IRJET- Constructing Inter Domain Packet Filter for Controlling IP Spoofing

International Research Journal of Engineering and Technology (IRJET) e-ISSN: 2395-0056
Volume: 05 Issue: 12 | Dec 2018 www.irjet.net p-ISSN: 2395-0072
© 2018, IRJET | Impact Factor value: 7.211 | ISO 9001:2008 Certified Journal | Page 7
Constructing Inter Domain Packet Filter for Controlling IP Spoofing
Madhuri Ghorpade
Student, Dept. of Computer Science, California State University Sacramento, California, USA
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Abstract - The Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack
is always been a serious threat to the legitimate use of the
Internet. All impediment mechanisms employed have been
prevented by the capacity of attackers to spoof the source
address of the IP packet. By applying IP Spoofing, attackers
can evade detection and put a substantial burden on the
destination network for policing attack packets. An Inter
Domain Packet Filter (IDPF) architecture is proposed to
reduce the extent of IP spoofing on the internet. IDPF does
not require global routing information. It is constructed
based on the information implicit in Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) route update, and then they are deployed in
network border routers. The conditions under which the
IDPF discards packets with spoofed source address and
allows packets with valid source addresses is established.
Extensive simulation studies states that even with partial
deployment on the internet, IDPFs can limit the spoofing
capability of attackers. Further, they can help localize the
source of an attack packet to a small number of candidate
networks.
Key Words: IP Spoofing, IDPF, DDoS, BGP, legitimate
use.
1. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks pose an
increasingly grave threat to the Internet, as evidenced by
recent DDoS attacks mounted on both popular Internet
sites and the Internet infrastructure [1]. IP spoofing is one
of the factors that complicates the mechanisms of policing
such attacks, the act of forging the source addresses in IP
packets. Attackers hide its actual identity and location by
masquerading as a different host, rendering source-based
packet filtering less effective. It has been shown that a
large part of the Internet is vulnerable to IP spoofing [3].
It has been observed that attackers can insert arbitrary
source addresses into IP packets, but they cannot,
however, control the actual paths through which the
packets travel to the destination. Based on this
observation, we proposed the route-based packet filters as
a way to control IP spoofing. The basic idea in this scheme
is that, assuming single-path routing, there is exactly one
single path p(s, d) between source node s and destination
node d. Hence, any packets with source address s and
destination address d that appear in a router not in p(s, d)
should be discarded. However, constructing a specific
route-based packet filter in a node requires the knowledge
of global routing decisions made by all the other nodes in
the network, which is hard to reconcile on the current
BGP-based Internet routing infrastructure [5].
Inspired by the idea of route-based packet filters, Inter
Domain Packet Filter (IDPF) architecture has been
proposed. The IDPF architecture takes advantage of the
fact that while network connectivity may imply a large
number of potential paths between source and destination
domains, commercial relationships between
ASes(Autonomous System) act to restrict to a much
smaller set, the number of feasible paths that can be used
to carry traffic from the source to the destination[7].
It is investigated how other AS relationship and routing
information may help further improve the performance of
IDPFs in our future work. The system shows that locally
exchanged routing information between neighbors, i.e.,
BGP route updates, is sufficient to identify feasible paths
and construct IDPFs, assuming all ASes on the Internet
employ a set of routing policies that are commonly used
today [15, 10]. Like route-based packet filters [4], the
proposed IDPFs cannot stop all spoofed packets. However,
when spoofed packets are not filtered out, IDPFs can help
localize the origin of attack packets to a small set of ASes,
which can significantly improve the IP traceback situation
[ 5].
Fig -1: Intruder in communication
Internet Protocol (IP) is a basic protocol for transferring
data over the Internet network. IP spoofing is the method
of creating an IP packet using a fake IP address that is
duplicating a legal and legitimate IP address with the
intention of attacking a network in order to gain
illegitimate access. The attack is based on the fact that
origination address is generally ignored by routers while
handling internet connection between distant computers.
Routers finds the best route by examining the destination
address.
Trusted Node Victim

2. RELATED WORK
The idea of IDPF is based on the study of the relationship
between network topology and the effectiveness of route-
based packet filtering. Unicast reverse path forwarding
(uRPF) [9] requires that a packet is forwarded only when
the interface that the packet arrives on is exactly the same
used by the router to reach the source IP of the packet.
Packet is dropped if the interface does not match. While
simple, the scheme is limited given that Internet routing is
inherently asymmetric, i.e., the forward and reverse paths
between a pair of hosts are often quite different. Hence,
the loose mode is less effective in detecting spoofed
packets. In Hop-Count Filtering (HCF) [10], each end
system maintains a mapping between IP address
aggregates and valid hop counts from the origin to the end
system. Packets that arrive with a different hop count are
suspicious and are therefore discarded or marked for
further processing. In Path Identification [11], each packet
along a path is marked by a unique Path identifier (Pi) of
the path. Victim nodes can filter packets based on Pi
carried in the packet header. StackPi [12] improved the
incremental deployment property of Pi by proposing two
new packet marking schemes. In the Packet Passport
System [13], a packet originated from a participating
domain carries a passport that is computed based on
secret keys shared by the source domain and the transit
domains from source to destination. Packets carrying an
invalid passport are discarded by the transit domains.
In the Network Ingress Filtering proposal described in
[14], traffic originating from a network is forwarded only
if the source IP in the packets belongs to the network.
Ingress filtering basically prevents a specific network from
being used to attack others. Thus, while there is a
collective social benefit in everyone deploying it,
individuals do not receive direct incentives.
3. PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
A. BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL AND AS
INTERCONNECTIONS:
BGP pis known for performing inter-domain routing in
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)
networks. BGP is an exterior gateway protocol (EGP),
which means that it performs routing between multiple
ASes or domains and exchanges routing and reachability
information with other BGP systems. As BGP is an
incremental protocol, it generates updates only in
response to network events. In the absence of any event,
no route updates are triggered or exchanged between
neighbors, and the routing system is said to be in a stable
state. Formally, Definition 1 (Stable Routing State): A
routing system is in a stable state if all the nodes have
selected a best route to reach other nodes and no route
updates are generated (and propagated) by any node.
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is one of the core
routing protocol of the Internet. It maintains a table of IP
networks or 'prefixes' which designate network reach
ability among ASes. It is described as a path vector
protocol.
To begin with, let us consider the AS graph of the Internet
as an undirected graph G = (V, E). Each node v V
corresponds to an AS (AS), and each edge e(u,v) E
represents a BGP session between two neighboring ASes
u,v V . It is assumed that there is at most one edge between
neighboring ASes. BGP route updates which can be a
announcement or withdrawal, are exchanged by nodes to
learn the changes (if any) to reach destination ability
prefixes. A route announcement list contains a list of route
attributes associated with the destination network prefix.
Of particular interest to us is the path vector attribute,
as_path, which is the sequence of ASes that this route has
been propagated over. Let r.as_path be used to denote the
AS path attribute of route r and r.prefix the destination
network prefix of r. Let r.as_path = (vk, vk-1…v1v0). The
route was first announced (originated) by node v0, which
owns the address space as described by r.prefix. Before
arriving at node vk , the route was carried over nodes
v1,v2,…vk-1 that order. Route r and its AS path r.as_path
can be used interchangeably. For convenience, consider a
specific destination node d, all route announcements and
withdrawals are specific to the network prefixes owned by
d. Notation d can also be used to denote the network
prefixes owned by the node. Hence, a route r can be used
to denote the route to reach the destination d.
1. Policies and Route Selection:
A single best route to the destination (if any) is selected
and propagated by a node to its neighbors. BGP is a policy-
based routing protocol, where both the selection and the
propagation of best routes are guided by locally defined
routing policies. Two distinct sets of routing policies are
usually employed by a node: import policies and export
policies. Neighbor-specific import policies are applied
upon routes learned from neighbors, whereas neighbor-
specific export policies are applied on locally-selected best
routes before they are propagated to the neighbors. Let r
be a route (to destination d) received at v from node u.
The possibly modified route that has been transformed by
the import policies can be denoted by import (v u) [{r}].
After the routes are passed through the import policies at
node v, they are stored in v's routing table. The set of all
such routes is denoted as candidateR (v,d): candidateR (v,
d) = { r : import(v u)[{r}] {} r.prefix = d; u N(v)}. (1) Here,
N(v) is the set of v's neighbors Out of all the members of
candidateR (v,d), node v selects a single best route to
reach the destination based on a defined procedure(see
[3]). The outcome of the selection procedure at node v, i.e.,
the best route, is denoted as bestR (v,d), which reads best
route to destination d at node v After selecting bestR (v,d)
from candidateR(v,d), v exports the route to its neighbors
after applying neighbor specific export policies. The
export policies determine if a route should be forwarded
to the neighbor, and if so, modify the route attributes
according to the policies. (Section III-B) export(v u)[{r}]

denote the route sent to neighbor u by node v, after node v
applies the export policies on route r.
Table -1: Import routing policies at an as
Table -2: Route export rules at an as
Table -2: Route export rules at an as
2. AS Relationships and Routing Policies:
A pair of ASs can enter into one of the following
arrangements: [6], [8]
• Provider to customer: In this arrangement, provider AS
gets paid by customer AS to carry its traffic. It is most
common when the customer is smaller in size and
provider is much larger in size than customer.
• Peer to peer: In a mutual peering agreement, the Ass
decides to carry traffic from each other (and their
customers).
• Mutual Peers: They do not carry transit traffic fo each
other.
• Sibling to sibling: Two ASs can provide mutual transit
service to each other. One sibling AS can be regarded as
the provider of the other AS
In this paper it is assumed that each AS sets its import
routing policies and export routing policies according to
the rules specified in Table I [7] and Table II [6], [8],
respectively. In Table I r1,r2 denote are the routes (to
destination) received by node v from the neighbors u1,u2
respectively and customer(v), peer(v), provider(v) and
sibling(v) denote the set of customers, peers, providers
and siblings of node v respectively. According to Import
routing policies from Table I, an AS will prefer the routes
learned from customers or siblings over the routes
learned from peers or providers.
In Table II, the columns marked with r1-r4 denote the
export policies employed by an AS to announce routes to
providers, customers, peers, and siblings, respectively. For
instance, export rule r1 states that an AS will announce
routes to its own networks, and routes learned from
customers and siblings to a provider, but it will not
announce routes learned from other providers and peers
to the provider. Hence, number of possible paths between
each pair of ASes is limited. The export policies described
in Table I are not complete. In a few cases, less restrictive
policies may be applied by ASes inorder to satisfy traffic
engineering goals. For the moment, assume that all ASes
follow the rules r1-r4 and that each AS accepts legal routes
exported by neighbors. If AS b is a provider of AS a, and AS
c is a provider of AS b, then c is an indirect provider of a,
and a an indirect customer of c. Indirect siblings are
defined in a similar fashion. Rules r1-r4 implies that an AS
will distribute the routes to direct or indirect
customers/siblings to its peers and providers. If e(u, v)
bestR(s,d).as path, then u is the best upstream neighbor of
node v for traffic from node s to destination d, and denote
u as u = bestU(s, d, v). An edge from a provider to a
customer AS is referred as a provider-to-customer edge,
an edge from a customer to provider as a customer-to-
provider edge, and an edge connecting sibling (peering)
ASes as sibling-to-sibling (peer-to-peer) edge. A downhill
path is a sequence of edges that are either provider-to-
customer or sibling-to-sibling edges, and an uphill path is
a sequence of edges that are either customer-to-provider
or sibling-to-sibling edges. Gao [9] established the
following theorem about the candidate routes in a BGP
routing table. Theorem 1 (Gao [9]): If all ASes set their
export policies according to r1-r4, any candidate route in a
BGP routing table is either (a) an uphill path, (b) a
downhill path, (c) an uphill path followed by a downhill
path, (d) an uphill path followed by a peer-to-peer edge,
(e) a peer-to-peer edge followed by a downhill path, or (f)
an uphill path followed by a peer-to-peer edge, which is
followed by a downhill path.
B. INTER DOMAIN PACKET FILTERS:
In this section, the idea behind the IDPF architecture,
using BGP updates IDPF construction is described, and
establishment of the correctness of IDPFs is discussed.
Later the cases where ASes have routing policies that are
less restrictive than ones in Tables I and II is also
discussed. Let us assume that the routing system is in the
stable routing state in this section.
Let M(s, d) denote a packet that has source address as s,
and destination address as d. A packet filtering scheme
decides if the packet can be forwarded or dropped based
on certain criteria. One example is the route based packet
filtering [4]:
Definition 2 (Route-Based Packet Filtering): Node v
accepts packet M(s, d) forwarded from node u if and only
if e(u, v) ϵ bestR(s, d). Else the source address of the
packet is considered as spoofed, and the packet is
discarded by v.
Even with the perfect routing information, the route based
packet filter would not be able to identify spoofed packet
[4], a valid packet filter should focus on not dropping any
If (u1 ∈ customer(v) ∪ sibling(v)) and (u2 ∈ peer (v) ∪
provider(v)) then r1.local_pref>r2.local_pref
- - - P
—> cu

valid packets and possessing a capability to limit spoofed
packets. Accordingly correctness of packet filter is defined
as follows.
Definition 3(Correctness of Packet Filtering): A packet
filter is correct if it do not discard packets having valid
source addresses when the routing system is stable.
Since valid packets from source ’s’ to destination ‘d’ will
only traverse the edges on bestR(s, d), clearly the route
based packet filtering is correct. Computation of route-
based packet filters requires the knowledge of bestR(s, d)
on every node, which is impossible in BGP. IDPF
overcomes this problem.
1. IDPF Overview: A topological route between
nodes s and d is a loop free path between the two nodes.
Such routes (topological) are implied by network
connectivity.
A topological route is a feasible route under BGP if and
only if the construction of the route does not violate the
routing policies imposed by the relationship between ASes
(Table I and II). Let feasibleR(s, d) be the set of feasible
routes from source s to destination d, it can be defined as
follows:
feasibleR(s, d)) = { < s ⊕ U feasibleR(u, d) > },
u: import(s ← u)[{r}] ≠ {},
r.prefix = d, u ∈ N(s)
Where ⊕ is the concatenation operation, for example:
{ s ⊕ {<ab>, <uv>}} = {<sab>,<suv> }. It is noticed that
feasibleR(s, d) contains all the routes between the pair
that does not violate the import and export routing
policies given in Table I and II. Obviously, bestR(s, d) ϵ
candidateR(s, d) feasibleR(s, d). Each of the feasible routes
can potentially be a candidate route in a BGP routing table.
Theorem 1 also applies to feasible routes.
Fig -2: An example of network topology
(a)Topological routes implied by connectivity
(b) Feasible routes constrained by routing policies
Fig 3. Routes between source s and destination d
Definition 4 (Feasible Upstream Neighbor): Consider a
feasible route r ϵ feasibleR(s, d). If an edge e(u, v) ϵ
r.as_path, then node u is a feasible upstream neighbor of
node v for packet M(s, d). The set of all such feasible
upstream neighbors of v is denoted as feasibleU(s, d, v).
The idea behind IDPF framework is as following:
Firstly, a node v is able to infer its feasible upstream
neighbors using BGP route updates. This technique is
described in next sub-section. A node can only allow M(s,
d) from its feasible upstream neighbor to pass and discard
all other packets since, bestR(s, d) ϵ candidateR(s, d)
feasibleR(s, d). Such a filtering will not discard legitimate
packets. Secondly, although network connectivity may
imply a large number of topological routes between a
source and destination, commercial relationship between
ASes and routing policies employed by ASes act to restrict
the size of feasibleR(s, d). Consider an example [13] in
Figure 2. Figure 3(a) and 3(b) represent the topological
routes implied by network connectivity and feasible
routes constrained by routing between source s and d. In
figure 3(b) it is assumed that nodes a, b, c and d have
mutual peering relationship, and that a and b are
providers to s. Although there are 10 topological routes
between source s and d, there are only 2 feasible routes
that are supported by routing policies in Table (I and II).
Of more important to IDPF is that, feasible routes
constrained by routing policies help limit the set of such
neighbors. For an example, let us consider the situation at
node d. Given that only nodes ‘a' and ‘b’ (but not c) are on
the feasible routes from s to d can infer that all packets
forwarded by node c are spoofed and must be discarded.
Hence IDPF is less powerful than route-based packet
filters [4] because IDPF filters are computed based on
feasibleR(s, d) instead of bestR(s, d). However, feasible
routes can be inferred from local BGP updates while best
routes cannot.
2. Construction of IDPF:
The technique to identify the feasible upstream neighbors
of node v for packet M(s, d) is summarized by the
following lemma.

Lemma 1: Consider a feasible route r between source s
and destination d. Let v ϵ r.as_path and u be the feasible
upstream neighbor of node v along r. When the routing
system is stable, export (u-> v)[{bestR(u, s)}] ≠{},
assuming that all ASes follow the import and export
routing policies in Tables I and II and that each AS accepts
legitimate routes exported by neighbors [13]. Lemma 1
states that if node u is a feasible upstream neighbor of
node v for packet M(s, d), node u must have exported to
node v its best route to reach the source s [13].
Proof: Since Theorem 1 applies to feasible routes, a
feasible route can be one of the six types of paths in
Theorem 1. In the following it is assumed that the feasible
route r is of type (c), i.e., an uphill path followed by a
downhill path. Cases where r has other types (a), (b), (d)-
(f) can be similarly proved. To prove the lemma, consider
the possible positions of nodes u and v in the feasible
route.
Case 1: Nodes u and v belong to the uphill path. Then node
s must be an (indirect) customer or sibling of node u. From
the import routing policies in Table I and the export
routing policy r1 and the definition of indirect customers-
siblings, it is followed that u will propagate to (provider)
node v the reachability information of s [13].
Case 2: Nodes u and v belong to the downhill path. Let e(x,
y) be the peer-to-peer edge along the feasible route r and
note that u is an (indirect) customer of y. The node y
learns the reachability information of s from x, based on
the import routing policies in Table 1 and the export
routing policy r3. From the export routing policy r2 and
the definition of indirect customers, node y will propagate
the reachability information of s to node u, which will
further export the reachability information of s to
(customer) node v [13].
Based on Lemma 1, a node can classify the feasible
upstream neighbors for packet M(s, d) and consider the
behavior of IDPF as follows:
Definition 5 (Inter-Domain Packet Filtering (IDPF)): Node
v will accept packet M(s, d) forwarded by a neighbor node
u, if and only if export (u -> v)[{bestR(u, s)}] ≠ {} [13].
Otherwise, the source address of the packet must have
been spoofed, and the packet should be discarded by node
v [13].
3. Correctness of IDPF:
Theorem 3: An IDPF as defined in Definition 5 is correct
[13].
Proof: Without loss of simplification, consider source s,
destination d, and a node v ϵ bestR(s, d).as_path such that
v deploys an IDPF filter. In order to prove the correctness
of the theorem, it is need to establish that v will not
discard packet M(s, d) forwarded by the best upstream
neighbor u, along bestR(s, d).
From the best route selection process, the best route
between a source and destination is also a feasible route
between the two (bestR(s, d) ϵ candidateR(s, d))
feasibleR(s, d)). Therefore, u is also a feasible upstream
neighbor of node v for packet M(s, d). From Lemma 1, it is
concluded that, export (u -> v) [{bestR(u, s)}] ≠{}, that is u
must have exported to node v its best route to source s.
From Definition 5, packet M(s, d) forwarded by node u will
not be discarded by v, and the correctness of the theorem
is established [13].
4. Routing Dynamics:
Consider two different types of routing dynamics: 1) those
caused by network failures; 2) and those caused by the
creation of a new network (or recovery from a fail-down
network event) [13].
For the first type of routing dynamics, the possibility that
the filter will block a valid IP packet can be eliminated. It is
illustrated as follows: Consider an IDPF facilitated AS v
that is on the best route from s to d. Let u = bestU(s, d, v),
and let U = feasibleU(s, d, v). If a link or router fails
between u and s, it can have following three outcomes:
1) AS u can still reach AS s, and u is still preferred to
be the best upstream neighbor for packet M(s, d), i.e, u =
bestU(s, d, v). In this situation, although u may travel and
announce multiple routes to v during the path exploration
process [14], the filtering function of v is unaffected.
2) AS u is no longer the best upstream neighbor for
packet M(s, d); another feasible upstream neighbor u' ϵ U
can reach AS s and is instead chosen to be the new best
upstream neighbor (for M(s, d)) [13]. Now, both u and u'
may explore multiple routes; however, since u' has already
announced a route (about s) to v, the IDPF at v can
correctly filter (i.e., accept) packet M(s, d) forwarded from
u' [13].
3) No feasible upstream neighbors can reach s.
Therefore, AS v will also not be able to reach s, and v will
no longer be on the best route between s and d. Hence, no
new packet M(s, d) should be sent through v.
The second type of routing dynamics relates to how newly
connected network or a network recovered from a fail-
down event will be affected. In general, a network may
start sending data immediately following the
announcement of a new prefix, even before the route has
time to propagate to the rest of the Internet [13]. In the
time that it takes for the route to be propagated, some
packets (from this prefix) may be discarded by some
IDPFs if the reachability information has not yet
propagated to them. In general, the time taken for new
prefix information to reach an IDPF is proportional to the
shortest AS path between the IDPF and the initiator of the
prefix and independent of the number of alternate paths
between the two [13]. Sometimes in the short timescales,
it is acceptable for IDPFs to potentially behave incorrectly,

i.e. discarding valid packets originated from the new
network prefix, before the corresponding BGP
announcements reach the IDPFs.
But in this case, the packets are stored, till the packet is
alive. Once the packet is time out, BGP announcements are
sent to the IDPF’s and the new feasible routes are found.
The packet is then sent through those new feasible routes.
Thus, the packet is not discarded by handling the network
dynamically.
C. IP TRACEBACK
IP traceback is to find the origin of an IP packet on the
Internet without trusting on the source IP address field.
The source IP address of a packet is not authenticated, due
to the trusting nature of the IP protocol. Therefore, the
source address in an IP packet can be falsified (IP address
spoofing). Spoofed IP packets can be used for different
attacks. IP traceback problem is known as the problem of
finding source of a packet. IP traceback is a critical ability
for identifying sources of attacks and instituting
protection measures for the Internet. Most existing
approaches to this problem have been tailored toward
DDoS attack detection.
Inter Domain Packet Filter is used to find the feasible
routes. If the packet is not among the set of the feasible
routes, it is detected as spoofed packet and is discarded.
The spoofed packet’s route is traced to detect the intruder
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed an inter-domain packet filter
(IDPF) architecture as an effective guard against the IP
Spoofing-based DDoS attacks. IDPFs rely on BGP update
messages exchanged on the Internet to assess the validity
of source address of a packet forwarded by a neighbor.
The conditions under which IDPF framework can work
correctly without discarding any valid packets are stated.
It is observed that by deploying IDPFs on the Internet, the
spoofing capability of attackers can significantly be
limited. In addition, they also help to determine the true
origin of an attack packet thus simplifying the IP traceback
process.
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IRJET- Constructing Inter Domain Packet Filter for Controlling IP Spoofing