LPM: A DISTRIBUTED ARCHITECTURE AND ALGORITHMS FOR LOCATION PRIVACY IN LBS

International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.4, No.2, March 2012
DOI : 10.5121/ijnsa.2012.4210 135
LPM: A DISTRIBUTED ARCHITECTURE AND
ALOGORITHMS FOR LOCATION PRIVACY IN LBS
Muhamed Ilyas1,*
, Dr. R. Vijayakumar2
1
Research Scholar, School of Computer Science, Mahatma Gandhi University
Kottayam, Kerala, India
Muhamed.ilyas@gmail.com
2
School of Computer Science, Mahatma Gandhi University
Kottayam, Kerala, India
Kiran2k@bsnl.in
ABSTRACT
Recent advances in mobile communication and development of sophisticated equipments lead to the wide
spread use of Location Based Services (LBS). A major concern for large-scale deployment of LBSs is the
potential abuse of their client location data, which may imply sensitive personal information. Protecting
location information of the mobile user is challenging because a location itself may reveal user identity.
Several schemes have been proposed for location cloaking. In our paper, we propose a generic Enhanced
Location Privacy Model (LPM), which describes the concept, the architecture, algorithms and the
functionalities for location privacy in LBS. As per the architecture, the system ensures location privacy,
without trusting anybody including the peers or LBS servers. The system is fully distributed and
evaluation shows its efficiency and high level of privacy with QoS.
KEYWORDS
Location privacy, Location Based Services, Location Cloaking, Distributed Query Processing
1. INTRODUCTION
The last decade showed an accelerated development of mobile and Internet technologies. Internet
technology with globally connected mobile networks introduces new business models and the
development of service architecture. Location-Based Services (LBS) are such an example.
Location based services (LBS) are Internet services that provide information or enable
communication based on the location of users and/or resources at specific times. Service
providers envision offering many new services based on a user’s location as well as augmenting
many existing services with location information [3]. At the same time, LBSs poses a new threat,
i.e., privacy preservation. For example, someone wants to have dinner and is searching for a
restaurant using the Internet. In order to get more accurate and useful research results, more
terms such as the mobile user’s location, the type of food, etc. should be included in his search
criteria. Unfortunately, if the queries are not securely managed, it could be possible for a third
party to retrieve the mobile user’s personal sensitive information such as his location
information, his habit, etc. In this case, even if an individual does not directly release personal
information to the service provider, this provider may become aware of the sensitive information
if it has to provide a service to such an individual [4].
Research in the field of privacy preservation in pervasive computing has mainly concentrated
on techniques for anonymous communication [1], access control and obfuscation [6, 7], dummy
requests [5], or on a combination of such techniques. Many of these techniques are based on a
central server called Location anonymizer (LA). In this case, the mobile user has to submit
his/her location identifier to the LA, and LA cloaks the location using different models

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developed, like K-anonymity, before submitting the query to the LBS. Location Cloaking with a
centralized architecture must trust the central third party server with their identities, locations and
queries. However, there are a number of disadvantages for centralized approaches, such as a
single point of failure, bottlenecks due to communication overhead, and privacy threats as these
systems store all information in a single place. To overcome these problems, several
decentralized approaches have bee proposed. [ 22 ].
We propose a distributed approach to protect user privacy in LBS that does not need a
centralized server for location cloaking and does not trust any one including participating peers.
Our approach is similar to the work proposed by [5], but with cluster based peer selection
algorithm and an enhanced distributed peer cloaking method. Our approach uses the capabilities
of current mobile systems to form ad-hoc Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) using
technologies like Bluetooth. As per the system, a user who needs a location services, called
query initiator, initially forms a peer group of n individuals based on a cluster algorithm. Then it
randomly selects a peer, called query requestor, to forward the query, on behalf of the query
initiator, to the LBS server. A major challenge of this approach is the selection of the query
requestor with uniform probability. It ensures that even if the LSP has access to the information
that currently n devices form an ad-hoc network, the LSP is only able to identify the query
initiator with a probability of 1/n [5].
In our approach, the user and the peers do not reveal their exact location to each other.
Instead the actual positions are obfuscated with an imprecise location like circle. For maximal
privacy protection this approach combines obfuscation with K-anonymity [5]. If a user requires a
location service, our algorithm computes a minimum bounding circle (called Global Cloaking
Area, GCA), that enclose obfuscated locations of all his peers. The GCA contains the obfuscated
location of the user and the obfuscated locations of all other K-1 peers.
In summary, our contributions in this paper are as follows:
We propose a heuristic algorithm to compute the obfuscated location, called Self Cloaked
Area (SCA), of the user and all its participating peers. Self Cloaking is done individually by the
query initiator and all participating peers.
We develop a Greedy algorithm for generating a user’s K-anonymous obfuscated location
from available n SCAs. In each iteration the algorithm checks the K-anonymity and continues
until K-anonymity level is met. Unlike in [5], where the selection of peers to meet the K-
anonymity is done by the query initiator, our work distributes this process among peers. Each
peer calculates, whether it’s Self Cloaked Area is within the GCA and is eligible to participate in
the obfuscation process to meet the K-anonymity level.
We present a near-uniform random selection algorithm to select a query requestor without
revealing their identities. In paper [5] they presented a decentralized approach to protect user
privacy during the access of LBSs using wireless ad-hoc networks. Users do not need to trust any
involved party, including their peers, the LSP or the infrastructure. We extend this work by
further decentralizing location obfuscation among peers with less computational overheads, and
also introducing simple greedy algorithm for a near-uniform random selection for any type of
peer distribution.
2. RELATED WORKS
Location anonymity and privacy awareness in location-based services has been extensively
studied as a solution to protect user privacy in recent literatures. The objective is to allow the
mobile user to request services without compromising his/her privacy, especially location
privacy [8]. Several privacy protection techniques have already been proposed. These
techniques are broadly classified into TTP-based methods and (ii) TTP-free methods. Based on

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the underlying methodologies, these techniques can further be divided into three categories:
pseudonym, Cloaking, Transformation.
2.1 Simple and TTP Schemes
In the simplest form of communication between an LBS user (U) and an LBS provider (P),
the former sends a simple query (Q) containing an ID, his location (L) and a request for
information (I) that he wants to retrieve from P as shown in figure 1. Thus, a simple query sent
from U to P can be Q = {ID, L, I} = {ID, xU, yU, “Where is the closest bus station?”} By sending
their current locations to P, LBS users assume that P manages their data honestly and refrains
from any misuse. However, LBS providers cannot always be trusted and more complex
communication schemes are needed. [23].
Figure 1. Simple communication scheme with an LBS user and an LBS provider
Most of the initial solutions for location privacy were based on Trusted Third Parties (TTP)
as shown in Figure 2. In the simple scheme described above, users send their location
information and queries directly to the LBS provider. In TTP scheme, instead of sending the
query directly to LBS server, it is submitted to a TTP, where the location and identification of
the user is obfuscated using either transformation or pseudonym. TTP act as an intermediate
entity between user and LBS server. So, LBS providers are no longer aware of the real locations
and identities of the users. The problem is that the user has to trust the third party intermediate
entity instead of LBS server as in the case of simple LBS service, and whatever location privacy
LBS users can get depends on the honest behaviour of the TTP.
Figure 2. A TTP based scheme
TTP-based schemes are very common because they are easy to understand/develop, and
because, in general, they offer a reasonable trade-off between efficiency, accuracy and privacy.
Moreover, some of the ideas used in these schemes arose in more mature fields like e-commerce
[23]. A TTP can act as a Pseudonymiser or as an Anonymiser.
Pseudonymiser is the simplest form of a TTP scheme. It receives queries from users and,
prior to forwarding to them to the LBS server; it replaces the real ID of the user with
pseudonym. In this way the real user is hidden from the LBS server. However, the real ID is
kept with the Pseudonymiser in order to forward the answer from the LBS server to the user.
The problem is that it is vulnerable to attack as both real IDs and their corresponding
LBS
ProviderUser
Q= {ID, L, I}
{Answer}
LBS Provider
T
T
P
Users

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pseudonyms are stored at the same place. Moreover, users must completely trust
Pseudonymiser, because the latter see all the location information of the former.
Anonymiser is the most sophisticated form of TTP scheme. In this scheme, the intermediate
entity which act as a TTP, hide the real location of the user by using the k-anonymity property.
k-Anonymity is an interesting approach to hide a user location by cloaking (spatial cloaking) the
location of another k-1 users. Spatial cloaking with k-anonymity was first suggested by
Samarati and Sweeney [16, 17, and 18]. The location of a user is k-anonymous if it is
indistinguishable from the location of another k − 1 users. So, the fundamental idea behind k-
anonymisers is to replace the real location of the user by cloaking areas (spatial cloaking) in
which at least k users are located. Spatial cloaking is being applied in both TTP based scheme as
well as TTP free schemes. While the former employs a centralized method, the latter suggests
different distributed methods for maximum location privacy.
2.2 TTP Based Spatial Cloaking
Spatial Cloaking is the most widely used privacy preserving technique for users accessing
LBS. The main idea behind cloaking approaches is to blur a user’s exact location in a larger
cloaked region and to make him/her indistinguishable among the set of other (real or dummy)
users located in the cloaked region
Many existing approaches in spatial cloaking are based on a centralized architecture. These
approaches rely on the existence of a trusted Intermediary server called location anonymizer
which protects a user’s private location and identity information from an untrusted location
server (e.g., Mokbel et al., 2006; Gruteser and Grunwald, 2003; Gedik and Liu, 2005a, 2005b;
Du et al., 2007) [9 -14]. The main idea in centralized cloaking is to put an anonymiser between
the users and the location server to prevent the server from learning users’ precise location
information and identities. Every location-based query is first sent to the anonymizer, which
transforms the user’s exact location to a cloaked area (i.e., rectangle or circle) and forwards the
query to the LBS server for that cloaked area. While different cloaking algorithms are proposed
for cloaking a user’s location, the common objective is to blur a user’s location in an area of size
at least Amin and/or among a set of at least k – 1 other users. Depending on the approach, these
parameters can be specified by each user independently, or are chosen as system parameters.
During the second phase, the privacy-aware location server, which is modified to process a
cloaked region query, generates a candidate list which is guaranteed to include the nearest
neighbor of any point inside the cloaked region. This list is then transferred to the client side for
further refinement to obtain the final result set [15]. The blurred spatial area can be based either
on the k-anonymity concept [Samarati 2001; Sweeney 2002a, 2002b] [16, 17,18] (i.e., the area
should contain at least k users) or on a graph model that represents a road network [Duckham
and Kulik 2005]. [19]
2.2 TTP Free Spatial Cloaking
Centralized approaches discussed above, however the centralized approach has several
disadvantages. This approach requires an anonymiser, as sophisticated as the location server
itself, to act as a proxy between users and the server per query. There are chances for single
point of failure/attack and bottleneck due to communication overhead. Another important
drawback is that, in many scenarios cloaking users’ location information in a larger region or
among k – 1 other user does not protect user’s location information. This is due to the fact that
based on user distributions in the space and the value of k (or similarly size of the cloaked
region), precise user location can be derived using several techniques. To overcome these
limitations, decentralized approaches have been proposed that construct cloaked region. The
approaches proposed by Chow et al. (2006) [20] and Ghinita et al. (2007b, 2007c) [20, 21]
assume users communicate with each other to collaboratively form a cloaked region. Ghinita et
al. (2007b) propose a hierarchical overlay network resembling a distributed B+ tree for
constructing the cloaked region that overcomes the above drawback. However, it suffers from

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very slow response time. Ghinita et al. (2007c)[21] propose methods which provide stronger
privacy than Chow et al. (2006) for various distributions and do not suffer from slow response
time of Ghinita et al. (2007b). The authors propose a distributed method to find a random set of
k adjacent users based on their 1-D Hilbert ordering. Finally, Duckham and Kulik (2005) [19]
propose a graph model to represent possible user’s locations and denote the cloaked region by a
set of vertices in the graph. The client progressively gives more information about her precise
location until the query result set reaches her desired accuracy.
Tanzima Hashem, Lars Kulik [5] have developed a decentralized approach to protect user
privacy during the access of LBSs using wireless ad-hoc networks. Users do not need to trust
any involved party, including their peers, the LSP or the infrastructure provider. It exploits the
wireless advantage that all users in communication range can overhear a message to anonymize
the communication among users.
Wireless Ad-hoc networks are adaptive and self-organizing, and a consequence securing
such networks is non-trivial. Several efficient protocols have been developed for securing
medium access, routing, resource management, quality of service and security in mobile ad-hoc
networks. In particular, protocols like AODV, R-AODV (Reliant Ad-hoc On-demand Distance
Vector Routing) and Trust Based Scheme for QoS Assurance in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks [25]
propose security enhancements by ensuring that data does not go through malicious nodes that
have been known to misbehave. However, in our paper, we are not going into the details of ad-
hoc network security.
Our work is similar to [5] but with less communication overhead and with a distributed
cloaking method. In [5], every user has to maintain the list of their peers within the
communication range all the time and it is maintained even if the user is not intended to submit
any request to the LBS server. This makes heavy processing and communication overhead for
all users in a mobile environment, and peers may change dynamically. Secondly, calculating the
cloaked area and selecting K-1 peers within the cloaked area are done at the query requestor,
which incurs processing overhead at the query requestor. In our method, selecting K-1 peers
within the cloaked area is done dynamically, only when the user wants to get some service from
the LBS server. Selection of K-1 peers within the cloaked area is done by the peers, thus
eliminating the process overhead at the query requestor. The second Simulation results show
that it has less communication overhead and high quality of service.
2.3 Query processing
Several efficient algorithms has been developed for finding the nearest POI with respect a
rectangular or a circular area. In new Casper [10], Mokbel et al. have developed an algorithm
that returns a range of POIs including the nearest POIs for every point of a rectangle. In [12],
algorithms have been proposed to evaluate m-nearest POIs for every point of a circle. All of
these algorithms may need to return a large set of answers and thus incur high processing and
communication overheads. In our previous paper [24], this issue has been addressed by using a
decentralized architecture for processing POI and range queries.
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND LOCATION CLOAKING
We present a decentralized system that employs the power of ad-hoc networking for
obfuscating the user location from third party LBS servers. User and each participating peer,
cloaks their location as a circle, where the user location may be anywhere within the circle, and
thus the location cannot be identified by an adversary. The user, who wants to access the LBS
service, first determines K-1 number of participating peers for cloaking the location. After that it
determines the size of the circle, which contains all K-1 peers that participate in the cloaking
process, (Called Global Cloaked Area) in terms of its radius. The cloaking process proceeds in

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two stages. Initially, the query initiator determines the radius of GCA and value of K. and it
calculates its Self Cloaked Area (SCA). Then it sends a broadcast message to all its peers, which
are normally one hope away from the user. The message contains three parameters; the pseudo
IP address of the query initiator, the parameters of its SC, and the parameters of the initial GCA.
On receiving the message, each peer calculates its SCA. Then it performs a spatial ‘within’
operation to identify that its SCA lies completely within the boundary of GCA. The result is true
if the SCA is fully within GCA, else the result is false. The peer returns its SCA along with
Boolean result of the spatial operation. After receiving the results from its peers, the query
initiator checks for the K-anonymity. If the desired anonymity is met, it proceeds to the next
step, otherwise continues the process with hope distances > 1 until the K-anonymity level is
met. The GCA will be a minimum radii circle which encloses all K-1 SCAs. Then our Random
Selection Algorithm selects a query requestor to forward the query along with GCA to LBS
Server.
In our proposed method, the peers are responsible for identifying themselves, whether to
participate in the cloaking process or not. This is a distributed approach, thus eliminating the
overhead at the query initiator for calculating the Globally Cloaked Area (GCA) with K-1 peers.
3.1 Generating SCA
In our approach, we generate a circular cloaked area which contains the peer’s real location
anywhere in the circle. We have developed a heuristic algorithm to generate the cloaked circle.
Let (x, y) be the real location of the mobile user. (The location might be received from GPS or
any other means). In order to obtain maximum anonymity, we cloak the point (x, y) with a
surrounding circle. But if we generate such a circle, adversary can easily identify the location of
the user, as it may be centre of the circle. So we translate the real location of the user to a point
(x0, y0), and generate a pseudo circle with centre (x0, y0) as shown in figure 3. The radius of the
pseudo circle is chosen in such a way that the real location (x, y) of the mobile user must be
anywhere within the circle. Let R be the radius of the Self cloaked circle, decided by each user.
In order to find a random point (x0, y0), we randomly choose a distance value r, where r <= R,
and an angle θ, where 0<= θ <= 2П.
Figure 3. Self Cloaking
The real location (x, y) of the user is transformed into another location by using simple polar to
rectangular coordinate conversion equation x = r cos θ, y = r sin θ
Then, the transformed location (x0, y0) is obtained by x0 = x + r Cos θ
y0 = y + r Sin θ, where r <= R
.
(x, y)
(x0, y0)
r
R
θ

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The cloaked area, with radius R, then can be calculated. This ensures that the original location
of the mobile user is within or on the boundary of the newly created obfuscated circle with
centre (x0, y0). The algorithm for generating a self cloaked area by a user is given below.
Algorithm 1: ComputeSCA
Input:
x0 , y0 : Centre of the GCA circle
RGCA : Radius of GCA
Ref : xi , yi , R
Ref : within (Boolean)
Output:
xi : x-coordinate of the obfuscated user position
yi : y-coordinate of the obfuscated user position
R : Radius of SCA ( Obfuscated circle)
1. x x-coordinate of the user position from GPS
2. y y-coordinate of the user position from GPS
3. Let r ( Random value where 0< r ≤ R
4. θ ( Random value where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2П
5. R ( Required radius of the obfuscated circle (SCA)
6. xi = x + r cos θ
7. yi = y + r sin θ
8. within Return ‘True’ if the spatial ‘within’ operation of SCA with GCA (RGCA as
radius), else return ‘False’
9. return xi, yi, R, within as reference
10. Return true if spatial within operation is true
3.2 Generating GCA
Figure 4. Globally Cloaked Area
R
(xo, yo)
.
(x1, y1)
.
(x2, y2)
.
(x3, y3)
.
(x4, y4)
.

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Let Kl and Kh be lowest and highest anonymity level of the query initiator j. Also let Rl and
Rh be the lowest and highest radius of the circular area which the query initiator wants to
obfuscate, which we call the Globally Cloaked Area (GCA) as shown in figure 4. R is selected
in such a way that it balances the K-anonymity and an optimal area which includes all other K-1
self cloaked peers. At the first step, the Query initiator sends a message to all its 1-hop peers
requesting its pseudonym, the obfuscated origin (xpi, yPi) of the Self Cloaked Area (SCA) and
the radius of SCA; if SCA of the peer Pi is within the Globally Cloaked Area (GCA).
Initially the message is sent down to all 1-hop peers with a value R. If the query initiator
fails to find sufficient number of SCAs within the limits of GCA, query initiator either
decrement the value of K or it increments the value of R. This process continues until the value
of K >= Kl and the value of R reaches Rh.
3.3 The Greedy Algorithm
We present an algorithm to compute the Globally Cloaked Area of the query initiator j. This
is Greedy algorithm which executes until the desired level of anonymity is obtained. Assume
that K is the desired anonymity level of j and Rl and Rh be the lowest and highest radius of the
Globally Cloaked Area. i.e., the area of Globally Cloaked Area is пRl
2
≤ GCA ≤ пRh
2
. To
compute the GCA, we have to find the smallest circle r that encloses a K-subset (including j’s
SCA) from the n SCAs. The SCA of a user i is described by its obfuscated centre (xi, yi) and the
radius ri. If the initial GCA with radius Rl and query initiators obfuscated centre (x0,y0), is not
able to contain all K-1 SCAs then the value of R (Radius of GCA) is incremented in each step
until Rl reaches the value Rh. We have developed a greedy-based algorithm (GBA) with a time
complexity of O(h), where h is the hop count. Initially the message is broadcasted to all 1-hop
peers. All peers receiving this message, computes its own SCA, perform a spatial ‘within’
operation with GCA (The ‘within’ predicate in spatial geometry returns t (TRUE) if the first
geometry is completely inside the second geometry). If the result of the ‘Within’ operation is
true, then function returns the obfuscated centre of the SCA, and the radius of the SCA. The
numbers of SCAs are counted after each hop iteration, if the number of SCAs are below the K-
anonymity level, then we increment the hop and continue the process until the system desired
parameter hmax is reached.
Algorithm 2: Compute GCA
Input:
hmax : The maximum hop count
K : The anonymity level
Rl : The minimum radius of the GCA
Rh : The maximum radius of the GCA
x0, y0 : Obfuscated coordinates of Query initiator
Output: A, The Globally Cloaked Area of the Query initiator that covers K-SCAs
1. A α
2. Let S(Pseudo ID, x0, y0, Boolean Result) be the set of SCA
3. S α
4. Compute SCA of Query initiator
5. x0 X-coordinate of the centre of SCA of Query initiator
6. y0 Y coordinate of the centre of SCA of Query initiator
7. AGCA Initial Area of GCA with circle Rl
8. for R = Rl to Rh step 1 do
9. for h = 1 to hmax step 1 do

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i. if Compute SCA = true then add SCA to S
ii. Count Total count of Peers after Computing their SCAs and within the
geometrical boundary of AGCA
b. if Count < K then continue else stop
10. if count < K the continue to step 8 else stop
11. Stop
Once the Optimal GCA has been computed, the query initiator randomly finds a query
requestor from the set of available peers within the GCA. The query initiator performs a random
selection operation over the set of n SCAs to select a query requestor to forward the query on
behalf of query initiator to the LBS server. The peers are addressed with their pseudonyms that
are sent back from peers, during the process of computing SCAs. The query is then forwarded to
the query requestor, and it is submitted to the LBS server with GCA. Since the GCA is an
obfuscated area, adversary may find it difficult to locate the query initiator. Moreover all IPs are
encrypted with their pseudonyms. The LBS server returns a list of results applicable for this
GCA. From this set of result the query initiator filter the values that he is interested in.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate our system with Greedy based GCA computation in [5]. We adopted the
selection metric from two classes: processing time at the query initiator (finding the GCA and
the peers participating in the process) and peer response time for the query from the query
initiator. This can be decomposed as the sum of communications delay (CD) and Query
initiator’s processing time (QP). Peer response time (TR) is the sum of the time required to
calculate its cloaked area (TC) and the communication overhead (CD). i.e., (TR = TC + CD). As
both of the systems assume the same communication delay, this may be approximated as TR ≈
TC. To compare the performance, we define average peer response time metric as shown in table
1.
Table 1: Definition of average peer response time
As our system employs a simple transformation method to obfuscate peer location, the average
response time comparatively less that other methods as shown in figure 5. The processing time
QP is less compared to the methods in [5], because, the greedy algorithm that forms the GCA to
meet K-anonymity, is run at the query initiator, whereas in our method, this process has been
distributed among individual peers. The time complexity of the processing time for the greedy
algorithm of GGC in [5] is O(n log n) where as our system the time complexity is O(h) where h
is the hop of the peers that are included in the GCA. We set our simulation for experiments in
this article on a Pentium 2.8 GHz and 1 GB RAM with varying K and R for GCA. For all K the
system has shown remarkable performance compared to GGC in [5], because all SCA
computation and the selection of optimal GCA are done at peers simultaneously, instead of
computing at the system of query initiator. Figure 5 shows the average response time for GGC
and for our system. We assume that the distributions of objects are normal. Figure 6 shows the
computational cost for generating GCA for a set of 50 users. Since, in our system, the SCAs are
n No. of peers
ti Time that Query initiator requested the peer i
tj Time that Query initiator received the result from peer i
AvgRT Average response time, computed as ∑(ti - tj) / n

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calculated at the peers, the value of the anonymity level K or the numbers of peer does not affect
Figure 5. Response time for K subset of 25 SCAs
the total computational cost. All the computations are distributed and are executed in our system
simultaneously. Where as in the case GGC the GCA is calculated by the query initiator and the
computational cost of GCA is directly proportional to the value of K and the number of peers n.
Figure 6. Computational cost for a subset of 25 SCAs

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5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a distributed location obfuscation method, to protect location
privacy for Location Based services (LBS). In this case, the query initiator does not want to trust
anyone including the peers and any third party service providers. Even peers do not reveal their
exact locations, instead presents only their Self cloaked Areas. The system we presented fully
distributes all computations, and even GCA calculation is done at peers. We have also presented
algorithms which needs less computation time at the query initiator, compared to our previous
works, due to the fully distributed approach. We also evaluated our system with different size of
K-anonymity level and shows good accuracy and optimal results.
We plan to extend our work, with a network assisted approach, where the numbers of
participating peers are less than the anonymity level K. We are also investigating the possibility
of moving peers and dynamic Self Cloaked Areas (SCA).
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Authors
Muhamed Ilyas received his MCA degree from University of Kerala, Trivandrum, India. He is currently
pursuing his PhD degree in the School of Computer Science, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam,
Kerala, India, under the guidance of Dr. R. Vijayakumar. His research interests include next-generation
wireless system architectures, design and evaluation of location and service management schemes in
mobile computing environments, and mobile database systems. He is a member of the ACM
Dr. R. Vijayakumar, working as Professor in the School of Computer Science, Mahatma Gandhi
University, Kottayam, Kerala, India had completed 25 years of teaching career. His graduation is in B.Sc
(Electrical Engineering) from College of Engineering, Trivandrum in 1984; and his M.Tech Degree in
Computer Science & Engineering is from IIT Bombay in 1992. He was awarded the first Ph. D in
Computer Science and Engineering in the faculty of Engineering from University of Kerala in 2000.
Published 47 papers in National levels, International levels and journals in various fields of Parallel
Distributed Processing and applications He is a consultant of Co-operative bank/Govt. institutions
computerization and banking software/Hardware. He was member of Board of studies for Under Graduate
and Post graduate studies in Kannur University and Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala. Being the
Senate Member of Calicut University, Kerala he is Chairman of Board of examiners in Computer Science
and related subjects in Universities in South India. Completed sponsored projects of Govt. of Kerala and
institutions in Kerala in the fields of Computer Network and applications. Apart from these he is research
guide in Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala and Anna University, Coimbatore, India.

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