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Patterns of Economic Growth of the Brazilian Economy 1970- 
2006: demand led growth under balance of payments constraint 
An outline of the paper 
Fabio N. P. de Freitas1 and Esther Dweck2 
Abstract 
The paper analyses the patterns of economic growth that characterized the huge decline 
of the Brazilian trend GDP growth rate in the period between 1970 and 2006. The analysis is 
based on an analytical framework that combines the classical supermultiplier demand led 
growth model with the hypothesis that the balance of payments is the main potential (and 
often the effective) constraint to the expansion of the Brazilian economy in the period under 
consideration. From this perspective, the proximate causes of the decline of the GDP growth 
trend are the following. First, we have the relatively low growth rate of the domestic 
components of final demand which combined, with its high weight in total final demand 
explains the low contribution of this type of expenditure to the GDP growth rate since the 
1980s. Secondly, the external sector contribution to GDP growth was both very unstable and, 
whenever its contribution was relatively high, it could not sustain the relatively high GDP 
growth rates of 1970s. These patterns of demand led growth are quantitatively investigated 
with the application of a demand led growth accounting methodology which allows us to 
analyze the expansion patterns of a set of periods between 1970 and 2006. In what concerns 
the more fundamental causes, the paper points out to the relevance of: (a) the changing 
patterns of commercial and financial external insertion of the Brazilian economy; (b) the 
worsening of the income distribution conditions associated with the trend decline in the wage 
share, the high percentage of the population still below the poverty line and the high 
inequality in personal income distribution; and (c) the macroeconomic policy regimes, in 
particular from 1999 on with the adoption of the policy mix combining inflation targeting, large 
primary government budget surplus and floating (but very much managed) exchange rates. 
1 Professor of Economics, Institute of Economics, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Address: 
Instituto de Economia – UFRJ, Av. Pasteur, 250, Urca – Rio de Janeiro – RJ, 22.290-240. Tel.: 55 21 3873- 
5242. Fax.: 55 21 2541-8148. E-mail: fabio@ie.ufrj.br. 
2 Professor of Economics, Institute of Economics, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Address: 
Instituto de Economia – UFRJ, Av. Pasteur, 250, Urca – Rio de Janeiro – RJ, 22.290-240. Tel.: 55 21 3873- 
5242. Fax.: 55 21 2541-8148. E-mail: edweck@ie.ufrj.br.
1. Introduction 
2. The Brazilian Economic Growth Experience in Perspective 
The Brazilian economy was one of the fastest growing economies in the 20th century. From 
the early 1900’s until the end of the 2nd world war it experimented a relatively high average 
growth rate (3,8% per year approximately), but was also confronted by a huge instability, an 
important feature of the primary export pattern of development that characterized the period. 
The Brazilian economy has performed particularly well from the start of the State led 
industrialization process after the end of the 2nd world war until the Latin America crises in the 
1980’s. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 1 below, in this period the Brazilian economy has 
grown at an average rate of 6,8% per year, with the higher growth rates registered in the 
second half of the 1950s and in the 1970s as a whole. 
Figure 1 – Brazilian long term real growth rates 
15,0% 
10,0% 
5,0% 
0,0% 
-5,0% 
-10,0% 
1 9 0 0 
1 9 0 2 
1 9 0 4 
1 9 0 6 
1 9 0 8 
1 9 1 0 
1 9 1 2 
1 9 1 4 
1 9 1 6 
1 9 1 8 
1 9 2 0 
1 9 2 2 
1 9 2 4 
1 9 2 6 
1 9 2 8 
1 9 3 0 
1 9 3 2 
1 9 3 4 
1 9 3 6 
1 9 3 8 
1 9 4 0 
1 9 4 2 
1 9 4 4 
1 9 4 6 
1 9 4 8 
1 9 5 0 
1 9 5 2 
1 9 5 4 1 9 5 6 
1 9 5 8 
1 9 6 0 
1 9 6 2 
1 9 6 4 
1 9 6 6 
1 9 6 8 
1 9 7 0 
1 9 7 2 
1 9 7 4 
1 9 7 6 
1 9 7 8 
1 9 8 0 
1 9 8 2 
1 9 8 4 
1 9 8 6 
1 9 8 8 
1 9 9 0 
1 9 9 2 
1 9 9 4 
1 9 9 6 
1 9 9 8 
2 0 0 0 
2 0 0 2 
2 0 0 4 
2 0 0 6 
2 0 0 8 
GDP Growth Period Trend Growth Polinomial GDP Growth Trend 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data available in Maddison (2010). 
The worst period in terms of growth performance was the prolonged stagnation of the 
1980’s and 1990’s (with an average growth rate of 2% per year). It started in the beginning of 
the 1980’s with the Latin America crises and was maintained in the period of intensive liberal 
reforms of the 1990’s. In the new millennium, the Brazilian economy has presented higher 
growth rates (with an average rate of growth of 3,3% per year), in line with the better 
performance of the world economy (see Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. 
below). However, it should be remarked that the growth acceleration has not been able to
recover even the average growth rates that prevailed in the primary export period in the 
beginning of the last century. 
We can also compare the Brazilian growth performance with that of other reference 
countries. First, let us make a comparison of the levels of Per Capita GDP of Brazil, Republic of 
Korea (South Korea) and the United States of America. The US economy is our benchmark 
country for the convergence analysis. We also include South Korea in our analysis in order to 
make a contrast between Brazil and a successful economy of the Asian periphery. 
Figure 2 - Per capita GDP levels (logarithmic scale) 
11 
10,5 
10 
9,5 
9 
8,5 
8 
7,5 
7 
6,5 
6 
1 9 5 0 
1 9 5 2 
1 9 5 4 
1 9 5 6 
1 9 5 8 
1 9 6 0 
1 9 6 2 
1 9 6 4 
1 9 6 6 
1 9 6 8 
1 9 7 0 
1 9 7 2 
1 9 7 4 
1 9 7 6 
1 9 7 8 
1 9 8 0 
1 9 8 2 
1 9 8 4 
1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 
1 9 9 0 
1 9 9 2 
1 9 9 4 
1 9 9 6 
1 9 9 8 
2 0 0 0 
2 0 0 2 
2 0 0 4 
2 0 0 6 
2 0 0 8 
Brazil Korea US 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data available in Maddison, A. (2010). 
Table 1 - Relative per capita GDP (% of US per capita GDP 
Year Brazil South Korea 
1950 17,5 8,9 
1980 28,0 22,1 
2000 19,4 50,5 
2008 20,6 62,9 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data available in Maddison (2010). 
From Figure 2 and Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. we can observe that 
both, Brazil and South Korea, engaged in a process of catching-up with the US economy until
the 1980’s. Starting from relative shares of US per capita GDP of, respectively, 17,5% and 8,9% 
in 1950, Brazil and South Korea achieved relative shares of respectively 28,0% and 22,1% in 
1980. From then on the Brazilian convergence process was interrupted by the Latin America 
crises and Brazil has lagged behind until the beginning of the new millennium. Indeed, after 
two decades of stagnation the Brazilian economy ended the 1990’s with a relative share of 
19,4% and after thatit presented only a slight recover, achieving 20,6% of US per capita GDP in 
2008. In contrast, South Korea managed to continue its convergence process only briefly 
interrupted by the Asian Crisis, reaching a relative share of 62,9% in 2008. 
Table 2 - Average Real GDP Growth Rates (% per year) 
Periods Brazil South Korea US World 
1950-1980 6,8 7,5 3,6 4,5 
1980-2000 2,0 7,5 3,2 3,0 
2000-2008 3,3 4,4 2,1 4,2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data available in Maddison (2010). 
Another revealing comparison can be done between the economic growth experience of 
Brazil, South Korea, United Sates of America and the World economy. Indeed, we can observe 
in Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. the same pattern of convergence and 
divergence discussed above in terms of per capita GDP levels. Additionally, we can see that the 
Brazilian economy only attained a higher growth rate than the world economy in the State led 
development period between 1950 and 1980, while South Korea was able to maintain its 
expansion rate higher than the world economy for the whole period (i.e., 1950-2008). 
The above discussion gives us the background subjacent to our main subject of analysis. It 
shows that in the period covered by our paper the Brazilian economy experienced its highest 
growth rates in the 1970’s, from which it followed a lasting stagnation period in the 1980’s and 
1990’s, and, finally, a slight acceleration of GDP growth rates in the end of the whole period. 
Hence, two important background questions drive our investigation. First, and more 
important, is to understand what caused the decline in the trend growth rates of the Brazilian 
economy observed in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Second, relates to what are the factors behind 
the later increase of the Brazilian economy expansion rates. In what follows we will try to 
answer these questions. It should be highlighted that our answer to the last question will be 
admittedly more tentative, since it refers to a shorter and very recent period, which hampers 
the evaluation. 
3. The Analytical Framework 
The above questions, in particular, the first one have been the subject of important 
debates concerning the interpretation of the Brazilian growth experience. More recently, the 
literature explaining the huge decline in the Brazilian growth rates has been influenced by the 
neoclassical economic theory. According to this standpoint, the price system is supposed to 
convey information on the relative scarcity of resources that is transmitted to consumers and
producers and govern their choices in the direction of the full utilization of the available 
resources. Hence, the long term economic growth should be characterized as a supply-constrained 
process, whose rate of expansion would depend on the growth of capital and 
labor inputs available to the economy and also on the growth of the efficiency on the 
utilization of these inputs. Therefore, according to this interpretative literature, the causes of 
the decline of the trend GDP growth rate of the Brazilian economy would be: the low domestic 
savings rate, the low investment in human capital, and the low (or even negative) growth rate 
of total factor productivity. These proximate causes have been evaluated quantitatively by the 
use of a growth accounting supply-side empirical methodology, inspired by neoclassical growth 
theory. Furthermore, the referred literature also tries to indentify the more fundamental 
causes responsible for the decline of the Brazilian GDP growth trend. In this aspect, it has been 
suggested that the poor growth performance of the Brazilian economy since the 1980s is 
explained by the “market-unfriendly” institutions and the pervasive market (and government) 
imperfections inherited from the post war State that induced an inward oriented development 
strategy. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the usual neoclassical viewpoint, the Brazilian economy has not 
been normally constrained by the availability of resources in general and labor in particular. As 
occurs in many developing economies, the Brazilian economy is characterized by a high degree 
of structural heterogeneity and by the existence of significant labor surplus. One type of 
quantitative expression of this kind of heterogeneity is the great disparity in the observed 
levels of labor productivity between economic activities. 
Table 3 - Relative Productivity, Employment Structure and Labor Productivity 
Growth by sector 
Variable 
Sector 
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing 
Mining and Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Public Utilities 
Construction 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade, Hotels and 
Restaurants 
Transport, Storage, and 
Communication 
Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate 
Community, Social and 
Personal Services (including 
Government Services) 
Sectoral Sum 
1970 19 269 180 133 142 83 99 460 164 100 
1980 17 205 190 250 138 69 141 357 110 100 
1990 28 372 143 470 135 41 132 377 95 100 
2000 37 646 166 1010 141 36 122 267 92 100 
2005 45 620 167 888 134 33 119 251 88 100 
1970 48% 1% 14% 1% 6% 10% 3% 4% 13% 100% 
1980 37% 1% 14% 1% 9% 11% 3% 6% 19% 100% 
1990 25% 1% 16% 1% 7% 17% 4% 7% 24% 100% 
2000 21% 0% 13% 0% 6% 20% 4% 7% 29% 100% 
2005 19% 0% 13% 0% 6% 21% 4% 7% 29% 100% 
1970-1980 3,4% 2,0% 5,4% 11,7% 4,5% 2,9% 8,6% 2,2% 0,7% 4,8% 
1980-1990 3,0% 4,1% -4,7% 4,4% -2,1% -6,9% -2,6% -1,4% -3,3% -1,9% 
1990-2000 4,0% 6,7% 2,5% 9,0% 1,4% -0,4% 0,2% -2,5% 0,6% 1,0% 
2000-2005 4,1% -0,7% 0,2% -2,4% -0,9% -1,8% -0,5% -1,0% -0,6% 0,1% 
Source : Author's calculations based on data available in Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10-sector database, June 2007, 
http://www.ggdc.net/, de Vries and Timmer (2007) 
Relative 
Sectoral Labor 
Productivity 
levels 
Sectoral 
Employment 
Structure 
Sectoral Labor 
Productivity 
growth 
From Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., we can see that the sectoral labor 
productivity levels show a high degree of divergence in the whole period. In the 1970’s the low 
relative productivity of the sector “agriculture, forestry and fishing” is an indicator of the 
existence of a labor surplus in this sector. As the growth and development process occurred,
the labor productivity in the sector under discussion increased at a rate above the average rate 
of growth of productivity in the economy and, concomitantly, the employment share of the 
sector has declined. Yet, in the same period, due to the fast urbanization, the employment 
share of the sectors “wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants” and “community, 
social and personal services” has increased and their labor productivity has grown at a rate 
lower than the average rate of growth of productivity in the economy. Note that, in contrast 
with the former movement, this second movement has contributed to the increase in the 
structural heterogeneity. So the process of industrialization cum urbanization of the Brazilian 
economy has been characterized by the reduction of the labor surplus in primary activities 
alongside to its increase in the low productive and low paid service activities localized in the 
urban centers, most of it in an informal situation. In sum, the industrialization process was not 
capable to produce a decline in the degree of structural heterogeneity and to eliminate the 
existence of surplus labor in the Brazilian economy. Hence, the idea that the Brazilian economy 
can be characterized by generalized labor force constraint in its growth trajectory seems to be 
very implausible one. 
Figure 3 –Labor Productivity and GDP Growth Rates 
15,0% 
10,0% 
5,0% 
0,0% 
-5,0% 
-10,0% 
1 9 5 1 
1 9 5 3 
1 9 5 5 
1 9 5 7 
1 9 5 9 
1 9 6 1 
1 9 6 3 
1 9 6 5 
1 9 6 7 
1 9 6 9 
1 9 7 1 
1 9 7 3 
1 9 7 5 
1 9 7 7 
1 9 7 9 
1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 
1 9 8 5 
1 9 8 7 
1 9 8 9 
1 9 9 1 
1 9 9 3 
1 9 9 5 
1 9 9 7 
1 9 9 9 
2 0 0 1 
2 0 0 3 
2 0 0 5 
2 0 0 7 
2 0 0 9 
Labour Productivity Growth GDP Growth Labor Productivity Growth Trend GDP Growth Trend 
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, September 2010, http://www.conference-board. 
org/data/economydatabase/ 
The conclusion reached above is also reinforced by the observed behavior of labor 
productivity growth in relation to the GDP growth path. In fact, as we can see in Figure 3 
above, the two economic series present a similar behavior and move normally in the same 
direction. According to neoclassical standpoint this observation could be explained by 
supposing that the behavior of the labor productivity growth rate would govern the behavior 
of the GDP growth rate. Certainly, assuming almost continuous full employment, movements
in the former would generate movements in the same direction of the latter. But once we 
admit that the labor constraint is not effective, this type of explanation completely loses 
itspower . Therefore, an alternative explanation should be offered. A possible candidate is 
provided by the type of hypothesis subjacent to the so called “Kaldor-Verdoorn Law” 
literature. The latter empirical regularity suggests that it is the behavior of the GDP growth 
that would cause the labor productivity growth movements. This would be the case because of 
the existence of static and dynamic economies of scale associated to the process of economic 
growth. 
Consequently, conceiving economic expansion as a demand led process, an acceleration of 
the demand induced growth rate would trigger an acceleration of the labor productivity 
growth, attenuating the impact of the faster growth pace on labor requirements and vice-versa. 
Normally, the inducement under analysis is not strong enough to prevent the GDP 
growth rate to be positively related with the employment growth rate. It only implies that the 
output-elasticity of employment assumes values in the interval between zero and one. So the 
conclusion that emerges from our discussion is that the availability of labor force has not been 
an effective constraint for the long term expansion of the Brazilian economy. 
3.1. Theoretical background 
The main interpretative hypothesis subjacent to this paper is that the economic expansion 
of the Brazilian economy in the period analyzed can be conceived as a demand led growth 
process subject to a balance of payments constraint. From the theoretical standpoint our 
analytical framework is based on the classical (or sraffian) supermultiplier demand led growth 
model proposed by Serrano (1995 and 1996). We use a simplified small open economy version 
of the model as our reference (see the appendix for a presentation of the basic equations and 
variables involved in the model). Here we will briefly discuss the main hypothesis and 
implications of the model. 
Let us start from the equilibrium condition between aggregate supply and demand. With 
the maximum number of components of the demand side allowed by our database we obtain.3 
Now, assume that imports are related to total aggregate demand as expressed by the 
equation below 
Next, let us further assume that non-durable household consumption and private 
enterprise investment are induced: 
3 In the appendix it can be found a list of symbols and its respective meanings.
and that the remaining aggregate demand components are autonomous: 
According to the supemultiplier model the induced component of aggregate consumption 
is related to the purchasing power introduced in the economy by production decisions, 
normally associated with the wage bill generated by such decisions. So, one of the main 
determinants of the propensity to consume (c) is the wage share in aggregate income. In what 
concerns investments, the above equations captures the influence of the level of activity on 
investment expenditures realized by private enterprises. The propensity to invest (h) is 
considered an endogenous variable in the classical supermultiplier model. According to latter, 
the behavior of h would be explained by the deviations between the realized capacity output 
utilization rate and the normal capacity utilization rate. The process of capitalist competition 
would induce an increase of h whenever we have a positive deviation and vice-versa. This 
would produce a tendency for the adjustment of productive capacity in relation to aggregate 
demand. As a result the model predicts a tendency to gravitate around a position of normal 
capacity utilization. Furthermore, the model predicts also that h would be positively related to 
the GDP growth rate. 
Yet, substituting the above relations on the first two equations we obtain 
Solving the equation for the equilibrium level of the GDP we reach the following result 
Hence according to the supermultiplier the behavior of the GDP would be explained by 
the behavior of the supermultiplier ( ) and of the total autonomous expenditures (Z). In fact, 
the model predicts that the GDP trend rate of growth is governed by the pace o the expansion 
of the autonomous expenditures. This is so because although the variables involved in the 
supermultiplier formula can change, they are limited in their range of variation. 
3.2. Empirical methodology 
4. Results 
4.1. An assessment of the whole period
From the theoretical background discussed above we pointed out the main variables that 
influence the performance of the GDP. The way each one of them contributes to the total 
growth may change through time, and it is possible to identify different patterns of growth 
associated to difference in the importance of each component. In order to identify these 
patterns one can isolate the behavior of each component indicating which of them was more 
important at each period, by a method of decomposition analysis. 
Before discussing each period separately, it is interesting to analyze the entire period as 
whole, in order to capture the main drivers of growth. In the following sections, we will discuss 
each period trying to indicate the causes of the main changes in the patterns and, therefore, 
addressing the two questions presented above. 
As can be seen in Table 4, the annual average growth rate of the Brazilian economy during 
the period of 1970 to 2006 was around 4%, mainly driven by the autonomous expenditures, 
whose contribution to the average growth as more than 100%. The supermutiplier, on the 
other hand, had a negative impact due to a decrease in its 3 components, the domestic 
content coefficient, the propensity to consume and the propensity to invest. Among the 
autonomous expenditures, government consumption was the main driver, contributing to 
almost 45% of its total contribution. 
Before going further it is important to explain in a little bit more details how to read Table 
4, since the main will be shown in tables like this one in the following sections. On the first 
column we have each of the demand components described above. The result for each of 
them is presented in the sixth column and they can be added up to the total growth rate, 
shown in the last cell of this column. These components can be aggregated in two different 
forms. First, as shown by columns 2nd-5th, we can aggregate them among domestic or external 
sector components, separating the domestic sector on public and private contributions. In the 
last line of these columns we can see that the domestic public sector was the main driver, 
followed by the external sector. The small contribution of the private sector is related to the 
nature of most of its components. As can be seen in the second form of aggregation, columns 
7th-9th, both private sector investment and non-durable consumption affect GDP growth only 
through their impact on the supermultiplier. On the other hand, all of the public sector 
components affect directly the GDP, since they are autonomous expenditures.
Table 4 – Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1970 – 2006) 
Domestic Sector External 
Public Private 
Supermulti 
plier 
Expenditures 
Sector 
Inventory 
change 
Total 
Autonomous 
Expenditures 
Gov Consumption 1.81% 1.81% 1.81% 
Gov Investment 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 
SOE Investment -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 
HH Res Investment 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 
HH Durables Cons. 0.46% 0.46% 0.46% 
HH Non-Durables Cons. -0.14% -0.14% -0.14% 
PE Investment -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% 
Domestic Content Coeff. -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% 
Exports 1.37% 1.37% 1.37% 
Inventory 
change 
Inventory change 0.18% 0.18% 0.18% 
Total 1.95% 0.65% 1.26% 0.18% 4.04% 4.13% -0.27% 0.18% 
4.2. Abundant international liquidity and high growth: 
1970-1980 
The golden age of the Brazilian economy culminated with a very fast growth in the late 
1960s and beginning of the 70s. The period from 1968-1973 is called the Brazilian miracle with 
an average growth rate higher than 10%. After the first Oil shock there was a slowdown on 
growth, but even so, the average growth rate of the 1970s was more than 8%. This last boom 
of the economy consolidated the structural transformation that started after the second World 
War and ended at the beginning of the 1980s. 
We divided the 1970s in two periods, from 1970 – 1975, shown in Table 5, and 1976-1980, 
in Table 6. This division is due to data availability and is not the best one for the period, ideally 
the breaking point should be in 1973, however, the only data source for dividing the household 
consumption into durable and non-durable were the input-output matrices that were available 
for every five years since 1970. 
Contrasting with the average of the whole period, in the 1970s the private sector had a 
much greater influence, and in the second half of the decade was the most important 
component. Household durable consumption had a major role, however, it is important to 
highlight that both propensity to consume and investment rate also had an important role 
increasing the multiplier. In the first half, their impact was more than compensated by an 
decrease on the domestic content coefficient. As highlighted by Tavares (1972), the decrease 
in the domestic content coefficient is an important by-product of the process of import 
substitution, by which the country changes its imports structure. Usually there is a change
from importing simple consumption goods to more sophisticated intermediate and capital 
goods. 
After the First oil shock the Brazilian government decided to implement a large 
industrialization plan (Second National Develpoment Plan) that started in 1974 focusing on 
these more sophisticated sectors and, specially, energy. Most of these 
Table 5 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1970 – 1975) 
Domestic Sector External 
Public Private 
Expenditures 
Sector 
Inventory 
change 
Total 
Autonomous 
Expenditure 
s 
Supermulti 
pler 
Inventory 
change 
Gov Consumption 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 
Gov Investment 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
SOE Investment 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 
HH Res Invest 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 
HH Durables Cons. 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 
HH Non-Durables Cons. 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
PE Investment 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 
Domestic Content Coeff. -1.5% -1.5% -1.5% 
Exports 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 
Inventory change 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 
Total 4.9% 3.6% 0.4% 1.1% 10.1% 9.2% -0.3% 1.1% 
Table 6- Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1976 – 1980) 
Domestic Sector External 
Public Private 
Expenditures 
Sector 
Inventory 
change 
Total 
Autonomous 
Expenditures 
Supermulti 
plier 
Inventory 
change 
Gov Consumption 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 
Gov Investment -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 
SOE Investment 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 
HH Res Invest 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 
HH Durables Cons. 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 
HH Non-Durables Cons. 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 
PE Investment 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Domestic Content Coeff. -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 
Exports 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 
Inventory change -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% 
Total 1.8% 3.7% 2.5% -0.7% 7.2% 7.0% 1.0% -0.7%
Figure 1 – Balance o Payments Accounts as a percentage of Exports 
150% 
100% 
50% 
0% 
-50% 
-100% 
-150% 
BP Accounts (% Exports) 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
BP Current Account Balance (% exports) BP Financial Account (% exports) BP Overall Balance (% exports) 
4.3. “Hard landing”, high inflation and low growth: 1981- 
1993 
The 1980s in Brazil started with the aftermath of second oil shock that were shot up by 
the Mexican default in 1982. The debt crises that followed were caused by a complete stop of 
the capital inflows. As a result of the huge balance of payments constraint faced by the 
brazilian economy in the period we have the relatively low growth rate of the domestic 
components of final demand which combined, with its high weight in total final demand 
explains the low contribution of this type of expenditure to the GDP growth rate since the 
1980s. In particular the low contribution of domestic demand is explained by the relatively low 
trend growth of government expenditures since the 1980s. On the other hand, we have the 
external sector becoming the major contributor to economic growth in the period under 
analysis. This occurs both, by the relatively higher contribution of exports and by the increase 
in the domestic content coefficient. The pattern of economic growth in the period is 
dominated by the necessity of adjustment of the Brazilian economy to the external situation.
Table 7 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1981 – 1985) 
Domestic Sector External 
Public Private 
Expenditures 
Sector 
Inventory 
change 
Total 
Autonomous 
Expenditures 
Supermulti 
plier 
Inventory 
change 
Gov Consumption 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 
Gov Investment 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
SOE Investment -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% 
HH Res Invest -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 
HH Durables Cons. 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
HH Non-Durables Cons. -3.2% -3.2% -3.2% 
PE Investment -2.1% -2.1% -2.1% 
Domestic Content Coeff. 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 
Exports 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 
Inventory change 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 
Total 0.6% -4.9% 4.9% 1.1% 1.6% 3.7% -3.1% 1.1% 
Table 8 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1986 – 1993) 
Domestic Sector External 
Public Private 
Expenditures 
Sector 
Inventory 
change 
Total 
Autonomous 
Expenditures 
Supermulti 
plier 
Inventory 
change 
Gov Consumption 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 
Gov Investment 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
SOE Investment -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% 
HH Res Invest 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
HH Durables Cons. -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% 
HH Non-Durables Cons. -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% 
PE Investment -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% 
Domestic Content Coeff. -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% 
Exports -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% 
Inventory change 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 
Total 4.1% -0.9% -1.0% 0.8% 3.0% 3.7% -1.5% 0.8%
4.4. Price stabilization and continued stagnation: 1994- 
1998 
Table 9 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1994 – 1998) 
Domestic Sector External 
Public Private 
Expenditures 
Sector 
Inventory 
change 
Total 
Autonomous 
Expenditures 
Supermulti 
plier 
Inventory 
change 
Gov Consumption 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 
Gov Investment -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% 
SOE Investment -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% 
HH Res Invest 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
HH Durables Cons. 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
HH Non-Durables Cons. 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 
PE Investment -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 
Domestic Content Coeff. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Exports -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% 
Inventory change 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 1.0% 1.2% -0.6% 0.0% 1.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.0% 
4.5. Lagging behind with inflation targeting and the fiscal 
policy conservative consensus: 1999-2006 
Table 10 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1999 – 2006) 
Domestic Sector External 
Public Private 
Supermulti 
plier 
Inventory 
change 
Expenditures 
Sector 
Inventory 
change 
Total 
Autonomous 
Expenditures 
Gov Consumption 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 
Gov Investment 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
SOE Investment 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
HH Res Invest 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
HH Durables Cons. 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
HH Non-Durables Cons. -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% 
PE Investment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Domestic Content Coeff. -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% 
Exports 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 
Inventory change -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% 
Total 1.2% 0.0% 1.9% -0.2% 3.0% 4.5% -1.4% -0.2%
5. Some final remarks 
The paper analyses the patterns of economic growth of the Brazilian economy from 1970 
to 2007. In this period the Brazilian economy experienced a huge decline in its trend GDP 
growth rate, from an average rate of almost 8.5% per year in 1970s to an average growth rate 
of approximately 2.5% per year for the whole period since the 1980s. The more recent 
literature analyzing the period under discussion has been dominated by a neoclassical 
standpoint. The present paper adopts a completely different perspective. It is based on a 
different theoretical framework that combines the classical supermultiplier demand led 
growth model with the hypothesis that the balance of payments is the main potential (and 
often the effective) constraint to the expansion of the Brazilian economy in the period under 
consideration. 
From this perspective the proximate causes of the decline of the GDP growth trend are 
the following. First, we have the relatively low growth rate of the domestic components of 
final demand which combined, with its high weight in total final demand explains the low 
contribution of this type of expenditure to the GDP growth rate since the 1980s. In particular 
the low contribution of domestic demand is explained by the relatively low trend growth of 
government expenditures since the 1980s. Secondly, the external sector contribution to GDP 
growth (which combines the contributions of exports and of the coefficient of domestic 
content of output) were both very unstable and, whenever its contribution was relatively high, 
it could not sustain the same GDP growth rates of 1970s. This occurred both because of the 
inward oriented state led development process experimented by the Brazilian economy in the 
post war period and the continental size of Brazil, which together explains the low weight of 
the external sector had (and even today has) in the Brazilian economy. This also explains why 
for some periods the Brazilian economy did experiment, as suggested by Medeiros & Serrano, 
an export led stagnation pattern. 
These patterns of demand led growth are quantitatively investigated in the paper with the 
application of a demand led growth accounting methodology which allows us to analyze the 
expansion patterns of a set of periods between 1970 and 2006. In what concerns the more 
fundamental causes, the paper points out to the relevance of the changing patterns of 
commercial and financial external insertion of the Brazilian economy and its influence on the 
expansion process of the economy through two channels. First, it exerts a direct influence 
through its effect on the contribution of the external sector to the GDP growth. Secondly, by 
means of an indirect channel, through its influence on the balance of payments constraint 
that, from time to time, has been an effective financial obstacle for the expansion of the 
Brazilian economy. The performance of the balance of payments depended crucially on the 
behavior of exports along the whole period. This occurred because, besides being the most 
important source of foreign currency, the rate of growth of exports exerted an important 
influence on the sustainability of the financial flows that were necessary to support the 
external current account imbalances that characterized some sub periods of the period under 
consideration. This result confirms the point raised by Medeiros and Serrano (2001) in their 
analysis of the Brazilian economy, export growth is very important even for an economy, like 
the Brazilian one, in which the role of exports as a demand component is clearly secondary.
Besides the patterns of external trade, the other fundamental causes underlying the 
Brazilian growth experience in the period under analysis are: changes in income distribution 
and macroeconomic policy regimes. Income distribution exerted its influence on the growth 
path of the Brazilian economy mainly through its effects on the behavior of household’s 
consumption and residential investment expenditures. The trend decline in the wage share, 
the high percentage of the population still below the poverty line and the high inequality in 
personal income distribution all contributed to explain the low contribution of household’s 
expenditures to the growth performance of the country; especially since the 1980s, when the 
effect of these factors were aggravated by the very high inflation rates (until the middle of 
1990s) and the relatively high rates of unemployment. Finally, the influence of the 
macroeconomic policy regimes is obviously an important element for the interpretation of the 
growth process throughout the whole period under analysis. It is particularly relevant for the 
understanding of the more recent period because external conditions were much more 
favorable to higher rate of growth. However, the Brazilian economy lagged behind in terms of 
its growth performance when compared to others developing countries and even to some of 
the more developed countries. This is the result of the adoption by Brazil’s governments since 
1999 of a combination of an inflation targeting monetary policy, a large primary budget surplus 
target for fiscal policy and a policy of floating (but very much managed) exchange rates with a 
marked tendency to real exchange appreciation. 
6. References (very incomplete) 
Maddison, A. (2010) Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD, Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre. 
Medeiros, C. & Serrano, F. (2001) "Inserção externa, exportações e crescimento no Brasil" in 
Fiori, J. & Medeiros, C. (orgs.) Polarização Mundial e Crescimento, Petrópolis: Vozes. 
Serrano, F. (1995) “Long Period Effective Demand and the Sraffian Supermultiplier”, 
Contributions to Political Economy, 14, pp. 67-90. 
Serrano, F. (1996) The Sraffian Supermultiplier, unpublished dissertation, Cambridge 
University, England. 
Serrano, F. (2001b) “Acumulação e Gasto Improdutivo na Economia do 
Desenvolvimento”,em Fiori, J. L. & Medeiros, C. A. (orgs.) Polarização Mundial e Crescimento, 
Petropolis: Editora Vozes. 
Tavares, M. C. (1972) Da substituição de importações ao capitalismo financeiro. Rio de 
Janeiro, Zahar.
7. Appendix 
List of variables 
- Gross Domestic Product 
- Imports 
– Households non-durables consumption 
- Households durable consumption 
– Households (Residential) Investment 
– Government Consumption 
- Government Investment 
- State Enterprises Investment 
- Private Enterprises Investment 
- Exports 
- Inventory Change 
- Domestic Content Coefficient 
– Propensity to Consume 
- Propensity to Invest 
- Total Autonomous Expenditures 
- The Supermulplier 
– GDP Growth Rate 
- Growth Rate of the Variable 
The Decomposition methodology
Let us start from the national account identity between aggregate supply and demand. 
With the maximum number of components of the demand side allowed by our database we 
obtain. 
Now, assume that imports are related to total aggregate demand as expressed by the 
equation below 
Next, let us further assume that 
Then, substituting the above relations on the first two equations we obtain 
This equation will serve as the starting point of our subsequent GDP growth 
decomposition analysis. So let us take the GDP change as described by the above equation. 
Summing and subtracting the terms and on the RHS of the 
equation and using the fact that we have 
Dividing both sides of the equation by , we arrive at the following equation 
Next, by summing and subtracting and on the RHS we obtain 
Solving the above equation for the growth rate we have
Now let us first collect all the terms in that appears. Then putting in evidence 
and using the fact that we arrive at the fourth term on the RHS of the equation 
below. Besides this we can use the fact that to 
obtain the third term on the RHS. 
But we know that , so the 
fourth term on the RHS is equal to . Further the third term on the RHS can be 
dismembered in order to isolate the individual contribution of each type of expenditure 
involved. As a consequence we arrive at the equation that appears in the text, that is:

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Patterns of Economic Growth of the Brazilian Economy 1970-2007: Demand led growth under balance of payments constraint

  • 1. Patterns of Economic Growth of the Brazilian Economy 1970- 2006: demand led growth under balance of payments constraint An outline of the paper Fabio N. P. de Freitas1 and Esther Dweck2 Abstract The paper analyses the patterns of economic growth that characterized the huge decline of the Brazilian trend GDP growth rate in the period between 1970 and 2006. The analysis is based on an analytical framework that combines the classical supermultiplier demand led growth model with the hypothesis that the balance of payments is the main potential (and often the effective) constraint to the expansion of the Brazilian economy in the period under consideration. From this perspective, the proximate causes of the decline of the GDP growth trend are the following. First, we have the relatively low growth rate of the domestic components of final demand which combined, with its high weight in total final demand explains the low contribution of this type of expenditure to the GDP growth rate since the 1980s. Secondly, the external sector contribution to GDP growth was both very unstable and, whenever its contribution was relatively high, it could not sustain the relatively high GDP growth rates of 1970s. These patterns of demand led growth are quantitatively investigated with the application of a demand led growth accounting methodology which allows us to analyze the expansion patterns of a set of periods between 1970 and 2006. In what concerns the more fundamental causes, the paper points out to the relevance of: (a) the changing patterns of commercial and financial external insertion of the Brazilian economy; (b) the worsening of the income distribution conditions associated with the trend decline in the wage share, the high percentage of the population still below the poverty line and the high inequality in personal income distribution; and (c) the macroeconomic policy regimes, in particular from 1999 on with the adoption of the policy mix combining inflation targeting, large primary government budget surplus and floating (but very much managed) exchange rates. 1 Professor of Economics, Institute of Economics, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Address: Instituto de Economia – UFRJ, Av. Pasteur, 250, Urca – Rio de Janeiro – RJ, 22.290-240. Tel.: 55 21 3873- 5242. Fax.: 55 21 2541-8148. E-mail: [email protected]. 2 Professor of Economics, Institute of Economics, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Address: Instituto de Economia – UFRJ, Av. Pasteur, 250, Urca – Rio de Janeiro – RJ, 22.290-240. Tel.: 55 21 3873- 5242. Fax.: 55 21 2541-8148. E-mail: [email protected].
  • 2. 1. Introduction 2. The Brazilian Economic Growth Experience in Perspective The Brazilian economy was one of the fastest growing economies in the 20th century. From the early 1900’s until the end of the 2nd world war it experimented a relatively high average growth rate (3,8% per year approximately), but was also confronted by a huge instability, an important feature of the primary export pattern of development that characterized the period. The Brazilian economy has performed particularly well from the start of the State led industrialization process after the end of the 2nd world war until the Latin America crises in the 1980’s. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 1 below, in this period the Brazilian economy has grown at an average rate of 6,8% per year, with the higher growth rates registered in the second half of the 1950s and in the 1970s as a whole. Figure 1 – Brazilian long term real growth rates 15,0% 10,0% 5,0% 0,0% -5,0% -10,0% 1 9 0 0 1 9 0 2 1 9 0 4 1 9 0 6 1 9 0 8 1 9 1 0 1 9 1 2 1 9 1 4 1 9 1 6 1 9 1 8 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 2 1 9 2 4 1 9 2 6 1 9 2 8 1 9 3 0 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 4 1 9 3 6 1 9 3 8 1 9 4 0 1 9 4 2 1 9 4 4 1 9 4 6 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 GDP Growth Period Trend Growth Polinomial GDP Growth Trend Source: Author’s calculations based on data available in Maddison (2010). The worst period in terms of growth performance was the prolonged stagnation of the 1980’s and 1990’s (with an average growth rate of 2% per year). It started in the beginning of the 1980’s with the Latin America crises and was maintained in the period of intensive liberal reforms of the 1990’s. In the new millennium, the Brazilian economy has presented higher growth rates (with an average rate of growth of 3,3% per year), in line with the better performance of the world economy (see Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. below). However, it should be remarked that the growth acceleration has not been able to
  • 3. recover even the average growth rates that prevailed in the primary export period in the beginning of the last century. We can also compare the Brazilian growth performance with that of other reference countries. First, let us make a comparison of the levels of Per Capita GDP of Brazil, Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the United States of America. The US economy is our benchmark country for the convergence analysis. We also include South Korea in our analysis in order to make a contrast between Brazil and a successful economy of the Asian periphery. Figure 2 - Per capita GDP levels (logarithmic scale) 11 10,5 10 9,5 9 8,5 8 7,5 7 6,5 6 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 Brazil Korea US Source: Author’s calculations based on data available in Maddison, A. (2010). Table 1 - Relative per capita GDP (% of US per capita GDP Year Brazil South Korea 1950 17,5 8,9 1980 28,0 22,1 2000 19,4 50,5 2008 20,6 62,9 Source: Author’s calculations based on data available in Maddison (2010). From Figure 2 and Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. we can observe that both, Brazil and South Korea, engaged in a process of catching-up with the US economy until
  • 4. the 1980’s. Starting from relative shares of US per capita GDP of, respectively, 17,5% and 8,9% in 1950, Brazil and South Korea achieved relative shares of respectively 28,0% and 22,1% in 1980. From then on the Brazilian convergence process was interrupted by the Latin America crises and Brazil has lagged behind until the beginning of the new millennium. Indeed, after two decades of stagnation the Brazilian economy ended the 1990’s with a relative share of 19,4% and after thatit presented only a slight recover, achieving 20,6% of US per capita GDP in 2008. In contrast, South Korea managed to continue its convergence process only briefly interrupted by the Asian Crisis, reaching a relative share of 62,9% in 2008. Table 2 - Average Real GDP Growth Rates (% per year) Periods Brazil South Korea US World 1950-1980 6,8 7,5 3,6 4,5 1980-2000 2,0 7,5 3,2 3,0 2000-2008 3,3 4,4 2,1 4,2 Source: Author’s calculations based on data available in Maddison (2010). Another revealing comparison can be done between the economic growth experience of Brazil, South Korea, United Sates of America and the World economy. Indeed, we can observe in Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. the same pattern of convergence and divergence discussed above in terms of per capita GDP levels. Additionally, we can see that the Brazilian economy only attained a higher growth rate than the world economy in the State led development period between 1950 and 1980, while South Korea was able to maintain its expansion rate higher than the world economy for the whole period (i.e., 1950-2008). The above discussion gives us the background subjacent to our main subject of analysis. It shows that in the period covered by our paper the Brazilian economy experienced its highest growth rates in the 1970’s, from which it followed a lasting stagnation period in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and, finally, a slight acceleration of GDP growth rates in the end of the whole period. Hence, two important background questions drive our investigation. First, and more important, is to understand what caused the decline in the trend growth rates of the Brazilian economy observed in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Second, relates to what are the factors behind the later increase of the Brazilian economy expansion rates. In what follows we will try to answer these questions. It should be highlighted that our answer to the last question will be admittedly more tentative, since it refers to a shorter and very recent period, which hampers the evaluation. 3. The Analytical Framework The above questions, in particular, the first one have been the subject of important debates concerning the interpretation of the Brazilian growth experience. More recently, the literature explaining the huge decline in the Brazilian growth rates has been influenced by the neoclassical economic theory. According to this standpoint, the price system is supposed to convey information on the relative scarcity of resources that is transmitted to consumers and
  • 5. producers and govern their choices in the direction of the full utilization of the available resources. Hence, the long term economic growth should be characterized as a supply-constrained process, whose rate of expansion would depend on the growth of capital and labor inputs available to the economy and also on the growth of the efficiency on the utilization of these inputs. Therefore, according to this interpretative literature, the causes of the decline of the trend GDP growth rate of the Brazilian economy would be: the low domestic savings rate, the low investment in human capital, and the low (or even negative) growth rate of total factor productivity. These proximate causes have been evaluated quantitatively by the use of a growth accounting supply-side empirical methodology, inspired by neoclassical growth theory. Furthermore, the referred literature also tries to indentify the more fundamental causes responsible for the decline of the Brazilian GDP growth trend. In this aspect, it has been suggested that the poor growth performance of the Brazilian economy since the 1980s is explained by the “market-unfriendly” institutions and the pervasive market (and government) imperfections inherited from the post war State that induced an inward oriented development strategy. Nevertheless, contrary to the usual neoclassical viewpoint, the Brazilian economy has not been normally constrained by the availability of resources in general and labor in particular. As occurs in many developing economies, the Brazilian economy is characterized by a high degree of structural heterogeneity and by the existence of significant labor surplus. One type of quantitative expression of this kind of heterogeneity is the great disparity in the observed levels of labor productivity between economic activities. Table 3 - Relative Productivity, Employment Structure and Labor Productivity Growth by sector Variable Sector Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Public Utilities Construction Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants Transport, Storage, and Communication Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate Community, Social and Personal Services (including Government Services) Sectoral Sum 1970 19 269 180 133 142 83 99 460 164 100 1980 17 205 190 250 138 69 141 357 110 100 1990 28 372 143 470 135 41 132 377 95 100 2000 37 646 166 1010 141 36 122 267 92 100 2005 45 620 167 888 134 33 119 251 88 100 1970 48% 1% 14% 1% 6% 10% 3% 4% 13% 100% 1980 37% 1% 14% 1% 9% 11% 3% 6% 19% 100% 1990 25% 1% 16% 1% 7% 17% 4% 7% 24% 100% 2000 21% 0% 13% 0% 6% 20% 4% 7% 29% 100% 2005 19% 0% 13% 0% 6% 21% 4% 7% 29% 100% 1970-1980 3,4% 2,0% 5,4% 11,7% 4,5% 2,9% 8,6% 2,2% 0,7% 4,8% 1980-1990 3,0% 4,1% -4,7% 4,4% -2,1% -6,9% -2,6% -1,4% -3,3% -1,9% 1990-2000 4,0% 6,7% 2,5% 9,0% 1,4% -0,4% 0,2% -2,5% 0,6% 1,0% 2000-2005 4,1% -0,7% 0,2% -2,4% -0,9% -1,8% -0,5% -1,0% -0,6% 0,1% Source : Author's calculations based on data available in Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10-sector database, June 2007, http://www.ggdc.net/, de Vries and Timmer (2007) Relative Sectoral Labor Productivity levels Sectoral Employment Structure Sectoral Labor Productivity growth From Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., we can see that the sectoral labor productivity levels show a high degree of divergence in the whole period. In the 1970’s the low relative productivity of the sector “agriculture, forestry and fishing” is an indicator of the existence of a labor surplus in this sector. As the growth and development process occurred,
  • 6. the labor productivity in the sector under discussion increased at a rate above the average rate of growth of productivity in the economy and, concomitantly, the employment share of the sector has declined. Yet, in the same period, due to the fast urbanization, the employment share of the sectors “wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants” and “community, social and personal services” has increased and their labor productivity has grown at a rate lower than the average rate of growth of productivity in the economy. Note that, in contrast with the former movement, this second movement has contributed to the increase in the structural heterogeneity. So the process of industrialization cum urbanization of the Brazilian economy has been characterized by the reduction of the labor surplus in primary activities alongside to its increase in the low productive and low paid service activities localized in the urban centers, most of it in an informal situation. In sum, the industrialization process was not capable to produce a decline in the degree of structural heterogeneity and to eliminate the existence of surplus labor in the Brazilian economy. Hence, the idea that the Brazilian economy can be characterized by generalized labor force constraint in its growth trajectory seems to be very implausible one. Figure 3 –Labor Productivity and GDP Growth Rates 15,0% 10,0% 5,0% 0,0% -5,0% -10,0% 1 9 5 1 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 9 Labour Productivity Growth GDP Growth Labor Productivity Growth Trend GDP Growth Trend Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, September 2010, http://www.conference-board. org/data/economydatabase/ The conclusion reached above is also reinforced by the observed behavior of labor productivity growth in relation to the GDP growth path. In fact, as we can see in Figure 3 above, the two economic series present a similar behavior and move normally in the same direction. According to neoclassical standpoint this observation could be explained by supposing that the behavior of the labor productivity growth rate would govern the behavior of the GDP growth rate. Certainly, assuming almost continuous full employment, movements
  • 7. in the former would generate movements in the same direction of the latter. But once we admit that the labor constraint is not effective, this type of explanation completely loses itspower . Therefore, an alternative explanation should be offered. A possible candidate is provided by the type of hypothesis subjacent to the so called “Kaldor-Verdoorn Law” literature. The latter empirical regularity suggests that it is the behavior of the GDP growth that would cause the labor productivity growth movements. This would be the case because of the existence of static and dynamic economies of scale associated to the process of economic growth. Consequently, conceiving economic expansion as a demand led process, an acceleration of the demand induced growth rate would trigger an acceleration of the labor productivity growth, attenuating the impact of the faster growth pace on labor requirements and vice-versa. Normally, the inducement under analysis is not strong enough to prevent the GDP growth rate to be positively related with the employment growth rate. It only implies that the output-elasticity of employment assumes values in the interval between zero and one. So the conclusion that emerges from our discussion is that the availability of labor force has not been an effective constraint for the long term expansion of the Brazilian economy. 3.1. Theoretical background The main interpretative hypothesis subjacent to this paper is that the economic expansion of the Brazilian economy in the period analyzed can be conceived as a demand led growth process subject to a balance of payments constraint. From the theoretical standpoint our analytical framework is based on the classical (or sraffian) supermultiplier demand led growth model proposed by Serrano (1995 and 1996). We use a simplified small open economy version of the model as our reference (see the appendix for a presentation of the basic equations and variables involved in the model). Here we will briefly discuss the main hypothesis and implications of the model. Let us start from the equilibrium condition between aggregate supply and demand. With the maximum number of components of the demand side allowed by our database we obtain.3 Now, assume that imports are related to total aggregate demand as expressed by the equation below Next, let us further assume that non-durable household consumption and private enterprise investment are induced: 3 In the appendix it can be found a list of symbols and its respective meanings.
  • 8. and that the remaining aggregate demand components are autonomous: According to the supemultiplier model the induced component of aggregate consumption is related to the purchasing power introduced in the economy by production decisions, normally associated with the wage bill generated by such decisions. So, one of the main determinants of the propensity to consume (c) is the wage share in aggregate income. In what concerns investments, the above equations captures the influence of the level of activity on investment expenditures realized by private enterprises. The propensity to invest (h) is considered an endogenous variable in the classical supermultiplier model. According to latter, the behavior of h would be explained by the deviations between the realized capacity output utilization rate and the normal capacity utilization rate. The process of capitalist competition would induce an increase of h whenever we have a positive deviation and vice-versa. This would produce a tendency for the adjustment of productive capacity in relation to aggregate demand. As a result the model predicts a tendency to gravitate around a position of normal capacity utilization. Furthermore, the model predicts also that h would be positively related to the GDP growth rate. Yet, substituting the above relations on the first two equations we obtain Solving the equation for the equilibrium level of the GDP we reach the following result Hence according to the supermultiplier the behavior of the GDP would be explained by the behavior of the supermultiplier ( ) and of the total autonomous expenditures (Z). In fact, the model predicts that the GDP trend rate of growth is governed by the pace o the expansion of the autonomous expenditures. This is so because although the variables involved in the supermultiplier formula can change, they are limited in their range of variation. 3.2. Empirical methodology 4. Results 4.1. An assessment of the whole period
  • 9. From the theoretical background discussed above we pointed out the main variables that influence the performance of the GDP. The way each one of them contributes to the total growth may change through time, and it is possible to identify different patterns of growth associated to difference in the importance of each component. In order to identify these patterns one can isolate the behavior of each component indicating which of them was more important at each period, by a method of decomposition analysis. Before discussing each period separately, it is interesting to analyze the entire period as whole, in order to capture the main drivers of growth. In the following sections, we will discuss each period trying to indicate the causes of the main changes in the patterns and, therefore, addressing the two questions presented above. As can be seen in Table 4, the annual average growth rate of the Brazilian economy during the period of 1970 to 2006 was around 4%, mainly driven by the autonomous expenditures, whose contribution to the average growth as more than 100%. The supermutiplier, on the other hand, had a negative impact due to a decrease in its 3 components, the domestic content coefficient, the propensity to consume and the propensity to invest. Among the autonomous expenditures, government consumption was the main driver, contributing to almost 45% of its total contribution. Before going further it is important to explain in a little bit more details how to read Table 4, since the main will be shown in tables like this one in the following sections. On the first column we have each of the demand components described above. The result for each of them is presented in the sixth column and they can be added up to the total growth rate, shown in the last cell of this column. These components can be aggregated in two different forms. First, as shown by columns 2nd-5th, we can aggregate them among domestic or external sector components, separating the domestic sector on public and private contributions. In the last line of these columns we can see that the domestic public sector was the main driver, followed by the external sector. The small contribution of the private sector is related to the nature of most of its components. As can be seen in the second form of aggregation, columns 7th-9th, both private sector investment and non-durable consumption affect GDP growth only through their impact on the supermultiplier. On the other hand, all of the public sector components affect directly the GDP, since they are autonomous expenditures.
  • 10. Table 4 – Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1970 – 2006) Domestic Sector External Public Private Supermulti plier Expenditures Sector Inventory change Total Autonomous Expenditures Gov Consumption 1.81% 1.81% 1.81% Gov Investment 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% SOE Investment -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% HH Res Investment 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% HH Durables Cons. 0.46% 0.46% 0.46% HH Non-Durables Cons. -0.14% -0.14% -0.14% PE Investment -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% Domestic Content Coeff. -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% Exports 1.37% 1.37% 1.37% Inventory change Inventory change 0.18% 0.18% 0.18% Total 1.95% 0.65% 1.26% 0.18% 4.04% 4.13% -0.27% 0.18% 4.2. Abundant international liquidity and high growth: 1970-1980 The golden age of the Brazilian economy culminated with a very fast growth in the late 1960s and beginning of the 70s. The period from 1968-1973 is called the Brazilian miracle with an average growth rate higher than 10%. After the first Oil shock there was a slowdown on growth, but even so, the average growth rate of the 1970s was more than 8%. This last boom of the economy consolidated the structural transformation that started after the second World War and ended at the beginning of the 1980s. We divided the 1970s in two periods, from 1970 – 1975, shown in Table 5, and 1976-1980, in Table 6. This division is due to data availability and is not the best one for the period, ideally the breaking point should be in 1973, however, the only data source for dividing the household consumption into durable and non-durable were the input-output matrices that were available for every five years since 1970. Contrasting with the average of the whole period, in the 1970s the private sector had a much greater influence, and in the second half of the decade was the most important component. Household durable consumption had a major role, however, it is important to highlight that both propensity to consume and investment rate also had an important role increasing the multiplier. In the first half, their impact was more than compensated by an decrease on the domestic content coefficient. As highlighted by Tavares (1972), the decrease in the domestic content coefficient is an important by-product of the process of import substitution, by which the country changes its imports structure. Usually there is a change
  • 11. from importing simple consumption goods to more sophisticated intermediate and capital goods. After the First oil shock the Brazilian government decided to implement a large industrialization plan (Second National Develpoment Plan) that started in 1974 focusing on these more sophisticated sectors and, specially, energy. Most of these Table 5 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1970 – 1975) Domestic Sector External Public Private Expenditures Sector Inventory change Total Autonomous Expenditure s Supermulti pler Inventory change Gov Consumption 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% Gov Investment 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% SOE Investment 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% HH Res Invest 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% HH Durables Cons. 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% HH Non-Durables Cons. 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% PE Investment 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% Domestic Content Coeff. -1.5% -1.5% -1.5% Exports 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% Inventory change 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% Total 4.9% 3.6% 0.4% 1.1% 10.1% 9.2% -0.3% 1.1% Table 6- Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1976 – 1980) Domestic Sector External Public Private Expenditures Sector Inventory change Total Autonomous Expenditures Supermulti plier Inventory change Gov Consumption 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% Gov Investment -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% SOE Investment 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% HH Res Invest 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% HH Durables Cons. 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% HH Non-Durables Cons. 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% PE Investment 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% Domestic Content Coeff. -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% Exports 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% Inventory change -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% Total 1.8% 3.7% 2.5% -0.7% 7.2% 7.0% 1.0% -0.7%
  • 12. Figure 1 – Balance o Payments Accounts as a percentage of Exports 150% 100% 50% 0% -50% -100% -150% BP Accounts (% Exports) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 BP Current Account Balance (% exports) BP Financial Account (% exports) BP Overall Balance (% exports) 4.3. “Hard landing”, high inflation and low growth: 1981- 1993 The 1980s in Brazil started with the aftermath of second oil shock that were shot up by the Mexican default in 1982. The debt crises that followed were caused by a complete stop of the capital inflows. As a result of the huge balance of payments constraint faced by the brazilian economy in the period we have the relatively low growth rate of the domestic components of final demand which combined, with its high weight in total final demand explains the low contribution of this type of expenditure to the GDP growth rate since the 1980s. In particular the low contribution of domestic demand is explained by the relatively low trend growth of government expenditures since the 1980s. On the other hand, we have the external sector becoming the major contributor to economic growth in the period under analysis. This occurs both, by the relatively higher contribution of exports and by the increase in the domestic content coefficient. The pattern of economic growth in the period is dominated by the necessity of adjustment of the Brazilian economy to the external situation.
  • 13. Table 7 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1981 – 1985) Domestic Sector External Public Private Expenditures Sector Inventory change Total Autonomous Expenditures Supermulti plier Inventory change Gov Consumption 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% Gov Investment 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% SOE Investment -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% HH Res Invest -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% HH Durables Cons. 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% HH Non-Durables Cons. -3.2% -3.2% -3.2% PE Investment -2.1% -2.1% -2.1% Domestic Content Coeff. 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% Exports 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% Inventory change 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% Total 0.6% -4.9% 4.9% 1.1% 1.6% 3.7% -3.1% 1.1% Table 8 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1986 – 1993) Domestic Sector External Public Private Expenditures Sector Inventory change Total Autonomous Expenditures Supermulti plier Inventory change Gov Consumption 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% Gov Investment 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% SOE Investment -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% HH Res Invest 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% HH Durables Cons. -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% HH Non-Durables Cons. -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% PE Investment -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% Domestic Content Coeff. -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% Exports -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% Inventory change 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% Total 4.1% -0.9% -1.0% 0.8% 3.0% 3.7% -1.5% 0.8%
  • 14. 4.4. Price stabilization and continued stagnation: 1994- 1998 Table 9 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1994 – 1998) Domestic Sector External Public Private Expenditures Sector Inventory change Total Autonomous Expenditures Supermulti plier Inventory change Gov Consumption 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% Gov Investment -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% SOE Investment -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% HH Res Invest 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% HH Durables Cons. 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% HH Non-Durables Cons. 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% PE Investment -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% Domestic Content Coeff. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Exports -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% Inventory change 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Total 1.0% 1.2% -0.6% 0.0% 1.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.0% 4.5. Lagging behind with inflation targeting and the fiscal policy conservative consensus: 1999-2006 Table 10 - Decomposition of the annual average rate of growth (1999 – 2006) Domestic Sector External Public Private Supermulti plier Inventory change Expenditures Sector Inventory change Total Autonomous Expenditures Gov Consumption 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% Gov Investment 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% SOE Investment 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% HH Res Invest 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% HH Durables Cons. 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% HH Non-Durables Cons. -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% PE Investment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Domestic Content Coeff. -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% Exports 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% Inventory change -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% Total 1.2% 0.0% 1.9% -0.2% 3.0% 4.5% -1.4% -0.2%
  • 15. 5. Some final remarks The paper analyses the patterns of economic growth of the Brazilian economy from 1970 to 2007. In this period the Brazilian economy experienced a huge decline in its trend GDP growth rate, from an average rate of almost 8.5% per year in 1970s to an average growth rate of approximately 2.5% per year for the whole period since the 1980s. The more recent literature analyzing the period under discussion has been dominated by a neoclassical standpoint. The present paper adopts a completely different perspective. It is based on a different theoretical framework that combines the classical supermultiplier demand led growth model with the hypothesis that the balance of payments is the main potential (and often the effective) constraint to the expansion of the Brazilian economy in the period under consideration. From this perspective the proximate causes of the decline of the GDP growth trend are the following. First, we have the relatively low growth rate of the domestic components of final demand which combined, with its high weight in total final demand explains the low contribution of this type of expenditure to the GDP growth rate since the 1980s. In particular the low contribution of domestic demand is explained by the relatively low trend growth of government expenditures since the 1980s. Secondly, the external sector contribution to GDP growth (which combines the contributions of exports and of the coefficient of domestic content of output) were both very unstable and, whenever its contribution was relatively high, it could not sustain the same GDP growth rates of 1970s. This occurred both because of the inward oriented state led development process experimented by the Brazilian economy in the post war period and the continental size of Brazil, which together explains the low weight of the external sector had (and even today has) in the Brazilian economy. This also explains why for some periods the Brazilian economy did experiment, as suggested by Medeiros & Serrano, an export led stagnation pattern. These patterns of demand led growth are quantitatively investigated in the paper with the application of a demand led growth accounting methodology which allows us to analyze the expansion patterns of a set of periods between 1970 and 2006. In what concerns the more fundamental causes, the paper points out to the relevance of the changing patterns of commercial and financial external insertion of the Brazilian economy and its influence on the expansion process of the economy through two channels. First, it exerts a direct influence through its effect on the contribution of the external sector to the GDP growth. Secondly, by means of an indirect channel, through its influence on the balance of payments constraint that, from time to time, has been an effective financial obstacle for the expansion of the Brazilian economy. The performance of the balance of payments depended crucially on the behavior of exports along the whole period. This occurred because, besides being the most important source of foreign currency, the rate of growth of exports exerted an important influence on the sustainability of the financial flows that were necessary to support the external current account imbalances that characterized some sub periods of the period under consideration. This result confirms the point raised by Medeiros and Serrano (2001) in their analysis of the Brazilian economy, export growth is very important even for an economy, like the Brazilian one, in which the role of exports as a demand component is clearly secondary.
  • 16. Besides the patterns of external trade, the other fundamental causes underlying the Brazilian growth experience in the period under analysis are: changes in income distribution and macroeconomic policy regimes. Income distribution exerted its influence on the growth path of the Brazilian economy mainly through its effects on the behavior of household’s consumption and residential investment expenditures. The trend decline in the wage share, the high percentage of the population still below the poverty line and the high inequality in personal income distribution all contributed to explain the low contribution of household’s expenditures to the growth performance of the country; especially since the 1980s, when the effect of these factors were aggravated by the very high inflation rates (until the middle of 1990s) and the relatively high rates of unemployment. Finally, the influence of the macroeconomic policy regimes is obviously an important element for the interpretation of the growth process throughout the whole period under analysis. It is particularly relevant for the understanding of the more recent period because external conditions were much more favorable to higher rate of growth. However, the Brazilian economy lagged behind in terms of its growth performance when compared to others developing countries and even to some of the more developed countries. This is the result of the adoption by Brazil’s governments since 1999 of a combination of an inflation targeting monetary policy, a large primary budget surplus target for fiscal policy and a policy of floating (but very much managed) exchange rates with a marked tendency to real exchange appreciation. 6. References (very incomplete) Maddison, A. (2010) Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD, Groningen Growth and Development Centre. Medeiros, C. & Serrano, F. (2001) "Inserção externa, exportações e crescimento no Brasil" in Fiori, J. & Medeiros, C. (orgs.) Polarização Mundial e Crescimento, Petrópolis: Vozes. Serrano, F. (1995) “Long Period Effective Demand and the Sraffian Supermultiplier”, Contributions to Political Economy, 14, pp. 67-90. Serrano, F. (1996) The Sraffian Supermultiplier, unpublished dissertation, Cambridge University, England. Serrano, F. (2001b) “Acumulação e Gasto Improdutivo na Economia do Desenvolvimento”,em Fiori, J. L. & Medeiros, C. A. (orgs.) Polarização Mundial e Crescimento, Petropolis: Editora Vozes. Tavares, M. C. (1972) Da substituição de importações ao capitalismo financeiro. Rio de Janeiro, Zahar.
  • 17. 7. Appendix List of variables - Gross Domestic Product - Imports – Households non-durables consumption - Households durable consumption – Households (Residential) Investment – Government Consumption - Government Investment - State Enterprises Investment - Private Enterprises Investment - Exports - Inventory Change - Domestic Content Coefficient – Propensity to Consume - Propensity to Invest - Total Autonomous Expenditures - The Supermulplier – GDP Growth Rate - Growth Rate of the Variable The Decomposition methodology
  • 18. Let us start from the national account identity between aggregate supply and demand. With the maximum number of components of the demand side allowed by our database we obtain. Now, assume that imports are related to total aggregate demand as expressed by the equation below Next, let us further assume that Then, substituting the above relations on the first two equations we obtain This equation will serve as the starting point of our subsequent GDP growth decomposition analysis. So let us take the GDP change as described by the above equation. Summing and subtracting the terms and on the RHS of the equation and using the fact that we have Dividing both sides of the equation by , we arrive at the following equation Next, by summing and subtracting and on the RHS we obtain Solving the above equation for the growth rate we have
  • 19. Now let us first collect all the terms in that appears. Then putting in evidence and using the fact that we arrive at the fourth term on the RHS of the equation below. Besides this we can use the fact that to obtain the third term on the RHS. But we know that , so the fourth term on the RHS is equal to . Further the third term on the RHS can be dismembered in order to isolate the individual contribution of each type of expenditure involved. As a consequence we arrive at the equation that appears in the text, that is: