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Tips to Remediate Your Vulnerability
Management Program
Paula Januszkiewicz
CQURE: CEO, Cybersecurity Expert
CQURE Academy: Trainer
MVP: Enterprise Security
Microsoft Regional Director (not working at Microsoft ;))
www.cqureacademy.com
paula@cqure.us
@CQUREAcademy
@paulaCQURE
CONSULTING
Tips to Remediate your Vulnerability Management Program
What does CQURE do?
CQURE Consulting:
Extensive IT Security Audits and Penetration Tests of all kinds
Configuration Audit and Architecture Design
Social Engineering Tests
Advanced Troubleshooting and Debugging
Data Analysis
Emergency Response Services
R&D & Publications
CQURE Academy (education):
40 authored deep โ€“ dive trainings
Technical education offline (mainly in New York or via our partners worldwide)
Technical education online (over 1 million views)
Management security awareness training series
Tips to Remediate your Vulnerability Management Program
Awareness >> Behavior >> Culture
must aim
for a responsible security culture.
I know the traffic rulesโ€ฆ.
Awareness comes with experience
I know the traffic rulesโ€ฆ.
Does it guarantee that I am a good driver?
Behavior comes with awareness
Culture comes with understanding
We have the best security solutionsโ€ฆ
โ€ฆbut the security landscape has changed.
Unmanaged & Mobile Clients
Sensitive
Workloads
Cybersecurity Reference Architecture
Intranet
Extranet
Azure Key Vault
Azure Security Center
โ€ข Security Hygiene
โ€ข Threat Detection
System Management + Patching - SCCM + Intune
Microsoft Azure
On Premises Datacenter(s)
NGFW
IPS
DLP
SSL Proxy
Nearly all customer breaches Microsoftโ€™s Incident Response team investigates involve credential theft
63% of confirmed data breaches involve weak, default, or stolen passwords (Verizon 2016 DBR)
IaaS/Hoster
$ Windows 10
EPP - Windows Defender
Office 365 ATP
โ€ข Email Gateway
โ€ข Anti-malware
EDR - Windows Defender ATPMac
OS
Multi-Factor
Authentication
MIM PAMAzure App Gateway
Network Security Groups
Windows
Information
Protection
AAD PIM
Azure Antimalware
Disk & Storage Encryption
Endpoint DLP
Shielded VMs
SQL Encryption & Firewall
Hello for
Business
Azure
Information
Protection (AIP)
โ€ข Classification
โ€ข Labelling
โ€ข Encryption
โ€ข Rights
Management
โ€ข Document
Tracking
โ€ข Reporting
Enterprise Servers
VPN
VPN
Domain Controllers
VMs VMs
Certification
Authority (PKI)
Incident
Response
Vulnerability
Management
Enterprise
Threat
Detection
Analytics
Managed
Security
Provider OMS
ATA
SIEM
Security Operations
Center (SOC)
Logs & Analytics
Active Threat Detection
Hunting
Teams
Investigation
and Recovery
WEF
SIEM
Integration
IoT
Identity &
Access
80% + of employees admit using
non-approved SaaS apps for
work (Stratecast, December 2013)
UEBA
Windows 10 Security
โ€ข Secure Boot
โ€ข Device Guard
โ€ข Credential Guard
โ€ข Remote Credential Guard
โ€ข Windows Hello
Managed Clients
Legacy
Windows
Office 365
Security
Appliances
Intune MDM/MAM
Conditional Access
Cloud App Security
Information
Protection
Windows Server 2016 Security
Secure Boot, Nano Server, Just Enough Admin, Device Guard, Credential
Guard, Remote Credential Guard, Hyper-V Containers, โ€ฆ
Software as a Service
Analytics
& Reporting
ATA
Privileged Access Workstations
Internet of Things
ASM
Lockbox
Admin
Forest
According to the industryโ€™s statistics, by 2019 the
market will need 6 mln security professionals.
But only 4 to 5 million of them will have the
needed qualifications.
*Source: Financial Times
SECURITY IN THE ENTERPRISE =
ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURES WE FOLLOW
+
VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT
+
INSECURE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
And here come some statisticsโ€ฆ
*Based on Trustwave Global Security Report 2013/2014
Vulnerability Management โ€“ Whatโ€™s This?
Security Scopes
DEFENDING
AGAINST MODERN
SECURITY THREATS
SECURED
DEVICES
SECURED
IDENTITIES
INFORMATION
PROTECTION
THREAT
RESISTANCE
Secured Identities
What is the most successful
path for the attack right now?
:)
THE ANATOMY OF AN ATTACK
Healthy
Computer
User Receives
Email
User Lured to
Malicious Site
Device
Infected with
Malware
HelpDesk Logs
into Device
Identity Stolen,
Attacker Has
Increased Privs
:)
Healthy
Computer
User Receives
Email
User Lured to
Malicious Site
Device
Infected with
Malware
User Lured to
Malicious Site
Device
Infected with
Malware
HelpDesk Logs
into Device
Identity Stolen,
Attacker Has
Increased Privs
ceives
il
Tips to Remediate your Vulnerability Management Program
โ€œPASS THE HASHโ€
ATTACKS
Todayโ€™s security challenge
User: Adm...
Hash:E1977
Fredโ€™s Laptop
Fredโ€™s User Session
User: Fred
Password hash: A3D7โ€ฆ
Sueโ€™s Laptop
Sueโ€™s User Session
Pass-The-Hash Technique
Malware Session
User: Administrator
Password hash: E1977โ€ฆ
Malware User Session
User: Admโ€ฆ
Hash: E1977
User: Sue
Hash: C9DF
User: Sue
Password hash: C9DFโ€ฆ
File Server
User: Sue
Hash:C9DF
1 3 4
1. FRED RUNS MALWARE, HE IS A LOCAL ADMINISTRATOR
2. THERE IS A PASS THE HASH SESSION ESTABLISHED WITH ANOTHER COMPUTER
3. MALWARE INFECTS SUEโ€™S LAPTOP AS FRED
4. MALWARE INFECTS FILE SERVER AS SUE
2
Virtual Secure Mode
Virtual Secure Mode (VSM)
Kernel
Credential
Guard
Hypervisor
Hardware
Windows
Kernel
Apps
VirtualTPM
Hyper-Visor
CodeIntegrity
Information Protection
Class names for keys from HKLMSYSTEMCCSControlLsa
HKLMSECURITYCache
HKLMSECURITYPolicySecrets
HKLMSECURITYPolicySecrets
Classic Data Protection API
Based on the following components:
Password, data blob, entropy
Is not prone to password resets!
Protects from outsiders when being in offline access
Effectively protects users data
Stores the password history
You need to be able to get access to some of your passwords
from the past
Conclusion: OS greatly helps us to protect secrets
Cached Logons: It used to be like thisโ€ฆ
Before the attacks facilitated by pass-the-hash, we can
only rejoice the "salting" by the username.
There are a number pre-computed tables for users as
Administrator facilitating attacks on these hashes.
Cached Logons
There is actually not much of a difference with XP /
2003!
No additional salting.
PBKDF2 introduced a new variable: the number of
iterations SHA1 with the same salt as before (username).
Learning Points for Secured Idenities
Key learning points:
โœ“ gMSA can also be used for the attack
โœ“ Service accountsโ€™ passwords are in the registry, available online
and offline
โœ“ A privileged user is someone who has administrative access to
critical systems
โœ“ Privileged users have sometimes more access than we think (see:
SeBackupRead privilege or SeDebugPrivilege)
โœ“ Privileged users have possibility to read SYSTEM and SECURITY
hives from the registry
Warning! Enabling Credential Guard blocks:
x Kerberos DES encryption support
x Kerberos unconstrained delegation
x Extracting the Kerberos TGT
x NTLMv1
Threat Resistance
Lack of SMB Signing (or alternative)
Key learning points:
โœ“ Set SPNs for services to avoid NTLM:
SetSPN โ€“L <your service account for AGPM/SQL/Exch/Custom>
SetSPN โ€“A Servicename/FQDN of hostname/FQDN of domain
domainserviceaccount
โœ“ Reconsider using Kerberos authentication all over
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj865668.aspx
โœ“ Require SPN target name validation
Microsoft network server: Server SPN target name validation level
โœ“ Reconsider turning on SMB Signing
โœ“ Reconsider port filtering
โœ“ Reconsider code execution prevention but do not forget that
this attack leverages administrative accounts
SMB2/3 client and SMB2/3 server signing settings
Setting Group Policy Setting Registry Key
Required * Digitally sign communications (always) โ€“
Enabled
RequireSecuritySignature = 1
Not Required ** Digitally sign communications (always) โ€“
Disabled
RequireSecuritySignature = 0
* The default setting for signing on a Domain Controller (defined via Group Policy) is โ€œRequiredโ€.
** The default setting for signing on SMB2 Servers and SMB Clients is โ€œNot Requiredโ€.
Server โ€“ Required Server โ€“ Not Required
Client โ€“ Required Signed Signed
Client โ€“ Not Required Signed* Not Signed**
Effective behavior for SMB2/3:
* Default for Domain Controller SMB traffic.
** Default for all other SMB traffic.
Allowing unusual code execution
Key learning points:
Common file formats containing malware are:
โœ“ .exe (Executables, GUI, CUI, and all variants like SCR, CPL etc)
โœ“ .dll (Dynamic Link Libraries)
โœ“ .vbs (Script files like JS, JSE, VBS, VBE, PS1, PS2, CHM, BAT,
COM, CMD etc)
โœ“ .docm, .xlsm etc. (Office Macro files)
โœ“ .other (LNK, PDF, PIF, etc.)
If SafeDllSearchMode is enabled, the search order is as follows:
1. The directory from which the application loaded
2. The system directory
3. The 16-bit system directory
4. The Windows directory
5. The current directory
6. The directories that are listed in the PATH environment
variable
Old protocols or their default settings
Secured Devices
Services
Store configuration in the registry
Always need some identity to run the executable!
Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets
Must be stored locally, especially when domain credentials are used
Can be accessed when we impersonate to Local System
Their accounts should be monitored
If you cannot use gMSA, MSA, use subscription for svc_ accounts (naming convention)
Conclusion: Think twice before using an Administrative account, use gMSA
IIS Configuration
In contrast to the earlier IIS versions, IIS 10.0 is set to use two new Cryptography API: Next
Generation (CNG) providers by default:
IISWASOnlyCngProvider and IISCngProvider. We still have: IISWASOnlyRsaProvider, AesProvider,
IISWasOnlyAesProvider and RsaProtectedConfigurationProvider, DataProtectionConfigurationProvider
CNG stores shared private keys in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%Application DataMicrosoftCryptoKeys
Worker Processes (w3wp.exe)
Their identity is defined in Application Pool settings
Are managed by Windows Process Activation Service that knows how to read secrets
Passwords for AppPool identity can be โ€™decryptedโ€™ even offline
They are stored in the encrypted form in applicationHost.config
Conclusion: IIS relies itโ€™s security on Machine Keys (Local System)
Secured Devices vs. Trusting solutions without knowing how to
break them
Key learning points:
โœ“ The best operators won't use a component until they
know how it breaks
โœ“ Almost each solution has some โ€˜backdoor weaknessโ€™
โœ“ Some antivirus solutions can be stopped by SDDL
modification for their services
โœ“ Configuration can be monitored by Desired State
Configuration (DSC)
โœ“ DSC if not configured properly will not be able to spot
internal service configuration changes
Example: how to I get to the password management
portal?
Tips to Remediate your Vulnerability Management Program
Reason 1: Security is both a Reality and Feeling
For End User
Security is a feeling
Success lies in influencing the โ€œfeelingโ€ of security
Reason 2: Not every attack(er) is that smart
Control efficiency
Risk
severity/
Attacker
Smartness/
Attack
Efficiency
Technology & Processes
Awareness & Competence
Automatic security controls โ€“ AV, Updates
Technology + Human โ€“ Firewall configuration,
Choosing a secure Wifi
Human โ€“ Recognizing a zero day attack,
Phishing mails, Not posting business
information in social media
The very smart attacker
1
2
3
4
People exaggerate risks
that are spectacular or
uncommon
Reason 3: Technologyโ€ฆyes, but humansโ€ฆ of course!
Aircrafts have become more advanced,
but does it mean that pilot training
requirements have reduced?
Medical technology has become more
advanced, but will you choose a hospital
for itโ€™s machines or the doctors?
InformationSecurityFramework
GovernanceManagement
Context and Leadership
Information Security
Charter
Culture and Awareness
Information Security
Organizational Structure
Prevention
Identity and Access
Management
Identity Security
Data Security
Hardware Asset
Management
Data Security & Privacy
Infrastructure Security
Network Security
Evaluation and Direction
Security Risk
Management
Security Strategy and
Communication
Security Policies
Endpoint Security
Malicious Code
Application Security Cloud Security
Vulnerability
Management
Cryptography
Management
Physical Security
HR Security
HR Security
Change and Support
Configuration and
Change Management
Vendor Management
Compliance, Audit, and Review
Security Compliance
Management
External Security Audit
Internal Security Audit
Management Review of
Security
Detection
Security Threat
Detection
Log and Event
Management
Measurement
Metrics Program
Continuous
Improvement
Response and Recovery
Security Incident
Management
Information Security in
BCM
Security eDiscovery and
Forensics
Backup and Recovery
A best-of-breed security framework
Security framework should integrate several best
practices to create a best-of-breed security framework
ISO
27000
series
CIS โ€“
Critical
Security
Controls
COBIT
5
NIST
SP800-
53
SECURITY
FRAMEWORK
Comprehensive
standard providing
best practices
associated with each
control
Provides a detailed list
of security controls
along with many
implementation best
practices intended for
US federal information
systems and
organizations
Comprised of a concise list
of 20 controls and sub-
controls for actionable
cyber defence
A process and
principle structured
security best practice
framework
Best-of-Breed Information
Security Framework
Summary: Cybersecurity Questions
The 11 key cyber security questions
1. Do we treat cyber security as a business or IT responsibility?
2. Do our security goals align with business priorities?
3. Have we identified and protected our most valuable processes and information?
4. Does our business culture support a secure cyber environment?
5. Do we have the basics right? (For example, access rights, software patching,
vulnerability management and data leakage prevention.)
6. Do we focus on security compliance or security capability?
7. Are we certain our third-party partners are securing our most valuable
information?
8. Do we regularly evaluate the effectiveness of our security?
9. Are we vigilant and do we monitor our systems and can we prevent breaches?
10.Do we have an organized plan for responding to a security breach?
11.Are we adequately resourced and insured?
Summary: Technologies
1: Privileged Access Management
Access Monitoring / Effective Access
We need to know about who and where has access to
Access should be role driven
2: Incident Response Plan
Action list
In case of emergency situation: allows to act reasonably and
according to the plan
Increases chances that evidence is gathered properly
Allows to define responsibilities for recovery
Discussions provide management with understanding of security
Jump Bag: preserving evidence
Disk data: Disk2VHD, WinDD, FTK Imager
Memory dumps: DumpIT, Mdd, Mandiant tools, LiME, OSXPMem
Centralization of the event logs
Pre-incident steps: use Sysmon for better knowledge about processes
and network
3: Whitelisting
Code execution prevention
It is an absolute necessity taking into consideration the current
security trends
PowerShell is a new hacking tool
Scripting languages are the biggest threat
Ransomware can be in a form of PowerShell script
Just Enough Administration: PowerShell should be blocked for
users and limited for helpdesk to use the necessary commands
It is necessary to know what executes on
your servers
Sysmon is perfect for this
AppLocker / DeviceGuard in the audit mode
4: Hardware-based Credentials Protection
Virtual Secure Mode (VSM)
VSM isolates sensitive Windows processes in a hardware
based Hyper-V container
VSM protects VSM kernel and Trustlets even if Windows
Kernel is fully compromised
Requires processor virtualization extensions (e.g.: VT-X,
VT-D)
Implements Credential Guard where derived credentials
that VSM protected LSA Service gives to Windows are
non-replayable
VSM runs the Windows Kernel and a series of Trustlets
(Processes) within it
5: Automation Level Master
PowerShell implements great automation
(and hacking tool)
Some solutions are managed by Powershell
only (Nano, IoT)
Experience shows that administrators try
to avoid it โ€“ especially these ones with
great experience
There are so many custom modules available:
PowerForensics, AccessControl etc.
You can create your own customized modules
6: Testing Yourself When You Can
Tips to Remediate your Vulnerability Management Program
Tips to Remediate your Vulnerability Management Program
Retina Enterprise
Vulnerability Management
Alex DaCosta
BeyondTrust
RETINA
VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT
POWERBROKER
PRIVILEGED ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT
59
PRIVILEGE
MANAGEMENT
ACTIVE DIRECTORY
BRIDGING
PRIVLEGED
PASSWORD
MANAGEMENT
AUDITING &
PROTECTION
ENTERPRISE
VULNERABILITY
MANAGEMENT
BEYONDSAAS
CLOUD-BASED
SCANNING
NETWORK SECURITY
SCANNER
WEB SECURITY
SCANNER
BEYONDINSIGHT CLARITY THREAT ANALYTICS
BEYONDINSIGHT IT RISK MANAGEMENT PLATFORM
EXTENSIVE
REPORTING
CENTRAL DATA
WAREHOUSE
ASSET
DISCOVERY
ASSET
PROFILING
ASSET SMART
GROUPS
USER
MANAGEMENT
WORKFLOW &
NOTIFICATION
THIRD-PARTY
INTEGRATION
Demo
Quick Poll + Q&A Time
Thank you for attending!

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Tips to Remediate your Vulnerability Management Program

  • 1. Tips to Remediate Your Vulnerability Management Program Paula Januszkiewicz CQURE: CEO, Cybersecurity Expert CQURE Academy: Trainer MVP: Enterprise Security Microsoft Regional Director (not working at Microsoft ;)) www.cqureacademy.com [email protected] @CQUREAcademy @paulaCQURE CONSULTING
  • 3. What does CQURE do? CQURE Consulting: Extensive IT Security Audits and Penetration Tests of all kinds Configuration Audit and Architecture Design Social Engineering Tests Advanced Troubleshooting and Debugging Data Analysis Emergency Response Services R&D & Publications CQURE Academy (education): 40 authored deep โ€“ dive trainings Technical education offline (mainly in New York or via our partners worldwide) Technical education online (over 1 million views) Management security awareness training series
  • 5. Awareness >> Behavior >> Culture must aim for a responsible security culture.
  • 6. I know the traffic rulesโ€ฆ. Awareness comes with experience I know the traffic rulesโ€ฆ.
  • 7. Does it guarantee that I am a good driver? Behavior comes with awareness
  • 8. Culture comes with understanding
  • 9. We have the best security solutionsโ€ฆ
  • 10. โ€ฆbut the security landscape has changed.
  • 11. Unmanaged & Mobile Clients Sensitive Workloads Cybersecurity Reference Architecture Intranet Extranet Azure Key Vault Azure Security Center โ€ข Security Hygiene โ€ข Threat Detection System Management + Patching - SCCM + Intune Microsoft Azure On Premises Datacenter(s) NGFW IPS DLP SSL Proxy Nearly all customer breaches Microsoftโ€™s Incident Response team investigates involve credential theft 63% of confirmed data breaches involve weak, default, or stolen passwords (Verizon 2016 DBR) IaaS/Hoster $ Windows 10 EPP - Windows Defender Office 365 ATP โ€ข Email Gateway โ€ข Anti-malware EDR - Windows Defender ATPMac OS Multi-Factor Authentication MIM PAMAzure App Gateway Network Security Groups Windows Information Protection AAD PIM Azure Antimalware Disk & Storage Encryption Endpoint DLP Shielded VMs SQL Encryption & Firewall Hello for Business Azure Information Protection (AIP) โ€ข Classification โ€ข Labelling โ€ข Encryption โ€ข Rights Management โ€ข Document Tracking โ€ข Reporting Enterprise Servers VPN VPN Domain Controllers VMs VMs Certification Authority (PKI) Incident Response Vulnerability Management Enterprise Threat Detection Analytics Managed Security Provider OMS ATA SIEM Security Operations Center (SOC) Logs & Analytics Active Threat Detection Hunting Teams Investigation and Recovery WEF SIEM Integration IoT Identity & Access 80% + of employees admit using non-approved SaaS apps for work (Stratecast, December 2013) UEBA Windows 10 Security โ€ข Secure Boot โ€ข Device Guard โ€ข Credential Guard โ€ข Remote Credential Guard โ€ข Windows Hello Managed Clients Legacy Windows Office 365 Security Appliances Intune MDM/MAM Conditional Access Cloud App Security Information Protection Windows Server 2016 Security Secure Boot, Nano Server, Just Enough Admin, Device Guard, Credential Guard, Remote Credential Guard, Hyper-V Containers, โ€ฆ Software as a Service Analytics & Reporting ATA Privileged Access Workstations Internet of Things ASM Lockbox Admin Forest
  • 12. According to the industryโ€™s statistics, by 2019 the market will need 6 mln security professionals. But only 4 to 5 million of them will have the needed qualifications. *Source: Financial Times
  • 13. SECURITY IN THE ENTERPRISE = ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURES WE FOLLOW + VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT + INSECURE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
  • 14. And here come some statisticsโ€ฆ *Based on Trustwave Global Security Report 2013/2014
  • 15. Vulnerability Management โ€“ Whatโ€™s This?
  • 16. Security Scopes DEFENDING AGAINST MODERN SECURITY THREATS SECURED DEVICES SECURED IDENTITIES INFORMATION PROTECTION THREAT RESISTANCE
  • 18. What is the most successful path for the attack right now?
  • 19. :) THE ANATOMY OF AN ATTACK Healthy Computer User Receives Email User Lured to Malicious Site Device Infected with Malware
  • 20. HelpDesk Logs into Device Identity Stolen, Attacker Has Increased Privs :) Healthy Computer User Receives Email User Lured to Malicious Site Device Infected with Malware
  • 21. User Lured to Malicious Site Device Infected with Malware HelpDesk Logs into Device Identity Stolen, Attacker Has Increased Privs ceives il
  • 24. User: Adm... Hash:E1977 Fredโ€™s Laptop Fredโ€™s User Session User: Fred Password hash: A3D7โ€ฆ Sueโ€™s Laptop Sueโ€™s User Session Pass-The-Hash Technique Malware Session User: Administrator Password hash: E1977โ€ฆ Malware User Session User: Admโ€ฆ Hash: E1977 User: Sue Hash: C9DF User: Sue Password hash: C9DFโ€ฆ File Server User: Sue Hash:C9DF 1 3 4 1. FRED RUNS MALWARE, HE IS A LOCAL ADMINISTRATOR 2. THERE IS A PASS THE HASH SESSION ESTABLISHED WITH ANOTHER COMPUTER 3. MALWARE INFECTS SUEโ€™S LAPTOP AS FRED 4. MALWARE INFECTS FILE SERVER AS SUE 2
  • 25. Virtual Secure Mode Virtual Secure Mode (VSM) Kernel Credential Guard Hypervisor Hardware Windows Kernel Apps VirtualTPM Hyper-Visor CodeIntegrity
  • 27. Class names for keys from HKLMSYSTEMCCSControlLsa HKLMSECURITYCache HKLMSECURITYPolicySecrets HKLMSECURITYPolicySecrets
  • 28. Classic Data Protection API Based on the following components: Password, data blob, entropy Is not prone to password resets! Protects from outsiders when being in offline access Effectively protects users data Stores the password history You need to be able to get access to some of your passwords from the past Conclusion: OS greatly helps us to protect secrets
  • 29. Cached Logons: It used to be like thisโ€ฆ Before the attacks facilitated by pass-the-hash, we can only rejoice the "salting" by the username. There are a number pre-computed tables for users as Administrator facilitating attacks on these hashes.
  • 30. Cached Logons There is actually not much of a difference with XP / 2003! No additional salting. PBKDF2 introduced a new variable: the number of iterations SHA1 with the same salt as before (username).
  • 31. Learning Points for Secured Idenities Key learning points: โœ“ gMSA can also be used for the attack โœ“ Service accountsโ€™ passwords are in the registry, available online and offline โœ“ A privileged user is someone who has administrative access to critical systems โœ“ Privileged users have sometimes more access than we think (see: SeBackupRead privilege or SeDebugPrivilege) โœ“ Privileged users have possibility to read SYSTEM and SECURITY hives from the registry Warning! Enabling Credential Guard blocks: x Kerberos DES encryption support x Kerberos unconstrained delegation x Extracting the Kerberos TGT x NTLMv1
  • 33. Lack of SMB Signing (or alternative) Key learning points: โœ“ Set SPNs for services to avoid NTLM: SetSPN โ€“L <your service account for AGPM/SQL/Exch/Custom> SetSPN โ€“A Servicename/FQDN of hostname/FQDN of domain domainserviceaccount โœ“ Reconsider using Kerberos authentication all over https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj865668.aspx โœ“ Require SPN target name validation Microsoft network server: Server SPN target name validation level โœ“ Reconsider turning on SMB Signing โœ“ Reconsider port filtering โœ“ Reconsider code execution prevention but do not forget that this attack leverages administrative accounts
  • 34. SMB2/3 client and SMB2/3 server signing settings Setting Group Policy Setting Registry Key Required * Digitally sign communications (always) โ€“ Enabled RequireSecuritySignature = 1 Not Required ** Digitally sign communications (always) โ€“ Disabled RequireSecuritySignature = 0 * The default setting for signing on a Domain Controller (defined via Group Policy) is โ€œRequiredโ€. ** The default setting for signing on SMB2 Servers and SMB Clients is โ€œNot Requiredโ€. Server โ€“ Required Server โ€“ Not Required Client โ€“ Required Signed Signed Client โ€“ Not Required Signed* Not Signed** Effective behavior for SMB2/3: * Default for Domain Controller SMB traffic. ** Default for all other SMB traffic.
  • 35. Allowing unusual code execution Key learning points: Common file formats containing malware are: โœ“ .exe (Executables, GUI, CUI, and all variants like SCR, CPL etc) โœ“ .dll (Dynamic Link Libraries) โœ“ .vbs (Script files like JS, JSE, VBS, VBE, PS1, PS2, CHM, BAT, COM, CMD etc) โœ“ .docm, .xlsm etc. (Office Macro files) โœ“ .other (LNK, PDF, PIF, etc.) If SafeDllSearchMode is enabled, the search order is as follows: 1. The directory from which the application loaded 2. The system directory 3. The 16-bit system directory 4. The Windows directory 5. The current directory 6. The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable
  • 36. Old protocols or their default settings
  • 38. Services Store configuration in the registry Always need some identity to run the executable! Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets Must be stored locally, especially when domain credentials are used Can be accessed when we impersonate to Local System Their accounts should be monitored If you cannot use gMSA, MSA, use subscription for svc_ accounts (naming convention) Conclusion: Think twice before using an Administrative account, use gMSA
  • 39. IIS Configuration In contrast to the earlier IIS versions, IIS 10.0 is set to use two new Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) providers by default: IISWASOnlyCngProvider and IISCngProvider. We still have: IISWASOnlyRsaProvider, AesProvider, IISWasOnlyAesProvider and RsaProtectedConfigurationProvider, DataProtectionConfigurationProvider CNG stores shared private keys in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%Application DataMicrosoftCryptoKeys Worker Processes (w3wp.exe) Their identity is defined in Application Pool settings Are managed by Windows Process Activation Service that knows how to read secrets Passwords for AppPool identity can be โ€™decryptedโ€™ even offline They are stored in the encrypted form in applicationHost.config Conclusion: IIS relies itโ€™s security on Machine Keys (Local System)
  • 40. Secured Devices vs. Trusting solutions without knowing how to break them Key learning points: โœ“ The best operators won't use a component until they know how it breaks โœ“ Almost each solution has some โ€˜backdoor weaknessโ€™ โœ“ Some antivirus solutions can be stopped by SDDL modification for their services โœ“ Configuration can be monitored by Desired State Configuration (DSC) โœ“ DSC if not configured properly will not be able to spot internal service configuration changes Example: how to I get to the password management portal?
  • 42. Reason 1: Security is both a Reality and Feeling For End User Security is a feeling Success lies in influencing the โ€œfeelingโ€ of security
  • 43. Reason 2: Not every attack(er) is that smart Control efficiency Risk severity/ Attacker Smartness/ Attack Efficiency Technology & Processes Awareness & Competence Automatic security controls โ€“ AV, Updates Technology + Human โ€“ Firewall configuration, Choosing a secure Wifi Human โ€“ Recognizing a zero day attack, Phishing mails, Not posting business information in social media The very smart attacker 1 2 3 4 People exaggerate risks that are spectacular or uncommon
  • 44. Reason 3: Technologyโ€ฆyes, but humansโ€ฆ of course! Aircrafts have become more advanced, but does it mean that pilot training requirements have reduced? Medical technology has become more advanced, but will you choose a hospital for itโ€™s machines or the doctors?
  • 45. InformationSecurityFramework GovernanceManagement Context and Leadership Information Security Charter Culture and Awareness Information Security Organizational Structure Prevention Identity and Access Management Identity Security Data Security Hardware Asset Management Data Security & Privacy Infrastructure Security Network Security Evaluation and Direction Security Risk Management Security Strategy and Communication Security Policies Endpoint Security Malicious Code Application Security Cloud Security Vulnerability Management Cryptography Management Physical Security HR Security HR Security Change and Support Configuration and Change Management Vendor Management Compliance, Audit, and Review Security Compliance Management External Security Audit Internal Security Audit Management Review of Security Detection Security Threat Detection Log and Event Management Measurement Metrics Program Continuous Improvement Response and Recovery Security Incident Management Information Security in BCM Security eDiscovery and Forensics Backup and Recovery A best-of-breed security framework
  • 46. Security framework should integrate several best practices to create a best-of-breed security framework ISO 27000 series CIS โ€“ Critical Security Controls COBIT 5 NIST SP800- 53 SECURITY FRAMEWORK Comprehensive standard providing best practices associated with each control Provides a detailed list of security controls along with many implementation best practices intended for US federal information systems and organizations Comprised of a concise list of 20 controls and sub- controls for actionable cyber defence A process and principle structured security best practice framework Best-of-Breed Information Security Framework
  • 48. The 11 key cyber security questions 1. Do we treat cyber security as a business or IT responsibility? 2. Do our security goals align with business priorities? 3. Have we identified and protected our most valuable processes and information? 4. Does our business culture support a secure cyber environment? 5. Do we have the basics right? (For example, access rights, software patching, vulnerability management and data leakage prevention.) 6. Do we focus on security compliance or security capability? 7. Are we certain our third-party partners are securing our most valuable information? 8. Do we regularly evaluate the effectiveness of our security? 9. Are we vigilant and do we monitor our systems and can we prevent breaches? 10.Do we have an organized plan for responding to a security breach? 11.Are we adequately resourced and insured?
  • 50. 1: Privileged Access Management Access Monitoring / Effective Access We need to know about who and where has access to Access should be role driven
  • 51. 2: Incident Response Plan Action list In case of emergency situation: allows to act reasonably and according to the plan Increases chances that evidence is gathered properly Allows to define responsibilities for recovery Discussions provide management with understanding of security Jump Bag: preserving evidence Disk data: Disk2VHD, WinDD, FTK Imager Memory dumps: DumpIT, Mdd, Mandiant tools, LiME, OSXPMem Centralization of the event logs Pre-incident steps: use Sysmon for better knowledge about processes and network
  • 52. 3: Whitelisting Code execution prevention It is an absolute necessity taking into consideration the current security trends PowerShell is a new hacking tool Scripting languages are the biggest threat Ransomware can be in a form of PowerShell script Just Enough Administration: PowerShell should be blocked for users and limited for helpdesk to use the necessary commands It is necessary to know what executes on your servers Sysmon is perfect for this AppLocker / DeviceGuard in the audit mode
  • 53. 4: Hardware-based Credentials Protection Virtual Secure Mode (VSM) VSM isolates sensitive Windows processes in a hardware based Hyper-V container VSM protects VSM kernel and Trustlets even if Windows Kernel is fully compromised Requires processor virtualization extensions (e.g.: VT-X, VT-D) Implements Credential Guard where derived credentials that VSM protected LSA Service gives to Windows are non-replayable VSM runs the Windows Kernel and a series of Trustlets (Processes) within it
  • 54. 5: Automation Level Master PowerShell implements great automation (and hacking tool) Some solutions are managed by Powershell only (Nano, IoT) Experience shows that administrators try to avoid it โ€“ especially these ones with great experience There are so many custom modules available: PowerForensics, AccessControl etc. You can create your own customized modules
  • 55. 6: Testing Yourself When You Can
  • 59. RETINA VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT POWERBROKER PRIVILEGED ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT 59 PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT ACTIVE DIRECTORY BRIDGING PRIVLEGED PASSWORD MANAGEMENT AUDITING & PROTECTION ENTERPRISE VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT BEYONDSAAS CLOUD-BASED SCANNING NETWORK SECURITY SCANNER WEB SECURITY SCANNER BEYONDINSIGHT CLARITY THREAT ANALYTICS BEYONDINSIGHT IT RISK MANAGEMENT PLATFORM EXTENSIVE REPORTING CENTRAL DATA WAREHOUSE ASSET DISCOVERY ASSET PROFILING ASSET SMART GROUPS USER MANAGEMENT WORKFLOW & NOTIFICATION THIRD-PARTY INTEGRATION
  • 60. Demo
  • 61. Quick Poll + Q&A Time Thank you for attending!