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SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Wolfgang Kandek
Getting a Jump on Hackers
Tech-T08
CTO
Qualys
@wkandek
#RSAC
Hackers
 Attack your Organization by continuously probing your
organization for weaknesses.
 Find and catalog vulnerabilities, software flaws and
misconfigurations
 Use exploits to gain control over your systems
#RSAC
Hackers – Attack Perimeter
#RSAC
Hackers
 We can get a jump on them by using their weak spots.
 Weak Spots:
 Millions of Malware samples
 Thousands of Vulnerabilities
 Tens of Exploitation vectors
#RSAC
Hackers
 Mass Malware
 APT and 0-days
 Nation State
#RSAC
Hackers – Mass Malware
 Majority of all attacks
 Mature technologies (on both sides)
 Exploit Kits (Angler, Nuclear, …)
 Analysis and Patching
 “Digital Carelessness”
 Research
#RSAC
Hackers – Mass Malware
 BSI – German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
 Digital Situation Report December 2014
 Situation is critical
 Digitale Sorglosigkeit => “Digital Carelessness”
 95% of issues are easily addressed
 Attackers use known vulnerabilities
 In a limited set of software
#RSAC
Hackers – Mass Malware
 BSI – German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
 Digital Situation Report December 2014
 Situation is critical
 Digitale Sorglosigkeit => “Digital Carelessness”
 95% of issues are easily addressed
 Attackers use known vulnerabilities
 In a limited set of software
#RSAC
Hackers – Mass Malware - Java
 Java is on our top unpatched threat for the year
#RSAC
Hackers – Mass Malware - Java
 Java is on our top unpatched threats for the year
 BTW, attacks are on desktop not serverside Java
 We can’t patch Java
 Our business critical timecard application requires it..
 Yes, you can.
 Oracle Java v7 and v8 have a “Java Router” embedded
 Multiple Javas on a machine can be selectively deployed
 Deployment Rulesets - by URL, by checksum, by…
#RSAC
Hackers – Mass Malware - Java
 Java is on our top unpatched threats for the year
 BTW, attacks are on desktop not serverside Java
 We can’t patch Java
 Our business critical timecard application requires it..
 Yes, you can.
 Oracle Java v7 and v8 have a “Java Router” embedded
 Multiple Javas on a machine can be selectively deployed
#RSAC
Hackers – Mass Malware - Java
Demo
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 0-days in 2014/2015
 2x Windows in 2014
 4x Internet Explorer in 2014, 1x2015
 4x Adobe Flash in 2015
 Use Safe Neighborhood Software
 Alternative OS: Mac OS X
 Alternative Browser: Chrome
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 Alternative Browser: Chrome
 60% Marketshare
 220 critical vulnerabilities in 2012-2014
 0 known attacks
 Aggressive Autoupdate & Fast Patching: 24 hours to 7 days
 Faster than typical exploits
 Sandboxing
#RSAC
Hackers – VDBIR 2015
 Few Vulnerabilities are being exploited – 40 in 2014
 99.9% of Vulnerabilities exploited are > 1 year old
 50% of 2014 CVE exploits happened within 2 weeks
 Lesson: Patch all, decide which to patch faster (pg 17)
 Exploitable Attribute: most important factor (pg 17)
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 0-days in 2014/2015
 2x Windows in 2014
 4x Internet Explorer in 2014,1x2015
 4x Adobe Flash in 2015
 Use Safe Neighborhood Software
 Alternative OS: Mac OS X
 Alternative Browser: Chrome
 Alternative Flash: HTML5?
 Sandbox: Chrome/Flash combo not attacked
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 Sandboxing
 Jarno Niemela’s (F-Secure) VB 2013 Paper
 930 APT malwares against Hardening
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 Sandboxing
 Jarno Niemela’s (F-Secure) VB 2013 Paper
 930 APT malwares against Hardening
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
System Hardening Application
Hardening
Sandboxie EMET
Exploit Mitigations
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 Sandboxing
 Jarno Niemela’s (F-Secure) VB 2013 Paper
 930 APT malwares against Hardening
 Sandbox testing not conclusive
 Application Hardening and EMET are free
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 But APT means attacker can do anything
 Bypass your Hardening, the Sandbox, EMET…
 How good are they?
 Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis
 15+ sample families assessed
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 But APT means attacker can do anything
 How good are they?
 Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis
 15+ sample families assessed
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 But APT means attacker can do anything
 How good are they?
 Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis
 15+ sample families assessed
 7 skill categories
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 But APT means attacker can do anything
 How good are they?
 Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis
 15+ sample families assessed
 7 skill categories
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 But APT means attacker can do anything
 How good are they?
 Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis
 15+ sample families assessed
 7 skill categories
 Mixed results 50% trivial, 50% advanced
 All (!) attacked only 1 software version – Office 2010 (SP2, 32bit)
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 But APT means attacker can do anything
 How good are they?
 Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis
 15+ sample families assessed
 7 skill categories
 Mixed results 50% trivial, 50% advanced
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 Dan Guido – Exploit Intelligence Project
 Focus on robust configurations to prevent future exploits
 Few vulnerabilities are relevant: 14 in 2009, 13 in 2010
 20 in 2014
 Tighter Security Settings defeat new attacks
 DEP, ASLR
 EMET (btw, all IE 0-days in 2014)
 Disable EXE/Javascript in PDF
 Limit Java to internal Applications
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 Dan Guido – Exploit Intelligence Project
 Focus on robust configurations to prevent future exploits
 Few vulnerabilities are relevant: 14 in 2009, 13 in 2010
 20 in 2014
 Tighter Security Settings defeat new attacks
 DEP, ASLR
 EMET (all IE 0-days in 2014)
 Disable EXE/Javascript in PDF
#RSAC
Hackers – APT and 0-days
 Harden Applications and deploy EMET
 Safer Neighbourhoods - Alternative Technology stacks
 Limit Java to internal/known Applications – Deployment Rulesets
#RSAC
Hackers – Attack Perimeter
#RSAC
Hackers – Attack Perimeter
#RSAC
Hackers – Attack Perimeter
 Perimeter is everywhere
 Mobility, Personal Devices
 SaaS Applications enable
 Security Pros
 All Machines Internet hardened
 No Client/Peer networking = no malware lateral growth
 Security Cons
 Traditional Non-Internet Tools challenged
 Internet Agent Solutions
#RSAC
Hackers – Attack Perimeter
#RSAC
Hackers – Attack Perimeter
#RSAC
Hackers - Credentials
 Abuse worldwide connectivity (e-mail, mobile workstations, VPN)
 Steal credentials through phishing attacks (e-mail)
 Install undetectable malware
 Access VPNs
#RSAC
Hackers - Credentials
 Abuse worldwide connectivity (e-mail, mobile workstations, VPN)
 Steal credentials through phishing attacks (e-mail)
 Install undetectable malware
 Access VPNs
#RSAC
Hackers - Credentials
 Teach users to recognize attacks – ✔
 Require better passwords – ✔
 But limited effect > 2% will still click
 Password reuse rampant due to complicated rules
 Massive username/password databases available
#RSAC
Hackers - Credentials
 Teach users to recognize attacks – ✔
 Require better passwords – ✔
 But limited effect > 2% will still click
 Password reuse rampant due to complicated rules
 Massive username/passworddatabases available
#RSAC
Hackers - Credentials
 Teach users to recognize attacks – ✔
 Require better passwords – ✔
 But limited effect > 2% will still click
 Password reuse rampant due to complicated rules
 Massive username/password databases available
 Password decoding/guessing in the realm of all attackers.
#RSAC
Hackers - Credentials
 Two factor authentication
#RSAC
Hackers - Credentials
 Two factor authentication
#RSAC
Hackers - Credentials
 Teach users to recognize attacks – ✔
 Require better passwords – ✔
 Teach your users to protect their own personal data
 Banks, E-mail, Linkedin
 2FA is mature now
 Implement 2FA for your systems
#RSAC
Act Now – x days
 x=30: Scan your Perimeter Server continuously, alert on changes
 x=60: Software inventory for Flash,Reader,IE,Office,Java
 x=90: Update versions – Mass Malware cure
 x=90+: Address Vulnerabilities Quickly
 x=90+: Harden Setup - APT and 0-days
 Newest Software, Use EMET, Safe neighborhoods
 x=90+: Authentication - Deploy 2-Factor
 Then: Watch Logs for Anomalies, Run Sandboxes
SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Thank you
Tech-T08
http://laws.qualys.com
@wkandek
Wolfgang Kandek

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RSA USA 2015 - Getting a Jump on Hackers

  • 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC Wolfgang Kandek Getting a Jump on Hackers Tech-T08 CTO Qualys @wkandek
  • 2. #RSAC Hackers  Attack your Organization by continuously probing your organization for weaknesses.  Find and catalog vulnerabilities, software flaws and misconfigurations  Use exploits to gain control over your systems
  • 4. #RSAC Hackers  We can get a jump on them by using their weak spots.  Weak Spots:  Millions of Malware samples  Thousands of Vulnerabilities  Tens of Exploitation vectors
  • 5. #RSAC Hackers  Mass Malware  APT and 0-days  Nation State
  • 6. #RSAC Hackers – Mass Malware  Majority of all attacks  Mature technologies (on both sides)  Exploit Kits (Angler, Nuclear, …)  Analysis and Patching  “Digital Carelessness”  Research
  • 7. #RSAC Hackers – Mass Malware  BSI – German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik  Digital Situation Report December 2014  Situation is critical  Digitale Sorglosigkeit => “Digital Carelessness”  95% of issues are easily addressed  Attackers use known vulnerabilities  In a limited set of software
  • 8. #RSAC Hackers – Mass Malware  BSI – German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik  Digital Situation Report December 2014  Situation is critical  Digitale Sorglosigkeit => “Digital Carelessness”  95% of issues are easily addressed  Attackers use known vulnerabilities  In a limited set of software
  • 9. #RSAC Hackers – Mass Malware - Java  Java is on our top unpatched threat for the year
  • 10. #RSAC Hackers – Mass Malware - Java  Java is on our top unpatched threats for the year  BTW, attacks are on desktop not serverside Java  We can’t patch Java  Our business critical timecard application requires it..  Yes, you can.  Oracle Java v7 and v8 have a “Java Router” embedded  Multiple Javas on a machine can be selectively deployed  Deployment Rulesets - by URL, by checksum, by…
  • 11. #RSAC Hackers – Mass Malware - Java  Java is on our top unpatched threats for the year  BTW, attacks are on desktop not serverside Java  We can’t patch Java  Our business critical timecard application requires it..  Yes, you can.  Oracle Java v7 and v8 have a “Java Router” embedded  Multiple Javas on a machine can be selectively deployed
  • 12. #RSAC Hackers – Mass Malware - Java Demo
  • 13. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  0-days in 2014/2015  2x Windows in 2014  4x Internet Explorer in 2014, 1x2015  4x Adobe Flash in 2015  Use Safe Neighborhood Software  Alternative OS: Mac OS X  Alternative Browser: Chrome
  • 14. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  Alternative Browser: Chrome  60% Marketshare  220 critical vulnerabilities in 2012-2014  0 known attacks  Aggressive Autoupdate & Fast Patching: 24 hours to 7 days  Faster than typical exploits  Sandboxing
  • 15. #RSAC Hackers – VDBIR 2015  Few Vulnerabilities are being exploited – 40 in 2014  99.9% of Vulnerabilities exploited are > 1 year old  50% of 2014 CVE exploits happened within 2 weeks  Lesson: Patch all, decide which to patch faster (pg 17)  Exploitable Attribute: most important factor (pg 17)
  • 16. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  0-days in 2014/2015  2x Windows in 2014  4x Internet Explorer in 2014,1x2015  4x Adobe Flash in 2015  Use Safe Neighborhood Software  Alternative OS: Mac OS X  Alternative Browser: Chrome  Alternative Flash: HTML5?  Sandbox: Chrome/Flash combo not attacked
  • 17. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  Sandboxing  Jarno Niemela’s (F-Secure) VB 2013 Paper  930 APT malwares against Hardening
  • 18. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  Sandboxing  Jarno Niemela’s (F-Secure) VB 2013 Paper  930 APT malwares against Hardening 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% System Hardening Application Hardening Sandboxie EMET Exploit Mitigations
  • 19. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  Sandboxing  Jarno Niemela’s (F-Secure) VB 2013 Paper  930 APT malwares against Hardening  Sandbox testing not conclusive  Application Hardening and EMET are free
  • 20. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  But APT means attacker can do anything  Bypass your Hardening, the Sandbox, EMET…  How good are they?  Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis  15+ sample families assessed
  • 21. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  But APT means attacker can do anything  How good are they?  Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis  15+ sample families assessed
  • 22. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  But APT means attacker can do anything  How good are they?  Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis  15+ sample families assessed  7 skill categories
  • 23. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  But APT means attacker can do anything  How good are they?  Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis  15+ sample families assessed  7 skill categories
  • 24. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  But APT means attacker can do anything  How good are they?  Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis  15+ sample families assessed  7 skill categories  Mixed results 50% trivial, 50% advanced  All (!) attacked only 1 software version – Office 2010 (SP2, 32bit)
  • 25. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  But APT means attacker can do anything  How good are they?  Sophos: CVE-2014-1761 (Word RTF) analysis  15+ sample families assessed  7 skill categories  Mixed results 50% trivial, 50% advanced
  • 26. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  Dan Guido – Exploit Intelligence Project  Focus on robust configurations to prevent future exploits  Few vulnerabilities are relevant: 14 in 2009, 13 in 2010  20 in 2014  Tighter Security Settings defeat new attacks  DEP, ASLR  EMET (btw, all IE 0-days in 2014)  Disable EXE/Javascript in PDF  Limit Java to internal Applications
  • 27. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  Dan Guido – Exploit Intelligence Project  Focus on robust configurations to prevent future exploits  Few vulnerabilities are relevant: 14 in 2009, 13 in 2010  20 in 2014  Tighter Security Settings defeat new attacks  DEP, ASLR  EMET (all IE 0-days in 2014)  Disable EXE/Javascript in PDF
  • 28. #RSAC Hackers – APT and 0-days  Harden Applications and deploy EMET  Safer Neighbourhoods - Alternative Technology stacks  Limit Java to internal/known Applications – Deployment Rulesets
  • 31. #RSAC Hackers – Attack Perimeter  Perimeter is everywhere  Mobility, Personal Devices  SaaS Applications enable  Security Pros  All Machines Internet hardened  No Client/Peer networking = no malware lateral growth  Security Cons  Traditional Non-Internet Tools challenged  Internet Agent Solutions
  • 34. #RSAC Hackers - Credentials  Abuse worldwide connectivity (e-mail, mobile workstations, VPN)  Steal credentials through phishing attacks (e-mail)  Install undetectable malware  Access VPNs
  • 35. #RSAC Hackers - Credentials  Abuse worldwide connectivity (e-mail, mobile workstations, VPN)  Steal credentials through phishing attacks (e-mail)  Install undetectable malware  Access VPNs
  • 36. #RSAC Hackers - Credentials  Teach users to recognize attacks – ✔  Require better passwords – ✔  But limited effect > 2% will still click  Password reuse rampant due to complicated rules  Massive username/password databases available
  • 37. #RSAC Hackers - Credentials  Teach users to recognize attacks – ✔  Require better passwords – ✔  But limited effect > 2% will still click  Password reuse rampant due to complicated rules  Massive username/passworddatabases available
  • 38. #RSAC Hackers - Credentials  Teach users to recognize attacks – ✔  Require better passwords – ✔  But limited effect > 2% will still click  Password reuse rampant due to complicated rules  Massive username/password databases available  Password decoding/guessing in the realm of all attackers.
  • 39. #RSAC Hackers - Credentials  Two factor authentication
  • 40. #RSAC Hackers - Credentials  Two factor authentication
  • 41. #RSAC Hackers - Credentials  Teach users to recognize attacks – ✔  Require better passwords – ✔  Teach your users to protect their own personal data  Banks, E-mail, Linkedin  2FA is mature now  Implement 2FA for your systems
  • 42. #RSAC Act Now – x days  x=30: Scan your Perimeter Server continuously, alert on changes  x=60: Software inventory for Flash,Reader,IE,Office,Java  x=90: Update versions – Mass Malware cure  x=90+: Address Vulnerabilities Quickly  x=90+: Harden Setup - APT and 0-days  Newest Software, Use EMET, Safe neighborhoods  x=90+: Authentication - Deploy 2-Factor  Then: Watch Logs for Anomalies, Run Sandboxes