Security on cloud storage and IaaS (NSC: Taiwan - JST: Japan workshop)
2 likes•787 views
The document discusses security issues with cloud storage and proposes a solution called Virtual Jail Storage System (VJSS). VJSS aims to prevent information leaks from servers and clients by encrypting and splitting data across multiple providers. It also seeks to address concerns about information erasure and loss through error correction and an append-only file system.
![My interests Research Institute
for Secure Systems
• Sharing technologies (virtualization technologies)
on IaaS are good for security?
• Based on my papers [HotSec10], [EuroSec11], [EuroSec12]
• Information leak / erase / loss on cloud storage
• Funded by Strategic Information and Communications R&D Promotion
Programme(SCOPE), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
(MIC).](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/taiwan-japan-workshop-suzaki-121127082955-phpapp02/85/Security-on-cloud-storage-and-IaaS-NSC-Taiwan-JST-Japan-workshop-3-320.jpg)
![Is Memory Deduplication
Research Institute
good or bad for security? for Secure Systems
(1) Good
• From logical sharing to physical sharing [HotSec10]
(2) Bad
• Cross-VM Side Channel Attack [EuroSec11]
• Cause Information leak
(3) Good or Bad
• Affects to current security functions (Address
Space Layout Randomization, Memory
Sanitization, Page Cache Flushing) [EuroSec11]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/taiwan-japan-workshop-suzaki-121127082955-phpapp02/85/Security-on-cloud-storage-and-IaaS-NSC-Taiwan-JST-Japan-workshop-6-320.jpg)
![(1) From Logical sharing
Research Institute
to physical sharing for Secure Systems
• Instead of static link, we proposed to use
“self-contained binary translator” which
integrates shared libraries into an ELF
binary file. [HotSec’10]
• The ELF binaries become fatter than static link,
but the redundancy is shared by physical
sharing (memory deduplication).
• OSes on a cloud can increase security.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/taiwan-japan-workshop-suzaki-121127082955-phpapp02/85/Security-on-cloud-storage-and-IaaS-NSC-Taiwan-JST-Japan-workshop-9-320.jpg)
![(2) Attacking problem Research Institute
for Secure Systems
• Cross VM side channel attack looks simple, but
there are some problems.
① 4KB Alignment problem
• Attacker must prepare exact same pages in order to
guess victim’s contents.
② Self-reflection problem
• Caused by redundant memory management on cache
and heap. Attacker has a false-positive result.
③ Run time modification problem
• Caused by swap-out, etc. Attacker has a false-
negative result.
• The attacking methods and countermeasure are mentioned in [EuroSec11].](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/taiwan-japan-workshop-suzaki-121127082955-phpapp02/85/Security-on-cloud-storage-and-IaaS-NSC-Taiwan-JST-Japan-workshop-12-320.jpg)
![(3) Affects on Security
Research Institute
Functions for Secure Systems
• ASLR looks to be independent of memory
deduplication because the contents are not changed
on memory. However it increased consumption of
memory, because It made different page tables.
• Memory Sanitization and Page Cache Flushing
increase zero-cleared pages and help memory
deduplication. However, the costs are heavy and
they decreased performance severely.
The detail is written in my paper [EuroSec’12]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/taiwan-japan-workshop-suzaki-121127082955-phpapp02/85/Security-on-cloud-storage-and-IaaS-NSC-Taiwan-JST-Japan-workshop-14-320.jpg)
Security on cloud storage and IaaS (NSC: Taiwan - JST: Japan workshop)
- 1. Research Institute for Secure Systems Security on cloud storage and IaaS at Taiwan-Japan Workshop 2012/Nov/22 http://www.jst.go.jp/sicp/ws2012_nsc.html Kuniyasu Suzaki Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC) National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
- 2. Overview of Security on Research Institute IaaS Cloud Computing for Secure Systems Internet App1 App2 App3 (Secure communication) OS1 OS2 OS3 man in the middle attack Formal Verification To take high level EAL (Evaluation Assurance Client User Level) Mem Mem Mem • ID, Password, Secret Key management CPU CPU CPU •Software vulnerability Software Vulnerability Security update ・Hypervisor Virtual Machine Monitor (hypervisor) ・Management Host OS Memory CPU Vulnerable safe (un-mature) Security Guideline • CSA (Cloud Security Alliance) • Open Cloud Manifesto Auditing Standard Data Management • SAS70 •Information Leak Auditing • HIPAA •Information Loss •Digital Forensic •Information Erasure •Log
- 3. My interests Research Institute for Secure Systems • Sharing technologies (virtualization technologies) on IaaS are good for security? • Based on my papers [HotSec10], [EuroSec11], [EuroSec12] • Information leak / erase / loss on cloud storage • Funded by Strategic Information and Communications R&D Promotion Programme(SCOPE), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC).
- 4. Sharing Technology Research Institute for Secure Systems • Sharing is a key technology on Cloud computing, because it can reduce costs. It offers pseudo physical devices and shares same parts of devices. • Virtual Machine • VMware, Xen, KVM, etc. • Storage deduplication • Dropbox, EMC products, etc. • Memory deduplication
- 5. Memory Deduplication Research Institute for Secure Systems • Memory deduplication is a technique to share same contents page. • Mainly used for virtual machines. • Very effective when same guest OS runs on many virtual machines. • Most memory deduplication are included in virtual machine monitors with different implementations. • VMware, Xen, and KVM have own memory deduplication Guest Pseudo Memory VM1 VM2 VM(n) Real Physical Memory
- 6. Is Memory Deduplication Research Institute good or bad for security? for Secure Systems (1) Good • From logical sharing to physical sharing [HotSec10] (2) Bad • Cross-VM Side Channel Attack [EuroSec11] • Cause Information leak (3) Good or Bad • Affects to current security functions (Address Space Layout Randomization, Memory Sanitization, Page Cache Flushing) [EuroSec11]
- 7. (1) Logical Sharing Research Institute for Secure Systems • Current OSes use logical sharing technique to reduce consumption of memory. • “Dynamic-Link Shared Library” • Unfortunately, it includes vulnerabilities caused by dynamic management. • Search Path Replacement Attack • GOT (Global Offset Table) overwrite attack • Dependency Hell • Etc.
- 8. (1) Solution, and further Research Institute problem for Secure Systems • These vulnerabilities are solved by static-link in general, but it increase consumption of memory. • Fortunately, the increased consumption is mitigated by memory deduplication on IaaS. • It looks easy to solve the problem, but … • Current applications assume dynamic-link and are not re-compiled as static-link easily. • Dynamic-link is used for avoiding license contamination problems. The programs includes “dlopen()” to call dynamic link explicitly.
- 9. (1) From Logical sharing Research Institute to physical sharing for Secure Systems • Instead of static link, we proposed to use “self-contained binary translator” which integrates shared libraries into an ELF binary file. [HotSec’10] • The ELF binaries become fatter than static link, but the redundancy is shared by physical sharing (memory deduplication). • OSes on a cloud can increase security.
- 10. (2) VM Side Channel Attack Research Institute for Secure Systems • Memory deduplication is vulnerable for side channel attack. • The vulnerable is caused by Copy-On-Write of memory deduplication. • Copy-On-Write is a common technique to manage shared contents, but it became a Covert Channel for Information Leak.
- 11. (2) Copy-On-Write (COW) Research Institute for Secure Systems • When a write access is issued to a deduplicated page, a same contents page is created and accepts write access. This action is logically valid, but … • Write access time difference between deduplicated and non-deduplicated pages due to copying. Guest Pseudo Memory Attacker can guess VM1 VM2 Write Access VM1 VM2 existence of same (victim) (attacker) (victim) (attacker) contents on other VM. Real Physical Memory Re-created page cases access time difference
- 12. (2) Attacking problem Research Institute for Secure Systems • Cross VM side channel attack looks simple, but there are some problems. ① 4KB Alignment problem • Attacker must prepare exact same pages in order to guess victim’s contents. ② Self-reflection problem • Caused by redundant memory management on cache and heap. Attacker has a false-positive result. ③ Run time modification problem • Caused by swap-out, etc. Attacker has a false- negative result. • The attacking methods and countermeasure are mentioned in [EuroSec11].
- 13. (3) Affects of OS Security functions Research Institute on memory deduplication for Secure Systems • Modern OSes have security functions that modify memory contents dynamically. 1. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 2. Memory Sanitization • Pages are zero-cleared. Increase deduplication. 3. Page Cache Flushing • Useful to remove redundant pages. • These security functions are affected by memory deduplication.
- 14. (3) Affects on Security Research Institute Functions for Secure Systems • ASLR looks to be independent of memory deduplication because the contents are not changed on memory. However it increased consumption of memory, because It made different page tables. • Memory Sanitization and Page Cache Flushing increase zero-cleared pages and help memory deduplication. However, the costs are heavy and they decreased performance severely. The detail is written in my paper [EuroSec’12]
- 15. Summary: Research Institute OS on sharing technology for Secure Systems • Memory deduplication on cloud computing have a potential to change the structure of OS from the view of secuirty. • It will differ from OSes on devices (PC, Smartphone, etc), because OSes interact each other on IaaS. • The OS on IaaS should take care of security and performance on the environment which shares resources with others.
- 16. Data management Problem Information Leak Research Institute for Secure Systems • Information leak does not occur on network. • Secure communication (ssh, SSL/TLS, etc) is established between client and server, and it is not easy to attack. • Most information leaks on cloud storage occur on both edge machines (servers and clients) • On server • Gmail Administrator read use’s contents (2010) Admin • Dropbox had a bug to allow access with no Secure pass word (2011) Comm • On Client • P2P File sharing Mis-config • (Japanese “Winny”) (2003 ~ ) User Uploader
- 17. Our proposal Research Institute for Secure Systems • Virtual Jail Storage System (VJSS) • On Server: • Data are encrypted and cut a split tally. • It mean that whole content of file are not upload. Even if the all uploaded data are gathered, the full contents are not reconstructed. • Data are also coded by Reed-Solomon and uploaded on some servers. It works for fault tolerance. • On Client: • Original file is reconstructed with the split tally. × Admin • Files are under access-control. Files are × prohibited copying, printing, and screen cut&paste. Mis-config User Uploader
- 18. Overview of VJSS Research Institute for Secure Systems Original Sever Side Encryption × Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D Crash × AONT: All or Nothing Transform Tally Encoding Read Solomon Split tally (3:4) Small part of encrypted file is cut Client Side Network and stored in a client. Printer Decoding Cut&Paste Tally ＋ Decryption NonCopy VJSS (Jail Storage) Storage
- 19. Deploying Plan Research Institute (Against Disaster) for Secure Systems Hokkaido • Japan had a heavy natural disaster last (Sapporo) year. The deploying plan considers location against disaster. • Collaborate with Japanese providers. Tsukuba • Hokkaido Telecommunication Network • Tokyo - Hokkaido(Sapporo) 1,000km • Dream Arts Okinawa • Tokyo - Okinawa 1,500km • Severs for VJSS will be located at the southern and northern edges of Japan in order to prevent natural disasters. Okinawa Taiwan
- 20. Information Erase Research Institute (Planned) for Secure Systems • Most users want to erase uploaded data completely, after the service is terminated. • Unfortunately most provider cannot guarantee that all uploaded data are removed. • Even if uploaded data are encrypted, the data may be decrypted by brute-force attack. • Our VJSS is a little bit advanced, because it keeps split tally in a client. Even if all uploaded data are decrypted, all contents are not disclosed.
- 21. Information loss Research Institute (Planned) for Secure Systems • Hosting services have to prevent data loss, but some incidents occurred. • T-Mobile Sidekick lost user’s data (2009). • Japanese provider FirstServer lost user’s data (2012). • Most information loss incidents were caused by operation mistake. • VJSS has data redundancy by Reed-Solomon error correction, but it is not enough. • We propose to use append-only file system on Cloud Storage. • Most data will be shared by deduplication technology.
- 22. Conclusion Research Institute for Secure Systems • Sharing technology (deduplication) on IaaS has a potential to change the structure of OS on it. • Many people want to use cloud storage, but they are afraid of information leak/erase/loss. • Virtual Jail Storage System (VJSS) prevents information leak from a server and a client. VJSS plans to treat information erase and loss.