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Network Security  Data Visualization Greg Conti www.cc.gatech.edu/~conti CS6262 http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/walrus1_large.gif
http://www.interz0ne.com/
information visualization  is the use of  interactive, sensory representations,  typically visual, of abstract data to  reinforce cognition.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_visualization
Why InfoVis? Helps find patterns Helps reduce search space Aids efficient monitoring Enables interaction (what if) Help prevent overwhelming the user
So What? Go Beyond the Algorithm Help with detecting and understand some 0 day attacks Make CTF and Root Wars a Spectator Sport Help find insider threats Help visually fingerprint attacks What tasks do you need help with?
TCP Dump  image: http://www.bgnett.no/~giva/pcap/tcpdump.png
Network Traffic Viewed in Ethereal Ethereal by Gerald Combs can be found at http://www.ethereal.com/ image: http://www.linux-france.org/prj/edu/archinet/AMSI/index/images/ethereal.gif
Network Traffic as Viewed in EtherApe Etherape by Juan Toledo can be found at http://etherape.sourceforge.net/ screenshot:  http://www.solaris4you.dk/sniffersSS.html
Outline Quick overview of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Quick overview of Information Visualization What data is available on the wire Finding interesting combinations What the attacks look like
Intrusion Detection System An intrusion-detection system (IDS) is a tool used to detect attacks or other security breaches in a computer system or network.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion-detection_system
Intrusion Detection System Types Host-based intrusion-detection is the art of detecting malicious activity within a single computer by using host log information system activity virus scanners A  Network intrusion detection system  is a system that tries to detect malicious activity such as denial of service attacks, port-scans or other attempts to hack into computers by reading all the incoming packets and trying to find suspicious patterns.  http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Host-based_intrusion-detection_system http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_intrusion_detection_system
Information Visualization Mantra Overview First,  Zoom & Filter, Details on Demand -  Ben Shneiderman http://www.cs.umd.edu/~ben/
Overview First…
Zoom and Filter…
Details on  Demand…
What Tools are at Your Disposal… Color Size Shape Orientation Scale Interactivity Sequence Filtering Perspective
What Can InfoVis Help You See? Relationships between X & Y & Z… Anomalies Outliers Extremes Patterns Comparisons and Differences Trends
User Tasks ID Locate Distinguish Categorize Cluster Distribution Rank Compare Associate Correlate http://www.siggraph.org/education/materials/HyperVis/concepts/matrx_lo.htm See also http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~zhou/project/CHI98Title.html
Representative Current Research
Dr. Rob Erbacher Representative Research Visual Summarizing and Analysis Techniques for Intrusion Data  Multi-Dimensional Data Visualization A Component-Based Event-Driven Interactive Visualization Software Architecture  http://otherland.cs.usu.edu/~erbacher/
http://otherland.cs.usu.edu/~erbacher/ Demo
Dr. David Marchette Passive Fingerprinting Statistics for intrusion detection http://www.mts.jhu.edu/~marchette/
http://www.mts.jhu.edu/~marchette/ (images) http://www.galaxy.gmu.edu/stats/faculty/wegman.html (descriptions)
Soon Tee Teoh Visualizing Internet Routing Data http://graphics.cs.ucdavis.edu/~steoh/
CAIDA Code Red Worm Propagation Young Hyun David Moore  Colleen Shannon Bradley Huffaker http://www.caida.org/tools/visualization/walrus/examples/codered/
Jukka Juslin http://www.cs.hut.fi/~jtjuslin/ Intrustion Detection and  Visualization Using Perl
Michal Zalewski TCP/IP Sequence Number Generation Initial paper -  http://razor.bindview.com/publish/papers/tcpseq/print.html Follow-up paper -  http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/ Linux 2.2 TCP/IP sequence numbers are not as good as they might be, but are certainly adequate, and attack feasibility is very low.  Linux 2.2 TCP/IP sequence numbers are not as good as they might be, but are certainly adequate, and attack feasibility is very low.  Linux 2.2 TCP/IP sequence numbers are not as good as they might be, but are certainly adequate, and attack feasibility is very low.
Atlas of  Cyber Space http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/atlas.html
John Levine The Use of Honeynets to Detect Exploited Systems Across Large Enterprise Networks Interesting look at detecting zero-day attacks http://users.ece.gatech.edu/~owen/Research/Conference%20Publications/honeynet_IAW2003.pdf
Port 135 MS BLASTER scans Date Public: 7/16/03  Date Attack: 8/11/03 Georgia Tech Honeynett Source:  John Levine, Georgia Tech
Port 1434 (MS-SQL) scans Date Public: 7/24/02  Date Attack: 1/25/03 Georgia Tech Honeynet Source:  John Levine, Georgia Tech
Port 554 (RTSP) scans Date Public: 8/15/2003  Date Attack: 8/22/03 Georgia Tech Honeypot Source:  John Levine, Georgia Tech
Hot Research Areas… visualizing vulnerabilities  visualizing IDS alarms (NIDS/HIDS)  visualizing worm/virus propagation  visualizing routing anamolies  visualizing large volume computer network logs  visual correlations of security events  visualizing network traffic for security  visualizing attacks in near-real-time  security visualization at line speeds  dynamic attack tree creation (graphic)  forensic visualization  http://www.cs.fit.edu/~pkc/vizdmsec04/
More Hot Research Areas… feature selection  feature construction  incremental/online learning  noise in the data  skewed data distribution  distributed mining  correlating multiple models  efficient processing of large amounts of data  correlating alerts  signature detection  anomaly detection  forensic analysis http://www.cs.fit.edu/~pkc/vizdmsec04/
One Approach… Look at TCP/IP Protocol Stack Data (particularly header information) Find interesting visualizations Throw some interesting traffic at them See what they can detect Refine
TCP/IP Protocol Stack http://ai3.asti.dost.gov.ph/sat/levels.jpg
Information Available On and Off the Wire Levels of analysis External data Time  Size Protocol compliance Real vs. Actual Values  Matrices of options Header slides http://ai3.asti.dost.gov.ph/sat/levels.jpg
Link Layer (Ethernet) http://www.itec.suny.edu/scsys/vms/OVMSDOC073/V73/6136/ZK-3743A.gif Physical Link Network Transport Application Presentation Session
Network Layer (IP) http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0791.txt Physical Link Network Transport Application Presentation Session
Transport Layer (TCP) http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc793.txt Physical Link Network Transport Application Presentation Session
Transport Layer (UDP) http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0768.txt Physical Link Network Transport Application Presentation Session
 
Exploitation Pattern of Typical Internet Worm Target Vulnerabilities on Specific Operating Systems Localized Scanning to Propagate (Code Red) 3/8 of time within same Class B (/16 network) 1/2 of time within same Class A (/8 network) 1/8 of time random address Allows for Quick Infection Within Internal Networks with High Concentration of Vulnerable Hosts ? Source: John Levine, Georgia Tech
Ethernet Packet Capture Parse Process Plot tcpdump (pcap, winpcap, snort) Perl (c/c++) Perl (c/c++) xmgrace (GNU plotutils gtk+/opengl html) tcpdump capture files
Grace “ Grace  is a WYSIWYG 2D plotting tool for the X Window System and M*tif. Grace runs on practically any version of Unix-like OS. As well, it has been successfully ported to VMS, OS/2, and Win9*/NT/2000/XP”  http://plasma-gate.weizmann.ac.il/Grace/
Required Files Perl, tcpdump and grace need to be installed. - http://www.tcpdump.org/ - http://www.perl.org/ - http://plasma-gate.weizmann.ac.il/Grace/ to install grace... Download RPMs (or source) ftp://plasma-gate.weizmann.ac.il/pub/grace/contrib/RPMS The files you want grace-5.1.14-1.i386.rpm pdflib-4.0.3-1.i386.rpm Install #rpm -i pdflib-4.0.3-1.i386.rpm #rpm -i grace-5.1.14-1.i386.rpm
Hello World Example # tcpdump -lnnq -c10 | perl parse.pl | perl analyze.pl |outfile.dat # xmgrace outfile.dat & Optionally you can run xmgrace with an external format language file… # xmgrace outfile.dat -batch formatfile
Hello World Example (cont) Optionally you can run xmgrace with an external format language file… xmgrace outfile.dat -batch formatfile formatfile is a text file that pre-configures Grace e.g. title "Port Scan Against Single Host" subtitle "Superscan w/ports 1-1024" yaxis label "Port" yaxis label place both yaxis ticklabel place both xaxis ticklabel off xaxis tick major off xaxis tick minor off autoscale
Data Format tcpdump outputs somewhat verbose output 09:02:01.858240 0:6:5b:4:20:14 0:5:9a:50:70:9 62: 10.100.1.120.4532 > 10.1.3.0.1080: tcp 0 (DF) parse.pl cleans up output 09 02 01 858240 0:6:5b:4:20:14 0:5:9a:50:70:9 10.100.1.120.4532 10.100.1.120 4532 10.1.3.0.1080 10.1.3.0 1080 tcp analyze.pl extracts/formats for Grace. 0 4532  1 1080   0 4537  1 1080  0 2370  1 1080
Results Example 1 - Baseline with Normal Traffic Example 2 - Port Scan Example 3 - Port Scan “Fingerprinting” Example 4 - Vulnerability Scanner Example 5 - Wargame
Example 1 - Baseline Normal network traffic FTP, HTTP, SSH, ICMP… Command Line Capture Raw Data tcpdump -l -nnqe -c 1000 tcp or udp | perl parse.pl > exp1_outfile.txt Run through Analysis Script cat exp1_outfile.txt | perl analyze_1a.pl > output1a.dat Open in Grace xmgrace output1a.dat &
 
 
Example 2 - PortScan Light “normal” network traffic (HTTP) Command Line  Run 2a.bat (chmod +x 2a.bat)  echo running experiment 2  echo 1-1024 port scan tcpdump -l -nnqe -c 1200 tcp or udp > raw_outfile_2.txt cat raw_outfile_2.txt | perl parse_2a.pl > exp2_outfile.txt  cat exp2_outfile.txt | perl analyze_2a.pl > output_2a.dat xmgrace output_2a.dat & echo experiment 2 completed
 
Attacker
Defender
Example 3- PortScan “Fingerprinting” Tools Examined: Nmap Win 1.3.1 (on top of Nmap 3.00) XP Attacker (http://www.insecure.org/nmap/) Nmap 3.00  RH 8.0 Attacker (http://www.insecure.org/nmap/) Superscan 3.0 RH 8.0 Attacker ( http://www.foundstone.com/index.htm?subnav=resources/navigation.htm&subcontent=/resources/proddesc/superscan.htm)
nmap 3.00 default (RH 8.0) nmap 3.00 udp scan (RH 8.0) Superscan 3.0 Nmap Win 1.3.1
Three Parallel Scans
Example 4: Vulnerability Scanner Attacker: RH 8.0 running Nessus 2.0.10 Target:  RH 9.0
 
Example 5: Wargame Attackers:  NSA Red Team Defenders: US Service Academies Defenders lock down network, but must provide certain services Dataset -  http://www.itoc.usma.edu/cdx/2003/logs.zip
 
 
 
 
Zooming in on port 8080
 
Port 135 CAN-2003-0605 tcp any 135 The RPC DCOM interface in Windows 2000 SP3 and SP4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash), and local attackers to use the DoS to hijack the epmapper pipe to gain privileges, via certain messages to the __RemoteGetClassObject interface that cause a NULL pointer to be passed to the PerformScmStage function. CAN-2003-0352 6 any 135 Buffer overflow in a certain DCOM interface for RPC in Microsoft Windows NT 4.0, 2000, XP, and Server 2003 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a malformed message, as exploited by the Blaster/MSblast/LovSAN worm. http://isc.incidents.org/port_details.html?port=135
Conclusions Limited fingerprinting of tools is possible Visualization can help drive better algorithms Some attacker techniques can be identified Some vulnerabilities can be identified
Demo See readme.txt Two demo scripts… runme.bat  (uses sample dataset) runme_sniff.bat (performs live capture, must be root) Note: you must modify the IP address variable in the Analyzer script. (See analyzer2.pl for example)
Future Distributed NIDS Visualization Real-time vs. Offline Interesting datasets 3D Other visualization techniques Visualization of protocol attacks Visualization of application layer attacks Visualization of physical layer attacks (?) Code up some stand-alone tools
Questions? http://carcino.gen.nz/images/index.php/04980e0b/53c55ca5
Who are your users:   1.   2.   3. What are their tasks?   1.   2.   3. ID Locate Distinguish Categorize Cluster Distribution Rank Compare Associate Correlate Color Size Shape Orientation Scale Interactivity Sequence Filtering Perspective
 
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Network Security Data Visualization

  • 1. Network Security Data Visualization Greg Conti www.cc.gatech.edu/~conti CS6262 http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/walrus1_large.gif
  • 3. information visualization is the use of interactive, sensory representations, typically visual, of abstract data to reinforce cognition. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_visualization
  • 4. Why InfoVis? Helps find patterns Helps reduce search space Aids efficient monitoring Enables interaction (what if) Help prevent overwhelming the user
  • 5. So What? Go Beyond the Algorithm Help with detecting and understand some 0 day attacks Make CTF and Root Wars a Spectator Sport Help find insider threats Help visually fingerprint attacks What tasks do you need help with?
  • 6. TCP Dump image: http://www.bgnett.no/~giva/pcap/tcpdump.png
  • 7. Network Traffic Viewed in Ethereal Ethereal by Gerald Combs can be found at http://www.ethereal.com/ image: http://www.linux-france.org/prj/edu/archinet/AMSI/index/images/ethereal.gif
  • 8. Network Traffic as Viewed in EtherApe Etherape by Juan Toledo can be found at http://etherape.sourceforge.net/ screenshot: http://www.solaris4you.dk/sniffersSS.html
  • 9. Outline Quick overview of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Quick overview of Information Visualization What data is available on the wire Finding interesting combinations What the attacks look like
  • 10. Intrusion Detection System An intrusion-detection system (IDS) is a tool used to detect attacks or other security breaches in a computer system or network. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion-detection_system
  • 11. Intrusion Detection System Types Host-based intrusion-detection is the art of detecting malicious activity within a single computer by using host log information system activity virus scanners A Network intrusion detection system is a system that tries to detect malicious activity such as denial of service attacks, port-scans or other attempts to hack into computers by reading all the incoming packets and trying to find suspicious patterns. http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Host-based_intrusion-detection_system http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_intrusion_detection_system
  • 12. Information Visualization Mantra Overview First, Zoom & Filter, Details on Demand - Ben Shneiderman http://www.cs.umd.edu/~ben/
  • 15. Details on Demand…
  • 16. What Tools are at Your Disposal… Color Size Shape Orientation Scale Interactivity Sequence Filtering Perspective
  • 17. What Can InfoVis Help You See? Relationships between X & Y & Z… Anomalies Outliers Extremes Patterns Comparisons and Differences Trends
  • 18. User Tasks ID Locate Distinguish Categorize Cluster Distribution Rank Compare Associate Correlate http://www.siggraph.org/education/materials/HyperVis/concepts/matrx_lo.htm See also http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~zhou/project/CHI98Title.html
  • 20. Dr. Rob Erbacher Representative Research Visual Summarizing and Analysis Techniques for Intrusion Data Multi-Dimensional Data Visualization A Component-Based Event-Driven Interactive Visualization Software Architecture http://otherland.cs.usu.edu/~erbacher/
  • 22. Dr. David Marchette Passive Fingerprinting Statistics for intrusion detection http://www.mts.jhu.edu/~marchette/
  • 24. Soon Tee Teoh Visualizing Internet Routing Data http://graphics.cs.ucdavis.edu/~steoh/
  • 25. CAIDA Code Red Worm Propagation Young Hyun David Moore Colleen Shannon Bradley Huffaker http://www.caida.org/tools/visualization/walrus/examples/codered/
  • 26. Jukka Juslin http://www.cs.hut.fi/~jtjuslin/ Intrustion Detection and Visualization Using Perl
  • 27. Michal Zalewski TCP/IP Sequence Number Generation Initial paper - http://razor.bindview.com/publish/papers/tcpseq/print.html Follow-up paper - http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/ Linux 2.2 TCP/IP sequence numbers are not as good as they might be, but are certainly adequate, and attack feasibility is very low. Linux 2.2 TCP/IP sequence numbers are not as good as they might be, but are certainly adequate, and attack feasibility is very low. Linux 2.2 TCP/IP sequence numbers are not as good as they might be, but are certainly adequate, and attack feasibility is very low.
  • 28. Atlas of Cyber Space http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/atlas.html
  • 29. John Levine The Use of Honeynets to Detect Exploited Systems Across Large Enterprise Networks Interesting look at detecting zero-day attacks http://users.ece.gatech.edu/~owen/Research/Conference%20Publications/honeynet_IAW2003.pdf
  • 30. Port 135 MS BLASTER scans Date Public: 7/16/03 Date Attack: 8/11/03 Georgia Tech Honeynett Source: John Levine, Georgia Tech
  • 31. Port 1434 (MS-SQL) scans Date Public: 7/24/02 Date Attack: 1/25/03 Georgia Tech Honeynet Source: John Levine, Georgia Tech
  • 32. Port 554 (RTSP) scans Date Public: 8/15/2003 Date Attack: 8/22/03 Georgia Tech Honeypot Source: John Levine, Georgia Tech
  • 33. Hot Research Areas… visualizing vulnerabilities visualizing IDS alarms (NIDS/HIDS) visualizing worm/virus propagation visualizing routing anamolies visualizing large volume computer network logs visual correlations of security events visualizing network traffic for security visualizing attacks in near-real-time security visualization at line speeds dynamic attack tree creation (graphic) forensic visualization http://www.cs.fit.edu/~pkc/vizdmsec04/
  • 34. More Hot Research Areas… feature selection feature construction incremental/online learning noise in the data skewed data distribution distributed mining correlating multiple models efficient processing of large amounts of data correlating alerts signature detection anomaly detection forensic analysis http://www.cs.fit.edu/~pkc/vizdmsec04/
  • 35. One Approach… Look at TCP/IP Protocol Stack Data (particularly header information) Find interesting visualizations Throw some interesting traffic at them See what they can detect Refine
  • 36. TCP/IP Protocol Stack http://ai3.asti.dost.gov.ph/sat/levels.jpg
  • 37. Information Available On and Off the Wire Levels of analysis External data Time Size Protocol compliance Real vs. Actual Values Matrices of options Header slides http://ai3.asti.dost.gov.ph/sat/levels.jpg
  • 38. Link Layer (Ethernet) http://www.itec.suny.edu/scsys/vms/OVMSDOC073/V73/6136/ZK-3743A.gif Physical Link Network Transport Application Presentation Session
  • 39. Network Layer (IP) http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0791.txt Physical Link Network Transport Application Presentation Session
  • 40. Transport Layer (TCP) http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc793.txt Physical Link Network Transport Application Presentation Session
  • 41. Transport Layer (UDP) http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0768.txt Physical Link Network Transport Application Presentation Session
  • 42.  
  • 43. Exploitation Pattern of Typical Internet Worm Target Vulnerabilities on Specific Operating Systems Localized Scanning to Propagate (Code Red) 3/8 of time within same Class B (/16 network) 1/2 of time within same Class A (/8 network) 1/8 of time random address Allows for Quick Infection Within Internal Networks with High Concentration of Vulnerable Hosts ? Source: John Levine, Georgia Tech
  • 44. Ethernet Packet Capture Parse Process Plot tcpdump (pcap, winpcap, snort) Perl (c/c++) Perl (c/c++) xmgrace (GNU plotutils gtk+/opengl html) tcpdump capture files
  • 45. Grace “ Grace is a WYSIWYG 2D plotting tool for the X Window System and M*tif. Grace runs on practically any version of Unix-like OS. As well, it has been successfully ported to VMS, OS/2, and Win9*/NT/2000/XP” http://plasma-gate.weizmann.ac.il/Grace/
  • 46. Required Files Perl, tcpdump and grace need to be installed. - http://www.tcpdump.org/ - http://www.perl.org/ - http://plasma-gate.weizmann.ac.il/Grace/ to install grace... Download RPMs (or source) ftp://plasma-gate.weizmann.ac.il/pub/grace/contrib/RPMS The files you want grace-5.1.14-1.i386.rpm pdflib-4.0.3-1.i386.rpm Install #rpm -i pdflib-4.0.3-1.i386.rpm #rpm -i grace-5.1.14-1.i386.rpm
  • 47. Hello World Example # tcpdump -lnnq -c10 | perl parse.pl | perl analyze.pl |outfile.dat # xmgrace outfile.dat & Optionally you can run xmgrace with an external format language file… # xmgrace outfile.dat -batch formatfile
  • 48. Hello World Example (cont) Optionally you can run xmgrace with an external format language file… xmgrace outfile.dat -batch formatfile formatfile is a text file that pre-configures Grace e.g. title "Port Scan Against Single Host" subtitle "Superscan w/ports 1-1024" yaxis label "Port" yaxis label place both yaxis ticklabel place both xaxis ticklabel off xaxis tick major off xaxis tick minor off autoscale
  • 49. Data Format tcpdump outputs somewhat verbose output 09:02:01.858240 0:6:5b:4:20:14 0:5:9a:50:70:9 62: 10.100.1.120.4532 > 10.1.3.0.1080: tcp 0 (DF) parse.pl cleans up output 09 02 01 858240 0:6:5b:4:20:14 0:5:9a:50:70:9 10.100.1.120.4532 10.100.1.120 4532 10.1.3.0.1080 10.1.3.0 1080 tcp analyze.pl extracts/formats for Grace. 0 4532 1 1080 0 4537 1 1080 0 2370 1 1080
  • 50. Results Example 1 - Baseline with Normal Traffic Example 2 - Port Scan Example 3 - Port Scan “Fingerprinting” Example 4 - Vulnerability Scanner Example 5 - Wargame
  • 51. Example 1 - Baseline Normal network traffic FTP, HTTP, SSH, ICMP… Command Line Capture Raw Data tcpdump -l -nnqe -c 1000 tcp or udp | perl parse.pl > exp1_outfile.txt Run through Analysis Script cat exp1_outfile.txt | perl analyze_1a.pl > output1a.dat Open in Grace xmgrace output1a.dat &
  • 52.  
  • 53.  
  • 54. Example 2 - PortScan Light “normal” network traffic (HTTP) Command Line Run 2a.bat (chmod +x 2a.bat) echo running experiment 2 echo 1-1024 port scan tcpdump -l -nnqe -c 1200 tcp or udp > raw_outfile_2.txt cat raw_outfile_2.txt | perl parse_2a.pl > exp2_outfile.txt cat exp2_outfile.txt | perl analyze_2a.pl > output_2a.dat xmgrace output_2a.dat & echo experiment 2 completed
  • 55.  
  • 58. Example 3- PortScan “Fingerprinting” Tools Examined: Nmap Win 1.3.1 (on top of Nmap 3.00) XP Attacker (http://www.insecure.org/nmap/) Nmap 3.00 RH 8.0 Attacker (http://www.insecure.org/nmap/) Superscan 3.0 RH 8.0 Attacker ( http://www.foundstone.com/index.htm?subnav=resources/navigation.htm&subcontent=/resources/proddesc/superscan.htm)
  • 59. nmap 3.00 default (RH 8.0) nmap 3.00 udp scan (RH 8.0) Superscan 3.0 Nmap Win 1.3.1
  • 61. Example 4: Vulnerability Scanner Attacker: RH 8.0 running Nessus 2.0.10 Target: RH 9.0
  • 62.  
  • 63. Example 5: Wargame Attackers: NSA Red Team Defenders: US Service Academies Defenders lock down network, but must provide certain services Dataset - http://www.itoc.usma.edu/cdx/2003/logs.zip
  • 64.  
  • 65.  
  • 66.  
  • 67.  
  • 68. Zooming in on port 8080
  • 69.  
  • 70. Port 135 CAN-2003-0605 tcp any 135 The RPC DCOM interface in Windows 2000 SP3 and SP4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash), and local attackers to use the DoS to hijack the epmapper pipe to gain privileges, via certain messages to the __RemoteGetClassObject interface that cause a NULL pointer to be passed to the PerformScmStage function. CAN-2003-0352 6 any 135 Buffer overflow in a certain DCOM interface for RPC in Microsoft Windows NT 4.0, 2000, XP, and Server 2003 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a malformed message, as exploited by the Blaster/MSblast/LovSAN worm. http://isc.incidents.org/port_details.html?port=135
  • 71. Conclusions Limited fingerprinting of tools is possible Visualization can help drive better algorithms Some attacker techniques can be identified Some vulnerabilities can be identified
  • 72. Demo See readme.txt Two demo scripts… runme.bat (uses sample dataset) runme_sniff.bat (performs live capture, must be root) Note: you must modify the IP address variable in the Analyzer script. (See analyzer2.pl for example)
  • 73. Future Distributed NIDS Visualization Real-time vs. Offline Interesting datasets 3D Other visualization techniques Visualization of protocol attacks Visualization of application layer attacks Visualization of physical layer attacks (?) Code up some stand-alone tools
  • 75. Who are your users: 1. 2. 3. What are their tasks? 1. 2. 3. ID Locate Distinguish Categorize Cluster Distribution Rank Compare Associate Correlate Color Size Shape Orientation Scale Interactivity Sequence Filtering Perspective
  • 76.  

Editor's Notes

  • #2: “ These striking images are 3D hyperbolic graphs of Internet topology. They are created using the Walrus visualisation tool developed by Young Hyun at the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis ( CAIDA ). The underlying data on the topological structure of the Internet is gathered by skitter , a CAIDA tool for large-scale collection and analysis of Internet traffic path data.” -http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/topology.html