Security Considerations in Process Control and SCADA Environments

Security Considerations in Process Control and SCADA Environments Rich Clark Industry Security Guidance Wonderware and ArchestrA Business Units Invensys Wonderware

Introduction Security risks come with rapidly evolving technological advances Threat vectors (security holes or technology exploits) appear in rapidly changing technology New security features are built into Wonderware Products and newer Microsoft OS's and toolkits, and are being added to every day. Close coordination with industry organizations ISA and other Guidance Organizations Government Labs and Entities 3rd Party Vendors Microsoft, Security Vendors, Tool Manufacturers, etc.

Context for Discussing PCN/SCADA Security The DHS (Department of Homeland Security) believes that the next major war most likely will be an infrastructure war or will involve disabling our infrastructure There is no such thing as an Enterprise that is 100% secure even though some people want it 80/20 rule for Security The first 80% of threat vectors are relatively inexpensive to secure against The costs and maintenance climb exponentially when attempting to secure the remaining 20%

Context for Discussing PCN/SCADA Security (cont.) Process Control Software is designed to add intelligence and efficiency to a Production Enterprise Wonderware: “Powering Intelligent Plant Decisions in Real Time”

Context for Discussing PCN/SCADA Security (cont.) Process Control Software is designed to add intelligence and efficiency to a Production Enterprise Wonderware: “Powering Intelligent Plant Decisions in Real Time” Remember that: “A properly designed and fully operational Process Control Network (PCN) or SCADA System is greater than the sum of the parts”

Context for Discussing PCN/SCADA Security (cont.) Process Control Software is designed to add intelligence and efficiency to a Production Enterprise Wonderware: “Powering Intelligent Plant Decisions in Real Time” Remember that: “ A properly designed and fully operational Process Control Network (PCN) or SCADA System is greater than the sum of the parts” A central issue to implementation and security Most IT personnel view individual PCN machines as end devices, instead of the whole PCN as the end device This is the fundamental disconnect between Process Control Engineers and IT Personnel

Control Enterprise Definitions What is the difference between a Process Control Network (PCN) and a SCADA System? Not Much!

Control Enterprise Definitions What is the difference between a Process Control Network (PCN) and a SCADA System? Not Much! Industry groups are having trouble categorizing each Enterprise Type because there are too many similarities between them SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) Systems usually have remote, sometimes independent nodes running single tasks PCNs usually perform more complex or a wider variety of tasks than SCADA Systems

Typical Industry Process Control Network (PCN)

Evolution of the Plant The need for protecting and securing PCN/SCADA Systems is mostly due to growth in Proliferation of open platforms and OS’s Wireless technologies Increase in joint ventures/mergers Outsourcing Regulatory mandates Complex plant environments/intelligent equipment Increased connectivity Increased network intrusion

Solution Delivery  Project Completion Complete Enterprise Integration will include the Process Design Solution incorporating the following Industry regulations and regulatory agencies Standards organizations Security risk identification and assessment with appropriate countermeasures Compliance to legacy systems Architectural changes and latest guidance External and internal influences affecting the Enterprise Multiple vendors Company policies and industry best practices

Standards and Regulations To make your job easier, Wonderware is working with these organizations and helping to establish standards MSMUG OPC Standards Committee FDA ISO 900x NERC 1300 Electrical Industry ENISA 460 Euro Control Systems Standards ISA S-99 GAO DHS

Establishing a Security Program for the PCN Create a formal project and address the following topics Security Program Performance Management Awareness & Assessment Policy & Procedures Security Solution

Awareness and Assessment Review Establish Security Team Define Security Objectives Identify Current Vulnerabilities Establish Security Plan Security Program Performance Management Awareness & Assessment Policy & Procedures Security Solution

Risk Analysis and Assessment Risk is broadly defined as IF a Threat Agent uses a tool, technique, or method to exploit a Vulnerability, THEN a loss of (confidentiality, integrity, or availability) to an Asset may result in an impact Risk Assessment is a methodical process to determine threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to determine what solutions should be put in place A Formal Risk Assessment will produce a probability number from 0-1 of the event occurring Generally speaking, low probability (of occurring) risks are harder to protect against and cost more to do so

Cost of Protection vs Breach Event Probability More Vulnerable to Attack Safer Against Breach Events Cost curve for increasing the protection level Breach events having a high probability of never occurring

Risk Analysis and Assessment (cont.) Sources of threats External Internal Accidental Vulnerabilities

Some Sources of These Threats… General attacker threats Common criminals Organized crime Nation states/ Governments Non state-sponsored terrorism Anti world trade/ Anti globalization activists Regional political activism Animal rights activists Environmental groups Malicious code attack specifically directed against a Customer General malicious code threat Illegal information brokers and freelance agents Competitors, contractors, corporations Disaffected staff (including contractors) Corporate intelligence/ Investigation companies “ Insider” threats including social engineering, espionage, and spoofing people with high access levels Unintentional exposure of vulnerabilities by untrained personnel

Risk Analysis and Assessment (cont.) Sources of threats External Internal Accidental Vulnerabilities As attack software and network tools become more sophisticated, the attacker’s need for technical knowledge of what they are doing is being greatly reduced

Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge Sources: Carnegie Mellon University, 2002 and Idaho National Laboratory, 2005 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Automated Probes/Scans Password Guessing Self-Replicating Code Password Cracking Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities Disabling Audits Hijacking Sessions Sweepers Sniffers Distributed Attack Tools Denial of Service GUI Network Management Diagnostics WWW Attacks “ Stealth”/Advanced Scanning Techniques High Low Intruders Back Doors Zombies BOTS Morphing Malicious Code Attack Sophistication Intruder Knowledge Packet Spoofing

Final Note: Vulnerabilities Risk Mitigation The largest vulnerability that existed was open source Operating Systems Microsoft put $10M into tightening up security of Windows XP and 2003 Server last year None of the other open platform Operating Systems manufacturers have committed those kinds of resources to tighten up similar vulnerabilities in their OS’s Microsoft OS Security has become a matter of user identification of risks (risk analysis) and applying specific countermeasures at appropriate levels of OS interaction

Policy and Procedures Established Standards Regulatory Drivers Local and Company Requirements ISO 17799, ISA-SP99, META, CERT, etc. FDA, FERC, NERC, SEC, DEA, etc. Site Policy, Information, Authorizations, etc. Security Program Performance Management Awareness & Assessment Policy & Procedures Security Solution

Establishing Policies and Procedures Create a committee of Subject Matter Experts SMEs should include Process Engineers and IT personnel who are being cross-trained Get Executive buy-in No one is exempt from company security policy including Executive Level…

The Case of the CFO’s Sleeping Notebook Historian – InSQL Application Object Server Application Object Server Application Object Server Instead of shutting down the machine properly, he made the machine sleep keeping the virus in resident memory. Company policy required that all machines connected to the Corp Net be rebooted and virus scanned. They did not enforce this policy at the Executive Level. When it connected to the Corp Net and woke up, the virus spread immediately to all machines that were not properly patched for the particular virus (a lot of them). The Enterprise was down for 2 days. His daughter used the machine to surf the web and it contracted a virus. CFO Notebook Operator Station Operator Station Operator Station Operator Station Development Station Development Station

Establishing Policies and Procedures Create a committee of Subject Matter Experts SMEs should include Process Engineers and IT personnel who are being cross-trained Get Executive buy-in No one is exempt from company security policy including Executive level A security officer is a good idea This position is the single point of contact between outside connections and the PCN This position enforces the policy created by the security committee

Policies and Procedures Establishing Policies and Procedures is the foundation of a solid security strategy Some considerations for user accounts Only validated users Users IDs have unique names with medium to strong passwords Individuals are accountable Restrict access Lockout duration well defined Groups are defined by user access needs and roles Reset any Guest and Default accounts Operator accounts defined/limited by operational area Service accounts on local domain machines are not used to logon to network domains

Policies and Procedures (continued) Passwords Enforce password history to limit reuse of old passwords Enforce password aging to force interval changing of passwords Enforce minimum password length Usually 7 or 8 characters minimum

Policies and Procedures (continued) Passwords Enforce password history to limit reuse of old passwords Enforce password aging to force interval changing of passwords Enforce minimum password length Usually 7 or 8 characters minimum Enforce password complexity Some strong password requirements can result in less security because people tend to write these down Do not use strong passwords unless you can enforce social engineering

Policies and Procedures (continued) Passwords Enforce password history to limit reuse of old passwords Enforce password aging to force interval changing of passwords Enforce minimum password length Usually 7 or 8 characters minimum Enforce password complexity Some strong password requirements can result in less security because people tend to write these down Do not use strong passwords unless you can enforce social engineering Do not store using reversible encryption

Policies and Procedures (continued) Remote Access Limit access by defining access based upon needs Check all equipment brought to the site Separate role based user groups for temporary accounts —review often Define/document all outside access routes and accounts

Policies and Procedures (continued) Remote Access Limit access by defining access based upon needs Check all equipment brought to the site Separate role based user groups for temporary accounts —review often Define/document all outside access routes and accounts Physical Access Keep locked Have specific personnel directly responsible

Policies and Procedures (continued) Remote Access Limit access by defining access based upon needs Check all equipment brought to the site Separate role based user groups for temporary accounts —review often Define/document all outside access routes and accounts Physical Access Keep locked Have specific personnel directly responsible Final Note: You as the engineer or integrator should have a keen awareness of all these issues before the project even starts!

Security Solution Solution Design Solution Recommendations Solution Implementation Security Program Performance Management Awareness & Assessment Policy & Procedures Security Solution

Security Ecosystem Security perspective of a manufacturing and/or industrial ecosystem System Architecture External and Internal Influence Vendors Policies and Procedures Platform Vendor Automation Software Vendor Standards

Requirements for a Secure Network Have a prevention policy using Firewalls and firewall devices Network based intrusion prevention/detection Host based intrusion prevention/detection Layer, Layer, Layer Bury any vulnerabilities inside of secure layers!

Requirements for a Secure Network Have a prevention policy using Firewalls and firewall devices Network based intrusion prevention/detection Host based intrusion prevention/detection Layer, Layer, Layer. Bury any vulnerabilities inside of secure layers! Do not put Corporate and Plant networks on the same domain No secure and insecure protocols on same network Continually monitor, create alerting and diagnostics of plant network control systems, and look for any “backdoor” integration to the corporate network

Secure Architectures Secure systems are directly related to Infrastructure Servers Workstations Ethernet Cables Fiber Optics Switches Routers Firewalls Connectivity

Secure Architectures Secure systems are directly related to Infrastructure Servers Workstations Ethernet Cables Fiber Optics Protocols and Communications Host Software Operating Systems Virus Protection Intrusion Protection Switches Routers Firewalls Connectivity

Secure Architectures Secure systems are directly related to Infrastructure Servers Workstations Ethernet Cables Fiber Optics Protocols and Communications Host Software Operating Systems Virus Protection Intrusion Protection Recommendation: Define the Enterprise into Secure Areas (Layers or Rings) Switches Routers Firewalls Connectivity

Current Designs of Secure Architectures: SCADA Legacy HMI OPC or SuiteLink Enabled Firewall Client PC with Active Factory SuiteVoyager Client Win Terminal Client HMI Win Terminal Client Dev Other Corporate IT Functions Corporate Network Infrastructure Firewall InSQL Server Platform / AlarmDB Other WW Databases SuiteVoyager Platform Win Terminal Server Platform InTouch TSE FS A 2 Dev TSE DMZ InTouch Platform ActiveFactory Alarm History Viewer Other WW DB Viewers PLCs Sub-station Network Optional Firewall SCADAlarm With Modem and Monitored DO line Galaxy Repository InTouch file server AOS Platform DI Network Object AOS Platform DI Network Object SCADA Com Manager PLCs Proprietary Distributed SCADA Communications Infrastructure Firewall Firewall Firewall Supervisory Control Network TCP/IP Distributed SCADA Communications Infrastructure InTouch Platform Active Factory Alarm History Viewer Other WW DB Viewers PLCs Sub-station Network

Current Designs of Secure Architectures: PCN Firewall Client PC with Active Factory SuiteVoyager Client Win Terminal Client HMI Win Terminal Client Dev Other Corporate IT Functions Corporate Network Infrastructure Firewall InSQL Server Platform / AlarmDB Other WW Databases SuiteVoyager Platform Win Terminal Server Platform InTouch TSE FS A 2 Dev TSE DMZ InTouch Platform ActiveFactory Alarm Clients QI Client Router PLCs Factory Floor Network (TCP/IP) Optional Firewall SCADAlarm With Modem and Monitored DO line Galaxy Repository InTouch file server TSE server IDE AOS Platform DI Network Object PLCs Non TCP/IP based PLC Network Process Control Network

Current Designs of Secure Architectures: PCN Firewall Client PC with Active Factory SuiteVoyager Client Win Terminal Client HMI Win Terminal Client Dev Other Corporate IT Functions Corporate Network Infrastructure Firewall InSQL Server Platform / AlarmDB Other WW Databases SuiteVoyager Platform Win Terminal Server Platform InTouch TSE FS A 2 Dev TSE DMZ InTouch Platform ActiveFactory Alarm Clients QI Client Router PLCs Factory Floor Network (TCP/IP) Optional Firewall SCADAlarm With Modem and Monitored DO line Galaxy Repository InTouch file server TSE server IDE AOS Platform DI Network Object PLCs Non TCP/IP based PLC Network Process Control Network This is a Serious Data Bottleneck

Current Designs of Secure Architectures: PCN Firewall Client PC with Active Factory SuiteVoyager Client Win Terminal Client HMI Win Terminal Client Dev Other Corporate IT Functions Corporate Network Infrastructure Firewall InSQL Server Platform / AlarmDB Other WW Databases SuiteVoyager Platform Win Terminal Server Platform InTouch TSE FS A 2 Dev TSE DMZ InTouch Platform ActiveFactory Alarm Clients QI Client Router PLCs Factory Floor Network (TCP/IP) Optional Firewall SCADAlarm With Modem and Monitored DO line Galaxy Repository InTouch file server TSE server IDE AOS Platform DI Network Object PLCs Non TCP/IP based PLC Network Process Control Network This is all the same logon/admin domain. The PCN is susceptible to Corp Net failure and attacks.

Current Wonderware Architecture Guidance Secure Area (Effective DMZ) The whole domain is an “ End Device”

Current Wonderware Architecture Guidance Only one single point of ingress/ egress

Current Wonderware Architecture Guidance ActiveDirectory Manages Users and PCN Domain Security

Current Wonderware Architecture Guidance Only minimal traffic passes here

Current Wonderware Architecture Guidance This network only carries PCN traffic. No corporate spending projections. No emails to Aunt Hildebrandt. No web surfing to see how my stocks are doing.

Data Communications and Protocols Getting data securely from one place to another requires some forethought and understanding Data is usually binary, hexadecimal, or text (ASCII) Data can be secured by Encrypting with an algorithm Common encryption methods include a Virtual Private Network (VPN) which uses IPSec as a tunneling protocol

Data Communications and Protocols IPSec co-processor and firewall cards installed here.

Data Communications and Protocols IPSec Appliance (small router) installed here

Data Communications and Protocols Edge Device (represents a single router or router pair)

Data Communications and Protocols Getting data securely from one place to another requires some forethought and understanding Data is usually binary, hexadecimal, or text (ASCII) Data can be secured by Encrypting with an algorithm Common encryption methods include a Virtual Private Network (VPN) which uses IPSec as a tunneling protocol Limiting it through specific ports with DCOM Config Certain ports are used by every software manufacturer that has to have access to security or domain services, including Kerberos, Terminal Services, HTTP; anything whether TCP or UDP DCOM is also used to request or start services or programs (using RPC), which makes it viewed by some IT departments as something that cannot be used

OSI Model and the Security Schemes DCOM and port selection occurs in this layer above the TDI. (Transport Driver Interface) It is difficult to secure the processes. IPSec Occurs in this layer mostly below the TDI and at the kernel level and the data is secure before it gets into the machine.

Final Solution Requirements May Include: Retention of forensic information to support investigation/legal litigation Secure connectivity to wireless devices Doing these exercises will ensure that major elements are considered and incorporated into the final design and include People Process Policies Products

Security Considerations Site Networks and Control System Security Approach View from management and technical perspective Address solutions from the IT and Process Control System perspectives Design/develop multiple layers of network, system, and application security Ensure compliance with industry, regulatory, and international standards

Total Security Design Considerations Following these steps will prevent Process Control Networks (PCNs) from being implemented in pieces that will result in inconsistent or unsafe security designs Develop security policy Define requirements to implement a secure process environment Develop plan to implement security Implement the PCN without tightening down the machines Only after the above steps are complete… Apply the security policies and plan once the PCN is operating correctly!

Final Solution Thoughts: Creating Infrastructure Review the types of available authenticators that you may want to use Password, Biometric, Key Card, etc.

Final Solution Thoughts: Creating Infrastructure Review the types of available authenticators that you may want to use Password, Biometric, Key Card, etc. Final Review: Compliance with your company’s established Security Policy Make sure the devices that you select for the solution will do what they are supposed to in relation to your established security policies and requirements Firewalls, Routers, Switches Domain Controllers Physical Networks Remote Access Devices Wireless Access

Security Program Performance Management Security Program Performance Management Awareness & Assessment Policy & Procedures Security Solution

Security Program Performance Management Continual Monitoring and Alerting Yearly Review and Auditing Periodic Testing and Validation Continual Updating of Security System Requirements Security Program Performance Management Awareness & Assessment Policy & Procedures Security Solution

Security Lifecycle Project Management Define Risk Goals Assess & Define Existing System Design or Select Countermeasures Conduct Risk Assessment & Gap Analysis Procure or Build Security Countermeasures

Security Lifecycle Project Management Define Risk Goals Assess & Define Existing System Design or Select Countermeasures Define Integration Test Plan Define System Validation Test Plan Conduct Risk Assessment & Gap Analysis Procure or Build Security Countermeasures Define Component Test Plans

Security Lifecycle Project Management Finalize Operational Security Measures Perform Pre-Installation Integration Test Define Risk Goals Assess & Define Existing System Design or Select Countermeasures Define Integration Test Plan Perform Validation Test on Installed System Define System Validation Test Plan Conduct Risk Assessment & Gap Analysis Procure or Build Security Countermeasures Test Countermeasures Define Component Test Plans

Security Lifecycle Project Management Reevaluate Security Countermeasures (Break-in or Major Plant Change) Periodic Audit and Compliance Measures Routine Security Reporting and Analysis Finalize Operational Security Measures Perform Pre-Installation Integration Test System Goes Operational Here Define Risk Goals Assess & Define Existing System Design or Select Countermeasures Define Integration Test Plan Perform Validation Test on Installed System Define System Validation Test Plan Conduct Risk Assessment & Gap Analysis Procure or Build Security Countermeasures Test Countermeasures Define Component Test Plans

Security Program Performance Management Establish ways to identify attacks before they occur Honeypots lure attackers away from actual assets Excessive numbers of Logon attempts is a good indicator Do your own packet monitoring and set up alarms for out of parameter or unusual activity Educate your personnel—all users of the systems —to look for and report anything unusual or out-of-the-ordinary

Security Program Performance Management Establish ways to identify attacks before they occur Honeypots lure attackers away from actual assets Excessive numbers of Logon attempts is a good indicator Do your own packet monitoring and set up alarms for out of parameter or unusual activity Educate your personnel—all users of the systems —to look for and report anything unusual or out-of-the-ordinary Monitoring and Alerts also give metrics on the health of the PCN and security systems If unusual activity is noted, fix it before it brings the system down

Security Program Performance Management The policies and procedures should be reviewed annually to insure compliance with established or updated corporate security policies New policies may have been adopted that do not make sense in a PCN/SCADA environment

Security Program Performance Management The policies and procedures should be reviewed annually to insure compliance with established or updated corporate security policies New policies may have been adopted that do not make sense in a PCN/SCADA environment Audit your metrics to be sure they make sense Some attacks can be long-term and can be disguised within expected data Some regulatory agencies may require audits of your PCN/SCADA security in the future Start doing this on your own before it is required so you can understand your processes when the time comes!

In Summary… You must understand the corporate security policies They should be formal policies and they should be written out—if not, it could be a slippery slope

In Summary… You must understand the corporate security policies They should be formal policies and they should be written out—if not, it could be a slippery slope The application integration must be constructed with the corporate security policies in mind In some cases it will not be possible to adhere to corporate IT policies because of cumulative poor IT security definition practices or deficient network design Mitigation strategies should be addressed up front for any perceived security breaches Common mitigation strategies include asking why a specific security policy is in place and doing a risk analysis of this perceived threat Additional mitigation strategies include burying the perceived breach inside of a secure layer or DMZ

Additional Resources Best Practices Guidelines V1.0 document from the Microsoft Manufacturing Users Group, available at http://www.omac.org/wgs/MfgInfsrct/MSMUG/msmug_default.htm Microsoft Security Guidance http://www.microsoft.com/security/guidance ArchestrA Community http://www.ArchestrA.biz GAO Documents (GAO-04-354 and GAO-04-321) Department of Homeland Security http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ ISA http://www.isa.org/

Additional Resources Antivirus Technical Article http://www.wonderware.com/support/mmi/comprehensive/kbcd/html/t002098.htm Wonderware Security White Paper http://dominoext.wonderware.com/PublicWWR5/PromoCol.nsf/wwwhite/0E58BBBF3F73885388257003005A5641/$file/SecurityWP_May16_color_Final.pdf Wonderware Security Resource Center http://www.wonderware.com/support/security/

Your Presenter has been… Please drop me an email if you have any security related questions. Customer Security Guidance

Thank You Very Much! The complete Basic Security Class is available online. Look for the schedule of all the Online Seminars at: www.wonderware.com/Training

Thank You Very Much! QUESTIONS? Customer Security Guidance

Security Considerations in Process Control and SCADA Environments

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Security Considerations in Process Control and SCADA Environments