securities. This raises guarantees on State loans (credit default swaps: CDS) and mortgages
weak countries in the long-term. However, this situation develops the inventiveness of States
with performing economies in terms of protectionism. In an open economy, where finance
sanctions the decision and the investment act, the States of industrial and emerging countries
use regulations to justify expansion effects or relative decline. These States give up their
power on their territories to the private sector and extend their trade policy through
international bodies, treaties and standards to the benefit of large companies, which through
mergers, acquisitions and equity investments can thus increase their power in the global
market.
Therefore, we should learn from previous development efforts to advocate for programs with
realistic goals. For example, we should accept, as Joseph E. Stiglitz argues [STI 02], the
gradual and differentiated international opening up of developing countries according to their
objectives as did (and still do) industrialized countries that have built their economies by
protecting key sectors of their industrialization. But the new agreements on direct investment
(agreement on trade-related investment measures – TRIMS) signed in the WTO framework
prevent developing countries from protecting their industries, either by substituting imports
with local production, or by applying measures to increase “local content” in the case of FDI.
However, these countries are forced to implement strict legislation on intellectual property
protection (agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights – TRIPS). The
abidance to scientific and technical progress essentially achieved in industrialized countries
constrains the establishment and development of national innovation systems in developing
countries.
1.4.2. Toward an alternative model of economic growth?
Global governance formalizes a commercial, productive and financial framework drawn by the
political choices of major economies [UZU 10b], while promising to developing countries to
accelerate their industrialization thanks to free trade [UZU 05, UZU 10d]. But according to J.K.
Galbraith [GAL84], the industrial world applies an economic model in companies that doesn’t
take historical processes into account: the great powers apply standard development programs
without considering the historical characteristics of less developed economies. These
programs express the state of the economy of these powers and leave little space for
sociopolitical conditions on which capital formation could be based. For Galbraith, and
according to the experiences of former industrialized countries, the prerequisite for economic
development is political development, itself correlated with the democratization of education.
A political system must be stable and predictable, honest and efficient; citizens (educated and
informed) should be the stakeholders. But in order to achieve this, citizens must be educated.
Good governance starts with the organization of a system of basic teaching, education and
training of individuals.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-37-320.jpg)
![After the Second World War, countries seeking to develop were encouraged not to develop
their own capacity to innovate but rather to import the most advanced technologies as heavily
as possible. This mimicry largely explains the failure of development strategies. It induced
debt crises, greater dependence on Northern countries, a brain drain, poverty and an explosion
of migration. The idea that we can simply import foreign technologies without appropriating at
least part of their production conditions is unfounded. The demands of an active integration
into the world economy combined with those of the structuring of a competitive production
system lead the researcher to question the capacity of developing countries to develop their
own innovation systems.
The issue of development is therefore to make globalization profitable and from this
perspective, it is clear that there is no alternative but to renew reflection on the relevance of a
new and proactive role of States and more particularly, in science and technology policy and
innovation policy. The merits of such policies depend on the existence of so-called market
failures. Institutional, structural, productive, distributive, financial, etc., inefficiencies are all
market failures that legitimize public measures to deal with them, with a view to ensuring
effective operation of the production system and promoting its integration into the global
economy, according to development requirements. But initially, economic policy should move
toward the establishment of institutions guaranteeing: (1) the best possible allocation of
resources in order to avoid dominant market positions; (2) the economy stabilization to
effectively and fully use these capital and labor resources; (3) the social transfers to meet the
basic needs of the population (food, health, education and housing); (4) the financing through
fiscal policy for the production of public goods.
Unlike analyses that reduce the State to an agent that creates distortions and/or collects income,
new development macroeconomics connect growth, competitiveness and financial balances
and introduce structuralist elements in a macroeconomic framework [UZU 10e]. Thus, in the
context of a globalized economy, the “pro” State (promoter, prospector, protector and
producer) becomes a central agent of development that aims to change the modes of integration
of the country in the international division of labor (IDL). This requires a change in the nature
of specializations through the implementation of industrial and innovation economic policies,
coupled with institutional and social modernization, which act on the productive structures. By
this logic, UNCTAD proposes the establishment of development policies whose objective is to
stimulate and monitor structural transformations.
The revival of the State is concomitant to a change in its modes of action in fundamentally
altered national and international contexts. The design of an alternative development model
assumes that national States have significant enough “leeway” to control its economy. This
thesis will certainly go against the Washington Consensus (which is based on the objective of
convergence of policies for undifferentiated integration in the global market), but it does not
reject the relevance of active and phased integration policies in international flows of goods
and capital.
The economic policy of development in globalization involves the definition of strategic
objectives at the center of which is the design and promotion of innovation capacities and the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-40-320.jpg)
![2
Innovative Capacities and Systems of the South in
Globalization
The challenges of globalization, beyond the system of global governance, demonstrate the
importance of innovation and technologies as tools for growth and sustainable development in
the North as much as in the South.
There has been widespread research on innovation in Southern economies over the last 30
years [KIM 97, HOB 95, AMS 01, BEL97]. More recently, the issue has been whether the
concept of an “innovation system”, as developed in the 1980s, is a useful tool for studying
growth and development [LUN 09, MUC 03]. The idea is to use this concept to understand
learning and innovation processes in developing economies. Therefore, it would not only serve
as a tool for comparing the technological performance of countries, but also as a promotional
tool for economic development.
Initially applied in Northern economies, the concept of “innovation system” was introduced
into development economics for the construction of a set of economic policy proposals that
combined the demands of globalization with the specificities of Southern economies [ALT 09].
The structure of the private sector in developing countries and its performance differ largely
from Northern economies. This requires considering, among other things, a number of key
elements such as weak legal systems (less secure property rights and higher transaction costs),
differences in demand conditions (low purchasing power, demand for more or less
sophisticated products), poor infrastructure (high transport and production costs), weak
education systems (from primary school to universities), price instability and greater capital
volatility.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we attempt to understand how to examine systemic
innovation in the South and then we discuss the difficulties of achieving it. The concept of the
innovation system will find its meaning in a broader sense, given the nature of innovation and
especially the connection with building necessary innovation capabilities. But for this
instrument to be consistent and applicable, it is necessary to understand on what strategies
innovation of the South is based and how the North/South technology transfer is ensured, as the
technology comes from innovation systems that are richly endowed with scientific and
technical resources. Thus, it is important to create national learning capacities but these must
be accompanied by internal learning processes that are based on endogenous knowledge.
However, institutional and innovation policy failures prevent many developing countries from
building skills and consequently create systemic links between potential and current innovators
and between endogenous and imported innovation.
2.1. Innovation for economic development](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-42-320.jpg)
![delivering a service. It was a transmission of knowledge between companies and public
institutions belonging to different countries and an exchange of equipment and technology
between countries. Technology transfer can take place from one firm to another firm in a
foreign country, from a research laboratory to a newly created firm or one that already exists.
The innovation process in developing economies comes from a process of this technology
transfer. Here, “technology transfer” means the dissemination and the capacity of developing
economies to capture foreign technology in order to integrate it into their production operations
to launch products and competitive services on (local and/or global) markets and increasing
added value.
Although there was an abundant literature on technology transfer in the 1980s, Hendrickx
[HEN 96] sums up the three existing categories: material transfer, transfer of concept and
transfer of capacities:
1) Material transfer is treated as the simple import of new equipment and related
techniques. Local adaptation is designed as trial and error. The core technology is trapped
inside the physical goods;
2) Transfer of concept is achieved through transfer of certain plans, formulas or books in
order to make a domestic product. This is a simple transfer of information, data and
guidelines for creating basic skills;
3) Transfer of capacities is in turn directed toward a transfer of scientific knowledge for
the production of locally adapted technologies. This transfer leads to the development of
our own technologies from imported technology.
Teece [TEE 76] clarified two main forms: a physical form with the characteristics of various
products and equipment and another more informational form, which may be acquired if the
equipment is actually used. Technology transfer should include four distinct elements, namely
one content, two parties and a result. The content consists of a transfer of tangible and
intangible assets for operating the transferred technology. The two parties are the exporter and
importer of the technology. The result is relative to the recipient’s ability to operate the
imported technology. UNCTAD classifies three forms of technology transfer: its production
through multinational companies and R&D, its transfer through multiple forms of external
growth strategies (mergers and acquisitions, franchising, license acquisition, technical
assistance) and its diffusion through the generated externalities. For Berthe [BER 97], there
were three different categories of technology transfer: appropriate technology relevant to the
needs of the local population; advanced technology associated with the use of technologies
from developed countries; technology recovery to recover and transform technology from
developed countries.
But this technology transfer also came at a cost. Teece [TEE 76] described four components in
particular: the costs of technological engineering exchange related to the theoretical basis, the
engineering costs associated with the transfer itself, the R&D costs and the training costs.
Technology transfer was much influenced by the efficiency of the process of
internationalization of firms as a basis for multinational companies and direct foreign](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-44-320.jpg)
![investment [BUC 76].
Technology transfer can take place in various forms, such as:
– intellectual property rights license agreement;
– know-how transmission agreement;
– research and license contracts;
– technical assistance and vocational training contract;
– contract for realization of industrial complex;
– direct investment controller joint-venture;
– mixed contract including one or more forms.
But here, we are less interested in the forms than in the processes related to their development.
Although the literature is abundant, we can nevertheless present two major theoretical
orientations: that of the technology gap between rich and poor countries and more recently,
those related to capacity and skill building. The latter literature insists on the ability of
developing countries to internalize foreign knowledge. We can consider that developing
countries are not mere imitators of foreign technology and can appropriate foreign knowledge
by creating a capacity to innovate.
The technological gap theory is far from recent. It was developed by Posner in 1961 to
highlight the strong competition of the economies between high and medium technology sectors
[POS 61]. By focusing on innovation, certain countries gained a technological edge in a sector,
which gives them an export monopoly in this sector, regardless of their advantages in factor
endowment. A technology trade gap arises if foreign consumers express a demand for new
products that require a certain period. This imitation period will be ever longer as the
innovator maintains a cost advantage that is often associated with economies of scale arising
from the existence of an extending market. New products appear and others disappear at a high
rate that corresponds to rapid technological change.
The works by Vernon [VER 66] were in line with this neo-technological approach. Focusing
on the product lifecycle problems, Vernon quickly extended his analysis to international trade.
According to this author, any innovative product undergoes a lifecycle that has four phases:
introduction, growth, saturation and decline. These phases can be coupled with the technology
dissemination procedures on foreign territory:
– The launch phase corresponds to a diffusion of the product in the domestic market with
high incomes and strong demand for innovative products. The firm behind the new product
may have a temporary monopoly.
– The growth phase is marked by widespread nature of the product which becomes a
commonplace on its home market, encouraging the innovative firm to export the product to
similar markets.
– The saturation phase is characterized by the fact that the diffusion of the product is no](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-45-320.jpg)
![Minervini lesse dipinta sulla parete sinistra della casa la seguente
epigrafe, che oggi è frammentata per la caduta dell’intonaco:
PROCVLE . FRONTONI
TVO . OFFICIVM . COMMODA
Questa raccomandazione, scrive il dotto signor G. De Petra,
illustrando nel Giornale degli Scavi la casa e il pistrino di P. Paquio
Proculo[284], così per la sua forma, come pel luogo dov’è scritta, mi
pare indubitato che Frontone la rivolgesse al padrone della casa, il
quale perciò doveva chiamarsi Proculo. Con tal cognome occorrono
più di frequente nei programmi pompejani due persone, P. Paquio
Proculo e Q. Postumio Proculo; ma considerando che in una
colonna dell’atrio è graffito il nome di Pacuia, la figlia di Paquio,
rimane provato che col nome di questo debba intitolarsi la casa.
Donde si fa ancora probabile che l’altra raccomandazione elettorale
publicata dal ch. Fiorelli (Giornale degli Scavi, 1862, p. 47, n. 4):
Sabinum aed (ilem) Procule fac, et ille te facient, fosse indirizzata
allo stesso P. Paquio, che pare sia stato un uomo assai influente e
popolare. Diffatti il ch. Garrucci (Bull. arch. Nap., n. 5, tom. II, p. 52)
fece nota questa epigrafe che sinora non trova riscontro di sorta fra
le reminiscenze elettorali: P. Paquium Proculum ii. Vir. i. d. d. r. p.
universi Pompejani fecerunt; nondimeno chi era questo Proculo, che
i Pompeiani unanimi sollevarono alla somma dignità di duumviro
giusdicente? Niente altro, come si vedrà, che un panattiere! Il qual
fatto ci autorizza a conchiudere, che in Pompei le magistrature
municipali non eran monopolio dei soli ricchi, e che questi
conoscevano di buona voglia (universi fecerunt) la convenienza di
farvi partecipare anche i più autorevoli e migliori cittadini di
condizione plebea. — Lezione buona pei nostri tempi, in cui le
elezioni amministrative e politiche sembrano infeudate
all’aristocrazia del sangue e del denaro: colpa precipua del popolo
stesso che si ostina, a parole, a gridar contro i ricchi e gli uomini di
grande autorità, ma in fatto è poi sempre lo stesso peccatore, che
religiosamente serba il suo stolido feticismo per chi tiene di classe a
sè superiore; salvo a ricominciare di poi le sue maledizioni contro gli](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-48-320.jpg)
![eletti proprj, che ignari de’ suoi bisogni, fanno leggi a sproposito e a
detrimento.
Anche all’ingresso della viottola della Fontana del Bue, sulla
muraglia a sinistra, una bella e ben conservata pittura di simboliche
serpi è sormontata, oltre che da un piccolo larario, anche da varie
iscrizioni, parte in oggi cancellate dalla rovina, fra le quali leggesi la
seguente, che ognor più avvalora e l’influenza e la ricchezza di
questo importantissimo panattiere in Pompei:
P. PAQVIVM PROCVLVM
II VIR . I . D . THALAMVS CLIENS[285].
Io non mi divagherò a descrivere la casa di questo P. Paquio
Proculo, che qui l’argomento ne sarebbe spostato: verrò invece
difilato al pistrino che vi è in essa, e che è nel lato destro. Vi si
riconosce la camera del panificium, e ciò si argomenta, scrive il De
Petra, dai cinque podii di fabbrica per sostegno di tre tavoloni di
legno su cui rimaneggiavasi la pasta, da varii recipienti per
conservar l’acqua, quali sono una vaschetta quadra fabbricata, un
gran dolio sepolto a metà nel suolo e un’anfora murata in uno de’
poggiuoli, infine dalle traccie degli assi di legno che sostenevano le
tavole su cui disponevansi i pani. Una porta priva di soglia dava il
passaggio da questo luogo a quello dov’è il forno; ma tra l’una e
l’altra stanza, per uno scopo limitato, cioè per la sola cottura del
pane, v’era una comunicazione anche più diretta e sollecita. Si
notarono tre molæ per isfarinare il grano, avendo una di esse la
base ricoperta da una lamina di piombo, la meta di una quarta mola
senza il catillus e la base circolare per una quinta; due serbatoj
d’acqua fabbricati, un pozzo con coperchio, un piccolo dolio
contenente calce e tre poggiuoli.
Il dipinto larario solito a incontrarsi nei pistrini, non è mancato in
questo, ma sventuratamente tornò a luce poco conservato. Sotto un
verdeggiante festone è la Dea Vesta ammantata con lo scettro nella
sinistra e il dritto braccio proteso sopra un focus. Dietro a Vesta è
l’asino, l’animale, come dissi, usato più spesso a girar le macine;](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-49-320.jpg)
![rimpetto alla Dea v’è un giovane in piedi che nella sinistra ha la
cornucopia, e stende la diritta sull’ara.
A sinistra del forno v’è un ampio locale in cui probabilmente si
conservavano saccula di grano o di farina.
Di questo P. Paquio Proculo e di sua moglie, nel tablinum della loro
casa, si rinvenne il ritratto dipinto sulle pareti gialle. Cedo la penna
all’egregio De Petra. «Questo dipinto, offre la volgare fisonomia di
Paquio, che ammantato dalla bianca toga magistrale, stringe nella
destra un volume col rispettivo titolo di colore rosso. Gli è a fianco la
sua donna, cui pendono sulla fronte i ricciolini sfuggiti alla fascetta
che le stringe i capelli; ha pendenti di perle alle orecchie, e rossa la
veste; avvicina alle labbre la punta dello stilo che tiene nella dritta ed
ha i pugillari aperti nella sinistra[286]. Donde si può inferire, che
l’anzidetta positura sia stata convenzionale nei ritratti, poichè
l’atteggiarsi dell’uomo e della donna trovasi ripetuto esattamente in
due scudetti publicati nelle Pitture d’Ercolano (tom. III, tav. 45) e in
quegli altri due che ornano il tablino d’una casa nella Regione
Settima, isola 10, propriamente quella che vien dopo la casa del
Balcone Pensile. Oltrecchè l’atteggiamento della donna si confronta
con la scrittrice dipinta nell’atrio della casa di Popidio Prisco (Reg.
VII, Is. 11, n. 20) e con un’altra delle Pitture d’Erc. (t. III, tav. 46)[287].
Quale simbolo dell’amor conjugale di P. Paquio e sua moglie,
vedevasi al di sopra dei loro ritratti un grazioso ed importante
quadretto, ora nel Museo, rappresentante Amore e Psiche
teneramente abbracciati. Il bacio e l’amplesso di essi, ovvio in tanti
altri monumenti, è ritratto in questa pittura pompejana in una
movenza nuova, sebbene non molto diversa delle altre conosciute.»
Nella Via degli Augustali, come dipendenza della Casa detta dei
Capitelli figurati, aprivasi poi una taberna da pasticciere, pistor
dulciarius, il quale, come ne fa sapere Apulejo, panes et mellita
concinnabat eduleia. Vi si videro parecchi mulinetti, pistrillæ, che un
sol uomo bastava a girare; ma destò la speciale attenzione il forno,
dalla forma del quale direbbesi a riverbero, costituendosi di due
cavità sovrapposte, accendendosi il fuoco nella cavità inferiore da](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-50-320.jpg)
![cui il calore ascendeva per un’apertura, nella cavità superiore, ove si
deponevano a cuocer le pasticcerie. Due pasticcetti si trovarono
negli scavi e si conservano nel Museo di Napoli.
Toccato de’ pistrini, vediamo ora le altre botteghe e spacci
pompejani di merci attinenti i cibi e gli alimenti.
Una taberna o venditorio d’olio si scoprì nel 1852 nella via di Stabia,
quasi all’angolo della viottola della Fontana del Bue. Il podio o banco
della bottega era di marmo cipollino e grigio antico, con in mezzo
dello specchio davanti un medaglione di porfido verde e due bei
rosoni. Su di esso vi erano incastrate otto belle ed ampie scodelle in
terra cotta. Nell’interno si ritrovò un pozzo, un fornello e l’ingresso
del ripostiglio dell’olio. La quantità degli ulivi che si coltivavano
nell’agro campano doveva necessariamente far luogo ad una
produzione assai abbondante di olio. Anche gli scavi hanno offerte
conserve nell’olio di grosse ulive, che dovevano probabilmente
aversi dalle famiglie pompejane fra le consuete ghiottornie.
Presso la casa di Cornelio Rufo e quella di Messinio nella Via di
Stabia evvi una casetta, che l’illustre Fioretti, seguendo le indicazioni
di Pompeo Festo e di Varrone, qualifica per un Ganeum, o Ganea,
specialmente per avervi vedute pitture ed iscrizioni licenziose[288].
Era la Ganea o il Ganeum, come meglio piaccia al lettore di
appellarlo, secondo essi, un ritrovo nascosto di meretrici, le camere
da letto delle quali erano a pian terreno, come i cenacoli nella parte
superiore delle case, ed io ne toccherò poi nel capitolo del Lupanare;
ma Bréton, nella sua Pompeja, avendo constatato nell’area del
peristilio sette grandi coppe, o giare, misure di capacità pei liquidi, e
sette dolii coi loro coperchi, senza manichi, fu indotto a credere che
questa casa potesse essere al contrario un magazzeno d’olio. Si
sono poi trovati negli scavi dei particolari mulini che si sono creduti
atti alla macinazione dei grani oleosi: l’uno fu rinvenuto nelle
vicinanze del Foro Triangolare o Nundinario.
Prima di entrare nel Foro Civile, sulla diritta, stava la taberna di un
venditore di latte. L’insegna di essa è in terra cotta e rappresenta
una capra. Sotto di essa vi si lesse questa iscrizione in caratteri](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-51-320.jpg)
![rossi, all’epoca del suo sterramento, ma che ora non si distinguono
più.
M. CASELLIVM AED. DIF. FAC.
FIDELIS...
Nel podio di materia di fabbrica, come d’uso nelle taberne di liquidi,
v’erano incassati dei vasi.
Nell’isola intorno al Tempio d’Augusto si constatarono diverse
botteghe di commestibili. Una di venditori di pesci salati, forse ciò
argomentandosi dai pesci che si videro dipinti sulle pareti, della
natura di quelli che si vendono nella salamoja, e già sappiamo che
Pompei era nota e famosa pel suo garo che sapeva preparare e del
quale ho già intrattenuto il lettore sulla fine del Capitolo Quinto.
Un’altra di fruttivendolo, nè in questa si errò di certo, poichè vi si
accogliessero fichi secchi in abbondanza, uva passa, susine, frutta
in vasi di vetro, lenti, semi di canape; oltre una ciambella, vari
frammenti di pasta e di pane, molto denaro, una staderina e varie
bilancie. I fruttivendoli in Pompei dovevano essere di molti, così
essendo lecito di pensare dalla iscrizione che fu letta sul pilastro che
separa la Fullonica, di cui dirò qui appresso, dalla Casa della gran
Fontana, scritta, come il più spesso, in caratteri rossi e che sembra
riferirsi al magistrato, del quale abbiam veduto come la statua
decorasse il teatro:
M. HOLCONIVM PRISCVM II VIR. I. D.
POMARI VNIVERSI CVM HELVIO
VESTALE ROGANT[289]
I fruttivendoli pompejani si raccomandano ancora in altre due
iscrizioni, che si lessero nella strada ove è l’arco di trionfo. L’una è
così concepita:
IVLIVM SABINVM AEDILEM
POMARII ROGANT
e l’altra così:](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-52-320.jpg)
![MARCVM CERRINIVM AEDILEM
POMARII ROGANT
Ciò che vuol essere osservato si è che in queste botteghe, che sono
circostanti al Tempio di Augusto, si sono rinvenuti molti oggetti
preziosi e d’arte, fra quali una statuetta di bronzo rappresentante
una Vittoria con armille d’oro alle braccia; un’altra in marmo; Venere
che si asciuga i capelli, come sorgesse allora dalle spume dell’Ionio
mare, colla parte inferiore velata da un drappo dipinto in rosso; una
bella tazza d’alabastro, anelli d’oro, gemme, sistri isiaci, un vaso di
vaghissimo lavoro, amuleti, strigili e diverse monete.
Sarà negli ulteriori scavi che verrà dato indubbiamente di scoprire
taberne d’altre cose mangerecce, e soprattutto lanienae, o botteghe
da beccai e macelli, la principale opera e materia prima dei quali
veniva somministrata dai templi, per le continue vittime che vi si
immolavano, per lo più in buoi, giovenche e pecore; e se agli Dei si
bruciavano ciocche di lana e qualche inutile interiora, tutt’al più
spruzzate da vino e mescolate di fiori, il meglio veniva accortamente
goduto dai sacerdoti pel loro uso, e venduto nuovamente ai gonzi, di
cui si costituisce la maggior parte del pubblico, che a ragion di
divozione avevano fatto prima l’offerta. I macellai dell’antichità erano
adunque principalmente i sacerdoti.
Della bottega del Chirurgo e del Seplasarius o farmacista e di quella
di prodotti chimici, ho già detto nel Capitolo delle Scuole; di quella
dello scultore mi occuperò nel venturo delle Belle Arti, come anche
del mercante de’ colori; perocchè meglio vi si trovino in essi collocati,
come materia che a que’ capitoli ha tutto il suo riferimento.
Nella stradicciuola di Mercurio, gli scavi trovarono nel 1853 un
Myropolium, o bottega da profumiere, detta anche, come la vediam
nominata in Varrone e Svetonio, unguentaria taberna[290]. Già
superiormente ho toccato dello spreco di profumi, aromi ed unguenti
che si faceva a quei tempi di grande effeminatezza in Roma e in
tutto l’orbe a lei soggetto. Non era soltanto, cioè, del mondo
muliebre; ma pur degli uomini. All’uscire del letto, prima d’entrare nel
bagno, nel bagno e dopo, era costume di ugnersi e di profumarsi;](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-53-320.jpg)
![altrettanto facevasi nelle case prima del pasto e avanti comparire in
pubblico e prima di coricarsi; ogni occasione era buona per
ispargersi il corpo e le vestimenta di odorose essenze, per ungere i
capelli e perfino per profumare camere ed appartamenti. Già abbiam
veduto nel capitolo dell’Anfiteatro come si facesse eziandio all’aperto
assai gitto di croco: si può pertanto argomentare cosa dovesse
essere negli appartamenti chiusi: a suo luogo vedremo,
specialmente nel triclinio e ne’ funerali.
Ma più che tutto, era nell’amore che di profumi si abusava, come
eccitanti e preparatori allo stesso. È noto, scrive Dufour[291], che il
muschio, il zibetto, l’ambra grigia e gli altri odori animali portati nelle
vesti, nei capelli, in tutte le parti del corpo esercitano un’azione
attivissima sul sistema nervoso e sugli organi della generazione. Nè
solo adoperavano esternamente detti profumi, ma non temevano di
far entrare aromi e spezie in quantità nel giornaliero loro alimento;
onde a ciò si voglia ascrivere quell’appetito e prurito continuo che
tormentava la romana società e che la spingeva in tutti gli eccessi
dell’amor fisico.
La lussuria asiatica portò seco tali profumi e d’allora in poi, così
prodigioso fu il consumo delle sostanze aromatiche, che parve non
bastare quanto inviava la Persia, l’Arabia e tutto l’Oriente insieme.
S’era insomma venuto a tal punto, da aver ragione Plauto, quando
nella Mostellaria usciva in questi accenti:
Quia ecastor mulier recte olet, ubi nihil olet.
Nam istæc veteres, quæ se unguentis unctitant, inter poles,
Vetulæ, edentulæ, quæ vilia corporis fuco occulunt,
Ubi sese sudor cum unguentis consociavit, illico
Itidem olent, quasi cum una multa jura confudit cocus.
Quid oleant nescias, nisi id unum, ut male olere intelligas[292].
Profumi e cosmetici assumevano il nome dal paese onde venivano:
così furono celebrati l’unguento di Cipri, il balsamo di Mende, il
nardo d’Achemenis, il malobutrum di Sidone, distillato in olio pei
capelli, l’olio d’Arabia, quello della Siria, il mirobolano di Arabia;](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-54-320.jpg)
![novelle e chiacchierare, come Plauto ne fa sapere quando
nell’Epidico fa che Apecide dica aver cercato ovunque di Perifane:
Dii immortales, utinam conveniam domi
Periphanem! per omnem urbem quem sum defessus quærere:
Per medicinas, per tonstrinas, in gymnasia atque in foro,
Per myropolia, et lanienas, circumque argentarias
Rogitando sum raucus factus[293].
Spettava a’ profumieri l’imbalsamazion de’ cadaveri e la vendita
degli aromi pei sagrifici, e nel myropolium di Pompei diffatti le
insegne o pitture che vi stavano nell’ingresso ed ora scomparse, e le
quali condussero a constatare od almeno a far credere essere quella
una taberna unguentaria, rappresentavano l’una un sagrificatore che
conduceva all’altare un toro; l’altra quattro uomini che portavano una
enorme cassa, intorno alla quale stavano sospesi alcuni vasi.
Superiormente poi vedevansi dipinte alcune persone intente a
profumare un cadavere, prima d’essere portato al rogo.
Dal profumiere, passiamo a vedere la taberna del barbiere nella Via
di Mercurio. È picciolissima: a destra vi è un podio, sopra di esso
due nicchie simili a quelle che altrove servirono a larario, ma che qui
più probabilmente avranno giovato per collocarvi cosmetici, vasi di
profumi, pettini e novaculæ o lame di metallo molto affilate colle quali
radevano i capelli della testa o i peli della barba, come i nostri rasoi.
In mezzo alla bottega v’è un sedile in materia da fabbrica, dove
l’avventore si sarà seduto, e in un dietro bottega sta il fornello, che
avrà servito per riscaldare l’acqua. Non saprei spiegare come e
perchè si trovassero in questa seconda camera gli avanzi di un
mulino.
Circa questo mestiere del barbiere, tonsor, poco è a dirsi. Lo si
faceva consistere nel tagliare i capelli, nel radere la barba, nel
pareggiare le ugne e nello svellere i peli parassiti colle pinzette,
volsellæ. I ricchi usavano a tutto ciò nella propria casa di uno
schiavo o di liberto; il popolo veniva alla bottega. A radersi
frequentemente la barba, si cominciò tardi in Roma, nell’anno cioè](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-56-320.jpg)
![454, della sua fondazione, alla venuta dalla Sicilia del primo
barbiere: avanti di costui la si lasciava crescere generalmente. Nelle
tonstrinæ, — così chiamate le botteghe di barbieri, e noi diremmo
barbierie, — era assai frequente che vi esercitassero tal mestiere le
donne, dette però Tonstrices; e Plauto, fedel pittore di que’ vecchi
costumi, nel Truculentus, accenna appunto alla Sura barbiera:
. . . tonstricem Suram
Novisti nostram, quæ modo erga ædes habet[294].
e Marziale acerbamente morde la moglie d’un barbiere che stava
presso alla Suburra, e la quale co’ suoi artificii carpiva denaro alla
gente:
Sed ista tonstrix, Ammiane, non tondet;
Non tondet, inquis? ergo quid facit? radit[295].
Non di meglio del resto aveva trattato lo stesso poeta, Marziale, il
barbiere Eutrapelo nel seguente epigramma:
Eutrapelus tonsor dum circuit ora Luperci
Expungitque genas; altera barba subit[296].
Lo che dimostra che di buoni e grami barbieri ve ne erano allora
come ve ne hanno di presente. L’epigramma adunque avrà sempre
la propria attualità.
Di sarti finora gli scavi non rivelarono botteghe; di calzolajo se ne
sospettò alcuna giusta quel che ne dirò tra breve, e così di tal’altre
industrie e mestieri attinenti il vestire, e quel che si sterrerà per lo
avanti, riguardando la parte più abitata dalla gente operaja, verrà
forse facendo al proposito interessanti rivelazioni. Certo che nè le
vestimenta, nè i calceamenti erano a que’ dì complicati come di
presente, da richiedere specialità di artieri. L’importante quanto ai
primi era la finezza della stofa onde si facevano tonache e mantelli,
pepli e toghe e studio nel portarle onde si acquistasse grazia ed
eleganza. Gli schiavi, le donne bastavano all’uopo e forse ognuno,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-57-320.jpg)
![Nel Vicolo del Panatico, al lato destro, vi è un piccolo stabilimento di
lavanderia: per tale venne riconosciuto, abbenchè tutto vi fosse
rovinato e nulla di particolare offra ad essere riferito. Due altre
lavanderie pure non di grande importanza, stanno nel Vicolo della
Maschera: più vasta è quella in Via del Lupanare e detta di Narciso,
scoperta nel 1862 e così denominata da una superba statuetta di
bronzo che si conserva al Museo, rappresentante infatti questo
personaggio mitologico nell’atto che ascolta la voce lontana della
Ninfa Eco, che vien considerata come una delle migliori rarità trovate
negli scavi, sì che Dognée giungesse a dire: Les fouilles n’eussent-
elles déterré que ce seul bronze, l’importation des principes
immortelles de l’art grec dans le vieux monde romain eût été
démontrée par une trace glorieuse dont la splendeur indique
incontestablement l’illustre origine[297]. È una bottega, in cui si
veggono vasche diverse di pietra, in due delle quali era l’acqua
condotta da un tubo di piombo con un robinetto. Sotto di queste due
vasche è un fornello; ma giustamente osserva Bréton, siccome il
piombo non può sopportare un fuoco di troppo ardente, si deve
supporre, che in questi due fornelli non si ponesse che della brace
destinata solo a tener caldo il liquido, nel quale si lavavano le stofe
di lana o di lino. Al disopra del lavatojo, nella muraglia, vi sono dei
buchi, ne’ quali erano infissi dei chiodi per la biancheria. Il suolo
della bottega ha un certo pendìo verso un lato, per ivi condurre le
acque che vi scorrevano per uscire sulla via. A destra della bottega,
è una cameretta, in mezzo alla quale è una tavola di marmo
rettangolare d’un solo piede ornato d’un corno d’abbondanza e d’una
pàtera con tracce di pitture. In fondo della stessa, scendendo quattro
gradini, si entra in una vasta corte in cui si vedono le traccie dei
chiodi cui si saran dovute accomandare le corde onde distendervi le
biancherie ad asciugare.
Nella bottega sull’angolo della Via degli Augustali e del Lupanare,
designata per quella del Conciapelli, coriarius o, come potrebbe
essere, d’un calzolajo, giusta l’opinione di Fiorelli e di Overbeck,
appartenente a Nonio Campano soldato della IX Coorte pretoriana,
come era scritto in grandi caratteri rossi sulla bianca parete di essa,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-59-320.jpg)
![se non abbiamo speciali oggetti a rimarcare, tranne alcuni utensili
propri a questo mestiere, l’argomento però ci obbliga a ricordare
l’uso precipuo de’ suoi prodotti, cioè quello de’ calzari e scarpe.
Sutor chiamavasi l’artefice che cuciva in cuojo, adoperando la lesina,
subula, e introducendo la setola, seta; onde sutrina la bottega di lui.
Dalla diversa qualità del lavoro, dicevasi sutor crepidarius, o sutor
caligarius, o anche calcearius; onde la parola nostra calzolajo.
Facevansi pure da’ calzolai romani i coturni, ed erano essi stivali di
greco modello, di cuoio, usualmente portato da’ cacciatori e copriva
l’intero piede e la gamba sino al polpaccio, allacciandosi sul davanti
ed arrovesciato in cima con una ritoccatura, ed una suola diritta atta
ad uno o all’altro piede, utroque actus pedi, come scrive Servio
scoliaste di Virgilio[298]. Uno stivale dello stesso genere, dice Rich,
ma ornato con più cura, è assegnato talora dagli artisti greci a talune
delle loro divinità, in ispecie a Diana, Bacco e Mercurio e dai Romani
nello stesso modo alla Dea Roma ed ai loro imperatori, come un
segno di divinità. Così furono adottati da Marco Antonio, quando si
attribuì il carattere e gli attributi di Bacco[299]; ma però non eran
portati dai Romani come parte del loro vestiario consueto. Cicerone
biasima l’insolenza d’un Tuditano, che si mostra in pubblico cum
palla et cothurnis[300]. Il coturno portato dagli attori tragici sulla
scena, abbiam già visto avesse la suola di sughero. — I cacciatori,
oltre il coturno, portavano anche l’ocrea, specie di moderne uose.
Ocrea era anche la gambiera che copriva lo stinco dal malleolo sino
a poco sopra il ginocchio: per lo più era di metallo e se ne scoprirono
degli esemplari in Pompei.
Crepida, era un calzare che si componeva d’una suola alta, ornata di
una bassa striscia di cuojo che copriva solo il fianco del piede, ma
aveva un certo numero d’occhielli, ansæ, sul suo orlo superiore,
attraverso i quali passava una correggia piatta, amentum, per
allacciarla sul piede. Propriamente era peculiare del vestiario
nazionale greco ed usato dai due sessi e si considerava come la
calzatura conveniente a portarsi col pallium e colla chlamys. Le
crepidæ carbatinæ erano poi le più ordinarie di tutte le calzature in
uso fra gli antichi e particolari ai contadini delle regioni meridionali.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-60-320.jpg)
![Consistevano in un pezzo quadrato di cuojo per suola, poi rivoltato
all’insù a’ canti e sopra le dita, legato sul collo del piede attorno la
parte più bassa della gamba con coreggiuoli passati attraverso dei
buchi sugli orli.
Calceus era una piccola scarpa o calzaretto, per lo più portato dalle
donne. Ne’ dipinti Pompejani si videro tre distinti modelli di essi: tutti
per altro giungono a’ malleoli, con suola e tacco basso e così senza,
come con laccetti. Calceus invece era uno stivaletto fatto sopra
forma così per il piè destro, come per il sinistro, in maniera da
coprire interamente il piede, a differenza dei sandali e delle pianelle
che non ne coprivano se non solo una porzione. Come poi vediamo
pur oggidì usarsi dalle nostre signore, aggiungere tacco a tacco per
render alta la persona; così per le Romane, ad esempio delle
Greche, invece d’una, usavano di due e tre suole, onde la solea
pigliava allora il nome di fulmenia, sincope di fulcimenia. Di queste
duplici e triplici suole giovavansi inoltre, come faremmo noi adesso,
per difenderci dalla umidità. V’era il calceus patricius che portavano i
senatori, di qualità diversa da quella degli altri cittadini; di dove la
frase di Cicerone calceos mutare[301], per significare che alcuno
diventava senatore, e s’allacciavano con istringhe che s’incrociavano
sul collo del piede e poi s’avvolgevano attorno alla gamba sino al
principio del polpaccio; il calceus repandus, scarpa con una larga
punta ricurva in su o indietro. — Calceamentum e calceamen erano
poi termini generici per esprimere ogni maniera di copertura del
piede.
Da obstragulum, che era quella striscia di cuojo o correggia con cui
la crepida si allacciava attorno al piede e che passava tra il pollice e
il dito vicino e che da persone affettate si portava talora tempestata
di perle, come lasciò Plinio ricordato[302], derivò obstrigillum, ch’era
una particolare sorta di scarpa, che aveva i quartieri, per i laccetti,
cuciti alla suola da ciascun lato. Di queste scarpe se n’ha esempio in
una pittura pompejana.
Sandalum era una pantufola squisitamente ornata, che portata dalle
donne greche, venne poi introdotta dalle signore di Roma. Pare che](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-61-320.jpg)
![fosse d’una forma intermedia tra il calceolus e la solea, avendo un
suolo ed un tomajo sopra le dita e la parte davanti del piede, ma
lasciando scoverte le calcagna e la parte di dietro, come una
pantufola nostra.
Finalmente v’era la solea, della forma più semplice del sandalum,
consisteva in una semplice suola sotto la pianta del piede, legata
con un correggiuolo attraverso il collo del piede stesso, come a un
dipresso sono i sandali degli odierni cappuccini e si portava da ambo
i sessi. V’era poi la solea spartea, o stivale fatto di ginestra
spagnuola, ma non era ad uso degli uomini, ma delle bestie da
soma, a proteggere i loro piedi quando malati.
La solea tuttavia non si portava fuori di casa: altrimenti sarebbe stata
sconveniente o indizio di affettazione o di moda straniera, come
avvertì Seneca ed anche Cicerone[303].
Perones, Sculponeæ e Soleæ ligneæ, erano nomi con cui si
designavano i sandali e scarpe da famigli. I primi due indicavano
calzari fatti di cuojo; le soleæ ligneæ erano, come esprime il loro
aggettivo, di legno.
E qui s’arresta la mia erudizione in fatto di calzoleria romana e
pompejana.
Non però di quanto riguarda l’arte del coriarius, o cuojajo, perocchè
ad essa spettassero quelle altre opere che or si direbbero da sellajo.
Mi sbrigherò a dirne, sommariamente, ricordandone le sole
denominazioni de’ relativi arnesi.
Lorea si chiamavano le briglie, o corregge; le redini più propriamente
dicevansi habenæ; capistrum la cavezza, ma più precisamente
quella dell’asino; helcia, i tiragli, co’ quali cavalli o asini si
attaccavano al timone; erano essi o lorata, o spartea, o cannabina;
stragula, la fornitura, ephippia, la sella; clitellæ, il basto; soleæ, le
staffe.
E poichè avviene di ricordare tanti oggetti di selleria, porgo qui le
denominazioni di juga lignea, o gioghi per appajare i buoi; oreæ, il](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-62-320.jpg)
![morso; frenum, il freno; murices, lupi, lupata si chiamavano altri freni
di ferro asprissimi, atti a diverse nature di giumenti.
Or passiamo alla ricerca delle altre taberne che coi loro prodotti
contribuivano al vestimento, o piuttosto alla varietà e mantenimento
di esso.
Presso la casa di Olconio eravi una bottega da tintore, che i latini
chiamavano taberna offectoris, perchè, secondo spiega Pompeo
Festo, colorum infectoris. Distinguevansi, secondo lo stesso
scrittore, gli offectores dagli infectores: questi erano qui alienum
colorem in lanam conjiciunt: offectores qui proprio colori novum
officiunt[304]. Nulla in questa bottega si rinvenne di particolare: nel
fondo di essa eravi il laboratorio, con un fornello e vasche rivestite di
cemento assai duro, ma pur guasto evidentemente dagli acidi che
venivano usati nel tingere.
Nè io di più mi vi soffermerò, da che egual materia mi chiami a più
largamente trattare della Fullonica.
L’arte dei fulloni, che Plinio vuole sia stata trovata da Nicia
megarese, consisteva nel purgare, lavare ed anche tingere i panni.
Trattando dell’edificio di Eumachia nel Capitolo XI di quest’opera, ho
già fatto un rapido cenno dell’importanza di quest’arte in Pompei,
che vi aveva anzi una speciale corporazione. Che una congenere vi
fosse anche in Roma lo si raccoglie dalle Inscriptiones publicate dal
Fabbretti, ricordando come quel collegio litigasse assai lungamente
a proposito delle fontane[305]. Infatti non poteva a meno che essere
numerosa la classe de’ folloni, per la necessità che dell’arte loro
sentivasi per la politura delle vestimenta. Riccio ne dà informazioni
dei folloni, da cui rivelasi come di essi si giovasse allora come
adesso noi de’ nostri lavandaj e cavamacchie per rinettare ed
imbiancare gli abiti, dopo averli portati, effetto che ottenevano col
pestare co’ piedi i panni in larghe tinozze di acqua mischiata con
orina e terra di Sardegna. I nostri cavamacchia di presente vi
sostituiscono l’ammoniaca. Allora, onde procacciarsi tanta materia
quanta ne bastasse all’uopo, ponevansi vasi agli angoli delle Vie,
come già notai nel Capitolo appunto che tratta delle Vie; onde aveva](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-63-320.jpg)
![ragione Marziale di mordere la puzzolente Taide, dicendola più fetida
del vaso d’un follone:
Tam male Thais olet, quam non fullonis avari
Testa vetus, media sed modo fracta via[306].
Il panno così lavato e netto distendevasi sulla cavea viminea, o
graticcio semicircolare, con sottoposta fumigazione di zolfo, come si
deduce da un passo di Apulejo[307]; dopo di che passava al
cardatore, che col cardo fullonicus, vi risollevava il pelo, d’onde poi
mettevasi allo strettojo per quella che or direbbesi cilindratura. Fin
dall’anno 354 di Roma, la legge fatta dal Censore Flaminio, riferita
da Plinio, aveva prescritta una maniera in parte diversa dall’or detta,
con cui i folloni dovevano condursi per ben eseguire il loro lavoro.
Così si esprimeva: «Si lavin dapprima le stofe di lana colla terra di
Sardegna disciolta; si faccia quindi una fumigazione di zolfo, poi si
purghi con terra di Cimolo, di buon colore, riconoscendosi la falsa in
ciò che lo zolfo si rode e s’annerisce. La vera terra di Cimolo ravviva
i colori impalliditi dal zolfo. La terra chiamata saxum è la più
conveniente alle stofe bianche quand’esse sono state solforate: esso
è però nocevole alle stofe colorate. In Grecia in luogo della terra di
Cimolo, si serviva del gesso tinfaico di Etolia.»
L’antica Fullonica di Pompei era sulla Via di Mercurio e riusciva su
quella a cui essa medesima diè il nome: la sua pianta chiarisce
l’importanza di questo stabilimento scoperto e sterrato negli anni
1835 e 1836.
È una grand’area, chiusa da tre lati da largo portico fiancheggiato da
pilastri con archi. In fondo della corte si trovano quattro bacini alti,
ma alquanto inclinati per lo scolo delle acque e dinnanzi ad essi un
lungo banco di pietra, all’estremità del quale disposti due altri piccoli
bacini e muricciuoli sono per collocarvi le vaschette. Era qui che si
imbiancavano le stofe. All’ingiro de’ portici eran le camere dei folloni:
il proprietario doveva alloggiare nell’appartamento più distinto. Vi si
rinvenne un forno co’ suoi accessorj. Il piano superiore doveva avere](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/45927-250225202816-695ad48a/85/Innovation-Capabilities-and-Economic-Development-in-Open-Economies-1st-Edition-Casadella-64-320.jpg)
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Innovation Capabilities and Economic Development in Open Economies 1st Edition Casadella
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- 5. Innovation Capabilities and Economic Development in Open Economies 1st Edition Casadella Digital Instant Download Author(s): Casadella, Vanessa; Liu, Zeting; Uzunidis, Dimitri ISBN(s): 9781119185819, 1848218745 Edition: 1 File Details: PDF, 1.46 MB Year: 2015 Language: english
- 7. Table of Contents Cover Title Copyright Preface Introduction 1: Theories and Policies of Economic Development 1.1. The era of economic interventionism 1.2. The era of liberalism 1.3. The era of “good governance” 1.4. The system of “global governance” under scrutiny 2: Innovative Capacities and Systems of the South in Globalization 2.1. Innovation for economic development 2.2. Innovation systems and integration into the world economy 2.3. The difficulties of implementing innovation policies in developing countries Conclusion Bibliography Index End User License Agreement List of Illustrations 2: Innovative Capacities and Systems of the South in Globalization Figure 2.1. Strategy of innovative activities location of the global firm Figure 2.2. Industrial performance by region (1995/2010) Figure 2.3. The vicious circle of technological dependency List of Tables 1: Theories and Policies of Economic Development Table 1.1. Share of manufacturing in GDP by region, 1960-2017 (in %) Table 1.2. Development, global governance and institutional renewal 2: Innovative Capacities and Systems of the South in Globalization
- 8. Table 2.1. Economic development by accumulation and use of tangible and intangible resources Table 2.2. Interaction between the formal and informal elements of the innovation system Table 2.3. Comparison between NIS of the North and of the South Table 2.4. Regional trends of growth in developing countries and countries in transition Table 2.5. Share of high school graduates pursuing higher education by region (1991 and 2004) Table 2.6. Domestic expenditure on R&D (in % share) Table 2.7. Spending on research and development (% of GDP) from 1996 to 2012 Table 2.8. Science and technology indicators by country group Table 2.9. The 10 most innovative countries in the world in 2014 and the positioning of emerging countries in the ranking of global innovation
- 9. Innovation Capabilities and Economic Development in Open Economies V olume 1 Smart Innovation Set coordinated by Dimitri Uzunidis Vanessa Casadella Zeting Liu Dimitri Uzunidis
- 10. First published 2015 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address: ISTE Ltd 27-37 St George’s Road London SW19 4EU UK www.iste.co.uk John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street Hoboken, NJ 07030 USA www.wiley.com © ISTE Ltd 2015 The rights of Vanessa Casadella, Zeting Liu and Dimitri Uzunidis to be identified as the authors of this work have been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Library of Congress Control Number: 2015948060 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-84821- 874-1
- 11. Preface Besides increasing inequality, poverty, hunger, disease and conflict, the impacts on poorer countries of the accelerating pace of technological change, globalization of sociotechnical transitions (energy, ecological and demographic), globalization of technofinancial strategies of firms and the trend toward standardization in the global economic space are problems to which the economic analysis of development must find solutions. Since scientific and technical knowledge of mankind are inexhaustible resources, the question is then how to turn such knowledge into useful goods and services and how to define their usefulness in different socioeconomic backgrounds where these goods and services can be introduced. So, in other words, the question is: what efforts should be made, and for which innovations in developing countries? Sustained innovation and proactive policy is needed to develop new production techniques and to produce new goods and services to meet local demand, but they must also be sufficiently demanded and reasonably competitive on the global market. The dialectic of development thus supposes that a double performance is needed: innovation to expand the local market; innovation to enter or to stay on the technological trajectories that are needed in the global market. For now, international technological disparities between countries (industrialized, emerging, middle-income, and less developed) remain significant. What would be the appropriate development models for promoting endogenous technology while simultaneously integrating into the imported knowledge production system? How are technology transfer vectors formed? How do national innovation systems emerge in different contexts and on what institutional foundations? How do policies contribute to organizing production systems? What are the limitations and how do we create the necessary conditions for connecting scientific and technical knowledge with tacit and local knowledge in developing countries? How do we evaluate the performance of such systems? In this book, we set out to present key intellectual mechanisms – conceptualized by our experience in the field – that support the integration of innovation in general development policy. This book is the result of works carried out within the Research Network on Innovation (http://2ri.eu) whose objective is threefold: to observe and analyze the innovation process, to theorize innovation systems and to promote research in economics and management of innovation. The Cité des Sciences et de l’Industrie in Paris, as well as the Institut CDC pour la Recherche of the Caisse des Dépôts group contributed materially to the production of this book. We would particularly like to thank Lamia Yacoub and Gwenaëlle Otando, the Tunisian and Gabonese researchers, respectively, for their valuable contributions to the study of active economic policies and new institutional architectures in developing countries. Dimitri UZUNIDIS
- 12. President of the Research Network on Innovation August 2015
- 13. Introduction The study of development refers to standards that characterize innovative capacity, industrial competitiveness and economic performance of rich countries. Development policies therefore aim at bringing countries out of a state of “underdevelopment”, which must itself be defined in relation to these standards: widespread poverty, low production potential coupled with high population growth, insufficient promotion of natural resources, survival of an economic and social status described as “archaic”, disjointedness of the productive apparatus due to the coexistence of a modern extrovert sector and a traditional survival sector, etc. The question of the constitution of an economic system is paramount: the model, the structure and pace of economic development are schematically determined by political architecture. With this in mind, economic development is one of the most studied subjects in international economics. The fundamental differences are rooted in the mismatch between two fundamental economic approaches: liberal and interventionist. Development issues fuel a debate of great political acuity that itself refers to an ideological and theoretical debate. Indeed, the requirements and effects of globalization have propelled reflections on the legitimacy of an active economic policy based on innovation to the front of the stage [UZU 10c, UZU 10d, UZU 10e]. The fact is that a proactive role of the State would result in, according to the predominant neoliberal approach, extensive and unjustified interventionism, which is a stark contrast to the context of globalization. In fact, liberal principles and speeches advocating the neutrality of economic policy were developed around the 1980s with the supremacy of monetarist approaches and then, to some extent, embodied in the Washington Consensus, while Keynesian-inspired regulations were already “well-softened”. Recently, liberally-inspired approaches have been developed, which in fact singularly relativize the end of Keynesianism. Today, the idea of the State is still valid, even if its role is challenged in many politico-economic discourses. Indeed, from what the advent of globalization suggests, it is probably unable to consider the organization and development of the world on the basis of a simple interstate system. Hence the recurrent idea of global economic governance, which underpins that worldwide regulation is no longer reducible to the exclusive and independent regulation of States, which, as we shall see in this book, reduces the leeway of development stakeholders. Therefore, at a time when the world economy is mutating and sources of competitiveness are constantly changing, would it be wise to admit that globalization inexorably leads to the substitution of market forces for State interventions in favor of the economy? Otherwise, will a strong foundation for the active role of the State against the hegemony of the liberal approach that underlies globalization be found in recent economic theories (endogenous growth, post- Keynesian growth, neo-institutionalistic growth, etc.)? And so, with reference to theoretical developments as well as recent economic policy practices, what room for maneuver do States actually have to face the challenges of a globalized economy? Is the activation of innovation potential of the South an economic modernization that would allow these countries to
- 14. beneficially integrate transnational processes of economic growth? These legitimate questions, which relate to both theoretical and practical reflections, encourage us to analyze the main elements they raise in the debate on the economic role of active innovation policies in the context of globalization. Our goal is to show that recent development, and seemingly paradoxically, economic policy is nothing other than the implementation of a renewed debate on the proactive role of the State. The term globalization refers both to: the strong integration of national economies into the international flow of capital and goods; and the establishment of international institutions (International Monetary Funds (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO)), a set of rules that ensure freedom of cross-border activities of companies. A transnational legal regulatory framework will tend to fall into place as the result of tensions and political compromises between States. This framework is based on the immutable principle in a market economy where capital must be valued at all times and by all means (financial, commercial and regulatory) with a view to improve potential profit-making. It is now a highlight of globalization that challenges the active and voluntary nature of national economic policies and weakens the role of the State in the development process. But a certain awareness of the challenges of globalization, and the opportunities and constraints it creates at all levels, seems to be renewing the debate on development issues. Within the context of this debate, there are some for which a global governance system would be the best answer, if not the only answer, to solving the proliferation of interests and conflicting objectives. They rely on arguments drawn from different theoretical approaches (which we will present later) to legitimize this intermediate system between the State and the global market. While for others, the global governance system would be the legitimation of a legal and institutional framework whose true aims are far from achieving the need for new development of the economy and global society. They, in turn, rely on theoretical arguments, but also on historical and recent events, questioning the validity of liberal policies advocated by international institutions. They relate the global governance system to an organizational mode that favors the interests of powerful economies and that embodies the supremacy of decision-making powers of multinational corporations and financial markets [UZU 10b]. While it may be theoretically and logically sustainable, this system seems a priori unable to achieve its objective of improving overall performance. Behind this inefficiency, multiple dysfunction problems loom, leading to a crisis of global governance system goals where the global governance system is itself linked to a crisis of legitimacy of recommended actions and stakeholders involved in the decision-making process [UZU 10a, UZU 10b, UZU 10c]. Our goal here is not to propose “ready-made” solutions to this problem, but rather to highlight the gaps in global governance that, until now, have separated us from the perspective of a harmonized, diverse and accelerated development. This analysis will form the first chapter of this book. The second chapter of this book is dedicated to the study of the main track that developing countries could take to strengthen their economies when confronted with the demands of globalization. The ability to innovate, in fact, allows an economy to improve its performance
- 15. as well as those of its stakeholders (companies, institutions and individuals). But this capacity depends on the strength of national innovation systems (NISs). The concept of an innovation system is used to measure technological performance and to understand the growth and economic development of a country. The process of innovation and learning from the South differs from those in developed economies. Technology transfer is achieved through the construction of technological capacities and national efforts for absorption and diffusion of foreign knowledge. But this construction also involves the creation of more microeconomic learning processes that are based on indigenous and specific knowledge. The ultimate goal would be to understand the process of innovation in the form of actual construction of skills, with the aim of promoting economic development. But to do this, we will justify the implementation of active innovation policies; we will also discuss the challenges of innovative capacity building in developing countries.
- 16. 1 Theories and Policies of Economic Development In the early 1980s, the crisis of state interventionism in developing countries led to the launch of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. SAPs were considered remedies for the excess debt and the widening macroeconomic imbalances. These programs were implemented by short-term economic policies of monetarist inspiration where the idea of a “minimum State” was the founding perception. SAPs foreshadowed the Washington Consensus, such as was formulated in 1989. It was supposed to be a reference for economic policies that acted most heavily on the structures, advocating reforms of which the nature and meaning seemed consensual. In theory, the objective was to restore macroeconomic stability and especially to promote growth and reduce poverty. But as for the SAPs, a review of the applications of the Consensus does not attest the achievement of its stated objectives. While many economists argue that it was wrong to attach the Consensus to the strict doctrine of liberalism, the fact remains that its implementation was largely inspired from it. The proof: failure of the “minimum State” as a political and ideological objective. By renewing the debate on sources of growth and by “endogenizing” technical progress, new development approaches are advancing theoretical arguments that restore the role of economic policy and, in particular, that of innovation.
- 17. Box 1.1. Building economic indicators to measure “development” Economic, technical and social progress always go hand in hand for many economists. The increase of gross domestic product (GDP) and, consequently, the creation of material wealth translate the improvement of living conditions of the population into quantitative terms. One can compare the GDP of several countries, initially expressed in national currency, in two ways: current exchange rates or purchasing power parity (PPP). To calculate the latter, we use a standard basket of goods then calculate the conversion rate, which is the ratio of the prices of this basket between currencies. But an increase in GDP does not necessarily indicate improved well– being of the population because its calculation is based on a set of accounting policies. V olunteer work, domestic work or informal economy is not considered in GDP. Hence the concern over the last thirty years is to contruct new indicators that are qualitative rather than quantitative. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) proposed replacing GDP per capita by a composite indicator, the human development index (HDI), which aims to reflect three aspects of economic and social development: (1) life expectancy; (2) level of education; (3) access to the necessary resources to live decently. The level of human development is therefore measured using three indicators: life expectancy at birth (health); knowledge (education); standard of living (adjusted real GDP per capita). The average of the three indices is calculated. The composite index has a value between 0 and 1. A country is classed as developed if its HDI is greater than 0.8; developing countries are, therefore, countries with an HDI of less than 0.8. The United Nations retain three criteria for defining the least developed countries (LDCs): GDP per capita of less than 900 US dollars; delay in the areas of health, education and nutrition; economic vulnerability: lack of economic diversification, importance of production and export of agricultural products, political instability, etc. Out of all economic take-off models with structural adjustment policies, economic development concerns are perennial [UZU 10a]. The concept of “good governance” renewed the debate on development and the wealth of nations by giving institutions prominent attention. Thus, this chapter’s objective is to show how institutions, and thus the “good governance”, can play an important role in development. As we are aware that we cannot have foresight without a retrospective, we will first look back at theories that marked the development economics up until the 1990s. Subsequently, we will present, by shedding light on works of new institutional economics, the relationship between good governance, global governance and economic development in order to introduce the issue of innovation in proactive economic policies. 1.1. The era of economic interventionism
- 18. Development economics dates from the post-war years. On an international level, the decolonization process affected Asia and Africa; the Bretton-Woods institutions were established; the United Nations addressed issues of growth in backward countries, for their industrialization and their need to stabilize prices of raw materials; new regional institutions, such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), processed regional integration and import substitution strategies. In fact, “developmentalism” (theories about the necessary development of so-called underdeveloped countries), which was formed after the Second World War, mainly drew its references from the economic history of industrialized countries. Therefore, development theories from the time incorporated two major assumptions, besides the paradigm of modernization: the idea that faster growth could only result from the expansion of industrial activities and the idea of voluntarism or intervention in the process of State allocation of resources, “to correct the market laws that had previously distributed industry unevenly throughout the world” [ASS 02, p. 11]. For three decades, development economists correlated the development of Southern countries with state intervention. Theories of economic take-off, which were developed in the 1950– 1960s and critical theories of dependence, formalized in the 1970s, focused on state initiative and interstate relations on a global level. 1.1.1. Impasses of economic take-off theories During the first 20 years of its existence (1950–1960), development economics followed the reference model of so-called developed countries to the letter. The dominant post-war Anglo- Saxon economic thinking was in fact Keynesian, or classico-Keynesian. This constituted a reconnection with traditions of classical economic thinking. The dominant economic policies at the time thus gave state activism an undeniable role in the fight against unemployment and achieving growth. At that time, the structuralist approach that developed an analysis in terms of structural parameters (dependence resulting from the primary specialization, etc.) seemed to polarize controversies on development economics, which firstly addressed the problems of underdevelopment to then develop appropriate trajectories. Underdevelopment was perceived as a series of obstacles for change (lack of capital and entrepreneurs, population pressure, agrarian predominance, weak capacity to innovate). From this point of view, for economic take-off theorists, in order to engage in the path of development, it was appropriate to break the vicious circle of underdevelopment and deploy a sustained and much-needed effort to create enough revenue and thereby increase domestic savings; the latter, by financing new investments, would be able to maintain rapid growth. For A. Lewis [LEW 58], “the central problem of economic theory is to understand the process by which a community that was previously saving and investing 4–5% or less of its income, turns into an economy where voluntary saving is about 12–15% or more of its income”. Indeed, the first theories of development, formulated in the 1950s, advocated the image of the Marshall plan: large international financial transfers to third world countries, to enable them to accumulate the necessary capital for a critical investment threshold in order to initiate accelerated industrial modernization [SAW 87].
- 19. According to Rostow [ROS 60], take-off is a transitional phase of about twenty years after which growth moves toward maturity and then to mass consumption and finally, to a more moderate growth. This theory was criticized for several reasons: vagueness of the periodization, imprecision about details for setting up favorable conditions for take-off, excessive trust in the power of a “centralized and efficient” State [BIE 06]. Moreover, colonization was positively perceived as having laid the foundation for turning a traditional society to a modern society. Ultimately, in the tradition of the classical economists (Smith, Ricardo and Malthus), the development economics of the 1950s focused on accumulation and reproduction. Insofar that capital was the factor preventing economic development, priority was given to the savings rate, the investment rate and the choice of techniques in line with the availability of two main production factors: labor and capital. Development thus became evidence of finance. From this financial injection, economists expected to break the vicious circle of poverty ([NUR 53] according to which poverty fuels poverty), to accelerate the massive transfer of labor from agriculture to industry (Lewis theory), to initiate industrial growth [ROS 43] and, more generally, to trigger the transition of the society toward the industrial era. The path that was taken allows us to distinguish between liberal Anglo-Saxon economists who assimilated the role of the State to optimal allocation of resources in an open economy, and European heterodox economists, who recommended increased state intervention in a protected industry. Indeed, the central idea of the latter was that third world States should opt for selective voluntary public investment [PET 98, pp. 14–20] in favor of industrial sectors that were considered strategic in terms of economic benefits. This gave rise to a range of theories: (1) ripple effects [HIR 74], (2) growth poles [PER 59], (3) industrializing industries [DES 71]. However, despite the enormous differences between these theories, they focused on one main idea: “The developmentalist voluntarism of the state elites in the third world then seemed both obvious and unequivocal to solve the issue of socioeconomic development without any political problem” [PET 98, p. 15]. Indeed, these theorists were overly trusting in the State and showed no skepticism toward it. Therefore, the question was not to know whether the State was effective or not. That said, in the community of development economists, only the Swede Myrdal [MYR 57] raised the question of the nature of the State in poor countries as a possible obstacle for development. He insisted, therefore, on the risk of the existence of a State either too soft to conduct efficient policies, or too authoritarian or too corrupt to carry out appropriate policies for redistributing the fruits of growth. However, this warning against the deviant political behavior of the leaders was overshadowed by mainstream economists who threw these political issues out of the economic field. In the end, the development economics in the 1950s was based on the principle of rationality of the State in the long-term. Indeed, the rationalist ideal that has dominated Western thinking since the 19th century greatly influenced the first nationalist elite of the Third World borne from the independence movements. The “dependency theory” was then a reaction against the “structuralist” reformist current and against the evolutionary patterns, which it generally
- 20. equated with liberal thinking. It mainly criticized the “compradores” elites, who equated their interests with those of the elites of industrialized countries. It also denounced the dominant discourse on state voluntarism as “neutral”. Such thinking, influenced by the Latin American current and especially by the thinking of Prebisch [PRE 49], saw capitalism as the determining factor of underdevelopment and usually rejected the modernization agenda for a break with the international market in favor of import substitution by local production. Underdevelopment was no longer defined as a developmental delay but rather as a product of the dynamics of capitalism on a global scale [AMI 73]. There was unequal exchange between developed and underdeveloped countries [EMM 69]. The development economics was a prisoner from birth of the context of international relations at the time. Thus, the specialization of such countries in the production of poorly developed raw materials quickly attracted the attention of UN experts. It gave rise to the publication of a report written by R. Prebisch in 1949 [PRE 49]. This document discussed the difficulties faced by third world countries in transforming and adding value to their natural resources locally. Moreover, as the prices of the natural resources tended to decline compared to manufactured goods, the report radically challenged the specialization model based on the comparative advantages. The inclusion of structural aspects in the analysis of Southern economies was of utmost importance. Underdevelopment was not analyzed as a natural phenomenon, but rather as a historical situation related to the disintegration of productive structures and dependency phenomena maintained in the international economy. Indeed, the gap between elasticities and the limited number of products exported by the periphery was the origin of the secular deterioration of terms of trade. In this context, “dependency” economists made a series of recommendations to break the vicious circle of underdevelopment. Thus emerged strategies proposed to replace imports with local production. The focus of development on the domestic market and state intervention should have allowed a reversal of the trend toward unequal development between the center and the periphery. However, the stagnation of Latin American economies, and all countries that adopted the import substitution strategy, were the source of early criticism. Some authors, like Furtado, blamed the failure or perversion of these policies on the unfavorable integration of these countries into international trade: “More subtle and insidious forms of dependence, infiltrated in our financial and technological circuits, came to replace the supervision previously practiced by external markets on the regulation of our productive activities” [FUR 95, p. 63]. Despite the relevance of their analysis, which gave the study of structures a prominent role, these theories either underestimated or overestimated the role of the State. On the one hand, indeed, the place given to the State for correcting market imperfections and for designing public policies seemed significant. But the question of the behavior of the elite was hidden or overshadowed. For example, analyses by S. Amin [AMI 73] completely ignored the role of politics. The latter was reduced to an instrument in the hands of foreign interests. And so, the State, in this framework, was a puppet structure. Moreover, Furtado, by allowing the State to play an important role remained aware of the risk of perversion of development strategies in the context of the proliferation of coups d’état. As such, the advent of a new ruling class driven by the search for individual interests began. This is in line with the recent analyses by Stiglitz,
- 21. for whom the distribution of wealth in some developing countries is not determined by careful trade-offs between equality and efficiency: “It is not defined under the principles of social justice; it is the result of brute force. Wealth is power, and this power allows the ruling class to keep the wealth” [STI 06, p. 198]. Thus, we find ourselves at the heart of the institutional performance paradigm. 1.1.2. The crisis of the interventionist State The 1929 crisis gave rise to a particular echo in analyses by John Maynard Keynes (1883– 1946). The leading thread of his ideas was that for market economies experiencing sustainable endogenous imbalances, the onus shifts to the State to support growth and stimulate the economy to achieve full employment. Its intervention should be done via economic policies for boosting demand and by committing to additional public expenditure, corresponding to the regulatory function of the State. Concomitantly, to avoid a return to protectionism, the Bretton- Woods agreements adopted the principle of progression toward international liberalization through cooperation between external policies. And to avoid returning to unemployment and the inequalities of the 1930s, they left a margin of freedom for internal policies of full employment and the welfare State [COU 03]. Thus, after the Second World War, the States strengthened their role in the economy. The priority was to correct market failures, especially macroeconomic ones: boost growth, promote full employment and external balance, ensure price stability, improve living standards, etc. At the time, international exchange began to intensify, but growth depended mainly on the dynamics of domestic markets. This heightened the importance of the nation-State through a high degree of political, social and economic interactions that occurred internally. The trend was therefore toward national integration: consolidation of the welfare State in the first half of the 20th Century strengthened the legitimacy of the central government and, consequently, justified its massive intervention in the economy. The global economy changed dramatically in the 1970s, in response to the changing practices of policy makers, who, under the pressure of circumstances and public opinion, increased interventions in the economy: external deficits and international debt, stagnation and inflation (stagflation), corporate bankruptcies, spiraling unemployment, etc. More generally, an area of economic “turbulence” occurred, but which supporters of the liberal theory were slow to name “crisis” [HUM 95]. Since then, Keynesian-inspired regulations have been “dampened” after more than thirty years of economic and interventionist practice. It was the welfare State system that created a context of international crisis, conducive to neoliberal discourse, in the early 1980s. This was triggered by a slowdown in growth, growing imbalances, practice of social assistance and especially “hysterical” public spending. The arguments of liberal economists undermined the welfare State, first in England, then in the United States and then finally, triggering a liberal wave that gradually spread to many countries that, for the most part, also became supporters of “less State intervention”. The problem was simple: as a good policeman, the State must intervene to create and enforce conditions for effective competition through market transparency. Public or private monopoly, substitution of
- 22. the entrepreneur by the State, laws and social protection of employees, etc. were obstacles to innovation, to the detriment of consumers and employment. The role of the State was thus to ensure fair competition, to avoid excessive concentrations of economic activities and to protect consumers. The turning point in the functioning of national economies and the global economy occurred in the 1980s. In 1979, the arrival in power of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and, in 1981, of Ronald Reagan in the United States, facilitated the advent and spread of liberal doctrines; in his inaugural speech, Ronald Reagan said that “the State is not the solution, it is the problem”. In the late 1970s, Senegal inaugurated the first SAP, the debt crisis having begun in developing countries thus forcing them to adopt “market-friendly” development strategies. This unification of economic models also won over the Eastern countries: in 1984, China opened its first special economic zones. Five years later, the fall of the Berlin Wall announced the liberalization of the Soviet Union in 1991, which was also the year when India, who had been nationalist until then, in turn liberalized itself. Thus, in ten years, the configuration of the world changed dramatically with the rise of liberal-inspired approaches; approaches that were largely concretized through widespread therapy of SAPs for countries in crisis. 1.2. The era of liberalism Development economics were completely transformed from the 1980s. Debt crises were reorienting priorities. Thus emerged the need for balance, which expelled the temporal dimension of change. Due to this, the plurality of theories shrunk in favor of the liberal theory to which some neo-Keynesians aspects were added. However, the nagging question remained: why did some developing countries achieve good results in terms of development in the post- colonial period and others stagnated or even regressed? Differences in economic policies played an important role. In fact, international institutions strived to recommend a combination of economic policies grouped under the name of SAPs to developing countries; these advocated the establishment of a sound macroeconomic policy, the liberalization of domestic markets, reduced State spending, integration into the global economy, etc. The recommendations in these programs were invariable; specificities of developing countries, which fueled the early work on development economics and which were initiated by structuralist economists, were left out of the discourse of international institutions. The simple operation of market forces in a context of free competition and free insertion of the national economy into the world economy, was thus supposed to guarantee that poor countries caught up with the richest countries in terms of economic prosperity and social well-being. However, structural adjustment was not intended to assist in the creation of internal economic dynamics. That was for the authorities of countries that were subjected to the adjustment to deal with. The role of the adjustment was to ensure that the evolution of the balance of payments allocated the necessary resources to paying of a debt. The economic situation that was consistent with this observation was that activities involved in the domestic market slowed down, wages were compromised, indirect taxes were high while direct taxes were low and currencies were subjected to competitive devaluations. In this new vision of economic
- 23. development, the State had to seek macroeconomic stabilization and refrain from interfering negatively with market rules. 1.2.1. Structural adjustment programs Structural adjustment programs were set up to overcome the interventionist State crisis, which was manifested by a marked deterioration of internal and external balances, a result of unsustainable protectionist, inflationist and fiscal policies, particularly in Latin America, but also in varying forms in Africa and Asia. The second oil crisis worsened the situation, which struck developing countries more heavily than developed countries, which benefited from the recycling of petrodollars. The higher interest rates on international financial markets and deteriorating terms of trade resulted in widespread and widening imbalances. In the early 1980s, most developing countries faced the problem of international insolvency and cessation of payments. Sitting on their role as funders, the Bretton-Woods institutions advocated national economic policy guidelines for liberalizing their economies toward hypothetical deleveraging. SAPs were presented as a therapy of liberal inspiration, strengthening market mechanisms, improving productive and commercial efficiency and reducing the discretionary power of the State. To begin with, the priority was given to the consolidation of public finances and the easing of bureaucratic apparatuses, at a time when the level of demand was considered to be too high, the investment and consumption were based too heavily on imports, the inflation was too high, the weight of debt was too heavy, the economic competitiveness was too weak and the economies were not export-oriented enough. Interventionist economic policies were considered responsible for causing distortions. It was then necessary to enhance economic efficiency and ensure non-inflationary growth through the withdrawal of the State in favor of the free operation of market mechanisms. In the logic of the IMF and the World Bank, the SAPs should have been twofold: stabilization, then the adjustment of structures. The IMF’s actions corresponded to the first part, being more focused on monetary and financial aspects and presented as short-term stabilization policies of demand and recovery of a viable balance of payments. The actions of the World Bank rather corresponded to the second part, being more oriented toward the structural policy of supply management and modification of the conditions of production. The “stabilization” was based on measures that were as diverse as reducing public spending, slowing the increase in money supply by limiting credits to the economy, raising the interest rates, subordinating wage developments to productivity growth, devaluating the currency, etc. It was the typical policy mixes recommended by the international financial institutions, particularly the IMF before theorizing and advocating the practice of monetarism in an open economy. Let us recall that the monetarist current was born in the late 1940s, driven by M. Friedman [FRI 53, FRI 69] as a reaction against Keynesian preference for fiscal policy. Monetarist theories proposed a restriction of State intervention and believed that inflation was due to an excessive volume of money circulating in the economy; hence the need to implement
- 24. a monetary policy that restricted the money supply. The “structural adjustment” aimed to create the conditions for stable and sustainable economic recovery to ensure balanced growth via liberalization of productive, financial and business systems: gradual liberalization of imports, prices and interest rates, easing of public control over private national and foreign investment, restriction of direct government support to companies through the liberal percept trade not aid, withdrawal of the State from the productive fabric by massive privatization of public corporations, etc. Indeed, perceived by the liberal approach and the agency theory as a means for achieving specific interests, the public company was subjected to strong criticism, on behalf of the superior efficiency of coordination mechanisms by the market: public production did not maximize public interest, but rather private interests, at the expense of economic and social waste. This notion of “waste” highlighted the distortions that State intervention could create and it was then recommended that economic policy be neutral and that liberalism be the rule. In this sense, laisser-faire, market regulatory mechanisms and the benevolence of the invisible hand were to ensure optimal operation of the economic system. It was according to this same logic of minimum State that fiscal and financial reforms increased and the privatization process was accelerated over the past three decades in developing countries but also in the United States, Europe and in former socialist countries. The results have not matched expectations: in the late 1980s, the mandated treatment plunged developing countries into recession. Long-term development needs were side-lined. A number of developing country governments continued to implement the SAP, most for fear of suspension of loans and financial isolation, rather than for conviction of their merits or their success. At the end of the 1980s, the World Bank [WOR 87, p. 2] itself recognized that for many developing countries, “the adjustment proved to be a more lengthy process than was envisioned”. The SAPs were thus criticized for having too strict a vision of conditionality, but in reality, and at least until the early 1990s, there were a lot of loans and very few adjustments. Despite the mixed results, for international financial institutions the neutral economic policy and the logic of a lesser State were still desirable in the long-term; the problem lies deep in the configuration, the rhythm and the steps toward liberalization. It was apparently around this logic that the ten commandments of the “Washington Consensus” were founded, as formalized in 1989 (see Box 1.2).
- 25. Box 1.2. The “Washington Consensus” in ten points – “Fiscal Discipline”: whereas public deficit is a source of inflation and external deficit, fiscal austerity aims to deleverage the State, but also maintain and improve purchasing power, mainly in the categories of the most disadvantaged populations. – “Redefining priorities in public expenditure”: subsidies to the economy, for employment and to enterprises must replace direct aid funding health, education and infrastructure construction. – “Fiscal reform”: to counter tax evasion and the rise of an informal economy, but also to improve the finances of the State and give new life to the economy, the government must pursue two objectives: expand the tax base and lower marginal tax rates. – “Liberalization of interest rates”: the market must set interest rates, but the State must ensure that these are positive and moderate in order to be attractive to international investors. These can contribute to financing development. – “Competitive exchange rates”: the aim is to promote exports. Controlled currency depreciation should move in this direction while avoiding inflationary spiraling due to excessively low levels. – “Trade liberalization”: export promotion cannot be achieved without the liberalization of trade; to limit or even remove tariff and non-tariff barriers. – “Liberalization of direct investment from the outside”: first, foreign investment must be unfettered, then the international financial institutions imposed the liberalization of the movement of all kinds of capital, leading to significant financial crises throughout the 1990s. – “Privatization”: reduce public deficit, contain state intervention, but also make it more competitive (in liberalized markets) through more appropriate management, these are the main objectives of privatization that receive the broad consensus of experts of the “Washington Consensus”. – “Deregulation”: contestability of markets must be applied on a large scale. The supposed success of this policy in the United States (Reagan years) should inspire all governments; to eliminate barriers for entry and exit of the markets and promote free enterprise. – “Ownership rights”: the reinforcement of property rights fosters individual initiative and allows the informal sector to obtain ownership titles at acceptable costs. The Washington Consensus derives its name from an article by John Williamson in 1989. It is in Washington that the headquarters of the IMF and the World Bank, the US Treasury Department and many influential think tanks like the Institute for International Economics are
- 26. located. In this expression, Williamson defines “Washington” as Washington politics of Congress, as senior officials of the administration and technocratic Washington of the international financial institutions, of governmental economic agencies, of the Federal Reserve Board and of think tanks [WIL90]. His philosophy remained the same as that of the SAPs: strict budgetary discipline, strict monetary policy, openness to international trade. The idea was that the revival of economies, often ossified by bloated administrations, should be carried out by a supply policy: encouraging private investment and consumption with tax concessions and lower rates of direct taxation. 1.2.2. Failure of the “minimum State” In the early 1990s, Latin American States, like many other developing countries, made the Washington Consensus their cause. Clift [CLI 03] pointed out that this held some of its promises: stronger budgets, lower inflation and debt ratios, an influx of foreign investment and a recovery in growth. At the same time, unemployment rose and poverty remained endemic, while the opening markets exposed these countries to the collateral effects of globalization, including the influx of speculative financial capital, which was higher than foreign direct investment (FDI). On a theoretical level, but also in practice, the Washington Consensus was quickly challenged. According to Stiglitz [STI 98], the framework offered too few instruments, a restrictive vision of development and senseless marginalization of the role of the State. Moreover, it has often been held that the withdrawal of the State from its role as producer via massive privatizations, combined with deregulation and liberalization of FDI (if these reduce the budget deficit and boost growth), induces the strengthening of economic dependence of countries whose production bases and innovation systems are weak [STI 02, BER 04, UZU 05]. Moreover, Rodrik [ROD 98] showed that the liberalization of capital flows does not lead to more sustained growth and development because of their volatile financial capital that sought immediate payment. Financial liberalization was supposed to attract international investment capital in areas where the comparative advantage of a particular Southern country was identified and thus enabled the country to benefit from non-debt-generating funding. But not only this, because the opening and strengthening of attractiveness vis-à-vis the FDI were a factor of technology transfer from the North to the South and a means for reducing unemployment. However, capital flows proved to be highly concentrated and volatile, mostly corresponding to speculative investments (not to actual investment). This was where financialization of the global economy resided and created a kind of dichotomy between the real and financial spheres. And we do not take unnecessary risks on considering that international institutions contributed by advocating and imposing liberal policies based on the primacy of the opening of the capital account. Many economists now belatedly note that the sequencing of reforms matters enormously and that countries should first strengthen state control. Paradoxically, the institutions of this global governance [UZU 10c] had the greatest difficulties facing these markets as they were unable to predict or explain the upheavals and movements that were contrary to the classical theory of liberalism that had inspired them so.
- 27. Indeed, despite progress over more than half a century in the understanding of economic processes, and despite efforts from the IMF and other international stakeholders for effective governance of globalization, worldwide crises have been more recurrent and, in some ways, more serious. The financial crises that have erupted over the past decade are representative examples, such as those that occurred in Asia (1997), Latin America (Mexico, 1995; Argentina, 2002), in Russia and in 2008 in the United States followed by the rest of the world. Violent and costly crises aggravated poverty and inequality, relatively and to varying degrees, to the point that we can today speak of a “globalization” of poverty. Each time, these were opportunities to renew questions and revive reflections on the role, architecture and efficiency of the global accumulation framework, which was neither capable of stabilizing the global economy, nor effectively preventing and mitigating crises. Stiglitz’s [STI 02] reflections on this topic always proved to be valid: when a country is in crisis, not only have the IMF funds and prescriptions failed to stabilize the situation, but in many cases, they made them worse. It is indisputable that the IMF failed in its original mission to promote global stability and was not more “brilliant” in the new tasks it set, for example to guide the transition of ex-socialist countries toward a market economy. Financial globalization required mature financial systems, but not only this, as state regulation was also imperative for measuring the risks of capital mobility. The failures of globalization were due to the supremacy given to the private sector in the recommended model of development, gradually confining the crucially important role of the State to mere regulatory functions. It was not surprising then, that the influence of the private sector extended increasingly, and by default, in areas where State authority was weakened. Indeed, developing countries were led to practice pro-cyclical policies as prescribed in the Washington Consensus but which, in fact, worsened their situation: “Countries of the developing world have been asking why the United States, when faced with an economic crisis, is in favor of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, whereas when these countries themselves are in the same situation, they are required to do exactly the opposite” [STI 02, p. 308]. Developing countries were not in a position to counter the commandments of consensus. The restructuring undertaking became so complex that they often seemed politically and socially untenable. The need to eliminate all barriers to trade, investment and currency transactions was sharply opposed to the idea that these countries had to protect, consolidate or strengthen their economies. In the late 1990s, the results turned out to be different from what Williamson had expected, that the IMF and the World Bank had promised, what the States had hoped for and that econometric models had predicted. Was it because the liberal precepts on which the Consensus was based were poorly adapted to the real requirements of the context and national conditions? Or was it because there was a misinterpretation of the ten commandments? In the second half of the 1990s, ten middle-income countries experienced serious financial crises with consequences such as the decline of exports, accelerated deindustrialization, massive loss of employment, etc. The Asian crisis was a clear example, having occurred due to the excessive trust in the market and commitment toward deregulation based on the “minimum State”. On the other hand, China and India, who experienced sustained economic
- 28. growth, only gradually opened up and maintained a proactive economic policy. Chile having led an ultra-liberal economic policy in the 1970s, its performances thereafter were the result of a turn around to more economic voluntarism from the mid-1980s. These countries adopted counter-cyclical policies: support for exports, strengthening the system of education and research and control of short-term capital inflows. 1.3. The era of “good governance” After the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, it appeared that the consensus raised more problems than it solved. A “post-consensus” seemed to be emerging, in which the idea of a minimum State was put into perspective, at least regarding the pace of its withdrawal, the distribution of the fruits of growth and, ostensibly, the central role of institutions. In its 1997 annual report, the World Bank inflected its position by stating that a “good governance” was imperative for the proper functioning of the market. Rogoff [ROG 02] considered that the negative effects of the consensus were due to “bad governance” and poor conduct of economic policies. Rodrik [ROD 03] proposed to expand the Washington Consensus, focusing in this case on good governance. The failure of the structural adjustment policies was interpreted by the World Bank as a lack of institutional capacity in some countries, so it directed its programs to what it called “the good governance”. Therefore, the policy made a remarkable entry into the discourse of international institutions. In fact, in addition to the emphasis on the implementation of the programs, it was also about understanding the nature of the institutions that embodied these programs. Thus “good governance” could, a priori, refer to the inclusion of political behavior in development. That is to say, political cost was highlighted in the new theories of development. According to the new discourses, those States with a rational institutional architecture were the most capable to promote development. Institutionalism thus burst into the debate on development. From then on, the focus was on the institutional deficit that afflicted developing countries. In other words, if some theoretical receipts did not prove to be effective at the empirical level, it was because the institutional architecture of the economies in which they were applied was lacking. In this section, we propose to trace the outlines of a new development model by placing the question of institutions at its center. The a priori that governs this analysis emphasizes that the existence of good quality institutions is both the result and the cause of economic prosperity. However, regardless of causality, increasingly abundant empirical research shows that institutions have an important effect on determining the allocation of production resources and income distribution [ROD 05]. 1.3.1. Institutions, “good governance” and development In the 1990s, the dominant paradigm of development economics changed. The symbolic failures of all States (planning) and all markets (minimal State) led to a metamorphosis of development economics. The theory of “good governance” took over. This theory assumed that there was a strong complementarity between democracy and the market, in the sense that
- 29. political and economic systems were mutually reinforcing each other [FIT 04]. The issue of institutions became crucial. The report of the World Bank in 1991 was indicative of these changes: the poor performance of certain countries was explained by the quality of “institutions”. The institutional deficit experienced by the economies of developing countries was put forward to explain the gap in the economic performance with the North. In essence, development was not only conditioned by factor endowments. The institutional component explained a part. The concept of “good governance” is now ubiquitous in economic analysis. Proponents of this concept present it as a healthy alternative to power abuse in its current manifestations, a cure for all ills of contemporary society and especially the optimal way to ensure development in countries suffering from endemic underdevelopment. Its adoption by international institutions has allowed us to highlight some changes in the status of the State in economic theory of development. Bad development results from bad governance. Williamson [WIL94] was considered the father of new institutional economics based on the assumption of bounded rationality and opportunism of agents. He distinguished between different types of institutions, such as the market, the hierarchy and the hybrid forms. The central idea of the new institutional economics was that institutions mattered significantly in economic processes and could be analyzed using neoclassical theory tools. The inclusion of institutions thus represented a major advance in liberal theory. D. North [NOR 90] perceived institutions as the rules. He considered that there were two kinds of institutions: formal rules (constitutional rules, rules of property rights and contracts) and informal rules (standards and practices). The definition of institutions developed by North was meaningful insofar as institutions were seen as the rules of play of a society or, more formally, the constraints defined by men to shape their interactions. In this way, institutions ensured that the rules were respected in a context where different types of transactions occurred repeatedly. They had characteristics of public goods that the market could not supply efficiently. It is in the logic of minimizing transaction costs, in the control of opportunistic behavior within a relationship or in the reiterated balance that the explanation for the emergence and functionality of institutions can be found. Institutions are then based on power. Furthermore, if the idea of a combination of institutional architecture and economic performance seemed common to several economists, North insisted that it was incentives that served as a mediator between institutions and economic performance. Institutional framework determines the behavior of stakeholders; similarly, stakeholders will be the source of institutional change. The organizations and stakeholders that emerged seized the opportunities created by the institutional framework. If this rewarded speculation, speculative organizations would appear; if it rewarded innovation, innovative businesses would be created and systemic innovation would begin. For the World Bank, governance is “the set of rules governing the exercise of authority in the name of an electorate comprising of selecting and replacing those who exercise this authority” [WOR 09] and good governance is to exercise this authority by respecting the integrity, rights and needs of everyone in the State. Also according to the World Bank, relations of good
- 30. governance in a framework based on two universal values can be considered: social inclusion and responsibility. The idea is that insufficient quality of governance blights the economic, social and human development; which explains the economic delay in Southern countries compared with Northern countries. Good governance applied to developing countries required, according to the World Bank, the development of education and infrastructure, environmental protection and equitable distribution of resources as the necessary conditions for markets to function properly. A system of laws was necessary to regulate the liberalization of the markets of product, capital and labor in order to avoid the excess of capital flight and the increase of illegal and informal activities. Then, institutional reform was needed to better monitor the economy and enlist all economic stakeholders (political, business and trade unions) in the decision-making process. Finally, the tax system should ensure the proper distribution of income. But it also had to ensure that the poor “have access to assets”: instruction, ownership titles, microcredit, land reform, etc. It was not a question of returning to the hypertrophied, corrupt and expensive State, but rather moving toward an “astute State”. Institutional reforms aimed to implement a good decision- making process through the adoption of good policies. Let us note however that the concept of governance is generally (on a theoretical level) and particularly (by examining the facts) questionable. It is imbued with a strong dose of authoritarianism [UZU 10c, UZU 10d]. Indeed, if one refers to the question of institutions as a common infrastructure (“common good”) to all agents of a national economy, governance and democracy do not necessarily go together. In this case, “democracy” (deliberative) is not linked to any “common destiny” or legitimacy given to citizens’ acts as individuals, but it results from the intervention of “stakeholders”: dialogue of governments with economically or financially powerful forces (firms, banks, etc.) or with influence (lobby groups, unions, religions, etc.). The “moral” perspective of a “common good” is then substituted by a “political” perspective of the definition of “good”. These institutions that are formed by power relationships (of conflict and cooperation) create an economic development trajectory on which all stakeholders of the economy operate (or must operate to avoid exclusion). Ultimately, from the World Bank’s approach, liberal thought tried to promote a model of organization of developing economies based on the idea that democracy and the market are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the two complement each other. From this perspective, the State was expected to play an increasingly significant role in development through the establishment of an infrastructure and institutional basis. This explains the importance that researchers of development economics and stakeholders of the international community give to the topic of institutions. According to these stakeholders, it is the principle of effectiveness that guides the selection of institutions. But this principle of effectiveness is itself defined by the power relations that create the overall framework for the governance of the global economy. 1.3.2. “Development” in global governance The growing assertion of failures of liberalism (concretized by rather mixed results of the SAPs and the applications of the Washington Consensus), combined with the needs of new
- 31. economic theories of innovation that showed the important role of institutions, organizations and their interactions, shifted the development debate toward the conduct of “clever” policies to which national and international stakeholders had to adhere (grouped in a donor system: banks, companies, NGOs, IMF, World Bank, foreign governments, etc.). Developing countries then found themselves caught in a dialectical relationship between their own “governance” and governance of the global economy. Indeed, the rise of the topic of globalization and the consequent challenges for the nation-State suggested, according to functionalist logic, a transfer of regulatory instruments that had lost their effectiveness on a national level to a global scale. In other words, it was a new model of representation and management of the interdependence that should have emerged and been applied to a growing number of areas, in response to growing constraints and global problems arising from globalization. This globalization, often perceived as a process of homogenization of public management, rather proved to act as an accentuation factor of differences of all types and at all scales. A system of global governance should thus be the real place of power, faced with increasing complaints against reforms from developing countries and demands of civil society, which then join together to challenge the influence of developed countries and large firms and institutions. The aspiration to a more balanced and equitable globalization seemed to begin to materialize in the creation, at the end of the Uruguay Round, of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This symbolized the assertion of an arbitral power that relativized that of the most powerful States whose practice would be governed by the principles of international public law. The issue of power did not disappear, but it seemed to be confined to soft power. The appearance of conflicts of rules, sometimes with great symbolic significance (industry and environment, trade and social rights, trade and public health, etc.) also underlined the need for arbitration between global goals and national economic choices, in the North as much as in the South. It is this tangled set of concerns, paradoxes and requirements, combined with the ever- present distrust of functionalism and government interventionism that seems to have legitimized the establishment of global governance that coordinates and marks national policies, according to the challenges of globalization. Today, it is difficult to dissociate the term “globalization” from “governance” and “development”. The question of “development” is thus linked to the effectiveness of the system of global governance. The World Bank, IMF, UN and the OECD, in a joint document, defined the roadmap of good policy on an international plan: reducing inequalities in development between countries and reducing poverty in all its forms is the most critical challenge faced by the international community (UN, OECD, WB, IMF, 2000). But it is difficult not to maintain a strong skepticism of the new discourse since, concretely, practices remain the same and policies for opening up to foreign investment and trade remain the panacea for “poor development”. The analysis of global governance should be based on a thorough analysis of changes in the overall legal and institutional framework of competition and accumulation. Globalization and
- 32. global business strategy have no meaning other than to give it the potential to remove obstacles from making profits. Hence, the importance of a legal framework for the promotion and protection of freedom of entrepreneurship on a global level. The architecture of global governance (on which “development” depends) is based on a consistent set of coercive rules, forms, methods, means of competition and cooperation between economic players whose goal is to organize public and private economic activities globally without apparent discrimination or preferential treatment. These rules may be new (for example, compliance by all countries of free movement of capital or the protection of capital property) or old but, in the context of multilateral agreements, apply to all signatories without discrimination (for example, respect of the most favored nation clause for foreign investors, regardless of their origin). This architecture is global insofar as it assigns an inalienable legal status to economic stakeholders whose activity goes beyond the strict boundaries of a national economy. The organization of cross-border economic activities is only possible if the international firm acquires a legal status, that is to say a full recognition status that confers rights and obligations in any country, provided that those rights and obligations are the same from one country to another. In this context of establishment of supranational rules, it is clear that all countries should review their laws and constitutions to make their legal systems compatible with emerging international laws. Under these circumstances, the only possible road to development remains the capacity of economies and their stakeholders to transform the constraints of globalization into opportunities. The primary purpose of the power centers that govern global governance is the promotion of the national and international private sector where the opportunities to make globalization a beneficial process to all are supposed to lie. Wage moderation policy (to keep production costs low and attract international capital), liberalization of capital markets and privatization remain the key words, despite their failure following the implementation of SAPs and the Washington Consensus principles (as discussed above). The fact is that the rules of the global economic game are set, in most cases, in structures that embody a strong asymmetry in decision-making powers; they are the preferred instruments that serve the interests of industrialized countries and the interests of powerful private stakeholders within them, such as financial groups and large multinational firms. In the current situation, it is fundamentally far from this system of global governance whose legitimacy was logically and theoretically based on the need to mitigate the paradoxes created by globalization through reconciling the conflicting interests and objectives of all stakeholders. At this level of analysis, it would be reasonable to assume that in a globalization process where it is not the system itself, global governance should probably be considered as a new modality of politics for which the objective is less to exceed in complexity but rather to control and stabilize the tensions that are inherent to that complexity. The architectural flaws of global governance relating to “development” raise the question of the leeway that developing countries have in order to assert their claims as a stakeholder. What short, medium and long- term actions should be taken? Should we give the State back its traditional policy tools that proved to be so ineffective during the great inflation of the 1970s (loose fiscal and monetary policies, control of exchange and imports, depreciated currency, etc.)? Should we admit that it was a serious error to advocate neutrality of State actions in the development process, when its
- 33. role seemed to be more crucial and decisive than ever? Or should we work on the concept of an “astute State” more accurately? The fact is, as we will see later, the new challenges of globalization call on us to reflect on a new development model. If open borders and economic liberalism are the two pillars on which the system of global governance rests, the achievement of this “new development model” should lead economists and political scientists to rethink future economic policies. 1.4. The system of “global governance” under scrutiny Without supreme regulatory power, globalization and its constraints and challenges may result in unpredictable functioning of the global economy due to conflicts of interest between rival state entities. Fear of economic and political conflict has been used to justify the introduction of a global governance system [MAR 03]. The integration of national economies into globalization is entrusted to international institutions that are deemed to be exempt from state control. Transnationalist theses add to this, demonstrating internal–external continuity and depriving the State of its latest capabilities against the necessary emergence of a supra-State regulation system. Hidden behind the global governance goals, the problem of relevance of development policy implementation is emerging. Well-defined post-war guidelines (prepare and organize open trade, finance development, conduct proactive industrial policies, etc.) were replaced by a set of goals that do not seem to fulfill a unified vision of the future, even as economic integration (openness to international flows of goods and capital) and the dismantling of State power (economic liberalization, predominance of international treaties) have become an end in itself. This encourages us to see globalization as a process that inevitably leads to the difficulty for States to set goals and develop ways to achieve them: industrial choices, innovation policies, integration of FDI in a diversification program of economic activities, etc. 1.4.1. Global governance as a substitute for economic voluntarism How does the astute State differ from the minimum State and how is it more apt to promote rapid, equitable and environmentally responsible development? In fact, expenditure, operations, administrations, prerogatives, staff, aids to the productive sector, etc., are steadily decreasing. Consolidation and deleveraging remain the primary objectives of economic policies promoted by international institutions. From this perspective, the role of the State in the process of economic development seems weakened. Without any real economic policy instrument (currency being subjected to international rules and fluctuations; regulatory framework being drawn externally), the vast majority of developing (and even middle-income) countries are not masters of their own economy. Their bargaining power with major international companies in terms of technology transfer, employment, and reinvestment of profits or protection of infant industries is reduced. With national control measures of flows of investment or goods becoming obsolete, national governments are unable to control their economy. The problem is therefore a political issue.
- 34. Throughout history, in any economy and particularly in developing countries (Latin America, East Asia, China, India, etc.), the launch of major investment programs was accompanied by the implementation of measures to control foreign investment in the sectors of primary resource, energy, transport and communications, defense and security, banking and finance, etc. However, it is true that the results were (and are) questionable. But with the multilateral liberalization of flows, the host country no longer had the ability to guide foreign investment toward sectors that could promote or strengthen national industries and/or control its market. The lack of effective supervision of activities of international companies reduced the spillover effects on local activities, hindered investment, impoverished local production structures and made the economy even more dependent on external resources and more vulnerable to fluctuations in world markets without any control of debt. The example of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is revealing the issue. This treaty, which adhered the WTO Member States, was a treaty resulting from the Uruguay Round in 1994 and provided for the liberalization of services in all sectors, except those closely related to the exercise of sovereignty (justice, army, public order, and State administration). In short, health, education, transport, energy supply, etc., were integrated into WTO mechanisms and decisions, and were subjected to market forces. Services’ privatization policy, promoted by many governments, met the logic of dismantlement of the welfare State, which was considered to be too expensive. If we hold to existing theory and studies, the idea of global governance does not exclude the fact that the State may have a social and economic role to play. However, in practice, the weakening of the role of the State in development causes the architecture of global governance to be questioned by those who defend the political framework of the nation-State in the name of a sovereign conception of development. Indeed, today it is difficult to deny that the State is no longer the same unified actor that shares its internal and foreign policy initiative with other international stakeholders and that in many respects, its regulatory function of national economy is fading. Presumably, national interest has become blurred and ambiguous, and rigorous economic policy is giving way to a superior organizational form that itself incorporates singular forms of special interests. This “devaluation” of the power of the State in Southern countries prevents the implementation of proactive economic policies, leaving global governance to take the lead. Currently, the action of international institutions as leading players in the global governance system is often questioned. Not only the goals, but also the nature of decision-making processes on which this system is based, are questionable. Indeed, the strategy of liberal reforms underpinning the process of globalization is perceived as a gear in which each reform has two objectives: first, to respect a constraint or seize an opportunity for globalization; second, to create a new strain to reduce the State’s leeway. For example, the role of international financial institutions in the management of the world economy raises many conflicting opinions. While the IMF’s official mission is to ensure stability of the global financial system and the World Bank has a mandate to finance development, these two institutions have come together to play the role of fireman and policeman of the international system by conditioning aid for liberal reforms. However, economic theory has challenged the certainties of traditional models and no longer issues an
- 35. unequivocal message about the effects of trade liberalization on development. According to standard economic theory, the international division of labor and specialization of national economies in production, for which they have an abundance of capital or labor, are not only beneficial to a particular country but to the whole world. Through the relative price mechanism of goods and factors, costs would drop and people’s living standards would improve. The free movement of goods and that of capital is the necessary and sufficient condition for reaching global welfare. But history shows that there are impoverishing and discriminating specializations. It is also an assertion argued by the structuralist approach: it questions modes of insertion into the global economy as the primary and sufficient condition to trigger a sustained and consistent development process. The determining factor for development cannot be external demand for primary products. But historical conditions for development of the world market meant that developing countries were enrolled in the international division of labor as exporters of raw, agricultural and mining materials and as importers of industrial products and/or consumption. If the terms of trade deteriorate (as is regularly the case over a long period), these countries have to borrow in order to finance imports of food and industrial products, compounding their external deficit and, consequently, their external debt. This reality explains the results of the study by the Philippine sociologist Walden Bello [BEL 02] looking back at thirty years of economic liberalism. According to the study, 80% of loans from the World Bank have benefited a limited number of developing countries to access financial markets. These loans prove, moreover, to be ineffective if we consider that the World Bank itself estimated a 70% failure rate of its projects in poor countries. Indeed, the application of the liberal principles of global governance does not clearly result in better global allocation of production resources. Countries that show the most advanced development and adequate attractiveness policies (see the emerging countries: Brazil, India, China, South Africa, etc.) are those that structurally host the largest volume of foreign investments and have an important place in international trade. Countries with major transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure, where scientific and technical potential is the richest, and with large solvent markets, etc., are the ones that attract global firms. The more production and innovation systems are developed on a national basis, the more the economy in question is able to integrate the global logic of the operation of large companies. The liberalization of capital markets, positive interest rates, and the facilities and “national treatment” granted to internationalized companies open new perspectives for financing development. But according to the UN Conference on Development (UNCTAD), in the 1990s and early in this century, 90% of FDI in developing countries have gone to a small group of “emerging economies”, against about 50% before the outbreak of the debt crisis (late 1970s). The LDCs received 1%. These countries, unattractive for FDI and dependent on volatile private capital, are forced to contract multilateral loans packaged with reforms causing deeper imbalances; yet they still face another problem of the global governance system, namely the constant fall of official development assistance (ODA). The virtuous cycle of investment and growth is closely linked to profound changes in the economy and, in particular, to the development and diversification of industry. Even during the debt crisis, East Asian economies continued to rely on industry and high value-added
- 36. technology-intensive services, through protecting high-technology sectors, rising up the value chain in some sectors (for example, microelectronics) and investing in the development of services (such as banking, insurance and engineering). However, most Latin American countries experienced deindustrialization and African economies went through a “premature deindustrialization” (Table 1.1). Table 1.1. Share of manufacturing in GDP by region, 1960-2017 (in %) Source: [KOZ 04] Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2017 (projection) Sub-Saharan Africa 15.3 17.8 17.4 14.9 14.9 13.6 13.0 West Asia and North Africa 10.9 12.2 10.1 15.6 14.2 14.6 15.1 Latin America 28.1 26.8 28.2 25.0 17.8 16.8 16.2 South Asia 13.8 14.5 17.4 18.0 15.7 15.1 14.9 East Asia (excluding China) 14.6 20.6 25.4 26.8 27.0 27.4 27.2 China 23.7 30.1 40.6 33.0 34.5 32.3 31.9 Developing countries 21.5 22.3 24.7 24.4 22.7 21.9 20.9 Developed countries 28.9 28.3 24.5 22.1 18.9 17.6 17.2 The consequences of systematic deregulation are symptomatic of the constraints and paradoxes in the new world order and of the inability of major stakeholders of global governance to manage it effectively and globally. The first structural responses to financial crises that regularly cross the global economy show, in fact, a return to protectionism in major countries and blocks of Northern countries and simultaneously, a reconfiguration of the financial sphere. Protectionism is to encourage producers operating in the country itself over others, either through limiting the entry of foreign products into the national territory by quotas or hard-to- reach standards (health, labor, environmental, etc.), or through artificially enhancing the competitiveness of local products by duties on imported goods or subsidies to local producers. According to the World Bank, since the 2008 financial crisis, protectionist measures have been increasing, as well as a rise in anti-dumping measures to prevent the entry of foreign products at excessively low prices. The stimulus packages launched since 2009 (financing of transport, communications and energy infrastructures, bank debt redemption, continued low interest rates, etc.) in major industrialized countries accentuate these protectionist tendencies. For example, the European Union and the United States routinely resort to protectionism in order to protect and increase the export capacity of their businesses. This is the case for industrial agriculture into which these two protagonists pour a billion dollars per day to support it. This worsens the global nutrition problem due to the low purchasing power of the populations (mostly agrarian) in LDCs. The European Union and the United States demand that their manufactured goods and agricultural products, as well as their service companies, freely penetrate the markets of the world. But at the same time, they are the first to require the protection of intellectual property; 90% of patents are held by Western firms. The limitation of
- 37. knowledge flow creates a lasting superiority of the North over the South. However, new financial strategies guide development policy toward the management of debts at the expense of growth. Helped by rating agencies who decide on the reliability of borrowers, financial institutions spot the most fragile States and speculate on government securities. This raises guarantees on State loans (credit default swaps: CDS) and mortgages weak countries in the long-term. However, this situation develops the inventiveness of States with performing economies in terms of protectionism. In an open economy, where finance sanctions the decision and the investment act, the States of industrial and emerging countries use regulations to justify expansion effects or relative decline. These States give up their power on their territories to the private sector and extend their trade policy through international bodies, treaties and standards to the benefit of large companies, which through mergers, acquisitions and equity investments can thus increase their power in the global market. Therefore, we should learn from previous development efforts to advocate for programs with realistic goals. For example, we should accept, as Joseph E. Stiglitz argues [STI 02], the gradual and differentiated international opening up of developing countries according to their objectives as did (and still do) industrialized countries that have built their economies by protecting key sectors of their industrialization. But the new agreements on direct investment (agreement on trade-related investment measures – TRIMS) signed in the WTO framework prevent developing countries from protecting their industries, either by substituting imports with local production, or by applying measures to increase “local content” in the case of FDI. However, these countries are forced to implement strict legislation on intellectual property protection (agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights – TRIPS). The abidance to scientific and technical progress essentially achieved in industrialized countries constrains the establishment and development of national innovation systems in developing countries. 1.4.2. Toward an alternative model of economic growth? Global governance formalizes a commercial, productive and financial framework drawn by the political choices of major economies [UZU 10b], while promising to developing countries to accelerate their industrialization thanks to free trade [UZU 05, UZU 10d]. But according to J.K. Galbraith [GAL84], the industrial world applies an economic model in companies that doesn’t take historical processes into account: the great powers apply standard development programs without considering the historical characteristics of less developed economies. These programs express the state of the economy of these powers and leave little space for sociopolitical conditions on which capital formation could be based. For Galbraith, and according to the experiences of former industrialized countries, the prerequisite for economic development is political development, itself correlated with the democratization of education. A political system must be stable and predictable, honest and efficient; citizens (educated and informed) should be the stakeholders. But in order to achieve this, citizens must be educated. Good governance starts with the organization of a system of basic teaching, education and training of individuals.
- 38. Education is, indeed, the foundation of political organization from which the process of development emerges. World Bank reports share this view. Free, compulsory and good education will break the culture of poverty. It is also closely connected to the participation of individuals in decision-making in economic and political fields. A good general education sets the stage for more specialized education in a technical, scientific or administrative field. Itself forming the “human capital” that is essential for the selection, design and/or absorption, utilization and development of necessary technologies that are compatible with the economic development project. General and specialized education is also involved in the formation of a stable political system that is able to give meaning to development and provide the material, financial, cognitive and institutional resources needed to achieve it. In an open economy, what direction will lead to development? What are the conditions and what types of institutional tools can be used to stabilize the economy, to control the flows and the stocks? International institutions have realized that without a State, in the absence of a representative and legitimate political system, development options and managerial choices are limited. Table 1.2 shows, on one side, the impasses that the implementation of proposed measures in developing countries led to (especially for the most fragile economies) since the debt crisis (late 1970s); on the other side, it shows some institutional arrangements to escape underdevelopment. Table 1.2. Development, global governance and institutional renewal Global governance and development crisis Institutional renewal and economic organization – Instability and political crises – Unemployment, poverty, increasing social inequality – Deficient markets, informal practices – Financial and regulatory institutions in their infancy – Neglected collective infrastructure – Economy subject to the hazards of the international environment – Fragility due to unpredictable capital movements – Promotion of a predictable political system and rehabilitation of the role of the State – Priority to education and collective social infrastructure – Coordination system of market stakeholders and decision-making capacity of the State – National production resource control procedures (capital formation, income taxes, currency) – Centralization of a domestic savings system – Differentiated international opening according to national goals Table 1.2 shows the need for developing countries to create and strengthen the systemic relationships within their economies. Few countries that qualified as developing countries at the height of the political economy of development (1960–1970) followed the path opened since the 18th Century by the countries qualified today as industrialized countries, to attain the magic triangle: growth by opening new markets to satisfy the greater needs; establishment of a national economy system capable of ensuring an endogenous process of capital accumulation through innovation, mastering the financial circuits, investing and selectively opening to
- 39. international trade; emergence of an autonomous political process for defining the national economic development project. The current architecture of global governance does not allow this type of economic intervention, except for so-called large emerging countries that are endowed with primary resources, a sufficiently large market to launch industrialization and stakeholders (State, businesses and entrepreneurs) who are interacting with and having sufficiently important common interests to develop particular modes of regulation of the national economy. Research on the “third world” has long since reached the conclusion that most developing countries are political entities born from external constraints and do not reflect their current (or past) social and economic structures. Most often, their political systems are largely imported and reflect a projected socio-economic status that they can only aspire to. Development economists know this and forcefully point out: from the moment where a national rise is without the footprint of the political system on the model, the structure and the pace of development, any economic policy comes up short against the reality of structures. Under these conditions, the formation and consolidation of a national economy are priorities. Mastering accumulation means mastering the market, controlling natural and production resources, launching procedures for regulating and reforming the economy. Historical experience of industrial and currently emerging countries indeed shows that the constitution of the national economy, the model, the institutions, the structure and pace of economic development are largely determined by the political system, and not the opposite. Economic development policy is thus subject to six conditions: understanding of national capacities; ability to mobilize and strengthen them; definition of objectives to be reached; identification of bottlenecks; choice of technology; reformist capacity of the State. The representation of the market economy is based on “private effort to accumulate capital” but the neutrality of currency and the State in classical and neoclassical, Smithian and neo-Smithian models distorts the analysis of social organization and its reformist and adaptive dynamics. History, however, confirms the most basic realities and reveals in correct terms the fundamental problems of development: money creation, fiduciary revolution, State, system training and predominance of individual national systems. In globalization, the big picture is how to formulate a policy and how to develop the tools (commercial, financial, regulatory, scientific and technical) to design and implement development projects. The current rules of global governance are born and applied in the context of a world economy composed of power centers that are unequal in size and power, centers that are structured more or less solidly but maintaining asymmetrical relations. They also attribute a status to global companies and freeze positions in the global trading system. Hence also a renewed interest in “development economics” and the implementation of active policies, starting with the formation of a relatively independent national credit system in relation to international financial flows that ensure the capacity of money creation and the control money circulation. In turn, the effectiveness and efficiency of the financial system depend on the control of the labor market and the evolution of employment. The latter being dependent on the distribution patterns and allocation of surplus, itself dependent on the control of the market, natural resources or technologies.
- 40. After the Second World War, countries seeking to develop were encouraged not to develop their own capacity to innovate but rather to import the most advanced technologies as heavily as possible. This mimicry largely explains the failure of development strategies. It induced debt crises, greater dependence on Northern countries, a brain drain, poverty and an explosion of migration. The idea that we can simply import foreign technologies without appropriating at least part of their production conditions is unfounded. The demands of an active integration into the world economy combined with those of the structuring of a competitive production system lead the researcher to question the capacity of developing countries to develop their own innovation systems. The issue of development is therefore to make globalization profitable and from this perspective, it is clear that there is no alternative but to renew reflection on the relevance of a new and proactive role of States and more particularly, in science and technology policy and innovation policy. The merits of such policies depend on the existence of so-called market failures. Institutional, structural, productive, distributive, financial, etc., inefficiencies are all market failures that legitimize public measures to deal with them, with a view to ensuring effective operation of the production system and promoting its integration into the global economy, according to development requirements. But initially, economic policy should move toward the establishment of institutions guaranteeing: (1) the best possible allocation of resources in order to avoid dominant market positions; (2) the economy stabilization to effectively and fully use these capital and labor resources; (3) the social transfers to meet the basic needs of the population (food, health, education and housing); (4) the financing through fiscal policy for the production of public goods. Unlike analyses that reduce the State to an agent that creates distortions and/or collects income, new development macroeconomics connect growth, competitiveness and financial balances and introduce structuralist elements in a macroeconomic framework [UZU 10e]. Thus, in the context of a globalized economy, the “pro” State (promoter, prospector, protector and producer) becomes a central agent of development that aims to change the modes of integration of the country in the international division of labor (IDL). This requires a change in the nature of specializations through the implementation of industrial and innovation economic policies, coupled with institutional and social modernization, which act on the productive structures. By this logic, UNCTAD proposes the establishment of development policies whose objective is to stimulate and monitor structural transformations. The revival of the State is concomitant to a change in its modes of action in fundamentally altered national and international contexts. The design of an alternative development model assumes that national States have significant enough “leeway” to control its economy. This thesis will certainly go against the Washington Consensus (which is based on the objective of convergence of policies for undifferentiated integration in the global market), but it does not reject the relevance of active and phased integration policies in international flows of goods and capital. The economic policy of development in globalization involves the definition of strategic objectives at the center of which is the design and promotion of innovation capacities and the
- 41. formation of an innovation system capable of capturing and producing knowledge; the national economy thus can take advantage of technological advances and simultaneously contribute to their achievement. The performance of a country’s innovation system determines the structural competitiveness of its economy since micro- and macroeconomic performance depends on “non-cost competitiveness”. In other words, economic development cannot be based on the exploitation of static comparative advantages derived from factor endowments, but rather on building competitive advantages from the implementation of intensive production processes in scientific and technical knowledge and technologies. While technological and social innovation becomes the basis of development, the priority is given to incentives for R&D and human capital that guide the overall economic policy; financial considerations of development then move to the background.
- 42. 2 Innovative Capacities and Systems of the South in Globalization The challenges of globalization, beyond the system of global governance, demonstrate the importance of innovation and technologies as tools for growth and sustainable development in the North as much as in the South. There has been widespread research on innovation in Southern economies over the last 30 years [KIM 97, HOB 95, AMS 01, BEL97]. More recently, the issue has been whether the concept of an “innovation system”, as developed in the 1980s, is a useful tool for studying growth and development [LUN 09, MUC 03]. The idea is to use this concept to understand learning and innovation processes in developing economies. Therefore, it would not only serve as a tool for comparing the technological performance of countries, but also as a promotional tool for economic development. Initially applied in Northern economies, the concept of “innovation system” was introduced into development economics for the construction of a set of economic policy proposals that combined the demands of globalization with the specificities of Southern economies [ALT 09]. The structure of the private sector in developing countries and its performance differ largely from Northern economies. This requires considering, among other things, a number of key elements such as weak legal systems (less secure property rights and higher transaction costs), differences in demand conditions (low purchasing power, demand for more or less sophisticated products), poor infrastructure (high transport and production costs), weak education systems (from primary school to universities), price instability and greater capital volatility. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we attempt to understand how to examine systemic innovation in the South and then we discuss the difficulties of achieving it. The concept of the innovation system will find its meaning in a broader sense, given the nature of innovation and especially the connection with building necessary innovation capabilities. But for this instrument to be consistent and applicable, it is necessary to understand on what strategies innovation of the South is based and how the North/South technology transfer is ensured, as the technology comes from innovation systems that are richly endowed with scientific and technical resources. Thus, it is important to create national learning capacities but these must be accompanied by internal learning processes that are based on endogenous knowledge. However, institutional and innovation policy failures prevent many developing countries from building skills and consequently create systemic links between potential and current innovators and between endogenous and imported innovation. 2.1. Innovation for economic development
- 43. An innovation system describes the relations between institutions (scientific, technological, industrial, commercial, financial and political) both private and public (companies, research laboratories and engineering entities, administration, etc.). These relations are often formed through financial and information flows and movement of skilled and qualified people. The purpose of such a system is to produce innovations (new organizations, new goods and processes, new resources and new combinations of productive resources). These systems are national (or local) due to the specific features of their organization to which legal public regulation systems apply. Industrial and innovation policy is dedicated to the establishment of arrangements that are necessary for industrial and economic development through the strengthening of links between competitiveness and innovation. These links are assessed by the ability of countries to produce and export manufactured and technological products and the structural indicators of industrial performances: skills, R&D effort, direct investment from abroad, paid royalties and license payments abroad, modern infrastructure, etc. Disparities in the level of industrial development between developing countries are significant. We can observe a high concentration of technological capabilities in a few countries (so-called “emerging” countries) and a worsening of the situation of the poorest countries. To improve their position in global competitiveness, various experiences show that developing economies need to selectively open to international trade and foreign investment while supporting this opening policy by building their capacity for innovation. Integration into global value chains is one way to access the highest technology and to encourage, through learning, their mastery. But should industrialization not take into account the fact that innovation does not have the same meaning and the same form in all economies? Recent history shows that the recipes of the North often failed in the South. The interest shown in the nature of the innovation process (where collaboration is crucial) and in the varied forms of innovation (organizational, social, etc.) of the so-called “lagging” countries could perhaps form new sources of wealth and competitiveness. 2.1.1. Understanding globalization through technology transfer If the use and dissemination of modern technology, which diversifies supply and increases labor productivity, is faster in developed countries than in developing countries, then the current technology gap is widening. Since it is foolish to argue that the South must reinvent everything, it is obvious that technology transfer and their adaptation to local sociotechnical and economic contexts become priorities. Technology transfer cannot, as a matter of fact, replace the existence of R&D and innovation capacities in a country. Theories on technology transfer underwent a wide expansion in the 1980s. They were related to the intensity of globalization and the increase in the international competition. This transfer was a crucial factor for economic and social development. The economic catch-up assumed massive importation of technology from industrial countries. Technology transfer was defined in UN regulations as a transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product or for
- 44. delivering a service. It was a transmission of knowledge between companies and public institutions belonging to different countries and an exchange of equipment and technology between countries. Technology transfer can take place from one firm to another firm in a foreign country, from a research laboratory to a newly created firm or one that already exists. The innovation process in developing economies comes from a process of this technology transfer. Here, “technology transfer” means the dissemination and the capacity of developing economies to capture foreign technology in order to integrate it into their production operations to launch products and competitive services on (local and/or global) markets and increasing added value. Although there was an abundant literature on technology transfer in the 1980s, Hendrickx [HEN 96] sums up the three existing categories: material transfer, transfer of concept and transfer of capacities: 1) Material transfer is treated as the simple import of new equipment and related techniques. Local adaptation is designed as trial and error. The core technology is trapped inside the physical goods; 2) Transfer of concept is achieved through transfer of certain plans, formulas or books in order to make a domestic product. This is a simple transfer of information, data and guidelines for creating basic skills; 3) Transfer of capacities is in turn directed toward a transfer of scientific knowledge for the production of locally adapted technologies. This transfer leads to the development of our own technologies from imported technology. Teece [TEE 76] clarified two main forms: a physical form with the characteristics of various products and equipment and another more informational form, which may be acquired if the equipment is actually used. Technology transfer should include four distinct elements, namely one content, two parties and a result. The content consists of a transfer of tangible and intangible assets for operating the transferred technology. The two parties are the exporter and importer of the technology. The result is relative to the recipient’s ability to operate the imported technology. UNCTAD classifies three forms of technology transfer: its production through multinational companies and R&D, its transfer through multiple forms of external growth strategies (mergers and acquisitions, franchising, license acquisition, technical assistance) and its diffusion through the generated externalities. For Berthe [BER 97], there were three different categories of technology transfer: appropriate technology relevant to the needs of the local population; advanced technology associated with the use of technologies from developed countries; technology recovery to recover and transform technology from developed countries. But this technology transfer also came at a cost. Teece [TEE 76] described four components in particular: the costs of technological engineering exchange related to the theoretical basis, the engineering costs associated with the transfer itself, the R&D costs and the training costs. Technology transfer was much influenced by the efficiency of the process of internationalization of firms as a basis for multinational companies and direct foreign
- 45. investment [BUC 76]. Technology transfer can take place in various forms, such as: – intellectual property rights license agreement; – know-how transmission agreement; – research and license contracts; – technical assistance and vocational training contract; – contract for realization of industrial complex; – direct investment controller joint-venture; – mixed contract including one or more forms. But here, we are less interested in the forms than in the processes related to their development. Although the literature is abundant, we can nevertheless present two major theoretical orientations: that of the technology gap between rich and poor countries and more recently, those related to capacity and skill building. The latter literature insists on the ability of developing countries to internalize foreign knowledge. We can consider that developing countries are not mere imitators of foreign technology and can appropriate foreign knowledge by creating a capacity to innovate. The technological gap theory is far from recent. It was developed by Posner in 1961 to highlight the strong competition of the economies between high and medium technology sectors [POS 61]. By focusing on innovation, certain countries gained a technological edge in a sector, which gives them an export monopoly in this sector, regardless of their advantages in factor endowment. A technology trade gap arises if foreign consumers express a demand for new products that require a certain period. This imitation period will be ever longer as the innovator maintains a cost advantage that is often associated with economies of scale arising from the existence of an extending market. New products appear and others disappear at a high rate that corresponds to rapid technological change. The works by Vernon [VER 66] were in line with this neo-technological approach. Focusing on the product lifecycle problems, Vernon quickly extended his analysis to international trade. According to this author, any innovative product undergoes a lifecycle that has four phases: introduction, growth, saturation and decline. These phases can be coupled with the technology dissemination procedures on foreign territory: – The launch phase corresponds to a diffusion of the product in the domestic market with high incomes and strong demand for innovative products. The firm behind the new product may have a temporary monopoly. – The growth phase is marked by widespread nature of the product which becomes a commonplace on its home market, encouraging the innovative firm to export the product to similar markets. – The saturation phase is characterized by the fact that the diffusion of the product is no
- 46. Exploring the Variety of Random Documents with Different Content
- 47. pane; un’altra ove ponevasi a fermentare su tavole disposte l’una sull’altra lungo il muro, e quindi una terza ove riponevasi già cotto. Presso era la stalla degli asini che giravano le mole, secondo il metodo più usitato. In questo pistrino si trovarono quattro macine un po’ più basse delle consuete d’altrove, formate da un cono concavo che si volge su di un altro convesso, anfore di grano e farina, e sul muro del Pistrino, vedesi un dipinto che esprimeva un sagrificio alla Dea Fornace e diversi uccelli. È forse la panatteria migliore che si scoperse finora. Un altro forno publico è nel lato sinistro della casa di Fortunata presso quella di Pansa, con tre mulini, sull’un dei quali leggesi Sex. Sulla bocca del forno vi era un phallus colorito in rosso ed al di sopra scritta la leggenda hic habitat felicitas, novella prova che l’emblema non fosse unicamente a segno di mal costume, ma piuttosto a felice augurio ed a scongiuro di disgrazia, come già ebbi il destro di sostenere. Nella bottega attigua di panatteria esisteva una pittura rappresentante un serpente, simbolo di una divinità custode, e rimpetto una croce latina in basso rilievo. Sarebbe questo segno un indizio del sospetto da me già espresso che la religione di Cristo fosse già penetrata in Pompei? Faccio voti che i futuri scavi abbiano ad offerire maggiori dati, che il sospetto e l’induzione abbiano a mutare in certezza assoluta. Sull’angolo della via del Panatico, un’altra panatteria ha un gran forno con quattro mulini. Su due d’essi leggonsi le parole sex e sohal in caratteri rossi e sopra il forno vedevasi una figura rappresentante evidentemente un magistrato che distribuiva pane al popolo. Nella viottola della Fontana del Bue, si è pure trovato un pistrino con tre macine, un gran forno a corrente d’aria e delle madie foderate di piombo. D’un’ultima panatteria terrò conto, scoperta nel 1868 ed appartenente a Paquio Proculo, al quale apparteneva pure la casa. Essa è nella Via Stabiana (Regione VII, Isola II). Il chiarissimo
- 48. Minervini lesse dipinta sulla parete sinistra della casa la seguente epigrafe, che oggi è frammentata per la caduta dell’intonaco: PROCVLE . FRONTONI TVO . OFFICIVM . COMMODA Questa raccomandazione, scrive il dotto signor G. De Petra, illustrando nel Giornale degli Scavi la casa e il pistrino di P. Paquio Proculo[284], così per la sua forma, come pel luogo dov’è scritta, mi pare indubitato che Frontone la rivolgesse al padrone della casa, il quale perciò doveva chiamarsi Proculo. Con tal cognome occorrono più di frequente nei programmi pompejani due persone, P. Paquio Proculo e Q. Postumio Proculo; ma considerando che in una colonna dell’atrio è graffito il nome di Pacuia, la figlia di Paquio, rimane provato che col nome di questo debba intitolarsi la casa. Donde si fa ancora probabile che l’altra raccomandazione elettorale publicata dal ch. Fiorelli (Giornale degli Scavi, 1862, p. 47, n. 4): Sabinum aed (ilem) Procule fac, et ille te facient, fosse indirizzata allo stesso P. Paquio, che pare sia stato un uomo assai influente e popolare. Diffatti il ch. Garrucci (Bull. arch. Nap., n. 5, tom. II, p. 52) fece nota questa epigrafe che sinora non trova riscontro di sorta fra le reminiscenze elettorali: P. Paquium Proculum ii. Vir. i. d. d. r. p. universi Pompejani fecerunt; nondimeno chi era questo Proculo, che i Pompeiani unanimi sollevarono alla somma dignità di duumviro giusdicente? Niente altro, come si vedrà, che un panattiere! Il qual fatto ci autorizza a conchiudere, che in Pompei le magistrature municipali non eran monopolio dei soli ricchi, e che questi conoscevano di buona voglia (universi fecerunt) la convenienza di farvi partecipare anche i più autorevoli e migliori cittadini di condizione plebea. — Lezione buona pei nostri tempi, in cui le elezioni amministrative e politiche sembrano infeudate all’aristocrazia del sangue e del denaro: colpa precipua del popolo stesso che si ostina, a parole, a gridar contro i ricchi e gli uomini di grande autorità, ma in fatto è poi sempre lo stesso peccatore, che religiosamente serba il suo stolido feticismo per chi tiene di classe a sè superiore; salvo a ricominciare di poi le sue maledizioni contro gli
- 49. eletti proprj, che ignari de’ suoi bisogni, fanno leggi a sproposito e a detrimento. Anche all’ingresso della viottola della Fontana del Bue, sulla muraglia a sinistra, una bella e ben conservata pittura di simboliche serpi è sormontata, oltre che da un piccolo larario, anche da varie iscrizioni, parte in oggi cancellate dalla rovina, fra le quali leggesi la seguente, che ognor più avvalora e l’influenza e la ricchezza di questo importantissimo panattiere in Pompei: P. PAQVIVM PROCVLVM II VIR . I . D . THALAMVS CLIENS[285]. Io non mi divagherò a descrivere la casa di questo P. Paquio Proculo, che qui l’argomento ne sarebbe spostato: verrò invece difilato al pistrino che vi è in essa, e che è nel lato destro. Vi si riconosce la camera del panificium, e ciò si argomenta, scrive il De Petra, dai cinque podii di fabbrica per sostegno di tre tavoloni di legno su cui rimaneggiavasi la pasta, da varii recipienti per conservar l’acqua, quali sono una vaschetta quadra fabbricata, un gran dolio sepolto a metà nel suolo e un’anfora murata in uno de’ poggiuoli, infine dalle traccie degli assi di legno che sostenevano le tavole su cui disponevansi i pani. Una porta priva di soglia dava il passaggio da questo luogo a quello dov’è il forno; ma tra l’una e l’altra stanza, per uno scopo limitato, cioè per la sola cottura del pane, v’era una comunicazione anche più diretta e sollecita. Si notarono tre molæ per isfarinare il grano, avendo una di esse la base ricoperta da una lamina di piombo, la meta di una quarta mola senza il catillus e la base circolare per una quinta; due serbatoj d’acqua fabbricati, un pozzo con coperchio, un piccolo dolio contenente calce e tre poggiuoli. Il dipinto larario solito a incontrarsi nei pistrini, non è mancato in questo, ma sventuratamente tornò a luce poco conservato. Sotto un verdeggiante festone è la Dea Vesta ammantata con lo scettro nella sinistra e il dritto braccio proteso sopra un focus. Dietro a Vesta è l’asino, l’animale, come dissi, usato più spesso a girar le macine;
- 50. rimpetto alla Dea v’è un giovane in piedi che nella sinistra ha la cornucopia, e stende la diritta sull’ara. A sinistra del forno v’è un ampio locale in cui probabilmente si conservavano saccula di grano o di farina. Di questo P. Paquio Proculo e di sua moglie, nel tablinum della loro casa, si rinvenne il ritratto dipinto sulle pareti gialle. Cedo la penna all’egregio De Petra. «Questo dipinto, offre la volgare fisonomia di Paquio, che ammantato dalla bianca toga magistrale, stringe nella destra un volume col rispettivo titolo di colore rosso. Gli è a fianco la sua donna, cui pendono sulla fronte i ricciolini sfuggiti alla fascetta che le stringe i capelli; ha pendenti di perle alle orecchie, e rossa la veste; avvicina alle labbre la punta dello stilo che tiene nella dritta ed ha i pugillari aperti nella sinistra[286]. Donde si può inferire, che l’anzidetta positura sia stata convenzionale nei ritratti, poichè l’atteggiarsi dell’uomo e della donna trovasi ripetuto esattamente in due scudetti publicati nelle Pitture d’Ercolano (tom. III, tav. 45) e in quegli altri due che ornano il tablino d’una casa nella Regione Settima, isola 10, propriamente quella che vien dopo la casa del Balcone Pensile. Oltrecchè l’atteggiamento della donna si confronta con la scrittrice dipinta nell’atrio della casa di Popidio Prisco (Reg. VII, Is. 11, n. 20) e con un’altra delle Pitture d’Erc. (t. III, tav. 46)[287]. Quale simbolo dell’amor conjugale di P. Paquio e sua moglie, vedevasi al di sopra dei loro ritratti un grazioso ed importante quadretto, ora nel Museo, rappresentante Amore e Psiche teneramente abbracciati. Il bacio e l’amplesso di essi, ovvio in tanti altri monumenti, è ritratto in questa pittura pompejana in una movenza nuova, sebbene non molto diversa delle altre conosciute.» Nella Via degli Augustali, come dipendenza della Casa detta dei Capitelli figurati, aprivasi poi una taberna da pasticciere, pistor dulciarius, il quale, come ne fa sapere Apulejo, panes et mellita concinnabat eduleia. Vi si videro parecchi mulinetti, pistrillæ, che un sol uomo bastava a girare; ma destò la speciale attenzione il forno, dalla forma del quale direbbesi a riverbero, costituendosi di due cavità sovrapposte, accendendosi il fuoco nella cavità inferiore da
- 51. cui il calore ascendeva per un’apertura, nella cavità superiore, ove si deponevano a cuocer le pasticcerie. Due pasticcetti si trovarono negli scavi e si conservano nel Museo di Napoli. Toccato de’ pistrini, vediamo ora le altre botteghe e spacci pompejani di merci attinenti i cibi e gli alimenti. Una taberna o venditorio d’olio si scoprì nel 1852 nella via di Stabia, quasi all’angolo della viottola della Fontana del Bue. Il podio o banco della bottega era di marmo cipollino e grigio antico, con in mezzo dello specchio davanti un medaglione di porfido verde e due bei rosoni. Su di esso vi erano incastrate otto belle ed ampie scodelle in terra cotta. Nell’interno si ritrovò un pozzo, un fornello e l’ingresso del ripostiglio dell’olio. La quantità degli ulivi che si coltivavano nell’agro campano doveva necessariamente far luogo ad una produzione assai abbondante di olio. Anche gli scavi hanno offerte conserve nell’olio di grosse ulive, che dovevano probabilmente aversi dalle famiglie pompejane fra le consuete ghiottornie. Presso la casa di Cornelio Rufo e quella di Messinio nella Via di Stabia evvi una casetta, che l’illustre Fioretti, seguendo le indicazioni di Pompeo Festo e di Varrone, qualifica per un Ganeum, o Ganea, specialmente per avervi vedute pitture ed iscrizioni licenziose[288]. Era la Ganea o il Ganeum, come meglio piaccia al lettore di appellarlo, secondo essi, un ritrovo nascosto di meretrici, le camere da letto delle quali erano a pian terreno, come i cenacoli nella parte superiore delle case, ed io ne toccherò poi nel capitolo del Lupanare; ma Bréton, nella sua Pompeja, avendo constatato nell’area del peristilio sette grandi coppe, o giare, misure di capacità pei liquidi, e sette dolii coi loro coperchi, senza manichi, fu indotto a credere che questa casa potesse essere al contrario un magazzeno d’olio. Si sono poi trovati negli scavi dei particolari mulini che si sono creduti atti alla macinazione dei grani oleosi: l’uno fu rinvenuto nelle vicinanze del Foro Triangolare o Nundinario. Prima di entrare nel Foro Civile, sulla diritta, stava la taberna di un venditore di latte. L’insegna di essa è in terra cotta e rappresenta una capra. Sotto di essa vi si lesse questa iscrizione in caratteri
- 52. rossi, all’epoca del suo sterramento, ma che ora non si distinguono più. M. CASELLIVM AED. DIF. FAC. FIDELIS... Nel podio di materia di fabbrica, come d’uso nelle taberne di liquidi, v’erano incassati dei vasi. Nell’isola intorno al Tempio d’Augusto si constatarono diverse botteghe di commestibili. Una di venditori di pesci salati, forse ciò argomentandosi dai pesci che si videro dipinti sulle pareti, della natura di quelli che si vendono nella salamoja, e già sappiamo che Pompei era nota e famosa pel suo garo che sapeva preparare e del quale ho già intrattenuto il lettore sulla fine del Capitolo Quinto. Un’altra di fruttivendolo, nè in questa si errò di certo, poichè vi si accogliessero fichi secchi in abbondanza, uva passa, susine, frutta in vasi di vetro, lenti, semi di canape; oltre una ciambella, vari frammenti di pasta e di pane, molto denaro, una staderina e varie bilancie. I fruttivendoli in Pompei dovevano essere di molti, così essendo lecito di pensare dalla iscrizione che fu letta sul pilastro che separa la Fullonica, di cui dirò qui appresso, dalla Casa della gran Fontana, scritta, come il più spesso, in caratteri rossi e che sembra riferirsi al magistrato, del quale abbiam veduto come la statua decorasse il teatro: M. HOLCONIVM PRISCVM II VIR. I. D. POMARI VNIVERSI CVM HELVIO VESTALE ROGANT[289] I fruttivendoli pompejani si raccomandano ancora in altre due iscrizioni, che si lessero nella strada ove è l’arco di trionfo. L’una è così concepita: IVLIVM SABINVM AEDILEM POMARII ROGANT e l’altra così:
- 53. MARCVM CERRINIVM AEDILEM POMARII ROGANT Ciò che vuol essere osservato si è che in queste botteghe, che sono circostanti al Tempio di Augusto, si sono rinvenuti molti oggetti preziosi e d’arte, fra quali una statuetta di bronzo rappresentante una Vittoria con armille d’oro alle braccia; un’altra in marmo; Venere che si asciuga i capelli, come sorgesse allora dalle spume dell’Ionio mare, colla parte inferiore velata da un drappo dipinto in rosso; una bella tazza d’alabastro, anelli d’oro, gemme, sistri isiaci, un vaso di vaghissimo lavoro, amuleti, strigili e diverse monete. Sarà negli ulteriori scavi che verrà dato indubbiamente di scoprire taberne d’altre cose mangerecce, e soprattutto lanienae, o botteghe da beccai e macelli, la principale opera e materia prima dei quali veniva somministrata dai templi, per le continue vittime che vi si immolavano, per lo più in buoi, giovenche e pecore; e se agli Dei si bruciavano ciocche di lana e qualche inutile interiora, tutt’al più spruzzate da vino e mescolate di fiori, il meglio veniva accortamente goduto dai sacerdoti pel loro uso, e venduto nuovamente ai gonzi, di cui si costituisce la maggior parte del pubblico, che a ragion di divozione avevano fatto prima l’offerta. I macellai dell’antichità erano adunque principalmente i sacerdoti. Della bottega del Chirurgo e del Seplasarius o farmacista e di quella di prodotti chimici, ho già detto nel Capitolo delle Scuole; di quella dello scultore mi occuperò nel venturo delle Belle Arti, come anche del mercante de’ colori; perocchè meglio vi si trovino in essi collocati, come materia che a que’ capitoli ha tutto il suo riferimento. Nella stradicciuola di Mercurio, gli scavi trovarono nel 1853 un Myropolium, o bottega da profumiere, detta anche, come la vediam nominata in Varrone e Svetonio, unguentaria taberna[290]. Già superiormente ho toccato dello spreco di profumi, aromi ed unguenti che si faceva a quei tempi di grande effeminatezza in Roma e in tutto l’orbe a lei soggetto. Non era soltanto, cioè, del mondo muliebre; ma pur degli uomini. All’uscire del letto, prima d’entrare nel bagno, nel bagno e dopo, era costume di ugnersi e di profumarsi;
- 54. altrettanto facevasi nelle case prima del pasto e avanti comparire in pubblico e prima di coricarsi; ogni occasione era buona per ispargersi il corpo e le vestimenta di odorose essenze, per ungere i capelli e perfino per profumare camere ed appartamenti. Già abbiam veduto nel capitolo dell’Anfiteatro come si facesse eziandio all’aperto assai gitto di croco: si può pertanto argomentare cosa dovesse essere negli appartamenti chiusi: a suo luogo vedremo, specialmente nel triclinio e ne’ funerali. Ma più che tutto, era nell’amore che di profumi si abusava, come eccitanti e preparatori allo stesso. È noto, scrive Dufour[291], che il muschio, il zibetto, l’ambra grigia e gli altri odori animali portati nelle vesti, nei capelli, in tutte le parti del corpo esercitano un’azione attivissima sul sistema nervoso e sugli organi della generazione. Nè solo adoperavano esternamente detti profumi, ma non temevano di far entrare aromi e spezie in quantità nel giornaliero loro alimento; onde a ciò si voglia ascrivere quell’appetito e prurito continuo che tormentava la romana società e che la spingeva in tutti gli eccessi dell’amor fisico. La lussuria asiatica portò seco tali profumi e d’allora in poi, così prodigioso fu il consumo delle sostanze aromatiche, che parve non bastare quanto inviava la Persia, l’Arabia e tutto l’Oriente insieme. S’era insomma venuto a tal punto, da aver ragione Plauto, quando nella Mostellaria usciva in questi accenti: Quia ecastor mulier recte olet, ubi nihil olet. Nam istæc veteres, quæ se unguentis unctitant, inter poles, Vetulæ, edentulæ, quæ vilia corporis fuco occulunt, Ubi sese sudor cum unguentis consociavit, illico Itidem olent, quasi cum una multa jura confudit cocus. Quid oleant nescias, nisi id unum, ut male olere intelligas[292]. Profumi e cosmetici assumevano il nome dal paese onde venivano: così furono celebrati l’unguento di Cipri, il balsamo di Mende, il nardo d’Achemenis, il malobutrum di Sidone, distillato in olio pei capelli, l’olio d’Arabia, quello della Siria, il mirobolano di Arabia;
- 55. l’opobalsamum della Giudea, il cinnamomo dell’India, la maggiorana di Cipri, la mirra dell’Oronte e l’iride di Illiria, che Ovidio raccomanda nel suo Poemetto De Faciei medicamine, e del quale facciamo uso noi pure rinchiudendolo in seriche borse o sacchetti, che poniamo, per profumarla, per mezzo la biancheria. Altri profumi e unguenti pigliavano il nome dal loro inventore; come la Niceroziana ricordata da Marziale, odore inventato da Nicerote, e il Foliatum, manipolato da Folia, amica di Gratidia, che Orazio stigmatizzò nelle sue Odi, coprendola delle più infami accuse e vituperi, col nome di Canidia. V’era poi l’unguento dipelatorio, detto dropax unguentum, l’odontatrimna per i denti, le pastiglie dette diapasmata contro l’alito cattivo, e vie via molti altri unguenti che sarebbe troppo lungo l’enumerare. Malgrado questo bisogno che si provava dell’arte e dei prodotti del profumiere e del cosmeta, questi bottegai erano nel comune disprezzo, forse perchè a questo piccolo commercio s’applicassero cortigiane e cinedi, lenoni e mezzane, quando l’età toglieva loro ogni attrattiva e possibilità di continuare nel loro infame mestiere, o mancava la clientela, e così a donna ingenua ossia nata libera, il nome solo di profumatrice e cosmeta sarebbe giustamente suonato come la più fiera ingiuria. Nelle case de’ ricchi eravi sovente il laboratorio dell’unguentarius, a cui s’applicavano schiavi o liberti, e le cosmete e gli unguentarii valevano eziandio per le molteplici operazioni, che già conosciamo, de’ privati balinei. La gente onesta e della buona società teneva a disonore il mostrarsi publicamente nei myropolii o taberne unguentarie, e però quando vi accedevano o sceglievano le ore prime del mattino o quelle della sera, e tiravano il lembo della toga sul volto: non così gli sfaccendati che traevano a questi luoghi, non che alle tonstrinæ o botteghe da barbiere, od a quelle de’ medici e de’ banchieri, per raccogliervi
- 56. novelle e chiacchierare, come Plauto ne fa sapere quando nell’Epidico fa che Apecide dica aver cercato ovunque di Perifane: Dii immortales, utinam conveniam domi Periphanem! per omnem urbem quem sum defessus quærere: Per medicinas, per tonstrinas, in gymnasia atque in foro, Per myropolia, et lanienas, circumque argentarias Rogitando sum raucus factus[293]. Spettava a’ profumieri l’imbalsamazion de’ cadaveri e la vendita degli aromi pei sagrifici, e nel myropolium di Pompei diffatti le insegne o pitture che vi stavano nell’ingresso ed ora scomparse, e le quali condussero a constatare od almeno a far credere essere quella una taberna unguentaria, rappresentavano l’una un sagrificatore che conduceva all’altare un toro; l’altra quattro uomini che portavano una enorme cassa, intorno alla quale stavano sospesi alcuni vasi. Superiormente poi vedevansi dipinte alcune persone intente a profumare un cadavere, prima d’essere portato al rogo. Dal profumiere, passiamo a vedere la taberna del barbiere nella Via di Mercurio. È picciolissima: a destra vi è un podio, sopra di esso due nicchie simili a quelle che altrove servirono a larario, ma che qui più probabilmente avranno giovato per collocarvi cosmetici, vasi di profumi, pettini e novaculæ o lame di metallo molto affilate colle quali radevano i capelli della testa o i peli della barba, come i nostri rasoi. In mezzo alla bottega v’è un sedile in materia da fabbrica, dove l’avventore si sarà seduto, e in un dietro bottega sta il fornello, che avrà servito per riscaldare l’acqua. Non saprei spiegare come e perchè si trovassero in questa seconda camera gli avanzi di un mulino. Circa questo mestiere del barbiere, tonsor, poco è a dirsi. Lo si faceva consistere nel tagliare i capelli, nel radere la barba, nel pareggiare le ugne e nello svellere i peli parassiti colle pinzette, volsellæ. I ricchi usavano a tutto ciò nella propria casa di uno schiavo o di liberto; il popolo veniva alla bottega. A radersi frequentemente la barba, si cominciò tardi in Roma, nell’anno cioè
- 57. 454, della sua fondazione, alla venuta dalla Sicilia del primo barbiere: avanti di costui la si lasciava crescere generalmente. Nelle tonstrinæ, — così chiamate le botteghe di barbieri, e noi diremmo barbierie, — era assai frequente che vi esercitassero tal mestiere le donne, dette però Tonstrices; e Plauto, fedel pittore di que’ vecchi costumi, nel Truculentus, accenna appunto alla Sura barbiera: . . . tonstricem Suram Novisti nostram, quæ modo erga ædes habet[294]. e Marziale acerbamente morde la moglie d’un barbiere che stava presso alla Suburra, e la quale co’ suoi artificii carpiva denaro alla gente: Sed ista tonstrix, Ammiane, non tondet; Non tondet, inquis? ergo quid facit? radit[295]. Non di meglio del resto aveva trattato lo stesso poeta, Marziale, il barbiere Eutrapelo nel seguente epigramma: Eutrapelus tonsor dum circuit ora Luperci Expungitque genas; altera barba subit[296]. Lo che dimostra che di buoni e grami barbieri ve ne erano allora come ve ne hanno di presente. L’epigramma adunque avrà sempre la propria attualità. Di sarti finora gli scavi non rivelarono botteghe; di calzolajo se ne sospettò alcuna giusta quel che ne dirò tra breve, e così di tal’altre industrie e mestieri attinenti il vestire, e quel che si sterrerà per lo avanti, riguardando la parte più abitata dalla gente operaja, verrà forse facendo al proposito interessanti rivelazioni. Certo che nè le vestimenta, nè i calceamenti erano a que’ dì complicati come di presente, da richiedere specialità di artieri. L’importante quanto ai primi era la finezza della stofa onde si facevano tonache e mantelli, pepli e toghe e studio nel portarle onde si acquistasse grazia ed eleganza. Gli schiavi, le donne bastavano all’uopo e forse ognuno,
- 58. anche del popolo, in sua casa poteva dalle proprie donne farsi preparare tutto quello che appunto riguardasse il vestimento. Circa alle vestimenta poi della gente rustica, ne abbiamo in Marco Porcio Catone, De Re Rustica, ricordati i nomi: Tunicæ, saga, centones, centiculi, manicæ de pellibus; e cuculli o cuculliones, pilei e galeri a berrette o cappelli che si portavano in testa, ed erano in tutti di pelli lanute. In quanto ai secondi, cioè a’ calzolai, si può dirne qualche parola, perchè in taluna pittura pompejana si vide riprodotta la forma di qualche calzare, ma sarà tra breve, come dissi, quando visiteremo la bottega del cuojajo o conciatore di pelli. Presso le Prigioni, che abbiamo nell’undecimo Capitolo di quest’opera trovate nel Foro Civile Pompejano, vedesi un locale che fu designato siccome un ampio magazzeno in cui si vendevano tele e stofe ad uso proprio del vestire. Così fu interpretato l’uso di questo locale, fidandosi alla quantità dei buchi che vi si videro, che dovevano aver servito a sostenere gli armadj che contenevano quelle merci. Una pittura scoperta in Pompei, scrive Bonucci, fa per avventura allusione a questo Foro ed a questo magazzeno. Rappresenta un uomo in piedi, che tiene nelle mani un pezzo di stofa ch’egli offre ad una donna seduta. Questa mostra il desiderio di comperarla, ma fa osservare al mercante un difetto che si trova nel mezzo della merce, e il mercante cerca dissuaderla con ragioni che accompagna con gesti. Le due giovanette sedute, la servente che è dietro di esse, il gruppo di due altre donne che parlano con un uomo, e da ultimo i panneggiamenti che si scoprono nel fondo del quadro, possono indicare il luogo di che facciamo parola. Tele e lane servivano alla confezione degli abiti: solo negli ultimi tempi, cioè a quelli dell’Impero, le matrone, comperandola a carissimo prezzo, usavano della seta che derivavano dall’Asia; ma questa consideravasi come merce di smoderatissimo lusso, perocchè costasse come l’oro. Ho già notato le maraviglie che si fecero quando nel circo vennero distesi velarii di seta: erano esse in ragione della preziosità e rarità della stofa.
- 59. Nel Vicolo del Panatico, al lato destro, vi è un piccolo stabilimento di lavanderia: per tale venne riconosciuto, abbenchè tutto vi fosse rovinato e nulla di particolare offra ad essere riferito. Due altre lavanderie pure non di grande importanza, stanno nel Vicolo della Maschera: più vasta è quella in Via del Lupanare e detta di Narciso, scoperta nel 1862 e così denominata da una superba statuetta di bronzo che si conserva al Museo, rappresentante infatti questo personaggio mitologico nell’atto che ascolta la voce lontana della Ninfa Eco, che vien considerata come una delle migliori rarità trovate negli scavi, sì che Dognée giungesse a dire: Les fouilles n’eussent- elles déterré que ce seul bronze, l’importation des principes immortelles de l’art grec dans le vieux monde romain eût été démontrée par une trace glorieuse dont la splendeur indique incontestablement l’illustre origine[297]. È una bottega, in cui si veggono vasche diverse di pietra, in due delle quali era l’acqua condotta da un tubo di piombo con un robinetto. Sotto di queste due vasche è un fornello; ma giustamente osserva Bréton, siccome il piombo non può sopportare un fuoco di troppo ardente, si deve supporre, che in questi due fornelli non si ponesse che della brace destinata solo a tener caldo il liquido, nel quale si lavavano le stofe di lana o di lino. Al disopra del lavatojo, nella muraglia, vi sono dei buchi, ne’ quali erano infissi dei chiodi per la biancheria. Il suolo della bottega ha un certo pendìo verso un lato, per ivi condurre le acque che vi scorrevano per uscire sulla via. A destra della bottega, è una cameretta, in mezzo alla quale è una tavola di marmo rettangolare d’un solo piede ornato d’un corno d’abbondanza e d’una pàtera con tracce di pitture. In fondo della stessa, scendendo quattro gradini, si entra in una vasta corte in cui si vedono le traccie dei chiodi cui si saran dovute accomandare le corde onde distendervi le biancherie ad asciugare. Nella bottega sull’angolo della Via degli Augustali e del Lupanare, designata per quella del Conciapelli, coriarius o, come potrebbe essere, d’un calzolajo, giusta l’opinione di Fiorelli e di Overbeck, appartenente a Nonio Campano soldato della IX Coorte pretoriana, come era scritto in grandi caratteri rossi sulla bianca parete di essa,
- 60. se non abbiamo speciali oggetti a rimarcare, tranne alcuni utensili propri a questo mestiere, l’argomento però ci obbliga a ricordare l’uso precipuo de’ suoi prodotti, cioè quello de’ calzari e scarpe. Sutor chiamavasi l’artefice che cuciva in cuojo, adoperando la lesina, subula, e introducendo la setola, seta; onde sutrina la bottega di lui. Dalla diversa qualità del lavoro, dicevasi sutor crepidarius, o sutor caligarius, o anche calcearius; onde la parola nostra calzolajo. Facevansi pure da’ calzolai romani i coturni, ed erano essi stivali di greco modello, di cuoio, usualmente portato da’ cacciatori e copriva l’intero piede e la gamba sino al polpaccio, allacciandosi sul davanti ed arrovesciato in cima con una ritoccatura, ed una suola diritta atta ad uno o all’altro piede, utroque actus pedi, come scrive Servio scoliaste di Virgilio[298]. Uno stivale dello stesso genere, dice Rich, ma ornato con più cura, è assegnato talora dagli artisti greci a talune delle loro divinità, in ispecie a Diana, Bacco e Mercurio e dai Romani nello stesso modo alla Dea Roma ed ai loro imperatori, come un segno di divinità. Così furono adottati da Marco Antonio, quando si attribuì il carattere e gli attributi di Bacco[299]; ma però non eran portati dai Romani come parte del loro vestiario consueto. Cicerone biasima l’insolenza d’un Tuditano, che si mostra in pubblico cum palla et cothurnis[300]. Il coturno portato dagli attori tragici sulla scena, abbiam già visto avesse la suola di sughero. — I cacciatori, oltre il coturno, portavano anche l’ocrea, specie di moderne uose. Ocrea era anche la gambiera che copriva lo stinco dal malleolo sino a poco sopra il ginocchio: per lo più era di metallo e se ne scoprirono degli esemplari in Pompei. Crepida, era un calzare che si componeva d’una suola alta, ornata di una bassa striscia di cuojo che copriva solo il fianco del piede, ma aveva un certo numero d’occhielli, ansæ, sul suo orlo superiore, attraverso i quali passava una correggia piatta, amentum, per allacciarla sul piede. Propriamente era peculiare del vestiario nazionale greco ed usato dai due sessi e si considerava come la calzatura conveniente a portarsi col pallium e colla chlamys. Le crepidæ carbatinæ erano poi le più ordinarie di tutte le calzature in uso fra gli antichi e particolari ai contadini delle regioni meridionali.
- 61. Consistevano in un pezzo quadrato di cuojo per suola, poi rivoltato all’insù a’ canti e sopra le dita, legato sul collo del piede attorno la parte più bassa della gamba con coreggiuoli passati attraverso dei buchi sugli orli. Calceus era una piccola scarpa o calzaretto, per lo più portato dalle donne. Ne’ dipinti Pompejani si videro tre distinti modelli di essi: tutti per altro giungono a’ malleoli, con suola e tacco basso e così senza, come con laccetti. Calceus invece era uno stivaletto fatto sopra forma così per il piè destro, come per il sinistro, in maniera da coprire interamente il piede, a differenza dei sandali e delle pianelle che non ne coprivano se non solo una porzione. Come poi vediamo pur oggidì usarsi dalle nostre signore, aggiungere tacco a tacco per render alta la persona; così per le Romane, ad esempio delle Greche, invece d’una, usavano di due e tre suole, onde la solea pigliava allora il nome di fulmenia, sincope di fulcimenia. Di queste duplici e triplici suole giovavansi inoltre, come faremmo noi adesso, per difenderci dalla umidità. V’era il calceus patricius che portavano i senatori, di qualità diversa da quella degli altri cittadini; di dove la frase di Cicerone calceos mutare[301], per significare che alcuno diventava senatore, e s’allacciavano con istringhe che s’incrociavano sul collo del piede e poi s’avvolgevano attorno alla gamba sino al principio del polpaccio; il calceus repandus, scarpa con una larga punta ricurva in su o indietro. — Calceamentum e calceamen erano poi termini generici per esprimere ogni maniera di copertura del piede. Da obstragulum, che era quella striscia di cuojo o correggia con cui la crepida si allacciava attorno al piede e che passava tra il pollice e il dito vicino e che da persone affettate si portava talora tempestata di perle, come lasciò Plinio ricordato[302], derivò obstrigillum, ch’era una particolare sorta di scarpa, che aveva i quartieri, per i laccetti, cuciti alla suola da ciascun lato. Di queste scarpe se n’ha esempio in una pittura pompejana. Sandalum era una pantufola squisitamente ornata, che portata dalle donne greche, venne poi introdotta dalle signore di Roma. Pare che
- 62. fosse d’una forma intermedia tra il calceolus e la solea, avendo un suolo ed un tomajo sopra le dita e la parte davanti del piede, ma lasciando scoverte le calcagna e la parte di dietro, come una pantufola nostra. Finalmente v’era la solea, della forma più semplice del sandalum, consisteva in una semplice suola sotto la pianta del piede, legata con un correggiuolo attraverso il collo del piede stesso, come a un dipresso sono i sandali degli odierni cappuccini e si portava da ambo i sessi. V’era poi la solea spartea, o stivale fatto di ginestra spagnuola, ma non era ad uso degli uomini, ma delle bestie da soma, a proteggere i loro piedi quando malati. La solea tuttavia non si portava fuori di casa: altrimenti sarebbe stata sconveniente o indizio di affettazione o di moda straniera, come avvertì Seneca ed anche Cicerone[303]. Perones, Sculponeæ e Soleæ ligneæ, erano nomi con cui si designavano i sandali e scarpe da famigli. I primi due indicavano calzari fatti di cuojo; le soleæ ligneæ erano, come esprime il loro aggettivo, di legno. E qui s’arresta la mia erudizione in fatto di calzoleria romana e pompejana. Non però di quanto riguarda l’arte del coriarius, o cuojajo, perocchè ad essa spettassero quelle altre opere che or si direbbero da sellajo. Mi sbrigherò a dirne, sommariamente, ricordandone le sole denominazioni de’ relativi arnesi. Lorea si chiamavano le briglie, o corregge; le redini più propriamente dicevansi habenæ; capistrum la cavezza, ma più precisamente quella dell’asino; helcia, i tiragli, co’ quali cavalli o asini si attaccavano al timone; erano essi o lorata, o spartea, o cannabina; stragula, la fornitura, ephippia, la sella; clitellæ, il basto; soleæ, le staffe. E poichè avviene di ricordare tanti oggetti di selleria, porgo qui le denominazioni di juga lignea, o gioghi per appajare i buoi; oreæ, il
- 63. morso; frenum, il freno; murices, lupi, lupata si chiamavano altri freni di ferro asprissimi, atti a diverse nature di giumenti. Or passiamo alla ricerca delle altre taberne che coi loro prodotti contribuivano al vestimento, o piuttosto alla varietà e mantenimento di esso. Presso la casa di Olconio eravi una bottega da tintore, che i latini chiamavano taberna offectoris, perchè, secondo spiega Pompeo Festo, colorum infectoris. Distinguevansi, secondo lo stesso scrittore, gli offectores dagli infectores: questi erano qui alienum colorem in lanam conjiciunt: offectores qui proprio colori novum officiunt[304]. Nulla in questa bottega si rinvenne di particolare: nel fondo di essa eravi il laboratorio, con un fornello e vasche rivestite di cemento assai duro, ma pur guasto evidentemente dagli acidi che venivano usati nel tingere. Nè io di più mi vi soffermerò, da che egual materia mi chiami a più largamente trattare della Fullonica. L’arte dei fulloni, che Plinio vuole sia stata trovata da Nicia megarese, consisteva nel purgare, lavare ed anche tingere i panni. Trattando dell’edificio di Eumachia nel Capitolo XI di quest’opera, ho già fatto un rapido cenno dell’importanza di quest’arte in Pompei, che vi aveva anzi una speciale corporazione. Che una congenere vi fosse anche in Roma lo si raccoglie dalle Inscriptiones publicate dal Fabbretti, ricordando come quel collegio litigasse assai lungamente a proposito delle fontane[305]. Infatti non poteva a meno che essere numerosa la classe de’ folloni, per la necessità che dell’arte loro sentivasi per la politura delle vestimenta. Riccio ne dà informazioni dei folloni, da cui rivelasi come di essi si giovasse allora come adesso noi de’ nostri lavandaj e cavamacchie per rinettare ed imbiancare gli abiti, dopo averli portati, effetto che ottenevano col pestare co’ piedi i panni in larghe tinozze di acqua mischiata con orina e terra di Sardegna. I nostri cavamacchia di presente vi sostituiscono l’ammoniaca. Allora, onde procacciarsi tanta materia quanta ne bastasse all’uopo, ponevansi vasi agli angoli delle Vie, come già notai nel Capitolo appunto che tratta delle Vie; onde aveva
- 64. ragione Marziale di mordere la puzzolente Taide, dicendola più fetida del vaso d’un follone: Tam male Thais olet, quam non fullonis avari Testa vetus, media sed modo fracta via[306]. Il panno così lavato e netto distendevasi sulla cavea viminea, o graticcio semicircolare, con sottoposta fumigazione di zolfo, come si deduce da un passo di Apulejo[307]; dopo di che passava al cardatore, che col cardo fullonicus, vi risollevava il pelo, d’onde poi mettevasi allo strettojo per quella che or direbbesi cilindratura. Fin dall’anno 354 di Roma, la legge fatta dal Censore Flaminio, riferita da Plinio, aveva prescritta una maniera in parte diversa dall’or detta, con cui i folloni dovevano condursi per ben eseguire il loro lavoro. Così si esprimeva: «Si lavin dapprima le stofe di lana colla terra di Sardegna disciolta; si faccia quindi una fumigazione di zolfo, poi si purghi con terra di Cimolo, di buon colore, riconoscendosi la falsa in ciò che lo zolfo si rode e s’annerisce. La vera terra di Cimolo ravviva i colori impalliditi dal zolfo. La terra chiamata saxum è la più conveniente alle stofe bianche quand’esse sono state solforate: esso è però nocevole alle stofe colorate. In Grecia in luogo della terra di Cimolo, si serviva del gesso tinfaico di Etolia.» L’antica Fullonica di Pompei era sulla Via di Mercurio e riusciva su quella a cui essa medesima diè il nome: la sua pianta chiarisce l’importanza di questo stabilimento scoperto e sterrato negli anni 1835 e 1836. È una grand’area, chiusa da tre lati da largo portico fiancheggiato da pilastri con archi. In fondo della corte si trovano quattro bacini alti, ma alquanto inclinati per lo scolo delle acque e dinnanzi ad essi un lungo banco di pietra, all’estremità del quale disposti due altri piccoli bacini e muricciuoli sono per collocarvi le vaschette. Era qui che si imbiancavano le stofe. All’ingiro de’ portici eran le camere dei folloni: il proprietario doveva alloggiare nell’appartamento più distinto. Vi si rinvenne un forno co’ suoi accessorj. Il piano superiore doveva avere
- 65. delle gallerie coperte; le colonne di esse caddero indubbiamente nell’occasione dei cataclisma. Una fontana elegantissima di marmo, dei pozzi con condotti esterni dovevano somministrare ai bacini e vasche dei lavoratori acqua in abbondanza. Presso alla fontana vi son pitture su d’un pilastro che or sta al Museo, rappresentante le operazioni diverse de’ folloni. In colori ancor vivi veggonsi quattro giovani operai che colle gambe nude pestano in altrettante conche i panni, cui per tal modo tolgono il sucidiume. Più su si vede uno schiavo che reca un utensile per disseccare i drappi: un altro è occupato a passare il cardo fullonicus di ferro su di un drappo sospeso. Sull’altro lato del pilastro è figurato uno strettojo ornato di ghirlande; poi una bella dama che sembra dar degli ordini ad una donna e ad uno schiavo e presso a loro sono distese delle stofe a disseccare. Sul pilastro vicino è dipinto un altare, fiancheggiato da due serpenti, un Bacco ed un Apollo. Si ritrovò nello stabilimento di questa Fullonica molto sapone, lutus fullonicus, parecchi vasi pieni di calce, delle caldaje e delle mestole per rivolgere il sapone e lavorarlo. In un ripostiglio si rinvennero cinque vasi di vetro, l’uno contenente un liquore che si disperse per inavvertenza, un altro contenente un succo vegetale con olio e un terzo contenente delle olive, galleggianti nell’olio, d’una conservazione prodigiosa. Taluna di queste olive serbavano ancora il picciuolo ed apparivan sì recenti, che sembravan raccolte di fresco. Per Nuova Fullonica si designa un vasto edificio sull’angolo del Vicolo della Maschera e si trovarono infatti molti fornelli ricoperti di piombo e vasche rivestite di cemento; ma Bréton si domanda: se non sia piuttosto una lavanderia più importante di quelle che per tali vennero denominate, e si dichiara disposto ad accogliere questa seconda supposizione. Dopo le Fulloniche, occupiamoci delle due fabbriche di sapone che si trovarono finora: l’una nel 1788 presso al mercante di pesci salati, e nella bottega si vide molto sapone per terra ed anche molta calce di buona qualità, ma impietrita. In un’altra camera attigua vi erano sette vasche a livello del suolo per la fabbricazione; l’altra nella Via
- 66. degli Augustali, sull’angolo della viottola, che nulla offrì di rimarchevole, all’infuori d’un gran forno diroccato. Una importante corporazione erano in Pompei gli orefici, aurifices: essi abbiamo già veduto nel Capitolo Quarto come in una iscrizione pregassero ad essi propizio l’edile Cajo Cuspio Pansa, e pur senza di questa particolarità, le mille preziosità d’oro raccolte negli scavi e l’eleganza dei lavori, imporrebbero di aggiungere loro la massima riputazione. Collane, monili baccati o di pallottole vermiglie, braccialetti, orecchini, sigilli, falere, anelli e cento altre bazzicature muliebri, sono tutte eseguite col gusto più squisito e l’arte moderna ha ritratto da quegli oggetti molti esemplari alle proprie produzioni. Vi si facevano anche dagli orefici oggetti da toletta, istromenti pei sagrifici, statuette di numi e massime di lari, pàtere, coppe, utensili ed altre moltissime cose, delle quali il Museo Nazionale di Napoli ribocca e va fra i Musei del mondo ammiratissimo. E sì leggiadre cose eseguivansi dalla oreficeria di allora, che a rigore avrebbesi da me dovuto riserbarne la parola al capitolo vegnente, che s’intratterrà dell’Arti. E lodatissimi artisti si ricordarono dalle storie, di origine greca, o non mai usciti di Grecia, le opere de’ quali erano ricercatissime in Italia. Così ci giunse la fama di un Pasitele, che non metteva mano a nessun lavoro d’importanza senza prima averne abozzato il modello in argilla od in cera, conformemente al metodo raccomandato da Lisippo. Di lui si vantò assaissimo la perfezione di un piccolo gruppo d’argento da lui condotto, il quale rappresentava Roscio bambino lattante e la sua nutrice, che fremeva nello scorgerlo avvolto fra le spire di un serpente nella sua culla. Zopiro, altro orefice di non minore celebrità, non uscì mai di Grecia: ma di lui Plinio ci lasciò descritte due tazze d’argento, nelle quali aveva dimostrata la sua rara valentía: su l’una veggonsi Oreste uccisore della madre, ed accusato di tale delitto da Erigone innanzi all’Areopago, su l’altra lo stesso Oreste assolto da quell’augusto tribunale, per l’intervento di Minerva, che opponendosi alla fatale sentenza, gli accordava il proprio suffragio.
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