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KOREA
OECD
Reviews
of
Innovation
Policy
OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy
KOREA
How are a country’s achievements in innovation defined and measured, and how do they relate
to economic performance? What are the major features, strengths and weaknesses of a nation’s
innovation system? How can government foster innovation?
The OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy offer a comprehensive assessement of the innovation
system of individual OECD member and non-member countries, focusing on the role of government.
They provide concrete recommendations on how to improve policies that affect innovation
performance, including R&D policies. Each review identifies good practices from which other
countries can learn.
Korea’s exceptional economic success over the last half century has few parallels and has been
driven in no small part by a firm commitment to innovation. Among its strengths, Korea has one of
the highest rates of spending on R&D in the world, much of which is performed by private firms.
It also has a highly educated labour force – as signalled by its impressive PISA performance and
exceptionally high rates of tertiary level graduation – with a strong interest in science and technology.
However, a number of bottlenecks persist that hamper Korea’s economic convergence with the
leading OECD economies. These include a relatively weak SME sector and weak performance
in services, as well as lagging capacities to conduct leading-edge research in many areas.
Furthermore, Korea faces numerous threats in the mid term, notably increased levels of competition
from China and other newly-industrialising economies, the lowest fertility rate in the OECD and an
ageing society, and a continuing high dependency on imports of natural resources, particularly
hydrocarbons. In the shorter term, the economic crisis offers its own challenges, with the need for
some policy adjustments to deal with expected falls in business investment in R&D and growing
levels of unemployment among the highly skilled.
This report assesses the current status of Korea’s innovation system and policies, and identifies
where and how the government should focus its efforts to improve the country’s innovation
capabilities.
More information about the OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy series is available at
www.oecd.org/sti/innovation/reviews.
The full text of this book is available on line via this link:
www.sourceoecd.org/scienceIT/9789264067226
Those with access to all OECD books on line should use this link:
www.sourceoecd.org/9789264067226
SourceOECD is the OECD online library of books, periodicals and statistical databases.
For more information about this award-winning service and free trials ask your librarian, or write to us
at SourceOECD@oecd.org.
ISBN 978-92-64-06722-6
92 2009 04 1 P -:HSTCQE=U[WW[:
KOREA

Korea

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT
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ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy
experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate
domestic and international policies.
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
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views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries.

FOREWORD – 3
OECD REVIEWS OF INNOVATION POLICY: KOREA – ISBN 978-92-64-06722-6 © OECD 2009
Foreword
This review of Korea’s Innovation Policy is part of a series of OECD country reviews
of innovation policy.*
The review was requested by the Korean authorities, represented
by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST), and was carried out by
the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry (DSTI) under the auspices
of the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy (CSTP).
The review draws on a background report commissioned by the Korean authorities,**
and on the results of a series of interviews with major stakeholders in Korea’s innovation
system. The review was drafted by Michael Keenan (Country Review Unit, DSTI,
OECD) and Ron Johnston (consultant to the OECD, Professor at the University of
Sydney), with contributions from and under the supervision of Jean Guinet (Head,
Country Review Unit, DSTI, OECD).
This review owes much to STEPI researchers, particularly Kong-Rae Lee, for
organising a series of interviews in Korea, and to Korean government officials, in
particular Hae-Joo Moon, Pan-Sick Hwang, Jin-Hun Bae, Joo-Han Kim and Tae-Young
Kim for their guidance and for feedback on early drafts of the review. Yong-Nam Jung
(Institute for Information Technology Advancement) also arranged interviews for the
OECD team. An interim report prepared by the OECD and presented at a policy forum in
Seoul in January 2008 benefited from comments by and the participation of Dieter Ernst
(East-West Center, Honolulu). Finally, the review also benefited significantly from the
insights of Korean OECD colleagues, namely Tae-Seog Oh and Dong-Hoon Oh.
*
See www.oecd.org/sti/innovation/reviews.
**
The background report was prepared by a team of Korean experts and edited by Kong-Rae Lee of the
Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) on behalf of MEST. The team’s experts were Tae-
Kyung Sung (Jeonju University), Woo-Sung Lee (STEPI), Sangwon Ko (Korea Information Society
Development Institute) and Jung-Tae Hwang (STEPI).

TABLE OF CONTENTS – 5
Table of Contents
Introduction: Korean Innovation Policy in a Time of Economic Crisis...................................................... 7
Overall Assessment and Recommendations ................................................................................................ 13
Main strengths and weaknesses of Korea’s innovation system.................................................................... 14
Strategic tasks and guiding principles.......................................................................................................... 17
Recommendations........................................................................................................................................ 19
Évaluation générale et recommandations...................................................................................................... 31
Forces et faiblesses principales du système d’innovation coréen................................................................ 32
Missions stratégiques et principes directeurs .............................................................................................. 36
Recommandations ........................................................................................................................................ 38
Chapter 1. Performance and Framework Conditions for Innovation ...................................................... 51
1.1. Macroeconomic performance................................................................................................................ 51
1.2. Structural features ................................................................................................................................. 58
1.3. Framework conditions for innovation ................................................................................................... 72
1.4. Performance in science, technology and innovation ............................................................................. 74
Chapter 2. Main Features of the Innovation System.................................................................................. 87
2.1. Large national firms .............................................................................................................................. 87
2.2. SMEs and new technology-based firms .............................................................................................. 111
2.3. Government research institutes ........................................................................................................... 124
2.4. Higher education institutions............................................................................................................... 138
2.5. Human capital ..................................................................................................................................... 145
2.6. System linkages................................................................................................................................... 165
Notes .......................................................................................................................................................... 172
Chapter 3. Government Innovation Policy................................................................................................ 173
3.1. Introduction to Korean innovation policy ........................................................................................... 173
3.2. Policy-making institutions................................................................................................................... 178
3.3. STI policy and governance.................................................................................................................. 184
3.4. Research funding................................................................................................................................. 195
3.5. HRST policy........................................................................................................................................ 218
3.6. Knowledge diffusion and linkages...................................................................................................... 231
3.7. Improving the framework conditions for innovation .......................................................................... 236
3.8. Internationalisation.............................................................................................................................. 245
3.9. Regionalisation.................................................................................................................................... 251
Notes .......................................................................................................................................................... 258
References..................................................................................................................................................... 259

INTRODUCTION – 7
Introduction
Korean Innovation Policy in a Time of Economic Crisis
The research for this review, as well as much of its drafting, was carried out before
the global financial crisis and the earlier commodity price shock had started to take their
toll on Korea’s economic growth. An obvious question to ask, therefore, is whether the
analyses and recommendations contained in this review are still relevant. This intro-
duction seeks to answer this question by first sketching out the new economic environ-
ment for Korean innovation policy. It goes on to consider some of the challenges facing
the Korean innovation system before concluding with a set of guiding principles for
innovation policy. As will be apparent, these guiding principles are well aligned with, and
in fact reinforce, much of the analysis and many of the recommendations highlighted in
various parts of this review.
Innovation and the economic crisis
With its heavy dependence on oil and other commodity imports and its export-
oriented manufacturing economy, Korea was hard hit in 2008 by rising commodity prices
and steep declines in demand for its goods in international markets. The Bank of Korea
has reported the economy’s first year-on-year decline in quarterly growth since the Asian
financial crisis of 1997-98, with GDP falling 3.4% in the fourth quarter of 2008 against a
year earlier. Exports slumped by 12% in the same period, with semiconductor shipments
especially suffering, while manufacturing output was also down 12%. These figures are
clearly disturbing, with few prospects for improvement until a worldwide economic
recovery begins to take hold.
In the meantime, corporate profits continue to be squeezed, which in turn results in
declining growth in investment. Investments in R&D and innovation are unlikely to be
immune from these pressures. Indeed, longitudinal analysis shows that investments in
R&D and innovation are pro-cyclical and thus rise and fall in line with GDP growth. The
major reason is that such investments, more than most other types, are financed from cash
flow, which contracts, along with demand, in times of recession. Furthermore, invest-
ments by banks, markets, venture capitalists and the like are sensitive to the business
cycle, and this exacerbates the shortage of investment funding for innovation. The crisis
is also increasing unemployment levels. With falling demand in Korea’s export-oriented
high-technology industries, mass layoffs of skilled human resources are a growing threat.

8 – INTRODUCTION
Policy responses – past, present and future
These developments present serious challenges to innovation policy, particularly as
the business sector accounts for one of the highest proportions of national R&D spending
in the OECD area and employs three-quarters of all researchers. A significant part of this
activity and the jobs it supports are under threat as the economic crisis deepens. Korea
has faced similar challenges before, most notably during the Asian financial crisis of the
late 1990s, which led to significant down-scoping and downsizing by large firms. That
crisis was characterised by mass layoffs of highly skilled personnel and large reductions
in corporate R&D spending. The response of the Korean government was to increase
public R&D budgets, in order to offset declines in corporate R&D spending. But it also
promoted the development of a technology-based SME sector. This involved putting in
place a co-ordinated mix of policy measures, including: regulations (the government used
the crisis as an opportunity to overhaul regulations and to create a more positive
environment for venture start-ups and their growth); venture financing (government-
backed venture funds and tax incentives to investors); and research support (e.g. R&D
funding, tax waivers, tariff exemption for R&D equipment, and military service
exemptions for researchers).
These measures fuelled a rapid expansion in the number of corporate R&D labs
(which numbered about 3 000 at the time of the crisis and reached about 9 000 by 2001).
SMEs accounted for 95% of the increase. On the eve of the crisis, there were around 100
“venture firms” in Korea. By the end of 1999, there were over 5 000, and by the end of
2001, they numbered over 11 000. The long-term effects of these measures have been
striking. In 1997, SME spending accounted for just 12% of total business R&D, but by
2006, it had increased to 24%. Of course, this success cannot be explained by policy
intervention alone. The worldwide shift to a digital economy and the rapid growth of
information and communications technology provided exceptional business opportunities
for those with technology and ideas – notably researchers laid off by large Korean firms.
Nevertheless, without the government’s intervention, it is difficult to see how this could
have occurred.
The causes of the crisis facing Korea today are quite different from those that shaped
the previous crisis. Yet the effects are likely to be rather similar in some respects, with
deep cuts in business R&D and innovation activity a real possibility, along with mass
layoffs of researchers and other highly skilled human resources. Until now, the Korean
government has responded to the crisis with a broad range of policy measures, including
macroeconomic stimulus and regulatory reform. New measures for science and innova-
tion have not figured prominently in this stimulus package, although some of the stimuli
and reforms that have been announced may have a positive bearing on innovation. The
Korean government’s efforts in the regard, like those of other OECD governments, have,
understandably, sought to deal with the immediate threat of financial and economic
collapse, with longer-term growth prospects a secondary concern. Furthermore, the
Korean government had already committed itself to considerable expansion of the science
base before the crisis took hold. This included proposals for sizeable injections of new
funding, construction of new research and innovation infrastructures, and a renewed
emphasis on developing a green economy. In this sense, Korea was somewhat ahead of
the curve, with many other OECD governments only now – in the midst of the economic
crisis – making similar commitments.

INTRODUCTION – 9
Nonetheless, several challenges directly related to science and innovation lie ahead,
most notably the ability to manage an STI landscape marked by expected declines in
business R&D and innovation activity, and a concomitant depreciation of human capital
as a result of rising unemployment levels. Direct government spending on R&D will only
partly offset these developments and a broader perspective will be required, with, for
example, a focus on development of appropriate new skills and on new firm creation.
There are also risks that some of the necessary reforms highlighted in this review will be
postponed, which could ultimately hamper progress towards a sustainable recovery.
Guiding principles for innovation policy
Against this background, the following guiding principles should inform innovation
policy interventions:
• At the political level, it is important to maintain a steadfast commitment to existing
proposals for expanding science and innovation, as this will lay the ground for
sustainable recovery in the post-crisis era. Ensuring that economic stimulatory
measures take account of the longer term will be important in this regard, as this
will provide a natural “policy space” for science and innovation to feature
prominently on political agendas.
• From a shorter-term perspective, implementation of certain policy measures and
programmes should be accelerated as part of a wider package of stimulatory
measures. These should be carefully selected to maximize the short-term impact on
demand, but also to minimise the risk of wasting public money by rushing projects
that require more time to plan and implement. Moreover, the use of existing
programmes and agencies should be favoured as they do not require the long lead
times needed for new programmes and agencies to become effective.
• With levels of BERD expected to fall, public funding should be selectively used to
increase direct support to firms’ R&D, while taking care to minimise the crowding
out of private investment that would have occurred anyway. Again, existing
programmes and agencies are probably best placed to funnel such expenditure
increases. Furthermore, rises in direct funding of firm R&D should be used,
wherever reasonably possible, to deepen and extend interactions between the
public and private sectors. Such public-private partnerships increase the resilience
of R&D efforts as their financing can be rebalanced over the business cycle.
• Innovative clusters often involve such public-private partnerships and offer
important platforms for organising complementarities and mutual exchanges
between new and established firms and public-sector knowledge producers
(universities, GRIs, etc.). The government should target such agglomerations as
they provide an important conduit for reaching new and small players directly
through the funding of existing (“shovel-ready”) projects.
• Public procurement of innovative goods and services may further increase in
importance as a stimulant to innovation. The government should, wherever
possible, accelerate and expand its programmes in this area, many of which could
usefully involve public-private partnerships.

10 – INTRODUCTION
• At the same time, a short-term focus on existing programmes and industries should
not compromise the necessary shift towards a more balanced portfolio of support
measures that broaden Korea’s industrial specialisation over the longer term.
Certainly, some compromise is necessary to cushion the immediate effects of the
crisis, as there are trade-offs between short-term impacts and long-term benefits
and between support to existing firms and activities and promotion of new firms
and activities. But adopting a balanced scorecard approach, which should see
significant investments directed towards green investments and services innova-
tion, will be important for achieving long-term prosperity.
• A particular danger is that challenges such as educational reform and gender
mainstreaming will slip down the STI policy agenda. This should be avoided, as
such reforms are necessary for the long-term health and sustainability of the
Korean innovation system. Furthermore, the crisis intensifies the need for more
closely linked policy making between the various ministries and agencies
responsible for innovation policy. This is especially the case for the two wings of
MEST, which still seem to function in separate spheres, and for closer co-
ordination between MEST and MKE.
• Finally, layoffs and unemployment of the highly skilled will be an inevitable
consequence of the downturn. To prevent human capital lying idle and
depreciating during the crisis, the government should bolster its entrepreneurship
policies to aid new business start-ups. Furthermore, flexible approaches to lifelong
learning – for the employed as well as the unemployed – should be further
encouraged.
In summary, the imperative for the Korean government is to maintain its strong
commitment to research and innovation, to keep to its reform agenda, and to navigate a
course that balances short-term and long-term considerations in an appropriate manner
during this time of crisis.
Review outline
This review is divided into three main chapters. Chapter 1 reviews Korea’s innovation
performance and examines structural features of the Korean economy, recent
macroeconomic performance and the framework conditions for innovation. While the
chapter highlights many positive aspects of Korea’s performance, it also points to a
number of imbalances, including the traditional dominance of the chaebol in research and
innovation, the productivity gap between services and manufacturing, the diversity in
levels of regional economic development, and the relatively low levels of internationali-
sation in the economy. A final section assesses Korean performance in science,
technology and innovation and benchmarks it against the performance of leading OECD
economies.
Chapter 2 presents the main features of the Korean innovation system, beginning with
an overview of the role of large firms and SMEs in innovation and their performance. The
chapter then turns to the public sector, assessing the contribution and performance of the
GRIs and HEIs. The second part of the chapter moves from an assessment of system
actors to consideration of a few chosen elements of the system. A first is human resources
for science and technology and issues of supply and demand. A second is the linkages
between the various actors of the Korean innovation system, which are assessed in terms
of their strength and coherence.

INTRODUCTION – 11
In light of the characterisation and assessment of the first two chapters, Chapter 3
considers the appropriateness and performance of Korean innovation policy. It begins
with a short history of Korean innovation policy, highlighting the issues that dominate the
contemporary policy agenda. The main policy-making institutions are then described,
together with an examination of the way policy is co-ordinated and governed. The various
funding programmes for research are then discussed, as is Korean HRST policy. This is
followed by consideration of more demand-side policies. The final sections of the chapter
take a spatial perspective by considering policy efforts aimed at promoting the inter-
nationalisation and regionalisation of science and innovation.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS – 13
Overall Assessment and Recommendations
Korea has performed exceptionally well over the last few decades in its efforts to
catch up with the world’s leading economies, and it has instigated waves of industrial
upgrading to become a world leader in some of the most high-technology industries.
Historically, the Korean form of catch-up was shaped by strong state leadership, a state-
controlled banking system, and the dominance of the chaebol – large, highly diversified,
family-owned companies. Substantial increases in capital and labour, driven by the
highest rate of business investment in the OECD area, a growing population, a long
working-hours culture, and rising participation in the labour force, were the main drivers
of growth.
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 – which hit Korea particularly
hard – the catch-up model was revised, with significant restructuring of the chaebol and a
reduced leadership role for the state. The economy rebounded, the recovery was swift,
and today, Korea’s per capita income is around 70% of the OECD average. The chaebol
succeeded in accessing and exploiting international markets and sources of technology in
order to achieve the export-driven economic growth which has seen Korea transform a
trade deficit of USD 3 billion in 1997 into a trade surplus of USD 33 billion in 2006.
Moreover, the proportion of high- and medium-high-technology products among Korea’s
exports has grown sharply since the early 1990s, owing to the development of substantial
technological capabilities in a number of high-technology areas. Korean firms now have
the largest world market share in DRAM semiconductors, TFT-LCD and CDMA cellular
phones.
This success has few parallels around the world. Yet, at the same time, Korea is
entering a new and critical phase in its development and there are few guarantees of
continuing success. With the growth of labour and capital inputs already slowing,
continued convergence to the OECD average based on input-based growth will become
more difficult. Furthermore, with the lowest fertility rates in the OECD area and increasing
competition from newly industrialising countries, especially China, Korea faces new
challenges. More than ever, sustaining economic growth will depend upon boosting
innovation.
Korean innovation policy seeks to accelerate the shift from a “catch-up” to a
“creative” innovation system, as articulated in the 2004 Implementation Plan for the
National Innovation System. The catch-up model centred upon large-scale strategic
technology development with government-affiliated research institutes and large global
conglomerates taking the leading role. It has not been conducive to the creation of
innovative start-ups, to technology transfer, or to building basic research capabilities, all
of which are increasingly important as Korea moves towards knowledge frontiers. The
creative model instead relies upon greatly increased spending on R&D – by both the
public and private sectors – and upon attempts to improve knowledge flows and
technology transfer across the system. Under this model, innovation policy also seeks to

14 – OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
address regional imbalances in the national economy, with a rich portfolio of programmes
designed to develop innovation capacities outside of the Seoul metropolitan region.
While this shift in innovation policy appears broadly appropriate, it is worth recalling
that earlier policy goals – articulated in various policy statements stretching back to the
1990s – were broadly similar. In other words, while there has been a general awareness of
the general direction in which the innovation system needs to move, certain lock-ins
hamper its evolution. These include the still dominant role of the chaebol, despite efforts
to improve the innovation capacity of SMEs; an over-emphasis on short-term, industrially
oriented research at the expense of longer-term, fundamental research; a weakly
developed research capacity in the universities; lagging productivity in services;
relatively weak internationalisation of the domestic research system; and under-utilisation
of labour resources, particularly women. None of these problems is easy to resolve
quickly, particularly as many are legacies of past successes. However, if Korea is to
achieve full convergence with the leading OECD economies, the Korean government will
need to redouble efforts to shift the innovation system to a more creative mode.
Main strengths and weaknesses of Korea’s innovation system
It is important to take specific aspects of Korea’s history, geopolitical features, and
cultural and institutional characteristics into account when assessing the current state of
the innovation system and when determining the feasibility of policy responses to new
challenges and opportunities:
• In a relatively short time, Korea has changed from a backward agricultural
economy into one of the world’s most modern industrial economies. This
transformation has been underpinned by a strong, mobilising national vision which
is widely shared by government, business and the population at large.
• Korea occupies a unique geopolitical position between two economic superpowers
which have presented both opportunities and threats throughout its history. This
influences the Korean psyche – as has the continuing division of the Korean
peninsula – and encourages a strong sense of independence and self-sufficiency.
Perceived external opportunities and threats are implicitly mobilised to strengthen
the drive to meet the development challenge.
• Korea has few natural resources and is heavily dependent upon imports for energy
and raw materials. Thus, one of the main driving forces behind Korea’s trans-
formation has been investment in human capital. A socio-cultural eagerness for
education, rooted in longstanding Confucian educational values, has contributed to
strong demand for education.
Analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
Main strengths
• Strong commitment from the outset to technology-based economic development.
There has been strong support from successive governments as well as a national
consensus on the importance of science, technology and innovation (STI) as
drivers of future socioeconomic growth.

• High levels of gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD). GERD amounted to a
little under USD 30 billion in 2006, or 3.23% of GDP, one of the highest levels in
the world.
• High levels of business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD). The private sector
is by far the biggest R&D player, accounting for around three-quarters of Korean
GERD.
• A highly educated labour force. In international assessments of school education,
Korea ranks very high in reading, mathematics and science. More than any other
country, Korea has ensured that virtually all students complete secondary
education, and has moved towards universal tertiary education.
• Strong willingness to learn from failures and to learn from others. Korea has
benefited from accelerated learning owing to its openness to learn from failure and
its ability to assess policy options based upon international good practices.
• Good and improving framework conditions for innovation. In the wake of the
Asian financial crisis, the Korean government introduced strong competition
policy and further liberalised product and labour markets, thereby improving the
conditions for innovation.
• High degree of interest in science and technology. Korean society is a ready
adopter of new leading-edge technologies, and more young people study for
science and engineering degrees in Korea than in any other OECD country.
• Large firms that are internationally competitive. Several leading Korean chaebol,
such as Samsung, Hyundai Motors and LG, have become important transnational
corporations with operations across the globe and leading-edge technologies.
• Exceptional fast-followers. Korean industry is renowned for its ability to combine
opportunities in fast-moving markets and rapid technological change.
• Capability to produce talent. Korea has an exceptionally large number of talented
people in the arts, sciences and sport.
• Strong ICT infrastructure. Korea has one of the world’s highest rates of broadband
penetration and is rolling out one of the world’s most advanced mobile communi-
cations networks. This has created domestic demand, which in turn has led to the
development of new industries.
Main weaknesses
• Nascent but still lagging capacities to conduct fundamental research. Korea is a
relative newcomer to fundamental research and needs to bolster its capacities in
this area, particularly in the university sector. Universities employ around 70% of
all doctorates in Korea, yet account for just 10% of Korean spending on research.
• System linkages. As in most OECD countries, system linkages in Korea could be
stronger. However, mutual distrust and a lack of understanding between the
government research institutes (GRIs) and the universities inhibit the development
of closer and mutually beneficial linkages.

• Teaching styles. High school curricula place too much emphasis on preparation for
the national university entrance exam and rely heavily on rote learning. This leaves
little room for creative thinking and the emergence of an exploratory spirit.
• Tertiary education offerings. With a few notable exceptions, universities are
comprehensive rather than specialised. As a result, many courses are mediocre at
best and do not challenge students sufficiently.
• Under-utilisation of female labour. At around 30%, the graduation rate of women
in science and engineering (S&E) is close to the OECD average. However, women
make up only 13% of Korean researchers, the lowest level in the OECD.
• Weak performances in the services sector. Services currently make a very marginal
contribution to aggregate productivity growth in Korea, although they account for
around half of Korean GDP and more than 60% of employment.
• Relatively weak SMEs. Korea’s economic growth has been led by the chaebol. This
industrial structure offered some advantages during rapid catch-up but has left a
legacy of relatively weak SMEs.
• Unbalanced regional development. Economic activities in Korea are concentrated
in the Seoul metropolitan area. This creates serious geographical imbalances in the
national economy.
• Weak international linkages. Very little R&D carried out in Korea is financed from
abroad, linkages with foreign firms and institutions are relatively weak, and few
foreign researchers and students come to Korea to work or study. This suggests
that Korea may not draw sufficiently on the growing global stock of knowledge.
• Limited policy co-ordination. As most government ministries have their own
research policies and funding programmes, co-ordination of the Korean govern-
ment’s interventions and activities has proven difficult. The problem has been
compounded by strong rivalries between the main ministries, which have resulted
in some duplication of policies and programmes and insufficient inter-ministerial
co-operation.
• Legacy of dirigisme. While the national innovation system (NIS) concept has been
adopted to frame Korean innovation policy, many policies and programmes remain
mission-oriented rather than diffusion-oriented. Selection and targeting of strategic
industries and technologies still receive high priority while measures to upgrade
the innovation system are given less attention.
Threats and opportunities
• Continuing high dependency on natural resource imports, particularly hydro-
carbons. Korea is the world’s fourth largest importer of oil, so that its economy is
highly sensitive to oil price fluctuations. Growing uncertainties surrounding supply
and prices may cause serious problems, at least in the short term, but might also
usefully spur the development of new technologies that could ultimately form a
basis for export-oriented growth.

• Competition from China and other newly industrialising countries. Korea is
increasingly challenged by China in many industries in which it currently enjoys
competitive advantages. At the same time, Korea has benefited significantly from
economic development in China and other newly industrialising economies. Thus,
potential threats could become opportunities by providing new markets for Korean
exports and manufacturing, spurring domestic industrial upgrading, and accelera-
ting a shift towards the development of a more knowledge-intensive economy.
• Low fertility rates and an ageing society. Korea’s fertility rate, the lowest in the
OECD area, is likely to halve the current potential GDP growth rate by 2030, and
it will lead to an elderly society. This demographic pressure could be channelled to
increase productivity and to improve female workforce participation rates.
• Regional geopolitical developments. The uncertain direction of such develop-
ments, particularly as regards North Korea, creates a sense of unease in the region.
• Over-specialisation. The heavy concentration of R&D and innovation activities in
a few economic sectors, particularly ICTs, contributes to a dualism in the Korean
economy and may not provide a broad enough base to promote convergence to
income levels in the most advanced OECD countries.
• International trade environment. Korea is heavily dependent upon exports for
economic growth and would be affected by major disturbances in the international
trading system, as a result, for example, of a major economic recession or increased
protectionism.
• Growing Korean diaspora. Many graduate students are choosing to remain
overseas – particularly in the United States – after completing their PhDs, partly
because of fewer opportunities for post-doctoral positions in Korea. There is a risk
that many will never return to Korea and constitute a growing brain drain.
However, as Korean science continues to progress, there should be more job
opportunities in Korea. The time spent by young scientists overseas will then prove
an investment for Korea. Those who remain overseas can also constitute a useful
resource for collaboration.
• Technological change. Korea has been adept at exploiting technical change,
particularly in the ICT sector, but will need to further develop its capacities to
catch emerging technology waves, for example, in nanotechnology and biotechnology.
Strategic tasks and guiding principles
The main strategic task of Korea’s innovation policy is to achieve convergence with
the more advanced OECD economies. It needs to achieve this in the context of declining
fertility rates and increased competition from newly industrialising countries, particularly
China. Korean innovation policy therefore needs to accelerate the shift of the innovation
system away from a catch-up to a more creative model, by supporting more fundamental
research in diverse domains, raising the innovative and absorptive capacities of SMEs,
and better linking up to international sources of knowledge. In accomplishing these tasks,
policy should follow certain guiding principles:

• International openness. Korea needs to improve its research system’s international
openness in order to better access global knowledge pools. It has targeted
programmes to deal with this, but internationalisation should be part of most
policies dealing with science, technology and innovation.
• Diversification. Much of Korea’s recent growth has been due to its development
and exploitation of ICTs. Korea should seek to further diversify its economy by
exploiting new growth engines offered by biotechnology, nanotechnology and
other emerging areas of science and technology while strongly building upon
existing strengths.
• Shift from economic development programmes towards more public and generic
research. Korea has caught up with the most technologically advanced countries
and has moved towards technological frontiers. It is therefore time to shift from
high levels of public support for industrial R&D towards more public and welfare-
oriented R&D. Moreover, this shift should be taken as an opportunity to increase
the levels of fundamental research carried out in Korea.
• Incorporating a long-term perspective when assessing the costs and benefits of
public R&D funding. Policy makers and other innovation actors should better
appreciate that the returns to investment in fundamental research may be largely
intangible – and embodied – and will take a considerable time to accrue. This also
makes it very difficult to convincingly account for the full spectrum of benefits, at
least in the short term.
• Balancing competition with the development of co-operation and trust. A growing
convergence in the types of research and innovation being conducted by different
research performers means that distinctive core competencies and complementarities
are less clear-cut. This has led to greater competition between research performers,
as well as a lack of trust, probably at the expense of greater co-operation. Competi-
tion is no bad thing, but it should be better balanced with co-operation, particularly
between the GRIs and universities.
• Systematic and evolutionary approach to the promotion of innovation. A clear
overall strategy should inform policies that affect the dynamics and efficiency of
innovation processes. Such policies should adapt to changes in the global
environment and respond to the evolving needs of actors in innovation. They should
help to improve the performance of the innovation system and sub-systems through
continuous monitoring and assessment rather than define in advance an optimal
innovation structure.
• Comprehensive approach to fostering innovation beyond support for R&D and
high technology. To enhance innovation capabilities throughout the economy,
including in non-R&D-based activities, innovation policy should avoid too close a
focus on R&D and high technology. Non-technological or “soft” innovation –
notably in the SME sector, which has particularly weak innovation capabilities –
offers considerable opportunities for boosting productivity and income growth.
Moreover, the “servicification” of manufacturing and the increasing technological
component of services mean that both the manufacturing and services sectors need
common capabilities to increase their knowledge intensity.

• Gender mainstreaming. Given the demographic shifts facing Korea in the near
future, it will be imperative to increase female participation rates in science and
technology in order to maintain economic growth. The Korean government should
follow the example of OECD member governments that have introduced a “gender
mainstreaming” dimension into all of their policies.
• Co-ordination in policy. Achieving policy and programme coherence is a difficult
challenge for governments, which are generally not well organised to deal with
cross-cutting policy issues such as innovation. This means viewing government
intervention in terms of the so-called policy mix.
• Participatory governance of S&T. As Korean S&T moves towards knowledge
frontiers, it takes on new responsibilities and challenges that will require a
dialogue with society. This should be embodied in a new form of participatory
governance, in which scientists and governments engage in a genuine dialogue
with citizens on S&T developments.
Recommendations
In light of these strategic tasks and guiding principles, and in the context of Korea’s
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, this review makes a number of policy
recommendations.
Improve inter-ministerial co-ordination of innovation policy
An important challenge for the Korean government is to improve co-ordination
among the many ministries and agencies with a stake in R&D, and more broadly,
innovation. Previous Korean governments put in place quite elaborate mechanisms to
deal with this issue. These seem to have had some success – though problems
undoubtedly remained – but were largely abolished by the new government in 2008 in
favour of ministerial consolidation. This consolidation could go only so far and two
super-ministries now have the greatest influence on innovation policy in Korea,
i.e. MEST, which is responsible for the public science base and education; and MKE,
which is responsible for industrial technology R&D and cluster policy.
• Build a strong working relationship between MEST and MKE. Given the
ministerial separation of public science and education from industrial R&D, the
Korean government should take steps to ensure a fruitful working relationship
between MEST and MKE. While more space needs to be provided for fundamental
research – as argued throughout this review – it is also paramount that the public
science base does not become decoupled from an industrial R&D agenda.
• Ensure that science and innovation remain prominent on political agendas. Within
MEST and MKE, it will be important to ensure that the science, technology and
innovation agenda is not crowded out by other pressing (and often more short-
term) policy issues. This is a real potential concern in MEST, as international
experience has shown that the coupling of science with education often results in
neglecting the former when the more politically contentious issue of education
demands greater policy attention.

In addition to horizontal co-ordination, vertical lines of co-ordination and accounta-
bility are important for effective innovation policy. Five research councils have been
created for this purpose (recently reduced to three by the new administration), but their
role has been rather limited. Moreover, the assignment of individual GRIs to different
research councils seems to be somewhat arbitrary.
• Reconsider the purpose and functioning of the research councils. The Korean
government should consider reorganising them, perhaps along more disciplinary
lines, or possibly merging them into a single body, with a view to increasing their
strategic capability.
Redefine the roles of research performers
The traditional roles of the government research institutes and universities have been
evolving over the last couple of decades and some degree of convergence has been
occurring. The GRIs were originally established to accelerate the adoption and adaptation
of technology by Korean firms, while the universities were concerned primarily with
teaching. In terms of the role of the universities in research, there remains a significant
mismatch between research spending and human resource capabilities – the universities
have almost 70% of all Korean doctorates, but perform just 10% of Korean research.
• Tackle the mismatch between human resources and research spending in universi-
ties. This should be done urgently, for example, by increasing R&D spending
and/or providing incentives to encourage more doctorates to work in the private
sector or GRIs.
• Nurture closer relationships between universities and GRIs. It is clear that there is
still some way to go before Korea’s universities become research power-houses.
The funding of research centres and plans to attract leading foreign scientists to set
up research groups will surely make useful contributions, but reaching that goal
will take considerable time. A supplementary strategy might be the development of
closer relationships between the universities and the GRIs, as this might offer an
accelerated path to raising the research capacities of the universities. Such relation-
ships could range from relatively loose co-operation to full mergers between
institutions. The Korean government should review the benefits and feasibility of
such options, drawing upon international experiences in developing such relations.
• Ensure that research spending increases in the universities do not create ivory
towers. The government is broadly right to increase the number of small, non-
mission-oriented grants available, as this will benefit the individual researchers and
small groups commonly found in universities and should allow for carrying out
more curiosity-driven research. However, the availability of such grants should not
substitute for the more mission-oriented research currently performed in universi-
ties. Simply put, Korean university researchers (with a few notable exceptions)
need to become more active in research, and any additional research funding
should translate into more research being carried out.
While there is a high degree of consensus on the need to enhance universities’
research intensity, the role of the GRIs is still much debated. Several alternative (and non-
exclusive) future orientations – each with its pros and cons – have been proposed:
i) supporting technological development in SMEs; ii) moving away from industrially
oriented R&D and towards public and welfare research; iii) concentrating on platform
technologies; iv) leading Korea’s shift towards more fundamental research; and

v) working in areas of interdisciplinary and fusion research. In addition, various options
for the institutionalisation of the GRIs are regularly discussed. These range from merging
and breaking up different institutes to revising their ministerial location. More radical
proposals are also sometimes discussed, including privatisation and merger with
universities.
• Acknowledge the variety of GRIs when planning reforms. There is a great deal of
variety among the GRIs, with different types of organisations facing different
issues which require different policy responses. The government should be
sensitive to these differences when formulating policy vis-à-vis the GRIs and
should consider the future of each institute on a case-by-case basis.
• Expect the GRIs to play a multiplicity of roles. The GRIs should not be pigeon-
holed into performing a single function even if this gives the appearance of overall
system untidiness. Rather, they can play multiple roles in innovation systems,
something that policy should acknowledge.
• Learn from international experience to strengthen relationships between GRIs and
universities. Different models of university-GRI co-existence are to be found
around the world and adoption of any of these would need to be suitably adapted to
the Korean context.
• Make access to GRIs (and other public) research infrastructure more open. Large-
scale public research facilities and equipment are frequently criticised for being
ineffectively and inefficiently used. These infrastructures should be more widely
opened up to both public- and private-sector research actors.
Understand the benefits of fundamental research
With limited resources available during Korea’s catch-up phase, the government
carefully targeted certain areas and sought tangible (often short-term) returns from its
investments in R&D. With the large budget increases recently announced for fundamental
research, expectations on returns to investment need to shift. Although it appears to be
appreciated that a turn to more fundamental research is unlikely to provide immediate,
tangible returns, research performers are nevertheless under pressure to demonstrate early
outcomes from their R&D activities, particularly as these results have become important
assessment criteria in national evaluation efforts. The substantial growth in public R&D
investment has been accompanied by dramatic increases in GRIs’ and universities’ rates
of scientific publication and patenting in recent years. However, there is suspicion that
some of this growth is due to over-publication and over-patenting, as evidenced by the
marginal growth in citation rates and relatively low levels of technology transfer.
• Better reflect the varied contribution of R&D in national evaluation efforts. To
minimise unwanted behaviour, such as over-patenting, national evaluations should
better appreciate the varied contributions that higher education institutions and
GRIs make to innovation. The scope and effects – both intended and unintended –
of the elaborate programme evaluation arrangements rolled out over the last three
to four years should now be reviewed.

• Make greater use of the Korean diaspora in the national evaluation system. While
Korea makes extensive use of expert review panels in its evaluations, international
reviewers are rare owing to language barriers. Greater use of English might help,
but perhaps more reasonably, the growing Korean diaspora might bring a useful
international dimension to the review process.
The technological progress of firms – particularly the chaebol and high-technology
SMEs – helps drive the need for more fundamental research, but the need is also due to
the growth and maturity of Korea’s scientific endeavours and the demand for more
sophisticated infrastructure and greater levels of support. Many of these demands are
legitimate, given that investment in research infrastructure that makes it possible to carry
out more fundamental research can have real benefits for Korea’s socioeconomic
development. However, the validity and value to Korea of such investments should be
considered carefully on a case-by-case basis.
• Carefully assess proposals for large research infrastructures to ensure their
appropriateness and adaptability. Calls for large new infrastructures should be
judged on their merits, bearing in mind that many OECD countries with a longer
history of funding and conducting fundamental research have sometimes had
difficulties in ensuring the relevance of such research.
• Recognise the strategic nature of much fundamental research. Fundamental
research should not be solely equated with curiosity-driven research. In fact,
fundamental research is often carried out in the context of strategic missions. In
many instances, an ex ante assessment of the contribution of fundamental research
to a mission should be possible, even if there are practical difficulties in measuring
its contribution ex post.
Promote innovation in the business sector
The Korean government provides relatively generous tax credits to firms that conduct
R&D. On top of this, direct government research funding accounts for around 5% of
BERD – an average figure for OECD countries. However, more than 50% of government
research spending in the public sector is directed at industrial development – one of the
highest levels in the OECD. The government is also active in implementing policies and
programmes that deal with a broader range of innovation-related issues, such as venture
financing, skills development, industry-academic collaboration, and cluster agglomera-
tion. However, government policy intervention needs to be sensitive to two important
divides in the innovation performance of the Korean business sector: first, the divide
between the chaebol and SMEs; and second, the divide between manufacturing and
services.
On the first divide, SME innovation performance still falls far short of that of the
chaebol. This may improve in future, as the amount of R&D carried out by SMEs grew
almost fivefold from 1997 to 2006 and now amounts to almost one-quarter of Korean
BERD. Government incentive schemes, including R&D funding, tax waivers, tariff
exemption for R&D equipment, and military service exemption for researchers, have
fuelled much of this rapid expansion. The chaebol are also playing a more supportive role
in the development of a vibrant SME sector. This is because supplier companies have had
to substantially enhance their R&D capabilities in order to meet the increased techno-
logical demands of chaebol working at the technological frontier. Furthermore, as the
chaebol continue to source technologies internationally, Korean SMEs are looking to

reduce their dependency on a single chaebol and to diversify their customer base. To
succeed, they need to be internationally competitive. But emerging Chinese competition
means that Korean firms have less scope to rely upon price competitiveness and have to
improve the functionality and quality of their products; this obliges them to innovate.
• Continue support for innovation efforts in SMEs while acknowledging the limits of
public intervention. The target of government support for firm innovation has
shifted away from large firms and towards SMEs, a shift that would seem to be
broadly appropriate. The government has had some success in supporting the
development of SME capability, as well as in improving the conditions for innova-
tive start-up companies. Government policy should continue along this path, while
taking into account the limits and opportunities offered by wider Korean industrial
dynamics.
• Further streamline the various schemes on offer to support innovation by SMEs.
Many policies and programmes are targeted at SMEs, and the government now
directly funds more research in SMEs than in large firms. However, the schemes
on offer should be further streamlined as their number and scope cause confusion.
In terms of the divide between manufacturing and services, productivity growth in
manufacturing has soared in recent years but continues to stagnate in services. The
services sector accounted for just 7% of BERD in 2006, one of the lowest rates in the
OECD. A productive and competitive services sector is important to underpin the
performance of the manufacturing sector. Yet, consulting services, which are widely
regarded as important to innovation, are poorly developed in Korea, largely on account of
an industrial structure dominated by the self-contained chaebol and a domestic market for
services relatively closed to international competition.
• Consider ways in which innovation in services might be enhanced. The Korean
government should implement new policies and programmes that specifically
target innovation in the services sector as a means of broadening the basis for
future socioeconomic growth.
Broaden areas of specialisation
There appears to be a degree of lock-in in Korean R&D, as evidenced by the large
role played by ICT and physical engineering in research specialisation and scientific
publication. This situation is aligned with, and contributes to, Korea’s current industrial
strengths, particularly as much public research spending is still directed at industrial
R&D. However, Korea needs to diversify its competitive advantage through investments
in new knowledge-intensive fields with high-growth potential.
• Strike a better balance between supporting existing industrial champions and new
growth engines. MEST has announced its intention to decrease the proportion of
public funding of R&D in ICT and manufacturing engineering and to make more
money available to areas like bioscience, nanotechnology, space science, etc.
However, since much of the public research budget originates in mission-oriented
ministries (especially MKE), MEST’s ability to enact such a shift is limited.
Improved co-ordination across government will be required to ensure that a better
balance between fields can be attained.

• Formulate a set of more welfare-oriented “grand challenges” for research. These
should be used to diversify away from over-investment in relatively short-term
industrially oriented research, and could also fit well with the targeted approach
familiar to Korean R&D.
• Increase the use of small grants to diversify the research base. Diversification
efforts should be sensitive to the funding needs of the individual researcher or
small research groups in universities, who would prefer small grant funding in
order to build up their research capacities. These investments need not be restricted
to bottom-up funding schemes but can be extended to top-down managed
programmes as well.
• Promote innovation in services as a future key growth engine. As highlighted
elsewhere, special attention should be given to supporting innovation in services,
which is already Korea’s largest employer by far yet suffers from low levels of
productivity.
Improve the contribution of tertiary education to innovation
Education and skills development have been at the heart of Korea’s success in
transforming itself into a leading industrial economy. However, the education system that
has developed over the years now needs to adapt to the new challenges facing Korea. The
focus of this transformation lies in tertiary education and a better balance between the
supply of and demand for graduates with the particular skills and knowledge required to
meet economic and societal needs. Overall, there are too many people with bachelor’s
degrees and too few technicians and people with postgraduate qualifications in high-
technology fields. Moreover, the strong and overly rigid hierarchy of Korean universities
has a powerful influence on success in careers and social status. Unfortunately, the
resulting competition for places in the leading universities has not led to differentiation
and specialisation but to a system in which universities generally offer the same broad
profile of academic programmes. Moreover, the system is overly geared towards young
people, and there is insufficient flexibility in course design that would allow for greater
participation of older age groups.
• Continue policy efforts that encourage universities to specialise. The government
has sought to raise standards by encouraging higher education institutions (HEIs)
to specialise, preferably in fields in which graduates are likely to find local
employment opportunities (not least to ease the pressure on Seoul). This runs
counter to the expansionary tendencies of many institutions, but would seem to be
the right policy and should therefore be continued and even extended more
aggressively.
• Provide incentives to help make courses responsive to the skills needs of Korean
business and society. Korean firms currently indicate one of the highest levels of
dissatisfaction with the quality of graduates. However, many HEIs are now
increasingly working with firms and local governments on the redesign of
curricula and all should be encouraged to do so. This enhances their receptiveness
to demand signals and helps raise standards.

• Ensure that competition among HEIs is based upon reliable information about the
results and performance of their faculties and/or departments. The 2008 intro-
duction of the University Information Disclosure System – with information on
graduate employment rates, enrolment rates, full-time faculty rates, scholarship
provision, research achievements, curricular operation and school management – is
a welcome development. However, assessments that centre on individual depart-
ments or faculties should also be developed so as to make known the specialised
strengths of HEIs.
• Use periodic assessment of faculty and/or departmental research performance to
reinforce the link between research and graduate education. Large numbers of
postgraduate students in Korea are trained in faculties that do not engage
extensively in research. To address the problem of the resulting lack of connection
between research and education, departmental or faculty research should be
assessed, so that prospective students and funding agencies have access to good
information on their research strengths and quality.
• Raise the status of vocational training awards and the institutions in which they
can be earned. As the strong demand for bachelor’s degrees is unlikely to diminish
soon, consideration should be given to making awards for vocational training
equivalent to bachelor’s degrees.
• Offer further incentives to education providers to develop more flexible lifelong
learning programmes. University and junior college courses should be made more
flexible to allow learners to study part-time while in employment. At the same
time, employers and employees should be encouraged to engage in lifelong
learning activities.
Improve female participation rates in science and engineering
Simply from an economic perspective and given imminent demographic shifts, there
is an urgent need to get more women into science and engineering careers. While the
graduation rates of women in S&E subjects is close to the OECD average, many fail to
take up employment in the field. Comprehensive government policy in this area is
relatively new but is wide-ranging and reflects a high degree of international learning. In
addition to programmes aimed at attracting more females to S&E careers, recruitment
targets have been set for some parts of the public sector, along with favourable point
systems for research project selection. There are signs that these policies are having some
effect, but progress is rather slow and from a low base.
• Introduce gender mainstreaming across all areas of S&T policy. This will
demonstrate the Korean government’s seriousness about giving female partici-
pation in S&T the highest priority.
• Provide a mix of regulations and incentives to encourage the private sector to
utilise and support women in S&T. With most researchers employed by the private
sector, there are limitations on direct government interventions to support women
in S&T. Accordingly, a mix of regulation and incentives should be considered,
including measures such as affirmative action quotas, tax incentives, and the
subsidisation of childcare facilities.

• Use the diversification of R&D efforts as an opportunity to bring more women into
S&T. The move to broaden R&D efforts from ICTs and machine engineering to
biosciences, medical sciences and environmental sciences should be used as an
opportunity to increase female participation rates, as these fields tend to be more
female-friendly than the traditional engineering fields in which Korea has so far
been most active.
Improve labour mobility in the research system
A fundamental weakness of the research system concerns labour mobility, which is
low in volume and unidirectional. This is partly due to the dualistic nature of the labour
market; but the high status afforded to university staff is also a factor and has resulted in
an internal brain drain from the GRIs (and to a lesser extent, firms) to universities, with
very little movement in the opposite direction. The resulting lack of labour circulation
tends to hamper knowledge diffusion throughout the innovation system.
• Consider ways of further enhancing the status of GRIs so that they are considered
as attractive as universities as places to work. The prospect of increasing
convergence in the working conditions of the GRIs and universities – regarding
issues such as job security, career paths and pensions – could make the GRIs once
again relatively attractive places in which to work and might increase labour
mobility. However, as long as the status of GRIs is perceived to be lower than that
of universities, movement to the GRIs is likely to remain low. The government
should therefore enhance the status of the GRIs, for example, through investments
in leading-edge facilities and flagship projects.
Decentralise innovation policy in the interests of more balanced growth
Regions and city-regions perhaps offer one of the best levels at which to develop
productive innovation system linkages. However, there are no significant technology-
driven regional clusters beyond the Seoul macro-cluster. This concentration of S&T
resources was taken for granted during Korea’s rapid industrialisation process but is
being questioned in the framework of the government’s push for balanced development.
Korea needs a variety of policy programmes in order to address regional innovation
deficits, including measures that promote partnerships among regional innovation actors,
which until recently have been relatively weak. Accordingly, a mix of policy measures –
from public agencies at both national and regional levels – has been enacted to support or
build regional innovation systems. These efforts are, however, fragmented and
insufficiently co-ordinated. Much of the problem arises from the fact that many regional
programmes are centrally administered by national agencies rather than by the regions
themselves. This makes co-ordination at regional level difficult and has prevented the
development of a stronger regional planning and implementation capacity.
• Devolve greater responsibility to regions for the design and delivery of regional
innovation policy. The currently separate, but often entangled, policies on clusters,
R&D, regional innovation and education would best be melded into a compre-
hensive policy for regional economic development, with much responsibility for
design and delivery devolved to the regions themselves. This responsibility should
be accompanied by a system of accountability to ensure policy appropriateness and
efficiency and to facilitate inter-regional policy learning.

• Conduct a bottom-up strategic audit of regional innovation programmes. Within
the context of greater devolution, there is need for a strategic audit of the various
regional innovation initiatives enacted by different agencies, and efforts should be
made to further develop planning and implementation capacities in the regions.
The Korean government has also sought to engineer the development of a knowledge-
intensive cluster around the Daedeok Science Town complex – recently renamed the
Daedeok Innopolis. Whether Daedeok can transform itself from a science cluster into an
innovation cluster is still an open question, though early signs are promising. Perhaps
more controversially, the government is seeking to nurture smaller science-driven clusters
in other regions which have in some cases previously performed little science.
• Understand the long-term nature of investments and returns on regional innovation
systems. It is clear that even with government intervention, building research
capability in a region will take considerable time to bear fruit. This is not to say
that such investments should not be made; rather, such investments should be
given due time to show their benefits.
• Ensure that an innovation agenda lies at the core of any science-based investments
intended to promote regional development. Without this, the government risks
building “cathedrals in the desert”, i.e. centres of research excellence that bring
few benefits to the local economy.
Maximise benefits from the internationalisation of R&D
In recent years, as R&D has become increasingly internationalised, it has become
important for countries to open up to and engage in global knowledge production
networks. The Korean R&D system is considered to have been relatively closed to inter-
nationalisation: few foreign scientists work in Korea, few foreign research centres are
located in Korea, and the levels of international research co-operation are low. However,
in other respects, the Korean R&D system has been highly internationalised from its
earliest days, when the newly established GRIs depended for their research personnel
upon enticing Korean scientists back from the United States. This labour mobility has
continued to the present day, with many Koreans choosing to study overseas for their
doctorates, and increasingly for their bachelor’s and master’s degrees, before returning to
Korea to work. The recent acceleration of this outward mobility –Korea has more
students studying in the United States than any other country – is a growing concern,
since many choose not to return to Korea, at least not right away. Some derive a brain
drain scenario from this and point to the need to improve research and education
opportunities in Korean universities. Others view such developments more positively as
increasing Korea’s internationalisation through a process of brain circulation.
The Korean government rightly wants to reduce the risks associated with outward
mobility by encouraging inward mobility. It is redoubling its efforts to improve the
internationalisation of its S&T base and has recently enacted several policy initiatives that
seek to promote international R&D collaboration, attract foreign R&D centres, and attract
human resources in the form of students and skilled researchers to study and work in
Korea. The scale and scope of planned investments (e.g. for the newly announced World
Class University initiative) and the targets being set (e.g. numbers of foreign students)
demonstrate a suitable ambition, albeit against the current situation of low levels of co-
operation, low international investment in the country’s R&D, and few foreign researchers

and students in Korea. If these policy initiatives meet their goals, considerable progress
will have been made in the internationalisation of Korean R&D.
• Take advantage of wider system changes to enhance the internationalisation of
Korean R&D indirectly. These changes include a shift towards more fundamental
research, since much international scientific co-operation is in areas of funda-
mental research, and stronger university research capacity, a possible major nexus
of international co-operation and exchange.
• Continue to invest in overseas R&D facilities. The Korean chaebol have invested
quite heavily in overseas R&D facilities, particularly in the United States, Europe,
Russia and, increasingly, China. Similar, though more modest, links have been
established by a few public-sector research institutes. All of these are likely to
further enhance the links of Korean research and innovation to global knowledge
networks and should continue to be nurtured.
• Improve co-ordination between the internationalisation policies and programmes
of MEST and MKE. Where possible, policies and programmes should be rationalised
to avoid overlaps and to fill gaps.

Summary table: SWOT analysis of the Korean innovation system
Strengths Opportunities
• Strong, mobilising national vision
• High growth rates in GDP
• Strong government support for innovation and R&D
• Good and improving framework conditions for innovation
• High ratio of gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) to
business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD)
• Highly educated workforce
• Good supply of human resources for science and
technology (HRST)
• Ready early adopters of new technologies
• Strong ICT infrastructure
• Exceptionally fast followers
• Strong and internationally competitive firms
• Learning society with a capacity to learn from failures and
international good practices
• Capability to produce world-class talents
• Geopolitical positioning in one of the most dynamic regions
of the world
• Free trade agreements
• Globalisation, including of R&D
• Growing Korean S&T diaspora
• Developments in S&T (technological change), particularly
information technology, nanotechnology, biotechnology and
environmental technology – and their possible fusion
• Growth of China and other newly industrialising economies,
both in the region and worldwide, offering new markets for
Korean exports
Weaknesses Threats
• Underdeveloped fundamental research capabilities and
weak research capacity in universities
• Weak linkages between GRIs and institutions of higher
education
• In education, rote learning, overemphasis upon university
entrance exam, and crippling cost of private education
• Underutilisation of female labour
• Low productivity in the services sector
• Relatively weak SME sector
• Legacy of dirigisme which hampers the development of a
diffusion-oriented innovation policy
• Unbalanced international linkages
• Uneven development across regions and sectors
• Small domestic market (compared to China, Japan,
United States)
• Policy co-ordination problems between ministries
• Low fertility rates and an ageing society
• Arrival of strong new competitors in fields in which Korea
excels, e.g. ICTs, particularly from China
• Geopolitical developments in the region
• Disruption in the supply of imported natural resources and
energy upon which the Korean economy is highly
dependent
• Global economic outlook and its consequences for export-
oriented economies

ÉVALUATION GÉNÉRALE ET RECOMMANDATIONS – 31
Évaluation générale et recommandations
En l’espace de quelques décennies, les efforts déployés par la Corée pour rattraper les
principales économies mondiales ont produit des résultats exceptionnels, grâce à plusieurs
vagues de modernisation du tissu industriel, qui ont permis au pays de devenir
aujourd’hui un leader mondial dans certains des secteurs de très haute technologie. Le
modèle de rattrapage économique de la Corée s’est longtemps caractérisé par le rôle
dirigeant des pouvoirs publics, un système bancaire contrôlé par l’État et la domination
du secteur industriel par les chaebol – ces grandes entreprises familiales très diversifiées.
L’accumulation du capital et l’augmentation du volume de travail – rendues possibles par
le taux d’investissement productif le plus fort de la zone OCDE et l’accroissement de la
participation au marché du travail d’une population croissante et d’une culture laborieuse
– ont été les principaux moteurs de la croissance coréenne.
La crise financière asiatique de 1997-1998, qui a touché la Corée particulièrement
durement, a entrainé un infléchissement du modèle de rattrapage, notamment une
restructuration profonde des chaebol et une réduction du rôle de l’État. La reprise a été
rapide et l’économie a rebondi. Aujourd’hui, la Corée jouit d’un niveau de revenu par
habitant de l’ordre de 70 % de la moyenne de l'OCDE. Les chaebol ont su accéder aux
marchés étrangers et aux sources de technologie internationales pour alimenter une
croissance portée par les exportations qui a permis à la Corée de transformer un déficit
commercial de 3 milliards d’USD en 1997 en un excédent de 33 milliards d’USD en
2006, et de voir la proportion des produits à intensité technologique moyenne et
moyenne/haute parmi ses exportations fortement progresser depuis le début des années
90. Ces évolutions reflètent le développement de capacités technologiques importantes
dans un certain nombre de secteurs intensifs en recherche ; les entreprises coréennes
détiennent maintenant leurs plus grosses parts de marché dans les semi-conducteurs pour
mémoire RAM dynamique, la technologie LCD-TFT et les téléphones mobiles CDMA.
Cette réussite est presque sans équivalent dans le monde, mais la Corée entre
désormais dans une phase délicate de son développement, où les chances de succès
durable sont plus incertaines. Il va devenir plus difficile de poursuivre la convergence
vers la moyenne de l’OCDE grâce à une croissance fondée sur l’accroissement de la
quantité de facteurs de production, dont le ralentissement est d’ailleurs déjà notable. En
outre, avec les taux de fécondité les plus bas de l’OCDE et une concurrence accrue des
nouvelles économies industrielles, en particulier la Chine, la Corée doit faire face à de
nouveaux défis. Plus que jamais, il lui faudra, pour soutenir sa croissance économique,
stimuler l’innovation.
La politique de l’innovation en Corée vise à accélérer la transition d’un modèle « de
type rattrapage » vers un système d’innovation « de type créatif » – ainsi qu’il est énoncé
que le « Plan d’action pour le système d’innovation national » de 2004. La stratégie de
rattrapage était axée sur un développement à grande échelle des technologies stratégiques,
le rôle moteur étant tenu par des instituts de recherche parapublics et de grands conglo-
mérats industriels. Elle n’a pas été propice aux nouvelles entreprises innovantes ou au

32 – ÉVALUATION GÉNÉRALE ET RECOMMANDATIONS
transfert de technologies, ou bien encore au renforcement des capacités de recherche
fondamentale, qui sont de plus en plus vitales à mesure que l’innovation en Corée
s’effectue plus près des frontières de la connaissance. Le système de type créatif requiert
lui un accroissement sensible des dépenses de R-D – tant par le secteur public que par le
secteur privé – et une amélioration des flux de connaissances et le transfert de technologies
dans l’ensemble du système. L’objectif est également que la politique de l’innovation
contribue à résorber les déséquilibres régionaux, à l’aide de toute une série de programmes
destinés à renforcer les capacités d’innovation en dehors de la région métropolitaine de
Séoul.
Si cette nouvelle orientation de la politique de l’innovation semble globalement
appropriée, il convient de noter que des intentions plus ou moins analogues ont déjà été
exprimées dans des déclarations de politique générale dès les années 90. En d’autres
termes, la direction générale dans laquelle le système d’innovation doit évoluer est
connue, mais certains « verrous » freinent cette évolution, notamment la position toujours
dominante des chaebol en dépit des mesures prises pour renforcer les capacités
d’innovation des PME, l’importance excessive accordée à une recherche de court terme à
visée industrielle, au détriment de la recherche fondamentale à plus long terme, des
capacités de recherche peu développées à l’université, une productivité en perte de vitesse
dans les services, une internationalisation relativement faible du système de recherche et
une sous-utilisation d’une partie de la force de travail, en particulier des femmes. Aucun
de ces blocages n’est facile à desserrer rapidement, notamment parce que nombre d’entre
eux incarnent des réussites du passé. Mais si la Corée veut parvenir comme elle le
souhaite à rejoindre le camp des économies les plus avancées de l’OCDE, les autorités
devront redoubler d’efforts pour orienter le système d’innovation vers un mode plus
« créatif ».
Forces et faiblesses principales du système d’innovation coréen
Il est important de prendre en compte des aspects spécifiques de l’histoire du pays,
des facteurs géopolitiques et des caractéristiques culturelles et institutionnelles afin
d’évaluer la situation actuelle du système d’innovation et de déterminer la faisabilité des
réponses possibles aux nouveaux défis et opportunités de la part des pouvoirs publics:
• En un laps de temps relativement court, la Corée est passée d’une économie
agricole attardée à l’une des économies industrielles les plus modernes du monde.
Cette transformation a été inspirée par une vision nationale forte et mobilisatrice,
largement partagée par les autorités, les entreprises et la population au sens large.
• La Corée occupe une position géopolitique unique, entre deux superpuissances
économiques qui lui ont apporté des possibilités comme des menaces tout au long
de son histoire. Cette situation – tout comme la division de la péninsule coréenne –
influence le psychisme national et alimente une forte volonté d’indépendance et
d’autosuffisance de la population, pour qui les possibilités et menaces que recèle
l’environnement étranger sont perçues implicitement comme autant de raisons pour
œuvrer toujours plus en faveur du développement.
• La Corée possède peu de ressources naturelles et dépend largement des
importations pour son approvisionnement en énergie et ses matières premières.
L’un des principaux moteurs de la transformation du pays a donc été l’investisse-
ment dans le capital humain. L’empressement socioculturel de la population pour
l’éducation, qui s’explique par des valeurs confucéennes profondément enracinées

dans la société, a contribué à une forte demande sociale adressée au secteur de
l’enseignement.
Analyse des points forts, des faiblesses, des opportunités et des menaces
Atouts principaux
• Dès le départ, un engagement fort au service d’un développement économique
fondé sur les technologies : il y a eu un soutien franc de la part des gouvernements
successifs ainsi qu’un consensus national quant à l’importance de la science, de la
technologie et de l’innovation (STI) en tant que moteurs de la croissance socio-
économique.
• Des niveaux élevés de dépense intérieure brute de R-D (DIRD) : la Corée a
dépensé près de 30 milliards d’USD dans la R-D en 2006, soit 3.23 % du PIB, l’un
des niveaux les plus élevés au monde.
• Des niveaux élevés de dépense intérieure brute de R-D du secteur des entreprises
(DIRDE) : le secteur privé est de loin le principal acteur de la R-D, puisqu’il
représente les trois quarts environ de la DIRDE en Corée.
• Une main-d’œuvre hautement qualifiée : dans les évaluations internationales de
l’enseignement scolaire, la Corée se classe dans le groupe de tête en compré-
hension de l’écrit, en mathématiques et en sciences. Plus qu’aucun autre pays, la
Corée est parvenue à ce que la quasi-totalité de ses élèves achèvent leurs études
secondaires et tend désormais vers un niveau de formation supérieure pour tous.
• La volonté de tirer les leçons de ses échecs et d’apprendre des autres : la Corée a
bénéficié d’un apprentissage accéléré des bonnes pratiques grâce à sa capacité de
tirer parti des échecs et celle d’évaluer les actions possibles de politique à la
lumière de l’expérience internationale.
• De bonnes conditions-cadres pour l’innovation et qui vont en s’améliorant : après
la crise financière asiatique, les autorités coréennes ont instauré une politique de la
concurrence solide et ont poursuivi la libéralisation des marchés des produits et du
travail, établissant ainsi des conditions de plus en plus propices à l’innovation.
• Un intérêt marqué pour les sciences et les technologies : la société coréenne
adopte très facilement les nouvelles technologies de pointe et les jeunes Coréens
qui poursuivent des études scientifiques et d’ingénierie sont en pourcentage de leur
classe d’âge plus nombreux que partout ailleurs dans l’OCDE.
• De grandes entreprises solides et compétitives sur le plan international : plusieurs
grands chaebol coréens, tels que Samsung, Hyundai Motors et LG, sont devenus
des sociétés transnationales importantes qui opèrent partout dans le monde et
maîtrisent des technologies de pointe.
• Une réactivité exceptionnelle : l’industrie coréenne est réputée pour sa capacité de
conjuguer les opportunités offertes par des marchés en rapide évolution avec le
changement technologique.
• La capacité de révéler les talents : la Corée compte un nombre remarquablement
élevé de personnes talentueuses dans les arts, les sciences et les sports.

• Une infrastructure des TIC solide : la Corée a l’un des taux de pénétration du haut
débit les plus élevés au monde et possède l’un des réseaux de communications
mobiles les plus avancés, ce qui alimente la demande intérieure, qui à son tour
contribue au développement de nouveaux secteurs d’activités.
Faiblesses principales
• Des capacités de recherche fondamentale croissantes mais toujours nettement
insuffisantes : la Corée ne s’est aventurée que relativement récemment sur le
terrain de la recherche fondamentale et doit encore renforcer ses capacités dans ce
domaine, en particulier dans le secteur universitaire. Les universités emploient
70 % environ de tous les titulaires de doctorat en Corée, mais ne représentent
paradoxalement que 10 % à peine des dépenses du pays dans la recherche.
• Les liens au sein du système d’innovation : comme dans la plupart des pays de
l’OCDE, les relations entre les acteurs du système d’innovation pourraient être
plus étroits en Corée, mais un manque de compréhension et une défiance
réciproque entre les instituts de recherche publics et les universités empêchent
l’établissement de liens plus étroits et mutuellement avantageux.
• Les styles d’enseignement : les programmes de l’enseignement secondaire sont
exagérément conçus pour faciliter la préparation à l’examen national d’entrée à
l’université, et s’appuient trop sur l’apprentissage par cœur, qui laisse peu de place
à l’originalité et à la curiosité.
• L’offre dans l’enseignement supérieur : la plupart des universités, à quelques
exceptions notables près, ont une vocation généraliste et proposent peu de
domaines de spécialisation. Ainsi, de nombreux programmes sont, au mieux,
médiocres, et peu stimulants pour les étudiants.
• Une sous-utilisation de la main-d’œuvre féminine : avec un pourcentage tournant
autour de 30 %, le taux de femmes diplômées en sciences et en ingénierie est
proche de la moyenne de l’OCDE, mais les femmes ne représentent que 13 % des
chercheurs coréens, c’est-à-dire le taux le plus bas de l’OCDE.
• Un secteur tertiaire relativement peu performant : à l’heure actuelle, les services
contribuent de manière très marginale à la croissance de la productivité globale en
Corée, alors qu’ils représentent la moitié environ du PIB coréen et plus de 60 % de
l’emploi.
• Des PME relativement fragiles : la croissance économique du pays s’est appuyée sur
les chaebol. Cette structure industrielle a offert certains avantages pour un
rattrapage économique rapide mais a contribué à produire des PME relativement
fragiles.
• Un développement régional déséquilibré : les activités économiques en Corée sont
très concentrées dans la région métropolitaine de Séoul, ce qui crée de sérieux
déséquilibres géographiques au sein de l’économie nationale.
• Des liens internationaux insuffisamment développés : très peu des activités de R-D
menées en Corée sont financées à l’étranger, les liens avec les entreprises et établisse-
ments étrangers sont relativement faibles et peu de chercheurs et d’étudiants
étrangers viennent en Corée pour travailler ou étudier, ce qui signifie que la Corée

ne puise sans doute pas suffisamment dans le fonds de connaissances croissant à
l’échelle mondiale.
• Une coordination déficiente des politiques : la plupart des ministères ayant leurs
propres politiques de recherche et programmes de financement, il se révèle
difficile pour le gouvernement coréen de coordonner ses interventions et ses
actions. Les problèmes de coordination sont en outre aggravés par une rivalité
exacerbée entre les principaux ministères, qui entraîne un chevauchement des
politiques et des programmes ainsi qu’un manque de coopération interministérielle.
• L’héritage du dirigisme : si l’idée d’un système d’innovation national s’est
imposée pour modeler la politique de l’innovation en Corée, la plupart des actions
et des programmes demeurent axés sur les missions et non sur la diffusion. La
sélection et le ciblage de secteurs et de technologies stratégiques sont toujours
considérés comme prioritaires, tandis que les mesures visant à améliorer le
fonctionnement du système d’innovation dans son ensemble retiennent moins
l’attention.
Menaces et opportunités
• Une dépendance toujours forte aux importations de ressources naturelles, en
particulier les hydrocarbures : la Corée est le quatrième importateur mondial de
pétrole, de sorte que son économie est très vulnérable aux fluctuations du prix du
pétrole. L’incertitude grandissante autour de l’approvisionnement et des prix
pourrait causer de sérieux problèmes, du moins à court terme, mais pourrait
également motiver la mise au point de nouvelles technologies, qui pourraient en
définitive consolider la base d’une croissance tournée vers l’exportation.
• La concurrence de la Chine et d’autres économies industrielles nouvelles : la
Corée est de plus en plus concurrencée par la Chine dans nombre des secteurs où
elle exploite actuellement ses avantages comparatifs. D’un autre côté, la Corée tire
déjà largement parti du développement économique de la Chine et d’autres
économies industrielles nouvelles. Les menaces potentielles pourraient ainsi se
transformer en opportunités et offrir des marchés nouveaux aux exportations
manufacturières coréennes, favorisant ainsi la modernisation du tissu industriel
national et accélérant le passage à une économie davantage axée sur le savoir.
• Des taux de fécondité faibles et une population vieillissante : la Corée affiche le
taux de fécondité le plus bas de l’OCDE, ce qui entraînera le vieillissement de la
société et devrait diviser par deux le taux de croissance potentiel actuel du PIB
d’ici 2030. Cette évolution démographique pourrait être mise à profit pour
améliorer la productivité et rehausser le taux d’activité des femmes.
• Les évolutions géopolitiques régionales : il est encore difficile de discerner quels
chemins elles prendront, notamment en ce qui concerne la Corée du Nord, ce qui
génère un sentiment d’incertitude dans la région.
• Une spécialisation excessive : la concentration importante des activités de R-D et
d’innovation dans quelques secteurs économiques seulement, en particulier les
TIC, se traduit par une forme de dualisme économique de la Corée et pourrait ne
pas offrir une base suffisamment large pour promouvoir la convergence vers les
niveaux de revenu des pays de l’OCDE les plus avancés.

• Le contexte des échanges internationaux : la Corée est largement tributaire des
exportations pour sa croissance économique et serait donc vulnérable à toute
perturbation majeure du système commercial international, causée par exemple par
des récessions économiques profondes ou par un renforcement du protectionnisme.
• Une diaspora toujours plus nombreuse : de nombreux étudiants en post-licence
choisissent de rester à l’étranger – en particulier aux États-Unis - après avoir
obtenu leur doctorat, en partie parce qu’il leur est plus difficile d’obtenir un poste
de post-doctorat en Corée. Le risque est que beaucoup ne reviennent jamais en
Corée, ce qui pourrait se solder par une fuite croissante des cerveaux. Cela dit, le
secteur scientifique coréen continue à progresser et devrait donc offrir davantage
de débouchés. Le temps que passent les jeunes Coréens à l’étranger aura alors été
un investissement pour la Corée, et ceux qui restent à l’étranger pourraient
également constituer une source de collaboration utile.
• Le changement technologique : la Corée parvient parfaitement à exploiter le
changement technologique, en particulier dans le secteur des TIC, mais elle devra
renforcer encore ses capacités pour tirer parti des technologies émergentes, telles que
les nanotechnologies et les biotechnologies.
Missions stratégiques et principes directeurs
La principale mission de la politique de l’innovation de la Corée est de parvenir à la
convergence avec les pays de l’OCDE plus avancés. Cet objectif doit être atteint alors que
le taux de fécondité est en recul et que la concurrence s’accroît avec les nouvelles
économies industrielles, en particulier la Chine. La mission plus spécifique de la politique
de l'innovation doit donc être d’accélérer le passage d’un système d’innovation de type
rattrapage à un modèle plus créatif, en soutenant la recherche fondamentale dans un plus
grand nombre de domaines, en renforçant les capacités d’innovation et d’absorption des
PME et en établissant des liens plus solides avec des sources de connaissances à l’échelle
internationale.
Pour remplir ces missions, la politique de l’innovation doit reposer sur les principes
directeurs suivants :
• L’ouverture internationale : la Corée doit ouvrir davantage son système de
recherche au plan international afin de pouvoir mieux puiser dans les réservoirs de
connaissances mondiaux. Des programmes ciblés ont été mis en place pour
améliorer la situation, mais l’internationalisation devrait faire partie intégrante de
la majorité des politiques ayant trait à la science, la technologie et l’innovation.
• La diversification : la croissance récente de la Corée s’appuie en grande partie sur
le développement et l’exploitation des TIC. La Corée devrait chercher à diversifier
son économie en exploitant les nouveaux moteurs de croissance offerts par les
biotechnologies, les nanotechnologies et d’autres domaines scientifiques et techno-
logiques nouveaux, tout en tirant le meilleur parti possible de ses atouts existants.
• Le rééquilibrage du soutien public en faveur d’une recherche à visée publique et
générique plutôt qu’à visée purement économique : la Corée ayant « rattrapé » les
pays les plus avancés au plan technologique et cherchant désormais à progresser en
repoussant les frontières du savoir-faire technologique, il est temps pour la
politique d’innovation de faire une place plus grande aux activités de R-D visant le

public et le bien-être an se consacrant moins exclusivement à la promotion de la R-
D industrielle. Cette transition aurait aussi le mérite d’accroître les niveaux de
recherche fondamentale menée en Corée.
• L’adoption d’une perspective à long terme pour l’évaluation des coûts et des
avantages du financement de la R-D publique : il serait souhaitable que les
décideurs publics et les autres acteurs de l’innovation prennent pleinement en
compte le fait que les bénéfices des investissements dans la recherche fondamentale
peuvent être en grande partie immatérielles – très variés dans leur nature et pour
partie inséparables d’autres retombées de l’innovation – et qu’il faudra beaucoup
de temps pour les percevoir pleinement.
• L’équilibre entre concurrence et développement de la coopération et de la
confiance : La convergence des types de recherche et d’activités d’innovation
menés par les différents acteurs rend moins évidente l’identification de leurs
compétences clés respectives et de leurs complémentarités. Cela a encouragé une
concurrence plus vive entre ces acteurs, assortie d’un manque de confiance, sans
doute au détriment d’une coopération plus étroite. La concurrence entre les
principaux types d’acteurs du système d’innovation n’est pas une mauvaise chose
en soi, mais elle doit être mieux équilibrée avec la coopération, notamment entre
les instituts de recherche publics et les universités.
• Une approche systémique et évolutionniste de la promotion de l’innovation : une
stratégie globale claire devrait inspirer l’ensemble des politiques ayant une
incidence sur la dynamique et l’efficience des processus d’innovation. Ces
politiques doivent s’adapter à l’évolution du contexte mondial et répondre aux
nouveaux besoins des acteurs de l’innovation. Elles doivent également contribuer à
l’amélioration des performances du système d’innovation et de ses composantes en
s’appuyant sur des mécanismes de suivi et d’évaluation continus plutôt qu’en se
fixant pour objectif d’établir une structure optimale prédéfinie du système
d’innovation.
• Une approche globale de la promotion de l’innovation, au-delà du soutien à la R-
D et aux hautes technologies : pour renforcer les capacités d’innovation dans
l’ensemble de l’économie, y compris dans les activités non fondées sur la R-D, il
faut éviter une politique de l’innovation à trop focalisée sur la R-D et la haute
technologie. L’innovation non technologique ou « soft » – notamment dans le
secteur des PME, dont les capacités d’innovation sont particulièrement faibles –
offre de très grandes possibilités pour stimuler la productivité et la croissance des
revenus. En outre, la tertiarisation du secteur secondaire et la part technologique
croissante des services impliquent que les secteurs secondaire et tertiaire ont besoin
de capacités communes pour s’engager plus avant sur la voie d’une économie de la
connaissance.
• La prise en compte des questions d’égalité hommes-femmes : compte tenu de
l’évolution démographique de la Corée, il sera crucial d’accroître les taux
d’activité des femmes dans les secteurs scientifiques et technologiques. Les
autorités coréennes devraient suivre l’exemple d’autres pays membres de l’OCDE
qui ont choisi d’intégrer les questions d’égalité hommes-femmes dans l’ensemble
de leurs politiques.
• La coordination des politiques : il est difficile pour les gouvernements d’assurer la
cohérence de leurs politiques et programmes, car ils sont généralement mal

organisés pour traiter des questions transversales telles que l’innovation. Il faut
pour cela envisager l’intervention publique comme un dosage équilibré (« policy
mix ») des différents instruments d’action disponibles.
• La gouvernance participative en science et technologie : à mesure que la Corée
repousse les limites de la connaissance, elle prend de nouvelles responsabilités et
relève de nouveaux défis qui appellent un dialogue avec la société. Ce dialogue
devrait s’inscrire dans le cadre d’un nouveau système de gouvernance participatif
en science et technologie, qui permette aux scientifiques et aux autorités
d’entretenir un dialogue réel avec les citoyens à propos des nouveaux développe-
ments en science et en technologie.
Recommandations
À la lumière de ces missions stratégiques et de ces principes directeurs, et en
considérant les forces et les faiblesses du système d’innovation en Corée ainsi que les
opportunités et les menaces qui se présentent à lui, cet Examen présente un certain
nombre de recommandations pour l’action publique.
Améliorer la coordination interministérielle de la politique de l’innovation
L’une des tâches importantes du gouvernement coréen est d’améliorer la coordination
entre les nombreux ministères et agences intervenant dans la R-D et, plus généralement,
l’innovation. Les gouvernements précédents ont mis en place des mécanismes assez
élaborés pour répondre au problème de la coordination, mécanismes qui semblent avoir
eu quelque succès – bien que des difficultés demeurent manifestement – mais qui ont
dans leur majorité été supprimés par le nouveau gouvernement en 2008 dans un
mouvement général de consolidation ministérielle. Toutefois, cette consolidation ne va
pas se poursuivre indéfiniment et il restera toujours deux « super-ministères » qui ont une
influence majeure sur la politique de l’innovation en Corée, à savoir le Ministère de
l’éducation, de la science et de la technologie (MEST), qui est chargé de la science et de
l’éducation publiques, et le Ministère de l’économie du savoir (MKE), responsable de la
R-D et de la politique des pôles de technologie industrielle.
• Établir des relations de travail solides entre le MEST et le MKE. Compte tenu de
la séparation ministérielle entre la science et l’éducation publiques d’une part, et la
R-D industrielle d’autre part, le gouvernement coréen doit veiller à ce que le
MEST et le MKE entretiennent des relations de travail fructueuses. S’il est
manifestement nécessaire d’accorder plus de place à la recherche fondamentale
sans visée industrielle, ainsi qu’il est préconisé dans cet examen, il est également
essentiel que le système scientifique public ne se retrouve pas isolé de la R-D
industrielle.
• Veiller à ce que les sciences et l’innovation restent au premier plan des
préoccupations politiques. Au sein de chaque ministère élargi, il faudra également
s’assurer que les questions relatives à la science, à la technologie et à l’innovation
ne sont pas reléguées derrière d’autres plus pressantes à court terme. C’est un
risque réel au MEST, car l’expérience internationale montre que lorsqu’on associe
science et éducation, la première est souvent négligée au profit de la seconde, qui,
plus épineuse d’un point de vue politique, demande une attention constante plus
grande de la part des pouvoirs publics.

Outre une coordination de type horizontal, il est important d’établir des mécanismes
de coordination et de pilotage verticaux afin d’obtenir une bonne mise en œuvre de la
politique de l’innovation adoptée. Cinq conseils de recherche (CR) ont été créés à cet
effet (depuis peu réduits à trois par le nouveau gouvernement), mais leur rôle est assez
limité. En outre, l’affectation de chaque institut public de recherche à tel ou tel CR
semble quelque peu arbitraire.
• Réexaminer l’objectif et le fonctionnement des CR. Le gouvernement coréen
devrait envisager une réorganisation des CR, peut-être davantage en fonction des
différentes disciplines, ou leur regroupement éventuel au sein d’une même entité
afin de renforcer leurs capacités stratégiques.
Redéfinir les rôles des acteurs de la recherche
Les rôles traditionnels des instituts de recherche publics et des universités ont perdu
progressivement de leur pertinence depuis une vingtaine d’année sous l’effet d’un certain
degré de convergence de leurs missions respectives. Les instituts de recherche publics ont
été créés à l’origine pour accélérer l’adoption et l’adaptation des technologies de pointe
par les entreprises coréennes, alors que les universités avaient pour mission essentielle
l’enseignement. S’agissant du rôle des universités dans la recherche, il demeure un
décalage important entre les dépenses de recherche et les capacités en ressources
humaines : les universités accueillent près de 70 % des titulaires de doctorat coréens, mais
ne représentent que 10 % de la recherche nationale.
• Corriger le décalage entre la quantité de ressources humaines et le montant des
dépenses de recherche de l’université. Il s’agit là d’une tâche urgente, qui peut
exiger une hausse des dépenses de R-D et/ou des incitations plus puissantes pour
encourager un plus grand nombre de titulaires de doctorat à travailler dans le
secteur privé ou dans des instituts de recherche publics.
• Établir des liens plus étroits entre les universités et les instituts de recherche
publics. Il y a de toute évidence encore des progrès à faire avant que les universités
coréennes ne deviennent des acteurs majeurs de la recherche. Le soutien financier
aux centres de recherche et les plans visant à attirer des scientifiques étrangers
éminents afin de former des groupes de recherche de premier plan apporteront sans
doute des contributions précieuses, mais mettront beaucoup de temps à porter leurs
fruits. Une stratégie supplémentaire consisterait à établir des relations plus étroites
entre les universités et les instituts de recherche publics, ce qui pourrait accélérer le
renforcement des capacités de recherche des universités. Ces liens pourraient être
de différente nature, des plus relativement informels, ou au contraire prendre la
forme d’un regroupement total entre les organismes. Les autorités coréennes
devraient étudier les avantages et à la faisabilité de ces solutions, en s’inspirant des
initiatives étrangères de rapprochement entre établissements d’enseignement
supérieur et organismes de recherche publics.
• Veiller à ce que l’accroissement des dépenses dans la recherche universitaire
n’engendre pas des « tours d’ivoire ». Les pouvoirs publics ont de bonnes raisons
d’accroître le nombre des petites subventions accordées à des projets non liés à des
missions spécifiques, dans la mesure où cela bénéficiera aux chercheurs isolés et
aux petits groupes souvent présents dans les universités, et où cela pourrait
encourager une recherche davantage mue par la curiosité. Toutefois, l’existence de
ces subventions ne doit affaiblir les activités de recherche davantage orientées sur

des missions. Autrement dit, les chercheurs des universités coréennes (à quelques
exceptions notables près) doivent se consacrer plus activement à la recherche, et
tout financement supplémentaire dans ce domaine doit se traduire par un
développement effectif des activités réelles de recherche.
Si l’on s’accorde généralement sur la nécessité de renforcer la recherche à
l’université, le rôle des instituts de recherche publics fait toujours débat. Plusieurs axes
nouveaux (et non exclusifs) – chacun avec ses avantages et ses inconvénients – ont été
proposés, notamment i) soutenir le développement technologique des PME, ii) passer
d’une R-D de type industriel à une recherche tournée vers le public et le bien-être, iii) se
concentrer sur les technologies de plateforme, iv) mener l’effort national de renforcement
de la recherche fondamentale, et v) mettre l’accent sur des domaines de recherche
interdisciplinaires et transversaux. Parallèlement à ces axes nouveaux, différentes options
concernant la structure des instituts de recherche publics sont régulièrement étudiées.
Elles vont du regroupement ou de la division de différents instituts jusqu’à la révision de
leur tutelle ministérielle. Des propositions plus radicales sont aussi parfois évoquées,
notamment la privatisation et le regroupement avec les universités.
• Prendre en compte la diversité des instituts de recherche publics dans la planifica-
tion des réformes. Les instituts de recherche publics sont très différents les uns des
autres, ils font face à différents défis, qui demandent des actions adaptées. Les
pouvoirs publics devraient tenir compte de cette diversité dans la formulation de
leur politique à l’égard des instituts de recherche publics, et devrait étudier l’avenir
de chaque institut au cas par cas.
• Attendre des instituts de recherche publics qu’ils remplissent de multiples rôles.
Les instituts de recherche publics ne doivent pas être cantonnés à une seule
fonction – même si cela se traduit par plus de complexité du système national de
recherche. Ils ont au contraire de multiples rôles à jouer dans le système
d’innovation, ce qui doit être pris en compte dans la politique dans ce domaine.
• S’inspirer des initiatives étrangères visant à renforcer les liens entre instituts de
recherche publics et universités. Différents modèles de coexistence entre instituts
de recherche publics et universités ont été appliqués dans le monde et leur adoption
éventuelle doit être correctement adaptée au contexte coréen.
• Ouvrir davantage l’accès aux instituts de recherche publics (et aux autres
infrastructures de recherche publiques). L’utilisation de grands équipements et
installations de recherche publics est souvent critiquée pour son manque
d’efficacité et de rentabilité. Ces infrastructures doivent être plus largement
ouvertes aux acteurs de la recherche du secteur public comme du secteur privé.
Comprendre les avantages de la recherche fondamentale
Disposant de ressources limitées pendant la phase de rattrapage économique, les
autorités coréennes ont pris soin de cibler certains domaines et ont cherché à obtenir des
retombées concrètes (et souvent à court terme) de leurs investissements en R-D.
Toutefois, les hausses budgétaires importantes en faveur de la recherche fondamentale
qui ont été annoncées récemment doivent s’accompagner d’attentes différentes quant aux
retombées de cet investissement croissant. S’il semble admis que le développement de la
recherche fondamentale ne produira sans doute pas de retombées tangibles immédiates,
des pressions s’exercent néanmoins sur les acteurs de la recherche pour qu’ils obtiennent
rapidement des résultats – en particulier dans la mesure où ceux-ci sont devenus des

critères d’évaluation importants à l’échelle nationale. La forte progression des investisse-
ments en R-D publique a permis aux instituts de recherche publics et aux universités
d’augmenter très largement le nombre d’articles scientifiques publiés et de brevets
déposés ces dernières années. Cependant, il est à craindre qu’une partie de cette
progression soit due à un excès de publications et de dépôt de brevets, comme l’indiquent
la croissance marginale des taux de citation d’articles et la faiblesse relative des taux de
transfert de technologies.
• Mieux refléter les multiples contributions de la R-D dans les évaluations nationales.
Pour limiter autant que possible les comportements non souhaitables, tels que le
dépôt abusif de brevets, les diverses contributions que les établissements
d’enseignement supérieur et les instituts de recherche publics apportent en faveur
de l’innovation devraient mieux transparaître dans les évaluations nationales. C’est
pourquoi la portée et les effets – attendus ou imprévisibles – des dispositifs
complexes d’évaluation des programmes appliqués depuis trois ou quatre ans
devraient maintenant être révisés.
• Mobiliser davantage la diaspora coréenne dans le système d’évaluation national.
La Corée fait appel à de nombreux panels d’examen par des experts pour ses
évaluations, mais ne fait appel que rarement à des experts étrangers à cause de la
barrière de la langue. Cette situation pourrait s’améliorer par un emploi plus étendu
de l’anglais, mais aussi peut-être plus simplement par le recours à la diaspora
coréenne grandissante, qui apporterait une dimension internationale utile au
processus d’examen.
Le besoin des entreprises – en particulier les chaebol et les PME de haute
technologie - constitue un puissant motif de développement de la recherche fondamentale
en Corée, mais ce n’est pas le seul. La nécessité de ce développement découle également
de la dynamique propre du secteur scientifique, qui a atteint maintenant un niveau de
maturité important et réclame des infrastructures plus élaborées et des niveaux de soutien
plus importants. Nombre de ces demandes sont justifiées car des investissements dans
certaines infrastructures scientifiques nécessaires à la recherche fondamentale pourraient
contribuer significativement au développement socio-économique du pays. Toutefois,
certaines pourraient ne servir que les intérêts du milieu scientifique et doivent être
étudiées avec soin.
• Évaluer avec minutie les projets relatifs à de grandes infrastructures de recherche
afin de déterminer leur légitimité et leur adaptabilité aux besoins évolutifs. Les
demandes de grandes infrastructures nouvelles doivent être rigoureusement
examinées, en gardant à l’esprit que de nombreux pays de l’OCDE ayant une plus
grande expérience du financement et de la conduite de la recherche fondamentale
ont parfois eu du mal à s’assurer de la pertinence des travaux de recherche
associés.
• Reconnaître le caractère stratégique d’une grande partie de la recherche
fondamentale. La recherche fondamentale ne doit pas être assimilée à une
démarche uniquement motivée par la curiosité. De fait, les travaux de recherche
fondamentale sont souvent menés dans le cadre de missions stratégiques. Dans
bien des cas, il devrait être possible d’évaluer ex ante la contribution que peut
apporter la recherche fondamentale à telle ou telle mission, même s’il est difficile
de mesurer sa contribution a posteriori.

Promouvoir l’innovation dans le secteur des entreprises
Les pouvoirs publics ont prévu des crédits d’impôt relativement généreux pour les
entreprises qui poursuivent des activités de R-D. En outre, les financements publics
directs représentent 5 % environ de la DIRDE – un chiffre moyen pour les pays de
l’OCDE. Cependant, plus de 50 % des dépenses de l’État dans la recherche publique sont
axés sur le développement industriel – l’un des niveaux les plus élevés de l’OCDE. Les
autorités cherchent également à mettre en œuvre des politiques et des programmes portant
sur un éventail plus large de questions liées à l’innovation, entre autres le financement
d’entreprise, l’amélioration des compétences, la collaboration entre entreprises et
universités et les pôles d’activité. L’intervention publique doit toutefois tenir compte de
deux « clivages » importants concernant les résultats des entreprises coréennes en matière
d’innovation : premièrement, le clivage entre les chaebol et les PME, et deuxièmement,
celui entre le secteur manufacturier et les services.
En ce qui concerne le premier point, les performances des PME en matière
d’innovation arrivent toujours loin derrière celles des chaebol. Il est possible que cela
s’améliore à l’avenir, puisque le volume des activités de R-D menées par les PME a été
multiplié par cinq entre 1997 et 2006 et qu’il s’élève aujourd’hui à près d’un quart de la
DIRDE coréenne. Les mesures d’incitation de l’État, notamment le financement de la R-
D, les exonérations fiscales, l’exonération des droits de douane sur les équipements de R-
D et l’exemption du service militaire pour les chercheurs, entrent pour une large part dans
cette rapide expansion. Les chaebol jouent également un rôle de soutien plus important en
faveur d’un secteur des PME dynamique, car leurs fournisseurs ont dû renforcer
sensiblement leurs capacités de R-D afin de répondre aux besoins technologiques accrus
des chaebol travaillant sur des technologies de pointe. En outre, les chaebol continuant de
se procurer des technologies à l’extérieur, les PME coréennes cherchent à réduire leur
dépendance vis-à-vis d’un seul chaebol et à diversifier leur clientèle. Pour y parvenir,
elles doivent être compétitives au plan international. Cependant, face à la nouvelle
concurrence de la Chine, les entreprises coréennes peuvent moins s’appuyer sur la
compétitivité des prix et doivent améliorer la fonctionnalité et la qualité de leurs produits
– ce qui les oblige à innover encore davantage.
• Continuer à soutenir l’innovation au sein des PME tout en reconnaissant les
limites de l’intervention publique. Le soutien public à l’innovation, qui concernait
en premier lieu les grandes entreprises, se tourne désormais davantage vers les
PME – une nouvelle orientation qui semble globalement justifiée. Les pouvoirs
publics sont parvenus dans une certaine mesure à renforcer les capacités des PME,
ainsi qu’à rendre les conditions plus propices aux nouvelles entreprises innovantes.
Ils doivent poursuivre leurs efforts, tout en tenant compte des limites et des
possibilités qu’offre la dynamique industrielle globale du pays.
• Poursuivre la rationalisation des divers programmes de soutien à l’innovation
dans les PME. Les politiques et les programmes relatifs aux PME sont très
nombreux, et les autorités financent désormais directement plus de travaux de
recherche dans les PME que dans les grandes entreprises. Toutefois, il serait
souhaitable de rationaliser encore davantage les programmes proposés car leur
nombre et leurs champs d’application sont source de confusion.
Le second clivage concerne le secteur manufacturier et celui des services. La
productivité dans le secteur manufacturier a fortement progressé ces dernières années,
alors qu’elle continue de stagner dans les services. Le secteur tertiaire représentait à peine
7 % de la DIRDE en 2006, l’un des taux les plus faibles de l’OCDE. Il est important

d’avoir un secteur tertiaire productif et compétitif pour soutenir les performances du
secteur manufacturier. Pourtant, les services de conseil, qui sont généralement considérés
comme importants pour l’innovation, sont peu développés en Corée, notamment à cause
d’une structure industrielle dominée par les chaebol « autonomes » et d’un marché
intérieur des services relativement fermé à la concurrence étrangère.
• Imaginer des solutions pour favoriser l’innovation dans les services. Les pouvoirs
publics devraient mettre en œuvre des politiques et des programmes nouveaux
spécifiquement ciblés sur l’innovation dans le secteur tertiaire, en vue d’élargir
l’assise de la croissance socio-économique future.
Étendre les domaines de spécialisation
Il existe un certain degré d’inertie dans l’orientation sectorielle des activités de R-D
en Corée, comme le montrent la forte spécialisation de la recherche et des publications
scientifiques autour des TIC et du génie physique. Cette spécialisation correspond aux
atouts industriels actuels de la Corée, et n’est donc pas surprenante, d’autant moins que la
grande part des dépenses publiques de recherche est toujours consacrée à la R-D
industrielle. Cependant, la Corée doit diversifier ses avantages concurrentiels par des
investissements dans de nouveaux domaines à forte intensité de savoir et ayant un
potentiel de croissance élevé.
• Établir un meilleur équilibre entre le soutien aux secteurs phares bien établis et
aux « nouveaux vecteurs » de la croissance. Le MEST a annoncé son intention de
réduire la proportion des financements publics de R-D allouée aux TIC et au génie
industriel, et de consacrer plus d’argent à des secteurs tels que les sciences du
vivant, les nanotechnologies, les sciences spatiales, etc. Toutefois, étant donné
qu’une large part du budget public de recherche provient de ministères ayant des
missions sectorielles (notamment le MKE), l’influence du MEST sur une évolution
de cette nature semble limitée. Une meilleure coordination dans l’ensemble de
l’administration sera nécessaire pour s’assurer qu’un meilleur équilibre entre les
disciplines peut être obtenu.
• Définir les « grands défis » auxquels devra s’adresser une recherche davantage
orientée vers le bien-être. L’existence de ces défis devrait motiver une
diversification des investissements de recherche et se traduire en de nouvelles
priorités dont la poursuite pourrait se prêter à l’approche ciblée souvent employée
pour la R-D en Corée.
• Accroître le recours à de petites subventions afin de diversifier la recherche. Les
efforts de diversification doivent tenir compte des besoins de financement des
chercheurs isolés ou des petits groupes de recherche des universités actifs dans les
domaines concernés, pour lesquels des petites subventions peuvent particulière-
ment bien adaptées. Ces investissements ne doivent pas nécessairement être
consentis dans le cadre de mécanismes de financement ascendants (« bottom-up »)
et peuvent également l’être au sein de programmes gérés de manière descendante
(« top-down »).
• Promouvoir l’innovation dans les services – un vecteur de croissance essentiel à
l’avenir. Ainsi qu’il a déjà été souligné par ailleurs, il convient de soutenir
l’innovation dans le secteur tertiaire, qui est déjà de loin le premier employeur en
Corée et souffre de niveaux de productivité faibles.

Accroître la contribution de l’enseignement supérieur à l’innovation
Ce sont l’éducation et l’amélioration des compétences qui ont permis à la Corée de
devenir une grande économie industrielle. Cependant, le système éducatif qui s’est
développé au fil des années doit aujourd’hui s’adapter aux nouveaux défis auxquels le
pays doit faire face. Au cœur de cette évolution se trouve l’enseignement supérieur, où il
est nécessaire d’améliorer l’adéquation entre l’offre et la demande de diplômés ayant des
compétences et des connaissances répondant aux besoins de l’économie et de la société. Il
y a, de manière générale, trop de diplômés au niveau licence et trop peu de techniciens et
de diplômés au niveau post-licence dans les domaines de haute technologie. En outre, la
hiérarchie très visible et excessivement rigide des universités coréennes conditionne
fortement la réussite professionnelle et le statut social. Malheureusement, la concurrence
exacerbée pour l’entrée dans les universités les mieux cotées n’a pas entraîné une
différenciation et spécialisation au sein du système éducatif mais s’est traduit au contraire
par une uniformisation, les universités étant nombreuses à proposer les mêmes types de
cursus. Par ailleurs, le système est trop exclusivement au service des jeunes gens et n’est
pas assez souple pour proposer des programmes qui favoriseraient une participation plus
nombreuse d’apprenants plus âgés.
• Poursuivre les actions encourageant les universités à se spécialiser. Les pouvoirs
publics cherchent à relever les niveaux en encourageant les universités à se
spécialiser, de préférence dans des domaines où les diplômés ont plus de chances
de trouver un emploi au niveau local (en particulier pour atténuer la pression sur
Séoul). Cette démarche va à contre-courant de l’expansion non viable vers laquelle
tendent de nombreuses universités, mais semble être la bonne marche à suivre et
doit donc être poursuivie, voire étendue plus activement.
• Offrir de nouvelles incitations afin que les cursus universitaires répondent aux
besoins en personnel qualifié des entreprises coréennes et de la société. Dans une
comparaison internationale, les entreprises coréennes montrent l’un des niveaux
d'insatisfaction les plus élevés quant à la qualité des diplômés. De nombreux
établissements d’enseignement supérieur sont en train de relever leur niveau et
travaillent de plus en plus avec des entreprises et les autorités locales en vue de
réviser les programmes pour les rendre plus réactifs à l’évolution de la demande.
• Veiller à ce que la concurrence entre les établissements d’enseignement supérieur
s’appuie sur des informations fiables concernant les résultats et le fonctionnement
de leurs facultés et/ou départements. La mise en place en 2008 du système
d’information universitaire – qui comprend des renseignements sur les taux
d’emploi des diplômés, les taux d’inscription, la proportion d’enseignants à temps
plein, l’offre de bourses, les résultats scientifiques, le fonctionnement des
programmes et la gestion des écoles – est une initiative fort opportune à cet égard.
Cependant, une évaluation supplémentaire de chaque département ou faculté
devrait également être mise au point, ce qui permettrait de mettre mieux en lumière
les atouts spécifiques des établissements d’enseignement supérieur.
• Effectuer une évaluation régulière des résultats de la recherche au sein des
facultés et/ou des départements afin de renforcer les liens entre la recherche et la
formation post-licence. De nombreux étudiants post-licence en Corée sont formés
dans des facultés peu actives dans le domaine de la recherche, ce qui signifie que
le lien étroit entre recherche et enseignement est brisé. Pour résoudre ce problème,
il conviendrait d’évaluer les travaux de recherche menés au sein des départements

ou des facultés, de sorte que les étudiants éventuels et les bailleurs de fonds
disposent des informations requises pour un choix éclairé.
• Rehausser le statut des diplômes de formation professionnelle et celui des
établissements où ils peuvent être obtenus. Comme la forte demande en diplômes
de licence ne devrait pas diminuer dans l’immédiat, il conviendrait d’envisager de
revaloriser les brevets professionnels en les rendant équivalents à des diplômes de
licence.
• Offrir de nouvelles incitations aux prestataires d’enseignement afin qu’ils
élaborent des programmes de formation tout au long de la vie plus souples. Les
programmes des universités et des « junior colleges » devraient être plus flexibles
et permettre aux apprenants d’étudier à temps partiel tout en continuant à travailler.
Parallèlement, les employeurs et les salariés devraient être davantage incités à
s’investir dans des activités de formation tout au long de la vie.
Augmenter les taux d’activité des femmes en science et en ingénierie
D’un point de vue strictement économique, il est urgent que plus de femmes
travaillent dans les sciences et l’ingénierie, étant donné l’évolution démographique
prévisible de la Corée. Les taux d’obtention de diplôme des femmes dans ces secteurs
sont proches de la moyenne de l'OCDE, mais nombre d’entre elles ne parviennent pas à
trouver un emploi dans ce domaine. Les pouvoirs publics ne se sont attaqués à ce
problème qu’assez récemment mais leurs initiatives sont de portée large et mettent à
profit les expériences de l’étranger. Outre les programmes visant à attirer plus de femmes
vers des carrières scientifiques et d’ingénieur, des objectifs de recrutement ont été fixés
dans certaines parties du secteur public, ainsi que des systèmes favorables à points pour la
sélection des projets de recherche. Certains éléments semblent indiquer que ces mesures
ont des effets, mais les progrès sont plutôt lents et partent d’un niveau faible.
• Prendre en compte les questions d’égalité hommes-femmes à tous les niveaux de la
politique scientifique et technologique. Cela montrera la détermination du
gouvernement coréen à accorder la priorité la plus haute à la présence des femmes
dans ces secteurs.
• Conjuguer réglementation et incitations afin de pousser le secteur privé à
employer plus de femmes dans les domaines scientifiques et technologiques. La
plupart des chercheurs étant employés par le secteur privé, il y a des limites à
l’intervention directe des autorités. C’est pourquoi une combinaison de régle-
mentation et d’incitations devrait être envisagée, notamment des mesures telles que
des quotas en faveur des femmes, des incitations fiscales et des subventions pour
les structures de garde d’enfants.
• Mettre à profit la diversification des efforts de R-D pour favoriser une présence
accrue des femmes dans les domaines scientifiques et technologiques. Le recul
relatif des TIC et de l’ingénierie des machines au profit des sciences du vivant, des
sciences médicales et des sciences de l’environnement doit être mis à profit pour
accroître les taux d’activité des femmes, dans la mesure où ces disciplines
semblent plus propices aux femmes que les secteurs dans lesquels la Corée a été la
plus active jusqu’à présent.

Améliorer la mobilité professionnelle au sein du système de recherche
La mobilité de la main-d’œuvre constitue l’une des faiblesses fondamentales du
système de recherche : elle est à la fois faible en volume et unidirectionnelle. Cela tient en
partie au dualisme du marché du travail, mais le haut statut accordé au personnel
universitaire joue également et entraîne progressivement une « fuite des cerveaux »
interne à partir des instituts de recherche publics (et, dans une moindre mesure, des
entreprises), les mouvements inverses étant très peu nombreux. Le manque de circulation
de la main-d’œuvre qui en résulte a tendance à gêner la diffusion des connaissances au
sein du système d’innovation.
• Étudier des moyens de rehausser le statut des instituts de recherche publics de
sorte qu’ils soient considérés comme des lieux de travail aussi intéressants que les
universités. Si les conditions de travail dans les instituts de recherche publics se
rapprochaient davantage de celles dans les universités – en termes de sécurité de
l’emploi, d’évolution de carrière et de pension de retraite par exemple – cela
pourrait permettre aux premiers de redevenir des employeurs plus attractifs et
encouragerait sans doute la mobilité de la main-d’œuvre. Cependant, le statut des
instituts de recherche publics étant considéré comme moins prestigieux que celui
des universités, la mobilité vers les instituts risque de rester modeste. Les pouvoirs
publics devraient donc redorer l’image des instituts de recherche publics, par
exemple en investissant dans des équipements de pointe et des projets phares.
Décentraliser la politique de l'innovation pour une croissance plus équilibrée
Les régions et les régions urbaines constituent peut-être l’un des meilleurs niveaux
pour établir des relations productives au sein du système d’innovation. Cependant, il
n’existe pas de pôles technologiques importants au-delà du « macropôle » de Séoul. Cette
concentration des ressources scientifiques et technologiques semblait aller de soi pendant
le processus d’industrialisation rapide de la Corée, mais elle est désormais remise en
question, les pouvoirs publics souhaitant promouvoir un développement plus équilibré
géographiquement. La Corée doit mettre en œuvre différents programmes d’action pour
combler des manques d’innovation au plan régional, notamment des mesures
encourageant les partenariats entre les acteurs régionaux de l’innovation, qui étaient
récemment encore peu développés. En conséquence, une série de mesures – mises en
œuvre dans diverses agences publiques à l’échelle nationale comme dans les régions – a
été adoptée afin de soutenir/renforcer les systèmes d’innovation régionaux. Cependant,
ces efforts sont fragmentés et manquent de coordination. Le problème est essentiellement
dû au fait que de nombreux programmes régionaux sont gérés au niveau central par des
agences nationales et non par les régions elles-mêmes. La coordination au niveau régional
est ainsi compliquée et empêche le développement et l’enracinement de capacités de
planification et de mise en œuvre plus solides.
• Donner plus de responsabilités aux régions pour la conception et l’application de
la politique d’innovation régionale. Les politiques actuellement distinctes mais
souvent enchevêtrées sur les pôles, la R-D, l’innovation régionale et l’éducation
devraient être regroupées en une stratégie globale au service du développement
économique régional, qui laisserait une grande marge de manœuvre aux régions
elles-mêmes en matière de conception et d’application. Cette responsabilité devrait
s’accompagner d’un système de contrôle permettant de veiller à l’adéquation et à
l’efficience de l’action, et permettant également de tirer plus facilement des leçons
des politiques appliquées au niveau régional.

• Mener un audit stratégique ascendant sur les programmes d’innovation régionaux.
Dans le contexte d’une décentralisation accrue des pouvoirs, il est nécessaire de
réaliser un audit stratégique des diverses initiatives régionales en matière d’innova-
tion prises par les différentes agences, ainsi que des efforts consentis pour
renforcer les capacités de planification et de mise en œuvre dans les régions.
Le gouvernement coréen a également cherché à faire émerger un pôle d’activités à
forte intensité de savoir autour de la cité de la science de Daedok – rebaptisée récemment
Daedok Innopolis. La transformation de Daedok d’un pôle scientifique en un pôle de
l’innovation n’est pas acquise, mais les premiers signes sont encourageants. Autre point
peut-être davantage sujet à controverse, les autorités veulent encourager le développe-
ment de pôles scientifiques plus petits dans d’autres régions qui n’ont jusqu’à présent que
peu d’activités de recherche.
• Comprendre que les investissements et les retombées associés aux systèmes
d’innovation régionaux s’inscrivent dans la durée. Il est évident que même avec
l’intervention de l’État, il faudra très longtemps pour que le renforcement des
capacités de recherche d’une région porte ses fruits. Cela ne signifie pas renoncer à
investir pour ce renforcement, mais plutôt admettre que les bénéfices attendus
mettront du temps à se matérialiser pleinement. .
• Veiller à ce que l’innovation soit au cœur de tout investissement à visée
scientifique destiné à promouvoir le développement régional. Sans cela, les
pouvoirs publics risquent de bâtir des « cathédrales dans le désert », autrement dit
des centres d’excellence scientifique comportant peu d’avantages pour l’économie
locale.
Tirer le meilleur parti possible de l'internationalisation de la R-D
Ces dernières années, alors que la R-D s’est de plus en plus internationalisée, il est
devenu important pour les pays de s’ouvrir et de participer à des réseaux mondiaux de
production de savoir. Le système coréen de R-D est considéré à bien des égards comme
relativement fermé à l’internationalisation : les scientifiques étrangers sont peu nombreux
à travailler en Corée, il existe peu de centres de recherche étrangers dans le pays et la
coopération internationale en matière de recherche n’est guère développée. Toutefois, sur
d’autres aspects, le système de R-D coréen a toujours été très internationalisé, et ce, dès le
début, lorsque les instituts de recherche publics nouvellement créés devaient débaucher
des scientifiques coréens travaillant aux États-Unis pour étoffer leurs effectifs. Cette
mobilité de la main-d’œuvre s’est poursuivie jusqu’à aujourd’hui, de nombreux Coréens
choisissant de passer leur doctorat à l’étranger, et de plus en plus, leur licence et leur
master, avant de retourner en Corée pour travailler. Néanmoins, l’accélération récente de
cette mobilité vers l’extérieur (la Corée compte plus d’étudiants aux États-Unis qu’aucun
autre pays) est une préoccupation grandissante, dans la mesure où de nombreuses
personnes choisissent de ne pas retourner en Corée, du moins pas dans l’immédiat.
Certains parlent de « fuite des cerveaux » et soulignent la nécessité d’améliorer les
possibilités de recherche et d’enseignement dans les universités coréennes. D’autres
considèrent ces évolutions de manière plus positive et y voient l’internationalisation de la
Corée par un processus de « circulation des cerveaux ».

Les pouvoirs publics coréens souhaitent à juste titre réduire les risques associés à la
mobilité vers l’extérieur en encourageant le mouvement inverse, vers la Corée. Ils
redoublent d'efforts pour améliorer l'internationalisation de l’assise scientifique et
technologique du pays et ont récemment adopté plusieurs plans d'action visant à
i) promouvoir la collaboration internationale en matière de R-D ; ii) attirer des centres de
R-D étrangers en Corée; iii) attirer des ressources humaines – étudiants et chercheurs
qualifiés – afin qu'ils étudient et travaillent en Corée. L'ampleur et la portée des
investissements prévus (par exemple, pour l'initiative qui vient d'être annoncée sur les
Universités de classe mondiale) ainsi que les objectifs fixés (sur les effectifs d'étudiants
étrangers, par exemple) montrent une réelle ambition. Si ces plans d'action atteignent
leurs objectifs, des progrès considérables auront été faits en vue de l'internationalisation
de la R-D coréenne.
• Tirer parti des évolutions systémiques au sens large pour renforcer indirectement
l'internationalisation de la R-D en Corée. Ces évolutions concernent notamment
i) l'accent mis sur la recherche fondamentale, dans la mesure où celle-ci est propice
à de nombreuses coopérations scientifiques internationales, et ii) le renforcement
des capacités de recherche universitaires, qui devraient devenir un axe majeur de la
coopération et des échanges avec l’étranger.
• Continuer d'investir dans des installations de R-D à l'étranger. Les chaebol
coréens investissent assez largement dans des installations de R-D à l'étranger, en
particulier aux États-Unis, en Europe, en Russie et, de plus en plus, en Chine. Des
relations similaires, bien que plus modestes, ont été établies par quelques instituts
de recherche du secteur public. Tous ces efforts vont sans doute contribuer à
renforcer les liens entre la recherche et l'innovation en Corée et les réseaux
mondiaux de savoir, et doivent donc être poursuivis.
• Améliorer la coordination entre les politiques et les programmes du MEST et du
MKE en faveur de l'internationalisation. Il conviendrait autant que possible de
rationnaliser les politiques et les programmes de manière à éviter les chevauche-
ments et à combler les manques.

Exploring the Variety of Random
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his mind whether she were really false.
When he recollected the quick passion of her caresses, the
tenderness of her words, the gentle sympathy with which
she had asked him to confide in her, he found it difficult to
believe that she could actually forget him five minutes after
leaving him in that ballroom, and waltz airily with the man
with whose name her own was being everywhere coupled.
To him, honest, upright man that he was, this seemed an
absolute impossibility. He refused to believe it. Surely she
loved him, in spite of her perplexing caprices; surely she
had been seized by remorse for her own fickleness.
He endeavoured to compare the two women, but the
comparison caused him to start up in quick impatience.
“No!” he cried aloud in a fierce voice. “A thousand times no!
I love Claudia—no one else!—no one else in all the world!”
Next day when he entered his room at Downing Street,
Wrey, his secretary, put before him a quantity of documents
requiring attention. He held the responsible office of
superintending under-secretary of the Commercial
Department of Her Majesty’s Foreign Office, the business of
which consisted of correspondence with our Ministers and
Consuls abroad; with the representatives of the Foreign
Powers in England, and with the Board of Trade and other
departments of the Government. He had been absorbed in
these papers for some hours, snatching only a few minutes
for a glass of sherry and a biscuit at luncheon-time, when
Wrey returned to remind him of a long-standing
engagement that evening at the little town of Godalming,
which was in his constituency, four miles from Albury.
He glanced up from his writing and gave vent to a sharp
ejaculation of annoyance.

“Are you quite certain it is to-night?” he asked, for the
reminder was to him a most unpleasant one. He avoided
speaking in his constituency whenever he could.
“Yes. I put it down in the diary a month ago—a dinner given
by the Lodge of Odd Fellows in aid of a local charity.”
Dudley groaned. He knew too well those charity dinners
given in a small room among his honest but rather uncouth
supporters. He dreaded the tinned soups, the roast beef,
the tough fowls, and the surreptitious tankards of ale in lieu
of wine, to be followed by those post-prandial pipes and
strong cigars. He shuddered. The dense atmosphere always
turned him sick, so that he usually made his speech while it
was still possible to see across the room. He was very fond
of the working-man, and subscribed liberally to all
charitable objects and associations, from those with a
political aim down to the smallest coal club in the outlying
villages; but why could not those honest sons of toil leave
him in peace?
His presence, of course, gave importance to the occasion,
but if they had found it possible to spare him the ordeal of
sitting through their dinner he would have been thankful.
Out of fifty invitations to banquets of various kinds,
openings of bazaars, flower-shows, lectures, concerts,
entertainments and penny-readings, he usually declined
forty-nine. As he could not absolutely cut himself aloof from
his Division, on rare occasions he accepted, and spent an
evening at Albury, or Godalming, or some of the less
important local centres of political thought.
The pot-house politician, who forms his ideas of current
events from the ultra-patriotic screeches of certain popular
newspapers, was a common object in his constituency; but
in Godalming, at any rate, the great majority of his

supporters were honest working-men. The little town is a
quaint, old-world place with a long High Street of ancient
houses, many of them displaying the oak-beams of the
sixteenth century, and its politics were just as staunch and
old-fashioned as the borough itself. True, a new town of
comfortable villas has sprung up of late around it, and high
upon the hill are to be seen the pinnacles of Charterhouse
School; but, notwithstanding these innovations, Godalming
has not marched with the times. Because of this the blatant
reformer has but little chance there, and the Parliamentary
Seat is always a safe one for the Conservatives.
Much as he disliked the duty, he saw that it was absolutely
necessary to go down and make pretence of having a meal
with that estimable Society of Odd Fellows. He rose from his
seat at the littered table, at once feeling a sudden desire for
fresh air after the closeness of his room, and a few minutes
later was driving in a cab to Waterloo. To dress for such a
function was quite unnecessary. Working-men do not
approve of their Member wearing a dinner-jacket when
among them, for they look upon a starched shirt as a sign
of superiority. He was always fond of the country round
Godalming, where he had once spent a summer, and as it
was a sunshiny afternoon saw in the occasion an
opportunity of taking a walk through some of the most
picturesque lanes in Surrey.
He was tired, world-weary, utterly sick of life. The duties of
his office pressed heavily upon him; but most burdensome
of all was the ever-present dread that the threatened blow
should fall and crush him. He wanted air: he wanted to be
alone to think.
And so, when that afternoon he alighted at Godalming and
returned the salutes of the station-master and book-stall
keeper, he started off up the steep road as far as the

Charterhouse, and from that point struck off by a narrow
footpath which led away across the brown ploughed fields to
where the Hog’s Back stretched before him in the blue
distance. The autumn sun shone brightly in the clear, grey
sky, and the trees in all their glory of brown and gold shed
their leaves upon him as he passed.
Save the station-master and the book-stall clerk, none had
recognised him. This was fortunate, for now he was free,
out in the open country with its rich meadows and
picturesque hills and valleys, until the hour when he must
dine with his supporters and utter some trite sayings
regarding the work of the Government and its policy
abroad.
He was fond of walking, and was glad to escape from
Downing Street and from the House for a single evening; so
he strode along down the path with a swinging gait, though
with a heart not light enough for the full enjoyment of his
lovely surroundings.
The by-path he had taken was that which leads over the
hills from Godalming past Field Place to the little old-world
village of Compton. Having crossed the ploughed lands, he
entered a thick coppice, where the path began to run down
with remarkable steepness into wide meadows, on the other
side of which lay a dark wood. The narrow path running
through the coppice terminated at a stile which gave
entrance to the park-like meadow-land.
Descending this path he halted at the stile, leaning against
it. Alone in that rural solitude, far removed from the mad
hurry of London life, he stood to think. Each gust of wind
brought down a shower of brown leaves from the oaks
above, and the only other sound was the cry of a pheasant
in the wood.

For at least five minutes he stood motionless. Then he
suddenly roused himself, and some words escaped his lips:
“How strange,” he murmured, “that my footsteps should
lead me to this very spot, of all others! Why, I wonder, has
Fate directed me here?”
He turned and gazed slowly round upon the scene spread
before him, the green meadows, the dark wood, the sloping
hill with its bare, brown fields, and the Hog’s Back rising in
the far distance, with the black line of the telegraph
standing out against the sky. With slow deliberation he took
in every feature of the landscape. Then, facing about, with
his back to the stile, his eyes wandered up the steep path
by which he had just descended from the crest of the hill.
“No,” he went on in a strange, low voice, speaking to
himself, “it has not changed—not in the least. It is all just
the same to-day, as then—just the same.” He sighed heavily
as he leaned back upon the wooden rail and gazed up the
ascent, brown with its carpet of acorns and fallen leaves.
“Yes,” he continued at last, “it is destiny that has led me
here, to this well-remembered spot for the last time before
I die—the justice which demands a life for a life.”
Throughout the district it would not have been easy to find
a more secluded spot than the small belt of dense wood,
half of which lay on either side of the footpath. So steep
was this path that considerable care had to be exercised
during its descent, especially in autumn, when the damp
leaves and acorns were slippery, or in winter, when the rain-
channels were frozen into precipitous slides.
“A life for a life!” he repeated slowly with a strange curl of
the lip. He permitted himself to speak aloud because in that
rural, solitude he had no fear of eavesdroppers. “I have

lived my life,” he said, “and now it is ended. My attempted
atonement is all to no purpose, for to-day, or to-morrow, a
voice as from the grave will arise to condemn me—to drive
me to take my life!”
He glanced at his watch.
“Yes,” he sighed. “Four o’clock!—at this very spot—at this
hour on a wet day in mid-winter—”
And his eyes fixed themselves blankly upon the ground a
couple of yards distant from where he was standing. “Six
years have gone, and it has remained ever a mystery!”
His face was pale, his brow contracted, his teeth firmly set.
His eyes still rested upon that spot covered with dead brown
leaves. Certainly it was strange that the steep and narrow
pathway should possess such fascination for him, for he had
wandered there quite involuntarily. It is not too much to say
that he would have flown to any other part of England
rather than stand upon the spot so closely associated with
the chapter in his life’s history that he hoped was closed for
ever.
Suddenly he roused himself, and, walking forward a couple
of paces, marked with his stick a square in the dead leaves.
Apparently he was deep in calculation, for after he had
made the mark he carefully measured, by means of his
cane, the distance between the square and the top of the
short ascent. On either side of the path was a steep moss-
grown bank surmounted by thick hazel-bushes, but on the
left a little distance up was an old wooden fence, grey with
lichen. He appeared to be deeply interested in this fence,
for after going close up to it he measured by careful pacing
the distance between it and the spot he had marked out.

When this was done, he stood again motionless, his fevered
brow bared to the breezes as though to him that spot were
hallowed. Then, crossing the stile, he entered the meadow,
passing and repassing the narrow lane as though for the
purpose of discovering the exact position an observer would
be compelled to take up in order to watch a person standing
at the point he had marked.
At last he returned, standing again with his back to the
stile, his hat raised in reverence, gazing fixedly upon those
dead and decaying leaves.
“Yes,” he murmured, “I was mad—mad! The devil tempted
me, and I fell. Would to God that I could make amends! But
I cannot—I dare not. No, I must suffer!”

Chapter Fourteen.
Which Demands Explanation.
Chisholm dined that night in the upstairs room of that old-
fashioned hostelry, the Angel, at Godalming, in company
with the brethren of the banner.
He sat at the right of the estimable, fat-handed butcher who
presided, and was informed by him that as the gigantic
roast sirloin that was served was his “own killing,” he could
recommend it. They ate, drank, and made merry, these
men banded together by their sacred rites, until the heat
grew so intense that the windows were opened, with the
result that decorous High Street echoed to the volleys of
their hearty laughter.
As drink was included in the cost of the repast, those diners
with the more rapacious appetites—who, indeed, made no
secret that they had been existing in a state of semi-
starvation all day in order to eat at night—drank
indiscriminately of the lemonade, beer, wine and whiskey
placed upon the table. Indeed, as is usual at such feasts,
they ate and drank all within reach of their hands. But these
bearded working-men and small tradesmen were merry and
well-meaning with it all. After “The King” had been
honoured, they toasted with boisterous enthusiasm “Our
Honourable Member,” and joined in the usual chorus of
poetical praise, “For he’s a jolly good fellow.”
Dudley sat bowing and smiling, yet at heart sick of the
whole performance. He dreaded the pipes and cigars that
would in a few moments appear. Shag and clays always

turned him ill. He was no great smoker himself, and had
never been able to withstand the smell of a strong cigar.
His quick eyes observed a man who was beginning in an
affectionate manner to fondle a well-coloured short clay. He
bent at once to the chairman, saying that he would now
deliver his speech.
“Silence, please, gentlemen!” shouted the rotund butcher,
rapping the table with his wooden mallet after their guest’s
health had been drunk. “Silence for our Honourable
Member! Silence—please!”
Then Dudley rose eagerly, happy in the knowledge that he
was almost through the ordeal, and, with a preliminary “Mr
Chairman and Gentlemen,” addressed the hundred or so of
his faithful supporters, telling them this and that about the
Government, and assuring them of the soundness of the
policy adopted by Her Majesty’s Ministers. It was not a very
long speech, but it was upon a subject of the moment; and
as there were two “gentlemen of the Press” representing
the local advertisement sheets, the one a mere boy, and the
other a melancholy, disappointed-looking man, with a sage
and rather ascetic expression, the speech would appear in
the papers, and the Godalming Lodge of Odd Fellows would
receive the credit of having entertained one of England’s
most rising statesmen. The two representatives of the
Press, each of whom took himself very seriously, had been
regaled with a bottle of port and some cigars by the
committee, who entertained a hope that they would thus be
induced to give a lengthy and laudatory account of the
function.
While Dudley was on his legs the cloud of tobacco-smoke
became thicker and thicker. Those triumphs of the
tobacconist called “tuppenny smokes” are nauseous when in

combination with the odour of food. Dudley sniffed them,
coughed slightly, sipped some water, and then drew his
speech to a close amid a terrific outburst of applause and a
beating upon the tables which caused the glasses and
crockery to jingle.
While this oration was in full blast he noticed a committee-
man uncovering the piano, by which he knew that
“harmony” was to embellish the hot whiskey period. At last,
however, he managed to excuse himself, upon the plea that
he must return to the House for a Division that was
expected; and as soon as he was out in the High Street he
breathed more freely. Then he hurried to the train, and,
entering the express from Portsmouth, tried to forget the
spot he had visited in that small belt of forest—the scene
that too often commanded the most vivid powers of his
memory.
“I was a fool ever to have gone there!—an absolute fool!”
he murmured to himself, as he flung himself back in the
first-class compartment when alone. “I ran an unnecessary
risk. And that man who came so suddenly upon me just as I
was leaving! What if he had watched and recognised me? If
so, he would certainly gossip about my presence there,
describe my actions—and then—”
He was silent; his face became blanched and drawn.
“Even though six years have passed, the affair is not
forgotten,” he went on in a hard voice. “It is still the local
mystery which Scotland Yard failed to elucidate. Yes,” he
added, “I was a fool—a confounded fool! What absurd whim
took me to that place of all others, I can’t imagine. I’m mad
—mad!” he cried in wild despair. “This madness is the
shadow of suicide!”

Instead of going down to the House he drove back at once
to his chambers.
Upon his table was a note from Claudia, affectionate as
usual, and full of regret that they had not met again on the
previous night—when they had been so suddenly separated
at Penarth House.
“What do you think of little Muriel Mortimer? I saw you
speaking with her,” she wrote. “She was full of you when I
met her shopping in Bond Street this morning. You have
made quite an impression, my dear Dudley. But don’t
altogether forget me, will you?”
Forget? Could he ever forget the woman whom he loved,
and yet despised? Strange that Claudia should have plotted
with Lady Meldrum against his bachelor estate, and should
have determined to bring about this marriage with Muriel
Mortimer!
In a frenzy of despair he cast her letter into the flames. He
recollected the words she had uttered to him in that room
on the previous night, the sweet words of love and
tenderness that had held him spellbound. No, there was no
other woman in all the world save her—and yet, she was
false and fickle, as all the world knew.
Life’s comforts are its cares. He smiled bitterly as he
reflected upon that phrase, which was an extract from one
of his many brilliant speeches. If a person has no cares,
that person must make them, or be wretched; care is
actually an employment, an action; sometimes even a joy.
And so it is with love. Life and love must have employment
and action. There must be responsibility and a striving to
reach a goal; for if not, both the power to endure and the
power to give comfort are shrunken and crippled.

When Dudley Chisholm was young he had long worshipped
an ideal. But when he found his idol to be undeserving of
the idolatry, madness fell upon him, and he accepted the
creed of the prodigal. Raking over the ashes of the
numerous bonfires he had made, for which his senses had
been the fuel, he now found a revelation of his inner self.
He recognised for the first time his weakness and his
unworthiness. He wanted something better than he had
known—not in others, but in himself. He had discovered a
spot of tenderness in his heart that had, so to speak,
remained virgin soil.
“Could a really smart woman possess any nice sense of
honour?” he asked himself for the hundredth time. If she is
endowed with any particular intelligence, and the world
discovers it, then society is prone to think that she is
necessarily a “schemer,” and, unless her friends know her
very well, she is soon given a place upon society’s black list
as an “adventuress,” a term which applies to the whole
gamut of West End wickedness. No, after all, few women
can be both honourable and smart.
His thoughts wandered back into the past, as they so
frequently did, and a moan came from his heart. He
remembered Claudia as an ideal woman of whom a cruel
Fate had robbed him in those days before he learned the
world to be what it is. And he still loved her—even though
this great gulf yawned between them.
Dudley Chisholm was blind to Claudia’s true character. He
was attracted to her by her intellect and her physical
magnetism. In these days of her freedom she had dared to
be herself, and having knowledge of herself and of men, she
had developed his admiration up to her own standpoint. She
had taught him women as she knew them herself. She was
playing with all the edged tools of daring because she felt

that she was the stronger of the two, and that he would
dare no further than she willed. She was charmed with the
freedom she allowed herself; while he was, in a manner,
flattered by her apparent constancy to him and by her
finding in him anything that interested a woman of her
attainments and popularity. Thus he had become thoroughly
interested, madly infatuated, as well as honestly in love.
Men so seldom understand the inner nature, the designing
nature, if I may be forgiven the expression, of some
women. Such women are unscrupulous in their dealings
both with men and women. The West End is full of them.
They live for what they can get out of their acquaintances,
instead of for what they can do for them. They give as
much love to all as to one, unless that one should happen
to be more wealthy or distinguished than the others. Then
the wealthy one will get the largest quantity of attention,
while the others will be kept dangling on the string for use
at odd times. Such women are shrewd. Mayfair has taught
them the art of conversation. They have reduced it to a
science. With the innocent face of a child, they learn never
to let the left hand know what the right hand is doing. And,
if the bare truth be stated, Claudia Nevill was one of these.
She, in her shrewdness, had handled Dudley with light
ribbons. She had intuitively understood what kind of woman
he preferred, and she had been that woman—until now,
when the bitter truth had been made plain to him.
In this life of ours the tossing between the extremes of
happiness and misery are terribly wearying. When once
life’s lessons begin they continue in a mad headlong rush of
events. During the last few days Dudley Chisholm seemed
to have lived a lifetime. Fate twisted and turned him
through and round human follies and treachery. It laughed
at him, beating up all that was false against all that was
true in his own nature, until he found himself in such a pot-

pourri of sunshine and storm that life seemed suddenly too
incomprehensible to be endured.
The daintiness of women rivets and enchains men of
Dudley’s stamp—the perfume of the hair, the baby-smell of
the skin, the frills, the laces, the violets exuding from the
chiffons, the arched foot, the neat ankle, the clinging
drapery—everything, in fact, that means delicate luxury not
to be enjoyed save in the company of a woman.
Awkwardness disenchants, but well-poised, graceful lines,
added to a chic in dress, hold for ever. To be essentially
feminine places a woman in the holy of holies in a man’s
heart. As Claudia was essentially feminine, she still held
Dudley safe, in spite of that sudden gust of scandal.
Alone, seated in his familiar armchair, he cast aside the
heavy thoughts that had so oppressed him ever since he
had stood at that spot deep in rural Surrey, and looked
upon the place every object of which was photographed
upon his memory. He thought of Claudia, and, remembering
the declaration of her love whispered in that room, felt
regret at the hard words he had uttered. She had made
mistakes and become entangled in the meshes of the net
spread out for her. Was it not his duty to extricate her? He
too had made a mistake in not paying respect, at least
outwardly, to the social code, and now the time had come
when he was forced to recognise that necessity. Yes, in his
inner consciousness he fully realised the mistake he had
made. He had all unconsciously aided and abetted her in
becoming what was known as “a smart woman.”
Perhaps, however, his opinion of her would have been a
different one had he been present at that moment in one of
the smaller sitting-rooms of the great mansion at Albert
Gate. It was a cosy apartment, with the lamplight mellowed
to a half tone by the yellow shade; dull greyish blue was the

colour of the silken walls, a cool, restful tint that seemed a
fitting background for the cosy lounge draped with dark
Egyptian red and suppressed greens and yellows.
Upon the couch, in a handsome dinner-gown of pale pink
trimmed with black velvet, lazily lounged its mistress
among her silken pillows, slowly waving her fan, while near
her in one of the big saddle-bag chairs sat the Grand-Duke
Stanislas smoking a cigarette, his eyes fixed upon her.
At his throat he wore the ribbon of St. Andrew, one of the
highest of the Russian orders, the splendid diamond cross
glittering upon his shirt-front. He was on his way to a
reception at the Austrian Embassy given in his honour by
the ambassador, but at Claudia’s invitation he had dined
with her.
“No, really,” she was laughing, “it is not so in England. I
quite admit that men make it a general accusation against
us, as a sex, that we are ill-natured, unfair, pitiless, in
judging one another. They say that when women get
together, at every word a reputation dies; they say that as a
savage proves his heroism by displaying in grim array the
torn scalps of his enemies, so a woman thinks she proves
her virtue by exhibiting the mangled reputations of her
friends; they say—But there is no end to the witty
impertinences and fag-ends of rhymes from Simonides to
Pope, which they fling at us on this subject I have never
heard men so eloquently satirical as when treating with
utter scorn the idea that a woman can possibly elevate
herself in the eyes of one of their sex by degrading, or
suffering to be degraded, one of her own; and in their
censure they are right—quite right; but wrong—quite wrong
in attributing this, our worst propensity, to ill-nature and
jealousy. Ignorance is the main cause: ignorance of
ourselves and others.”

He laughed at her philosophy, and blew a cloud of smoke
towards the ceiling.
“I think, my dear madame, that you must be full of whims,
comme disent les Anglais. A pretty woman like yourself
always is,” he said in his marked foreign accent.
“And why not?” she inquired, for he had suddenly changed
the channel of their conversation, and she much feared that
he now intended to give her a réchauffé of his sentimental
nonsense.
“Because you brought your friend to the duchess’s last
night. I saw him. C’etait assez.”
“You are jealous—eh?”
“Not in the least, I assure you,” he answered quite coolly.
“Only it is pretty folly on madame’s part—that is all.”
“Why folly? O la belle idée!”
“Madame’s amitiés are of course friendships,” he said,
raising his dark eyebrows. “Nevertheless, she should be
warned.”
“Of what?”
“Of Monsieur the Under-Secretary,” he replied, still
regarding her quite calmly with his dark eyes. “For her own
reputation madame should no longer be seen with him.”
She glanced at her guest quickly, for she was used to men’s
jealousies. Yet surely this scion of an Imperial House could
not be jealous!
“And for what reason, pray?” she asked, puzzled.

“Because of a regrettable circumstance,” he answered
mysteriously. “Because of a forthcoming exposure which will
be startling. In a certain Chancellerie in a certain capital of
Europe there reposes a document which must shortly be
made public property.”
“Well, and what then?” she asked, not yet grasping his
meaning.
“Its publication will bring disgrace and ruin upon madame’s
friend,” he answered simply. “That is why I warn you not to
be seen again in his company.”
“What do you mean?” she cried, starting up with sudden
hauteur. “You tell me this, in order to turn me from him.”
“No, ma chère, I tell you a secret which is known in the
Chancellerie of a certain Power antagonistic to your
country,” he responded. “I have told madame the truth for
her own benefit.”
“You would try to poison my mind against Dudley Chisholm
by hints such as these!” she cried, magnificent in her
sudden fury. “You!—You! But let me tell you that I love him
—that—that—”
“That you refuse to believe my word!” he said, concluding
her unfinished sentence.
“Yes, that I absolutely refuse to believe you!” she declared
emphatically, facing him boldly in a manner which showed
that her nature had revolted against this attempt to
denounce the man she loved.
“C’est assez!” he laughed with an air of nonchalance the
moment he had blown a cloud of smoke from his lips.
“Madame has spoken!”

Chapter Fifteen.
Is told in the Grass Country.
Throughout November Dudley remained in town tied to the
House by his official duties, and saw little of Claudia, who
had gone into Leicestershire for the hunting. Riding to
hounds was her favourite sport, and she was one of the
best horse-women within fifty miles of Market Harborough.
Each season she went on a visit to Lady Atteridge, whose
husband had a box right in the centre of the hunting-
country, and at every meet she was a conspicuous figure.
An acquaintance she made in the field with the late
Empress of Austria, during a run with the Pytchley across
the Grafton country, ripened into a warm friendship, and on
many occasions she had entertained her now lamented
Majesty at Albert Gate. Nearly every year some foreign
royalty or other is the centre of hunting interest. Unable to
enjoy the race over the grass in their own land, they come
to England for healthful sport, and generally make
Harborough their headquarters. That season it was the
Grand-Duke Stanislas who rode to nearly every meet,
always accompanied by his equerry. Hence Claudia and he
frequently met, but since that evening when he had
endeavoured to turn her from the man she loved she had
avoided him. She purposely refrained from attending any
function at which he might possibly be present, and when
they were compelled to meet with the hounds she only
bowed, and seldom, if ever, offered him her hand.
On his part, he was always fussing about her, scolding her
for her too reckless riding across boggy meadows, or at
hedges made dangerous by barbed wires, and always

holding himself prepared to render her any of those many
little services which the hunting-man renders the fair sex in
the field. But on her part she was absolutely indifferent to
his attentions, and at the same time annoyed that he
should thus publicly exhibit his admiration.
Certainly no figure was more neat and chic than hers in its
well-cut habit, her dark hair tightly coiled beneath her
becoming hunting-hat. In the saddle she looked as if she
were part of the animal she rode, and her mare, “Tattie,”
was a splendid creature, which always came in for a full
share of praise among those who could tell a good hunter
when they saw one. The men who ride to hounds in the
Harborough country are, as a rule, hard as nails, and as
keen and outspoken critics of a woman as of a horse. But
Claudia Nevill and “Tattie” were both pronounced first-class,
the former because she was so extremely affable with one
and all, even to the farmer’s sons who followed the hounds,
and blushed with a countryman’s awkwardness when she,
the woman of whom the papers spoke, addressed them.
There was no pride about her ladyship, and the whole
countryside, from Harborough right across to Peterborough,
declared her to be “one of the right sort.”
Of course even in the villages there were whispers that she
was very friendly with the Grand-Duke, and the usual
deductions were made from the fact that the latest foreign
star in the hunting-firmament was always riding near her.
But in the country the people are very slow to give credence
to scandal, and the gossip, though active, was not ill-
natured; besides, it had long ago been known that the
Foreign Under-Secretary was passionately attached to her.
Last season Chisholm had hunted with the Pytchley and had
been always at her side, so that the rustics, and even the
members of the hunt had come to regard him as her future

husband, and had pronounced them to be a well-matched
pair.
Late one afternoon towards the close of November the end
of a busy day was drawing near. The meet was at Althorpe
Park, Earl Spencer’s seat, and the spinneys all around the
park were drawn one after the other; but although plenty of
pretty hunting took place, the hounds did not do any good.
On drawing No-bottle Wood the greater portion of the large
field managed to get away with the pack as the hounds
raced away up wind in the direction of Harlestone. The first
fox led his pursuers over fine grass country to a copse near
Floore, where the sight of hounds in full cry, a rare
occurrence, caused considerable excitement among the
villagers. Continuing past Weedon Beck, the fugitive circled
round in the direction of Pattishall, but he was so hotly
pressed that he was obliged to take shelter in a drain near
Bugbrook, where it was decided to leave him. The second
fox, which was started from Dowsby Gorse, gave a fine run
of an hour. He travelled first to Byfield, thence across the
hilly country back to Weedon Beck, over almost the same
district as his predecessor. Near Weedon reynard had an
encounter with some terriers belonging to a rabbiting party,
but got safely away and finally beat the pack close to the
Nene.
The run had been a very fast one, but both Claudia and
Stanislas were among the few in at the finish. As many of
the hunters jogged homeward along the Daventry road, the
Grand-Duke managed to take up his position by the side of
the beautiful woman whom he so greatly admired.
Stanislas, who was an excellent rider, had left his equerry
far behind in the mad race across hedges, ditches, stubble
and ploughed land. Somewhat bespattered by mud, he sat
his horse with perfect ease and with almost imperial dignity.
To the casual observer there was nothing to distinguish him

from any of the other hunters, for in his well-worn riding-
breeches, gaiters and black coat his appearance was devoid
of that elegance which had distinguished him in London
society, and he looked more like a country squire than the
son of an emperor.
They were descending the slope towards a small hamlet of
thatched cottages, when of a sudden he drew his horse
closer to hers and, turning to her, exclaimed in English of
rather a pleasant accent:
“Madame is, I fear, fatigued—of my company?”
“Oh dear no,” she laughed, turning her fine dark eyes
mischievously towards him. “Why should I be? When you
are so self-sacrificing as to leave Muriel Mortimer to Captain
Graydon’s charge and ride with me, I surely ought not to
complain.”
“Why do you speak of Mam’zelle Mortimer?” he asked, at
once grown serious.
“Because you have been flirting with her outrageously all
day. You can’t deny it,” she declared, turning to him in her
saddle.
“I was merely pleasant to her,” he admitted. “But you
English declare that a man is a flirt if he merely extends the
most commonplace courtesies to a woman. It is so different
in other countries.”
“Yes,” she laughed. “Here, in England, woman is fortunately
respected, but it is not so on the Continent.”
“I trust that madame has not found me indiscreet,” he said
earnestly. “If I have been, I must crave forgiveness,
because I am so unused to English manners.”

“I don’t think any one need blame you for indiscretion,
providing that Muriel does not object.”
“Object? I do not follow you,” he said.
“Well, she may object to her name being bandied about as a
woman with whom you are carrying on an open flirtation.”
“You appear to blame me for common civility to her,” he
observed. “I cannot, somehow, understand madame of late.
She has so changed.”
“Yes,” she answered with a bitter smile; “I have grown older
—and wiser.”
“Wisdom always adds charm to a woman,” he replied,
endeavouring to turn her sarcasm into a compliment.
“And age commands respect,” she answered.
He laughed uneasily, for he knew well her quick and clever
repartee.
“I have been wishing to have a word with madame for a
long time,” he said, at last breaking a silence that had fallen
between them. “You have pointedly avoided me for several
weeks. Have I given you offence? If so, I beg a thousand
pardons.”
She did not answer for some time. At heart she despised
this Imperial Prince, before whom half the women in London
bowed and curtsied. She had once allowed him to pay court
to her in his fussy, foreign manner, amused and flattered
that one of his degree should find her interesting; but all
that was now of the past. In those brief moments as they
rode together along the country road in the wintry twilight,
recollections of summer days at Fernhurst came back to her,

and she hated herself. In those days she had actually
forgotten Dudley. And then she also remembered how this
man had condemned her lover: how he had urged her to
break off the acquaintance, and how he had hinted at some
secret which, when exposed, must result in Dudley’s ruin.
Those enigmatical words of his had caused her much
thought. At what had he hinted? A thousand times had she
endeavoured to discover his meaning, but had utterly failed.
If such a secret actually existed, and if its revelation could
cause the downfall of Dudley Chisholm, then it was surely
her duty to discover it and to seek its suppression. This
latter thought caused her to hesitate, and to leave unsaid
the hasty answer that had flashed into her mind.
“Well,” she said at length, “now that you have spoken
plainly, I may as well confess that I have been annoyed—
very much annoyed.”
“I regret that!” he exclaimed with quick concern. “If I have
caused madame any annoyance, I assure her it was not in
the least intentional. But tell me how I have annoyed you.”
“Oh, it was a small matter, quite a trivial one,” she said with
affected carelessness, settling her habit and glancing
furtively at the man who had declared that he held her
lover’s secret.
“But you will tell me,” he urged. “Please do. I have already
apologised.”
“Then that is sufficient,” she replied.
“No, it is not sufficient I must know my offence, to be fully
cognisant of its gravity.”

Her brows contracted slightly, but in the fading light he did
not notice the shadow of annoyance that passed across her
countenance.
“As I have told you, the offence was not a grave one,” she
declared. “I was merely annoyed, that is all.”
“Annoyed by my actions, or by my words?”
“By your words.”
“On what occasion?”
“On the last occasion you dined at my house.”
For a moment his face assumed a puzzled expression, then
in an instant the truth flashed upon him.
“Ah!” he cried; “I recollect, of course. Madame has been
offended at what I said regarding her friend, the Under-
Secretary. I can only repeat my apologies.”
“You repeat them because what you told me was untrue!”
she exclaimed, turning and looking him full in the face.
They had allowed their horses to walk, in order to be able to
converse.
“I much regret, madame, that it was true,” he replied.
“All of it?”
“All of it.”
“And there exists somewhere or other a document which
inculpates Dudley Chisholm?”
“Yes, it inculpates him very gravely, I am sorry to say.”

“Sorry! Why?”
“Well, because he is madame’s friend—her very best friend,
if report speaks the truth.” There was a sarcastic ring in his
words which she did not fail to detect, and it stung her to
fury.
“I cannot see why you should entertain the least sympathy
for my friend,” she remarked in a hard voice. “More
especially for one unknown to you.”
“Oh, we have met!” her companion said. “We met in Paris
long since on an occasion when I was travelling incognito,
and I liked him. Indeed, he was dining at the Carlton a
week ago at the next table to me.”
“And you are aware of the nature of this secret, which,
according to what you tell me, must some day or other
bring about his utter downfall?”
“Ah, no. Madame misunderstands me entirely,” he hastened
to protest. “I am not a diplomatist, nor have I any
connection, official or otherwise, with diplomacy. I merely
told you of a matter which had come to my knowledge.
Recollect, that a young man in Chisholm’s position of
responsibility must have a large number of jealous enemies.
Perhaps it will be owing to one of these that the secret will
leak out.”
“It will be used for a political purpose, you mean?”
“Exactly,” replied the Grand-Duke. “Your Government, what
with the two or three contending parties, is always at war,
as it were, and the Opposition, as you term it, may, as a
coup de grace to the Government, reveal the secret.”

“But you told me that it was a document, and that it
reposed safely in one of the Chancelleries in a foreign
capital, if I remember aright,” she said. “Now, tell me
honestly, is St. Petersburg the capital you refer to?”
“No, it is not,” he replied promptly.
“And the Embassy in London that is aware of the truth is
not in Chesham Place?”
“Most assuredly not, madame,” he replied.
“Cannot you be more explicit,” she urged. “Cannot you, if
you are my friend, as you have more than once declared
yourself to be, tell me more regarding this extraordinary
matter which is to create such a terrible scandal?”
“No, it is impossible—utterly impossible. If I could, I would
tell madame everything. But my information really carries
me no further than the bare fact that a certain Power
antagonistic to England has been able to secure a document
which must prove the ruin of the most brilliant and
promising of the younger English statesmen.”
“And have you really no idea whatever as to the nature of
the secret?”
“None.”
“From what you tell me one would almost infer that Dudley
Chisholm had been guilty of some crime. Have you no
suspicion of its nature?”
“Absolutely none,” her companion declared. “The only other
fact I know is the whereabouts of the document in question,
and that I must keep a secret, according to my solemn
promise.”

“You promised not to divulge the direction in which danger
lies?” she said suspiciously. “Why did you do so? You surely
must have had some motive!”
“I had none. The affair was mentioned to me confidentially,
and I was compelled to promise that I would give no
indication as to what person held the incriminating paper. I
told madame of its existence merely to warn her, and
perhaps to prepare her for an unwelcome revelation.”
“You refuse to tell me more?” she asked quickly, “even
though you must be aware how deeply this extraordinary
matter affects me?”
“I am compelled to refuse, madame,” he answered in the
same calm, unruffled tone. “I cannot break my word of
honour.”

Chapter Sixteen.
Suggests a Double Problem.
Fashion, as we call it, is in these decadent days at the
mercy of any millionaire pork-butcher, or any enterprising
adventurer from across the seas. Victorian literature has
declined into the “short story” and the “problem play,”
taking its heroines from among women with a past and its
heroes from the slums. In prose, in verse, and in
conversation, the favourite style is the Cockney slang of the
costermonger, the betting-ring, and the barrack canteen. Is
it not appalling that the reek of the pot-house, the music-
hall, the turf, the share-market, the thieves’ doss-house
infects our literature, our manners, our amusements, and
our ideals of life? Yet is it not the truth?
Dudley, yielding to Claudia’s persuasion, gave a large
house-party at Wroxeter during the Christmas recess. As he
was too much occupied with his public duties to be able to
arrange the affair himself, she returned from Market
Harborough and went down to Shropshire to make his
arrangements. Truth to tell, he was wearied of the nightly
discussions in the House and his daily work at the Foreign
Office, and looked forward to a brief period of relaxation
and gaiety, when he could entertain his friends. He left
everything to her, just as he had done on several previous
occasions. Very soon after his decision to ask his friends
down to the old feudal castle, Wroxeter was the scene of
much cleaning and garnishing.
Claudia, whose charm of manner was unequalled, was an
admirable hostess of striking individuality, and her own
entertainments were always brilliant successes. Royalties

came to her small parties, and every one who was any one
was seen at her receptions. She it was who decided what
guests should be asked to Wroxeter, and who sent out the
invitations; then, after seeing that all was in complete
readiness, she returned again to town. She was a born
entertainer, and never so happy as when arranging a social
function, whether it was a dinner, private theatricals, a
bazaar, or a theatre supper at the Carlton. It follows that as
regards the arrangement of Dudley’s house-party at
Wroxeter she was entirely in her element.
A paragraph crept into the papers announcing how the
popular Under-Secretary intended to spend the recess. This
was copied into hundreds of papers all over the country
with that rapidity with which the personal paragraph always
travels.
Of course the invitations were sent out in Dudley’s name,
and the fact that Claudia had arranged the whole matter
was carefully concealed. As the relict of Dick Nevill she had
a perfect right to act as hostess on Chisholm’s behalf if she
so desired, but Dudley had strenuously refused to allow
this, for people might renew their ill-natured gossip. He had
no desire to submit either Claudia or himself to a fresh
burst of scandal.
The House rose. Three days later the guests began to
assemble at Wroxeter, making the old halls echo with their
laughter in a manner in which they had not echoed for
many years. Claudia herself did not arrive until a couple of
days later, but the arrangements she had made with the
housekeeper were perfect.
The guests numbered thirty-three, nearly all of them
Dudley’s most intimate friends, including a Cabinet Minister
and a sprinkling of political notabilities. Among them were,

of course, some smart women and pretty girls; and with a
perfect round of entertainment the Christmas festival was
kept in a right royal manner, worthy the best traditions of
the Chisholms. Holly boughs and mistletoe were suspended
in the great oak-panelled hall, while a boar’s head and other
old-world dishes formed part of the fare on Christmas Day.
Outside, the weather was intensely cold, for snow had fallen
heavily and had now frozen, giving the park and the
surrounding hills quite a fairy-like appearance. It was in
every respect such a festival as we most of us desire, “an
old-fashioned Christmas.”
The Grand-Duke was in Paris, and Dudley was secretly glad
that on this account he could not be invited. But among the
guests were the portly Lady Meldrum, whose black satin
seemed a fixed part of her, her inoffensive husband, Sir
Henry, and pretty, fair-haired Muriel Mortimer. Benthall, the
Member for East Glamorganshire, was, of course, there, but
the colonel, who had been his fellow-guest for the shooting,
had gone to Cannes for the winter, in accordance with his
usual habit.
With such a party, a woman’s directing influence was, of
course, indispensable, but Claudia acted the part of hostess
in a manner so unobtrusive that no one could demur. So
skilfully planned was the whole affair that a perfect round of
gaiety was enjoyed each day, with some amusement to
attract everybody.
Compelled to be civil and affable to everybody, Dudley
somehow found himself more often in the company of
Muriel Mortimer than in that of Claudia. Whether it was that
Lady Meldrum’s ward deliberately sought his society, or
whether chance threw them together so often, he could not
decide. At any rate, he played billiards with her, danced with

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