Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

• 1.
  Japan’s Post-Fukushima Energy Policy EricJohnston Deputy Editor, The Japan Times ANuclearPastor aNon-Nuclear Future?
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  Japan’s Energy Situation 1.Japan imports 90 percent of energy needs. 2. Due to geopolitical problems, little Russian oil or LNG comes to Japan. 3. Oil and LNG is transported from Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, and coal from Australia. Huge transportation costs and in the case of oil, political uncertainties add to price. 4. U.S. is exporting shale gas in small quantities to Japan, which will increase in coming years. But political issues in US Congress creating uncertainty of guaranteed supply. Alaska wants Japan to help build an LNG pipeline.
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  Japan’s Energy Mix 28.6 10.7 1.71 1月24日 25 27.6 30.329.3 39.5 42.5 43.2 7.1 14.4 18.3 14.9 8.3 9 8.4 8.5 1.1 1.4 1.6 2.2 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 2010 2011 2012 2013 PERCENTAGES Nuclear Coal LNG Oil Hydro Renewables
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  Nuclear Pre 3/11 Before March 11, 2011, there were 54 commercial nuclear reactors in Japan supplying about 1/3 of Japan’s electricity.  Each reactor generated between 540 megawatts electricity (MWe) and 1.3 gigawatts (GWe). 1,000 megawatts = 1 gigawatt.  There had also been plans to ramp up the share of nuclear power to as much as 40 percent by mid-century by building new plants to replace aging ones.
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  Why Did Japan GoNuclear in the first place? ABrief(verybrief)History
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  The End ofWWII and the Occupation Japan went to war at least partially to secure oil and gas reserves for its growing domestic industries. The dream of becoming ``self-sufficient’’ in energy production had haunted the country since the late 1800s, after Japan opened to the outside world after two and a half centuries of isolation. The postwar U.S.-led Occupation of Japan made the country a U.S. ally in the Pacific against communism. Japan got access to fossil fuel sources from U.S. allies, but the independent energy dream never died.
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  1953: A ChanceMeeting At Harvard Yasuhiro Nakasone Henry Kissinger
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  Dec. 1953: AtomsFor Peace Concerned about other nations, allied or otherwise, pursuing their own nuclear technology programs, President Dwight Eisenhower announces in the United Nations the ``Atoms for Peace’’ program, the practical result being that the U.S. supplies nuclear knowhow and technology to friendly nations like Japan wanting it for ``peaceful purposes.’’ In March 1954, Nakasone manages to get the first-ever budget for nuclear research passed in parliament, thus beginning Japan’s road to nuclear power.
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  Selling Nuclear To ASkeptical Nation SHORIKI MATSUTARO Yomiuri Shimbun owner, friend of Nakasone, convicted war criminal, CIA agent, and The Godfather of Japanese Pro Baseball and the Japanese Nuclear Power Industry ZENSAKU AZUMA Japan’s Charles Lindbergh’’, extremely popular with the public, promoted eating uranium-laced food, extolled nuclear power (and cigarettes), and died of cancer.
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  The Three ElectricityLaws: Payoffs to the Provinces By the early 1970s, Japan had built its first commercial nuclear reactors using American, British, and French technology and knowhow. But as the dangers of nuclear power, and concerns about nuclear weapons, grew, and following the 1973 oil shock, Japan’s leaders realized that in order to overcome antinuclear sentiment and build more plants, local governments where the power plants were located needed to be financially compensated. In the mid-1970s, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s government passed three new laws that provided funding to any locality that agreed to host a nuclear power plant. Thus was born the ``nuclear power village’’ of national government officials, utilities, and local governments and businesses that we know today.
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  HowMuch Official FundingDoLocal GovernmentsGet? Model Case: Construction of a 1.35GW nuclear power plant. Assumptions (1) Environmental Impact Study takes three years (2) Construction takes seven years (3) Plant Operates for 40 years Over a 45 year period, from beginning of environmental assessment to the 35th year of the plant’s operation, local governments hosting the plant can receive 121.5 billion yen, or almost 1.2 billion dollars under the Electricity Laws. This does not include additional donations from the utility or other unofficial forms of assistance. TOTAL AMOUNT A LOCAL TOWN OR VILLAGE RECEIVES FOR HOSTING A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: Nobody Really Knows.
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  Ye Olde NuclearVillage For over four decades, the ``nuclear power village’’ has kept opposition to nuclear power at bay. Four years after 3/11, though, a powerful struggle between the powerful village and renewable energy proponents threatens the village as never before.
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  RENEWABLE ENERGY: Talkin’ `bouta Revolution! Post-3/11 Developments X
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  The Nuclear VillageUnder Attack Inthemonthsafter3/11,polls showedthat upto90percentofJapanesewantedoutof nuclearpower. Seizingtheopportunity,renewableenergy advocatespushedhardtowinpoliticaland financialsupport.Formonths,thenuclear village wasunderattackbythemedia, politicians,andthepublicatlargeasthe nationaskeditselffundamentalquestions aboutwhyithadembracednucleartobegin withandhowitcouldmoveoutofnuclear powerandintorenewables.
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  Renewable Energy advocatespushed hard for a Feed-In Tariff after 3/11. The (then) ruling Democratic Party of Japan favored the FIT, especially Prime Minister Naoto Kan. It was strongly opposed by the Nuclear Power Village but passed at the end of August, 2011– the sam day Kan resigned over his handling of 3/11. The new tariff went into effect on July 1st, 2012: The New Tariff means businesses in five renewable energy sectors can sell their power at a guaranteed fixed rate over a fixed period of time. Utilities are required to purchase renewable energy at that price, but can refuse if they judge, for reasons not always clear, that to do so would create distribution problems.
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  THE FEED-IN TARIFFS SOLARPOWER Output Range ABOVE 10 KW BELOW 10KW Basic Tariff (per kilowatt/hour) (as of July 1, 2015) 27 yen/kWh 33-35yen/kWh PERIOD 20 years 10 years
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  THE FEED-IN TARIFFS WINDPOWER TYPE BELOW 20kW ABOVE 20 kW OFFSHORE BASIC TARIFF 55 yen/kWh 22 yen/kWh 36 yen/kWh PERIOD 20 years
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  THE NEW FEED-INTARIFFS GEOTHERMAL POWER Output Range ABOVE 15,000 KW BELOW 15,000 KW Basic Tariff (per kilowatt/hour) 26 yen/kWh 40 yen/kWh PERIOD 15 years
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  THE NEW FEED-INTARIFFS (for NEW facilities) MINI-HYDRO Output Range 1mW- 30mW 200kW- 1mW Under 200kW Basic Tariff (per kilowatt hour) 24 yen/kWh 29 yen/kWh 34 yen/kWh PERIOD 20 years
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  THE NEW FEED-INTARIFFS BIOMASS Sector Wood (unused) Wood (general) Building Waste Wood Construction waste- related Biomass Methane Type 2,000 kW or more Under 2,000 kW Unused Wood Products General Wood Various Sewer sludge, etc. Basic Tariff (per kwH) 32 40 yen/kW yen/kW 24 yen/kWh 13 yen/kWh 17 yen/kWh 39 yen/kWh Period 20 years
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  The Current Situation asof FEBRUARY 2015 TYPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY CUMULATIVE CERTIFIED CAPACITY PV (under 10 kW) 3.633 GW PV (over 10 kw) 70.9 GW Wind 1.986 GW Mini-Hydro 0.567 GW Geothermal 0.069 GW Biomass 1.529 GW TOTAL 78.684 GW
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  BUT, the actualamount in operation as of JANUARY 2015 TYPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY CUMULATIVE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY PV (under 10 kW) 2.95 GW PV (over 10 kw) 13.3 GW Wind 0.255 GW Mini-Hydro 0.044 GW Geothermal 0.002 GW Biomass 0.151 GW TOTAL 16.71 GW
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  The Good News: Photovoltaic(Solar) Systems According to the Yano Research Institute, thanks to the 2012 Feed In Tariff, Japan was ranked first in the world in terms of installed Solar PV power generation in 2014. Unofficial estimate of how much power solar energy could ``feasibly’’ generate: 100-150GW
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  The Good News:Offshore Wind Power A 2 megawatt offshore wind power facility was built off the coast of Fukushima prefecture, almost within site of the crippled nuclear power plant. Operation commenced in November 2013. This will be followed by two 7 MW offshore wind turbines installed in March. Studies show Fukushima and Japanese coastal areas are ideal for offshore wind farms. No concerns about noise complaints, and wider area of potential establishment than land-based wind farms, which means they can be located closer to the grid. Japan’s potential offshore wind power capacity: 1,600GW
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  Local Governments, NOTTokyo are leading the way to a renewable future OPERATING CAPACITY (Dec. 2014, kW) Rank Prefecture SOLAR WIND HYDRO GEOTHERMAL BIOMASS TOTAL 1 FUKUOKA 831,653 1 23 0 190 831,867 2 MIYAGI 783,305 16,000 1,600 0 16,740 817,645 3 AICHI 767,075 12,000 0 0 0 779,075 4 HYOGO 728,185 12,000 6 0 7,457 747,648 5 CHIBA 694,784 0 330 0 1,770 696,884 6 KAGOSHIMA 628,203 33,602 1,676 0 0 663,481 7 SHIZUOKA 585,572 0 1,043 0 95 586,710 8 TOCHIGI 557,111 0 690 0 2,815 560,616 9 GUNMA 522,158 0 73 0 400 522,631 10 SAITAMA 492,850 0 326 0 1,813 494,989 NATIONWIDE (as of Dec.31st, 2014) 15,408,838 226,922 43,701 906 136,016 15,816,382
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  But It’s NotAll Good News PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES TO REALIZING A RENEWABLE FUTURE
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  1 TECHINCAL/LOGISTICAL CHALLENGS
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  CHALLENGE A: TheGrid System Grids to Major Urban Centers (electricityusers): locations bestsuitedfor renewableenergyprojects, particularlylarge-scalesolar farmsandwind farms,often locatedin rural areasfar awayfromurbanusers. Japanis divided into 60 Hz grids(for western Japan) and 50 Hz (for eastern and northern Japan), meaning a nationwiderenewable grid is not commercially feasible.
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  CHALLENGE A: TheGrid System
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  CHALLENGE B: Regional UtilityMonopoly System  10 major utilities largely control the generation, distribution, and sale of electric power in Japan. They set prices in general agreement with each other, and new players to the energy market have to deal with them if they want to get connected to a piece of the national grid.  Utilities have nearly total control over which electricity generation sources they send down to the grid to customers, and their motto is always the same, ``Safe, Stable, and Secure’’ electricity supply, at a fixed price.
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  CHALLENGE B: Regional UtilityMonopoly System
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  PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: SOLARPOWER Rapidly improving solar technologies makes Japan’s highly conservative electricity industry cautious about installing solar power technology now that will be out of date in one or two years. Worries about securing a ``safe and stable’’ electricity supply during cloudy nights, at night, etc., and insufficent battery storage technologies. Battle between Large Solar Farm proponents and Small Solar Products/Residential Area proponents over direction of industry. Nuclear lobby’s anti-solar campaign (``nobody wants solar farms in their backyard’’, ``it’s still too expensive’’) is working.
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  PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: WINDPOWER FIT needs to be based on wind conditions of location, not a fixed amount of power generation for all locations. Noise: Local communities complain about loud windmills Birds: Bird strikes and migratory patterns mean strict environmental regulations on wind farm development. Remoteness: Best Locations for On-Shore windmills often located far from urban centers, necessitating expensive grid connections.
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  PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: GEOTHERALPOWER 1) Vast majority of Japan’s geothermal resources in National Park areas: Strict environmental regulations. 2) Many ideal geothermal locations on, or beside, onsens (hot spring resorts) whose politically-connected owners oppose geothermal development for business reasons. 3) Geothermal requires heavy initial investment. High cost to maintain and repair plants. 4) Public fears, aided by pro-nuclear propagandists, that geothermal drilling causes earthquakes.
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  PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: MINI-HYDRO POWER  Requires rivers and streams with regular flows of water at ideal speeds, and those can be hard to find.  Strict gradation requirements often means construction work is needed, creating further environmental damage.  Remote areas of many ideal mini-hydro spots means increased costs to deliver generated electricity.
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  PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: BIOMASS 1)Bureaucratic turf wars in Japan means a regulatory nightmare, little cooperation between ministries (Environment, Forestry, Trade and Industry) to promote different biomass forms. 2) Opposition from both the pro- nuclear business lobby and from environmentalists who warn burning biomass for fuel will simply increase greenhouse gas emissions. 3) Lack of government and major corporate interest in biomass, compared to solar and wind.
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  GENERAL CHALLENGES TO GETTINGOUT OF NUCLEAR AND INTO RENEWABLE ENERGY:
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  1) Outdated Structureof Established Anti-Nuclear Groups. a) Traditional anti-nuclear NGO leaders now well into their 60s, 70s, and 80s, and have been protesting for over four decades. a) Often have limited understanding of, or interest in, modern NGO leadership techniques, media and public outreach strategies, or broad- based public education of the issues.
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  2) Provincialism Because anti-nucleargroups have traditionally been local community-based, they can be extremely provincial and suspicious of outsiders. Town A’s anti-nuclear groups don’t talk or care much about Town B’s anti- nuclear groups. When cooperation occurs, it’s often at the ``let’s exchange information’’ level only, not at the political action level.
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  3) Group-ism Seniority, deferringto one’s elders, and group consensus cultural traits mean young people (i.e. those under 50 years of age) feel shut out by traditional anti-nuclear groups. As a result, such groups played something of a secondary role in the mass public demonstrations against nuclear power after March 11, 2011.
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  4) Divisions WithinAnti-Nuke Movement Factionalism Within Anti-Nuclear Organizations Themselves: For decades, many of the groups in Japan seeking the abolishment of nuclear weapons were actually pro- nuclear power. Even today, most of the main groups that organize the yearly protests against nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki are often reluctant to come out strongly against nuclear power because their members work at utilities.
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  Problems With RenewableEnergy Groups Bottom Up Versus Top Down: Major NGOs and other organizations promoting renewable energy are Tokyo-based, and generally favor a top-down approach whereby the central government leads and local governments follow. Local governments and businesses often favor a more decentralized, bottom-up approach (localized small-scale renewable energy projects with revised local ordinances to make them happen)
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  Problems With RenewableEnergy Groups The Big Guys versus the New Players: Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sharp, Sanyo, Toyota, Kyocera. . . these are just some of the huge Japanese firms making heavy investments in renewable energy technologies and massive projects. Clearly, the new FIT is tilted in their favor. But the kind of innovation from small and medium-sized firms like we see in the U.S., as well as Canada, China, South Korea, India, and parts of Europe is not as high- profile. It’s all occurring (mostly) under the radar.
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  Problems with RenewableEnergy Groups ``Solar? Wind? Geothermal’’?Competition And Factionalism Within The Renewable Energy Movement Creates Public Confusion and Doubt: Solar, wind, mini-hydro, biomass and geothermal advocates lobby hard for their chosen energy source. Policy makers at the local and national level want the ``best energy mix’’ that offers ``safe, stable, and secure’’ electricity generation. But WHICH combination of renewables meets the goal in the short and medium-term? Depends on who you talk to.
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  Problems with RenewableEnergy Groups Weakness in Addressing Specific Public Concerns about Higher Electricity Bills for Individuals and Possible Negative Effects on Industries Using Lots of Electricity
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  HOWEVER. . . FORALL OF THE PROBLEMS WITH RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE PROBLEMS WITH A RETURN TO NUCLEAR ARE MUCH GREATER
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  Problem 1:AGING REACTORS 12out of the 50 reactors are now over 36 years old. SEVEN are now over 40 years old. The life-span of Japan’s nuclear reactors is officially considered 40 years. At the end of the 40 year cycle, the operator can apply for a 20 year extension, theoretically extending the life of a plant to 60 years.
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  Japan’s Aging NuclearReactors (as of 2015) Name of Utility Name of Reactor Age KANSAI ELECTRIC Mihama No. 1 reactor 45 years old Mihama No. 2 reactor 43 years old Mihama No. 3 reactor 39 years old Oi No. 1 reactor 36 years old Oi No. 2 reactor 36 years old Takahama No. 1 reactor 41 years old Takahama No. 2 reactor 40 years old CHUGOKU ELECTRIC Shimane No. 1 reactor 41 years old SHIKOKU ELECTRIC Ikata No. 1 reactor 38 years old KYUSHU ELECTRIC Genkai No. 1 reactor 40 years old NIHON GENDEN Higashiumi Dai Ni 37 years old Tsuruga No. 1 reactor 45 years old
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  PROBLEM NUMBER TWO: SPENTFUEL POOLS ALMOST FULL: ``Building a nuclear power plant is like building a house without a toilet.’’ Once nuclear fuel is burned, the resulting spent fuel waste is removed from the reactor and stored in cooling pools. But. ..
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  NUMBER OF YEARSAFTER RESTART UNTIL SPENT FUEL POOLS ARE FULL NAME OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND REACTORS LESS THAN SIX YEARS REMAINING UNTIL FULL (33 of 50 reactors) Tomari No. 1, 2 (Hokkaido); Onogawa No. 1, 2 (Miyagi) Fukushima Daichi 1 No. 5, 6; Fukushima Daini, No. 1-4 Kashiwazaki-Karuiwa No. 1-7 (Tepco) Hamaoka No. 3,4 (Chubu), Mihama No. 1, 2; Oi 1, 2; Takahama 1, 2 (Kepco) Shimane No. 1, Ikata No. 1,2 (Shikoku) Genkai No. 1-4 (Kyushu) BETWEEN SIX AND TWELVE YEARS REMAINING UNTIL FULL (14 of 50 reactors) Higashidori (Aomori) Onogawa No. 3 (Miyagi) Tsuruga No. 1,2 (Fukui) Hamaoka No. 5 (Shizuoka) Shiga No. 1,2 (Ishikawa) Mihama No. 3 (Fukui) Oi No. 3, 4 (Fukui) Takahama No. 3, 4 (Fukui) Shimane No. 2 (Shimane) Sendai No. 2 (Kagoshima) MORE THAN 12 YEARS (3 reactors) Tomari No. 3 (Hokkaido) Ikata No. 3 (Ehime) Sendai No. 1 (Kagoshima)
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  SO, NOW WHAT? Currently,14,200 tons of spent nuclear fuel sits in storage at Japan’s nuclear power plants. Spent fuel pools are now 70 percent full, on average What Are The Options Each Plant Has For Dealing With Spent Fuel? OPTION 1: Ship it the Rokkasho Reprocesssing Plant in Aomori Prefecture OPTION 2: Move it to specially designed mid-term storage containers OPTION 3: Reprocess the spent fuel overseas
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  OPTION 1: Shipit to Rokkasho PROBLEMS The Rokkasho reprocessing plant : 1) Has suffered numerous technical problems, delaying the projected start-up numerous times. 2) Is opposed by not only traditional antinuclear activists but also international nonproliferation experts. 3) Is not expected to go into operation anytime soon. 4) Is already storing 2,945 tons of spent fuel – 98 percent of its storage capacity Rokkasho plant, when it goes into operation, is supposed to take spent nuclear fuel from Japan’s reactors, reprocess it, and send it back to plants to be used again and again.
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  OPTION 2: Mid-termStorage: (spent fuel spends 50 years in offsite facility before ``final’’ disposal at Rokkasho) PROBLEMS: 1) Costs involved with transporting spent fuel by truck or ship from current location to new facility and costs of storage: Who pays? 2) Safety concerns in any locality the waste passes through: What happens if towns and villages or fisherman’s unions oppose shipments, forcing transportation routes to be altered? Will town demand financial compensation from government or utilities for allowing waste to pass through? How does that affect the ultimate cost of ``cheap’’ nuclear power? 3) THE BIGGEST PROBLEM: Local governments around Japan have ignored pleas from Tokyo to host facilities, which would mean nuclear waste in their backyard for at least a half century. THIS IS WHY TOKYO RECENTLY SAID IT WILL DETERMINE LOCATION OF STORAGE FACILITIES RATHER THAN ASK LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO VOLUNTEER TO TAKE THEM
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  OPTION 3: Reprocessit Overseas This has been done on a limited scale. Reprocessing Japanese fuel, which is then returned to Japan and reused, has taken place in England and France. PROBLEMS: 1) Huge Expense, drives up cost/kWh. 2) International Proliferation Risks 3) Refusal of many countries to allow nuclear-laden ships to pass through their waters. 4) Risk of an Accident or Terrorist Attack, sinking or damaging ships transporting nuclear cargo.
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  So what’s theplan for the remaining reactors? (as of April)  Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors 5 and 6 (the ones not damaged by the quake) will be scrapped.  Fukushima Dai-Ni’s four plants will have to be scrapped as it’s politically impossible to restart them.  Five reactors nationwide at least 40 years old will be decommissioned.  24 reactors are under review for possible restart, including two over 40 years old.  Two reactors in Fukui Prefecture that power Kyoto, originally approved by Tokyo for restart, have a provisional injunction against their restart.  Two reactors in Kyushu are thought likely to restart this year, but recent volcano creating concerns.  A reactor in Ehime (Shikoku) could be first to restart
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  ``So, just extendthe older plants’ lives past 40 years.’’ Questions about Safety  Would a plant that is 40 years old pass the stricter safety standards that went into effect in 2013?  Would the operating utility be required to beef up safety measures before government permission for extension past 40 years is granted?  Would local governments hosting the plant need to implement any additional safety measures? Questions about Money Though not a legal requirement, would local authorities grant permission for plant’s life to be extended past 40 years? How much money would they demand (in the form of, for example, ``stronger safety measures’’) from either Tokyo or the operating utility before granting permission? How long would these negotiations over money take, and, ultimately, would they cost the taxpayers money in the form of higher utility bills? Would a nuclear reactor more than 40 years old generate electricity at an economically competitive price?
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  By The Way.. . National Energy Policy requires planning for the mid and long- term –decades, not years. Obviously, the most basic question is, how big will your domestic electricity market be by, say, 2030 or 2040?
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  Future Electricity Demand:Supplying Power to a Smaller, Older Japan Japan’s Population faces a steep decline between now and 2040 2010 population 2015 population 2020 population 2025 population 2030 population 2035 population 2040 population 128.057 million 126.597 million 124.100 million 120.659 million 116.618 million 112.124 million 107.276 million The Working Age Population (15-64) was 81 million in 2010 By 2040, it will be 57 million – a decline of 30 percent
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  Who is Goingto Need Electricity?  In Tokyo, the overall population is expected to decline by just seven percent by 2040, compared to 2010.  However, one-third of Tokyoites (34%) will be over 65 years old (20% in 2010) and 17% (9% in 2010) will be over 75 years old by 2040.  In Osaka, the overall population will decline by 16% by 2040 compared to 2010.  36% of Osakans will be over 65 years old in 2040 (22% in 2010). 20% will be over 75 years old (10% in 2010).  Nationwide, 36% of the population, on average, will be over 65 years old by 2040.  Over one-fifth, 21% ,of Japan will be over 75 years old in 2040.
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  And What If.. .?  20% of the world’searthquakes 5.0 and above on the RichterScale occur in Japan.  Accordingthe Japanesegovernment, the numberaftershocks(not earthquakes)thatmeasured5.0 and above on the differentscaleJapan uses betweenMarch11, 2013 and March10, 2014 was``only’’56. That’sdownfrom653 betweenMarch11, 2011 and March10, 2012.  Do you reallywantbuildmorenuclearreactorsgiventhis seismic reality?
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  So, To SumUp. . . In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country that has 16% less people than it had in 2010 (128 million down to 107 million).  In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country where, overall, more than one-third of the population (36%) has reached retirement age and, presumably, will be consuming less electricity in the workplace than at present.  In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will include the needs of the one-fifth of the country (20%) who are 75 years and above.  In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will provide power to consumer products and businesses that are likely to be far more energy-efficient than is the case today, as technological innovation continues.
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  ``Nuclear power willcontinue to play an important role in Japan’s future energy mix’’. A Reality Check…  In 2040, 45 of the current 50 commercial nuclear power plants will be at least 40 years old (By 2020, 12 will have already reached 40 years of operation)  Assuming their life is extended to 60 years (involving unknown additional costs), 17 of the 50 reactors would be at least 50 years old in 2040.  12 reactors would be over 60 years old by 2040 and would be undergoing decommissioning – including 8 of 14 reactors in Fukui Pref. which supply power to the Kansai region.  You have decommissioning costs of between 35 and 83 billion yen per reactor that will have to be paid, either after 40 or 60 years of operation, ON TOP OF any other costs. ALL OF THESE ARE GOING TO GET PASSED ON TO CONSUMERS.
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  What all thismeans is. . .  By 2020, long-term decisions will have to be made on the first 12 reactors that have reached, or surpassed, 40 years of operation. Continuing their operations means: 1) Getting local permission to operate for another 20 years. This will involve increased use of national tax money for local pet construction projects in return for permission. 2) Making whatever safety and engineering adjustments are needed to get approval for another 20 years. Who pays for such measures? How long will they take to implement? 3) Operating an aging plant, more likely to be in need of increased monitoring and repairs. Will such plants continue to operate at a capacity that keeps the cost per kilowatt hour competitive with LNG or even some renewables?
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  Oh, and don’tforget about those nearly full spent fuel pools.  Even if you extend the life of a 40 year old reactor for 20 years, you still have the problem of what to do with the spent fuel it generates.  Remember, 33 of the nation’s 50 reactors will see their spent fuel pools filled to the brim within about six years if operations are restarted tomorrow. Another 14 will be full a dozen years after being restarted. AND THERE ARE NO NEW STORAGE FACILITIES BEING BUILT AT PRESENT.
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  And just whois going to be operating those nuclear plants?  Japan has three undergraduate and nine master’s degree courses with either ``nuclear’’ or ``atomic’’ in their names. Most are under-enrolled.  Majority of nuclear plant workers entered workforce in the 1970s, now facing retirement.  Japan Atomic Industrial Forum reported that 80 percent fewer students participated in annual recruitment events in Tokyo and Osaka in 2012, compared to 2010.  The lack of interest in nuclear power among the younger generations comes as aging plants must be continued or decommissioned after 40 years, requiring a new generation of skilled workers.
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  BUT HERE ISTHE REAL PROBLEM: Japan says it is doing all it can to save energy and electricity and is far more efficient than most nations in using electricity. Is it?
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  Not Legally Requiredto Cut Usage  Despite all of the nuclear power village warnings about possible electricity shortages without nuclear power, there are no mandatory electricity savings measures in place.  What Japan has are ``voluntary’’ reductions on electricity use that carry no legal weight.
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  ``Don’t Worry, BeHappy’’  Urban residents have made very few major changes to their lifestyles since 3/11. Many cities have not curbed the use of neon lighting, while some retail stores operate with their doors and windows open and their air conditioners on. The utilities run ads on TV encouraging people to use MORE not less electricity.
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  A Small Example:Vending Machines  Few curbs on things like electricity-guzzling vending machines. (``Vending machines serve as an emergency lifeline in times of natural disaster– a Coca-Cola spokeswoman in Tokyo after the Tohoku quake)  Japan has over 5 million vending machines –in country with a population of 127 million.  The U.S, with a population of 317 million, has about 4.6 million vending machines.
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  Limits on WhatHouseholds Can Do Traditional Japanese Homes: Not Designed with Efficient Use of Electricity In Mind. Modern Homes: Often lack insulation, central heating, double-glazed windows, and
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  In Conclusion  Tocontinue with nuclear power will be far more expensive than the Nuclear Power Village claims, carries all sorts of safety risks, and runs the risk of investing in a technology that, like the steam engine, has had its day.  To switch to renewables will take time and huge amounts of money, angers the politically powerful Nuclear Power Village, and involves technologies still being developed.  Japanese are addicted to a hyper-urban, hyper- convenient lifestyle that uses lots of electricity. Getting them to change their habits is the toughest challenge, but demographics may do it anyway.
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  THANKS FOR LISTENING!