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An Introduction to the Emerging JSON-Based Identity and Security Protocols (OWASP Vancouver edition)

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Brian Campbell

The document provides an introduction to JSON-based identity and security protocols, highlighting new frameworks like JSON Web Token (JWT), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Encryption (JWE). It discusses their components, benefits for improving interoperability, and security enhancements over older XML-based methods like SAML. The speaker, Brian Campbell, shares his professional background and contributions to the field of identity and security standards.

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An Introduction to the Emerging JSON-Based Identity and Security Protocols OWASP Vancouver 1 Brian Campbell @__b_c November 2013 Slides: http://goo.gl/cQIQSf Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
Agenda • Introductions • Backstory • Technical Overview of a few of the new(ish) JSON-Based Protocols 2 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
Brian Campbell Brian Campbell As Portfolio Architect for Ping Identity, Brian Campbell aspires to one day know what a Portfolio Architect actually does for a living. In the meantime, he's tried to make himself useful with little things like designing and building much of PingFederate, the product that put Ping Identity on the map. When not making himself useful, he contributes to various identity and security standards including a two-year stint as co-chair of the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee (SAML) and is currently contributing to OAuth and JOSE in the IETF as well as OpenID Connect. He holds a B.A., magna cum laude, in Computer Science from Amherst College in Massachusetts. Despite spending four years in the state, he has to look up how to spell "Massachusetts" every time he writes it. 3 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
4 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
That Sam-I-am! • Security Assertion Markup Language – SAML sounded better than SCML • XML-based framework that allows identity and security information to be shared across security domains • Primarily used for cross domain Web browser single sign-on • Assertion is a (usually signed, sometimes encrypted) security token – XML Digital Signatures – XML Encryption • Enterprisy Reputation • Paying my bills for nearly a decade 5 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
http://flic.kr/s/aHsjAP3nKo 6 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
SAML is DEAD! SAML 7 * http://www.linkedin.com/in/burtonian Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
WTF “SAML is dead”? I‟ve got a mortgage to pay… But I just started this job! @ian13550 @paulmadsen *Disclaimer: I work with these guys at Ping 8 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
it was the age of wisdom… * @dak3 meanwhile I‟ve got 29 years of mortgage payments remaining and kids in private school so I thought maybe I should figure out what *is* the future… 9 ** Burton actually said it but Kearns quotes him in http://blogs.kuppingercole.com/kearns/2012/07/31/the-death-and-life-of-a-protocol/ Copyright ©2013 wanted to use “Crusty Curmudgeon” and I really Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
on your deathbed, you will receive total consciousness *I did actually receive permission to use this photo Sometimes reinventing the wheel gets you something a little more round – – – – JSON Web Token JSON Web Signature JSON Web Encryption JSON Web Key JW* or JW[STEAK] 10 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
base64 vs. base64url • base64url is *almost* like base64 – Both are a means of encoding binary data in a printable ASCII string format – Each 6 bits -> 1 character (from a 64 character alphabet) – 3 bytes -> 4 characters • But base64url uses a URL safe alphabet rather than the nearly URL safe alphabet of regular base64 – – – – 62 alphanumeric characters “-” rather than “+” “_” rather than “/” Padding “=” is typically omitted • A remaining unreserved URI character: “.” – This will prove important shortly 11 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
JWS • JSON Web Signature • A way of representing content secured with a digital signature or MAC using JSON data structures and base64url encoding – Encoded segment are concatenated with a “.” • Intended for space constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers and URI query parameters • Conceptually Simple: – Header.Payload.Signature 12 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
JWS Header • JWS Header – • A bit of JSON that describes the digital signature or MAC operation applied to create the JWS Signature value Reserved Header Parameter Names – “alg”: Algorithm • • • – – – – – – – – • HMAC, RSA and ECDSA None (controversy!) Extensible “kid”: Key ID “jku”: JWK Set URL “jwk”: JSON Web Key “x5u”: X.509 URL “x5t”: X.509 Certificate Thumbprint “x5c”: X.509 Certificate Chain “typ”: Type “cty”: Content Type Header Example “I signed this thing with RSA-SHA256 using key ID of „9er‟ and you can find the corresponding public key at https://www.example.com/jwk” {"alg":"RS256", "kid":”9er", "jwk”:"https://www.example.com/jwk"} 13 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
JWS Algorithms http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-17.html 14 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
JWS Example Payload -> USA #1! base64url encoded payload -> VVNBICMxIQ Header (going to sign with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256) -> {"alg":"ES256"} base64url encoded header -> eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9 Secured Input -> eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.VVNBICMxIQ base64url encoded signature over the Secured Input -> Zi1ZJeptOMNJ7Yb-WjlVQyz8sk4GZTy-EZh4dI_8UiZOu7nKK6xjTapsLRfe7fYoKtpCcHOYo1m8DNl6hLoISw JWS Compact Serialization -> eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.VVNBICMxIQ.Zi1ZJeptOMNJ7Yb-WjlVQyz8sk4GZTy-EZh4dI_8UiZOu7nKK6xjTapsLRfe7fYoKtpCcHOYo1m8DNl6hLoISw Which you can think of sort of like: {"alg":"ES256"}.USA #1!.<SIGNATURE> 15 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
JWE • JSON Web Encryption • Similar in motivation and design to JWS but for encrypting content • A little more complicated – Headers • • • • “alg”: Algorithm (key wrap or agreement) “enc”: Encryption Method (Authenticated Encryption only) “zip”: Compression Algorithm Etc. • Five Parts Header.EncryptedKey.InitializationVector.Ciphertext.AuthenticationTag 16 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
JWE Key Management Algorithms (“alg”) 17 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved. http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-17.html
JWE Content Encryption Algorithms (“enc”) http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-17.html • Note that all of the encryption methods are AEAD algorithms 18 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
Payload/plaintext -> I actually really like Canada JWE Example Header -> {"alg":"ECDH-ES+A128KW","enc":"A128CBCHS256","epk":{"kty":"EC","x":"Y9YfiejQGZW4o47zj4q7THlRRwhSpJPvtf5oF0sOMVA","y":"DnYzBhlR 57cW4Y8_Ae2s9WRm1Ju0Pi81aLY0VkA2Gnk","crv":"P-256"}} base64url encode header -> eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYiLCJlcGsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJ4 IjoiWTlZZmllalFHWlc0bzQ3emo0cTdUSGxSUndoU3BKUHZ0ZjVvRjBzT01WQSIsInkiOiJEbll6QmhsUjU3Y1c0 WThfQWUyczlXUm0xSnUwUGk4MWFMWTBWa0EyR25rIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYifX0 Encrypted Key: ECDH-ES key agreement used to AES Key wrap a 256 bit random key which is base64url encoded -> DhHq778-jzaFU8I9i4BQOGAPi0gBWp4L8hqlaSvuwq1-eHpruLwlNg IV: base64url encoded 128 bit initialization vector -> wAnQy_IfyJd5cW3ZKYzzIg Ciphertext: AES 128 CBC plaintext is base64url encoded -> teyZQzpSBgEQtfLGduU9HlO0pZYo9ALnLHLIvPT0n8 Authentication Tag: base64url encoded left truncated SHA-256 HMAC of encoded header, IV and ciphertext -> Mlc19AsGhJBUA1J3-vojD Header.EncryptedKey.InitializationVector.Ciphertext.AuthenticationTag eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYiLCJlcGsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJ4 IjoiWTlZZmllalFHWlc0bzQ3emo0cTdUSGxSUndoU3BKUHZ0ZjVvRjBzT01WQSIsInkiOiJEbll6QmhsUjU3Y1c0 WThfQWUyczlXUm0xSnUwUGk4MWFMWTBWa0EyR25rIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYifX0. DhHq778-jzaFU8I9i4BQOGAPi0gBWp4L8hqlaSvuwq1-eHpruLwlNg. wAnQy_IfyJd5cW3ZKYzzIg. teyZQzpS-BgEQtfLGduU9HlO0pZYo9ALnLHLIvPT0n8. 19 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved. Mlc19AsGhJBUA1J3-vojD
JWT • JSON Web Token • Suggested pronunciation: "jot” • Compact URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties • JWS and/or JWE with JSON claims as the payload • JWT Claim – A piece of information asserted about a subject (or the JWT itself). – Represented name/value pairs, consisting of a Claim Name and a Claim Value (which can be any JSON object). – Reserved Claim Names 20 • • • • • • • “iss”: Issuer “sub”: Subject “aud”: Audience “exp”: Expiration Time “nbf”: Not Before “iat”: Issued At “jti”: JWT ID Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
jot or not? The Header {"kid":"5","alg":"ES256"} The Payload {"iss":"https://idp.example.com", "exp":1357255788, "aud":"https://sp.example.org", "jti":"tmYvYVU2x8LvN72B5Q_EacH._5A", "acr":"2", "sub":"Brian"} The JWT eyJraWQiOiI1IiwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYifQ.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvaWRwLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKIm V4cCI6MTM1NzI1NTc4OCwKImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOlwvXC9zcC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZyIsCiJqdGkiOiJ0bVl2WVZ VMng4THZONzJCNVFfRWFjSC5fNUEiLAoiYWNyIjoiMiIsCiJzdWIiOiJCcmlhbiJ9.SbPJIx_JSRM1wluioY0 SvfykKWK_yK4LO0BKBiESHu0GUGwikgC8iPrv8qnVkIK1aljVMXcbgYnZixZJ5UOArg The Signature [computery junk] 21 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
it‟s not the size of your token… eyJraWQiOiI1IiwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYifQ.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvaWRwLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKImV4cCI6MTM1NzI1NTc4OCwKImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOl wvXC9zcC 5leGFtcGxlLm9yZyIsCiJqdGkiOiJ0bVl2WVZVMng4THZONzJCNVFfRWFjSC5fNUEiLAoiYWNyIjoiMiIsCiJzdWIiOiJCcmlhbiJ9.SbPJIx_JSRM1wluioY0SvfykKWK_yK 4LO0BKBiESHu0GUGwikgC8iPrv8qnVkIK1aljVMXcbgYnZixZJ5UOArg <Assertion Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2013-01-03T23:34:38.546Z” ID="oPm.DxOqT3ZZi83IwuVr3x83xlr" xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion” xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> <Issuer>https://idp.example.com</Issuer> <ds:Signature> <ds:SignedInfo> <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256"/> <ds:Reference URI="#oPm.DxOqT3ZZi83IwuVr3x83xlr"> <ds:Transforms> <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/> <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> </ds:Transforms> <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> <ds:DigestValue>8JT03jjlsqBgXhStxmDhs2zlCPsgMkMTC1lIK9g7e0o=</ds:DigestValue> </ds:Reference> </ds:SignedInfo> <ds:SignatureValue>SAXf8eCmTjuhV742blyvLvVumZJ+TqiG3eMsRDUQU8RnNSspZzNJ8MOUwffkT6kvAR3BXeVzob5p08jsb99UJQ==</ds:SignatureValue> </ds:Signature> <Subject> <NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified">Brian</NameID> <SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"> <SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="2013-01-03T23:39:38.552Z" Recipient="https://sp.example.org"/> </SubjectConfirmation> </Subject> <Conditions NotOnOrAfter="2013-01-03T23:39:38.552Z" NotBefore="2013-01-03T23:29:38.552Z"> <AudienceRestriction> <Audience>https://sp.example.org</Audience> </AudienceRestriction> </Conditions> <AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2013-01-03T23:34:38.483Z" SessionIndex="oPm.DxOqT3ZZi83IwuVr3x83xlr"> <AuthnContext> <AuthnContextClassRef>2</AuthnContextClassRef> </AuthnContext> </AuthnStatement> </Assertion> 22 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
…it‟s how you use it • Simpler = Better • Web safe encoding w/ no canonicalization – Because canonicalization is a four letter word (especially when you spell it c14n) • Improved Interoperability & (hopefully) More Secure • Eliminates entire classes of attacks – – – – – – XSLT Transform DOS, Remote Code Execution, and Bypass C14N Hash Collision w/ & w/out comments Entity Expansion Attacks XPath Transform DOS and Bypass External Reference DOS Signature Wrapping Attacks* * This poor bastard was the „victim‟ in my POC of a signature wrapping vulnerability in SAML SSO for Google Apps http://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/hall-of-fame/reward/ 23 Copyright wicked smaht and Corporation. All rights reserved. Brad Hill is ©2013 Ping Identitypublished some of the attacks listed here
JSON Web Key (JWK) • JSON data structure that represents cryptographic key(s) which can be – – – – included in a JWS/JWE/JWT header saved in a file used in place of self signed certificates published at an HTTPS endpoint and referenced JWT/JWS Header {"kid":"5", "alg":"ES256"} 24 {"keys":[ {"kty":"EC", "kid":"4", "x":"LX-7aQn7RAx3jDDTioNssbODUfED_6XvZP8NsGzMlRo", "y":"dJbHEoeWzezPYuz6qjKJoRVLks7X8-BJXbewfyoJQ-A", "crv":"P-256"}, {"kty":"EC", "kid":"5", "x":"f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU", "y":"x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0", "crv":"P-256"}, {"kty":"EC", "kid":"6", "x":"J8z237wci2YJAzArSdWIj4OgrOCCfuZ18WI77jsiS00", "y":"5tTxvax8aRMMJ4unKdKsV0wcf3pOI3OG771gOa45wBU", "crv":"P-256"} Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved. ]}
JW[STEAK] in Action • Compossible, reusable and being used – – – – – OAuth OpenID Connect Mozilla Persona W3C Web Cryptography API And more… • *Approaching* finalization as RFCs – – – – – 25 three nerds holding a blurry piece of paper they tell me is some kind of award for OpenID Connect http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-12 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-17 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-17 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-17 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-17 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
JW[STEAK] Implementations • Java – • Ruby – • • Note that inclusion here does not imply endorsement of any kind (except for jose4j) and is informational in nature and intended only to show that there is widespread support for the emerging new standards https://github.com/ritou/php-Akita_JOSE .NET – 26 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/jws/0.1.0 https://github.com/rohe/pyjwkest PHP – • https://metacpan.org/module/JSON::WebToken https://github.com/kjur/jwsverify.pl https://github.com/xaicron/p5-JSON-WebToken Python – – • http://kjur.github.com/jsjws/ https://npmjs.org/package/jwt https://npmjs.org/package/green-jwt https://npmjs.org/package/jsjws Perl – – – • https://github.com/nov/json-jwt JavaScript – – – – • https://bitbucket.org/b_c/jose4j https://github.com/johnsheehan/jwt Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
JW[STEAK] implies a simple programming interface • Which is nice • The JWS and JWE examples in this presentation were created using jose4j and just a few lines of code https://bitbucket.org/b_c/jose4j in case you missed the URL on the last slide 27 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
You’ve been Introduced to some JSON-Based Identity and Security Protocols Any Questions? SAML And thanks for putting up with me for the last hour. 28 Brian Campbell @__b_c November 2013 http://goo.gl/cQIQSf Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.

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An Introduction to the Emerging JSON-Based Identity and Security Protocols (OWASP Vancouver edition)

  • 1. An Introduction to the Emerging JSON-Based Identity and Security Protocols OWASP Vancouver 1 Brian Campbell @__b_c November 2013 Slides: http://goo.gl/cQIQSf Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 2. Agenda • Introductions • Backstory • Technical Overview of a few of the new(ish) JSON-Based Protocols 2 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 3. Brian Campbell Brian Campbell As Portfolio Architect for Ping Identity, Brian Campbell aspires to one day know what a Portfolio Architect actually does for a living. In the meantime, he's tried to make himself useful with little things like designing and building much of PingFederate, the product that put Ping Identity on the map. When not making himself useful, he contributes to various identity and security standards including a two-year stint as co-chair of the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee (SAML) and is currently contributing to OAuth and JOSE in the IETF as well as OpenID Connect. He holds a B.A., magna cum laude, in Computer Science from Amherst College in Massachusetts. Despite spending four years in the state, he has to look up how to spell "Massachusetts" every time he writes it. 3 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 4. 4 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 5. That Sam-I-am! • Security Assertion Markup Language – SAML sounded better than SCML • XML-based framework that allows identity and security information to be shared across security domains • Primarily used for cross domain Web browser single sign-on • Assertion is a (usually signed, sometimes encrypted) security token – XML Digital Signatures – XML Encryption • Enterprisy Reputation • Paying my bills for nearly a decade 5 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 8. WTF “SAML is dead”? I‟ve got a mortgage to pay… But I just started this job! @ian13550 @paulmadsen *Disclaimer: I work with these guys at Ping 8 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 9. it was the age of wisdom… * @dak3 meanwhile I‟ve got 29 years of mortgage payments remaining and kids in private school so I thought maybe I should figure out what *is* the future… 9 ** Burton actually said it but Kearns quotes him in http://blogs.kuppingercole.com/kearns/2012/07/31/the-death-and-life-of-a-protocol/ Copyright ©2013 wanted to use “Crusty Curmudgeon” and I really Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 10. on your deathbed, you will receive total consciousness *I did actually receive permission to use this photo Sometimes reinventing the wheel gets you something a little more round – – – – JSON Web Token JSON Web Signature JSON Web Encryption JSON Web Key JW* or JW[STEAK] 10 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 11. base64 vs. base64url • base64url is *almost* like base64 – Both are a means of encoding binary data in a printable ASCII string format – Each 6 bits -> 1 character (from a 64 character alphabet) – 3 bytes -> 4 characters • But base64url uses a URL safe alphabet rather than the nearly URL safe alphabet of regular base64 – – – – 62 alphanumeric characters “-” rather than “+” “_” rather than “/” Padding “=” is typically omitted • A remaining unreserved URI character: “.” – This will prove important shortly 11 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 12. JWS • JSON Web Signature • A way of representing content secured with a digital signature or MAC using JSON data structures and base64url encoding – Encoded segment are concatenated with a “.” • Intended for space constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers and URI query parameters • Conceptually Simple: – Header.Payload.Signature 12 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 13. JWS Header • JWS Header – • A bit of JSON that describes the digital signature or MAC operation applied to create the JWS Signature value Reserved Header Parameter Names – “alg”: Algorithm • • • – – – – – – – – • HMAC, RSA and ECDSA None (controversy!) Extensible “kid”: Key ID “jku”: JWK Set URL “jwk”: JSON Web Key “x5u”: X.509 URL “x5t”: X.509 Certificate Thumbprint “x5c”: X.509 Certificate Chain “typ”: Type “cty”: Content Type Header Example “I signed this thing with RSA-SHA256 using key ID of „9er‟ and you can find the corresponding public key at https://www.example.com/jwk” {"alg":"RS256", "kid":”9er", "jwk”:"https://www.example.com/jwk"} 13 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 15. JWS Example Payload -> USA #1! base64url encoded payload -> VVNBICMxIQ Header (going to sign with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256) -> {"alg":"ES256"} base64url encoded header -> eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9 Secured Input -> eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.VVNBICMxIQ base64url encoded signature over the Secured Input -> Zi1ZJeptOMNJ7Yb-WjlVQyz8sk4GZTy-EZh4dI_8UiZOu7nKK6xjTapsLRfe7fYoKtpCcHOYo1m8DNl6hLoISw JWS Compact Serialization -> eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.VVNBICMxIQ.Zi1ZJeptOMNJ7Yb-WjlVQyz8sk4GZTy-EZh4dI_8UiZOu7nKK6xjTapsLRfe7fYoKtpCcHOYo1m8DNl6hLoISw Which you can think of sort of like: {"alg":"ES256"}.USA #1!.<SIGNATURE> 15 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 16. JWE • JSON Web Encryption • Similar in motivation and design to JWS but for encrypting content • A little more complicated – Headers • • • • “alg”: Algorithm (key wrap or agreement) “enc”: Encryption Method (Authenticated Encryption only) “zip”: Compression Algorithm Etc. • Five Parts Header.EncryptedKey.InitializationVector.Ciphertext.AuthenticationTag 16 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 17. JWE Key Management Algorithms (“alg”) 17 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved. http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-17.html
  • 18. JWE Content Encryption Algorithms (“enc”) http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-17.html • Note that all of the encryption methods are AEAD algorithms 18 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 19. Payload/plaintext -> I actually really like Canada JWE Example Header -> {"alg":"ECDH-ES+A128KW","enc":"A128CBCHS256","epk":{"kty":"EC","x":"Y9YfiejQGZW4o47zj4q7THlRRwhSpJPvtf5oF0sOMVA","y":"DnYzBhlR 57cW4Y8_Ae2s9WRm1Ju0Pi81aLY0VkA2Gnk","crv":"P-256"}} base64url encode header -> eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYiLCJlcGsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJ4 IjoiWTlZZmllalFHWlc0bzQ3emo0cTdUSGxSUndoU3BKUHZ0ZjVvRjBzT01WQSIsInkiOiJEbll6QmhsUjU3Y1c0 WThfQWUyczlXUm0xSnUwUGk4MWFMWTBWa0EyR25rIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYifX0 Encrypted Key: ECDH-ES key agreement used to AES Key wrap a 256 bit random key which is base64url encoded -> DhHq778-jzaFU8I9i4BQOGAPi0gBWp4L8hqlaSvuwq1-eHpruLwlNg IV: base64url encoded 128 bit initialization vector -> wAnQy_IfyJd5cW3ZKYzzIg Ciphertext: AES 128 CBC plaintext is base64url encoded -> teyZQzpSBgEQtfLGduU9HlO0pZYo9ALnLHLIvPT0n8 Authentication Tag: base64url encoded left truncated SHA-256 HMAC of encoded header, IV and ciphertext -> Mlc19AsGhJBUA1J3-vojD Header.EncryptedKey.InitializationVector.Ciphertext.AuthenticationTag eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYiLCJlcGsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJ4 IjoiWTlZZmllalFHWlc0bzQ3emo0cTdUSGxSUndoU3BKUHZ0ZjVvRjBzT01WQSIsInkiOiJEbll6QmhsUjU3Y1c0 WThfQWUyczlXUm0xSnUwUGk4MWFMWTBWa0EyR25rIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYifX0. DhHq778-jzaFU8I9i4BQOGAPi0gBWp4L8hqlaSvuwq1-eHpruLwlNg. wAnQy_IfyJd5cW3ZKYzzIg. teyZQzpS-BgEQtfLGduU9HlO0pZYo9ALnLHLIvPT0n8. 19 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved. Mlc19AsGhJBUA1J3-vojD
  • 20. JWT • JSON Web Token • Suggested pronunciation: "jot” • Compact URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties • JWS and/or JWE with JSON claims as the payload • JWT Claim – A piece of information asserted about a subject (or the JWT itself). – Represented name/value pairs, consisting of a Claim Name and a Claim Value (which can be any JSON object). – Reserved Claim Names 20 • • • • • • • “iss”: Issuer “sub”: Subject “aud”: Audience “exp”: Expiration Time “nbf”: Not Before “iat”: Issued At “jti”: JWT ID Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 21. jot or not? The Header {"kid":"5","alg":"ES256"} The Payload {"iss":"https://idp.example.com", "exp":1357255788, "aud":"https://sp.example.org", "jti":"tmYvYVU2x8LvN72B5Q_EacH._5A", "acr":"2", "sub":"Brian"} The JWT eyJraWQiOiI1IiwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYifQ.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvaWRwLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKIm V4cCI6MTM1NzI1NTc4OCwKImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOlwvXC9zcC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZyIsCiJqdGkiOiJ0bVl2WVZ VMng4THZONzJCNVFfRWFjSC5fNUEiLAoiYWNyIjoiMiIsCiJzdWIiOiJCcmlhbiJ9.SbPJIx_JSRM1wluioY0 SvfykKWK_yK4LO0BKBiESHu0GUGwikgC8iPrv8qnVkIK1aljVMXcbgYnZixZJ5UOArg The Signature [computery junk] 21 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 22. it‟s not the size of your token… eyJraWQiOiI1IiwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYifQ.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvaWRwLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKImV4cCI6MTM1NzI1NTc4OCwKImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOl wvXC9zcC 5leGFtcGxlLm9yZyIsCiJqdGkiOiJ0bVl2WVZVMng4THZONzJCNVFfRWFjSC5fNUEiLAoiYWNyIjoiMiIsCiJzdWIiOiJCcmlhbiJ9.SbPJIx_JSRM1wluioY0SvfykKWK_yK 4LO0BKBiESHu0GUGwikgC8iPrv8qnVkIK1aljVMXcbgYnZixZJ5UOArg <Assertion Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2013-01-03T23:34:38.546Z” ID="oPm.DxOqT3ZZi83IwuVr3x83xlr" xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion” xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> <Issuer>https://idp.example.com</Issuer> <ds:Signature> <ds:SignedInfo> <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256"/> <ds:Reference URI="#oPm.DxOqT3ZZi83IwuVr3x83xlr"> <ds:Transforms> <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/> <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> </ds:Transforms> <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> <ds:DigestValue>8JT03jjlsqBgXhStxmDhs2zlCPsgMkMTC1lIK9g7e0o=</ds:DigestValue> </ds:Reference> </ds:SignedInfo> <ds:SignatureValue>SAXf8eCmTjuhV742blyvLvVumZJ+TqiG3eMsRDUQU8RnNSspZzNJ8MOUwffkT6kvAR3BXeVzob5p08jsb99UJQ==</ds:SignatureValue> </ds:Signature> <Subject> <NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified">Brian</NameID> <SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"> <SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="2013-01-03T23:39:38.552Z" Recipient="https://sp.example.org"/> </SubjectConfirmation> </Subject> <Conditions NotOnOrAfter="2013-01-03T23:39:38.552Z" NotBefore="2013-01-03T23:29:38.552Z"> <AudienceRestriction> <Audience>https://sp.example.org</Audience> </AudienceRestriction> </Conditions> <AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2013-01-03T23:34:38.483Z" SessionIndex="oPm.DxOqT3ZZi83IwuVr3x83xlr"> <AuthnContext> <AuthnContextClassRef>2</AuthnContextClassRef> </AuthnContext> </AuthnStatement> </Assertion> 22 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 23. …it‟s how you use it • Simpler = Better • Web safe encoding w/ no canonicalization – Because canonicalization is a four letter word (especially when you spell it c14n) • Improved Interoperability & (hopefully) More Secure • Eliminates entire classes of attacks – – – – – – XSLT Transform DOS, Remote Code Execution, and Bypass C14N Hash Collision w/ & w/out comments Entity Expansion Attacks XPath Transform DOS and Bypass External Reference DOS Signature Wrapping Attacks* * This poor bastard was the „victim‟ in my POC of a signature wrapping vulnerability in SAML SSO for Google Apps http://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/hall-of-fame/reward/ 23 Copyright wicked smaht and Corporation. All rights reserved. Brad Hill is ©2013 Ping Identitypublished some of the attacks listed here
  • 24. JSON Web Key (JWK) • JSON data structure that represents cryptographic key(s) which can be – – – – included in a JWS/JWE/JWT header saved in a file used in place of self signed certificates published at an HTTPS endpoint and referenced JWT/JWS Header {"kid":"5", "alg":"ES256"} 24 {"keys":[ {"kty":"EC", "kid":"4", "x":"LX-7aQn7RAx3jDDTioNssbODUfED_6XvZP8NsGzMlRo", "y":"dJbHEoeWzezPYuz6qjKJoRVLks7X8-BJXbewfyoJQ-A", "crv":"P-256"}, {"kty":"EC", "kid":"5", "x":"f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU", "y":"x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0", "crv":"P-256"}, {"kty":"EC", "kid":"6", "x":"J8z237wci2YJAzArSdWIj4OgrOCCfuZ18WI77jsiS00", "y":"5tTxvax8aRMMJ4unKdKsV0wcf3pOI3OG771gOa45wBU", "crv":"P-256"} Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved. ]}
  • 25. JW[STEAK] in Action • Compossible, reusable and being used – – – – – OAuth OpenID Connect Mozilla Persona W3C Web Cryptography API And more… • *Approaching* finalization as RFCs – – – – – 25 three nerds holding a blurry piece of paper they tell me is some kind of award for OpenID Connect http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-12 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-17 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-17 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-17 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-17 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 26. JW[STEAK] Implementations • Java – • Ruby – • • Note that inclusion here does not imply endorsement of any kind (except for jose4j) and is informational in nature and intended only to show that there is widespread support for the emerging new standards https://github.com/ritou/php-Akita_JOSE .NET – 26 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/jws/0.1.0 https://github.com/rohe/pyjwkest PHP – • https://metacpan.org/module/JSON::WebToken https://github.com/kjur/jwsverify.pl https://github.com/xaicron/p5-JSON-WebToken Python – – • http://kjur.github.com/jsjws/ https://npmjs.org/package/jwt https://npmjs.org/package/green-jwt https://npmjs.org/package/jsjws Perl – – – • https://github.com/nov/json-jwt JavaScript – – – – • https://bitbucket.org/b_c/jose4j https://github.com/johnsheehan/jwt Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 27. JW[STEAK] implies a simple programming interface • Which is nice • The JWS and JWE examples in this presentation were created using jose4j and just a few lines of code https://bitbucket.org/b_c/jose4j in case you missed the URL on the last slide 27 Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • 28. You’ve been Introduced to some JSON-Based Identity and Security Protocols Any Questions? SAML And thanks for putting up with me for the last hour. 28 Brian Campbell @__b_c November 2013 http://goo.gl/cQIQSf Copyright ©2013 Ping Identity Corporation. All rights reserved.