Network Security Lec4

Editor's Notes

• #4: The most widely used private key block cipher, is the Data Encryption Standard (DES). It was adopted in 1977 by the National Bureau of Standards as Federal Information Processing Standard 46 (FIPS PUB 46). DES encrypts data in 64-bit blocks using a 56-bit key. The DES enjoys widespread use. It has also been the subject of much controversy its security.
• #5: The overall scheme for DES encryption is illustrated in Stallings Figure3.4, which takes as input 64-bits of data and of key. The left side shows the basic process for enciphering a 64-bit data block which consists of: - an initial permutation (IP) which shuffles the 64-bit input block - 16 rounds of a complex key dependent round function involving substitutions & permutations - a final permutation, being the inverse of IP The right side shows the handling of the 56-bit key and consists of: - an initial permutation of the key (PC1) which selects 56-bits out of the 64-bits input, in two 28-bit halves - 16 stages to generate the 48-bit subkeys using a left circular shift and a permutation of the two 28-bit halves
• #7: Detail here the internal structure of the DES round function F, which takes R half & subkey, and processes them through E, add subkey, S & P. This follows the classic structure for a feistel cipher. Note that the s-boxes provide the “confusion” of data and key values, whilst the permutation P then spreads this as widely as possible, so each S-box output affects as many S-box inputs in the next round as possible, giving “diffusion”.
• #10: The substitution consists of a set of eight S-boxes, each of which accepts 6 bits as input and produces 4 bits as output. These transformations are defined in Stallings Table 3.3, which is interpreted as follows: The first and last bits of the input to box S i form a 2-bit binary number to select one of four substitutions defined by the four rows in the table for S i . The middle four bits select one of the sixteen columns. The decimal value in the cell selected by the row and column is then converted to its 4-bit representation to produce the output. For example, in S1, for input 011001, the row is 01 (row 1) and the column is 1100 (column 12). The value in row 1, column 12 is 9, so the output is 1001. The example lists 8 6-bit values (ie 18 in hex is 011000 in binary, 09 hex is 001001 binary, 12 hex is 010010 binary, 3d hex is 111101 binary etc), each of which is replaced following the process detailed above using the appropriate S-box. ie S1(011000) lookup row 00 col 1100 in S1 to get 5 S2(001001) lookup row 01 col 0100 in S2 to get 15 = f in hex S3(010010) lookup row 00 col 1001 in S3 to get 13 = d in hex S4(111101) lookup row 11 col 1110 in S4 to get 2 etc
• #11: Stallings Figure 3.6 illustrates the internal structure of the DES round function F. The R input is first expanded to 48 bits by using expansion table E that defines a permutation plus an expansion that involves duplication of 16 of the R bits (Stallings Table 3.2c). The resulting 48 bits are XORed with Ki. This 48-bit result passes through a substitution function comprising 8 S-boxes which each map 6 input bits to 4 output bits, producing a 32-bit output, which is then permuted by permutation P as defined by Stallings Table 3.2d.
• #14: The DES Key Schedule generates the subkeys needed for each data encryption round. The 64-bit key input is first processed by Permuted Choice One (Stallings Table 3.4b). The resulting 56-bit key is then treated as two 28-bit quantities C & D. In each round, these are separately processed throgh a circular left shift (rotation) of 1 or 2bits as shown in Stallings Table 3.4d. These shifted values serve as input to the next round of the key schedule. They also serve as input to Permuted Choice Two (Stallings Table 3.4c), which produces a 48-bit output that serves as input to the round function F. The 56 bit key size comes from security considerations as we know now. It was big enough so that an exhaustive key search was about as hard as the best direct attack (a form of differential cryptanalysis called a T-attack, known by the IBM & NSA researchers), but no bigger. The extra 8 bits were then used as parity (error detecting) bits, which makes sense given the original design use for hardware communications links. However we hit an incompatibility with simple s/w implementations since the top bit in each byte is 0 (since ASCII only uses 7 bits), but the DES key schedule throws away the bottom bit! A good implementation needs to be cleverer!
• #19: As with any Feistel cipher, DES decryption uses the same algorithm as encryption except that the subkeys are used in reverse order SK16 .. SK1. If you trace through the DES overview diagram can see how each decryption step top to bottom with reversed subkeys, undoes the equivalent encryption step moving from bottom to top.
• #20: Since its adoption as a federal standard, there have been lingering concerns about the level of security provided by DES in two areas: key size and the nature of the algorithm. With a key length of 56 bits, there are 2^56 possible keys, which is approximately 7.2*10^16 keys. Thus a brute-force attack appeared impractical. However DES was finally and definitively proved insecure in July 1998, when the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) announced that it had broken a DES encryption using a special-purpose "DES cracker" machine that was built for less than $250,000. The attack took less than three days. The EFF has published a detailed description of the machine, enabling others to build their own cracker [EFF98]. There have been other demonstrated breaks of the DES using both large networks of computers & dedicated h/w, including: - 1997 on a large network of computers in a few months - 1998 on dedicated h/w (EFF) in a few days - 1999 above combined in 22hrs! It is important to note that there is more to a key-search attack than simply running through all possible keys. Unless known plaintext is provided, the analyst must be able to recognize plaintext as plaintext. Clearly must now consider alternatives to DES , the most important of which are AES and triple DES.
• #21: Although much progress has been made in designing block ciphers that are cryptographically strong, the basic principles have not changed all that much since the work of Feistel and the DES design team in the early 1970s. Some of the criteria used in the design of DES were reported in [COPP94], and focused on the design of the S-boxes and on the P function that distributes the output of the S boxes, as summarized above. See text for further details.
• #22: The cryptographic strength of a Feistel cipher derives from three aspects of the design: the number of rounds, the function F, and the key schedule algorithm. Briefly discuss these. The greater the number of rounds, the more difficult it is to perform cryptanalysis, even for a relatively weak F. In general, the criterion should be that the number of rounds is chosen so that known cryptanalytic efforts require greater effort than a simple brute-force key search attack. This criterion is attractive because it makes it easy to judge the strength of an algorithm and to compare different algorithms. The function F provides the element of confusion in a Feistel cipher, want it to be difficult to “unscramble” the substitution performed by F. One obvious criterion is that F be nonlinear. The more nonlinear F, the more difficult any type of cryptanalysis will be. We would like it to have good avalanche properties, or even the strict avalanche criterion (SAC). Another criterion is the bit independence criterion (BIC). One of the most intense areas of research in the field of symmetric block ciphers is that of S-box design. Would like any change to the input vector to an S-box to result in random-looking changes to the output. The relationship should be nonlinear and difficult to approximate with linear functions. A final area of block cipher design, and one that has received less attention than S-box design, is the key schedule algorithm. With any Feistel block cipher, the key schedule is used to generate a subkey for each round. Would like to select subkeys to maximize the difficulty of deducing individual subkeys and the difficulty of working back to the main key. The key schedule should guarantee key/ciphertext Strict Avalanche Criterion and Bit Independence Criterion.
• #23: Another concern is the possibility that cryptanalysis is possible by exploiting the characteristics of the DES algorithm. The focus of concern has been on the eight substitution tables, or S-boxes, that are used in each iteration. These techniques utilise some deep structure of the cipher by gathering information about encryptions so that eventually you can recover some/all of the sub-key bits, and then exhaustively search for the rest if necessary. Generally these are statistical attacks which depend on the amount of information gathered for their likelihood of success. Attacks of this form include differential cryptanalysis. linear cryptanalysis, and related key attacks.
• #24: A desirable property of any encryption algorithm is that a small change in either the plaintext or the key should produce a significant change in the ciphertext. In particular, a change in one bit of the plaintext or one bit of the key should produce a change in many bits of the ciphertext. If the change were small, this might provide a way to reduce the size of the plaintext or key space to be searched. DES exhibits a strong avalanche effect, as may be seen in Stallings Table 3.5.
• #25: We will discuss timing attacks in more detail later, as they relate to public-key algorithms. However,the issue may also be relevant for symmetric ciphers. A timing attack is one in which information about the key or the plaintext is obtained by observing how long it takes a given implementation to perform decryptions on various ciphertexts. A timing attack exploits the fact that an encryption or decryption algorithm often takes slightly different amounts of time on different inputs. The AES analysis process has highlighted this attack approach, and showed that it is a concern particularly with smartcard implementations, though DES appears to be fairly resistant to a successful timing attack.
• #28: The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was published by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) in 2001. AES is a symmetric block cipher that is intended to replace DES as the approved standard for a wide range of applications. The AES cipher (& other candidates) form the latest generation of block ciphers, and now we see a significant increase in the block size - from the old standard of 64-bits up to 128-bits; and keys from 128 to 256-bits. In part this has been driven by the public demonstrations of exhaustive key searches of DES. Whilst triple-DES is regarded as secure and well understood, it is slow, especially in s/w. In a first round of evaluation, 15 proposed algorithms were accepted. A second round narrowed the field to 5 algorithms. NIST completed its evaluation process and published a final standard (FIPS PUB 197) in November of 2001. NIST selected Rijndael as the proposed AES algorithm. The two researchers who developed and submitted Rijndael for the AES are both cryptographers from Belgium: Dr. Joan Daemen and Dr.Vincent Rijmen.
• #29: Listed above are NIST’s requirements for the AES candidate submissions. These criteria span the range of concerns for the practical application of modern symmetric block ciphers.
• #30: In fact, two set of criteria evolved. When NIST issued its original request for candidate algorithm nominations in 1997, the request stated that candidate algorithms would be compared based on the factors shown in Stallings Table5.1, which were used to evaluate field of 15 candidates to select shortlist of 5. These had categories of security, cost, and algorithm & implementation characteristics. The final criteria evolved during the evaluation process, and were used to select Rijndael from that short-list, and more details are given in Stallings Table 5.2, with categories of: general security, ease of software & hardware implementation, implementation attacks, & flexibility (in en/decrypt, keying, other factors).
• #31: The AES shortlist of 5 ciphers was as shown. Note mix of commercial (MARS, RC6, Twofish) verses academic (Rijndael, Serpent) proposals, sourced from various countries. All were thought to be good – it came down to the best balance of attributes to meet criteria, in particular the balance between speed, security & flexibility.
• #32: The Rijndael proposal for AES defined a cipher in which the block length and the key length can be independently specified to be 128,192,or 256 bits. The AES specification uses the same three key size alternatives but limits the block length to 128 bits. Rijndael is an academic submission, based on the earlier Square cipher, from Belgium academics Dr Joan Daemen and Dr Vincent Rijmen. It is an iterative cipher (operates on entire data block in every round) rather than feistel (operate on halves at a time), and was designed to have characteristics of: Resistance against all known attacks, Speed and code compactness on a wide range of platforms, & Design simplicity.
• #33: The input to the AES encryption and decryption algorithms is a single 128-bit block, depicted in FIPS PUB 197, as a square matrix of bytes .This block is copied into the State array, which is modified at each stage of encryption or decryption. After the final stage, State is copied to an output. The key is expanded into 44/52/60 lots of 32-bit words (see later), with 4 used in each round. The data computation then consists of an “add round key” step, then 9/11/13 rounds with all 4 steps, and a final 10 th /12 th /14 th step of byte subs + mix cols + add round key. This can be viewed as alternating XOR key & scramble data bytes operations. All of the steps are easily reversed, and can be efficiently implemented using XOR’s & table lookups.
• #38: Stallings Figure 5.1 s hows the overall structure of AES, as detailed on the previous slide.
• #39: Now discuss each of the four stages used in AES. The Substitute bytes stage uses an S-box to perform a byte-by-byte substitution of the block. There is a single 8-bit wide S-box used on every byte. This S-box is a permutation of all 256 8-bit values, constructed using a transformation which treats the values as polynomials in GF(2 8 ) – however it is fixed, so really only need to know the table when implementing. Decryption requires the inverse of the table. These tables are given in Stallings Table 4.5. The table was designed to be resistant to known cryptanalytic attacks. Specifically, the Rijndael developers sought a design that has a low correlation between input bits and output bits, with the property that the output cannot be described as a simple mathematical function of the input, with no fixed points and no “opposite fixed points”.
• #40: As this diagram from Stallings Fig 5.4a shows, the Byte Substitution operates on each byte of state independently, with the input byte used to index a row/col in the table to retrieve the substituted value.
• #46: Stalling Figure 5.5a illustrates the Shift Rows permutation.
• #50: DES (or any block cipher) forms a basic building block, which en/decrypts a fixed sized block of data. However to use these in practise, we usually need to handle arbitrary amounts of data, which may be available in advance (in which case a block mode is appropriate), and may only be available a bit/byte at a time (in which case a stream mode is used). To apply a block cipher in a variety of applications, four “modes of operation” have been defined by NIST (FIPS 81). The four modes are intended to cover virtually all the possible applications of encryption for which a block cipher could be used. As new applications and requirements have appeared, NIST has expanded the list of recommended modes to five in Special Publication 800-38A. These modes are intended for use with any symmetric block cipher, including triple DES and AES.
• #51: The simplest mode is the electronic codebook (ECB) mode, in which plaintext is handled one block at a time and each block of plaintext is encrypted using the same key. ECB is the simplest of the modes, and is used when only a single block of info needs to be sent (eg. a session key encrypted using a master key) .
• #52: Stallings Figure 6.3 illustrates the Electronic Codebook (ECB) Mode.
• #53: ECB is not appropriate for any quantity of data, since repetitions can be seen, esp. with graphics, and because the blocks can be shuffled/inserted without affecting the en/decryption of each block. Its main use is to send one or a very few blocks, eg a session encryption key.
• #54: To overcome the problems of repetitions and order independence in ECB, want some way of making the ciphertext dependent on all blocks before it. This is what CBC gives us, by combining the previous ciphertext block with the current message block before encrypting. To start the process, use an Initial Value (IV), which is usually well known (often all 0's), or otherwise is sent, ECB encrypted, just before starting CBC use. CBC mode is applicable whenever large amounts of data need to be sent securely, provided that all data is available in advance (eg email, FTP, web etc).
• #55: Stallings Figure 6.4 illustrates the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode.
• #56: One issue that arises with block modes is how to handle the last block, which may well not be complete. In general have to pad this block (typically with 0's), and then must recognise padding at other end - may be obvious (eg in text the 0 value should usually not occur), or otherwise must explicitly have the last byte as a count of how much padding was used (including the count). Note that if this is done, if the last block IS an even multiple of 8 bytes or has exactly the same form as pad+count, then will have to add an extra block, all padding so as to have a count in the last byte. There are other, more esoteric, “ciphertext stealing” modes, which avoid the need for an extra block.
• #57: CBC is the block mode generally used. The chaining provides an avalanche effect, which means the encrypted message cannot be changed or rearranged without totally destroying the subsequent data. However there is the issue of ensuring that the IV is either fixed or sent encrypted in ECB mode to stop attacks on 1st block.
• #58: If the data is only available a bit/byte at a time (eg. terminal session, sensor value etc), then must use some other approach to encrypting it, so as not to delay the info. Idea here is to use the block cipher essentially as a pseudo-random number generator (see stream cipher lecture later) and to combine these "random" bits with the message. Note as mentioned before, XOR is an easily inverted operator (just XOR with same thing again to undo). Again start with an IV to get things going, then use the ciphertext as the next input. As originally defined, idea was to "consume" as much of the "random" output as needed for each message unit (bit/byte) before "bumping" bits out of the buffer and re-encrypting. This is wasteful though, and slows the encryption down as more encryptions are needed. An alternate way to think of it is to generate a block of "random" bits, consume them as message bits/bytes arrive, and when they're used up, only then feed a full block of ciphertext back. This is CFB-64 or CFB-128 mode (depending on the block size of the cipher used eg DES or AES respectively). CFB is the usual choice for quantities of stream oriented data, and for authentication use.
• #59: Stallings Figure 6.5 illustrates the Cipher FeedBack (CFB) Mode.
• #60: CFB is the usual stream mode. As long as can keep up with the input, doing encryptions every 8 bytes. A possible problem is that if its used over a "noisy" link, then any corrupted bit will destroy values in the current and next blocks (since the current block feeds as input to create the random bits for the next). So either must use over a reliable network transport layer (pretty usual) or use OFB.
• #61: The alternative to CFB is OFB. Here the generation of the "random" bits is independent of the message being encrypted. The advantage is that firstly, they can be computed in advance, good for bursty traffic, and secondly, any bit error only affects a single bit. Thus this is good for noisy links (eg satellite TV transmissions etc).
• #62: Stallings Figure 6.6 illustrates the Output FeedBack (OFB) Mode.
• #63: One advantage of the OFB method is that bit errors in transmission do not propagate. The disadvantage of OFB is that it is more vulnerable to a message stream modification attack than is CFB. Since OFB is a Vernam cipher variant, the stream should never be used more than once (otherwise the 2 ciphertexts can be combined, cancelling these bits, and leaving a "book" cipher to solve). And sender & receiver need to remain in sync, or all data is lost. Also, research has shown that you should only ever use a full block feedback ie OFB-64/128 mode.
• #64: The Counter (CTR) mode is a variant of OFB, but which encrypts a counter value (hence name). Although it was proposed many years before, it has only recently been standardized for use with AES along with the other existing 4 modes. It is being used with applications in ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) network security and IPSec (IP security). A counter, equal to the plaintext block size is used. The only requirement stated in SP 800-38A is that the counter value must be different for each plaintext block that is encrypted. Typically the counter is initialized to some value and then incremented by 1 for each subsequent block.
• #65: Stallings Figure 6.7 illustrates the Counter (CTR) Mode.
• #66: CTR mode has a number of advantages in parallel h/w & s/w efficiency, can preprocess the output values in advance of needing to encrypt, can get random access to encrypted data blocks, and is simple. But like OFB have issue of not reusing the same key+counter value.
• #68: A typical stream cipher encrypts plaintext one byte (or bit) at a time, usually by XOR’ing with a pseudo-random keystream. The stream cipher is similar to the one-time pad discussed in Chapter 2. The difference is that a one-time pad uses a genuine random number stream, whereas a stream cipher uses a pseudorandom number stream. But rely on the randomness of stream key completely destroys statistically properties in message . However, you must never reuse a stream key since otherwise you can recover messages (as with a book cipher).
• #69: Stallings Figure 6.8 illustrates the general structure of a stream cipher, where a key is input to a pseudorandom bit generator that produces an apparently random keystream of bits, and which are XOR’d with message to encrypt it, and XOR’d again to decrypt it by the receiver.