Investment Outlook 2016

Investment
Outlook
2016
Global Economy and Markets
Subdued growth, still low
inflation, moderate returns
Portfolio Review
Strategic asset allocation
health check
By the Numbers
Key long-term investment
trends in charts
Themes in Portfolios
Our most impactful
investment ideas in action
Risks 2016
Known and unknown
unknowns
Emerging Markets
What will drive
performance in 2016?
Liquidity Matters
Investment strategies as
markets become less liquid
Untapped Opportunities
How to identify “hidden
investment gems”

Table of Contents
Letter from the CEO 5
Foreword 6
Editorial 7
Spotlight
Subdued growth, still low inflation, moderate returns 10
Portfolio Review
Strategic asset allocation health check 20
By the Numbers
Key long-term investment trends in charts 24
Our most impactful investment ideas in action 30
Features
Risks 2016
Known and unknown unknowns 34
Emerging Markets
What will drive performance in 2016? 40
Liquidity Matters
Investment strategies as markets become less liquid 48
How to identify “hidden investment gems” 54

“Our people and resources at
Credit Suisse are focused on
providing the best stewardship
and advice we can for our
clients’ investments.”
It is a privilege for me to provide a foreword for the Investment Outlook
2016. Like every year, the Investment Outlook is the result of collaboration
by our teams across the bank.
We hope that this document, which provides an assessment of the risks
and uncertainties in today’s world and contains proposals for portfolio
strategies, will help you to make decisions as you are looking into 2016.
The following 12 months will most likely not be easy for investors.
We believe it is an important part of the value we bring to our customers
to help them navigate through today’s short-term challenges, to name
a few: uneven global growth, divergent monetary policies and the risk
of illiquidity in some markets. Through the Investment Outlook 2016, we
aim to identify strategies that meet a range of time horizons and cover
different risk profiles for our clients.
Our people and resources at Credit Suisse are focused on providing
the best stewardship and advice we can for our clients’ investments.
This document is evidence of our commitment and determination
to help you achieve your financial objectives for 2016 and beyond.
I wish you a successful and prosperous 2016.
Tidjane Thiam
CEO Credit Suisse AG
Letter from the CEO
Letter from the CEO 5

Through all the market traumas of recent years – the crises in Greece,
slowdown scares in China, US political gridlock, the collapse in oil prices,
the wars and the migrant flows – investors prepared to weather short-term
volatility have seen handsome returns on developed economy equities
since the depths of the financial crisis in 2008, with euro and US dollar
investors seeing only one modestly down year in 2011. There has also
been good performance from high yield and investment grade corporate
bonds, the laggards (since 2011) being investments connected to
commodities and emerging markets.
Our analysis, set out in this Outlook, suggests that 2016 may deliver
a fairly similar pattern. Temporary traumas could emanate from Federal
Reserve tightening, reduced bond liquidity, renewed growth scares in
China or geopolitics, but behind these is an underlying picture of ongoing
expansion. The global economy is neither pushed up against capacity
limits nor facing severe slack (except for commodities and energy),
banking systems are healthy and debt levels seem more amber than red.
Rapid growth seems unlikely, given aging populations (bar Africa and
India) and sharing economy technologies that do not generate much Gross
Domestic Product, but sensibly priced assets do not need a booming
economy to generate reasonable returns. At the time of writing (in late
2015), high yield and investment grade credits have spreads just above
their quarter-century averages, giving them scope to weather gradual
Fed tightening. Developed equities have valuations somewhat above
historic norms on a price-earnings basis, but not on a price-book basis,
and operational leverage (especially in the Eurozone) and consolidating
oil prices should allow earnings growth to move from last year’s negatives
into the mid- to high-single digits. In short, we think developed equities
and credits are well placed for another year of reasonable returns, with
the dollar likely to be strong again as the Fed leads the monetary cycle.
As for emerging markets, and the commodities on which many depend,
a convincing general recovery looks some time away, but there is scope
for some to move ahead of the pack, as discussed in a special article.
Of course there can always be risks that are not visible and Fed tightening
has a habit of teasing these out, although usually not within its first year.
But, equally, there could be upside surprises, if the USA finally moves
toward solutions on taxing repatriated corporate cash and infrastructure
spending or, more simply, the signals of rising confidence already visible in
US and European consumer surveys translate into faster spending.
We trust our readers will find the Investment Outlook 2016 to be
of considerable interest for the coming year.
Michael Strobaek
Global Chief Investment Officer
“Temporary traumas could
come from the Fed, lower
bond liquidity, China
or geopolitics. But the
underlying picture
is of global expansion.”
Michael StrobaekThomas Gottstein
Giles Keating
Foreword Editorial
I am delighted to present to you our Investment Outlook 2016.
Designed to help you successfully navigate the year ahead, this publication
brings you in-depth research insights on a wide range of topics, regions
and asset classes, underscoring our commitment to providing you with
timely and actionable investment ideas for your portfolio.
Drawing from our extensive global network, our team of experts has
compiled a carefully curated selection of articles focused on key aspects
of portfolio decision-making in 2016. We highlight our outlook for capital
markets globally, our views on strategic and tactical asset allocation, and
provide our unique take on the most pressing issues affecting investors
today, including key risk factors in 2016, liquidity and the future of
emerging markets.
I trust you will enjoy reading the Investment Outlook 2016 and will find it
to be an extremely useful tool to help you separate market signals from
noise, especially in our information-saturated investment world.
We remain steadfast on anticipating and reacting quickly to developments
in the global economy and capital markets, and, as always, stay dedicated
to providing you with superior solutions, products and advisory services.
We will complement the rich content of this publication in the coming
months with exclusive Market Outlook seminars across the region.
Sincerely,
Thomas Gottstein
Head of Swiss Universal Bank
“We remain steadfast on
anticipating and reacting
quickly to developments
in the global economy
and capital markets.”
Giles Keating
Deputy Global Chief
Investment Officer
6 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Foreword/Editorial 7

Spotlight Global Economy and Markets
Portfolio Review
health check
By the Numbers
trends in charts
Our most impactful investment
ideas in action

Oliver Adler
Head of Economic Research
Joe Prendergast
Head of Financial Markets Analysis
John Woods
CIO Asia Pacific
Anja Hochberg
CIO Europe Switzerland
Michael O’Sullivan
CIO UK EEMEA
Most developed economies are likely to exhibit trend-like
growth in 2016, while in many emerging countries, the
adjustment of domestic and external imbalances is likely
to continue to depress growth. The resulting subdued
picture for global growth suggests that inflation will
generally remain low. With the US Federal Reserve
gradually hiking rates, core government bonds are likely
to generate meager returns. We foresee better, albeit
moderate returns for credit and equities, and believe
the US dollar will make further gains.
At the beginning of 2015, our forecast for real global growth
stood at close to 3.5%, but we gradually had to lower this
to below 3% (using purchasing power parity weights). Factors
weighing on growth include both long-term forces such
as demographics and also the short- to medium-term impact
of tighter policies and deleveraging in emerging markets
in response to previous credit excesses. Slower growth has
continued to exert downward pressure on commodity prices,
with additional disruptive effects for some countries that rely
on raw material exports.
10 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Global Economy and Markets 11

by improving labor supply. In contrast, growth has been stronger
than expected in Switzerland over the past years due to strong
immigration, but that is likely to abate over coming years.
Possibly more surprising has been the marked downtrend
in labor force participation, notably in the USA, as a result
of the retirement of the baby-boom generation and reduced
female participation. Until these retirement “waves” abate, US
trend growth is likely to decline to somewhere around 2%.
Meanwhile, the Japanese government is trying to raise labor
force participation of women to boost growth, but the impact
will probably be limited because the participation rate is not that
low. In some countries, such as Italy, measures to liberalize the
labor markets may be more successful in that regard.
Demographic transition has reached
emerging economies
Emerging markets are facing demographic challenges too,
especially China, whose population will probably peak at
the end of this decade and where working-age population
is already declining. The decision by the 5th plenum of the
Communist Party in October 2015 to abolish the one-child
policy will at best affect that trend within about a generation.
More decisive for the growth trend in the next decade will
be whether labor productivity can be maintained, or even
increased by guiding labor from lower to higher productivity
areas, and through reforms which improve efficiency. In
other parts of the emerging world, notably in many Latin
American countries, demographic factors will also be much
less supportive than in past decades. Turkey and parts of
the Middle East are in a less unfavorable position as regards
demographics, while India and most of Africa will see a
continued rise in population in the coming decades.
Weak productivity growth due to restrained
investment spending
An apparent second structural trend, less definitive than the
demographics, has been the marked slowdown in productivity
growth in most economies in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
This has persisted even as the economic recovery took hold in
the United States and other developed markets.
Weak productivity growth seems to largely reflect a downshift
in corporate investment spending since the crisis, although other
forces such as the rise of sharing economy activities not fully
measured within GDP may play a role. There are some factors
suggesting that these trends may persist, including the continued
shift to a services-based economy where the capital-labor ratio
is by its nature lower. Rapid advances in IT and the spreading
of low-cost internet-based services are likely to reduce needed
investment volumes as well. In China, overcapacity in some
sectors may also restrain investment spending.
In our 2016 forecast (see Table 1), we have tried to take
account of the slower long-term growth trend, while assessing
to what extent the fallout of the shorter-term forces will either
persist or reverse.
Trend changes: Declining labor force and reduced
participation in developed markets
The most important demographic trend has been a slowing
growth rate and in some cases an actual decline in the
working-age population in developed markets. This is most
apparent in Japan and is also visible in some European
countries, notably Germany. However, here the cyclical
recovery has been stronger than expected and, over the next
year or two, the significant influx of refugees could boost
growth, first via the necessary expenditure and then
GDP Inflation GDP Inflation
2014 2015E 2016E 2014 2015E 2016E 2014 2015E 2016E 2014 2015E 2016E
Global 3.2 2.9 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.6 Non-Japan Asia 6.3 6.0 6.1 3.2 2.4 3.0
G-3 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.3 0.2 1.5 China 7.4 7.1 7.0 2.0 1.5 2.1
BRIC 6.0 5.0 5.7 4.1 4.4 3.9 Hong Kong 2.3 2.6 3.0 4.3 3.5 3.2
EM-8 5.8 5.3 5.6 3.9 3.4 3.7 India (fiscal year) 7.4 6.9 7.3 7.0 5.4 6.0
USA 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.6 0.1 1.9 Indonesia 5.0 4.7 5.1 6.3 6.7 5.2
Canada 2.4 1.2 1.6 1.9 1.2 2.2 South Korea 3.3 2.6 3.1 1.3 0.8 2.0
Eurozone 0.9 1.5 1.7 0.4 0.1 1.0 Singapore 2.9 1.8 2.1 1.0 -0.5 0.6
Germany 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.8 0.2 1.1 Thailand 1.0 2.5 3.0 1.9 -0.5 2.0
Italy -0.4 0.7 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.7 CEE Russia 1.3 -0.6 1.7 6.4 10.6 6.1
France 0.2 1.1 1.3 0.6 0.2 1.1 Poland 3.5 3.5 3.5 0.0 -0.5 1.3
Spain 1.4 2.9 2.7 -0.2 -0.4 1.0 Russia 0.6 -3.5 0.5 7.8 15.4 7.5
United Kingdom 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.5 0.1 1.2 Turkey 2.9 3.2 2.8 8.9 7.7 7.2
Norway 2.2 1.2 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 Latin America 1.1 -0.5 0.7 11.3 16.3 18.1
Sweden 2.3 2.7 2.7 -0.2 0.3 1.6 Argentina 0.5 0.5 0.8 32.5 25.0 28.0
Switzerland 2.0 0.8 1.2 0.0 0.0 Brazil 0.1 -3.2 -1.2 6.3 8.8 6.4
Japan-Pacific 0.5 0.8 1.4 2.6 1.0 1.3 Mexico 2.1 2.6 3.0 4.0 2.7 3.5
Japan -0.1 0.5 1.1 2.7 0.9 1.0 Middle East Africa 3.2 3.1 3.0 5.1 5.6 5.7
Australia 2.7 2.2 2.4 2.5 1.8 2.3 GCC 3.4 3.4 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.4
New Zealand 3.3 2.3 2.4 1.2 0.5 1.9 South Africa 1.5 1.5 1.8 6.1 4.8 6.0
G-3: EMU, Japan, USA. EM-8: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, Turkey and South Africa.
GCC: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE. Regional figures are PPP-weighted.
Source: Datastream, Credit Suisse
Figure 1
Share of working-age population (15–64 years old; 1970=100)
Figure 2
Productivity growth in selected countries (YoY in %)
“Fed tightening suggests meager
returns on US Treasuries.”
Joe Prendergast
“In the USA, weak productivity may
partly reflect poor measurement
of the sharing economy.”
Oliver Adler
Table 1
Forecasts for growth and inflation
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
EM Asia ex China
India
Brazil
China
Switzerland
Germany
Japan
United States
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Source: United Nations, Credit Suisse
Share of working-age population (15–64 years old)
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
China (rhs)
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
UK
Switzerland
Eurozone
Australia
Canada
USA
Japan
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Source: OECD, Oxford Economics
Labor productivity growth YoY
Last data point: 2015 (E) Last data point: 2015
Source: OECD, Credit Suisse

The shocks: Emerging Market slowdown, commodity
price decline and financial stress
On top of these secular trends, a series of economic shocks
has slowed economic growth in the past 2–3 years: the
second leg of the Greece-triggered crisis led to recession
in the Eurozone in 2012–13, the “taper tantrum” in the US
Treasury market probably slowed growth in H2 2013, and the
Ukraine crisis set back European growth in mid-2014. Going
into 2015, the weakness in oil and commodity prices, and the
slowdown in China were arguably the main factors slowing
global, and especially emerging markets, growth.
The weakness in raw material and energy prices generated
real income gains for commodity consumers and lowered input
costs for industry in countries where currencies were more
or less stable. But on the other side of the ledger, it resulted
in significant income losses for many commodity-exporting
countries, both in emerging markets and developed markets.
Financial stress is still the risk case
The risk case is that weak growth, high debt, high local interest
rates and capital outflows, at a time when the Fed is starting
to raise US rates, leads to a full-fledged financial crisis in some
of the fragile emerging markets. But we think this is unlikely
because, compared to previous times of crisis, external debt
of governments is generally low, foreign exchange reserves are
high and monetary policy is focused on maintaining financial
stability. Continued financial vulnerabilities will, however, tend
to delay the easing of monetary policy in these countries that
would be necessary to boost growth.
Asia Pacific economies: Growth sustained as China’s
consumers, services and policy offset weak industry
In contrast to emerging markets with fragile external financial
positions, China’s trade and current account balance moved
back into significant surplus in 2015, largely due to lower
imports. Meanwhile, exports have been weak due to lackluster
external demand and the rising real exchange rate appreciation,
causing overcapacity in some industries. And, the post-crisis
construction boom led to slack in residential real estate.
In response, the Chinese authorities have gradually eased
policies, excess real estate inventory has been reduced, and
prices have stabilized or risen. Looking into 2016, with demand
for urban labor strong and wages rising at high single digits,
consumer spending – especially on services – should
in our view allow GDP to grow at around the government’s
target of close to 7%. Moderate fiscal expansion will be an
added stabilizing force. Overall, given its financial strength, we
continue to regard a “hard landing” of the Chinese economy as
unlikely, although domestic demand seems insufficient to boost
growth in APAC or other emerging markets much beyond
recent subdued rates.
Imbalances largely corrected in advanced economies
On the whole, our outlook for the majority of developed
markets is more settled, because imbalances generally appear
more limited. Fiscal deficits have declined markedly since the
global financial and euro crises, reducing financial vulnerability
and even opening some space for moderate fiscal easing. This
is most clearly the case in Germany and the USA, but the likely
persistence of extremely low borrowing costs should even give
countries such as Italy some fiscal breathing space. Also, low
This, in turn, lowered their demand for industrial goods from
China and elsewhere. Moreover, currencies of these countries
depreciated sharply, further undermining their purchasing
power. In some cases, most notably Brazil, the depreciation
set off a vicious cycle in which the drop in the currency
boosted inflation, triggered monetary tightening and led to
financial stress. The higher interest rates combined with weak
currencies raised doubts over the sustainability of domestic
as well as hard currency-denominated debt.
Emerging market rebalancing process has advanced
Commodity exporters and others faced with income losses and
currency depreciation have reduced their imports. Combined
with improving exports, this has led to an improvement in
current accounts across most emerging markets, reducing their
reliance on capital inflows. But the improvement seems to be
insufficient in a number of countries, including Brazil, Turkey,
South Africa and Indonesia. In these countries, central banks
will need to maintain a fairly tight stance. High structural fiscal
deficits have also significantly reduced the external surplus of
major oil exporters Russia and Saudi Arabia.
energy prices, low borrowing costs and better capitalized banks
should support consumer spending and real estate markets.
Corporate investment is likely to remain a weak point, but
momentum is unlikely to deteriorate.
Further acceleration in continental Europe and Japan,
USA stops accelerating, Australia and Canada sub-par
Among developed markets, we believe momentum will remain
strongest in continental Europe because of the potential for
consumers to boost their spending with monetary policy and
the weak currency being supportive. Much of Eastern Europe
remains competitive due to low wage costs and will benefit
from the improvement in Western Europe. In Greece, bank
recapitalization, easing capital controls, and funds from the
Juncker plan suggest potential for a strong turnaround.
The UK is also likely to remain on a fairly robust expansion
path as real wages rise, but policy tightening will provide
some constraint. We also do not expect the US economy
to accelerate further in 2016, as gradual monetary tightening,
a stronger US dollar and reduced labor market slack act as
constraints. Given some fiscal easing and a cautious Fed,
the risk of a sharper slowdown, or even recession, seems
very limited.
Meanwhile, growth in Japan should rise from low levels as
the negative impact of the Chinese growth slowdown abates,
the yen stabilizes at competitive levels, wages rise and
corporate investment improves slightly. The Trans Pacific
Partnership (TPP) would, if implemented, support the economy
in principle, but the effects are likely to be gradual. In Australia
and Canada, growth will continue to be depressed by low
commodity prices, while service-sector expansion, currency
depreciation and immigration will provide a buffer.
After-effects of currency shock to continue depressing
growth in Switzerland
The outlook for the Swiss economy is more subdued than
other developed markets in our view. The key headwind for
the economy remains the overvalued franc, which has seriously
harmed exports. With domestic investment weak and many
companies even in services (including banking), outsourcing
activities, job losses are likely to creep up. Meanwhile,
uncertainty regarding the bilateral treaties with the EU and
the future corporate tax regime is likely to further limit foreign
Figure 3
Growth of bank credit (YoY)
Figure 4
Current account balances (in % of global GDP)
“In Latin America, Brazil’s recession is set
to continue as interest rates stay high.”
Oliver Adler
“In EMEA, Russia’s recovery from recession
can continue while central Europe tabilizes.
In South Africa and Turkey, politics may
still weigh on assets.”
“Pan-Asian growth should expand modestly.
But the risk is that any temporary slowdown,
especially in China, could be punished
by markets.”
John Woods
“The Eurozone recovery should broaden
on consumption and exports, supported
by an easy ECB and weak EUR. But the
migration crisis raises political risks.”
Anja Hochberg
“Japanese fiscal stimulus is likely in early
2016 to counter the drag of a further
consumption tax hike. Medium term, TPP
should offset weak demographics.”
Soichiro Matsumoto, Chief Investment Strategist Japan
-2.0%
-1.5%
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
Major oil exporters (Russia, Saudi Arabia)
Latin America and the Caribbean
EM Asia ex China
Advanced economies ex USA
China
United States
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Source: National Statistics Ofﬁce
Current account balance in % of global GDP
Last data point: 10 November 2015 Last data point: 2015 (E)
Source: International Monetary Fund, Credit Suisse
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
EM-8 (median)
G-3 (average)
2005 2010 2015
EM-8: China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico,
Turkey, South Africa
G-3: USA, Eurozone, Japan
Growth of credit in DM and EM (YoY in %)

direct investment. Finally, it seems increasingly likely that the
construction boom of the past years has peaked.
Global growth too weak to raise inflation trend,
but headline rate may rise slightly
Putting the picture together suggests that the global economy
will most likely remain on a moderate growth path in 2016, in
the absence of any unforeseen and major geopolitical shocks
or significant policy errors. However, growth will remain too
weak, in our view, to trigger any significant rise in inflation
and we expect prices of traded manufactures to keep falling.
That said, commodity prices should gradually be supported
by cutbacks in investment and production, so that headline
inflation should rise somewhat in the course of 2016.
In the USA and UK, where the recovery has been underway for
some time, domestic core inflation should also rise gradually
toward the central banks’ 2% target as unemployment falls
and service providers regain some pricing power. But inflation
is set to stay below target in Japan, the Eurozone and
Switzerland. Inflation is also likely to remain low in China as well
as emerging markets in APAC and Eastern Europe. Finally,
countries which have suffered bouts of inflation in the past two
years as a result of either sharply depreciating currencies (such
as Brazil) or high government spending (such as India) should
see inflation abate as currencies stabilize.
Monetary divergence to remain pronounced
The outlook for growth and inflation will essentially determine
the monetary policy outlook in developed markets. Most
importantly, it seems likely that the US Fed will be the first
major central bank to tighten its reins. Meanwhile, we expect
the Bank of Japan to remain on hold for some time, not
least to avoid a renewed round of currency devaluation.
Should inflation fail to rise toward the target, however, added
quantitative easing (QE) or a move to negative interest rates
cannot be ruled out. With inflation well below its target and
a smaller balance sheet, the European Central Bank (ECB)
will, in our view, pursue a fairly aggressive easing policy.
Continued ECB expansion suggests that the Swiss National
Bank and the central banks in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe
will follow suite, with negative interest rates likely remaining
the norm. Monetary policy divergence is also likely among
emerging markets. Some, like Mexico, may need to raise rates
in response to the Fed and so we see MXN stabilizing sooner
than many other EM currencies. Others with very high interest
rates, such as Brazil, may be able to ease gradually as inflation
abates. The People’s Bank of China and some other Asian
central banks are likely to ease policy further given persistent
disinflation, but we do not expect China to allow the currency
to depreciate meaningfully.
Fed tightening set to reverse the decline in global yields
and boost the dollar
Regionally, bond yields may still be pulled in opposing directions
by diverging central bank policy moves, but the scale of
divergence should be lessened by USD strength. There is
of course a risk that unexpected negative growth surprises
could push some central banks to explore increasingly radical
measures, including pushing rates further into negative territory.
But current bond yield levels already appear to be pricing in
some of this risk. In the extreme case of Switzerland, faced
with potential further ECB easing, the 2-year government
yield is already near –1.0% and the 10-year around –0.3%,
essentially pricing in sub-zero interest rates for at least the next
four years.
There thus appears to be little upside potential for core
government bond returns in 2016, but quite some downside
potential, as coupon contributions are insufficient to absorb the
impact of even gradual yield increases. This is consistent with
our Capital Market Assumptions (CMAs, discussed in more
detail in the next article), which suggest unattractive or even
negative returns for core government bonds over the coming
3–5 years. Investors seeking either yield or capital gain will
need to look elsewhere in 2016.
Tactical, thematic, regional and sector strategies
to beat a moderate growth trend
Among the major asset classes, we see the greatest potential
in global equities. Based on an elevated but not extreme
price-to-earnings ratio of 15, a dividend yield of nearly 3%
and a price-to-book ratio of 1.9 in late 2015, equities compare
favorably with bonds in all but the weakest of growth scenarios
for the coming year. However, although attractive against
bonds, by historical standards returns may be limited given that
valuations are no longer cheap, economic growth is moderate
and interest rates may be rising.
To maximize potential, investors can adopt an active tactical
approach, seeking to deploy capital in the case of setbacks
and rising volatility, whether caused by economic news,
rising rates, illiquidity or geopolitics. The early stages of
Fed tightening (and any resulting rise in bond yields) could
trigger such an opportunity soon. Thematic, regional and
sectoral selections are also likely to prove critical for equity
outperformance. High corporate cash balances and still
relatively low earnings payout ratios should provide ongoing
support for specific themes related to mergers acquisitions
(MA) activity, stock buybacks and cash-flow-driven dividend
increases. Among alternative investments, the same theme
should favor MA arbitrage-oriented hedge funds.
Regionally, equities most closely affected by unconventional
policy easing appear most likely to outperform, notably in
the Eurozone and Switzerland, with a focus on stocks most
directly exposed to domestic European consumers (benefiting
from recovering consumer sentiment and credit growth).
Eurozone equities are among those with the highest potential
for earnings growth, in our view, and the possibility of the
ECB extending its QE program adds potential upside. Swiss
equities remain attractive, particularly for their yield, especially
for Swiss domestic investors who face negative bond yields as
Figure 5
Inflation rates in China (YoY in%)
Figure 6
Central bank balance sheets (in % of GDP)
“The Swiss economy is challenged
by the strong CHF but helped by
an improving Eurozone.”
Anja Hochberg
“For CHF-based investors, selective foreign
credit exposure can mitigate
the impact of negative yields.”
Anja Hochberg
“Eurozone equities should benefit from
economic recovery, margin growth, and
a weak EUR. Germany can outperform and
Spain is back in focus as Italy fades.”
Anja Hochberg
“Swiss equities exhibit an attractive mix of
defensives, global recovery exposure and
dividend yields.”
Anja Hochberg
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Consumer Price Index
Producer Price Index
2000 2005 2010 2015
Deﬂation in China's Industrial Sector
Last data point: 10 November 2015 Last data point: 10 November 2015 Last data point: October 2015
Figure 7
Real US bond yields
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
70 %
80 %
90 %
100 %
201520142013201220112010200920082007
ECB
SNB
Fed
BoE
BoJ
Expected inﬂation
Real yield
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
Mar 02 Mar04
US 5-year Treasury yield (%)
Mar 06 Mar 08 Mar 10 Mar 12 Mar 14
Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse / IDC

Return of risk premia may generate opportunities
in credit as 2016 unfolds
With core bond yields set to rise gradually, investors are likely
to struggle to find yield and capital gain opportunities in fixed
income that compare favorably with the global equity market.
But the trend toward higher risk premia in corporate credit in
2015 may provide opportunities as 2016 progresses. Unlike
government bonds, corporate yields now have better prospects
of offsetting at least a slow trend rise in interest rates,
assuming no surge in default risk. Among investment grade
credits, floating rate notes (FRNs) are an appealing alternative
to the duration risk presented by longer-dated (USD) fixed-
rate bonds, and so offer a hedge against a tighter Fed policy
trajectory.
For yield, lower-grade credits offer the only credible alternative
to equity assets but even here, care should be exercised in
timing and in choice of bonds. As of late 2015, aggregate
corporate credit spreads are just above their quarter-century
averages, reflecting the deterioration in credit fundamentals
particularly pronounced in the US energy sector and more
generally the prospect of Fed tightening. There is little doubt
that a Fed tightening cycle, representing a tightening of global
credit conditions, would raise the corporate default rate in
coming years, most notably within the high-yield sector. While
a further rise in the credit risk premium is possible in 2016, this
would open interesting long-term investment opportunities in
lower-rated corporate bonds.
Our CMA projections foresee trend returns to global high
yield of around 6%, consistent with only a moderate pick-
up in default rates as the cycle slowly turns. We see the key
to extracting value from the high yield sector as a carefully
diversified selection of credit risks, especially as the cycle
turns. Senior loans, which are secured credits, offer a similar
expected return, made up of a lower coupon but a typically
higher recovery rate in the event of default. Regionally, we
particularly favor European high yield, where the ECB’s
ongoing commitment to purchase assets suggests returns in
line with the 5.5% trend return expected in our CMA analysis.
Convertible bonds are also an appealing source of yield and
capital gain for the current cycle.
an (unattractive) alternative. In terms of sectors, there has been
substantial divergence in recent years, driven by both structural
and cyclical headwinds, which do not affect all equally. Modest
global growth, aging populations and weak productivity
growth suggest a bias toward service sectors where demand
is growing, most notably in healthcare – which suffered a
sharp setback of sentiment (but not revenue growth) in 2015;
as well as the large cap technology companies, which drive
and in part benefit from broader deflation in traditional goods
markets. Both the healthcare and technology sectors look set
to outperform, particularly compared to the more traditional
industrial sectors and the more interest rate sensitive ones like
utilities.
“Asian equities are still cheap, offer value,
and can attract value hunters in 2016. We
favor IT, healthcare and some telecoms.”
John Woods
Last data point: 30 October 2015
Hedges against inflation
Given current low yields, one of the primary risks in fixed
income would be a surprise acceleration of inflation, demanding
more aggressive Fed tightening and less or no easing
elsewhere. An attractive hedge for this scenario is in the form
of inflation-linked bonds. Although this market sector also
suffers from low yields, and would be vulnerable to any sharp
rise in real yields, it offers a direct and effective hedge against
the rise in inflation, which would likely precede any aggressive
central bank reaction.
Commodities are a notable exception from the expected key
trends and hedges for 2016. Although the asset class now
appears generally cheap, supply and capacity overhangs are
expected to limit upside potential at least early in the year.
An unexpected acceleration to strong global growth would
trigger a much higher trajectory of returns to commodities,
suggesting that this sector can provide a hedge against upside
growth surprises. But, equally, the sector would be most
vulnerable to a recession risk scenario. Similarly, gold could
swing severely with the actual Fed trajectory and its associated
US dollar consequences.
Currency considerations
While we expect the US dollar to return to strength in
2016, this path may not of course be equal among all major
currencies. The Bank of Japan’s apparent reluctance to either
move to negative interest rates or to pursue further quantitative
easing in late 2015 means that the Japanese yen is less
vulnerable than the euro or Swiss franc, whose central bank
rates have broken the zero barrier. The pound sterling may lag
the US dollar trend as the Bank of England lags the Federal
Reserve, and the specter of an “in-out” referendum on EU
membership by end of 2017 also limits potential.
But both the yen and the pound should outperform the euro
and Swiss franc in 2016. The franc itself is likely to remain in a
range versus the euro, based on the assumption that renewed
ECB easing is met by ongoing intervention and possible further
policy actions from the Swiss National Bank to avoid a return
of the EUR/CHF rate toward 1.00.
Our implied asset-allocation biases
From an asset allocation perspective, we see the greatest
potential in favoring global equities relative to global bonds.
Within equities, we favor exposures where the source of
liquidity is likely to be most consistent, most notably the
Eurozone, and where the sector uptrends appear to have the
most structural support, i.e. healthcare and technology. Among
credits, the widening of spreads in 2015 has created significant
risk premia that appear to overestimate aggregate corporate
default risks in 2016 and thus offer potentially attractive
expected returns – but selectivity at a regional, sectoral and
issuer level is key, as the default cycle is turning and continued
Fed tightening would amplify corporate event risk in coming
years.
Investors should maintain a high degree of diversification,
focus increasingly on selectivity of sources of yield, and pursue
a tactical bias for deployment of capital. Pockets of volatility
may emanate from Fed tightening, economic shocks, illiquidity
or geopolitics, but an underlying picture of ongoing growth is
expected to see investor patience rewarded.
“The EU referendum may weigh on sterling,
though the Bank of England’s rate ‘liftoff’
will likely prove more telling.”
Figure 8
Global equities, earnings per share (EPS) and earnings revisions
Source: Datastream, IBES, Credit Suisse / IDC
-100
-50
0
50
Net earnings revisions (%)
Jan
88
Jan
92
Jan
96
Jan
00
Jan
04
Jan
08
Jan
12
Jan
16
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
EPS 12 months (USD, trailing, rhs)
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
MSCI AC World Equity Index (USD)
IBES EPS forecasts (USD rhs)

Portfolio Review
health check
Many private and institutional investors conduct a
regular portfolio review, usually once a year, to see if
their portfolios still fit their strategic return and risk
parameters, or whether adjustments are needed
due to fundamental shifts in the environment. This
article focuses on these strategic reviews, which
are complementary to the more frequent tactical
adjustments that may be needed to reflect shorter-term
changes in markets and economies, and which we
address regularly in our “Investment Committee” and
“Investment Monthly” publications.
Nannette Hechler-Fayd’herbe
Global Head of Investment Strategy
Georg Stillhart
Head Asset Allocation Advisory
The strategic mix of assets in a portfolio is one of the most
important determinants of performance and risk. This is why
a regular review is advisable for most investors, especially
in present times given extreme monetary policies, and with
many assets having enjoyed several years of good cumulative
performance, thus making valuations more demanding than
before.
At Credit Suisse, we advise all our investors to perform such
a check annually. We also undertake this task ourselves on
behalf of those clients who entrust us with the management
of their wealth using the bank’s discretionary investment
solutions. Among the important working tools we use for
this purpose are our Capital Market Assumptions (CMAs).
20 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Portfolio Review 21

For investors focused on fixed income investments, we
recommend eliminating real estate exposure via REITS
because, although the latter are sensitive to interest rates,
the link can vary over time in ways that are difficult to predict.
So to manage the impact of expected rate rises on portfolios,
we believe it is easier to use direct holdings of bonds. As for
commodities, with negative carry and high volatility, these do
not seem as attractive as before compared to fixed-income-
related investments. To balance our recommended elimination
of real estate and the reduction in commodities,
we suggest buying convertibles (which diversify the fixed
income universe without increasing direct interest rate
sensitivity) and inflation-linked bonds (which are likely to offer
better returns than core nominal government bonds, while
playing a similar diversification role).
Portfolio health checks
In summary, the current review has shown that our
recommended strategic asset allocations were broadly in line
with the risk and return expectations and the various investor
profiles of our clients. We have thus made minor, rather than
major changes to recommended strategic weights. The main
shift is for investors focused on fixed income, where our
changes aim to reduce risk and increase diversification. We
believe our clients should undertake similar portfolio health
checks with their advisors as the new year begins, and compare
their allocations to those recommended. Our tools and specialists
can help improve the portfolio fit to clients’ actual needs and
expectations. And our regular Investment Committee and
Investment Monthly publications will provide updates on shorter-
term tactical recommendations throughout the year.
“For 2016 strategic
asset allocations, we
recommend another
modest increase
in equity allocations
for investors with
intermediate risk
profiles, reducing real
estate allocations
instead. In addition,
we propose a slightly
greater home bias
in equities, partly
to reduce foreign
exchange risk.”
Credit Suisse’s CMAs are a comprehensive set of total return
estimates, volatilities and correlations for 75 asset classes.
They are prepared to support our base case view of the
world over the next five years, and also for two risk scenarios
(strong and weak). The CMAs are built on our bank’s longer-
term macroeconomic growth forecasts, as well as inflation
and central bank rate projections, and are used to test our
recommended portfolio allocations and simulate realistic wealth
projections beyond just a 1-year horizon.
Cyclical recovery longer than usual
In our Capital Market Assumptions October 2015 update,
which is intended for use in portfolios during 2016, we
undertake a comprehensive review and conclude that the
economic world over the next five years will likely remain one
in which most developed economies converge toward their
potential growth over a more drawn-out cyclical recovery than
usual. This would be accompanied by low inflation and real
interest rates that continue to be mainly zero to negative.
We continue to forecast unattractive or even negative returns
for core government bonds as coupon contributions are
increasingly insufficient to absorb the impact of even very
gradual yield increases. Within fixed income, we expect the
best performance from lower-rated credits and convertibles.
While equity returns compare favorably to both bonds and
cash, we anticipate lower emerging market equity returns
than previously assumed. Within alternative investments,
hedge funds and Asian real estate should perform better than
commodities, gold and global real estate. In currencies, there
is generally less upside potential for the US dollar compared
to our previous CMAs.
Feeding these assumptions into our current strategic asset
allocations, we have found that only minor adjustments are
necessary compared to the position twelve months ago.
Back then, we decided to reduce recommended allocations
to government and investment-grade corporate bonds and
include sub-investment grade (high yield) bonds and emerging
market debt, while raising the suggested equity allocations.
We recommended avoiding foreign exchange risk in fixed
income, hedge funds and real estate by systematically
hedging international investments back to the investors’ home
currencies. In contrast, we recommended leaving equities
largely unhedged as the diversification benefits outweighed
the currency risk. However, in our more frequent tactical
adjustments, we sometimes feel it is appropriate to temporarily
recommend hedging currency risk for some equity positions.
For 2016, we recommend another modest increase in equity
allocations for investors with intermediate risk profiles, reducing
real estate allocations instead. In addition, we propose a
slightly greater home bias in equities, partly to reduce foreign
exchange risk. For investors focused on fixed income assets,
where we see the outlook as challenging, we make significant
adjustments to our recommendations, eliminating real estate
and reducing commodities and introducing convertibles and
inflation-linked bonds instead.
Main reasons for changes
Our recommendation to reduce real estate and raise equity
allocations is because often the only practical way for many
investors to take on real estate exposure is via real estate
investment trusts (REITs). These are correlated with equities,
and yet more vulnerable to the potentially adverse effect of
trend rises in interest rates. So we prefer raising our direct
exposure to the broader equity market.
Our suggestion to reduce currency risk by increasing equity
home bias is because many currency pairs have moved closer
to fair value based on our estimates, making strategic currency
exposures less compelling. For many investors, a cost-
effective way to reduce currency risk in portfolios is to increase
the equity home bias in strategic asset allocations. In our
recommendations, all other asset classes except commodities
are either in the investor’s reference currency or currency-
hedged.
22 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Portfolio Review 23

By the Numbers
trends in charts
Giles Keating
Deputy Global CIO
Here we show a small selection of charts from the
Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook
2015, published in February 2015. These charts illustrate
some of the long-term evolution of investment returns,
showing for example that equities have handsomely
outperformed inflation over the long term. We believe
these data provide a useful background for portfolio
construction and medium- to long-term investors.
One possible criticism is that the nature of the economy has
changed dramatically over the last two centuries, but there
is some evidence that underlying market dynamics exhibit
remarkable similarities across long time gaps, with for example
boom-bust cycles in technology occurring in the 19th as well
as the 21st century.
By the Numbers 25

Over time, the structure of the economy and the stock market
changes dramatically, although with a few areas of relative
stability. The dominant position of railway stocks in 1900 has
now completely disappeared, while totally new sectors like
technology have appeared. But the share of banks and utilities
has shifted relatively little.
The history of UK canal and rail stocks in the 19th century
has possible lessons for today, with the new technology (rail)
delivering good returns over time at the expense of the old
industry (canals), but with several burst bubbles along the way.
Modern-era technology stocks show remarkably similar patterns.
There is some evidence that so-called “sin” stocks (e.g., those
related to alcohol, tobacco, weapons and gaming) outperform
over time, perhaps because ethical investors shun them so they
sell at a relatively low price compared to the income stream they
generate. However, the impact seems to be generally small.
1811
205
46
1815 18231819 1827 1831 1835 1839 18471843 1851
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Figure 5
Performance of UK canal and railroad stocks, 1811–51 (1811=100)
Canals Railroads
US Technology
World Technology
US market
World market
757
670
532
437
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Figure 6
Performance of technology stocks, 1995 to date (1995=100)
Figure 7
Annual returns on “sin” stocks in 21 countries, 1970–2007
Source pp. 26/27: Credit Suisse Global Returns Yearbook 2015Last data point: 2015
Taiwan
Germany
Japan
Belgium
Portugal
Denmark
Spain
UK
Hong Kong
Netherlands
Finland
France
Canada
Norway
Korea
Australia
Switzerland
Italy
Singapore
Sweden
USA
Market return
Excess return relative to the market
7
8

10
13
13
13

10
10

13
14
17
18
19
20
21
21
21
23
27
27
27

26 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 By the Numbers 27
Rail 62.8%
Banks 6.7%
Other industrials 5.3%
Iron, coal steel 5.2%
Utilities 4.8%
Tobacco 4.0%
Telegraph 3.9%
Other transportations 3.7%
Food 2.5%
Textiles 0.7%
Drinks 0.3%
Retail 0.1%
Figure 1
US: Industry weights, 1900
Oil gas 14.7%
Banks 14.7%
Health 9.6%
Mines 7.3%
Insurance 6.2%
Telecoms 5.6%
Tobacco 5.4%
Drinks 4.7%
Utilities 4.5%
Others 4.2%
Media 3.6%
Retail 2.9%
Tech 1.1%
Food 0.8%
Textiles 0.4%
Figure 4
UK: Industry weights, 2015
Tech 16.6%
Health 13.2%
Banks 11%
Oil gas 8.2%
Retail 8.2%
Others 5.1%
Insurance 4.4%
Media 4.1%
Utilities 3.3%
Telecoms 2.3%
Drinks 2.0%
Food 1.9%
Tobacco 1.4%
Others 1%
Rail 1%
Textiles 0.5%
Iron coal 0.4%
Mines 0.1%
Figure 2
US: Industry weights, 2015
Rail 49.2%
Banks 15.4%
Mines 6.7%
Textiles 4.8%
Iron, coal steel 4.5%
Drinks 4.5%
Utilities 3.1%
Telegraph 2.5%
Insurance 1.9%
Retail 0.7%
Others 0.7%
Food 0.6%
Media 0.3%
Oil gas 0.2%
Figure 3
UK: Industry weights, 1900

“US equities since 1900,
through crashes and
volatility, have given
an excellent return that
has beaten inflation
by an average of 6.5%
a year, compared
to just 2% for
government bonds.”
Investors (and their descendants) who have stuck with US
equities for the very long term since 1900, through crashes
and volatility, have been rewarded with an excellent return that
has beaten inflation by an average of 6.5% a year, compared
to just 2% for government bonds.
Equities outside the USA have beaten inflation by an average
4.4% per annum since 1900, some two percentage points
behind the USA. Switzerland was almost on the non-US
average; the UK outperformed it while Germany lagged, hurt by
wartime destruction. The 1.6% annual real return on non-US
government bonds also lags the USA somewhat.
Long-term investment returns helped the USA rise from just
15% of global market cap in 1899 to over half at the end
of 2014. Germany and Austria saw their shares ravaged by
wartime destruction, while Switzerland benefited from having
the world’s strongest currency over the long period shown.
-3
0
3
6
1900–20141965–20142000–2014
Equities Bonds Bills
Figure 9
US: Annualized real returns on equities, bonds and bills
(in %)
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
1900–20141965–20142000–2014
Figure 11
World ex-US: Annualized real returns on equities, bonds and bills
( in %)
UK 24.9%
USA 15%
Germany 13%
France 11.5%
Smaller Yearbook 7.7%
Russia 6.1%
Austria 5.2%
Belgium 3.5%
Australia 3.5%
South Africa 3.3%
Netherlands 2.5%
Italy 2.1%
Not in Yearbook 1.7%
Figure 12
1899: Share of countries in global stock market valuations
USA 51.61%
Not in Yearbook 9.13%
Japan 7.83%
UK 7.20%
Smaller Yearbook 6.92%
Canada 3.27%
Switzerland 3.14%
France 3.08%
Germany 3.03%
Australia 2.61%
China 2.18%
Figure 13
2014: Share of countries in global stock market valuations
1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 10
Figure 10
World ex-US: Cumulative real returns on equities, bonds and bills,
1900–2014 (Logarithmic Index 1900=1)
148
6.0
2.7
0
1
10
100
1‘000
1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 10
Last data point: 2014 Last data point: 2014
28 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 By the Numbers 29
Source pp. 28/29: Credit Suisse Global Returns Yearbook 2015
1‘396
10.1
2.7
0
1
10
100
1‘000
10‘000
Figure 8
US: Cumulative real returns on equities, bonds and bills,
1900–2014 (Logarithmic Index 1900=1)

Our most impactful
investment ideas in action
Loris Centola
Global Head of Private Banking Research
Markus Stierli
Head Fundamental Micro Research
Themes in Portfolios describe Credit Suisse’s most
impactful investment ideas in an easy to understand
overview
Themes in Portfolios explained
Our Themes in Portfolios allow investors to populate their
portfolios with ideas that we expect to outperform within each
area. So, within equities, we expect stocks linked to European
economic recovery to outperform, reflecting reasonable
valuations, ongoing easy monetary policy and signs of gently
accelerating economic growth. We also have a number of other
themes including Swiss small and mid-cap stocks and US
technology stocks. Within fixed income, our themes include
floating rate bonds, as well as some of the more defensive
high yield bonds. These are chosen to help avoid the adverse
effect of rising bond yields, the first by their nature of having
almost no duration and the second by offering a credit spread
that should offset the impact of higher rates on capital values.
We include a number of other fixed income themes including
senior loans and hybrids. Among alternative investments, given
our outlook for commodities to trade without major up- or
downtrends, we believe active commodity strategies that take
advantage of short-term movements should be well placed
to deliver returns, and we also focus on other ideas including
selected real estate investments in some of the European
markets where recovery is still at a relatively early stage.
We select our themes and set our asset allocation in a single
investment process, with all decisions being taken by our
Investment Committee, which meets regularly to review and,
if necessary, update the recommendations. We also ensure
that specific solutions are available so that investors can
implement these ideas.
A theme for every asset class
Themes in Portfolios capture all asset classes in a portfolio.
Special attention is given to themes that align with asset
classes that have been overweighted in the asset allocation.
We call those Top Themes.
Equities Fixed income Alternative Investments Liquidity
U.S. technology
U.S. large caps
European recovery
Quality British companies
Japanese equities: Governance reform
Swiss quality
Swiss small and mid-caps
Reform-oriented EM oil importers
Asian reflation reform winners
Corporate cash goes to work
Success with small states
Inflation-linked bonds
Time to float
Defensive high-yield
Asian local bonds
Merger arbitrage
Commodities: Active strategies
European real estate recovery
Master Limited Partnerships
EM “hard” currencies
Value-based currency diversification
Diversify your portfolio with
senior loans and hybrids
EM quasi-sovereign and hard
currency bonds
Figure 1
Our thematic ideas at work (as at 15 November 2015)
Themes in Portfolios 31

Features Risks 2016
Known and unknown unknowns
Emerging Markets
What will drive performance
in 2016?
Liquidity Matters
Investment strategies as
markets become less liquid
investment gems”

Risks 2016
Known and unknown unknowns
Giles Keating
Deputy Global CIO
In this article, we set out some of the potential risk areas
relative to our central scenario that we feel investors
should focus on for 2016, based both on our own
analysis and on the views expressed by investors when
we asked them late in 2015.
We focus on four broad areas: (1) deeper-than-expected
economic weakness; (2) the opposite risk of stronger-than-
expected growth, leading to less friendly monetary policies;
(3) geopolitical and similar risks; and (4) issues originating
within financial markets themselves. In each case, we give our
view of the likelihood and also of the expected market impact.
We then comment on how these risks can be taken account
of as investors adjust their portfolios for 2016. Of course, we
can only write about risk areas that we have identified – beyond
those lie the “unknown unknowns.”
34 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Risks 2016 35

Deeper-than-expected economic weakness
We divide this area into two sub-scenarios.
First sub-scenario with a medium likelihood – intensified
weakness in emerging markets, spreading to a limited extent
to developed countries, but not causing outright global
recession. Some emerging countries are clearly vulnerable,
while others seem more robust, and we discuss this in detail
in an accompanying article. If it happens, we think it would be
good for most government and corporate bonds in developed
countries and gold, and broadly neutral for global equities, as
easier monetary policies offset most of the effect of poorer
corporate earnings. However, we think it would be bad for bank
deposits and for financial sector equities as more developed
countries adopt negative interest rates, bad for commodities,
and bad for the currencies and hard currency bonds of the
weaker emerging countries.
Second sub-scenario, with a low likelihood – a global economic
recession too big for central banks to avoid. It could be
caused by a slump in China’s growth (which the authorities
seem determined to prevent), but is unlikely to be triggered
by weakness in other emerging markets given their relatively
modest trade impact on developed economies. Among
other potential causes of recessions, there are financial
imbalances (rising corporate debt, slow progress in cutting
government deficits), but their impact is blunted by company
and government balance sheets generally being in reasonable
shape. There has generally not been over-investment in recent
years (other than in parts of China) and, conversely, few parts
of the world economy seem to be running out of capacity.
And deflation seems focused in narrow sectors (e.g. energy,
commodities). A recession could also be caused by the Fed
mistakenly tightening too much, which can never be ruled out,
or by geopolitical or environmental interruptions to trade or oil
supply, though we see a low likelihood of these (see below). If
an unexpected recession did occur, we believe it would be good
for long-dated quality government bonds and gold, but bad for
most other assets, including corporate bonds and equities, as
defaults rise and profits fall sharply.
Stronger-than-expected developed economies
This would cause accelerated Fed tightening and faster-than-
expected recovery in some emerging markets. We view this
with a low-to-medium likelihood. It could come if companies
start to spend more of their cash piles (perhaps helped by
new US tax legislation), if consumers slowly spend more of
the windfall from low oil prices, if Germany has to raise public
spending in the short term to provide housing and support for
the migrant influx (which should also help labor supply in the
longer term), or if a rising sales volume in new technologies
slowly dominates their tendency to depress prices. The market
impact would likely be significantly positive for equities and
mildly positive for both high yield and investment grade bonds
as higher profits offset higher interest rates. It should be good
for commodities and good for assets of accelerating emerging
markets, but bad for longer-dated quality bonds, gold and
for credits of some highly levered issuers, notably those in
countries that do not benefit from the faster growth.
Geopolitics, national politics and environment
Risks abound in many parts of the world. Our view is that any
one of these taken in isolation is a low probability, but taken
together, we see a noticeable risk that one of them (or some
other “unknown unknown”) occurs. The migration crisis in
Europe might get out of control, and could intensify support
for nationalist parties, perhaps triggering a new Euro Crisis.
In Switzerland, the debate over relations with the EU could
unexpectedly start to favor a looser link.
Tensions could appear or escalate in the seas near China
(possibly around January’s Taiwan election), in Ukraine or the
central Asian republics, and this (or fallout from Middle East
tensions) could adversely affect trade relations between the
West and China and/or Russia.
The 2016 US Presidential and Congressional elections (will
it be Clinton versus Trump, or a different contest?) could lead
to sector-specific scares, as recently seen for healthcare,
although it could also encourage progress in infrastructure
spending and tax rules for the repatriation of funds, giving a
positive impetus to equities as often in past election years.
Also, a major natural disaster, perhaps exacerbated by climate
change, could disrupt a major economy or trade route.
Historically, (geo)political events can cause generalized market
selloffs, but these tend to fade rapidly and be replaced by
a focus on the individual assets most affected. Our analysis
suggests that only the very deepest geopolitical shocks (the
two world wars and the 1973 oil embargo) had very large and
long-lasting effects on global financial assets.
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
Global economic slowdown
China debt implosion and/or EM crisis
Fed tightens a lot
Flash crash/market liquidity crisis
Outright military skirmishes in Pacific
US politics
New Euro Crisis
Source: Credit Suisse survey of APAC investors
Figure 1
What are the biggest risks up to end of 2016?
“We see weakness spreading
from emerging markets as a
medium likelihood, but a global
recession as a low likelihood.
And stronger-than-expected
growth is possible, too.”
As at September 2015

Risks originating within financial markets themselves
First, we see a medium-to-high likelihood of rising market
illiquidity, partly caused by tighter rules on bank capital
reducing banks’ capacity to hold the inventory needed to be
able to continuously offer to buy and sell securities. This could
cause brief disruptions like flash crashes and potentially more
sustained difficulties for investors to execute desired trades,
with the corporate bond universe and perhaps some small-
cap stocks likely to be more affected than larger-cap equities.
Second, we see a high likelihood of emerging countries and oil
exporters like Norway continuing to sell assets accumulated in
their foreign exchange reserves and Sovereign Wealth Funds
to offset a capital outflow. This “quantitative tightening” reduces
demand for assets like global equities and US bonds, but the
capital flowing out of these countries must itself be re-directed
somewhere else, most probably into exactly those assets
being sold or close substitutes, so the net effect may be small.
Third, we see a low but rising risk of systemic-scale defaults
in debt markets, following their very rapid growth during the
low-interest-rate years. So far, they have been resilient, with
successful restructuring of many energy bonds during 2015,
but future strains are visible in the US student loan market,
which the rating agencies are re-assessing after repayment
rates unexpectedly fell. More generally, the likely start of Fed
tightening may expose hidden weaknesses in the financial
system, as the cost of financing rises and lenders discriminate
more (or alternatively if the economy is weak, proliferating
negative interest rates could also create other strains).
Overall, we would warn that financial shocks often come from
unexpected directions – unknown unknowns.
Implications for portfolio construction in 2016
If we leave aside for a moment those risks that we have
classified as low, then the main ones to focus on are the slower
global economy (but not a global recession), accompanied by
significant extra monetary easing, the opposite risk of a faster
global economy leading to tighter-than-expected monetary
policy, and increased illiquidity in financial markets.
As described above, the impact of each of these relative to
our central scenario would be neutral to positive for both global
equities and for corporate bonds, and we believe this adds
to the confidence with which investors can allocate to these
major asset classes. However, these scenarios have divergent
impacts on gold, longer-dated government bonds and most
emerging market assets, so that holdings of these assets
can play a diversification role. But investors should be aware
that there is a significant chance that parts of this group will
underperform. Also, the rising illiquidity suggests that the credit
metrics applied when choosing any given bond should
be tightened compared to the past, given that selling bonds
at times of stress may be difficult.
Our analysis of historical events suggests that the geopolitical
shocks discussed (other than an oil crisis triggered by a broad
Middle East conflagration) might cause a brief negative effect
on a broad portfolio of global assets, but this would be reversed
rapidly, probably within weeks rather than months. However,
narrower pools of assets could see larger effects, e.g. some
UK assets might see larger and longer-lasting impacts if there
was a vote to leave the EU, and investors should take account
of such risks when assessing their risk-reward potential.
There is one pair of risks that would likely have a very different
impact on asset performance from those mentioned above,
causing equities and corporate bonds to fall while gold and long
government bonds improve. This would be a spread of
the Middle East conflicts that disrupted oil supply sufficiently
to trigger a global recession. To have such a drastic effect,
the conflict would have to be on a truly major scale, given the
slack in global oil markets and the flexibility of US shale output,
and this suggests a low likelihood. Given this, many investors
may choose not to adapt their portfolios for this, but those who
do could consider holding assets such as far out of the money
call options on oil or US Treasuries.
Deeper-dive analysis
In this article, we have offered a framework for considering
likely risks in 2016 and their implications for portfolio
construction. In the accompanying special articles, we offer a
deeper dive into some of the risks, including the issue of rising
market illiquidity and the risks of a deeper slowdown (or faster
recovery) in emerging markets around the world. Other key
issues such as the UK referendum are discussed in more detail
in the regional sections of the economic and market outlook.
“Rising illiquidity suggests
the credit metrics applied
when choosing bonds
should be tightened, given
that selling in times of
stress may be difficult.”
Figure 2
Stock market impact of major geopolitical events
DJIA indexed to 100
Figure 3
Stock market impact of less crucial geopolitical events
SP500 indexed to 100
gSource: Bloomber
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
Iraq invades Kuwait
1973 Arab-Israeli War
Assassination of Ferdinand I
Invasion of France
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45
DJIA indexed to 100
Months after event
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
Downing of MH17
9/11
Lockerbie Bombing
Beirut Bombing
Cuban Missile Crisis
Start Korean War
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60
SP500 indexed to 100
Days after event
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg

For emerging market (EM) economies, our core scenario
is for growth to stabilize in 2016 at close to the previous
year’s low levels. We believe this provides a reasonable
background for investors to take advantage of low asset
valuations after three years of underperformance against
developed markets, but careful selection is needed
given that some countries are set to suffer further
economic, financial and/or political strains.
Among hard currency bonds, we favor Mexico, Peru and
Russia, and investors could also consider South Africa,
Malaysia and Indonesia. The local currency bonds of the first
three countries on this list also offer a reasonable risk-reward
proposal in our view, and investors could consider unhedged
investments, especially in Mexico, given that recent weakness
has now pushed these currencies to low valuations. In Brazil,
we remain cautious about taking bond duration risk, but
Emerging Markets
What will drive performance
in 2016?
Mariano Arrieta
Emerging Markets Fixed Income Strategy
Luca Bindelli
Head of Foreign Exchange Strategy
Wenli Fei
Equity Analysis
Philipp Waeber
Economist, Global Macro Research
Nora Wassermann
Economist, Global Macro Research
40 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Emerging Markets 41

we would consider using any further bouts of weakness in
the Brazilian real in the coming months to add short-term
currency exposure, given how weak the unit has become.
Within EM equities, we favor India and China (H-shares), and
investors could also look at Taiwan and Korea. In Russia, low
valuations provide some potential and there is a small but not
negligible chance of a boost from improving geopolitics. In
Latin America, meanwhile, we see performance of most of the
stock exchanges held back by rising US interest rates. Key
risks include the possibility that the Fed might tighten faster
than expected, or that China might make a clear policy move
to depreciate the renminbi. Although we see these as low-
probability events, they would likely damage the performance
of many EM assets if they did occur.
Base case for EM economies in 2016:
Growth stabilization at subdued levels, moderating
inflation and cautious monetary easing
Most EM assets had a disappointing year in 2015, especially
when measured in US dollars, with performance generally
even weaker than in 2014 or 2013, and continued
underperformance versus developed markets. The main factor
lowering returns was currency depreciation. Worst affected
were commodity exporters and others dependent on exports to
a slowing China, while countries with weak external balances
also suffered. On the positive side, performance was better for
both equities and bonds in countries with lower inflation and
thus easier monetary policy.
In 2016, we expect EM growth to stabilize at subdued levels.
Fiscal and monetary policy stimulus in China should help
growth reach the government’s target, although imports will
remain weak. Korea and others in Asia will instead have to rely
on recent policy stimulus to support growth through domestic
demand. Meanwhile, economies dependent on commodities
and/or facing high debt will likely remain weak, but in most
cases we do not see things deteriorating and there may be
some marginal improvement. For example, in Russia, the
economy seems to have already largely absorbed the impact of
lower oil prices and sanctions, so that we see recession giving
way to stagnation, while, in Brazil, the pace of contraction
should abate. One benefit of poor growth is that it tends to
hold back prices, so that the very high inflation rates seen in
many weak-currency countries should subside, thus allowing
many central banks to move from tightening to cautious policy
easing. Important exceptions are Turkey and South Africa (due
to financial pressures) and Mexico (due to the growth impetus
from the USA).
Scoring economic strength, vulnerability
and policy flexibility
Economic growth is only one of the factors determining the
performance of EMs. Equally important is whether a country
is financially stable (allowing policy makers flexibility to respond
to external shocks) or whether it has high debt and poor fiscal
governance (making it vulnerable to global pressures). Table 1
provides a forward-looking “heat map” for these macro factors.
Most economies in Asia (apart from Indonesia) and Eastern
Europe tend to be more robust on this analysis, while Turkey,
South Africa and many of the Latin American countries –
Mexico aside – appear more vulnerable.
In the following sections, our asset class strategists derive
their outlook for investment returns by asking whether markets
have, or have not, fully discounted this macro picture.
Table 1
Macro scores for the main emerging markets
“We favor Indian and
Chinese equities.
In Russia, low valuations
provide some potential,
while, in Latin America,
Fed action is likely
to be a burden.”
Macro
strength
Policy flexibility External vulnerabilities Overall
score
Inflation
Public
debt
Public
deficit
Domestic
credit
Aggregate
score
FX
reserves/
external
debt
Current
account
balance
Aggregate
scoreEmerging Asia
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
Thailand
EEMEA
Croatia
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Russia
Turkey
Ukraine
South Africa
LatAm
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Venezuela
Explanatory note: All indicators were ranked, and ranks attributed colors on a scale ranging from dark red (worst score) over yellow to dark green (best
score). Macro strength relates to 2016 growth dynamics in reference to potential growth rates, with a neutral score (yellow) being attributed for growth
broadly in line with potential in 2016; inflation scores reflect monetary easing potential in 2016; public debt (2016 projection by IMF) is grouped in 5
classes (a ratio above 60% of GDP is red); the public deficit deficit (2016 projection by IMF) is grouped in 5 classes (a rate of 3% of GDP is red); the
score on domestic credit to the private sector in % of GDP reflects both the level and the latest dynamics, with the worst score being given for a
comparably elevated debt stock which is still rising; FX reserves (as of Q2 2015) and current account balances (2016 projections by IMF) are grouped in
quintiles; aggregate scores and the overall score are unweighted averages.
Sources: OECD, IMF, Worldbank, Credit Suisse

Currencies: Valuations are not yet
a robust anchor
We believe most EM currencies are likely to weaken further
against the US dollar due to still-weak economic fundamentals,
and in spite of China’s growth-supportive policies. On our
calculations, FX forward markets are discounting a faster
improvement in EM economic growth than seems realistic.
We thus foresee a scenario in which EM currencies weaken
further in the first half of 2016 and then range-trade for some
time before fundamentals improve enough to support outright
rebounds.
Latin American currency underperformance
likely to reverse
Although Latin America, led by Brazil, remains the riskiest
region based on fundamentals, the sell-off in 2015 has pushed
currencies to extremely cheap valuation levels. At the time
of writing BRL is down 30% versus USD, and MXN is more
than two standard deviations below its 10-year average. While
weak fundamentals and political risks could push BRL lower
in coming months, we see good prospects for stabilization or
even gains on a 12-month horizon. Given an annual carry of
12%, total returns versus USD should be positive. Meanwhile
MXN is likely to prove resilient, especially if rates are raised in
response to Fed action.
In Asia, INR should outperform CNY
While Asian EMs generally saw smaller declines in growth
and currencies than Latin America, valuations are generally
not as attractive. The only exceptions are MYR, and INR
where faster growth and fairly high inflation should keep
rates high. In China, policies to internationalize the currency
and an improving current account should provide support.
Policy easing and capital outflows could work in the opposite
direction, so that some marginal depreciation is possible.
However, we do not expect any major policy move to devalue.
In EMEA, carry currencies should eventually
gain support
While PLN offers the best fundamentals within the EMEA
countries (Europe, the Middle East and Africa) and could
initially outperform, its lack of carry is likely to lead to an
underperformance over the course of the year, while TRY,
ZAR, and RUB (which offer much more attractive rate spreads)
should eventually outperform in our view.
Among the risk scenarios, weakening developed market
growth could burden growth-sensitive EM currencies facing
external financing needs offset only partially by delays in Fed
rate hikes. If developed market growth surprises to the upside
instead, the Fed would likely tighten faster, which would be
negative for some South American currencies where there the
trade benefit from stronger demand is small. Upside surprises
to growth in China or the EM counties would naturally support
EM currencies, particularly those of countries with vulnerable
external balances and higher interest rates (i.e. IDR, ZAR,
TRY, and BRL).
Fixed income: Moderate overall returns,
with significant dispersion
Our baseline scenario foresees average returns on external
and domestic EM debt in the range of 3%–5% in USD terms,
although returns in some countries may lie well above or below
this range.
Local currency bonds: Searching
for pockets of value
The trend in the US dollar exchange rate will remain the single
most important driver of EM domestic bonds. At the time of
writing, the near-term forward markets in many countries have
discounted less currency weakness than appears justified by
macroeconomic fundamentals, implying the need for tactical
currency hedges, with Mexico and less clearly Peru and Russia
as exceptions. The positive news is that even with continued
EM currency weakness, inflation can still decline, making
upside surprises with regard to interest rates unlikely.
While our macro risk indicators show Latin America as being
more vulnerable than other regions, bond valuations have
become compelling. Mexico is preferred in the region, as a
possible rate hike by Banxico is already discounted. Peru,
Colombia and Brazil deserve a more opportunistic approach
and the FX-hedging costs should be analyzed individually.
Further policy rate hikes in Peru and Colombia are possible,
but the interest rate premium (“carry”) provides an offset.
Russia remains our highest conviction call in the CEEMEA
countries (Central Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa).
Although the strong rally has moved long-dated bonds to
expensive, they should benefit further from the disinflationary
environment, more stable growth and cautious monetary
easing. We prefer ZAR over TRY bonds because inflation
should be lower in South Africa, and we think high-yielding
countries will outperform PLN and HUF bonds because the
latter are already highly valued.
In Asia, Indian short-term bonds are still attractive on the back
of a more stable currency. Indonesia is likely to perform well
on a local currency basis, but less so on a USD-adjusted basis.
Philippines and Thailand are likely to underperform Malaysia
as fundamental valuations remain expensive.
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Fixed Income
12.4
8.5
13.3
3.6
2.1
18.1
7.8 7.7
9.1
5.0
–3.0 –3.9
6.4
7.36.1
FX vs. USD
3.6
0.5
–3.1
–4.4
–6.4
0.0
–6.5
–0.3
–5.5
–2.8
–3.8
–4.5
–5.0
–3.0
–6.5
EM-GBIGlobalDiv.
Philippines
Thailand
Malaysia
Indonesia
India
SouthAfrica
Turkey
Russia
Poland
Hungary
Peru
Colombia
Mexico
Brazil
Figure 2
Emerging Market Global Bond Index sub-indices –
12-month expected USD returns (in %)
Source: JP Morgan, Bloomberg and Credit Suisse
Figure 1
Valuation measures for emerging market currencies
Deviation in %
Source: Credit Suisse
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
BRL
MXN
PLN
RUB
ZAR
TRY
TWD
THB
PHP
IDR
MYR
INR
KRW
CNY
HKD
SGD
Expensive in REER terms
Cheap in REER terms
+/– 2 Standard Deviation
+/– 1 Standard Deviation
Real effective exchange rate (REER) deviation from
10-year moving average (current)
Real effective exchange ratte (REER) deviation from
10-year moving average (as on 30.09.2014)

Hard currency bonds: Returns stabilizing at low levels
The trend toward a downgrading of certain EM bonds by rating
agencies is likely to continue, especially for some vulnerable
high-profile countries. However, this seems to be largely priced
in so there should be little market impact unless fundamentals
deteriorate further. That said, we see little scope for spreads
on EM hard currency bonds to narrow as the Fed starts to
tighten, implying that such bonds provide few diversification
benefits in a global portfolio.
In Latin America, Mexico’s strong fiscal commitment places the
country’s bonds in a good position to outperform. Peru is also
attractively valued and the economy appears to be stabilizing.
In EMEA, valuations are generally expensive. Russia is our
preferred country in the region due to reasonably good fiscal
performance, but valuations are not cheap. South Africa is
better positioned than Turkey to retain its credit rating. Finally,
Malaysia and Indonesia are trading at wider spreads to peers
with similar credit ratings. In Malaysia, fiscal performance is
expected to improve, despite potentially lower dividends from
the state-owned oil- and gas-company Petronas. In Indonesia,
a delayed growth recovery might require additional spending.
India and Philippines are expensive, despite their better
fundamental credit ratios.
We are positive on equities in China
Within EM equities, we prefer EM Asia, not least because
most economies are net commodity importers. While growth
is well below pre-crisis levels, inflation is generally low and the
currencies are fairly stable, providing some room for additional
monetary easing. Within EM Asia, we have a medium- to
long-term positive view on India given its high growth potential.
We also favor China. While growth has turned down as the
economy transitions to consumption-led growth, we believe
this is priced in. The valuations of H-shares are attractive and
further monetary easing should be supportive. Meanwhile,
Taiwan and South Korea should benefit most from low
commodity prices, and Taiwan has a relatively high dividend
yield, while South Korea has a good earnings outlook.
Even though bonds in Argentina and/or Ukraine rallied to some
extent late in 2015 and valuations have become expensive,
risk-tolerant investors might consider positioning in these
countries for higher carry. Venezuela remains a wild card,
but credit metrics are likely to deteriorate as a result of the
economic crisis and high political uncertainty – the likelihood
of a credit event remains high, in our view.
Equities: Growth, valuation and monetary outlook
suggest EM Asia could outperform
After a good first quarter in 2015, EM equities fell almost
30% from April to September due to low commodity prices
and worries about China, followed by a recovery, which at the
time of writing is still limited. For 2016, we think that most of
the negative factors will remain in place, with no meaningful
recovery in commodities and a still-difficult macro environment.
But we do see opportunities in India, China, Taiwan, Korea and
Russia, while Latin America generally seems less attractive.
Fed’s rate hikes a headwind for LatAm and
some of EEMEA
Historically, EM equities have underperformed global equities
by more than 4% in the two months following a first Fed rate
hike. Rising US interest rates tend to weigh most on LatAm
and some EEMEA equities, due to their vulnerability to capital
outflows. Within EEMEA, Russia and South Africa, being
the biggest commodity exporters of the region, will more
likely continue to suffer from low commodity prices and weak
macro strength. However, cheap valuations should partially
counterbalance macro weakness in the case of Russia.
Moreover, EEMEA markets stand to benefit from their close
ties to EMU and the euro, particularly Poland, which should
benefit from positive momentum and supportive monetary
policy. Finally, political developments could have a meaningful
impact on Brazil’s performance if the ongoing political crisis
declines, or on Russia’s performance if the Ukraine situation
de-escalates.
Forecast
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
EMBI Div
Dec
98
Dec
00
Dec
02
Dec
04
Dec
06
Dec
08
Dec
12
Dec
10
Dec
14
Dec
16
Figure 3
Emerging Market Bond Index Global diversified
(EMBIG, in basis points)
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
Poland
Brazil
Taiwan
Turkey
China
India
Korea
Mexico
SouthAfrica
Russia
EM
Figure 4
Emerging markets year-to-date equity performance
(MSCI Indices, as of 30/10/2015)
Source: JP Morgan, Bloomberg and Credit Suisse Source: Datastream, Credit Suisse
“Mexico’s bonds are in
a good position to
outperform; Peru is also
attractively valued.
In EMEA, Russia is our
preferred country, but
valuations are not cheap.”
Total Return (YTD %, local currency)
Total Return (YTD %, USD)

Liquidity Matters
Investment strategies
as markets become
less liquid
Joe Prendergast
Head of Financial Markets Analysis
An investor who reviews an up-to-date valuation of his or
her portfolio on the screen or in a print-out tends to
assume that it would be possible to sell the assets in the
open market at somewhere around the prices shown or
buy more, with the exception of specialized items known
to be illiquid such as private equity and certain real
estate-related investments.
48 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Liquidity Matters 49

But times are changing. Mainstream assets such as blue-chip
equities, government bonds and major currencies that enjoyed
deep, liquid markets prior to the 2007-08 financial crisis, have
started to show signs of illiquidity, meaning that it may not
always be possible to buy/sell as easily as in the past. There
are various problems involved. For example, some assets now
have wider gaps between buying and selling prices (bid-offer
spread) and/or a decline in the maximum size that can be
traded in one transaction, and these effects may be especially
marked at certain times of day such as mid-afternoon. A more
extreme phenomenon is the “flash crash,” with examples seen
in equity or bond markets in May 2010, October 2014 and
August 2015, during which times the prices at which one
can trade may differ greatly from those quoted even a few
moments before. And in the normally liquid FX markets, the
removal of the Swiss franc cap in January 2015 led temporarily
to a suspension of most trading in that currency. Meanwhile,
many corporate bonds are currently difficult to buy in the
secondary market, especially in larger sizes, although sales
tend to be relatively easy for now. But the reverse applies in
a number of cases where issuers face unexpected credit risks,
and their bonds suddenly become difficult to sell.
In this article, we review some of the reasons for this decline
in liquidity and discuss the risk that it may deteriorate further
in future. We then suggest how investment strategies can be
adapted to allow for the changing environment. For example,
investors with crucial future cash flow needs should consider
relying more on dividend and interest flows, and less on asset
sales, while trading-orientated investors can stand ready to buy
or sell into flash-crash events.
Rising costs and tighter balance sheets at banks passed
on to investors through wider spreads and greater
selectivity
In the decade before the 2007–08 financial crisis, new
technologies, rapid deregulation and easy central bank policy
helped increase banks’ capacity to take risk, which in turn
made them more willing and able to make bid and offer prices
for a wide range of financial assets. The result was a trend
toward easier and cheaper trading for most investors. Since the
crisis, this process has gone into reverse, as market-making
capacity is reduced by tighter capital requirements, price-
stabilizing speculation is limited by restrictions on proprietary
risk-taking, and the USA moves to start raising short-term
interest rates.
Figure 1 shows that, since the financial crisis, the volumes
traded on the New York Stock Exchange have diverged from
the rapid recovery of market capitalization.
This is one signal of the declining liquidity behind the scenes,
which may become of greater concern amid less-friendly
market conditions.
The banks that offer to buy and sell financial assets (market
makers) are faced with higher capital costs, smaller balance
sheets and a more conservative attitude to risk among
shareholders, depositors and regulators.
In response, they have tended to widen bid-offer spreads, in
effect raising the price charged to their clients for taking the
risks involved in making markets. Moreover, they are tending to
assess the value of trades on a case-by-case basis rather than
provide liquidity indiscriminately. Credit Suisse studies of market
depth (meaning the volume of nearby bids and offers on either
side of the current mid-price, as typically provided by market
makers) suggest that depth in US and European government
bonds, for example, has been significantly diminished since the
Federal Reserve’s tapering ended late in 2014, and more so in
the USA than in Europe.
Moreover, market depth is elusive, responding rapidly and
negatively to increases in volatility. This could also help
explain why overall liquidity measures do not appear to have
deteriorated significantly, but pockets of illiquidity and extreme
volatility appear more frequent.
Less-liquid assets become even more illiquid (especially
at certain times of the day)
While the banks have been widening bid-offer spreads and
becoming more selective in their trading, there has been a
rise in high-tech automated trading strategies used by some
investors, which are programmed to favor liquid trading
conditions. The result has been a clustering of trades around
the same “most liquid” part of the day. More than one in six
trades in SP 500-listed stocks took place in the final hour
of trading in 2014, compared with almost one in ten in 2007.
By contrast, mid-afternoon trading is increasingly parched of
liquidity.
A similar clustering is visible across markets, with traditionally
less-liquid markets becoming even more illiquid. Smaller-cap
US stocks, where transaction costs were significantly higher to
start with, and volumes less, reflect this tendency. Quoted bid-
ask spreads for Russell 2000 (small cap) stocks have widened
relative to those of SP 500 (large cap) stocks in the past
three years (see Figure 2). Market makers (and high-frequency
traders) have congregated and provided the most liquidity in
large caps at the expense of small caps.
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Credit Suisse
“Mainstream assets have
started to show signs
of illiquidity. Some have
wider bid-offer spreads
or a decline in the
maximum transaction
size, especially at certain
times of day.”
Last data point: 24 July 2015
Figure 1
Equity volumes traded on the New York Stock Exchange diverge
from recovery of market capitalization
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
Jul 15Jul 13Jul 11Jul 09Jul 07Jul 05Jul 03
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
NYSE value traded (USD trn, l.h.s.)
NYSE market cap (USD trn, r.h.s.)
0 bps
1 bps
2 bps
3 bps
4 bps
5 bps
6 bps
20152014201320122011
Figure 2
Comparison of US large cap versus small cap equity bid-ask
spreads
0 bps
5 bps
10 bps
15 bps
20 bps
25 bps
30 bps
35 bps
Russell 2000 (small caps, r.h.s.)
SP 500 (large caps)
Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan

Another consequence has been smaller trade sizes, leading to
an illusion of liquidity, which disappears when larger trade sizes
are presented to the market. Block equity trades (defined as
trades of 10,000 or more shares) comprised only about 10%
of total volume in the last decade, compared to about one-third
of volumes in the preceding decade.
In short, there is a global trend in financial market liquidity, with
market-making concentrated in the most liquid securities at the
most liquid times of day, while deteriorating in less-liquid assets
and times, thus creating an increasing liquidity gap between
these extremes.
Looking ahead: Illiquidity in financial markets may worsen
as the Fed starts raising interest rates
Easy central bank monetary policy around the world has,
in our view, limited the deterioration in trading liquidity.
However, that very easy policy is now slowly being unwound.
The first step was the ending of US quantitative easing
in 2014, and the next step is the move toward slowly rising
US short rates in late 2015.
In previous cycles, there have been significant lags between
the initiation of monetary tightening and rising volatility in asset
markets, but the connection has nonetheless been strong
(Figure 3). As central bank policy normalizes, we expect
to see more evidence of reduced trading liquidity and its
consequences in the form of higher volatility.
In particular, at a point perhaps one to two years after interest
rates start to rise, we would expect conditions in corporate
bond markets to become tougher. This not only means
higher yields (i.e. lower prices), but also increasing illiquidity
in secondary markets. We noted above that, at the moment,
many corporate bonds are relatively difficult to buy in the
secondary market, and relatively easy to sell. This situation
could reverse as interest rate increases gather pace, so that
investors may not be able to make certain sales in their bond
portfolios.
A key variable to monitor, in our view, is US liquidity conditions,
which we proxy with our US Liquidity Indicator, as shown in
Figure 4. The US Liquidity Indicator is part of our proprietary
set of liquidity indicators that go beyond measuring trading
liquidity. In addition, they track rates, credit, housing activity,
bank lending and money supply to provide a broad snapshot
of liquidity conditions. The Federal Reserve’s tapering to end
quantitative easing has already seen some deterioration in
liquidity conditions on this measure, which contributed to some
significant occasions of market stress in 2015.
Some factors may help offset this sober picture. As banks
become less able to offer market-making services, large
institutional end-investors are already starting to make more
transactions directly among themselves via new trading
platforms, and this trend may continue. This may help smaller
investors indirectly if it limits the rise in overall market volatility.
This trend toward greater trading illiquidity has practical
relevance for investment decisions:
• Investors should analyze their expected future cash needs,
and plan to meet them as far as possible from expected
dividends, coupon payments and redemptions, with reduced
reliance on sales in the secondary markets, especially for
corporate bonds where this may become difficult as the Fed
tightening cycle progresses.
• Strategic portfolio construction should take account of
illiquidity as well as volatility when assessing the desirability
of an asset in a portfolio. In our discretionary mandates, for
example, the relative illiquidity of emerging market equities,
high yield bonds and convertibles reduces the amount we hold
compared to other assets offering a comparable risk-return.
• Open-ended funds will generally be saleable at or close to
underlying net asset value in all but the very most extreme
conditions, making them potentially more attractive for
investing in mainstream rather than closed-end markets,
which can trade well below net asset value at times of stress.
However, for investments outside of the mainstream (e.g.
frontier markets), open-ended funds may have to sell the
more liquid, better-quality assets in their portfolios during
a downturn to meet early redemptions, thus leaving the
remaining investors with low-quality assets, which does not
happen in a closed-end fund.
• Assets such as private equity and some real estate-linked
investments, which are traditionally seen as illiquid, can
play a valuable role in a diversified portfolio if they offer
sufficient expected returns. But they may become very deeply
discounted or unsaleable in periods of stress and investors
should allow for this in assessing their overall cash flow
needs.
• Investors should be prepared for greater volatility, with large
price movements even in traditionally liquid assets. Extreme
falls can create value and provide attractive entry points.
To take advantage of this volatility, it is important to hold
sufficient cash from asset sales during periods of exaggerated
price rises. As large falls (rises) in prices do not always
signal one of these entry (exit) points, a clear framework
for judging value is also needed, such as the tactical asset
allocation framework used by our discretionary mandates with
the resulting strategy also published in a regular and timely
manner in our Investment Committee report.
Source: Bloomberg, Datastream, Credit Suisse
“For mainstream markets,
open-ended funds have
the advantage of staying
close to valuation, unlike
closed-end funds.
But for unusual areas,
like frontier markets,
closed-end funds have
potential advantages in
times of stress.”
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
US 2Y real rates lagged by 24 months (r.h.s.)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
VIX Index
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Source: BloombergLast data point: 02 November 2015
Source: Bloomberg
Last data point: 04 November 2015
Credit Suisse Liquidity Indicator US
Figure 3
Rising real rates cause volatility, but with a lag
Figure 4
Credit Suisse Liquidity Indicator
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
20142012201020082006200420022000
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

investment gems”
CIO UK and EEMEA
One way to aim for improved investment performance is
to identify “hidden gems,” i.e. trends that are potentially
powerful and durable, but which have not yet been
reflected in market prices. Here we describe three such
trends: the superior profitability of companies with
gender diversity in their boards and senior management,
the outperformance of certain family businesses, and
the way that capital markets of small economies may be
able to punch above their weight in the longer term.
We also describe a fourth trend that is more tentative, but
potentially of considerable importance, i.e. the impact on
consumers and food product companies of the emerging
new consensus among nutritionists that fat may not have the
adverse effects once attributed to it.
54 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Untapped Opportunities 55

We have produced detailed research on all of these themes
in our think-tank, the Credit Suisse Research Institute (CSRI),
which draws on both our large internal research network and
other advisers. We have developed large proprietary datasets,
such as the CS Gender 3000, which contains unique data on
diversity within most of the world’s most important companies.
And we have lists of stocks that can be used to invest in some
of these themes, with investment products available in certain
cases.
Corporate gender diversity and improved financial
performance
The impact of gender diversity on corporate performance
is an increasingly prominent topic. However, it has not yet
become a fully mainstream theme, suggesting that markets
may not always properly reflect its impact, which can create
an investment opportunity. During 2015, the CSRI updated its
earlier “Gender Diversity and Corporate Performance Report”
to include, for the first time, data not only on boards, but also
top management. The report identifies by gender more than
28,000 senior managers at over 3,000 leading companies
actively covered by Credit Suisse analysts worldwide – The
CS Gender 3000.
The study shows that although the proportion of women in
senior management is in many cases similar to that on the
boards, their roles tend to be skewed toward areas of less
influence or offer less opportunity to move into the most
senior positions in a company. It also shows that female
representation is higher in “New Economy” companies and
in services (“Non-Manual Labor”) companies than in much
of manufacturing and construction, though sector-based
patterns of this kind are less prominent than country and
cultural factors.
For investors, the new report confirms most of the crucial
findings of the initial version. In particular, greater diversity
in boards and management is empirically associated with
higher returns on equity. This in turn is shown to be linked
over time to superior stock-price performance, with not only
higher earnings, but also higher valuations. These results
are correlations rather than proven causality, but they are
striking. They suggest that investment strategies based on
public information about gender diversity have the potential
to significantly outperform over a period of time – a key
conclusion for investors.
Moreover, new findings emerge from this added management
analysis. We find no evidence that female-led companies
miss out on equity returns by taking a financially conservative
approach to leverage. Also, dividend payout ratios are shown
to be higher. But, in a different and potentially positive way,
female CEOs are shown to be more conservative than
men. They are less acquisitive than men when assuming
the leadership position – and other studies have shown that
acquisitions are often associated with adverse effects on
shareholder value.
At the macro level, we find that board diversity has increased in
almost every country and every sector, progressing in our global
sample from 9.6% in 2010 to 12.7% at the end of 2013.
Female participation in top management (CEO and directors
reporting to the CEO) stood at 12.9% at the end of 2013,
but as noted above there is wide variation among sectors and
countries. Interestingly, countries with formal board quotas for
diversity are not, so far at least, showing a trickle-down effect
to female representation of women in top management.
From an investment point of view, it is possible to construct
strategies based on a selection of companies that we have
identified with a higher than average representation in terms
of women on the board and/or in top management. We would
suggest further refining the list so as to include only those
companies that also score well in terms of the operational
and valuation metrics in our HOLT* scorecard. Investors
could implement such a strategy either by direct purchases
of these equities or, where available, by purchasing a suitable
investment product.
Family businesses – stability and potential for longer-
term outperformance
While some family companies are held privately, there are also
many listed companies where a single family holds a significant
stake. Credit Suisse is very focused on family businesses and
we have published regular research on them since 2007, with
the most recent being the CSRI report, “The Family Business
Model,” published in July 2015. Our work finds that family
businesses have a distinctive focus on medium- to long-term
returns. Historically this has tended to produce successful
results that investors could potentially share if the trend
continues in future.
Among the reasons why we feel that family businesses
stand apart and why the return profile is different to that
of the broader corporate universe, we note a desire to
maintain control, leading to more cautious and more efficient
management and strategies, and a focus on value-added
products and brand development. Moreover, we see evidence
that family businesses tend to focus more on core activities
and this means they are less acquisitive and growth is organic.
Investment intensity, be it research and development (RD)
or broader capex, is lower than for other companies, but it
tends to cause less of a burden on short-term return on equity,
suggesting that the chosen investments and RD are more
efficient.
To aid our assessment of the health of family businesses
we have constructed The CS Global Family 900, a detailed
financial database of 900 family businesses globally. This group
of companies has shown an excess return of 4.5% compound
annual growth rate versus the MSCI All Countries World Index
since 2006. Over the longer term, family companies in the CS
Global Family 900 have generated twice the economic profit –
earnings in excess of the opportunity cost of utilizing assets or
capital – compared to benchmarks.
“The impact of gender
diversity on corporate
performance is increasingly
prominent, but has not
yet become a mainstream
theme, which can create
investment opportunities.”
2010 2011 2012 2013
Consumer Discretionary 10.6% 11.3% 12.4% 13.4%
Consumer Staples 13.3% 14.2% 14.9% 16.3%
Energy 6.7% 7.7% 8.3% 9.4%
Financials 11.3% 12.0% 13.0% 14.8%
Healthcare 11.7% 12.4% 12.9% 14.1%
Industrials 7.8% 8.7% 9.9% 11.0%
Materials 6.8% 7.7% 8.6% 10.0%
Technology 8.1% 8.4% 9.0% 10.9%
Telecoms 11.1% 11.0% 12.4% 14.2%
Utilities 10.6% 11.0% 12.0% 14.4%
Total 9.6% 10.3% 11.3% 12.7%
Source: Credit Suisse Research Institute
0 10%
10-
20%
20-
30% 30%
North America 24.7 11.0 39.6 18.6 6.0
Europe 10.3 6.3 31.4 32.8 19.2
EMEA 39.6 10.4 29.2 15.1 5.7
Latam 56.0 13.1 19.0 10.7 1.2
Developed Asia 54.0 11.1 24.3 8.7 1.9
Emerging Asia 49.5 17.2 23.3 6.7 3.3
Total 33.7 11.1 31.4 16.9 6.9
Source: Credit Suisse Research Institute
Table 1
Percentage of women on boards by industry
Table 2
Percentage of women on boards by region 2013

In general, family-owned companies are a lower return on
equity (ROE) business model in the more developed markets
of the USA and Europe. By contrast, they demonstrate higher
ROE in Asia and EMEA. Lower ROE is indicative of more
conservative strategies as well as broader priorities for family
ownership beyond simply financial returns. Similarly, leverage
is lower for US and European family businesses, in line with
previous research.
Finally, our dataset shows that family business growth is
organic. Since 1990, MA has been just 2.1% of sales versus
5.8% at non-family businesses. We also find that family
businesses make better and cheaper acquisitions as they drive
better growth and returns in the 3-year post-acquisition period.
For investors, it is possible to create a strategy that aims
to share in this potential performance by identifying small
portfolios of companies that have significant family holdings
and which also have good metrics in our HOLT* scorecard.
As with the gender diversity theme, investors could implement
such a strategy via direct purchases of these stocks or, if
available, by purchasing a suitable investment product.
The success of small countries
and markets
The long-term economic success of some smaller developed
countries such as Singapore and Switzerland is well known,
but the relationship between country size and the performance
of stock and bond markets is less widely studied, even though
there are widespread comparisons of the performance of
small and large companies within national stock markets. Our
recent research aimed to fill this gap and to see if this under-
researched area offered a potential investment opportunity. We
examined the link between small countries’ macro performance
and the performance of their capital markets and we found
that in the long term, small developed country equity markets
have outperformed large country ones. The same is true,
though less emphatically so, for small developed country bond
markets.
Of course, as highlighted by events in Greece, being small in
itself is no guarantee of success. The ingredients for strong
and sustained economic performance were analyzed in the
CSRI “Success of Small Countries Report” published in 2014,
where we developed a CS Country Strength index to identify
the key factors. Six of the top ten countries on this index were
small ones, and we found that key factors included “intangible
infrastructure” like education, technology and healthcare, which
were growth drivers in themselves and also built the base for
future success. This index can be used to help investors in
selecting countries, although it should be noted that long-term
success does not guarantee immunity from adverse global
economic forces in the shorter term, and indeed small countries
may be affected by them more, or more rapidly, than larger
countries. Switzerland and Denmark, for example, were forced
to adopt negative interest rates during 2015 in part because
their success was attracting excess inflows. New Zealand
and Norway are registering the side effects of slower growth
in China, the social costs of austerity are evident in Ireland
and Portugal, and the central banks in the Nordic region have
difficulty in containing the side effects of imported deflation.
Overall, small countries can be seen as the dashboard on which
many of the world’s imbalances first become evident.
Figure 1
CS Global Family 900 universe versus MSCI ACWI
0
50
100
150
200
250
15141312111009080706
MSCI AC World
CS Global Family 900
Last data point: 10 November 2015
Figure 2
Share price returns by generation
0
50
100
150
200
250
2015201420132012201120102009200820072006
1 2 3 4 5
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT
Figure 3
CS Global Family 900 universe cash flow return on investment versus MSCI ACWI
CS Global Family Index Global Universe
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT
0 %
2 %
4 %
6 %
8 %
10 %
12 %
141312111009080706050403020100999897969594
*CFROI®
, HOLT, HOLTfolio, HOLTSelect, ValueSearch, AggreGator, Signal Flag and
“Powered by HOLT” are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or registered
service marks of Credit Suisse AG or its affiliates in the United States and other countries.
HOLT is a corporate performance and valuation advisory service of Credit Suisse.
Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse Research Institute
Last data point: 10 November 2015 Last data point: 04 November 2015

Fat – the new health paradigm
The fourth and final theme discussed here is one that is only
slowly starting to emerge, and the investment implications are
not yet fully clear. However, it has the potential to be large in
its impact, so we highlight it here for investors who wish to
follow the theme from a relatively early stage and take action
in future as the appropriate investment strategy becomes more
apparent.
Fat is one of the three macronutrients of any diet; protein
and carbohydrates are the other two. Over the last 50 years,
general nutritional wisdom has been to recommend moderate
consumption of fat, lower the intake of saturated fats (butter,
lard, milk, red meat, coconut oil) and cholesterol (eggs) and
increase the consumption of polyunsaturated fats (soybean,
sunflower, corn, cottonseed oils) and carbohydrates (pasta,
bread, sugar, etc.).
These recommendations have been an area of huge debate
over the past 10–15 years. Some maintain that the results
of these dietary recommendations are nowhere more evident
that in the USA, where 35% of the population is now obese
and similar percentage is suffering from metabolic syndrome.
Others support maintaining the current “generally accepted
principles” with a limit of 10% of daily energy intake from
saturated fats and no limits on monounsaturated (olive
oil, canola oil, palm oil, nuts) fats, polyunsaturated fats or
carbohydrates.
In our recent CSRI Report entitled “Fat: The New Health
Paradigm,” published in September 2015, we analyze in depth
the ecosystem of “fat,” looking at the five main types of fats,
the main fat-rich foods and who produces them, the medical
research on fat and the perception of doctors, consumers and
health officials.
Our market surveys show that consumers’ and doctors’
perceptions are aligned with the official nutritional
recommendations. Yet, consumption of butter is growing
globally at a rate of 2%–4% a year and whole milk in the USA
in the first half of this year grew 11%, while skim milk shrank
by 14%. In the last 12 months, egg consumption in the USA
has grown by 2% and organic egg consumption by 21%.
We believe that we are at a breaking point. Our own analysis
and the most recent medical research support these new
trends. Medical research has shown that eating cholesterol has
basically no influence on the level of cholesterol in the blood
and therefore on potential heart illnesses; and the link between
saturated fat intake and cardiovascular risk has never been
proven. In other words, eating saturated fats has no negative
implication for heart-related diseases. On the other hand, at
current levels of consumption in the developed world,
omega-6 polyunsaturated fats (vegetable oils), are unlikely
to be as beneficial as people perceived.
The report concludes that natural fats are healthy and key to
the evolution of a society that focuses on developing heathy
individuals. Fat is one of the best sources of energy we can
store and use; saturated and monounsaturated fats are a good
source of energy; and omega-3 has impressive preventive
properties for our heart and brain. The companies that adjust
most quickly to this new emerging consensus are likely to
outperform, while those that lag are likely to underperform, and
we expect this to build to a clearer investment theme over time.
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Small Countries (developing)
Large Countries (developed)
Small Countries (blue chips)
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
% GDP Country Size Score
Luxembourg S 0.97
Switzerland S 0.89
Hong Kong S o.87
Ireland S 0.84
Belgium M 0.82
Hungary S 0.81
Iceland S 0.81
Netherlands M 0.80
Malta S 0.80
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Small countries
Large countries
Indexed, 1964 =1
Source: DMS database, Credit Suisse / IDC
1964
1969
1974
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
2004
2013
2009
Figure 4
Small developed economies are more open than larger ones
Table 3
Small countries dominate CS Globalization rankings
Figure 5
In the long run (total returns), small countries appear to have
outperformed
Source: World Bank, Credit Suisse

Major Global Events 2016
(subject to change)
Presidential
Elections
Taiwan
General
Elections
Thailand
General
Elections
Philippines
General
Elections
Peru
G7 Summit
Shima, Japan
General
Elections
Austria
General
Elections
Ireland
Republican
Party National
Convention
USA
Jackson Hole
Economic Policy
Symposium
USA
Democratic
Party National
Convention
USA
Parliamentary
Elections
Belarus
Legislative
Elections
South Korea
Legislative
Elections
Hong Kong,
China
APEC
Summit
Lima, Peru
Parliamentary
Elections
Russia
Legislative
Elections
Romania
Parliamentary
Elections
Montenegro
Municipal
Elections
Tunisia
House of
Representatives
Elections
USA
Parliamentary
Elections
Georgia
Presidential
Elections
Bulgaria
Presidential
Elections
Puerto Rico
Presidential
Elections
USA
G20 Summit
Hangzhou, China
Parliamentary
Elections
Lithuania
Boao Forum
for Asia
Boao, China
World Economic
Forum Annual
Meeting
Davos,
Switzerland
Parliamentary
Elections
Iran
Parliamentary
Elections
Slovakia
January February March April May June July August September October November December
62 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Major Global Events 2016 63

64 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016 Disclaimer 65
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66 Credit Suisse | Investment Outlook 2016
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