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Web Services Security


         Nathan Sportsman
         Founder and Chief Executive Officer




1   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Agenda
     Web Service Introduction

     Web Service Vulnerabilities

     Web Service Countermeasures




2    Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.        Your World, Secured
Introduction


3   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
How Did We Get Here?


                                                                  SOAP / XML



          HTML                                         HTML



                                                                      SOAP / XML




    1st Generation                           2nd Generation                     3rd Generation
     Static HTML                             Web Applications                   Web Services


4   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.     Your World, Secured
Web Services Are
     “…a software system designed to support interoperable
      machine-to-machine interaction over a network.”, W3C

     Capable of connecting to external computing resources
          – Supply chain infrastructure
          – Outsourced computing infrastructure




5    Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Web Services Primer
                                                                          Service Broker
     Built on existing and emerging standards
          – HTTP, XML, SOAP, UDDI, WSDL, WS-*…                                                UDDI

     Capabilities
          –    Loosely coupled
          –    Language neutral
                                                                        WSDL                  WSDL
          –    Platform and transport independent
          –    Interoperability



                                                                               SOAP

                                                               Client                        Service Provider


6    Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.                   Your World, Secured
Web Service Interoperability Example



      Embedded device                            Financial Transaction Gateway             Billing Services
      C++ on Linux/ARM                                C on AIX/PowerPC                     Java on NT/X86

                                                              Web Service
                                Web Service                                      Web Service




7   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.                         Your World, Secured
Web Service Vulnerabilities


8   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Attack Taxonomies
     Spoofing
     Tampering
     Repudiation
     Information Disclosure
     Denial of Service
     Escalation of Privileges




9    Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Web Services Vulnerabilities
  Existing and emerging vulnerabilities apply
          –    Brute Force
          –    Information Disclosure
          –    SQL Injection
          –    LDAP Injection
          –    Session Hijacking
          –    Denial of Service (DoS)
          –    Buffer Overflows
          –    Cross Site Scripting
          –    XML Injection
          –    XPATH Injection
          –    WSDL Manipulation
          –    DOS (Intensive XML load)
          –    …
10   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
SQL Injection
  Possible when user input provided through web service used
   in queries to backend database
          <?xml version=“1.0” encoding=“utf-8” standalone=“no” ?>
          <SOAP-ENV:Envelope
            xmlns:SOAPSDK1=“http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema”xmlns:SOAP
            SDK2=“http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance”
            xmlns:SOAPSDK3=“http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/”
            xmlns:SOAP-ENV=http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/>
            <SOAP-ENV:Body>
              <SOAPSDK4:MethodName xmlns:SOAPSDK4=“http://urltoapp/…”>
                          <SOAPSDK4:username>administrator</SOAPSDK4:username>
                 <SOAPSDK4:password>’ OR ‘1’=‘1</SOAPSDK4:password>
             </SOAP-ENV:Body>
            </SOAP-ENV:Envelope>




11   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.             Your World, Secured
Buffer Overflow
  Buffer Overflows
          – Not as prevalent except on older legacy systems and embedded
            devices written in unmanaged code
          – Large string parameters extending beyond allocated memory
          – No bounds checking

          <SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
            <SOAP-ENV:Body>
            <parameter1>

            lkasdllkdlfa;jkia;refjeoinveroinanlekrngaerinrlgerinreglnag
            linealinrglanirnaocnilrncoraeincelrgfnerginegnoeingerongoer
            ingeg…
            </SOAP-ENV:Body>
          </SOAP-ENV:Envelope>



12   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
XML Injection
  External input is not validated and passed in XML stream
   parsed by second-tier software

  Alters XML structure by injecting malicious data

  John Smith escalates privileges by changing his User ID from
   100 to 0
          <MyRec>
              <UserId>100</UserId>
              <Username>jsmith</Username><Uid>0</Uid><Username>jsmith</Username>
          </MyRec>




13   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
XPATH Injection
  Similar to SQL injection attack

  Information stored and retrieved from XML document instead
   of relational database
          //users/user[LoginID/text()='' or 1=1 and password/text()='' or 1=1]




14   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Denial of Service
  XML parsing can be expensive
                  • Extremely large / complex XML documents
                  • Deeply nested tags
                  • These can create extremely large memory footprints or utilize many CPU
                    cycles
             …
                 <SOAP-ENV:Body>
                   <BuildNestedXMLResponse xmlns=http://someap”>
                     <BuildNestedXMLResult>
                       <XML 1>
                         <XML 2>
                           <XML 3>
                             <XML 4/>
                           </XML 3>
                         </XML 2>
                        </XML 1>
                      </BuildNestedXMLResult>
                    </BuildNestedXMLResponse>
             …




15   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.       Your World, Secured
Web Services Countermeasures


16   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Defense Taxonomies
  Configuration Management
  Authentication
  Authorization
  User & Session Management
  Data Validation
  Error & Exception Handling
  Logging & Auditing
  Data Protection (Storage & Transit)




17   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Configuration Management
  Internet facing WSDLs can be found with Google hacking
   (filetype:wsdl inurl:wsdl)

  Review WSDLs for dangerous or antiquated functions

  Ensure hidden, debugging, or any non-production functions
   are removed before deployment

  Make sure they are not recreated automatically




18   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Authentication & Authorization
  Can be accomplished in various ways with various protocols

  Username/password, Certificates, etc

  Educate yourself on the characteristics of protocols available
   before deciding




19   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Session Management
  Use proven methods to generate session IDs

  Do not reinvent the wheel and attempt to create your own

  Utilize transport encryption to prevent eavesdropping /
   modification of session data

  Use transport and element encryption to prevent replay /
   injection attacks




20   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Data Validation
  Validate and sanitize all input from external sources

  Sanitize all output of potentially malicious characters in
   respect to the next tier (i.e. Database, XML stream, LDAP
   directory, etc.)

  If possible, consider a default deny policy with a white list of
   allowed input




21   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Logging & Auditing
  Consider using an existing logging framework

  Centralize location of log files

  Ensure logs provide enough information for non-repudiation
   of action

  Do not log password, credit cards or other sensitive
   information




22   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Error & Exception Handling
  Test for DoS conditions in QA/QC procedures

  Define and enforce data file types and sizes

  Check document complexity before handing to parser
          – XML “Firewall”, etc.

  Use strict XML schema verification

  Create custom error messages with minimal information to
   be returned by web services



23   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Data Protection (In Storage & Transit)
  Two mechanisms for encryption, SSL and WS-Security

  Disadvantages of WS-Security
          – Harder, more complex to implement (Easier to do wrong)
          – Larger attack surface (Attacker has a lot more to play with) vs. SSL
            with client certificates
          – Only explicitly encrypted / signed data are protected

  Advantages of WS-Security
          –    WS-Security offers end-to-end Security (Instead of point-to-point)
          –    Transport agnostic
          –    No longer an all or nothing approach
          –    Less over head, especially in stateless web services (debatable)


24   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
SSL
  Well understood and vetted technology

  Provides the functionality needed for most web service
   deployments

  Who is implementing SSL?
          – ISVs adding web service interface to their product (SSL)
          – Internet Companies exposing part of their service through web
            interface for consumption (SSL)
          – Internally distributed application previously using older technologies
            for inter-application communication (SSL)
               * By far majority of engagements, products, and web services we’ve seen implement SSL solution




25   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.                     Your World, Secured
WS-Security
  Enhances SOAP
          – Provides a framework for message integrity and confidentiality
          – Token type-, Encryption scheme-, and Signature scheme-agnostic

  Associates security tokens with messages

  Message integrity provided by XML Digital Signatures in conjunction with
   security tokens

  Message confidentiality provided by XML Encryption in conjunction with
   security tokens

  Describes mechanism to encode binary security tokens
          – X.509 certificates, Kerberos, opaque encrypted keys

  Who is implementing?
          – B2B application for company to company exchange

26   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.      Your World, Secured
How WS-Security fits in the Web Service Stack


                                                        Management                    Portals
                           Extended
                                                               Composition/Orchestration
                          Capabilities
                              Secure                                  Reliable
                              Reliable            WS-Security                         Transactions
                                                                     Messaging
                            Transaction
                                                       Endpoint identification, Publish/Subscribe

                                                      XML Schema, WSDL, UDDI, Attachments
                           Foundation
                             Transport
                                                                     XML, SOAP
                            Invocation
                            Description
                                                                    HTTP, HTTPS




27   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.                               Your World, Secured
Misconceptions
  Web services do not share some of the same vulnerabilities of
   web applications

  WS-Security is all you need to solve security concerns within
   web services

  XML firewalls and other technologies will protect against all
   WS attacks




28   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
Integrate Secure Development Lifecycle
  Security Requirements
          – Set requirements to meet security objectives

  Threat Modeling
          – Identify issues at the time of design
          – Assist in other phases of the development life cycle

  Code Review
          – Identify issues at the time of implementation
          – Static vs Dynamic Analysis
          – Manual and Automated Tools

  Penetration Testing
          – Blackbox vs White vs Grey Box Testing
          – Manual and Automated Tools


29   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.       Your World, Secured
Web Services Security


          Nathan Sportsman
          Founder and Chief Executive Officer




30   Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved.   Your World, Secured
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Web Services Presentation - Introduction, Vulnerabilities, & Countermeasures

  • 1. Web Services Security Nathan Sportsman Founder and Chief Executive Officer 1 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 2. Agenda  Web Service Introduction  Web Service Vulnerabilities  Web Service Countermeasures 2 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 3. Introduction 3 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 4. How Did We Get Here? SOAP / XML HTML HTML SOAP / XML 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation Static HTML Web Applications Web Services 4 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 5. Web Services Are  “…a software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network.”, W3C  Capable of connecting to external computing resources – Supply chain infrastructure – Outsourced computing infrastructure 5 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 6. Web Services Primer Service Broker  Built on existing and emerging standards – HTTP, XML, SOAP, UDDI, WSDL, WS-*… UDDI  Capabilities – Loosely coupled – Language neutral WSDL WSDL – Platform and transport independent – Interoperability SOAP Client Service Provider 6 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 7. Web Service Interoperability Example Embedded device Financial Transaction Gateway Billing Services C++ on Linux/ARM C on AIX/PowerPC Java on NT/X86 Web Service Web Service Web Service 7 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 8. Web Service Vulnerabilities 8 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 9. Attack Taxonomies  Spoofing  Tampering  Repudiation  Information Disclosure  Denial of Service  Escalation of Privileges 9 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 10. Web Services Vulnerabilities  Existing and emerging vulnerabilities apply – Brute Force – Information Disclosure – SQL Injection – LDAP Injection – Session Hijacking – Denial of Service (DoS) – Buffer Overflows – Cross Site Scripting – XML Injection – XPATH Injection – WSDL Manipulation – DOS (Intensive XML load) – … 10 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 11. SQL Injection  Possible when user input provided through web service used in queries to backend database <?xml version=“1.0” encoding=“utf-8” standalone=“no” ?> <SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAPSDK1=“http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema”xmlns:SOAP SDK2=“http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance” xmlns:SOAPSDK3=“http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/” xmlns:SOAP-ENV=http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/> <SOAP-ENV:Body> <SOAPSDK4:MethodName xmlns:SOAPSDK4=“http://urltoapp/…”> <SOAPSDK4:username>administrator</SOAPSDK4:username> <SOAPSDK4:password>’ OR ‘1’=‘1</SOAPSDK4:password> </SOAP-ENV:Body> </SOAP-ENV:Envelope> 11 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 12. Buffer Overflow  Buffer Overflows – Not as prevalent except on older legacy systems and embedded devices written in unmanaged code – Large string parameters extending beyond allocated memory – No bounds checking <SOAP-ENV:Envelope> <SOAP-ENV:Body> <parameter1> lkasdllkdlfa;jkia;refjeoinveroinanlekrngaerinrlgerinreglnag linealinrglanirnaocnilrncoraeincelrgfnerginegnoeingerongoer ingeg… </SOAP-ENV:Body> </SOAP-ENV:Envelope> 12 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 13. XML Injection  External input is not validated and passed in XML stream parsed by second-tier software  Alters XML structure by injecting malicious data  John Smith escalates privileges by changing his User ID from 100 to 0 <MyRec> <UserId>100</UserId> <Username>jsmith</Username><Uid>0</Uid><Username>jsmith</Username> </MyRec> 13 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 14. XPATH Injection  Similar to SQL injection attack  Information stored and retrieved from XML document instead of relational database //users/user[LoginID/text()='' or 1=1 and password/text()='' or 1=1] 14 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 15. Denial of Service  XML parsing can be expensive • Extremely large / complex XML documents • Deeply nested tags • These can create extremely large memory footprints or utilize many CPU cycles … <SOAP-ENV:Body> <BuildNestedXMLResponse xmlns=http://someap”> <BuildNestedXMLResult> <XML 1> <XML 2> <XML 3> <XML 4/> </XML 3> </XML 2> </XML 1> </BuildNestedXMLResult> </BuildNestedXMLResponse> … 15 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 16. Web Services Countermeasures 16 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 17. Defense Taxonomies  Configuration Management  Authentication  Authorization  User & Session Management  Data Validation  Error & Exception Handling  Logging & Auditing  Data Protection (Storage & Transit) 17 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 18. Configuration Management  Internet facing WSDLs can be found with Google hacking (filetype:wsdl inurl:wsdl)  Review WSDLs for dangerous or antiquated functions  Ensure hidden, debugging, or any non-production functions are removed before deployment  Make sure they are not recreated automatically 18 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 19. Authentication & Authorization  Can be accomplished in various ways with various protocols  Username/password, Certificates, etc  Educate yourself on the characteristics of protocols available before deciding 19 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 20. Session Management  Use proven methods to generate session IDs  Do not reinvent the wheel and attempt to create your own  Utilize transport encryption to prevent eavesdropping / modification of session data  Use transport and element encryption to prevent replay / injection attacks 20 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 21. Data Validation  Validate and sanitize all input from external sources  Sanitize all output of potentially malicious characters in respect to the next tier (i.e. Database, XML stream, LDAP directory, etc.)  If possible, consider a default deny policy with a white list of allowed input 21 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 22. Logging & Auditing  Consider using an existing logging framework  Centralize location of log files  Ensure logs provide enough information for non-repudiation of action  Do not log password, credit cards or other sensitive information 22 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 23. Error & Exception Handling  Test for DoS conditions in QA/QC procedures  Define and enforce data file types and sizes  Check document complexity before handing to parser – XML “Firewall”, etc.  Use strict XML schema verification  Create custom error messages with minimal information to be returned by web services 23 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 24. Data Protection (In Storage & Transit)  Two mechanisms for encryption, SSL and WS-Security  Disadvantages of WS-Security – Harder, more complex to implement (Easier to do wrong) – Larger attack surface (Attacker has a lot more to play with) vs. SSL with client certificates – Only explicitly encrypted / signed data are protected  Advantages of WS-Security – WS-Security offers end-to-end Security (Instead of point-to-point) – Transport agnostic – No longer an all or nothing approach – Less over head, especially in stateless web services (debatable) 24 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 25. SSL  Well understood and vetted technology  Provides the functionality needed for most web service deployments  Who is implementing SSL? – ISVs adding web service interface to their product (SSL) – Internet Companies exposing part of their service through web interface for consumption (SSL) – Internally distributed application previously using older technologies for inter-application communication (SSL) * By far majority of engagements, products, and web services we’ve seen implement SSL solution 25 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 26. WS-Security  Enhances SOAP – Provides a framework for message integrity and confidentiality – Token type-, Encryption scheme-, and Signature scheme-agnostic  Associates security tokens with messages  Message integrity provided by XML Digital Signatures in conjunction with security tokens  Message confidentiality provided by XML Encryption in conjunction with security tokens  Describes mechanism to encode binary security tokens – X.509 certificates, Kerberos, opaque encrypted keys  Who is implementing? – B2B application for company to company exchange 26 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 27. How WS-Security fits in the Web Service Stack Management Portals Extended Composition/Orchestration Capabilities Secure Reliable Reliable WS-Security Transactions Messaging Transaction Endpoint identification, Publish/Subscribe XML Schema, WSDL, UDDI, Attachments Foundation Transport XML, SOAP Invocation Description HTTP, HTTPS 27 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 28. Misconceptions  Web services do not share some of the same vulnerabilities of web applications  WS-Security is all you need to solve security concerns within web services  XML firewalls and other technologies will protect against all WS attacks 28 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 29. Integrate Secure Development Lifecycle  Security Requirements – Set requirements to meet security objectives  Threat Modeling – Identify issues at the time of design – Assist in other phases of the development life cycle  Code Review – Identify issues at the time of implementation – Static vs Dynamic Analysis – Manual and Automated Tools  Penetration Testing – Blackbox vs White vs Grey Box Testing – Manual and Automated Tools 29 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
  • 30. Web Services Security Nathan Sportsman Founder and Chief Executive Officer 30 Entire contents © 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured

Editor's Notes

  • #3: Threat Modeling © 2009 Praetorian. All rights reserved. According to BSIMM all 9 organizations surveyed include security activities in the design phase; however, these are companies such as Microsoft, Google, Adobe, etc where a real and concerted efforts is being made in the way of software security. Most of the focus by organizations, vendors, and service providers is on backend security controls in the development and testing phases such as code reviews (static analysis) or application penetration tests (dynamic analysis). Odd considering the cost benefit analysis graph presented earlier
  • #5: Web Service Security © 2009 Praetorian. All rights reserved. The first generation of Web applications was largely about delivering non-interactive content, i.e. publishing non-interactive HTML pages. For example, many applications simply operated in client/server mode and rendered HTML pages to send across the internet to browsers. The second generation of Web applications was about creating applications usable over the Web. E-commerce is an example; you can go to http://www.barnesandnoble.com/ select books, order them and pay for them. This second generation also includes a more scalable back-end (e.g. WinDNA architecture) and a richer UI (e.g. DHTML and ActiveX). However, useful though they may be, the second generation largely resulted in application islands on the Web. Yes, there are hyperlinks between sites, but for the most part, the actual applications at different sites do not interact. The third generation of Web application is using Web protocols and XML throughout to allow better integration between services on the Web. Protocols such as XML and SOAP allow you to create Web Services, enabling people and companies to easily create integrated appliabout cations.
  • #6: Web Service Security © 2009 Praetorian. All rights reserved. SOAP = simple object access protocol UDDI = Universal Description, Discovery and Integration -- a directory of webservices WSDL – web services description language – how to use the web service when communicating via SOAP
  • #7: Web Service Security © 2009 Praetorian. All rights reserved. SOAP = simple object access protocol UDDI = Universal Description, Discovery and Integration -- a directory of webservices WSDL – web services description language – how to use the web service when communicating via SOAP
  • #8: Web Service Security © 2009 Praetorian. All rights reserved. The idea here is that the server on the bottom is using web services to communicate with disparate systems using a common language
  • #12: Here the parameters in the SOAP envelope have been injected with SQL to bypass authentication by always returning true (I.e SELECT * from UserTable where username= ‘administrator’ and password=‘’ OR ‘1’=‘1’;
  • #18: Error &amp; Exception Handling Logging &amp; Auditing
  • #26: Web Service Security © 2009 Praetorian. All rights reserved. WS Security enhances SOAP by providing these mechanisms and more, we ’ll look at each mechanism in the following slides
  • #27: Web Service Security © 2009 Praetorian. All rights reserved. WS Security enhances SOAP by providing these mechanisms and more, we ’ll look at each mechanism in the following slides
  • #28: Web Service Security © 2009 Praetorian. All rights reserved. A high level overview of WS-Security. The important point here is that it sits on top of the standard web services architecture to provide security, reliability and transactions