SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Splunk Enterprise for
InfoSec Hands-On
Calgary, June 15, 2016
2
Agenda
Intro
Web Attacks
Lateral Movement
DNS Exfiltration
Wrap-up / Q&A
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Intro
Machine data contains a definitive record
of all interactions
Splunk is a very effective platform to collect,
store, and analyze all of that data
Human Machine
Machine Machine
Mainframe
Data
VMware
Platform for Machine Data
Splunk Solutions > Easy to Adopt
Exchange PCISecurity
Relational
Databases
MobileForwarders
Syslog /
TCP / Other
Sensors &
Control Systems
Across Data Sources, Use Cases & Consumption Models
Wire
Data
IT Svc Int
Splunk Premium Solutions & Apps Rich Ecosystem of Apps
ITSI UBA
UBA
6
Rapid Ascent in the Gartner SIEM Magic Quadrant*
*Gartner, Inc., SIEM Magic Quadrant 2011-2015. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or
service depicted in its research publication and not advise technology users to select only those
vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the
opinions of Gartner’s research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact.
Gartner disclaims all warranties, express or implied, with respect to this research, including any
warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
2015 Leader and the only vendor to
improve its visionary position
2014 Leader
2013 Leader
2012 Challenger
2011 Niche Player
2015
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Web Attacks
8
OWASP 2013 Top 10
[10] Unvalidated redirects and forwards
[9] Using components with known vulnerabilities
[8] Cross-site request forgery
[7] Missing function level access control
[6] Sensitive data exposure
[5] Security misconfiguration
[4] Insecure direct object reference
[3] Cross-site scripting (XSS)
[2] Broken authentication and session management
9
[1] Injection
SQL injection
Code injection
Command injection
LDAP injection
XML injection
XPath injection
SSI injection
IMAP/SMTP injection
Buffer overflow
10
Why did I get breached?
SQLi has been around a very, very long time
11
Imperva Web Application Attacks Report (WAAR), 2015
12
The anatomy of a SQL injection attack
SELECT * FROM users WHERE email='xxx@xxx.com'
OR 1 = 1 -- ' AND password='xxx';
xxx@xxx.xxx' OR 1 = 1 -- '
xxx
admin@admin.sys
1234
An attacker might supply:
13
TalkTalk: PII/Financial data for 4M customers
vTech: PII for 5M adults+kids
14
…and so far this year…
15
OR
16
You might need help!
Follow along with the
narration in the app, at
least for the first few
examples.
17
Newbie Path
18
Step by Step? Good for later!
19
How step-by-step works
But don’t use it now.
20
You’ve got this! Copy and
paste the example searches
into the “search bar” in the
“SplunkLive Security 2016”
app.
21
Ninja Path
22
Ninja Path
23
What have we here?
Our learning environment consists of:
• 8 Publically-accessible single Splunk
servers
• Each with ~5.5M events, from real
environments but massaged:
• Windows Security events
• Apache web access logs
• Bro DNS & HTTP
• Palo Alto traffic logs
• Some other various bits
Let’s get hands-on!
Web Attacks: Basic
25
https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1528/
Search for possible SQL injection in your events:
 looks for patterns in URI query field to see if
anyone has injected them with SQL
statements
 use standard deviations that are 2.5 times
greater than the average length of your URI
query field
Macros used
• sqlinjection_pattern(sourcetype, uri query field)
• sqlinjection_stats(sourcetype, uri query field)
26
Regular Expression FTW
sqlinjection_rex is a search macro. It contains:
(?<injection>(?i)select.*?from|union.*?select|'$|delete.*?from|update.*?set|alter.*?table|([
%27|'](%20)*=(%20)*[%27|'])|w*[%27|']or)
Which means: In the string we are given, look for ANY of the following matches and put that
into the “injection” field.
• Anything containing SELECT followed by FROM
• Anything containing UNION followed by SELECT
• Anything with a ‘ at the end
• Anything containing DELETE followed by FROM
• Anything containing UPDATE followed by SET
• Anything containing ALTER followed by TABLE
• A %27 OR a ‘ and then a %20 and any amount of characters then a %20 and then a %27 OR a ‘
• Note: %27 is encoded “’” and %20 is encoded <space>
• Any amount of word characters followed by a %27 OR a ‘ and then “or”
Let’s get hands-on!
Web Attacks: Advanced
28
Bonus: Try out the SQL Injection app!
29
Summary: Web attacks/SQL injection
SQL injection provide attackers with easy access to data
Detecting advanced SQL injection is hard – use an app!
Understand where SQLi is happening on your network and put a
stop to it
Augment your WAF with enterprise-wide Splunk searches
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Lateral Movement
31
Poking around
An attacker hacks a non-privileged user system.
So what?
Lateral Movement
Lateral Movement is the expansion of
systems controlled, and data accessed.
33
Most famous Lateral Movement attack?
(excluding password re-use)
Pass the Hash!
34
This and other techniques used in destructive Sands breach…
….
and at Sony, too
35
Detecting Legacy PtH
Look for Windows Events:
Event ID: 4624 or 4625
Logon type: 3
Auth package: NTLM
User account is not a domain logon, or Anonymous Logon
…this is trivially easy in Splunk
Let’s get hands on!
Lateral Movement: Legacy
37
Then it got harder
• Pass the Hash tools have
improved
• Adjusting of jitter, other
metrics
• So let’s detect lateral
movement differently – just
looking at Windows event
codes isn’t enough
38
Network traffic provides source of truth
I usually talk to 10 hosts
Then one day I talk to 10,000 hosts
ALARM!
Let’s get hands on!
Lateral Movement: Network Traffic
40
iz so hard… u haz magic?
41
iz so hard… u haz magic?Check out
UBA
• out-of-the-box solution
• unknown and hidden threats
• machine learning
• behavior baseline
• peer group analytics
• advanced correlation
42
Summary: Lateral Movement
Attacker success defines scope of a breach
High difficulty, high importance
Worth doing in Splunk
Easy with UBA
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
DNS Exfiltration
44
Kill Chain
45
domain=corp;user=dave;password=12345
encrypt
DNS Query:
ZG9tYWluPWNvcnA7dXNlcj1kYXZlO3Bhc3N3b3JkPTEyMzQ1DQoNCg==.attack.com
ZG9tYWluPWNvcnA7dXNlcj1kYXZlO3Bhc3N3b3JkPTEyMzQ1DQoNCg==
46
DNS exfil tends to be
overlooked within an
ocean of DNS data.
Let’s fix that!
DNS exfiltration
47
FrameworkPOS: a card-stealing program that exfiltrates data from the
target’s network by transmitting it as domain name system (DNS) traffic
But the big difference is the way how stolen data is
exfiltrated: the malware used DNS requests!
https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23942-new-frameworkpos-
variant-exfiltrates-data-via-dns-requests
“
”
… few organizations actually keep detailed logs or records
of the DNS traffic traversing their networks — making it an
ideal way to siphon data from a hacked network.
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/05/deconstructing-the-2014-sally-
beauty-breach/#more-30872
“
”
DNS exfiltration
48
https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/
DNS exfil detection – tricks of the trade
 parse URLs & complicated TLDs (Top Level Domain)
 calculate Shannon Entropy
List of provided lookups
• ut_parse_simple(url)
• ut_parse(url, list) or ut_parse_extended(url, list)
• ut_shannon(word)
• ut_countset(word, set)
• ut_suites(word, sets)
• ut_meaning(word)
• ut_bayesian(word)
• ut_levenshtein(word1, word2)
49
Examples
• The domain aaaaa.com has a Shannon Entropy score of 1.8 (very low)
• The domain google.com has a Shannon Entropy score of 2.6 (rather low)
• A00wlkj—(-a.aslkn-C.a.2.sk.esasdfasf1111)-890209uC.4.com has a Shannon
Entropy score of 3 (rather high)
Layman’s definition: a score reflecting the randomness or measure of
uncertainty of a string
Shannon Entropy
50
Detecting Data Exfiltration
index=bro sourcetype=bro_dns
| `ut_parse(query)`
| `ut_shannon(ut_subdomain)`
| eval sublen =
length(ut_subdomain)
| table ut_domain ut_subdomain
ut_shannon sublen
TIPS
 Leverage our Bro DNS data
 Calculate Shannon Entropy scores
 Calculate subdomain length
 Display Details
51
Detecting Data Exfiltration
… | stats
count
avg(ut_shannon) as avg_sha
avg(sublen) as avg_sublen
stdev(sublen) as stdev_sublen
by ut_domain
| search avg_sha>3 avg_sublen>20
stdev_sublen<2
TIPS
 Leverage our Bro DNS data
 Calculate Shannon Entropy scores
 Calculate subdomain length
 Display Details
 Display count, scores, lengths,
deviations
52
Detecting Data Exfiltration
RESULTS
• Exfiltrating data requires many DNS requests – look for high counts
• DNS exfiltration to mooo.com and chickenkiller.com
Let’s get hands on!
DNS Exfiltration
54
Summary: DNS exfiltration
Exfiltration by DNS and ICMP is a very common technique
Many organizations do not analyze DNS activity – do not be like them!
No DNS logs? No Splunk Stream? Look at FW byte counts
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Wrap-up / Q&A
56
Summary
Multiple phases to modern attacks
Deploy detection across all phases
Also consider adaptive response!
Stay abreast of modern advancements
Session hands-on guide:
https://splunk.box.com/v/SplunkLive2016CalgarySec
57
SEPT 26-29, 2016
WALT DISNEY WORLD, ORLANDO
SWAN AND DOLPHIN RESORTS
• 5000+ IT & Business Professionals
• 3 days of technical content
• 165+ sessions
• 80+ Customer Speakers
• 35+ Apps in Splunk Apps Showcase
• 75+ Technology Partners
• 1:1 networking: Ask The Experts and Security
Experts, Birds of a Feather and Chalk Talks
• NEW hands-on labs!
• Expanded show floor, Dashboards Control
Room & Clinic, and MORE!
The 7th Annual Splunk Worldwide Users’ Conference
PLUS Splunk University
• Three days: Sept 24-26, 2016
• Get Splunk Certified for FREE!
• Get CPE credits for CISSP, CAP, SSCP
• Save thousands on Splunk education!
THANK YOU
https://splunk.box.com/v/SplunkLive2016CalgarySec
Ad

More Related Content

What's hot (20)

Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior AnalyticsSplunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
AWS Loft London: Finding the signal in the noise - Effective SecOps with Soph...
AWS Loft London: Finding the signal in the noise - Effective SecOps with Soph...AWS Loft London: Finding the signal in the noise - Effective SecOps with Soph...
AWS Loft London: Finding the signal in the noise - Effective SecOps with Soph...
Splunk
 
Splunk Discovery: Warsaw 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics Methods
Splunk Discovery: Warsaw 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics MethodsSplunk Discovery: Warsaw 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics Methods
Splunk Discovery: Warsaw 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics Methods
Splunk
 
Machine Learning and Analytics Breakout Session
Machine Learning and Analytics Breakout SessionMachine Learning and Analytics Breakout Session
Machine Learning and Analytics Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Splunk EMEA Webinar: Scoping infections and disrupting breaches
Splunk EMEA Webinar: Scoping infections and disrupting breachesSplunk EMEA Webinar: Scoping infections and disrupting breaches
Splunk EMEA Webinar: Scoping infections and disrupting breaches
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout SessionSplunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout SessionSplunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior AnalyticsSplunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior AnalyticsGov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
 Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise
Getting Started with Splunk EnterpriseGetting Started with Splunk Enterprise
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise
Shannon Cuthbertson
 
Splunk for Security-Hands On
Splunk for Security-Hands OnSplunk for Security-Hands On
Splunk for Security-Hands On
Splunk
 
Splunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout Session
Splunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout SessionSplunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout Session
Splunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-OnSplunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk
 
Building a Security Information and Event Management platform at Travis Per...
 	Building a Security Information and Event Management platform at Travis Per... 	Building a Security Information and Event Management platform at Travis Per...
Building a Security Information and Event Management platform at Travis Per...
Splunk
 
Splunk Webinar: Webinar: Die Effizienz Ihres SOC verbessern mit neuen Funktio...
Splunk Webinar: Webinar: Die Effizienz Ihres SOC verbessern mit neuen Funktio...Splunk Webinar: Webinar: Die Effizienz Ihres SOC verbessern mit neuen Funktio...
Splunk Webinar: Webinar: Die Effizienz Ihres SOC verbessern mit neuen Funktio...
Splunk
 
SplunkLive! Zurich 2018: Use Splunk for Incident Response, Orchestration and ...
SplunkLive! Zurich 2018: Use Splunk for Incident Response, Orchestration and ...SplunkLive! Zurich 2018: Use Splunk for Incident Response, Orchestration and ...
SplunkLive! Zurich 2018: Use Splunk for Incident Response, Orchestration and ...
Splunk
 
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise Hands-On
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise Hands-OnGetting Started with Splunk Enterprise Hands-On
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise Hands-On
Splunk
 
Best Practices For Sharing Data Across The Enteprrise
Best Practices For Sharing Data Across The EnteprriseBest Practices For Sharing Data Across The Enteprrise
Best Practices For Sharing Data Across The Enteprrise
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior AnalyticsSplunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
AWS Loft London: Finding the signal in the noise - Effective SecOps with Soph...
AWS Loft London: Finding the signal in the noise - Effective SecOps with Soph...AWS Loft London: Finding the signal in the noise - Effective SecOps with Soph...
AWS Loft London: Finding the signal in the noise - Effective SecOps with Soph...
Splunk
 
Splunk Discovery: Warsaw 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics Methods
Splunk Discovery: Warsaw 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics MethodsSplunk Discovery: Warsaw 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics Methods
Splunk Discovery: Warsaw 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics Methods
Splunk
 
Machine Learning and Analytics Breakout Session
Machine Learning and Analytics Breakout SessionMachine Learning and Analytics Breakout Session
Machine Learning and Analytics Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Splunk EMEA Webinar: Scoping infections and disrupting breaches
Splunk EMEA Webinar: Scoping infections and disrupting breachesSplunk EMEA Webinar: Scoping infections and disrupting breaches
Splunk EMEA Webinar: Scoping infections and disrupting breaches
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout SessionSplunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout SessionSplunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior AnalyticsSplunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior AnalyticsGov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
 Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security and User Behavior Analytics
Splunk
 
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise
Getting Started with Splunk EnterpriseGetting Started with Splunk Enterprise
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise
Shannon Cuthbertson
 
Splunk for Security-Hands On
Splunk for Security-Hands OnSplunk for Security-Hands On
Splunk for Security-Hands On
Splunk
 
Splunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout Session
Splunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout SessionSplunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout Session
Splunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-OnSplunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk
 
Building a Security Information and Event Management platform at Travis Per...
 	Building a Security Information and Event Management platform at Travis Per... 	Building a Security Information and Event Management platform at Travis Per...
Building a Security Information and Event Management platform at Travis Per...
Splunk
 
Splunk Webinar: Webinar: Die Effizienz Ihres SOC verbessern mit neuen Funktio...
Splunk Webinar: Webinar: Die Effizienz Ihres SOC verbessern mit neuen Funktio...Splunk Webinar: Webinar: Die Effizienz Ihres SOC verbessern mit neuen Funktio...
Splunk Webinar: Webinar: Die Effizienz Ihres SOC verbessern mit neuen Funktio...
Splunk
 
SplunkLive! Zurich 2018: Use Splunk for Incident Response, Orchestration and ...
SplunkLive! Zurich 2018: Use Splunk for Incident Response, Orchestration and ...SplunkLive! Zurich 2018: Use Splunk for Incident Response, Orchestration and ...
SplunkLive! Zurich 2018: Use Splunk for Incident Response, Orchestration and ...
Splunk
 
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise Hands-On
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise Hands-OnGetting Started with Splunk Enterprise Hands-On
Getting Started with Splunk Enterprise Hands-On
Splunk
 
Best Practices For Sharing Data Across The Enteprrise
Best Practices For Sharing Data Across The EnteprriseBest Practices For Sharing Data Across The Enteprrise
Best Practices For Sharing Data Across The Enteprrise
Splunk
 

Viewers also liked (6)

ABC's of Privacy and Security
ABC's of Privacy and SecurityABC's of Privacy and Security
ABC's of Privacy and Security
Christina Gagnier
 
Personally Identifiable Information – FTC: Identity theft is the most common ...
Personally Identifiable Information – FTC: Identity theft is the most common ...Personally Identifiable Information – FTC: Identity theft is the most common ...
Personally Identifiable Information – FTC: Identity theft is the most common ...
Jan Carroza
 
Identity and Access Management - RSA 2017 Security Foundations Seminar
Identity and Access Management - RSA 2017 Security Foundations SeminarIdentity and Access Management - RSA 2017 Security Foundations Seminar
Identity and Access Management - RSA 2017 Security Foundations Seminar
Brian Campbell
 
Fundamentals of Business Process Management: A Quick Introduction to Value-Dr...
Fundamentals of Business Process Management: A Quick Introduction to Value-Dr...Fundamentals of Business Process Management: A Quick Introduction to Value-Dr...
Fundamentals of Business Process Management: A Quick Introduction to Value-Dr...
Marlon Dumas
 
WSO2Con USA 2017: Identity and Access Management in the Era of Digital Transf...
WSO2Con USA 2017: Identity and Access Management in the Era of Digital Transf...WSO2Con USA 2017: Identity and Access Management in the Era of Digital Transf...
WSO2Con USA 2017: Identity and Access Management in the Era of Digital Transf...
WSO2
 
Erp presentation
Erp presentationErp presentation
Erp presentation
Amany Faroun
 
ABC's of Privacy and Security
ABC's of Privacy and SecurityABC's of Privacy and Security
ABC's of Privacy and Security
Christina Gagnier
 
Personally Identifiable Information – FTC: Identity theft is the most common ...
Personally Identifiable Information – FTC: Identity theft is the most common ...Personally Identifiable Information – FTC: Identity theft is the most common ...
Personally Identifiable Information – FTC: Identity theft is the most common ...
Jan Carroza
 
Identity and Access Management - RSA 2017 Security Foundations Seminar
Identity and Access Management - RSA 2017 Security Foundations SeminarIdentity and Access Management - RSA 2017 Security Foundations Seminar
Identity and Access Management - RSA 2017 Security Foundations Seminar
Brian Campbell
 
Fundamentals of Business Process Management: A Quick Introduction to Value-Dr...
Fundamentals of Business Process Management: A Quick Introduction to Value-Dr...Fundamentals of Business Process Management: A Quick Introduction to Value-Dr...
Fundamentals of Business Process Management: A Quick Introduction to Value-Dr...
Marlon Dumas
 
WSO2Con USA 2017: Identity and Access Management in the Era of Digital Transf...
WSO2Con USA 2017: Identity and Access Management in the Era of Digital Transf...WSO2Con USA 2017: Identity and Access Management in the Era of Digital Transf...
WSO2Con USA 2017: Identity and Access Management in the Era of Digital Transf...
WSO2
 
Ad

Similar to Splunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout Session (20)

Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-OnSplunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk
 
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & VisualizationCreating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Raffael Marty
 
RIoT (Raiding Internet of Things) by Jacob Holcomb
RIoT  (Raiding Internet of Things)  by Jacob HolcombRIoT  (Raiding Internet of Things)  by Jacob Holcomb
RIoT (Raiding Internet of Things) by Jacob Holcomb
Priyanka Aash
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring UBA
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring UBASplunk for Enterprise Security Featuring UBA
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring UBA
Splunk
 
G3t R00t at IUT
G3t R00t at IUTG3t R00t at IUT
G3t R00t at IUT
Nahidul Kibria
 
Adversary Emulation - DerpCon
Adversary Emulation - DerpConAdversary Emulation - DerpCon
Adversary Emulation - DerpCon
Jorge Orchilles
 
Protecting Financial Networks from Cyber Crime
Protecting Financial Networks from Cyber CrimeProtecting Financial Networks from Cyber Crime
Protecting Financial Networks from Cyber Crime
Lancope, Inc.
 
The Hacking Games - Operation System Vulnerabilities Meetup 29112022
The Hacking Games - Operation System Vulnerabilities Meetup 29112022The Hacking Games - Operation System Vulnerabilities Meetup 29112022
The Hacking Games - Operation System Vulnerabilities Meetup 29112022
lior mazor
 
2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers
2014-12-16  defense news - shutdown the hackers2014-12-16  defense news - shutdown the hackers
2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers
Shawn Wells
 
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSABuilding Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Denim Group
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout SessionSplunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Scalar Security Roadshow - Ottawa Presentation
Scalar Security Roadshow - Ottawa PresentationScalar Security Roadshow - Ottawa Presentation
Scalar Security Roadshow - Ottawa Presentation
Scalar Decisions
 
Using Splunk for Information Security
Using Splunk for Information SecurityUsing Splunk for Information Security
Using Splunk for Information Security
Shannon Cuthbertson
 
Using Splunk for Information Security
Using Splunk for Information SecurityUsing Splunk for Information Security
Using Splunk for Information Security
Splunk
 
SplunkLive! Milano 2016 - Splunk Plenary Session
SplunkLive! Milano 2016 - Splunk Plenary SessionSplunkLive! Milano 2016 - Splunk Plenary Session
SplunkLive! Milano 2016 - Splunk Plenary Session
Splunk
 
SplunkLive! Paris 2016 - Plenary session
SplunkLive! Paris 2016 - Plenary sessionSplunkLive! Paris 2016 - Plenary session
SplunkLive! Paris 2016 - Plenary session
Splunk
 
Are you ready for the next attack? reviewing the sp security checklist (apnic...
Are you ready for the next attack? reviewing the sp security checklist (apnic...Are you ready for the next attack? reviewing the sp security checklist (apnic...
Are you ready for the next attack? reviewing the sp security checklist (apnic...
Barry Greene
 
Are you ready for the next attack? Reviewing the SP Security Checklist
Are you ready for the next attack? Reviewing the SP Security ChecklistAre you ready for the next attack? Reviewing the SP Security Checklist
Are you ready for the next attack? Reviewing the SP Security Checklist
APNIC
 
Software Analytics: Data Analytics for Software Engineering and Security
Software Analytics: Data Analytics for Software Engineering and SecuritySoftware Analytics: Data Analytics for Software Engineering and Security
Software Analytics: Data Analytics for Software Engineering and Security
Tao Xie
 
Getting Started with Splunk Breakout Session
Getting Started with Splunk Breakout SessionGetting Started with Splunk Breakout Session
Getting Started with Splunk Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-OnSplunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk Enterpise for Information Security Hands-On
Splunk
 
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & VisualizationCreating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Raffael Marty
 
RIoT (Raiding Internet of Things) by Jacob Holcomb
RIoT  (Raiding Internet of Things)  by Jacob HolcombRIoT  (Raiding Internet of Things)  by Jacob Holcomb
RIoT (Raiding Internet of Things) by Jacob Holcomb
Priyanka Aash
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring UBA
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring UBASplunk for Enterprise Security Featuring UBA
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring UBA
Splunk
 
Adversary Emulation - DerpCon
Adversary Emulation - DerpConAdversary Emulation - DerpCon
Adversary Emulation - DerpCon
Jorge Orchilles
 
Protecting Financial Networks from Cyber Crime
Protecting Financial Networks from Cyber CrimeProtecting Financial Networks from Cyber Crime
Protecting Financial Networks from Cyber Crime
Lancope, Inc.
 
The Hacking Games - Operation System Vulnerabilities Meetup 29112022
The Hacking Games - Operation System Vulnerabilities Meetup 29112022The Hacking Games - Operation System Vulnerabilities Meetup 29112022
The Hacking Games - Operation System Vulnerabilities Meetup 29112022
lior mazor
 
2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers
2014-12-16  defense news - shutdown the hackers2014-12-16  defense news - shutdown the hackers
2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers
Shawn Wells
 
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSABuilding Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Denim Group
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout SessionSplunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk for Enterprise Security featuring UBA Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Scalar Security Roadshow - Ottawa Presentation
Scalar Security Roadshow - Ottawa PresentationScalar Security Roadshow - Ottawa Presentation
Scalar Security Roadshow - Ottawa Presentation
Scalar Decisions
 
Using Splunk for Information Security
Using Splunk for Information SecurityUsing Splunk for Information Security
Using Splunk for Information Security
Shannon Cuthbertson
 
Using Splunk for Information Security
Using Splunk for Information SecurityUsing Splunk for Information Security
Using Splunk for Information Security
Splunk
 
SplunkLive! Milano 2016 - Splunk Plenary Session
SplunkLive! Milano 2016 - Splunk Plenary SessionSplunkLive! Milano 2016 - Splunk Plenary Session
SplunkLive! Milano 2016 - Splunk Plenary Session
Splunk
 
SplunkLive! Paris 2016 - Plenary session
SplunkLive! Paris 2016 - Plenary sessionSplunkLive! Paris 2016 - Plenary session
SplunkLive! Paris 2016 - Plenary session
Splunk
 
Are you ready for the next attack? reviewing the sp security checklist (apnic...
Are you ready for the next attack? reviewing the sp security checklist (apnic...Are you ready for the next attack? reviewing the sp security checklist (apnic...
Are you ready for the next attack? reviewing the sp security checklist (apnic...
Barry Greene
 
Are you ready for the next attack? Reviewing the SP Security Checklist
Are you ready for the next attack? Reviewing the SP Security ChecklistAre you ready for the next attack? Reviewing the SP Security Checklist
Are you ready for the next attack? Reviewing the SP Security Checklist
APNIC
 
Software Analytics: Data Analytics for Software Engineering and Security
Software Analytics: Data Analytics for Software Engineering and SecuritySoftware Analytics: Data Analytics for Software Engineering and Security
Software Analytics: Data Analytics for Software Engineering and Security
Tao Xie
 
Getting Started with Splunk Breakout Session
Getting Started with Splunk Breakout SessionGetting Started with Splunk Breakout Session
Getting Started with Splunk Breakout Session
Splunk
 
Ad

More from Splunk (20)

Splunk Security Update | Public Sector Summit Germany 2025
Splunk Security Update | Public Sector Summit Germany 2025Splunk Security Update | Public Sector Summit Germany 2025
Splunk Security Update | Public Sector Summit Germany 2025
Splunk
 
Building Resilience with Energy Management for the Public Sector
Building Resilience with Energy Management for the Public SectorBuilding Resilience with Energy Management for the Public Sector
Building Resilience with Energy Management for the Public Sector
Splunk
 
IT-Lagebild: Observability for Resilience (SVA)
IT-Lagebild: Observability for Resilience (SVA)IT-Lagebild: Observability for Resilience (SVA)
IT-Lagebild: Observability for Resilience (SVA)
Splunk
 
Nach dem SOC-Aufbau ist vor der Automatisierung (OFD Baden-Württemberg)
Nach dem SOC-Aufbau ist vor der Automatisierung (OFD Baden-Württemberg)Nach dem SOC-Aufbau ist vor der Automatisierung (OFD Baden-Württemberg)
Nach dem SOC-Aufbau ist vor der Automatisierung (OFD Baden-Württemberg)
Splunk
 
Monitoring einer Sicheren Inter-Netzwerk Architektur (SINA)
Monitoring einer Sicheren Inter-Netzwerk Architektur (SINA)Monitoring einer Sicheren Inter-Netzwerk Architektur (SINA)
Monitoring einer Sicheren Inter-Netzwerk Architektur (SINA)
Splunk
 
Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem Attack Analyser (gematik)
Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem Attack Analyser (gematik)Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem Attack Analyser (gematik)
Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem Attack Analyser (gematik)
Splunk
 
Cisco XDR & Splunk SIEM - stronger together (DATAGROUP Cyber Security)
Cisco XDR & Splunk SIEM - stronger together (DATAGROUP Cyber Security)Cisco XDR & Splunk SIEM - stronger together (DATAGROUP Cyber Security)
Cisco XDR & Splunk SIEM - stronger together (DATAGROUP Cyber Security)
Splunk
 
Security - Mit Sicherheit zum Erfolg (Telekom)
Security - Mit Sicherheit zum Erfolg (Telekom)Security - Mit Sicherheit zum Erfolg (Telekom)
Security - Mit Sicherheit zum Erfolg (Telekom)
Splunk
 
One Cisco - Splunk Public Sector Summit Germany April 2025
One Cisco - Splunk Public Sector Summit Germany April 2025One Cisco - Splunk Public Sector Summit Germany April 2025
One Cisco - Splunk Public Sector Summit Germany April 2025
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Data analysis as a routine
.conf Go 2023 - Data analysis as a routine.conf Go 2023 - Data analysis as a routine
.conf Go 2023 - Data analysis as a routine
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - How KPN drives Customer Satisfaction on IPTV
.conf Go 2023 - How KPN drives Customer Satisfaction on IPTV.conf Go 2023 - How KPN drives Customer Satisfaction on IPTV
.conf Go 2023 - How KPN drives Customer Satisfaction on IPTV
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Navegando la normativa SOX (Telefónica)
.conf Go 2023 - Navegando la normativa SOX (Telefónica).conf Go 2023 - Navegando la normativa SOX (Telefónica)
.conf Go 2023 - Navegando la normativa SOX (Telefónica)
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Raiffeisen Bank International
.conf Go 2023 - Raiffeisen Bank International.conf Go 2023 - Raiffeisen Bank International
.conf Go 2023 - Raiffeisen Bank International
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - På liv og død Om sikkerhetsarbeid i Norsk helsenett
.conf Go 2023 - På liv og død Om sikkerhetsarbeid i Norsk helsenett .conf Go 2023 - På liv og død Om sikkerhetsarbeid i Norsk helsenett
.conf Go 2023 - På liv og død Om sikkerhetsarbeid i Norsk helsenett
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Many roads lead to Rome - this was our journey (Julius Bär)
.conf Go 2023 - Many roads lead to Rome - this was our journey (Julius Bär).conf Go 2023 - Many roads lead to Rome - this was our journey (Julius Bär)
.conf Go 2023 - Many roads lead to Rome - this was our journey (Julius Bär)
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Das passende Rezept für die digitale (Security) Revolution zu...
.conf Go 2023 - Das passende Rezept für die digitale (Security) Revolution zu....conf Go 2023 - Das passende Rezept für die digitale (Security) Revolution zu...
.conf Go 2023 - Das passende Rezept für die digitale (Security) Revolution zu...
Splunk
 
.conf go 2023 - Cyber Resilienz – Herausforderungen und Ansatz für Energiever...
.conf go 2023 - Cyber Resilienz – Herausforderungen und Ansatz für Energiever....conf go 2023 - Cyber Resilienz – Herausforderungen und Ansatz für Energiever...
.conf go 2023 - Cyber Resilienz – Herausforderungen und Ansatz für Energiever...
Splunk
 
.conf go 2023 - De NOC a CSIRT (Cellnex)
.conf go 2023 - De NOC a CSIRT (Cellnex).conf go 2023 - De NOC a CSIRT (Cellnex)
.conf go 2023 - De NOC a CSIRT (Cellnex)
Splunk
 
conf go 2023 - El camino hacia la ciberseguridad (ABANCA)
conf go 2023 - El camino hacia la ciberseguridad (ABANCA)conf go 2023 - El camino hacia la ciberseguridad (ABANCA)
conf go 2023 - El camino hacia la ciberseguridad (ABANCA)
Splunk
 
Splunk - BMW connects business and IT with data driven operations SRE and O11y
Splunk - BMW connects business and IT with data driven operations SRE and O11ySplunk - BMW connects business and IT with data driven operations SRE and O11y
Splunk - BMW connects business and IT with data driven operations SRE and O11y
Splunk
 
Splunk Security Update | Public Sector Summit Germany 2025
Splunk Security Update | Public Sector Summit Germany 2025Splunk Security Update | Public Sector Summit Germany 2025
Splunk Security Update | Public Sector Summit Germany 2025
Splunk
 
Building Resilience with Energy Management for the Public Sector
Building Resilience with Energy Management for the Public SectorBuilding Resilience with Energy Management for the Public Sector
Building Resilience with Energy Management for the Public Sector
Splunk
 
IT-Lagebild: Observability for Resilience (SVA)
IT-Lagebild: Observability for Resilience (SVA)IT-Lagebild: Observability for Resilience (SVA)
IT-Lagebild: Observability for Resilience (SVA)
Splunk
 
Nach dem SOC-Aufbau ist vor der Automatisierung (OFD Baden-Württemberg)
Nach dem SOC-Aufbau ist vor der Automatisierung (OFD Baden-Württemberg)Nach dem SOC-Aufbau ist vor der Automatisierung (OFD Baden-Württemberg)
Nach dem SOC-Aufbau ist vor der Automatisierung (OFD Baden-Württemberg)
Splunk
 
Monitoring einer Sicheren Inter-Netzwerk Architektur (SINA)
Monitoring einer Sicheren Inter-Netzwerk Architektur (SINA)Monitoring einer Sicheren Inter-Netzwerk Architektur (SINA)
Monitoring einer Sicheren Inter-Netzwerk Architektur (SINA)
Splunk
 
Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem Attack Analyser (gematik)
Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem Attack Analyser (gematik)Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem Attack Analyser (gematik)
Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem Attack Analyser (gematik)
Splunk
 
Cisco XDR & Splunk SIEM - stronger together (DATAGROUP Cyber Security)
Cisco XDR & Splunk SIEM - stronger together (DATAGROUP Cyber Security)Cisco XDR & Splunk SIEM - stronger together (DATAGROUP Cyber Security)
Cisco XDR & Splunk SIEM - stronger together (DATAGROUP Cyber Security)
Splunk
 
Security - Mit Sicherheit zum Erfolg (Telekom)
Security - Mit Sicherheit zum Erfolg (Telekom)Security - Mit Sicherheit zum Erfolg (Telekom)
Security - Mit Sicherheit zum Erfolg (Telekom)
Splunk
 
One Cisco - Splunk Public Sector Summit Germany April 2025
One Cisco - Splunk Public Sector Summit Germany April 2025One Cisco - Splunk Public Sector Summit Germany April 2025
One Cisco - Splunk Public Sector Summit Germany April 2025
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Data analysis as a routine
.conf Go 2023 - Data analysis as a routine.conf Go 2023 - Data analysis as a routine
.conf Go 2023 - Data analysis as a routine
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - How KPN drives Customer Satisfaction on IPTV
.conf Go 2023 - How KPN drives Customer Satisfaction on IPTV.conf Go 2023 - How KPN drives Customer Satisfaction on IPTV
.conf Go 2023 - How KPN drives Customer Satisfaction on IPTV
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Navegando la normativa SOX (Telefónica)
.conf Go 2023 - Navegando la normativa SOX (Telefónica).conf Go 2023 - Navegando la normativa SOX (Telefónica)
.conf Go 2023 - Navegando la normativa SOX (Telefónica)
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Raiffeisen Bank International
.conf Go 2023 - Raiffeisen Bank International.conf Go 2023 - Raiffeisen Bank International
.conf Go 2023 - Raiffeisen Bank International
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - På liv og død Om sikkerhetsarbeid i Norsk helsenett
.conf Go 2023 - På liv og død Om sikkerhetsarbeid i Norsk helsenett .conf Go 2023 - På liv og død Om sikkerhetsarbeid i Norsk helsenett
.conf Go 2023 - På liv og død Om sikkerhetsarbeid i Norsk helsenett
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Many roads lead to Rome - this was our journey (Julius Bär)
.conf Go 2023 - Many roads lead to Rome - this was our journey (Julius Bär).conf Go 2023 - Many roads lead to Rome - this was our journey (Julius Bär)
.conf Go 2023 - Many roads lead to Rome - this was our journey (Julius Bär)
Splunk
 
.conf Go 2023 - Das passende Rezept für die digitale (Security) Revolution zu...
.conf Go 2023 - Das passende Rezept für die digitale (Security) Revolution zu....conf Go 2023 - Das passende Rezept für die digitale (Security) Revolution zu...
.conf Go 2023 - Das passende Rezept für die digitale (Security) Revolution zu...
Splunk
 
.conf go 2023 - Cyber Resilienz – Herausforderungen und Ansatz für Energiever...
.conf go 2023 - Cyber Resilienz – Herausforderungen und Ansatz für Energiever....conf go 2023 - Cyber Resilienz – Herausforderungen und Ansatz für Energiever...
.conf go 2023 - Cyber Resilienz – Herausforderungen und Ansatz für Energiever...
Splunk
 
.conf go 2023 - De NOC a CSIRT (Cellnex)
.conf go 2023 - De NOC a CSIRT (Cellnex).conf go 2023 - De NOC a CSIRT (Cellnex)
.conf go 2023 - De NOC a CSIRT (Cellnex)
Splunk
 
conf go 2023 - El camino hacia la ciberseguridad (ABANCA)
conf go 2023 - El camino hacia la ciberseguridad (ABANCA)conf go 2023 - El camino hacia la ciberseguridad (ABANCA)
conf go 2023 - El camino hacia la ciberseguridad (ABANCA)
Splunk
 
Splunk - BMW connects business and IT with data driven operations SRE and O11y
Splunk - BMW connects business and IT with data driven operations SRE and O11ySplunk - BMW connects business and IT with data driven operations SRE and O11y
Splunk - BMW connects business and IT with data driven operations SRE and O11y
Splunk
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Enhancing ICU Intelligence: How Our Functional Testing Enabled a Healthcare I...
Enhancing ICU Intelligence: How Our Functional Testing Enabled a Healthcare I...Enhancing ICU Intelligence: How Our Functional Testing Enabled a Healthcare I...
Enhancing ICU Intelligence: How Our Functional Testing Enabled a Healthcare I...
Impelsys Inc.
 
Manifest Pre-Seed Update | A Humanoid OEM Deeptech In France
Manifest Pre-Seed Update | A Humanoid OEM Deeptech In FranceManifest Pre-Seed Update | A Humanoid OEM Deeptech In France
Manifest Pre-Seed Update | A Humanoid OEM Deeptech In France
chb3
 
Mobile App Development Company in Saudi Arabia
Mobile App Development Company in Saudi ArabiaMobile App Development Company in Saudi Arabia
Mobile App Development Company in Saudi Arabia
Steve Jonas
 
Noah Loul Shares 5 Steps to Implement AI Agents for Maximum Business Efficien...
Noah Loul Shares 5 Steps to Implement AI Agents for Maximum Business Efficien...Noah Loul Shares 5 Steps to Implement AI Agents for Maximum Business Efficien...
Noah Loul Shares 5 Steps to Implement AI Agents for Maximum Business Efficien...
Noah Loul
 
Dev Dives: Automate and orchestrate your processes with UiPath Maestro
Dev Dives: Automate and orchestrate your processes with UiPath MaestroDev Dives: Automate and orchestrate your processes with UiPath Maestro
Dev Dives: Automate and orchestrate your processes with UiPath Maestro
UiPathCommunity
 
ThousandEyes Partner Innovation Updates for May 2025
ThousandEyes Partner Innovation Updates for May 2025ThousandEyes Partner Innovation Updates for May 2025
ThousandEyes Partner Innovation Updates for May 2025
ThousandEyes
 
Electronic_Mail_Attacks-1-35.pdf by xploit
Electronic_Mail_Attacks-1-35.pdf by xploitElectronic_Mail_Attacks-1-35.pdf by xploit
Electronic_Mail_Attacks-1-35.pdf by xploit
niftliyevhuseyn
 
Complete Guide to Advanced Logistics Management Software in Riyadh.pdf
Complete Guide to Advanced Logistics Management Software in Riyadh.pdfComplete Guide to Advanced Logistics Management Software in Riyadh.pdf
Complete Guide to Advanced Logistics Management Software in Riyadh.pdf
Software Company
 
Semantic Cultivators : The Critical Future Role to Enable AI
Semantic Cultivators : The Critical Future Role to Enable AISemantic Cultivators : The Critical Future Role to Enable AI
Semantic Cultivators : The Critical Future Role to Enable AI
artmondano
 
Role of Data Annotation Services in AI-Powered Manufacturing
Role of Data Annotation Services in AI-Powered ManufacturingRole of Data Annotation Services in AI-Powered Manufacturing
Role of Data Annotation Services in AI-Powered Manufacturing
Andrew Leo
 
Quantum Computing Quick Research Guide by Arthur Morgan
Quantum Computing Quick Research Guide by Arthur MorganQuantum Computing Quick Research Guide by Arthur Morgan
Quantum Computing Quick Research Guide by Arthur Morgan
Arthur Morgan
 
Drupalcamp Finland – Measuring Front-end Energy Consumption
Drupalcamp Finland – Measuring Front-end Energy ConsumptionDrupalcamp Finland – Measuring Front-end Energy Consumption
Drupalcamp Finland – Measuring Front-end Energy Consumption
Exove
 
Procurement Insights Cost To Value Guide.pptx
Procurement Insights Cost To Value Guide.pptxProcurement Insights Cost To Value Guide.pptx
Procurement Insights Cost To Value Guide.pptx
Jon Hansen
 
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tec...
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tec...Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tec...
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tec...
BookNet Canada
 
Technology Trends in 2025: AI and Big Data Analytics
Technology Trends in 2025: AI and Big Data AnalyticsTechnology Trends in 2025: AI and Big Data Analytics
Technology Trends in 2025: AI and Big Data Analytics
InData Labs
 
Linux Professional Institute LPIC-1 Exam.pdf
Linux Professional Institute LPIC-1 Exam.pdfLinux Professional Institute LPIC-1 Exam.pdf
Linux Professional Institute LPIC-1 Exam.pdf
RHCSA Guru
 
DevOpsDays Atlanta 2025 - Building 10x Development Organizations.pptx
DevOpsDays Atlanta 2025 - Building 10x Development Organizations.pptxDevOpsDays Atlanta 2025 - Building 10x Development Organizations.pptx
DevOpsDays Atlanta 2025 - Building 10x Development Organizations.pptx
Justin Reock
 
#StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tech Forum 2025
#StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tech Forum 2025#StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tech Forum 2025
#StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tech Forum 2025
BookNet Canada
 
AI and Data Privacy in 2025: Global Trends
AI and Data Privacy in 2025: Global TrendsAI and Data Privacy in 2025: Global Trends
AI and Data Privacy in 2025: Global Trends
InData Labs
 
Rusty Waters: Elevating Lakehouses Beyond Spark
Rusty Waters: Elevating Lakehouses Beyond SparkRusty Waters: Elevating Lakehouses Beyond Spark
Rusty Waters: Elevating Lakehouses Beyond Spark
carlyakerly1
 
Enhancing ICU Intelligence: How Our Functional Testing Enabled a Healthcare I...
Enhancing ICU Intelligence: How Our Functional Testing Enabled a Healthcare I...Enhancing ICU Intelligence: How Our Functional Testing Enabled a Healthcare I...
Enhancing ICU Intelligence: How Our Functional Testing Enabled a Healthcare I...
Impelsys Inc.
 
Manifest Pre-Seed Update | A Humanoid OEM Deeptech In France
Manifest Pre-Seed Update | A Humanoid OEM Deeptech In FranceManifest Pre-Seed Update | A Humanoid OEM Deeptech In France
Manifest Pre-Seed Update | A Humanoid OEM Deeptech In France
chb3
 
Mobile App Development Company in Saudi Arabia
Mobile App Development Company in Saudi ArabiaMobile App Development Company in Saudi Arabia
Mobile App Development Company in Saudi Arabia
Steve Jonas
 
Noah Loul Shares 5 Steps to Implement AI Agents for Maximum Business Efficien...
Noah Loul Shares 5 Steps to Implement AI Agents for Maximum Business Efficien...Noah Loul Shares 5 Steps to Implement AI Agents for Maximum Business Efficien...
Noah Loul Shares 5 Steps to Implement AI Agents for Maximum Business Efficien...
Noah Loul
 
Dev Dives: Automate and orchestrate your processes with UiPath Maestro
Dev Dives: Automate and orchestrate your processes with UiPath MaestroDev Dives: Automate and orchestrate your processes with UiPath Maestro
Dev Dives: Automate and orchestrate your processes with UiPath Maestro
UiPathCommunity
 
ThousandEyes Partner Innovation Updates for May 2025
ThousandEyes Partner Innovation Updates for May 2025ThousandEyes Partner Innovation Updates for May 2025
ThousandEyes Partner Innovation Updates for May 2025
ThousandEyes
 
Electronic_Mail_Attacks-1-35.pdf by xploit
Electronic_Mail_Attacks-1-35.pdf by xploitElectronic_Mail_Attacks-1-35.pdf by xploit
Electronic_Mail_Attacks-1-35.pdf by xploit
niftliyevhuseyn
 
Complete Guide to Advanced Logistics Management Software in Riyadh.pdf
Complete Guide to Advanced Logistics Management Software in Riyadh.pdfComplete Guide to Advanced Logistics Management Software in Riyadh.pdf
Complete Guide to Advanced Logistics Management Software in Riyadh.pdf
Software Company
 
Semantic Cultivators : The Critical Future Role to Enable AI
Semantic Cultivators : The Critical Future Role to Enable AISemantic Cultivators : The Critical Future Role to Enable AI
Semantic Cultivators : The Critical Future Role to Enable AI
artmondano
 
Role of Data Annotation Services in AI-Powered Manufacturing
Role of Data Annotation Services in AI-Powered ManufacturingRole of Data Annotation Services in AI-Powered Manufacturing
Role of Data Annotation Services in AI-Powered Manufacturing
Andrew Leo
 
Quantum Computing Quick Research Guide by Arthur Morgan
Quantum Computing Quick Research Guide by Arthur MorganQuantum Computing Quick Research Guide by Arthur Morgan
Quantum Computing Quick Research Guide by Arthur Morgan
Arthur Morgan
 
Drupalcamp Finland – Measuring Front-end Energy Consumption
Drupalcamp Finland – Measuring Front-end Energy ConsumptionDrupalcamp Finland – Measuring Front-end Energy Consumption
Drupalcamp Finland – Measuring Front-end Energy Consumption
Exove
 
Procurement Insights Cost To Value Guide.pptx
Procurement Insights Cost To Value Guide.pptxProcurement Insights Cost To Value Guide.pptx
Procurement Insights Cost To Value Guide.pptx
Jon Hansen
 
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tec...
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tec...Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tec...
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tec...
BookNet Canada
 
Technology Trends in 2025: AI and Big Data Analytics
Technology Trends in 2025: AI and Big Data AnalyticsTechnology Trends in 2025: AI and Big Data Analytics
Technology Trends in 2025: AI and Big Data Analytics
InData Labs
 
Linux Professional Institute LPIC-1 Exam.pdf
Linux Professional Institute LPIC-1 Exam.pdfLinux Professional Institute LPIC-1 Exam.pdf
Linux Professional Institute LPIC-1 Exam.pdf
RHCSA Guru
 
DevOpsDays Atlanta 2025 - Building 10x Development Organizations.pptx
DevOpsDays Atlanta 2025 - Building 10x Development Organizations.pptxDevOpsDays Atlanta 2025 - Building 10x Development Organizations.pptx
DevOpsDays Atlanta 2025 - Building 10x Development Organizations.pptx
Justin Reock
 
#StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tech Forum 2025
#StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tech Forum 2025#StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tech Forum 2025
#StandardsGoals for 2025: Standards & certification roundup - Tech Forum 2025
BookNet Canada
 
AI and Data Privacy in 2025: Global Trends
AI and Data Privacy in 2025: Global TrendsAI and Data Privacy in 2025: Global Trends
AI and Data Privacy in 2025: Global Trends
InData Labs
 
Rusty Waters: Elevating Lakehouses Beyond Spark
Rusty Waters: Elevating Lakehouses Beyond SparkRusty Waters: Elevating Lakehouses Beyond Spark
Rusty Waters: Elevating Lakehouses Beyond Spark
carlyakerly1
 

Splunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Breakout Session

  • 1. Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc. Splunk Enterprise for InfoSec Hands-On Calgary, June 15, 2016
  • 3. Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc. Intro
  • 4. Machine data contains a definitive record of all interactions Splunk is a very effective platform to collect, store, and analyze all of that data Human Machine Machine Machine
  • 5. Mainframe Data VMware Platform for Machine Data Splunk Solutions > Easy to Adopt Exchange PCISecurity Relational Databases MobileForwarders Syslog / TCP / Other Sensors & Control Systems Across Data Sources, Use Cases & Consumption Models Wire Data IT Svc Int Splunk Premium Solutions & Apps Rich Ecosystem of Apps ITSI UBA UBA
  • 6. 6 Rapid Ascent in the Gartner SIEM Magic Quadrant* *Gartner, Inc., SIEM Magic Quadrant 2011-2015. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publication and not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner’s research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, express or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. 2015 Leader and the only vendor to improve its visionary position 2014 Leader 2013 Leader 2012 Challenger 2011 Niche Player 2015
  • 7. Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc. Web Attacks
  • 8. 8 OWASP 2013 Top 10 [10] Unvalidated redirects and forwards [9] Using components with known vulnerabilities [8] Cross-site request forgery [7] Missing function level access control [6] Sensitive data exposure [5] Security misconfiguration [4] Insecure direct object reference [3] Cross-site scripting (XSS) [2] Broken authentication and session management
  • 9. 9 [1] Injection SQL injection Code injection Command injection LDAP injection XML injection XPath injection SSI injection IMAP/SMTP injection Buffer overflow
  • 10. 10 Why did I get breached? SQLi has been around a very, very long time
  • 11. 11 Imperva Web Application Attacks Report (WAAR), 2015
  • 12. 12 The anatomy of a SQL injection attack SELECT * FROM users WHERE email='[email protected]' OR 1 = 1 -- ' AND password='xxx'; [email protected]' OR 1 = 1 -- ' xxx [email protected] 1234 An attacker might supply:
  • 13. 13 TalkTalk: PII/Financial data for 4M customers vTech: PII for 5M adults+kids
  • 14. 14 …and so far this year…
  • 15. 15 OR
  • 16. 16 You might need help! Follow along with the narration in the app, at least for the first few examples.
  • 18. 18 Step by Step? Good for later!
  • 19. 19 How step-by-step works But don’t use it now.
  • 20. 20 You’ve got this! Copy and paste the example searches into the “search bar” in the “SplunkLive Security 2016” app.
  • 23. 23 What have we here? Our learning environment consists of: • 8 Publically-accessible single Splunk servers • Each with ~5.5M events, from real environments but massaged: • Windows Security events • Apache web access logs • Bro DNS & HTTP • Palo Alto traffic logs • Some other various bits
  • 24. Let’s get hands-on! Web Attacks: Basic
  • 25. 25 https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1528/ Search for possible SQL injection in your events:  looks for patterns in URI query field to see if anyone has injected them with SQL statements  use standard deviations that are 2.5 times greater than the average length of your URI query field Macros used • sqlinjection_pattern(sourcetype, uri query field) • sqlinjection_stats(sourcetype, uri query field)
  • 26. 26 Regular Expression FTW sqlinjection_rex is a search macro. It contains: (?<injection>(?i)select.*?from|union.*?select|'$|delete.*?from|update.*?set|alter.*?table|([ %27|'](%20)*=(%20)*[%27|'])|w*[%27|']or) Which means: In the string we are given, look for ANY of the following matches and put that into the “injection” field. • Anything containing SELECT followed by FROM • Anything containing UNION followed by SELECT • Anything with a ‘ at the end • Anything containing DELETE followed by FROM • Anything containing UPDATE followed by SET • Anything containing ALTER followed by TABLE • A %27 OR a ‘ and then a %20 and any amount of characters then a %20 and then a %27 OR a ‘ • Note: %27 is encoded “’” and %20 is encoded <space> • Any amount of word characters followed by a %27 OR a ‘ and then “or”
  • 27. Let’s get hands-on! Web Attacks: Advanced
  • 28. 28 Bonus: Try out the SQL Injection app!
  • 29. 29 Summary: Web attacks/SQL injection SQL injection provide attackers with easy access to data Detecting advanced SQL injection is hard – use an app! Understand where SQLi is happening on your network and put a stop to it Augment your WAF with enterprise-wide Splunk searches
  • 30. Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc. Lateral Movement
  • 31. 31 Poking around An attacker hacks a non-privileged user system. So what?
  • 32. Lateral Movement Lateral Movement is the expansion of systems controlled, and data accessed.
  • 33. 33 Most famous Lateral Movement attack? (excluding password re-use) Pass the Hash!
  • 34. 34 This and other techniques used in destructive Sands breach… …. and at Sony, too
  • 35. 35 Detecting Legacy PtH Look for Windows Events: Event ID: 4624 or 4625 Logon type: 3 Auth package: NTLM User account is not a domain logon, or Anonymous Logon …this is trivially easy in Splunk
  • 36. Let’s get hands on! Lateral Movement: Legacy
  • 37. 37 Then it got harder • Pass the Hash tools have improved • Adjusting of jitter, other metrics • So let’s detect lateral movement differently – just looking at Windows event codes isn’t enough
  • 38. 38 Network traffic provides source of truth I usually talk to 10 hosts Then one day I talk to 10,000 hosts ALARM!
  • 39. Let’s get hands on! Lateral Movement: Network Traffic
  • 40. 40 iz so hard… u haz magic?
  • 41. 41 iz so hard… u haz magic?Check out UBA • out-of-the-box solution • unknown and hidden threats • machine learning • behavior baseline • peer group analytics • advanced correlation
  • 42. 42 Summary: Lateral Movement Attacker success defines scope of a breach High difficulty, high importance Worth doing in Splunk Easy with UBA
  • 43. Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc. DNS Exfiltration
  • 46. 46 DNS exfil tends to be overlooked within an ocean of DNS data. Let’s fix that! DNS exfiltration
  • 47. 47 FrameworkPOS: a card-stealing program that exfiltrates data from the target’s network by transmitting it as domain name system (DNS) traffic But the big difference is the way how stolen data is exfiltrated: the malware used DNS requests! https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23942-new-frameworkpos- variant-exfiltrates-data-via-dns-requests “ ” … few organizations actually keep detailed logs or records of the DNS traffic traversing their networks — making it an ideal way to siphon data from a hacked network. http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/05/deconstructing-the-2014-sally- beauty-breach/#more-30872 “ ” DNS exfiltration
  • 48. 48 https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/ DNS exfil detection – tricks of the trade  parse URLs & complicated TLDs (Top Level Domain)  calculate Shannon Entropy List of provided lookups • ut_parse_simple(url) • ut_parse(url, list) or ut_parse_extended(url, list) • ut_shannon(word) • ut_countset(word, set) • ut_suites(word, sets) • ut_meaning(word) • ut_bayesian(word) • ut_levenshtein(word1, word2)
  • 49. 49 Examples • The domain aaaaa.com has a Shannon Entropy score of 1.8 (very low) • The domain google.com has a Shannon Entropy score of 2.6 (rather low) • A00wlkj—(-a.aslkn-C.a.2.sk.esasdfasf1111)-890209uC.4.com has a Shannon Entropy score of 3 (rather high) Layman’s definition: a score reflecting the randomness or measure of uncertainty of a string Shannon Entropy
  • 50. 50 Detecting Data Exfiltration index=bro sourcetype=bro_dns | `ut_parse(query)` | `ut_shannon(ut_subdomain)` | eval sublen = length(ut_subdomain) | table ut_domain ut_subdomain ut_shannon sublen TIPS  Leverage our Bro DNS data  Calculate Shannon Entropy scores  Calculate subdomain length  Display Details
  • 51. 51 Detecting Data Exfiltration … | stats count avg(ut_shannon) as avg_sha avg(sublen) as avg_sublen stdev(sublen) as stdev_sublen by ut_domain | search avg_sha>3 avg_sublen>20 stdev_sublen<2 TIPS  Leverage our Bro DNS data  Calculate Shannon Entropy scores  Calculate subdomain length  Display Details  Display count, scores, lengths, deviations
  • 52. 52 Detecting Data Exfiltration RESULTS • Exfiltrating data requires many DNS requests – look for high counts • DNS exfiltration to mooo.com and chickenkiller.com
  • 53. Let’s get hands on! DNS Exfiltration
  • 54. 54 Summary: DNS exfiltration Exfiltration by DNS and ICMP is a very common technique Many organizations do not analyze DNS activity – do not be like them! No DNS logs? No Splunk Stream? Look at FW byte counts
  • 55. Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc. Wrap-up / Q&A
  • 56. 56 Summary Multiple phases to modern attacks Deploy detection across all phases Also consider adaptive response! Stay abreast of modern advancements Session hands-on guide: https://splunk.box.com/v/SplunkLive2016CalgarySec
  • 57. 57 SEPT 26-29, 2016 WALT DISNEY WORLD, ORLANDO SWAN AND DOLPHIN RESORTS • 5000+ IT & Business Professionals • 3 days of technical content • 165+ sessions • 80+ Customer Speakers • 35+ Apps in Splunk Apps Showcase • 75+ Technology Partners • 1:1 networking: Ask The Experts and Security Experts, Birds of a Feather and Chalk Talks • NEW hands-on labs! • Expanded show floor, Dashboards Control Room & Clinic, and MORE! The 7th Annual Splunk Worldwide Users’ Conference PLUS Splunk University • Three days: Sept 24-26, 2016 • Get Splunk Certified for FREE! • Get CPE credits for CISSP, CAP, SSCP • Save thousands on Splunk education!

Editor's Notes

  • #2: - Real world problems and data - Tons of ways to do searches - Context-specific adjustments - Starting points - Because real data, real noise to filter. - Some quirks to the data
  • #3: We’ll do a intro of Splunk for security. We’ll then move pretty quickly to our hands-on exercise in three phases where we cover web attacks, lateral movement, and DNS exfil The Splunk examples will go from very simple, to very complex – all in the course of an hour Afterwards you will have all of the material we have gone through, and the servers will stay up through tonight If you require some additional time, we can discuss that after the talk
  • #5: Splunk excels at creating a data fabric Machine data: Anything with a timestamp, regardless of incoming format. Throw it all in there! Collect it. Store it in one place. Make it accessible for search/analytics/reporting/alerting. DETECTION NOT PREVENTION! ASSUME BREACH! So we need a place we can go to DETECT attacks. DETECT breaches. DETECT the “weird.” So if you had a place to see “everything” that happened… ….what would that mean for your SOC and IR teams?
  • #6: The Splunk platform consists of multiple products and deployment models to fit your needs. Splunk Enterprise – for on-premise deployment Splunk Cloud – Fully managed service with 100% SLA and all the capabilities of Splunk Enterprise…in the Cloud Splunk Light – log search and analytics for small IT environments Hunk – for analytics on data in Hadoop The products can pull in data from virtually any source to support multiple use cases. Splunk Apps extend and simplify deployments by providing pre-packaged content designed for specific use cases and data types.
  • #7: Our rapid ascent reflects the customer traction we have and value we deliver to customers – with thousands of security customers and 40% year-over-year growth, we are the fastest growing SIEM vendor in the market. 2011 was our first time in the MQ; In 2 short years we raced up to the top quadrant in the MQ.
  • #9: The goal of the OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project ) Top Ten is to raise awareness about application security by identifying some of the most critical risks facing organizations today. This list is refreshed every three years – we’re currently waiting on the 2016 one. These were the top 10 through 2 for 2013. What is #1?
  • #10: These are examples of injections flaws that occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker essentially tricks the interpreter into executing unintended commands or bypassing authorization/authentication. Most of us are familiar with SQL injection attacks, the risks they pose to our environments and maybe even the inner workings of the threat itself, because they have been around for about 10 years. However, the attack types can vary and mitigating them efficiently requires an understanding of the basic types of SQL injection attacks. SQL injection has been around so long…
  • #11: …so long, that this is what Google looked like when SQL injection first became a topic of discussion: 1998. With 18 years of ways to prevent SQLi, you would think that this isn’t a problem anymore, right?
  • #12: Wrong. Check out this survey conducted by Imperva – ostensibly to sell their web application firewalls, but still. This survey was just conducted last year…we can see that SQL injection attempts appear to happen in concentrated bursts, perhaps the result of specific campaigns. Regardless of when they happen, SQL injection attacks remain some of the most damaging to organizations in terms of records compromised and lost value. Attribution: http://www.imperva.com/docs/HII_Web_Application_Attack_Report_Ed6.pdf
  • #13: A SQL injection needs just two conditions to exist – a relational database that uses SQL, and a user controllable input which is directly used in an SQL query. An attacker would get into your organization though unsanitized user input. Instead of entering a “real” username or password, the hacker will enter a SQL command (or a JSON string in the case of a NoSQL database). As a result, the malicious code, the example SQL query shown here, is then sent to the database. Cybercriminals use injection attacks against databases to export data, to delete accounts, create bogus accounts and modify data. Injection attacks can even be used to initiate a Denial of Service (DOS) attack. There have been some notable SQL injection attacks in our recent history that have exfiltrated entire user databases, prompting system-wide password resets, such as…
  • #14: Here’s two big SQLi injection breaches that happened last year TalkTalk and vTech – resulting in the theft of about 10M records between the two of them – a lot of them in the vTech breach were kids – including names, genders, birthdates, and addresses.
  • #15: And so far this year – we’ve had at least 9 major breaches covered in the media that involved SQLi. You can just google “SQL injection hall of fame” to pull this up. Attribution: The Code Curmudgeon Blog http://codecurmudgeon.com/wp/sql-injection-hall-of-shame/
  • #16: We’re going to do some hands-on here, but before we do, let me set the stage a bit. How many of you have had your hands on Splunk before? OK – for the purposes of this discussion, you all are ninjas.
  • #17: For the newbies – or for anyone who wants a little more help – the app we’re going to use this afternoon is very self-guided. You can literally just read along and see the search examples without having to type any Splunk searches.
  • #18: This is what that looks like – the search is shown, and the results below.
  • #19: You will notice that in the app there’s this “step by step” button. Don’t press it – what it does is it allows you to step through the search line by line – great for learning, but not great for this shared environment where you’re all hitting the same servers.
  • #20: This is what that step by step looks like. You can use it later on your own time.
  • #21: Now if you are a ninja you can simply cut and paste the searches into the Search bar within the app – that’s what I will do up here.
  • #22: So what I will be doing is mousing over the search…
  • #23: …and pasting it in to the search bar.
  • #24: A little bit about our environment
  • #26: The answer is Splunk apps! Apps come with pre-built content, like dashboards, reports, alerts and workflows that anyone can leverage as a starting point or template and adapt them accordingly to their environment. We have a community of 11,000+ Splunk customers and this is one of the 1,000+ apps on SplunkBase (stats as of June 2016). New Splunk users often try to reinvent the wheel, when it turns out it is already there. In this case, a Splunk engineer wrote an app that searches for SQLI, and then published it on SplunkBase. He provides a broader regex that we are going to leverage for our next example.
  • #27: In that app one of the things provided is a regular expression pre-created for you to find common patterns in your data that could indicate a SQL injection attack. So all we need to do is call the macro when we do the search.
  • #29: If you’d like, you can take a look at the dashboards in the SQL injection app on your own time.
  • #30: In summary, why does SQL injection attacks continue to be one of the most common? BECAUSE IT STILL WORKS!! Don’t waste your previous cycles to reinvent the wheel, search for an existing app, or even provide one to the community. While there are great Web Application Firewalls and similar products that will sit inline and detect or even block these attacks, you will still benefit from looking through all of your data for any signs of SQL injection, and Splunk can help. If you have a specific question or use case that you want to run by us, come find us after the session.
  • #33: What if they use that to pivot around the environment to get to other more sensitive systems?
  • #34: Pass the hash – dump the hash tables from a system, then use those hashes to authenticate to other systems and move around the environment or proliferate malicious code.
  • #35: Guess what – this is pretty common – the Sands breach and Sony breaches from last year used PtH to move around the environment and in both cases distribute destructive malware. I mention these two because they were prominent and well researched.
  • #36: It used to be that PtH was pretty easy to find – and in some cases it still is. Basically we just look for certain Windows events, and if the user account is not domain or anonymous, or specifies an unusual domain – that’s suspicious. Today, a not-very-sophisticated actor might show up this way if we look for them…so let’s see how we can do that.
  • #38: If you look at some of the whitepapers and other links in the app you will see that the “old” ways of detecting PtH are not enough. Instead we really need to look at user and entity behavior and find unusual network connections and login patterns in our data. Again – splunk can help here…
  • #45: Recalling back to the magical UBA solution with the three high-level stages of the kill chain: We started with an intrusion through the use of SQL injection, expansion through lateral movement, and now we will discuss exfiltration via DNS.
  • #46: Recalling back to the magical UBA solution with the three high-level stages of the kill chain: We started with an intrusion through the use of SQL injection, expansion through lateral movement, and now we will discuss exfiltration via DNS. Here is a Dave‘s credentials in clear text; <CLICK> And what it looks like encoded <CLICK> An attacker could send that encoded string, containing Dave‘s credentials via a DNS request bound for his own DNS server. By the way – there are other ways to exfil data, too – you can use TXT records and chunk data into that and tunnel it. Our examples here however will exfil data right in the domain name.
  • #47: Raise your hand if you log your DNS data? Do you look at it? The point is: DNS data tends to be too chatty to log and often overlooked. The same goes for an ICMP content body.
  • #48: There are a couple of retail breaches that we have called out here. We will be posting all session slides to Slideshare, so you can view these articles at your leisure. FrameworkPOS is a packaged tool that hackers can buy and put into their hacking arsenal along with dnscat. Just like the hacker community have their tools, our Splunk community does too!
  • #49: URL Toolbox can parse URLs and complicated top level domains by dissecting a domain into its parts, such as subdomain, domain name and top level domain. It can also perform functions like shannon entropy, counting, suites, meaning ratio, bayesian analysis, etc. But our focus today will be on the use of Shannon Entropy.
  • #50: The Shannon Entropy will give us a numeric representation for how much randomness there is in the letters / numbers used in a subdomain. It is a good indication of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) or of data exfiltration because compressed and/or encrypted data will have very high entropy.
  • #51: Let’s all go to the DNS Exfil menu and select Detecting Data Exfiltration from the dropdown. Again, using pre-built content, we can parse out the query and domain components and calculate the Shannon Entropy for each subdomain. Since most data exfiltration occurs via subdomain, that’s where we will be focusing our search. If you recall back to the tornado slide, the attacker used encoded credentials as a subdomain for the DNS request.
  • #52: Large volumes of data exfiltration tend to have relatively similar data length because it is chunking big segments of data. A low standard deviation will help indicate that this is large volume data transfer.
  • #53: How many DNS requests would it take to exfiltrate a MB of data? How about a GB? This is why we look for high counts. Here, an 18K text file is being exfiltrated to chickenkiller.com and a 20MB+ zip file is being exfiltrated to mooo.com.
  • #55: In summary, don’t overlook the value in your DNS and ICMP data. If you don’t log it, you could consider grabbing the data right off the wire with Splunk Stream. If you don’t have logs or Stream, at a minimum, trend your firewall byte counts.
  • #58: We’re headed to the East Coast! 2 inspired Keynotes – General Session and Security Keynote + Super Sessions with Splunk Leadership in Cloud, IT Ops, Security and Business Analytics! 165+ Breakout sessions addressing all areas and levels of Operational Intelligence – IT, Business Analytics, Mobile, Cloud, IoT, Security…and MORE! 30+ hours of invaluable networking time with industry thought leaders, technologists, and other Splunk Ninjas and Champions waiting to share their business wins with you! Join the 50%+ of Fortune 100 companies who attended .conf2015 to get hands on with Splunk. You’ll be surrounded by thousands of other like-minded individuals who are ready to share exciting and cutting edge use cases and best practices. You can also deep dive on all things Splunk products together with your favorite Splunkers. Head back to your company with both practical and inspired new uses for Splunk, ready to unlock the unimaginable power of your data! Arrive in Orlando a Splunk user, leave Orlando a Splunk Ninja!