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S4 Japan 2014 Closing Remarks 
Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 1 - 
Tatsuaki Takebe 
All brand or product names in this document are trademarks or registered trademarks of their 
respective companies.
• First Self-destruct 
program (Richard 
Skrenta) 
• First Self-replicate 
program (Skrenta’s Elk 
Cloner) 
• ©Brain Virus 
developed by two 
Pakistanis’ 
• Yale, Cascade, 
Jerusalem, 
Lehigh, etc. 
• Ken 
Thompson 
demo first 
Trojan Horse 
• Fred Cohen’s 
VAX Viruses 
Protocol Weaknesses/Buffer overflow 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 2 - 
• Apple II Computer 
• Commodore 
• Atari 
• TI-99 
• TRS-80 
• First Worm 
developed in Xerox 
Palo Alto 
• FBI arrest “414s” 
Hacker Group 
• First 
“Concept” 
Macro Virus 
• Stealth virus (Whale) 
• Variable Encryption (1260) 
• Morris’ Worm 
• Robert T Morris 
fined $10K, 3 years 
probation 
• Code Red 
• Nimda 
• Philippines’ “I 
LOVE YOU” 
virus 
• Melissa virus 
($80m) 
• Excel Macro 
Virus (cross 
platform) 
• “Solar Sunrise” - 
Two California Teens 
attack on 500 Military, 
Govt, & Private 
Computer Systems 
(Vul) 
• Slammer 
• Blaster 
• WeiChia 
• MyDoom 
• Sasser 
• Melissa’s author 
sentenced 20 months 
jail 
• DDoS on 13 
“root” servers 
Standalone Systems – Disk/Diskette Sharing 
Information Warfare 
Computer Crimes 
Trusted Operating Systems (Orange Book) Trusted Network (Red Book) – ITSEC 
• Phishing attacks 
proliferated 
UK Green Book to BS 7799 to ISO 17799 to ISO 27001 
Common Criteria (ISO 15408) 
Insecure Default/Weak Security Techniques/Feature Misuse/Social Engineering 
• Spyware 
• Bots 
• Phishing 
begins in 
AOL 
• “Cuckoo’s Egg” 
in LBL 
Cyber Crimes 
• SPAM Mails 
Discovery 発見 
Experimentation 実験 
Criminal Exploitation 非合法利用 
197 
7 
197 
8 
197 
9 
198 
0 
198 
1 
198 
2 
198 
3 
198 
4 
198 
5 
198 
6 
198 
7 
198 
8 
198 
9 
199 
0 
199 
1 
199 
2 
199 
3 
199 
4 
199 
5 
199 
6 
199 
7 
199 
8 
199 
9 
200 
0 
200 
1 
200 
2 
200 
3 
200 
4 
200 
5 
200 
6 
• Pharming 
attacks (DNS 
poisoning) 
• Kevin Mitnick 
arrested, five 
years 
imprisonment 
• ZoTob 
• WMF 
Internet World Client-server/PC-LAN Networks Wide Web Web 2.0 
By Meng Chow Kang
" Attack Sophistication & Intruder Knowledge 
" Everybody can be an attacker. 
" Attack tools can be used for the control systems. 
“Stealth”/Advanced 
Scanning Techniques 
Network Management Diagnostics 
Sweepers 
Disabling Audits 
Malicious Code 
Morphing 
WWW Attacks 
Automated Probes/Scans 
Hijacking Sessions 
Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities 
Password Cracking 
Self-Replicating Code 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 3 - 
Password Guessing 
Sniffers 
BOTS 
Distributed Attack Tools 
Denial of Service 
GUI 
Packet Spoofing 
High 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Intruder Knowledge 
Low 
Attackers 
Back Doors 
Zombies 
Attack Sophistication 
Lipson, H. F., Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues, Special Report CMS/SEI-2002-SR-009, November 2002, page 10.
Security Incidents 
• From The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 4 - 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011
" Industrial Control Systems Security Coverage 
TCIP 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
I 
S 
C 
I 
ISCI 
I3P SCADA    L O G IIC                
Achilles 
Wurld- 
Tech 
- 5 - 
PCSRF 
A 
G 
A 
Power 
Oil & 
Gas 
Chem 
Water 
Transport 
Comm 
Req R&D Dev Test Eval Demo Deploy Operation 
 SCADA SBIRs 
CSSP 
CSSP 
NSTB 
ISA 
| 
9 
9 
API 
1164 
FERC、NERC 
S 
P 
| 
9 
9 
ISA 
CIDX 
ChemITC 
Mu 
Dynamics 
ICSJWG
Critical Infrastructure & Stds 
IEC ISO/IEC/JTC1 
ISO/IEC 15408, 18045, 
19790, 24759, 27001, 
27002(17799) 
62351-‐‑‒1〜~7 
62443-‐‑‒1〜~3 
NSTB 
CSSP 
CPNI(NISCC Tech Note Series) 
FERC EPRI 
NERC 
国際 International 
政府系 Govmtl 
業界 Industry 
成果 Outcome 
NIST 
SP800-‐‑‒82, 53, 30, 18, 37 
FIPS 199, 200, 140-‐‑‒2 
CMVP, CAVP 
ISCI 
I3P LOGIIC 
API 
Chemical CIDX 
化学 
薬品 
R isk M a p 
A ccess 
P o licy 
T o o l 
E m era ld 
D E A D B O L T 
S ecS S 
H S M T U 
Water Sewerage 運輸 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 6 - 
AGA 
a cc 
CIP-‐‑‒002-‐‑‒X〜~ -‐‑‒009-‐‑‒X 
API 1164 
AGA12 
Guidance for Addressing Cyber Security 
in the Chemical Industry 
In tellig en t 
ID S 
INL 
Cyber Security 
Procurement 
Language for Control 
Systems 
IEEE IE E E -1 4 0 2 , 
1 6 8 6 
DOE 21 Steps to Improve 
Cyber Security 
Unite PCSF 
Organizations & 
People 
ISA99 WG1-‐‑‒6 
ISA99.01.01,02.01, 
03.01, 
CCEVS,NVLAP(TestLab) 
Test Specs 
Test Labs 
PCSRF 
SPP-‐‑‒ICS PP 
Power 
電⼒力力 
Oil 
Gas 
⽯石油 
ガス 
上下 
⽔水道 
鉄道 
Transport 
Railroad 
Telecommunication 
通信 
Any
" Industrial Control Systems Security Coverage 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
I 
S 
C 
I 
ISCI 
- 7 - 
Power 
Oil & 
Gas 
Chem 
Water 
Transport 
Comm 
Req R&D Dev Test Eval Demo Deploy Operation 
ISA99 ISA99
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 8 - 
8 
" IEC/ISA 62443 Series structure
" ISA 99 organizational structure 
㼃㻳㻝 
㼃㻳㻟 
㼃㻳㻠 
㼃㻳㻡 
㼃㻳㻢 
㼃㻳㻣 
㼃㻳㻤 
㼃㻳㻝㻜 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 9 - 
㼃㼕㼞㼑㼘㼑㼟㼟㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼕㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌㻵㼚㼟㼠㼕㼠㼡㼠㼑 
9 
㼃㻯㻵 
㻵㻿㻭 
㻥㻥 
㻭㻿㻯㻵 
㻵㻿㻯㻵 
㻝㻜㻜 
㻭㼡㼠㼛㼙㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌 
㻿㼠㼍㼚㼐㼍㼞㼐㼟㻌 
㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼕㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌 
㻵㼚㼟㼠㼕㼠㼡㼠㼑 
㼃㻳㻞 
㼃㻳㻥 
㼃㻳㻝㻝 
㻵㻱㻯㻌㻸㼕㼍㼕㼟㼛㼚 
㼀㼑㼏㼔㼚㼛㼘㼛㼓㼕㼑㼟 
㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㻼㼞㼛㼓㼞㼍㼙 
㼀㼑㼞㼙㼕㼚㼛㼘㼛㼓㼥㻘㻌㻯㼛㼚㼏㼑㼜㼠㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻹㼛㼐㼑㼘㼟 
㼀㼑㼏㼔㼚㼕㼏㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼝㼡㼕㼞㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㼟 
㻯㼛㼙㼙㼕㼠㼠㼑㼑㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻰㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚 
㻼㼍㼠㼏㼔㻌㻹㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠 
㻿㼍㼒㼑㼠㼥㻌㻒㻌㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥 
㻯㼛㼙㼙㼡㼚㼕㼏㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻻㼡㼠㼞㼑㼍㼏㼔 
㼃㼕㼞㼑㼘㼑㼟㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㻶㼃㻳 
㼀㻳㻝 
㼀㻳㻟 
㼀㻳㻠 
㼀㻳㻡 
㻵㻿㻭㻥㻥㻌㻵㻿㻭㻢㻣㻌㻶㼃㻳㻌㼛㼚㻌㼏㼥㼎㼑㼞㻌㼟㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㼒㼛㼞㻌㼚㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㼜㼘㼍㼚㼠㼟 
㻲㼛㼡㼚㼐㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼝㼡㼕㼞㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㼟 
㼆㼛㼚㼑㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 
㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㼑㼐㻌㻾㼑㼝㼡㼕㼞㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㼟 
㻹㼑㼠㼞㼕㼏㼟 
㻼㼞㼛㼐㼡㼏㼠㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻾㼑㼝㼡㼕㼞㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㼟 
㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥 
㼃㼕㼞㼑㼘㼑㼟㼟 
㻵㻿㻭㻌㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼕㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌㻵㼚㼟㼠㼕㼠㼡㼠㼑 
㻵㻱㻯㻛㻶㼀㻯㻝㻌㻸㼕㼍㼕㼟㼛㼚㻌㻭㼏㼠㼕㼢㼕㼠㼕㼑㼟 
㻸㼑㼍㼐㼑㼞㼟㼔㼕㼜 
㼀㻳㻞 
㼀㻳㻢
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 10 - 
" IEC TC 65
Cards & PI BioMetrics 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 11 - 
" ISO IEC 
Security 
Financial 
Services 
Vocabulary
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 12 - 
" ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 
SC 27 
WG 1 
WG 2 
WG 3 
WG 4 
WG 5 
ISMS 
Crypto 
Security 
Evaluation 
Security 
Control & 
Services 
IDMgmnt & 
Privacy 
2700X 
15408 
19790 
24760 
29100 
29101 
ISA 99 
IEC TC 65/WG10 
SC 22/WG 23 
ISA 99 
IEC TC 65/WG10
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 13 - 
" ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 22 
SC 22 
WG4 
COBOL 
WG5 
Fortran 
WG9 
ADA 
WG14 
C 
WG17 
Prolog 
WG19 
Formal 
programming languages 
WG21 
C++ 
WG23 
Prog Lang Vul 
TR24772 
SC 27/WG 3
Secure IACS and maintain operational security 
㻵㼙㼜㼘㻌㼆㼛㼚㼑㼟㻌㻒 
㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟㻘㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜 
㻵 㼀 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 14 - 
㻿㼠㼍㼞㼠 
㻻㻷㻫 
㻱㼚㼐 
㻼㼍㼠㼏㼔㻌㻹㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠 
㻿㻭㻸䚷䠚㻩㻿㻭㻸 
㻱㼢㼍㼘㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙㻌 
㻾㼕㼟㼗 
㻿㼡㼎㼟㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙㼟 
㼆㼛㼚㼑㼟㻌㻒㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 
㻱㼢㼍㼘㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙㻌 
㻻㼜㼑㼞㻚㻌㻿㻭㻸 
㻾㼑㼠㼕㼞㼑㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙 
㻹㼍㼗㼑㻌㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌 
㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㻼㼛㼘㼕㼏㼥 
㻯㼔㼛㼛㼟㼑㻌㻿㻭㻸 
㼆㼛㼚㼑㼟㻌㻒㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 
㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼑㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙 
System Security Compliance Metrics 
Establishing an Industrial Automation 
and Control Systems Security Program 
Operating an industrial automation 
and control system security program 
IEC 62443-‐‑‒2-‐‑‒4 practices 
IACS 
supplier 
security 
policies 
and 
Target 
Security 
Assurance 
Levels 
for 
ISA 99.01.03 
ISA 99.02.01 
ISA 99.02.02 
ISA 99.02.03 
ISA 99.03.02 Zones 
and 
Conduits 
System security requirements and security 
assurance levels 
ISA 99.03.03 
ISA 99.02.01 
ISA 99.03.02 
ISA 99.03.02 
ISA 99.01.03 
ISA 99.03.03 
ISA 99.01.03 
ISA 99.02.02 
ISA 99.02.03 
ISA 99.02.01 
㻿㼠㼍㼞㼠 
㻱㼢㼍㼘㻌㻾㼕㼟㼗㻌㼒㼛㼞 
㻯㼛㼙㼜㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 
㻿㼑㼏㻌㻾㼝㼙㼚㼠㼟㻌㼒㼛㼞 
㻯㼛㼙㼜㻘㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 
㻰㼑㼟㼕㼓㼚㻌㻒㻌㻵㼙㼜㼘 
㻱㼢㼍㼘㻌㻿㻭㻸㻌㼒㼛㼞 
㻯㼛㼙㼜㻘㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 
㻻㻷 㻫 
ISA 99.04.01 
ISA 99.04.02 
㻱㼚㼐 
IEC 62443-‐‑‒2-‐‑‒4 
IEC 62443-‐‑‒2-‐‑‒4 
How to fit the entire pieces together?
" Compliance 
" IEC 62443-2-1 ISMS compliance for Asset Owners (62443-2-1 is 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 15 - 
aligned with ISO/IEC 27001) 
" IEC 62443-2-4 Vendor/System Integrator Security Maturity
Product security 
• IEC 62443-4-1 Assurance Sec Rea 
• IEC 62443-4-2 Functional Sec Req 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 16 -
ISASecure Levels 
Communication Robustness Testing 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 17 - 
Software Development Security 
Assessment 
ソフトウェア開発セキュリティ評価 
Functional Security Assessment 
セキュリティ機能評価 
Software Development 
Security Assessment 
ソフトウェア開発 
セキュリティ評価 
Functional Security 
Assessment 
セキュリティ機能評価 
Software Development 
Security Assessment 
ソフトウェア開発 
セキュリティ評価 
Functional Security 
Assessment 
セキュリティ機能評価 
LEVEL 1 
LEVEL 2 
LEVEL 3 
Requirements Necessary to Achieve 
Certification Levels 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Total Count in 
Specification 
SDSA 130 149 170 170 
FSA 20 49 82 82 
CRT All All All 
CRT Common Specification 
plus all 6 Protocol CRT 
Specifications
ISASecure EDSA Certification Program 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
Detects and Avoids systematic design faults 
• The vendor’s software development and maintenance 
processes are audited for artifacts for DUT 
• Ensures the organization follows a robust, secure software 
development process 
- 18 - 
Embedded Device 
Security Assurance 
Software Development 
Security Assurance (SDSA) 
ソフトウェア開発 
セキュリティ評価 
Functional Security 
Assessment (FSA) 
セキュリティ機能評価 
Communications 
Robustness Testing (CRT) 
通信堅牢性テスト 
Detects Implementation Errors/Omissions 
• A component’s security functionality is audited against its 
derived requirements for its specified security level 
• Ensures the product has properly implemented the security 
functional requirements 
Identifies vulnerabilities in device networking capabilities 
• A component’s communication robustness is tested against 
communication robustness requirements 
• Tests for vulnerabilities in the 4 layers of OSI Reference Model
ISA Security Compliance Institute 
• Document Structure for Product 
Evaluation 
" Similar structure for system evaluation is being discussed now. 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 19 - 
19 
Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
• In order to decrease the chances to be hacked, 
• You need investments 
• Attackers need skill, resources to crack the secure system 
• Let’s make an agreement and grade the level 
Lvl 4 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 20 - 
Attackers’ Skill, 
Resources, 
Tools, 
Time 
How much security? 
Investment, 
Efforts, 
Tech Level, 
Assurance 
Level 
Chances to get 
compromised. 
Lvl 3 
Lvl 2 
Lvl 1
" 62443-3-3 System security requirements and security assurance levels 
From Draft 3 ISA 62443-3-3(99.03.03) Sep 2011 
4. FR 1 Identification and authentication control 
To prevent unauthorized access to device and/or inquiry of its info 
To prevent unauthorized operation of device 
To prevent tampering data 
To prevent data leakage 
To prevent unauthorized information leakage 
To notify security violation to authority and to report forensic evidence 
To protect the entire NW resources from DoS attacks 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 21 - 
5. FR 2 – Use control 
6. FR 3 – Data integrity 
7. FR 4 – Data confidentiality 
8. FR 5 – Restricted data flow 
9. FR 6 – Timely response to events 
10. FR 7 – Resource availability 
21 
Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
" 62443-3-3 System security requirements and security assurance levels 
From Draft 3 ISA 62443-3-3(99.03.03) Sep 2011 
4. Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and 
devices), and allow them access to the system or assets. 
• SL 1 – Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and 
devices) by mechanisms which protect against casual or 
coincidental access by unauthorized entities. 
• SL 2 – Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and 
devices) by mechanisms which protect against intentional 
unauthorized access by entities using simple means. 
• SL 3 – Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and 
devices) by mechanisms which protect against intentional 
unauthorized access by entities using sophisticated means. 
• SL 4 – Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and 
devices) by mechanisms which protect against intentional 
unauthorized access by entities using sophisticated means with 
extended resources. 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 22 - 
22 
Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
" 62443-4-1 Product Development Requirements 
From Draft 1 Edit 1 ISA-99.04.01 Jun 2011 
5. Phase 1 – Security Management Plan (SMP) 
– SDSA-SMP-1 - Security Management Plan 
– SDSA-SMP-2 - Action Item Resolution 
– SDSA-SMP-3 - Documentation of software 
releases 
– SDSA-SMP-4 - Development Environment Security 
Documentation 
– SDSA-SMP-5 - CM System 
– SDSA-SMP-6 - Configuration Management Plan 
– SDSA-SMP-7 - Configuration List 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 23 - 
23 
Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
" 62443-4-1 Product Development Requirements 
From Draft 1 Edit 1 ISA-99.04.01 Jun 2011 
6. Phase 2 - Security Requirements Specification (SRS) 
7. Phase 3 – Software Architecture Design (SAD) 
8. Phase 4 - Security Risk Assessment and Threat Modeling 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 24 - 
(SRA) 
9. Phase 5 - Detailed Software Design (DSD) 
10. Phase 6 - Document Security Guidelines (DSG) 
11. Phase 7 - Module Implementation & Verification (MIV) 
12. Phase 8 - Security Integration Testing (SIT) 
13. Phase 9 - Security Process Verification (SPV) 
14. Phase 10 - Security Response Planning (SPR) 
15. Phase 11 - Security Validation Testing (SVT) 
16. Phase 12 - Security Response Execution (SRE) 
24 
Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
Conclusions 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 25 - 
• Why standards? 
• No security is perfect. 
• Standards are the golden mean agreed 
upon by the stakeholders. 
• Compliance/Certification gives 
assurance if something happens.
Thank you very much 
for your attention 
IAMK014-0411 
Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation 
<20141010> 
- 26 -

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S4xJapan Closing Keynote

  • 1. S4 Japan 2014 Closing Remarks Yokogawa Electric Corporation IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 1 - Tatsuaki Takebe All brand or product names in this document are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective companies.
  • 2. • First Self-destruct program (Richard Skrenta) • First Self-replicate program (Skrenta’s Elk Cloner) • ©Brain Virus developed by two Pakistanis’ • Yale, Cascade, Jerusalem, Lehigh, etc. • Ken Thompson demo first Trojan Horse • Fred Cohen’s VAX Viruses Protocol Weaknesses/Buffer overflow IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 2 - • Apple II Computer • Commodore • Atari • TI-99 • TRS-80 • First Worm developed in Xerox Palo Alto • FBI arrest “414s” Hacker Group • First “Concept” Macro Virus • Stealth virus (Whale) • Variable Encryption (1260) • Morris’ Worm • Robert T Morris fined $10K, 3 years probation • Code Red • Nimda • Philippines’ “I LOVE YOU” virus • Melissa virus ($80m) • Excel Macro Virus (cross platform) • “Solar Sunrise” - Two California Teens attack on 500 Military, Govt, & Private Computer Systems (Vul) • Slammer • Blaster • WeiChia • MyDoom • Sasser • Melissa’s author sentenced 20 months jail • DDoS on 13 “root” servers Standalone Systems – Disk/Diskette Sharing Information Warfare Computer Crimes Trusted Operating Systems (Orange Book) Trusted Network (Red Book) – ITSEC • Phishing attacks proliferated UK Green Book to BS 7799 to ISO 17799 to ISO 27001 Common Criteria (ISO 15408) Insecure Default/Weak Security Techniques/Feature Misuse/Social Engineering • Spyware • Bots • Phishing begins in AOL • “Cuckoo’s Egg” in LBL Cyber Crimes • SPAM Mails Discovery 発見 Experimentation 実験 Criminal Exploitation 非合法利用 197 7 197 8 197 9 198 0 198 1 198 2 198 3 198 4 198 5 198 6 198 7 198 8 198 9 199 0 199 1 199 2 199 3 199 4 199 5 199 6 199 7 199 8 199 9 200 0 200 1 200 2 200 3 200 4 200 5 200 6 • Pharming attacks (DNS poisoning) • Kevin Mitnick arrested, five years imprisonment • ZoTob • WMF Internet World Client-server/PC-LAN Networks Wide Web Web 2.0 By Meng Chow Kang
  • 3. " Attack Sophistication & Intruder Knowledge " Everybody can be an attacker. " Attack tools can be used for the control systems. “Stealth”/Advanced Scanning Techniques Network Management Diagnostics Sweepers Disabling Audits Malicious Code Morphing WWW Attacks Automated Probes/Scans Hijacking Sessions Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities Password Cracking Self-Replicating Code IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 3 - Password Guessing Sniffers BOTS Distributed Attack Tools Denial of Service GUI Packet Spoofing High 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Intruder Knowledge Low Attackers Back Doors Zombies Attack Sophistication Lipson, H. F., Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues, Special Report CMS/SEI-2002-SR-009, November 2002, page 10.
  • 4. Security Incidents • From The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 4 - 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
  • 5. " Industrial Control Systems Security Coverage TCIP IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> I S C I ISCI I3P SCADA    L O G IIC                Achilles Wurld- Tech - 5 - PCSRF A G A Power Oil & Gas Chem Water Transport Comm Req R&D Dev Test Eval Demo Deploy Operation  SCADA SBIRs CSSP CSSP NSTB ISA | 9 9 API 1164 FERC、NERC S P | 9 9 ISA CIDX ChemITC Mu Dynamics ICSJWG
  • 6. Critical Infrastructure & Stds IEC ISO/IEC/JTC1 ISO/IEC 15408, 18045, 19790, 24759, 27001, 27002(17799) 62351-‐‑‒1〜~7 62443-‐‑‒1〜~3 NSTB CSSP CPNI(NISCC Tech Note Series) FERC EPRI NERC 国際 International 政府系 Govmtl 業界 Industry 成果 Outcome NIST SP800-‐‑‒82, 53, 30, 18, 37 FIPS 199, 200, 140-‐‑‒2 CMVP, CAVP ISCI I3P LOGIIC API Chemical CIDX 化学 薬品 R isk M a p A ccess P o licy T o o l E m era ld D E A D B O L T S ecS S H S M T U Water Sewerage 運輸 IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 6 - AGA a cc CIP-‐‑‒002-‐‑‒X〜~ -‐‑‒009-‐‑‒X API 1164 AGA12 Guidance for Addressing Cyber Security in the Chemical Industry In tellig en t ID S INL Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems IEEE IE E E -1 4 0 2 , 1 6 8 6 DOE 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security Unite PCSF Organizations & People ISA99 WG1-‐‑‒6 ISA99.01.01,02.01, 03.01, CCEVS,NVLAP(TestLab) Test Specs Test Labs PCSRF SPP-‐‑‒ICS PP Power 電⼒力力 Oil Gas ⽯石油 ガス 上下 ⽔水道 鉄道 Transport Railroad Telecommunication 通信 Any
  • 7. " Industrial Control Systems Security Coverage IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> I S C I ISCI - 7 - Power Oil & Gas Chem Water Transport Comm Req R&D Dev Test Eval Demo Deploy Operation ISA99 ISA99
  • 8. IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 8 - 8 " IEC/ISA 62443 Series structure
  • 9. " ISA 99 organizational structure 㼃㻳㻝 㼃㻳㻟 㼃㻳㻠 㼃㻳㻡 㼃㻳㻢 㼃㻳㻣 㼃㻳㻤 㼃㻳㻝㻜 IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 9 - 㼃㼕㼞㼑㼘㼑㼟㼟㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼕㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌㻵㼚㼟㼠㼕㼠㼡㼠㼑 9 㼃㻯㻵 㻵㻿㻭 㻥㻥 㻭㻿㻯㻵 㻵㻿㻯㻵 㻝㻜㻜 㻭㼡㼠㼛㼙㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌 㻿㼠㼍㼚㼐㼍㼞㼐㼟㻌 㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼕㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌 㻵㼚㼟㼠㼕㼠㼡㼠㼑 㼃㻳㻞 㼃㻳㻥 㼃㻳㻝㻝 㻵㻱㻯㻌㻸㼕㼍㼕㼟㼛㼚 㼀㼑㼏㼔㼚㼛㼘㼛㼓㼕㼑㼟 㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㻼㼞㼛㼓㼞㼍㼙 㼀㼑㼞㼙㼕㼚㼛㼘㼛㼓㼥㻘㻌㻯㼛㼚㼏㼑㼜㼠㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻹㼛㼐㼑㼘㼟 㼀㼑㼏㼔㼚㼕㼏㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼝㼡㼕㼞㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㼟 㻯㼛㼙㼙㼕㼠㼠㼑㼑㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻰㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚 㻼㼍㼠㼏㼔㻌㻹㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠 㻿㼍㼒㼑㼠㼥㻌㻒㻌㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥 㻯㼛㼙㼙㼡㼚㼕㼏㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻻㼡㼠㼞㼑㼍㼏㼔 㼃㼕㼞㼑㼘㼑㼟㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㻶㼃㻳 㼀㻳㻝 㼀㻳㻟 㼀㻳㻠 㼀㻳㻡 㻵㻿㻭㻥㻥㻌㻵㻿㻭㻢㻣㻌㻶㼃㻳㻌㼛㼚㻌㼏㼥㼎㼑㼞㻌㼟㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㼒㼛㼞㻌㼚㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㼜㼘㼍㼚㼠㼟 㻲㼛㼡㼚㼐㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼝㼡㼕㼞㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㼟 㼆㼛㼚㼑㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㼑㼐㻌㻾㼑㼝㼡㼕㼞㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㼟 㻹㼑㼠㼞㼕㼏㼟 㻼㼞㼛㼐㼡㼏㼠㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻾㼑㼝㼡㼕㼞㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㼟 㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥 㼃㼕㼞㼑㼘㼑㼟㼟 㻵㻿㻭㻌㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼕㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌㻵㼚㼟㼠㼕㼠㼡㼠㼑 㻵㻱㻯㻛㻶㼀㻯㻝㻌㻸㼕㼍㼕㼟㼛㼚㻌㻭㼏㼠㼕㼢㼕㼠㼕㼑㼟 㻸㼑㼍㼐㼑㼞㼟㼔㼕㼜 㼀㻳㻞 㼀㻳㻢
  • 10. IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 10 - " IEC TC 65
  • 11. Cards & PI BioMetrics IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 11 - " ISO IEC Security Financial Services Vocabulary
  • 12. IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 12 - " ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 SC 27 WG 1 WG 2 WG 3 WG 4 WG 5 ISMS Crypto Security Evaluation Security Control & Services IDMgmnt & Privacy 2700X 15408 19790 24760 29100 29101 ISA 99 IEC TC 65/WG10 SC 22/WG 23 ISA 99 IEC TC 65/WG10
  • 13. IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 13 - " ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 22 SC 22 WG4 COBOL WG5 Fortran WG9 ADA WG14 C WG17 Prolog WG19 Formal programming languages WG21 C++ WG23 Prog Lang Vul TR24772 SC 27/WG 3
  • 14. Secure IACS and maintain operational security 㻵㼙㼜㼘㻌㼆㼛㼚㼑㼟㻌㻒 㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟㻘㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜 㻵 㼀 IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 14 - 㻿㼠㼍㼞㼠 㻻㻷㻫 㻱㼚㼐 㻼㼍㼠㼏㼔㻌㻹㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠 㻿㻭㻸䚷䠚㻩㻿㻭㻸 㻱㼢㼍㼘㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙㻌 㻾㼕㼟㼗 㻿㼡㼎㼟㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙㼟 㼆㼛㼚㼑㼟㻌㻒㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 㻱㼢㼍㼘㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙㻌 㻻㼜㼑㼞㻚㻌㻿㻭㻸 㻾㼑㼠㼕㼞㼑㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙 㻹㼍㼗㼑㻌㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌 㻿㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌㻼㼛㼘㼕㼏㼥 㻯㼔㼛㼛㼟㼑㻌㻿㻭㻸 㼆㼛㼚㼑㼟㻌㻒㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼑㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙 System Security Compliance Metrics Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security Program Operating an industrial automation and control system security program IEC 62443-‐‑‒2-‐‑‒4 practices IACS supplier security policies and Target Security Assurance Levels for ISA 99.01.03 ISA 99.02.01 ISA 99.02.02 ISA 99.02.03 ISA 99.03.02 Zones and Conduits System security requirements and security assurance levels ISA 99.03.03 ISA 99.02.01 ISA 99.03.02 ISA 99.03.02 ISA 99.01.03 ISA 99.03.03 ISA 99.01.03 ISA 99.02.02 ISA 99.02.03 ISA 99.02.01 㻿㼠㼍㼞㼠 㻱㼢㼍㼘㻌㻾㼕㼟㼗㻌㼒㼛㼞 㻯㼛㼙㼜㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 㻿㼑㼏㻌㻾㼝㼙㼚㼠㼟㻌㼒㼛㼞 㻯㼛㼙㼜㻘㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 㻰㼑㼟㼕㼓㼚㻌㻒㻌㻵㼙㼜㼘 㻱㼢㼍㼘㻌㻿㻭㻸㻌㼒㼛㼞 㻯㼛㼙㼜㻘㻌㻯㼛㼚㼐㼡㼕㼠㼟 㻻㻷 㻫 ISA 99.04.01 ISA 99.04.02 㻱㼚㼐 IEC 62443-‐‑‒2-‐‑‒4 IEC 62443-‐‑‒2-‐‑‒4 How to fit the entire pieces together?
  • 15. " Compliance " IEC 62443-2-1 ISMS compliance for Asset Owners (62443-2-1 is IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 15 - aligned with ISO/IEC 27001) " IEC 62443-2-4 Vendor/System Integrator Security Maturity
  • 16. Product security • IEC 62443-4-1 Assurance Sec Rea • IEC 62443-4-2 Functional Sec Req IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 16 -
  • 17. ISASecure Levels Communication Robustness Testing IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 17 - Software Development Security Assessment ソフトウェア開発セキュリティ評価 Functional Security Assessment セキュリティ機能評価 Software Development Security Assessment ソフトウェア開発 セキュリティ評価 Functional Security Assessment セキュリティ機能評価 Software Development Security Assessment ソフトウェア開発 セキュリティ評価 Functional Security Assessment セキュリティ機能評価 LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3 Requirements Necessary to Achieve Certification Levels Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Total Count in Specification SDSA 130 149 170 170 FSA 20 49 82 82 CRT All All All CRT Common Specification plus all 6 Protocol CRT Specifications
  • 18. ISASecure EDSA Certification Program IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> Detects and Avoids systematic design faults • The vendor’s software development and maintenance processes are audited for artifacts for DUT • Ensures the organization follows a robust, secure software development process - 18 - Embedded Device Security Assurance Software Development Security Assurance (SDSA) ソフトウェア開発 セキュリティ評価 Functional Security Assessment (FSA) セキュリティ機能評価 Communications Robustness Testing (CRT) 通信堅牢性テスト Detects Implementation Errors/Omissions • A component’s security functionality is audited against its derived requirements for its specified security level • Ensures the product has properly implemented the security functional requirements Identifies vulnerabilities in device networking capabilities • A component’s communication robustness is tested against communication robustness requirements • Tests for vulnerabilities in the 4 layers of OSI Reference Model
  • 19. ISA Security Compliance Institute • Document Structure for Product Evaluation " Similar structure for system evaluation is being discussed now. IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 19 - 19 Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
  • 20. • In order to decrease the chances to be hacked, • You need investments • Attackers need skill, resources to crack the secure system • Let’s make an agreement and grade the level Lvl 4 IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 20 - Attackers’ Skill, Resources, Tools, Time How much security? Investment, Efforts, Tech Level, Assurance Level Chances to get compromised. Lvl 3 Lvl 2 Lvl 1
  • 21. " 62443-3-3 System security requirements and security assurance levels From Draft 3 ISA 62443-3-3(99.03.03) Sep 2011 4. FR 1 Identification and authentication control To prevent unauthorized access to device and/or inquiry of its info To prevent unauthorized operation of device To prevent tampering data To prevent data leakage To prevent unauthorized information leakage To notify security violation to authority and to report forensic evidence To protect the entire NW resources from DoS attacks IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 21 - 5. FR 2 – Use control 6. FR 3 – Data integrity 7. FR 4 – Data confidentiality 8. FR 5 – Restricted data flow 9. FR 6 – Timely response to events 10. FR 7 – Resource availability 21 Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
  • 22. " 62443-3-3 System security requirements and security assurance levels From Draft 3 ISA 62443-3-3(99.03.03) Sep 2011 4. Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and devices), and allow them access to the system or assets. • SL 1 – Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and devices) by mechanisms which protect against casual or coincidental access by unauthorized entities. • SL 2 – Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and devices) by mechanisms which protect against intentional unauthorized access by entities using simple means. • SL 3 – Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and devices) by mechanisms which protect against intentional unauthorized access by entities using sophisticated means. • SL 4 – Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes and devices) by mechanisms which protect against intentional unauthorized access by entities using sophisticated means with extended resources. IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 22 - 22 Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
  • 23. " 62443-4-1 Product Development Requirements From Draft 1 Edit 1 ISA-99.04.01 Jun 2011 5. Phase 1 – Security Management Plan (SMP) – SDSA-SMP-1 - Security Management Plan – SDSA-SMP-2 - Action Item Resolution – SDSA-SMP-3 - Documentation of software releases – SDSA-SMP-4 - Development Environment Security Documentation – SDSA-SMP-5 - CM System – SDSA-SMP-6 - Configuration Management Plan – SDSA-SMP-7 - Configuration List IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 23 - 23 Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
  • 24. " 62443-4-1 Product Development Requirements From Draft 1 Edit 1 ISA-99.04.01 Jun 2011 6. Phase 2 - Security Requirements Specification (SRS) 7. Phase 3 – Software Architecture Design (SAD) 8. Phase 4 - Security Risk Assessment and Threat Modeling IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 24 - (SRA) 9. Phase 5 - Detailed Software Design (DSD) 10. Phase 6 - Document Security Guidelines (DSG) 11. Phase 7 - Module Implementation & Verification (MIV) 12. Phase 8 - Security Integration Testing (SIT) 13. Phase 9 - Security Process Verification (SPV) 14. Phase 10 - Security Response Planning (SPR) 15. Phase 11 - Security Validation Testing (SVT) 16. Phase 12 - Security Response Execution (SRE) 24 Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp.
  • 25. Conclusions IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 25 - • Why standards? • No security is perfect. • Standards are the golden mean agreed upon by the stakeholders. • Compliance/Certification gives assurance if something happens.
  • 26. Thank you very much for your attention IAMK014-0411 Copyright © Yokogawa Electric Corporation <20141010> - 26 -