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Do you...
●
have an User Account on any Computer?
●
visit unknown web-links from any search
engine?
●
host a Web Service?
●
use a Proxy?
●
log-in to your Web based accounts?
●
use any Web Service?
●
access any private data?
You are InSecure if you don't...
●
apply security policies over your User Account.
●
use patched Web Browsers.
●
use Intrusion Detection System.
●
use trusted SSL Proxy.
●
log-in to your Web Accounts over encrypted
connection.
●
use Firewall.
●
delete and format your storage
media.
You are InSecure
Even if you do
all this.
InSecurity
In Security
Security is just maintained, it's never achieved.
By : (m0727) Abhishek Kumar
Guide : Mr. Ramdas N. Karmali
O.S. User Account Log-In
● O.S. strongly encrypts the user password
to hash.
● These hashes are stored in files with
highly restricted user rights.
O.S. User Account Log-In
( Active Mode ) :: Hacks ::
Hackers have tools:
● Live Boot Discs to steal Password-Hash files
(otherwise inaccessible).
● Tool “John-The-Ripper” can try cracking
passwords by matching hash of guessed
passwords.
● Tool “Rainbow Crack” and “OPHCrack”
have precomputed hash tables of
several passwords to match the
hash in the stolen password file.
O.S. User Account Log-In
( Passive Mode ) :: Bypass ::
Cracking password consumes a lot of time against
strong passwords.
Hackers have tools:
● Grub/Lilo (Unix/Linux)
● Kon-Boot (Windows, Unix/Linux)
● Keyboard (Macintosh only)
Visiting Unknown Websites
:: SmbEnum ::
Reconnaissance via simple HTML Web Page
● IE supports “file://” and “res://” protocol for
accessing local machine resources' URI.
● Firefox has also started support for a similar
“resource://” protocol.
● Javascript can use these protocols to
enumerate resources.
● Could gather User Names using Brute Force.
● e.g. if “file:///c:/oracle/ora81/bin/
orclcontainer.bmp” loads, means
“Oracle 8” is present on system.
Visiting Unknown Websites
:: Res Timing Attack- ::
The 'res(ource)://' protocol hack using CPU Cycles.
● An attacker can even get resources to
execute on your machine.
● Could measure CPU Cycles for resource
enumeration, the CPU cycle count for
existing resources is almost twice the CPU
cycle count for non-existing resources.
● Could even exhaust Victim's machine
by generating infinite CPU cycles.
Hosting Vulnerable Web Server
:: Slowloris ::
The slow HTTP Denial-of-Service Attack..
● It's a stealth-mode attack.
● Allows single machine to attack Web-Server
with minimal bandwidth.
● Uses Partial HTTP Connections to keep Web
Server sockets busy, and slowly consumes
all the sockets.
● It works successfully over Apache 1.x,
Apache 2.x, dhttpd, GoAhead,
WebSense, etc. but fails against
IIS 6.0, IIS 7.0, lighttpd, squid,
nginx, etc.
:: Sidejacking ::
Intercept and Hijack an engaged web session.
● Websites protect against sniffing of
passwords by encrypting the log-in
mechanism, and create a session for further
authenticated access.
● But after log-in, if this Session Information is
transferred in plain-text, it can be sniffed.
● Attackers sniff this session information and
use them to replicate the required cookies or
session state managing file.
● Now, an user can access the same
Account without knowing the password.
:: DeAnonymize Proxy ::
Trojan infected proxy tools are the problem.
● Onion Proxy is one of the best Anonymizer.
● TOR works on it, using a chain of random
proxy servers between the entry node and
the exit node.
● According to Research, several TOR exit
clients are Trojan-infected, sniffing all the
sensitive data passed.
● e.g. doing a Reverse DNS Lookup
on POP3 packets and harvesting
usernames and passwords.
Protector Of Protocols
:: SSL (Secure Socket Layer) ::
Faulty Design and Poor Implementation.
● Earlier it allowed any Digital Certificate
Owner to sign any Digital Certificate (e.g.
haxor.com can sign certificate for paypal.com
and use itself)
● It was patched by specifying signing
authority field in Digital Certificate
● If attacker send a forged certificate with
expired validity date, several
applications ask for date confirmation
and perform no more checks
for certificate validation.
Defeating SSL
:: SSL Stripping Attack ::
Poor Implementation is an easy hack.
● Default behaviour of maximum Websites is
non-SSL. SSL is implemented by Redirecting
to a SSL Link or let user click the SSL
Service link.
● e.g. opening Facebook.com, opens
http://www.Facebook.com, here log-in button
has https:// link for SSL based Log-in.
● Attacker can modify webpage replacing
https://login link to http://login link
● Now log-in credentials transfer in
plain-text mode, thus they can be sniffed.
Defeating SSL
::SSL Digital Certificate Mod Attack::
Faulty Design is hard to find, best to exploit.
● Authority grants a digital certificate to an
organisation Y.org for all sub-domains it asks
say X.Y.org, irrespective of value of X.
● If X is “www.PayPal.com0”, then too it issues
the certificate to Y.org
for www.PayPal.com0Y.org.
Defeating SSL
::SSL Digital Certificate Mod Attack::
Null Character Insertion (except WebKit, Opera)
www.PayPal.com0Y.org get stored in a String
and read back only as www.PayPal.com0 .
Null Character Escape (for WebKit, Opera)
www.Pay0Pal.com0 get stored in a String and
read back only as www.PayPal.com0 .
Wildcard ('*', '|') Match
Matching several website certificates
at once.
Defeating SSL's Security
Certificate Revocation
Uses OCSP (Online CertificateRevocation Policy)
with two fields ResponseStatus and
ResonseBytes (with signature).
Setting “ResponseStatus=3” for “Try Later” has
no ResponseBytes, so no signature and hence the
victim does not see any effect of the attack.
Software Updates
Software Updates also work over SSL
channel, which is already compromised.
:: DNS ::
The base of all Network Services is Vulnerable.
● Man-in-the-Middle attack are a major threat
to DNS.
● DNS Cache Poisoning is possible even if
machines are behind a Firewall.
When DNS queries about IP of any Domain,
attacker spoofs as one of domain's
NameServer and answers a specially crafted
response making the Victim record the
attacker's IP for requested Domain.
Security over DNS
:: DNSSEC ::
Does not fulfill the basic requirement of Security.
● It provides Origin Authentication, Integrity
Protection, PKI, and even authenticated
denial of existence of data.
● But no Confidentiality, and confidentiality is
one of the fundamental requirement of
Security.
● DNS NameServer Enumeration is much
deeper because of 'DNS
Query Espionage'.
● CPU Flooding is possible as it uses
exhaustive encryption/decryption.
Forensic eXpert Hackers
:: Data Stealing ::
You loaded it in Main Memory, Hackers stole it.
●
Data Carving.
●
Cold Boot Attack.
●
Imaging RAM.
●
Dig Information from O.S.
●
Dig information from Files.
●
Timestomp.
:: Countermeasures :: #1
O.S. User Account Log-in Hack/Bypass
● Restrict any kind of physical access to your
machine, nothing else can counter it.
RES-Timing and SMBEnum Attack
● Turning off Javascript is a partial solution,
victim is vulnerable till correct patches are
provided by Microsoft and Mozilla.
Slowloris Attack
● Applying patches to Web Servers &
IDSes, but no optimal patch is
available.
:: Countermeasures :: #2
SideJacking
● Use private secure VPN.
● Don't log-in at any Public Hotspot.
DeAnonymize Proxy
● Use your own encryption channel for data
exchange over proxy.
Defeating SSL
● Use secure proxy channel.
● Check URL in Certificate with one
in Address Bar, do a WHOIS on
both & match them.
:: Countermeasures :: #3
DNSSEC Vulnerabilities
● Use static address mapping for important
domains.
● Use DNSCurve instead of DNSSEC.
Forensic eXpert Hackers
● Encrypt your content or even entire disc.
● Apply 'Secure Recursive Delete' on
sensitive data.
● Use ZipBomb to trouble the Hacker.
Conclusion
Security is just maintained, it's never achieved.
So keep track of latest vulnerabilities and start/stop
using resources based on them.
Refer sites like SecurityFocus.com, CERT.org/vuls,
updates.ZDNet.com/tags/security. html, etc.
Most of the Insecurity In Security comes
from badly written piece of code and we
have only careless developers to thank
for them.
Reference
I referred to the work of :
Thorkill (piotrbania, KryptosLogic)
Billy Rios (Security Engg., Verisign)
Robert Hansen (SecTheory)
Joshua 'Jabber' Abraham (Rapid7)
Robert Graham (Errata Security)
Moxy Marlinspike (ThoughtCrime)
Dan Kaminsky (Director, IOActive)
Adrian Crenshaw (InfoSec Enthu)
Presentaions from:
● BlackHat 2009
● DefCon 17
● DefCon 16
Queries...
?
My Crime is that of Curosity.
My Crime is of Judging people by what they say and think,
And not by what they look like.
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Insecurity-In-Security version.1 (2010)

  • 1. Do you... ● have an User Account on any Computer? ● visit unknown web-links from any search engine? ● host a Web Service? ● use a Proxy? ● log-in to your Web based accounts? ● use any Web Service? ● access any private data?
  • 2. You are InSecure if you don't... ● apply security policies over your User Account. ● use patched Web Browsers. ● use Intrusion Detection System. ● use trusted SSL Proxy. ● log-in to your Web Accounts over encrypted connection. ● use Firewall. ● delete and format your storage media.
  • 3. You are InSecure Even if you do all this.
  • 4. InSecurity In Security Security is just maintained, it's never achieved. By : (m0727) Abhishek Kumar Guide : Mr. Ramdas N. Karmali
  • 5. O.S. User Account Log-In ● O.S. strongly encrypts the user password to hash. ● These hashes are stored in files with highly restricted user rights.
  • 6. O.S. User Account Log-In ( Active Mode ) :: Hacks :: Hackers have tools: ● Live Boot Discs to steal Password-Hash files (otherwise inaccessible). ● Tool “John-The-Ripper” can try cracking passwords by matching hash of guessed passwords. ● Tool “Rainbow Crack” and “OPHCrack” have precomputed hash tables of several passwords to match the hash in the stolen password file.
  • 7. O.S. User Account Log-In ( Passive Mode ) :: Bypass :: Cracking password consumes a lot of time against strong passwords. Hackers have tools: ● Grub/Lilo (Unix/Linux) ● Kon-Boot (Windows, Unix/Linux) ● Keyboard (Macintosh only)
  • 8. Visiting Unknown Websites :: SmbEnum :: Reconnaissance via simple HTML Web Page ● IE supports “file://” and “res://” protocol for accessing local machine resources' URI. ● Firefox has also started support for a similar “resource://” protocol. ● Javascript can use these protocols to enumerate resources. ● Could gather User Names using Brute Force. ● e.g. if “file:///c:/oracle/ora81/bin/ orclcontainer.bmp” loads, means “Oracle 8” is present on system.
  • 9. Visiting Unknown Websites :: Res Timing Attack- :: The 'res(ource)://' protocol hack using CPU Cycles. ● An attacker can even get resources to execute on your machine. ● Could measure CPU Cycles for resource enumeration, the CPU cycle count for existing resources is almost twice the CPU cycle count for non-existing resources. ● Could even exhaust Victim's machine by generating infinite CPU cycles.
  • 10. Hosting Vulnerable Web Server :: Slowloris :: The slow HTTP Denial-of-Service Attack.. ● It's a stealth-mode attack. ● Allows single machine to attack Web-Server with minimal bandwidth. ● Uses Partial HTTP Connections to keep Web Server sockets busy, and slowly consumes all the sockets. ● It works successfully over Apache 1.x, Apache 2.x, dhttpd, GoAhead, WebSense, etc. but fails against IIS 6.0, IIS 7.0, lighttpd, squid, nginx, etc.
  • 11. :: Sidejacking :: Intercept and Hijack an engaged web session. ● Websites protect against sniffing of passwords by encrypting the log-in mechanism, and create a session for further authenticated access. ● But after log-in, if this Session Information is transferred in plain-text, it can be sniffed. ● Attackers sniff this session information and use them to replicate the required cookies or session state managing file. ● Now, an user can access the same Account without knowing the password.
  • 12. :: DeAnonymize Proxy :: Trojan infected proxy tools are the problem. ● Onion Proxy is one of the best Anonymizer. ● TOR works on it, using a chain of random proxy servers between the entry node and the exit node. ● According to Research, several TOR exit clients are Trojan-infected, sniffing all the sensitive data passed. ● e.g. doing a Reverse DNS Lookup on POP3 packets and harvesting usernames and passwords.
  • 13. Protector Of Protocols :: SSL (Secure Socket Layer) :: Faulty Design and Poor Implementation. ● Earlier it allowed any Digital Certificate Owner to sign any Digital Certificate (e.g. haxor.com can sign certificate for paypal.com and use itself) ● It was patched by specifying signing authority field in Digital Certificate ● If attacker send a forged certificate with expired validity date, several applications ask for date confirmation and perform no more checks for certificate validation.
  • 14. Defeating SSL :: SSL Stripping Attack :: Poor Implementation is an easy hack. ● Default behaviour of maximum Websites is non-SSL. SSL is implemented by Redirecting to a SSL Link or let user click the SSL Service link. ● e.g. opening Facebook.com, opens http://www.Facebook.com, here log-in button has https:// link for SSL based Log-in. ● Attacker can modify webpage replacing https://login link to http://login link ● Now log-in credentials transfer in plain-text mode, thus they can be sniffed.
  • 15. Defeating SSL ::SSL Digital Certificate Mod Attack:: Faulty Design is hard to find, best to exploit. ● Authority grants a digital certificate to an organisation Y.org for all sub-domains it asks say X.Y.org, irrespective of value of X. ● If X is “www.PayPal.com0”, then too it issues the certificate to Y.org for www.PayPal.com0Y.org.
  • 16. Defeating SSL ::SSL Digital Certificate Mod Attack:: Null Character Insertion (except WebKit, Opera) www.PayPal.com0Y.org get stored in a String and read back only as www.PayPal.com0 . Null Character Escape (for WebKit, Opera) www.Pay0Pal.com0 get stored in a String and read back only as www.PayPal.com0 . Wildcard ('*', '|') Match Matching several website certificates at once.
  • 17. Defeating SSL's Security Certificate Revocation Uses OCSP (Online CertificateRevocation Policy) with two fields ResponseStatus and ResonseBytes (with signature). Setting “ResponseStatus=3” for “Try Later” has no ResponseBytes, so no signature and hence the victim does not see any effect of the attack. Software Updates Software Updates also work over SSL channel, which is already compromised.
  • 18. :: DNS :: The base of all Network Services is Vulnerable. ● Man-in-the-Middle attack are a major threat to DNS. ● DNS Cache Poisoning is possible even if machines are behind a Firewall. When DNS queries about IP of any Domain, attacker spoofs as one of domain's NameServer and answers a specially crafted response making the Victim record the attacker's IP for requested Domain.
  • 19. Security over DNS :: DNSSEC :: Does not fulfill the basic requirement of Security. ● It provides Origin Authentication, Integrity Protection, PKI, and even authenticated denial of existence of data. ● But no Confidentiality, and confidentiality is one of the fundamental requirement of Security. ● DNS NameServer Enumeration is much deeper because of 'DNS Query Espionage'. ● CPU Flooding is possible as it uses exhaustive encryption/decryption.
  • 20. Forensic eXpert Hackers :: Data Stealing :: You loaded it in Main Memory, Hackers stole it. ● Data Carving. ● Cold Boot Attack. ● Imaging RAM. ● Dig Information from O.S. ● Dig information from Files. ● Timestomp.
  • 21. :: Countermeasures :: #1 O.S. User Account Log-in Hack/Bypass ● Restrict any kind of physical access to your machine, nothing else can counter it. RES-Timing and SMBEnum Attack ● Turning off Javascript is a partial solution, victim is vulnerable till correct patches are provided by Microsoft and Mozilla. Slowloris Attack ● Applying patches to Web Servers & IDSes, but no optimal patch is available.
  • 22. :: Countermeasures :: #2 SideJacking ● Use private secure VPN. ● Don't log-in at any Public Hotspot. DeAnonymize Proxy ● Use your own encryption channel for data exchange over proxy. Defeating SSL ● Use secure proxy channel. ● Check URL in Certificate with one in Address Bar, do a WHOIS on both & match them.
  • 23. :: Countermeasures :: #3 DNSSEC Vulnerabilities ● Use static address mapping for important domains. ● Use DNSCurve instead of DNSSEC. Forensic eXpert Hackers ● Encrypt your content or even entire disc. ● Apply 'Secure Recursive Delete' on sensitive data. ● Use ZipBomb to trouble the Hacker.
  • 24. Conclusion Security is just maintained, it's never achieved. So keep track of latest vulnerabilities and start/stop using resources based on them. Refer sites like SecurityFocus.com, CERT.org/vuls, updates.ZDNet.com/tags/security. html, etc. Most of the Insecurity In Security comes from badly written piece of code and we have only careless developers to thank for them.
  • 25. Reference I referred to the work of : Thorkill (piotrbania, KryptosLogic) Billy Rios (Security Engg., Verisign) Robert Hansen (SecTheory) Joshua 'Jabber' Abraham (Rapid7) Robert Graham (Errata Security) Moxy Marlinspike (ThoughtCrime) Dan Kaminsky (Director, IOActive) Adrian Crenshaw (InfoSec Enthu) Presentaions from: ● BlackHat 2009 ● DefCon 17 ● DefCon 16
  • 26. Queries... ? My Crime is that of Curosity. My Crime is of Judging people by what they say and think, And not by what they look like.