MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; David Westin and Andy Kettell, Nationwide
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This document discusses Nationwide's experience using threat intelligence to focus their MITRE ATT&CK activities. Their initial broad approach analyzing 240+ techniques at once was unsuccessful. They then prioritized techniques based on threats to the financial sector. This focused their efforts on the 27 most relevant threat actors and the 100+ techniques associated with them. They mapped techniques to the ATT&CK matrix and conducted intelligence research. This intelligence-led approach improved their security posture understanding and enabled prioritized, actionable recommendations. The process is ongoing to constantly evolve their defenses based on the latest intelligence.
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; David Westin and Andy Kettell, Nationwide
- 1. Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities October 29, 2019
- 2. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 2 • Andy Kettell – 20+ years IT security experience – 4+ years at Nationwide in Cyber Security Operations Center – CISSP, CCSP The Nationwide MITRE ATT&CK Team . • David Westin – 20+ years of Intelligence in U.S. Marine Corps – 4 years at U.S. Cyber Command – 1 year at Nationwide Others: • Risk Leaders • Business Area Leaders • Infrastructure Personnel • Columbus Collaboratory
- 3. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 3 This ATT&CK thing is cool! I want it! In the beginning… Okay…how do we do this?
- 4. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT “Project Squishee…” • What we did – Tried to analyze 240+ techniques, one technique at a time – Techniques chosen based on group consensus • Six months to get three mitigations • No real movement towards operationalizing the framework within the company Our First Attempt (February 2017)
- 5. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT • Why it didn’t work: – Tried to do everything (no focus) – Unfocused choosing of technique for deep dive analysis (what is cool…) – Tried to work technique from analysis to completing remediation issues – Bogged down in minutiae (took too long…) – No differentiation between basic and advanced techniques – No idea what we will get from this – Participation fatigue – No Intel personnel Our First Attempt (February 2017)
- 6. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 6 Bright Idea: Focus on the Threat!! Who is targeting us? What techniques do they use?
- 7. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 7 Nationwide MITRE ATT&CK Process Was Born Threat Intel Phase Testing Phase Assessment Phase Implementation Phase Leadership Phase Threat Intel provided the compass and map…
- 8. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT Should I Care About Everything? • Started with Excel spreadsheet created by Florian Roth (@cyb3rops) • Added capability/intent; simplified based on Nationwide needs • Used simple aging out criteria based on last known reports Prioritize…
- 9. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT Put It In a Pretty ChartCapabilityMaturity Interest in Financial Sector Adversaries to the Financial Sector
- 10. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT Focus on What Matters CapabilityMaturity Interest in Financial Sector Adversaries to the Financial Sector I Know ‘Who’, But Not ‘What’… • 100+ threat actors down to 27 • Focus is on those threat actors with capability and intent to go after finance/insurance industry
- 11. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 11 Researching Threat Actor Techniques • Intelligence collection tool of choice • MITRE ATT&CK Site (of course…) • ISAC/ISAO • Security Researchers • Twitter • Top Techniques Reported • Many others… Collect All The Things…
- 12. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT • If used by threat actor, add to chart • More red = more threat actors using that technique • Simple Excel spreadsheet math… Tying Research to ATT&CK Matrix Still Messy…
- 13. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 13 Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Exfiltration Command and Control Drive-by Compromise Command-Line Interface Accessibility Features Access Token Manipulation Code Signing Account Manipulation Account Discovery Application Deployment Software Data Staged Data Compressed Commonly Used Port Spearphishing Attachment Mshta Application Shimming Accessibility Features Disabling Security Tools Brute Force Application Window Discovery Exploitation of Remote Services Data from Local System Data Encrypted Connection Proxy Spearphishing Link PowerShell Create Account Application Shimming File Deletion Credential Dumping File and Directory Discovery Pass the Hash Data from Network Shared Drive Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Data Encoding Trusted Relationship Regsvr32 DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking Hidden Files and Directories Credentials in Files Network Service Scanning Remote Desktop Protocol Email Collection Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Data Obfuscation Valid Accounts Rundll32 Hidden Files and Directories Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Indicator Removal from Tools Input Capture Permission Groups Discovery Remote File Copy Fallback Channels Scheduled Task New Service New Service Indicator Removal on Host Process Discovery Remote Services Multi-Stage Channels Scripting Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Process Injection Masquerading Query Registry Windows Admin Shares Standard Application Layer Protocol User Execution Scheduled Task Scheduled Task Mshta Remote System Discovery Standard Cyrptographic Protocol Windows Management Instrumentation Shortcut Modification Valid Accounts Obfuscated Files or Information System Information Discovery Standard Non-Application Protocol Web Shell Process Injection System Network Configuration Discovery Uncommonly Used Port Regsvr32 System Network Connections Discovery Rundll32 System Owner/User Discovery Software Packing Timestomp Valid Accounts Web Service • 91 techniques across 11 tactics • Initial data necessary for prioritization Focusing Only On Identified Techniques… Manageable Project…
- 14. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 14 “Knowing Is Half The Battle” - G.I. Joe “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win” - Sun Tzu Winning Quotes
- 15. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT Intel Driving Operations Teams Involved: Threat Intelligence, Attack & Penetration, Infrastructure Operations, Security Tool administrators, Incident Response, Security Architecture, 2nd Line of Defense consultants, executive leadership Everyone Involved… Objective: Focus project on most likely adversary techniques Objective: Determine susceptibility to prioritized techniques Objective: Determine recommended detection & mitigation strategies Objective: Develop & implement detection and mitigation actions Objective: Determine risk associated with non-implemented strategies Threat Intel Phase Testing Phase Assessment Phase Implementation Phase Leadership Phase
- 16. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 16 • Reduced tested techniques from 240+ to 91 • Clear understanding of our security posture related to MITRE ATT&CK techniques associated with threat actors targeting the finance/insurance industry • Security focused recommendations vs. IT audit driven • Enabled MITRE ATT&CK to gain a foothold in the organization • Framework built to enable follow-on actions Where Did We End Up?
- 17. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 17 Are we done yet? What’s next? Keep The Momentum Going
- 18. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 18 Constantly EvolvingCapabilityMaturity Interest in Financial Sector Adversaries to the Financial Sector
- 19. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 19 • Prioritization of techniques – Third party research (Red Canary’s analysis of top techniques) – Attack & Penetration test results – Security expert input (FS-ISAC, Columbus Collaboratory, etc…) – Analysis of recent breach reports (Ryuk, Emotet, Qakbot, Fin7, etc…) – Analysis of Nationwide existing controls and effectiveness Priority Tactic Technique 1 Execution PowerShell 2 Credential Access Credential Dumping 3 Execution Command-Line Interface 4 Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access Valid Accounts 5 Initial Access Spearphishing Attachment 6 Initial Access Spearphishing Link 7 Exfiltration Data Compressed 8 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation Scheduled Task 9 Defense Evasion Masquerading 10 Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files Intelligence Led Prioritization *Not real results
- 20. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 20 Intelligence Driving Security • “Anatomy of ATT&CK” documents • Use security research and recent external events • Break down scenario by technique • Used to confirm security controls are in place
- 21. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 21 • Intel driven operations ensure clear focus and prioritization • Focus on threat actors in your sector and techniques they use • Don’t try to do it all…smaller chunks enable clearer understanding of final objectives • Constantly evolve and iterate to increase coverage Key Takeaways
- 22. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 22 Contact us at: [email protected] Andy Kettell David Westin Questions?