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Thick Application Penetration Test
CRASH COURSE v1.0
Author: Scott Sutherland
Who am I?

Scott Sutherland
Principal Security Consultant

• Penetration Testing
   ‒ Networks
   ‒ Web apps / services
   ‒ Thick apps
• Community Stuff
   ‒   Researcher
   ‒   Blogger
   ‒   Tool smith (or smithy if you like)
   ‒   Twitter stalker: @_nullbind
What are we going to talk about?

•   Why should you care
•   Testing Goal and Objectives
•   Project Scoping
•   Common Architectures
•   Accessing the Application
•   Testing Requirements
•   Application Walkthrough
•   Managed vs. Unmanaged
•   Testing the Application
•   Vulnerability Categories
•   Reporting
Why am I talking about this?




Thick applications create unique
risks that web applications don't.
Why am I talking about this?

Users often have full control over the
application environment which:
  ‒ Allows attacks on trusted
   components
  ‒ Exposes data, admin/hidden
   functions
  ‒ Leads to application and OS privilege
   escalation
Why am I talking about this?




Thick applications are the new web
           applications.
Why am I talking about this?

Publishing thick applications via Terminal
Services and Citrix: Good Stuff
  ‒ Helps meet client demand for “cloud
    services”
  ‒Converts Client/Server model to SaaS
    model
  ‒Cheaper/Faster than developing
    actual web based solution from
    scratch
Why am I talking about this?

Publishing thick applications via Terminal
Services and Citrix: Bad Stuff
  ‒Very hard to secure published
    desktops/applications
  ‒Commonly results in direct database
    access
  ‒Often exposes internal networks of
    service provider
Testing Goal & Objectives

Goal:
Determine what risks the application implementation
presents to the business so they can be mitigated.

Objectives:
Identify vulnerabilities that may exist in:
   ‒   The client application and server components
   ‒   The workstation or published application configuration
   ‒   The server or network configuration
Scoping Projects

Estimate effort:
  ‒ Number of forms
  ‒ Number of files
  ‒ Number of registry keys
  ‒ Number of user levels
  ‒ Application architecture
  ‒ Application technology
  ‒ Constraints
  ‒ Environment
Generally…
  ‒ More stuff = more time
  ‒ More complexity = more time
Common Architectures

Desktop Client  Remote Database
  ‒ Usually entire implementation is on internal network

Desktop Client  local DB Remote Database
  ‒ Local db typically syncs with remote db
  ‒ Usually client and local db are on internal network
    remote db is hosted by service provider

Desktop Client  Application Server  Database
  ‒ Usually client in on internal network and app/db server
    is located is hosted by service provider
  ‒ Common technologies: Web Services, Web
    Applications, JBOSS, and IBM WebSphere
Common Architectures

Terminal Services Application
  ‒ RDP  Terminal Server  Published app
  ‒ Website  RDP  Terminal Server  Published app

Citrix Application
  ‒ Citrix client  Terminal Server  Published app
  ‒ Website  Citrix client  Published app

Thin Application
  ‒ VMware application
  ‒ Hyper-V application
Accessing the Application

• Install locally, and test over VPN
• Install locally, and test over the internet
• Test over VPN, RDP to a client system,
  and install the tool sets for testing
• VPN + Terminal Services (TS)
• Web based TS
• VPN + Citrix Client
• Web based Citrix
• Run from network share
Testing Requirements

Minimum Requirements:
• 2 application credentials
  for each role
• Application Access
Potential Requirements:
• VPN access
• Local administrator
  on client test system
• Internet endpoints
• Installation package
Application Walkthrough

• Verify connectivity to application
• Verify all credentials
• Walk through common use cases
• Identify potential areas of client concern
• Better understand application
  architecture
Application Targets



UNMANAGED CODE APPLICATIONS
                and

 MANAGED CODE APPLICATIONS
UNMANAGED CODE APPLICATIONS

• General Information
  ‒ C and C++ (“unmanaged” or “native” languages)
  ‒ Compiled to machine code
  ‒ Include exportable functions
• Pros
  ‒ Typically run faster due to pre compiled code
  ‒ Can’t be easily decompiled to the original source code
• Cons
  ‒ Architecture specific
  ‒ Disassembly and reassembly is still possible
  ‒ API hooking is still possible
MANAGED CODE APPLICATIONS

• General Information
  ‒   Frameworks: .net (C# VB), Java Runtime, Dalvik
  ‒   Compiled to bytecode
  ‒   Usually does not include exportable functions
  ‒   Uses reflection to share public functions
• Pros
  ‒ Architecture independent
  ‒ Can be coded in different languages
  ‒ Can access unmanaged/native code
• Cons
  ‒   Slower due to Just in Time (JIT) compiling
  ‒   Disassembly and reassembly of CIL code is still possible
  ‒   Decompiling via reflection is still possible
  ‒   Global Assembly Cache (GAC) poisoning is possible
  ‒   API hooking is still possible
Attack Vectors

The usual suspects:

• Application GUI     • Network traffic
• Files and folders   • Application memory
• Windows registry    • Configurations
Application Test Plan

Create a test plan and follow it…
• Address high priority test cases identified by
  clients and business owners first
• Testing can be broken out by vector:
  ‒ GUI Review
  ‒ File Review
  ‒ Registry Review
  ‒ Network Review
  ‒ Memory Review
  ‒ Configuration Review
How far do we take this?

Stay in scope!
• That means only networks, servers, and
  applications defined by the client
• On in scope systems:
  ‒ Application admin = yes
  ‒ Database user = yes
  ‒ Database admin = yes
  ‒ Local OS admin = yes
  ‒ Remote OS admin = yes
  ‒ Domain Admin = yes
   (IF logged into system)

  …then no more escalation
Testing the Servers

• Automated authenticated scanning
  ‒ Multiple tools
  ‒ Multiple rounds

• Manual testing using standardized
  penetration test approach
  ‒   Information Gathering
  ‒   Vulnerability Enumeration
  ‒   Penetration
  ‒   Escalation
  ‒   Evidence Gathering
  ‒   Clean up
Testing the Application: GUI

• GUI object privileges
  Show hidden form objects
  Enable disabled functionality
  Reveal masked passwords (GUI B GONE)

• GUI content
  Review for sensitive data and passwords

• GUI logic
  Bypass controls using intended GUI Functionality

  Common Examples:
  ‒ SQL query windows
  ‒ Access control fields
  ‒ Export functions allow more access to data
  ‒ Break out of Citrix and Terminal Server applications
  ‒ External program execution
Testing the Application: GUI
        Tool                                      Description
UISpy              Enable disabled functions, and call actions related to disabled functions.

                   Show hidden objects, enabled disabled objects, execution functions, and generally
WinCheat           manipulate remote form objects.
                   View form object properties including the value of masked password fields, and mask
Window Detective   card numbers.
Testing the Application: Files

• File permissions
  Files and folders
• File Integrity
  Strong naming, Authenticode signing
• File content
 Debugging Symbols/files, sensitive data, passwords, and settings
• File and content manipulation
  Backdoor the framework
  DLL pre loading
  Race conditions
  Replacing files and content

 Common Examples:
   ‒    Application settings
   ‒    Trusted paths and executables
   ‒    Trusted hosts
   ‒    Update servers
   ‒    Passwords and Private keys
Testing the Application: Files

• Exported Functions (usually native code)
  Identify and run exported functions without authenticating

• Public Methods (managed code reflection)
  Create a wrapper to access public methods without authenticating

• Decompile and Recompile
 Recover source code, passwords, keys, and create patched assembly

• Decrypt and Deobfuscate
 Recover source code, passwords, keys, etc

• Disassemble and Reassemble
  Create patched assembly
Testing the Application: Files
                Tool                                                                        Description
AccessEnum, Privesc, autoruns,               Dump file, registry, and service permissions. Also, review scheduled tasks excessive privilege and write script
schtasks                                     locations.
 .Net Reflector, Reflexil, ildasm, IL_Spy,
                                             Decompile or disassemble binaries to recover source code, IL code, or assembly code. Use code review tools to
Graywolf,JD Java decompiler, java byte       identify vulnerabilities, and review for sensitive data such as passwords, private keys, proprietary algorithms.
code editor, Metasm, CFFExplorer

Reflexil .net reflector plugin, Graywolf     De obfuscate decompiled assemblies


                                             Review exports, view/edit imports, edit and extract resources, view disk/memory usage to identify compression,
CFF Explorer, dllexp                         disassemble binary, and finger print language
                                             MSFpayload. MSFencode, and MSFVenom can be used to generate shell code, DLL and EXE payloads for
Metasploit                                   injection and side loading. This also ships with METASM ruby library that can be used to disassemble and
                                             compile binaries
Process Explorer                             View image file settings, process, connections, threads, permissions, strings from process, environmental
                                             variables
                                             View DEP/ASLR settings, image file settings, process, connections, threads, permissions, strings from process,
Process Hacker 2                             environmental variables
Process Monitor, API Monitor                 Monitors calls to file, registry keys, and sockets. API monitor does what it sounds like.

Spider2008                                   Search file system for interesting strings with regular expressions

Strings                                      Dump strings from files

Symantec EPP                                 Scan all files for know malware

PE Explorer                                  Detect compiler or packer type and version

UPX, MPRESS, Iexpress, 7zip                  Decompress/unpack binaries and other files

Visual Studio, Ilasm, Metasm, winhex         Edit exported .net reflector projects, IL, or assembly and create patched executables.
Testing the Application: Registry

• Registry permissions
  Read and write access to registry keys
• Registry content
  Sensitive data, passwords, and settings
• Registry manipulation
  Bypass authentication and authorization
  Replace content

 Common Examples:
  ‒    Application settings
  ‒    Trusted paths and executables
  ‒    Trusted hosts
  ‒    Update servers
  ‒    Passwords
  ‒    Private keys
Testing the Application: Registry
          Tool                                    Description
Tools:
AccessEnum        Dump file and registry permissions


Regedit           Backup, review, and edit the registry


Regshot           Registry diffing tool.


Process Monitor   Monitors calls to file, registry keys, and sockets
Testing the Application: Network
• Network Rules
  Local and network firewall rules


• Network content
 Sensitive data, files, passwords, and settings

• Network manipulation
 Bypass authentication and authorization (SQL)
 Replacing content (Parameters)

 Common Examples:
  ‒     Application settings
  ‒     Trusted paths and executables
  ‒     Trusted hosts
  ‒     Update servers
  ‒     Passwords
  ‒     Private keys

• Reverse and Fuzz Proprietary Protocols
Testing the Application: Network
                Tool                                                                  Description
Cain                              Can be used for ARP based man in the middle attacks. Can be used to parse password in live traffic or a pcap file.


Burp                              Can be used to manipulate HTTP traffic.


Metasploit                        Create custom fuzzer for RPC protocols.


Sully                             Create custom fuzzing templates.


Echo Mirage                       Generic TCP proxy.


Ettercap                          Can be used for man in the middle attacks. Can be used to modify traffic in transit with filters.


Evilgrade, interceptor-ng         Tool for delivering Metasploit payloads instead of legitimate updates.


Network Miner                     Parse network traffic for files, systems, and shares.


oSpy, API Monitor 2               Dump data like encrypted SSL traffic and connection strings when DLL calls are made.


SOAPUI                            Can be used to interact directly with web services, and is often used with BURP


Web Inspect Service Attack Tool   Generic web service review.


Wireshark, windump,               Dump all network traffic. Rawcap is the bomb.
tcpdump,Rawcap
Testing the Application: Memory
• Process controls
  DEP, ASLR, permissions, and privileges

• Memory content
 Sensitive data, passwords, and settings

• Memory manipulation
 Bypass authentication and authorization
 Replacing content

 Common Examples:
  ‒    Application settings
  ‒    Trusted paths and executables
  ‒    Trusted hosts
  ‒    Update servers
  ‒    Passwords
  ‒    Private keys
Testing the Application: Memory

Run-time Modifications
• Direct editing
• DLL injection
• Shell code Injection
• Process replacement
• Modify assembly in memory
• Identification of dangerous functions
• Check if debugger can be run
• Debugging via stepping and breakpoints
  to analyze and modify
Testing the Application: Memory
          Tool                                      Description
Metasploit           Can be used to generate shell code, exe, and DLL payloads. Can also be used to
                     migrate into a running process.

Process Explorer     View image file settings, process, connections, threads, permissions, strings from
                     process, environmental variables

Process Hacker 2     View image file settings, DEP/ASLR settings, connections, threads, permissions,
                     environmental variables, inject DLL

RemoteDLL            Can be used to inject a DLL into a process.


Tsearch              Can be used to quickly find and replace strings in memory.


Immunity, OllyDBG,   Can be used to step through the application and modify assembly instructions on the
                     fly.
Windbg, and IDA
Debuggers
Winhex               Can be used to quickly find and replace strings in memory.


Userdump             Dump memory from process.
Testing the Application: Configurations

• Application user privileges
• Service account privileges
• Service configuration privileges
• Service registration
• Database account privileges
• Remote share permissions
• TS breakouts to OS
• Citrix breakouts to OS
Testing the Application: Configurations
        Tool                                        Description
windows-privesc-       Check privileges on servers and associated program directories, and manually
check                  check for insecurely registered services.

Citrix Client          Used to connect to Citrix applications.


Data Source (ODBC)     Look for existing ODBC connection and use tools like excel to leverage them.
Administrative Tool
Services.msc,          Review application services for insecure registration, binary paths, and
windows-privesc-       determine users who is running the service.
check
SQL Clients            Used to connect directly to the database. Examples include OSQL, ISQL,
                       SQLCMD, RAZOR SQL,TOAD, Microsoft SQL Management Studio Express.

Windows Explorer and   Access Windows dialog boxes to obtain access to a cmd console or
common dialog boxes    Powershell. Target links, shortcuts, open file functions, export functions,
                       import functions, and reporting functions. Help menus and verbose error
                       pages can also be handy.
Vulnerability Categories

1.   Application Logic
2.   Code Injection
3.   Excessive Privileges
4.   Unencrypted Storage of Sensitive Data
5.   Unencrypted Transmission of Sensitive Data
6.   Weak Encryption Implementations
7.   Weak Assembly Controls
8.   Weak GUI Controls
9.   Weak or Default Passwords
Reporting Stuff

• Create severity ranking system based on
  static criteria
• Internally, criteria should take compensating
  controls into consideration
• Prioritize findings based on
  ranking system
• Include instructions or
  screen shots to help
  reproduce and fix issues
• Don’t forget recommendations
Wrap Up

• General Summary
  ‒ Attack thick applications and related infrastructure
    from many vectors using many tools
  ‒ Managed code suffers from inherent weaknesses
    that can’t be fixed and is easier to attack
• General Advice
  ‒ Never store sensitive anything in an assembly
  ‒ If something sensitive “must” be stored in an
    assembly use unmanaged coding languages like C
    and C++
  ‒ Be very careful to implement sufficient controls
    when deploying thick applications via terminal
    services or Citrix
Ad

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Thick Application Penetration Testing: Crash Course

  • 1. Thick Application Penetration Test CRASH COURSE v1.0 Author: Scott Sutherland
  • 2. Who am I? Scott Sutherland Principal Security Consultant • Penetration Testing ‒ Networks ‒ Web apps / services ‒ Thick apps • Community Stuff ‒ Researcher ‒ Blogger ‒ Tool smith (or smithy if you like) ‒ Twitter stalker: @_nullbind
  • 3. What are we going to talk about? • Why should you care • Testing Goal and Objectives • Project Scoping • Common Architectures • Accessing the Application • Testing Requirements • Application Walkthrough • Managed vs. Unmanaged • Testing the Application • Vulnerability Categories • Reporting
  • 4. Why am I talking about this? Thick applications create unique risks that web applications don't.
  • 5. Why am I talking about this? Users often have full control over the application environment which: ‒ Allows attacks on trusted components ‒ Exposes data, admin/hidden functions ‒ Leads to application and OS privilege escalation
  • 6. Why am I talking about this? Thick applications are the new web applications.
  • 7. Why am I talking about this? Publishing thick applications via Terminal Services and Citrix: Good Stuff ‒ Helps meet client demand for “cloud services” ‒Converts Client/Server model to SaaS model ‒Cheaper/Faster than developing actual web based solution from scratch
  • 8. Why am I talking about this? Publishing thick applications via Terminal Services and Citrix: Bad Stuff ‒Very hard to secure published desktops/applications ‒Commonly results in direct database access ‒Often exposes internal networks of service provider
  • 9. Testing Goal & Objectives Goal: Determine what risks the application implementation presents to the business so they can be mitigated. Objectives: Identify vulnerabilities that may exist in: ‒ The client application and server components ‒ The workstation or published application configuration ‒ The server or network configuration
  • 10. Scoping Projects Estimate effort: ‒ Number of forms ‒ Number of files ‒ Number of registry keys ‒ Number of user levels ‒ Application architecture ‒ Application technology ‒ Constraints ‒ Environment Generally… ‒ More stuff = more time ‒ More complexity = more time
  • 11. Common Architectures Desktop Client  Remote Database ‒ Usually entire implementation is on internal network Desktop Client  local DB Remote Database ‒ Local db typically syncs with remote db ‒ Usually client and local db are on internal network remote db is hosted by service provider Desktop Client  Application Server  Database ‒ Usually client in on internal network and app/db server is located is hosted by service provider ‒ Common technologies: Web Services, Web Applications, JBOSS, and IBM WebSphere
  • 12. Common Architectures Terminal Services Application ‒ RDP  Terminal Server  Published app ‒ Website  RDP  Terminal Server  Published app Citrix Application ‒ Citrix client  Terminal Server  Published app ‒ Website  Citrix client  Published app Thin Application ‒ VMware application ‒ Hyper-V application
  • 13. Accessing the Application • Install locally, and test over VPN • Install locally, and test over the internet • Test over VPN, RDP to a client system, and install the tool sets for testing • VPN + Terminal Services (TS) • Web based TS • VPN + Citrix Client • Web based Citrix • Run from network share
  • 14. Testing Requirements Minimum Requirements: • 2 application credentials for each role • Application Access Potential Requirements: • VPN access • Local administrator on client test system • Internet endpoints • Installation package
  • 15. Application Walkthrough • Verify connectivity to application • Verify all credentials • Walk through common use cases • Identify potential areas of client concern • Better understand application architecture
  • 16. Application Targets UNMANAGED CODE APPLICATIONS and MANAGED CODE APPLICATIONS
  • 17. UNMANAGED CODE APPLICATIONS • General Information ‒ C and C++ (“unmanaged” or “native” languages) ‒ Compiled to machine code ‒ Include exportable functions • Pros ‒ Typically run faster due to pre compiled code ‒ Can’t be easily decompiled to the original source code • Cons ‒ Architecture specific ‒ Disassembly and reassembly is still possible ‒ API hooking is still possible
  • 18. MANAGED CODE APPLICATIONS • General Information ‒ Frameworks: .net (C# VB), Java Runtime, Dalvik ‒ Compiled to bytecode ‒ Usually does not include exportable functions ‒ Uses reflection to share public functions • Pros ‒ Architecture independent ‒ Can be coded in different languages ‒ Can access unmanaged/native code • Cons ‒ Slower due to Just in Time (JIT) compiling ‒ Disassembly and reassembly of CIL code is still possible ‒ Decompiling via reflection is still possible ‒ Global Assembly Cache (GAC) poisoning is possible ‒ API hooking is still possible
  • 19. Attack Vectors The usual suspects: • Application GUI • Network traffic • Files and folders • Application memory • Windows registry • Configurations
  • 20. Application Test Plan Create a test plan and follow it… • Address high priority test cases identified by clients and business owners first • Testing can be broken out by vector: ‒ GUI Review ‒ File Review ‒ Registry Review ‒ Network Review ‒ Memory Review ‒ Configuration Review
  • 21. How far do we take this? Stay in scope! • That means only networks, servers, and applications defined by the client • On in scope systems: ‒ Application admin = yes ‒ Database user = yes ‒ Database admin = yes ‒ Local OS admin = yes ‒ Remote OS admin = yes ‒ Domain Admin = yes (IF logged into system) …then no more escalation
  • 22. Testing the Servers • Automated authenticated scanning ‒ Multiple tools ‒ Multiple rounds • Manual testing using standardized penetration test approach ‒ Information Gathering ‒ Vulnerability Enumeration ‒ Penetration ‒ Escalation ‒ Evidence Gathering ‒ Clean up
  • 23. Testing the Application: GUI • GUI object privileges Show hidden form objects Enable disabled functionality Reveal masked passwords (GUI B GONE) • GUI content Review for sensitive data and passwords • GUI logic Bypass controls using intended GUI Functionality Common Examples: ‒ SQL query windows ‒ Access control fields ‒ Export functions allow more access to data ‒ Break out of Citrix and Terminal Server applications ‒ External program execution
  • 24. Testing the Application: GUI Tool Description UISpy Enable disabled functions, and call actions related to disabled functions. Show hidden objects, enabled disabled objects, execution functions, and generally WinCheat manipulate remote form objects. View form object properties including the value of masked password fields, and mask Window Detective card numbers.
  • 25. Testing the Application: Files • File permissions Files and folders • File Integrity Strong naming, Authenticode signing • File content Debugging Symbols/files, sensitive data, passwords, and settings • File and content manipulation Backdoor the framework DLL pre loading Race conditions Replacing files and content Common Examples: ‒ Application settings ‒ Trusted paths and executables ‒ Trusted hosts ‒ Update servers ‒ Passwords and Private keys
  • 26. Testing the Application: Files • Exported Functions (usually native code) Identify and run exported functions without authenticating • Public Methods (managed code reflection) Create a wrapper to access public methods without authenticating • Decompile and Recompile Recover source code, passwords, keys, and create patched assembly • Decrypt and Deobfuscate Recover source code, passwords, keys, etc • Disassemble and Reassemble Create patched assembly
  • 27. Testing the Application: Files Tool Description AccessEnum, Privesc, autoruns, Dump file, registry, and service permissions. Also, review scheduled tasks excessive privilege and write script schtasks locations. .Net Reflector, Reflexil, ildasm, IL_Spy, Decompile or disassemble binaries to recover source code, IL code, or assembly code. Use code review tools to Graywolf,JD Java decompiler, java byte identify vulnerabilities, and review for sensitive data such as passwords, private keys, proprietary algorithms. code editor, Metasm, CFFExplorer Reflexil .net reflector plugin, Graywolf De obfuscate decompiled assemblies Review exports, view/edit imports, edit and extract resources, view disk/memory usage to identify compression, CFF Explorer, dllexp disassemble binary, and finger print language MSFpayload. MSFencode, and MSFVenom can be used to generate shell code, DLL and EXE payloads for Metasploit injection and side loading. This also ships with METASM ruby library that can be used to disassemble and compile binaries Process Explorer View image file settings, process, connections, threads, permissions, strings from process, environmental variables View DEP/ASLR settings, image file settings, process, connections, threads, permissions, strings from process, Process Hacker 2 environmental variables Process Monitor, API Monitor Monitors calls to file, registry keys, and sockets. API monitor does what it sounds like. Spider2008 Search file system for interesting strings with regular expressions Strings Dump strings from files Symantec EPP Scan all files for know malware PE Explorer Detect compiler or packer type and version UPX, MPRESS, Iexpress, 7zip Decompress/unpack binaries and other files Visual Studio, Ilasm, Metasm, winhex Edit exported .net reflector projects, IL, or assembly and create patched executables.
  • 28. Testing the Application: Registry • Registry permissions Read and write access to registry keys • Registry content Sensitive data, passwords, and settings • Registry manipulation Bypass authentication and authorization Replace content Common Examples: ‒ Application settings ‒ Trusted paths and executables ‒ Trusted hosts ‒ Update servers ‒ Passwords ‒ Private keys
  • 29. Testing the Application: Registry Tool Description Tools: AccessEnum Dump file and registry permissions Regedit Backup, review, and edit the registry Regshot Registry diffing tool. Process Monitor Monitors calls to file, registry keys, and sockets
  • 30. Testing the Application: Network • Network Rules Local and network firewall rules • Network content Sensitive data, files, passwords, and settings • Network manipulation Bypass authentication and authorization (SQL) Replacing content (Parameters) Common Examples: ‒ Application settings ‒ Trusted paths and executables ‒ Trusted hosts ‒ Update servers ‒ Passwords ‒ Private keys • Reverse and Fuzz Proprietary Protocols
  • 31. Testing the Application: Network Tool Description Cain Can be used for ARP based man in the middle attacks. Can be used to parse password in live traffic or a pcap file. Burp Can be used to manipulate HTTP traffic. Metasploit Create custom fuzzer for RPC protocols. Sully Create custom fuzzing templates. Echo Mirage Generic TCP proxy. Ettercap Can be used for man in the middle attacks. Can be used to modify traffic in transit with filters. Evilgrade, interceptor-ng Tool for delivering Metasploit payloads instead of legitimate updates. Network Miner Parse network traffic for files, systems, and shares. oSpy, API Monitor 2 Dump data like encrypted SSL traffic and connection strings when DLL calls are made. SOAPUI Can be used to interact directly with web services, and is often used with BURP Web Inspect Service Attack Tool Generic web service review. Wireshark, windump, Dump all network traffic. Rawcap is the bomb. tcpdump,Rawcap
  • 32. Testing the Application: Memory • Process controls DEP, ASLR, permissions, and privileges • Memory content Sensitive data, passwords, and settings • Memory manipulation Bypass authentication and authorization Replacing content Common Examples: ‒ Application settings ‒ Trusted paths and executables ‒ Trusted hosts ‒ Update servers ‒ Passwords ‒ Private keys
  • 33. Testing the Application: Memory Run-time Modifications • Direct editing • DLL injection • Shell code Injection • Process replacement • Modify assembly in memory • Identification of dangerous functions • Check if debugger can be run • Debugging via stepping and breakpoints to analyze and modify
  • 34. Testing the Application: Memory Tool Description Metasploit Can be used to generate shell code, exe, and DLL payloads. Can also be used to migrate into a running process. Process Explorer View image file settings, process, connections, threads, permissions, strings from process, environmental variables Process Hacker 2 View image file settings, DEP/ASLR settings, connections, threads, permissions, environmental variables, inject DLL RemoteDLL Can be used to inject a DLL into a process. Tsearch Can be used to quickly find and replace strings in memory. Immunity, OllyDBG, Can be used to step through the application and modify assembly instructions on the fly. Windbg, and IDA Debuggers Winhex Can be used to quickly find and replace strings in memory. Userdump Dump memory from process.
  • 35. Testing the Application: Configurations • Application user privileges • Service account privileges • Service configuration privileges • Service registration • Database account privileges • Remote share permissions • TS breakouts to OS • Citrix breakouts to OS
  • 36. Testing the Application: Configurations Tool Description windows-privesc- Check privileges on servers and associated program directories, and manually check check for insecurely registered services. Citrix Client Used to connect to Citrix applications. Data Source (ODBC) Look for existing ODBC connection and use tools like excel to leverage them. Administrative Tool Services.msc, Review application services for insecure registration, binary paths, and windows-privesc- determine users who is running the service. check SQL Clients Used to connect directly to the database. Examples include OSQL, ISQL, SQLCMD, RAZOR SQL,TOAD, Microsoft SQL Management Studio Express. Windows Explorer and Access Windows dialog boxes to obtain access to a cmd console or common dialog boxes Powershell. Target links, shortcuts, open file functions, export functions, import functions, and reporting functions. Help menus and verbose error pages can also be handy.
  • 37. Vulnerability Categories 1. Application Logic 2. Code Injection 3. Excessive Privileges 4. Unencrypted Storage of Sensitive Data 5. Unencrypted Transmission of Sensitive Data 6. Weak Encryption Implementations 7. Weak Assembly Controls 8. Weak GUI Controls 9. Weak or Default Passwords
  • 38. Reporting Stuff • Create severity ranking system based on static criteria • Internally, criteria should take compensating controls into consideration • Prioritize findings based on ranking system • Include instructions or screen shots to help reproduce and fix issues • Don’t forget recommendations
  • 39. Wrap Up • General Summary ‒ Attack thick applications and related infrastructure from many vectors using many tools ‒ Managed code suffers from inherent weaknesses that can’t be fixed and is easier to attack • General Advice ‒ Never store sensitive anything in an assembly ‒ If something sensitive “must” be stored in an assembly use unmanaged coding languages like C and C++ ‒ Be very careful to implement sufficient controls when deploying thick applications via terminal services or Citrix