44CON 2014 - Pentesting NoSQL DB's Using NoSQL Exploitation Framework, Francis Alexander
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44CON 2014 - Pentesting NoSQL DB's Using NoSQL Exploitation Framework, Francis Alexander The rise of NoSQL databases and their simplicity has made corporates as well as end users have started to move towards NoSQL,However is it safe?.Does NoSQL mean we will not have to worry about Injection attacks. Yes We Do. This paper concentrates on exploiting NoSQL DB’s especially with its reach towards Mongodb,Couchdb and Redis and automating it using the NoSQL Exploitation Framework.
![Mongo With PHP
PHP converts parameter with brackets to associative arrays.
• Already addressed issue in previous researches
• POST http://target/ HTTP/1.1
• Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
• user[$gt]=&pass[$gt]=
• $pwned=$collection->find(array("username" => array('$ne' => "foo")))
Lets Look at Some New vectors
• $exists
• $type
• $all
• $regex](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/pentestingnosqldbswithnosqlexploitationframework-140915050819-phpapp01/85/44CON-2014-Pentesting-NoSQL-DB-s-Using-NoSQL-Exploitation-Framework-Francis-Alexander-27-320.jpg)
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44CON 2014 - Pentesting NoSQL DB's Using NoSQL Exploitation Framework, Francis Alexander
- 1. PENTESTING NOSQL DB'S WITH NOSQL EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK
- 2. #whoami • Independent Security Researcher, Jobless • Member @ OpenSecurity • Currently Pursuing My Bachelors Degree • Spoken @ a couple of Conferences
- 4. Agenda • More Emphasis Given on the Server-Client and Server Management Consoles of NoSQL DB’s • Pentesting Scenarios are given more importance. • We will not deal with Memory Related Bugs or issues. • NoSQL Exploitation Framework • Demos
- 6. Key Takeovers Schema less “ACID” (atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability) Not using the relational model Built for the 21st century web estates Support Open-source Running well on clusters
- 7. Mainly 4 types Wide Column Store / Column Families Hbase Cassandra Document Store MongoDB CouchDB Key Value / Tuple Store Riak Redis Graph Databases Neo4J DEX
- 9. Why Developers Need to Worry ?
- 10. You Will Love this Part
- 11. Low on Security Emphasizes on “Trusted Environment” Weak Authentication Mechanisms or No security by Default. Man in the Middle Attacks Open Source and API’s Widely Exposed. API for PHP widely abused.
- 12. MongoDB
- 13. Mongo Trivia Written in: C++ Main point: Retains some friendly properties of SQL. (Query, index) Protocol: Custom, binary (BSON) Mongod is the "Mongo Daemon” running on Port 27017 by Default Web Interface Runs on 28017 Mongo is the Client Mongod Uses MongoDB Wire Protocol (TCP/IP Socket) Data is Represented using JSON format
- 15. Mongo Client Mongo Client Mongo Server Mongo Client
- 16. Attackers Perspective Mongo Client Mongo Client Mongo Server Mongo Client Sniffing,Enumeration,JS Injection,DOS
- 18. Issues JavaScript Attacks mostly used against MongoDB Vulnerabilities Keep Popping Up • Run command RCE Mongo Shell Functions Purely Based on JavaScript Possible Chances to Overwrite Functions Resource Exhaustion Regex Matching ,plenty of JavaScript operations could be used
- 19. Mapping SQL Logical Commands to MongoDB • and mapped to && • or to || • ‘=‘ to ‘==‘
- 21. Reference to DB in Mongo • Mongo Functions get to refer the db object and its main functions • An attacker who finds an Injection point could abuse this. • Found in Versions 2.2 or less • Mongo Patched for versions above. Does JS Injection end here?
- 22. THIS Pointer Reference • Although mongo blocks reference to the db has ended • Attacker could use this pointer to return objects and dump as always
- 23. What if THIS is Blocked? Version to Rescue • Version command by default binds to mongo instances defined functions • So if an admin blocks the “this” pointer • function(){return this} Blocked • Function(){return version} or function(){return version()) • Scenario useful when developer uses $where to evaluate js code.
- 24. Timing Based Checks • Application can be tested for time based attacks • Mongo Shell Supports most of JavaScript functions • function(){ return sleep(500);} would render the application response delayed by 5sec. • Module added to NoSQL framework while testing for JS Injection attacks
- 26. Post Exploitation Phase • Allows the attacker to write JavaScript functions and save them • Can use for further attacks when needed rather than • db.system.js.save( { _id : “44con " , value : function (x, y){ return x + y; } } ); • db.loadServerScripts()
- 27. Mongo With PHP PHP converts parameter with brackets to associative arrays. • Already addressed issue in previous researches • POST http://target/ HTTP/1.1 • Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded • user[$gt]=&pass[$gt]= • $pwned=$collection->find(array("username" => array('$ne' => "foo"))) Lets Look at Some New vectors • $exists • $type • $all • $regex
- 29. Resource Exhaustion Mongo on 32 bit environment is too easy for attackers (Max Size limit 2GB) Use command creates arbitrary schemas on the fly Attacker could run it continuously exhausting the disk space resource as well as memory. var i=1;while(1){use i=i+1;} • An empty database takes up 192Mb
- 30. CouchDB
- 32. Key Features Written in: Erlang CouchDB document is a JSON object Schema-Free Main point: DB consistency, ease of use Protocol: HTTP/REST Distributed database system Runs on Default Port : 5984,Binds to loopback interface by default Client uses REST API to communicate with the Backend Futon Web Interface
- 34. Couch Architecture Backend CouchDB Couch FUTIL Interface Administrator
- 35. Backend CouchDB Couch FUTIL Interface CouchDB Attacker Perspective Administrator
- 36. Attack Surface Admin Party = Game Over. Auth Cookie Sniffable Credentials Send over Unencrypted Channel XSPA attacks in Replication (limited to port web server ports) XSS,HTML Injection in Futon Interface DOS (Versions on 1.5 and below),File Enumeration attacks
- 37. Vulnerabilities XSS at the token interface HTML Injection XSPA Attack (limited to port 80) can be used in the replication to check whether certain file Blind File Name Enumeration possible within the Replication
- 38. Addressing Auth Cookie Defaults to Expire within 10 min Attacker gaining access would want to use these 10 min Fruitfully NoSQL Framework kicks in with automation session grabbing and dumping necessary info.
- 39. PHP on Couch Driver Uses Curl Library to send the requests to the API Un validated PHP APPS could result in calling Arbitrary API Call Execution Download PHP on Couch: https://github.com/dready92/PHP-on-Couch/
- 43. Redis
- 46. Key Features • Key Value storage engine. • Contains Redis Server and Client • Driven By a Config File • Documentation is Laugh in a Park • Redis supports five data structures: • strings, hashes, lists, sets and ordered sets.
- 47. Attacks Discussed • Bruteforce Redis Passwords • Denial of Service on the FLY. • Command Killing • Config Rewrite • Arbitrary File Rewrite • Blind File Enumeration (usefull in pentests)
- 48. Redis Version • Redis Version 2.6 • No Support For Scripting. • Redis Introduced version 2.8 • Added Ability for LUA Scripts
- 49. Did We Just Say Scripting ?
- 50. Welcome to Redis LUA Script Engine and Basics • Redis uses LUA to manage scripts • LUA engine is properly sandboxed and offers enough security • Global variables protection • Scripts are Executed using eval (Available from Redis 2.6)
- 51. • Limited number of available of Available Libraries for Use • base lib. • table lib. • string lib. • math lib. • debug lib. • cjson lib. • cmsgpack lib.
- 52. Key Points • EVAL and EVALSHA are used to evaluate scripts using the Lua interpreter built into Redis. • SCRIPT KILL,LISTS,EXISTS • Important NB: When a script is running no other functions can be accessed or any operations can be performed
- 53. Sample Lua One Line DOS • redis-cli eval "$(cat test.lua)" 0 • test.lua
- 54. Commands Disabled By an Attacker • rename-command API Call Used • Sample Command • rename-command CONFIG l33tshit • rename-command CONFIG "“ • Disables the command completely
- 55. Arbitrary File Rewrite • CONFIG GET • Gives the Current set of Configuration • CONFIG SET • Sets the configuration of the default command • CONFIG SET dir /var/www
- 56. File Name Enumeration • Restricted Environment • Allows to use dofile (open file in lua scripting) • Although file doesn’t open gives the file or directory exists or not • eval "dofile('/var/www')" 0 • Directory Exists but cant open file • eval "dofile('/var/wwws')" 0 • No such directory exists
- 59. Cassandra
- 60. Key Takeaways • Written in: Java • Main point: Store huge datasets in "almost" SQL • Protocol: CQL3 & Thrift • CQL3 is very similar SQL, but with some limitations that come from the scalability (most notably: no JOINs, no aggregate functions.) • Runs on Port : 9160
- 61. Sad Facts ? • No OR • No UNION • No subrequests • Terms must be indexed • Primary key can only be queried for
- 62. Security Issues • Cassandra model › Keyspace (=database) › ColumnFamily > Data • CQL injection on Web Apps • Shell Commands can be useful to attacker(during privilege escalation). • SOURCE command • Reads the contents of the file • Blind File Enumeration • Database Enumeration and Dumping using NoSQL Exploitation Framework
- 64. H-Base
- 65. Key Points • Written in: Java • Main point: Billions of rows X millions of columns • Protocol: HTTP/REST (also Thrift) • Port:6379,8080(Rest API) • Emphasis on Trusted Environment
- 66. Security Issues • By Default offers No Security • Man in The Middle Attacks • REST API exposed • Database Scanning and Enumeration using NoSQL Exploitation Framework
- 67. NoSQL DB’s Never End!! More Research Needed • Ne04j,Memcache,Riak are under scanners(Some Discussed Vulnerabilities applies to those also) • Support for Neo4j,Memcache and Riak soon to be added • Memory Leaks and Overflows on the Rise • An excellent address to Ne04j security issue was written recently • Link:http://blog.scrt.ch/2014/05/09/neo4j-enter-the-graphdb/
- 68. Is Automation Needed? Do We have a framework ?
- 70. Key Points A framework of one of its Kind Open Source, Written In Python • I am not a hardcode coder(Bugs are prone ) Documented API’s Code Download:nosqlproject.com
- 71. Key Features • Support for Mongo,Couch,Redis-Base and Cassandra • Support for: • NoSQL Run Web Applications • Tests for JavaScript Attacks • Mongo DB $ Attacks • Couch PHP Driver Attack Vectors • Multithreaded Mass IP List Scanner
- 72. And the List Continues • Database Cloning Feature • Dictionary attacks • Post Exploitation Module Integrated • Shodan IP List Grabber • Sniffing DB credentials and cookies • Added More Payload List
- 73. Future Updates • Updated Cassandra and HBase attacks • Resource Exhaustion • Support for Riak,Memcache and Ne04j on its way. • Pentest Report Generation • More Stable (Bug Less )
- 75. Bugs or Contribute • Official Mailing List: [email protected] • Contribute By pulling from GITHUB.
- 76. References • http://kkovacs.eu/cassandra-vs-mongodb-vs-couchdb-vs-redis
- 77. Thank You Any Questions ??
- 79. I’m On • Facebook : francis.alexander.33 • Twitter: @torque59 • Github: torque59 • LinkedIn: http://in.linkedin.com/francis.alexander
Editor's Notes
- #3: Opensecurity a community of like minded people for security,organizes yearly conference’s on information and security.
- #7: Schema less means No schema required: Data can be inserted in a NoSQL database without first defining a rigid database schema. As a corollary, the format of the data being inserted can be changed at any time, without application disruption. This provides immense application flexibility, which ultimately delivers substantial business flexibility.
- #12: Low on Security Discuss various encryption issues
- #14: MongoDB wire Protocol is a simple socket-based, request-response style protocol. Clients communicate with the database server through a regular TCP/IP socket.
- #19: Since Mongo uses Javascript ,there has been lately a lot of abuse (it uses the V8 engine for version greater than 2.4 before used Spider Monkey) RCE for mongo 2.2 is already an metasploit module. Locked js environment but possibility to overwrite certain prototypes Resource exhaustion
- #28: Write new vectors exists, checks for whether document $exists Matches documents that have the specified field. $type Selects documents if a field is of the specified type.if char then return all documents with char $all Matches arrays that contain all elements specified in the query.
- #37: XSPA attacks in Replication (limited to port web server ports) File enumeration
- #38: Ports that have web interface used for XSPA only possible can be used in the replication to check whether certain file XSS is not quite usefull , use http-only cookie
- #40: _all_dbs,_changes
- #41: _design api call is used to fetch the documents And the _queryAndTest is used to give the request directly via Curl
- #47: Documentation allows attackers to specifically target redis,
- #63: Php app is broken somewhat (I had a demo for it )