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8. Transport Law in Australia
Second Edition
John Livermore
This book was originally published as a monograph in the International
Encyclopaedia of Laws/Transport Law.
General Editor: Roger Blanpain
Associate General Editor: Michele Colucci
Volume Editors: Marc Huybrechts, Eric Van Hooydonk
10. transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or
otherwise, without written permission from the publisher.
Permission to use this content must be obtained from the copyright owner. Please apply to: Permissions
Department, Wolters Kluwer Legal, 76 Ninth Avenue, 7th Floor, New York, NY 10011-5201, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Printed and Bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY.
11. The Author
John Livermore lives in Hobart, Tasmania, Australia.
He retired in 2002 as Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law in the School of
Accounting and Finance, Faculty of Commerce and Economics, University of
Tasmania after appointment in 1974. He holds an LL.B. (Bristol, 1959), a
Diploma in Social Studies (Sheffield, 1961), an LL.M. (Tasmania) 1988 and
a Professional Certificate in Arbitration (Adelaide) 2002. He served as Dean
of the Faculty of Economics and Commerce 1986–1988.
He is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport and a
former Chairperson of the Tasmanian Branch 1992–1994. He is also a Fellow
and Certified Practising Marketer of the Australian Marketing Institute, a
Graded Arbitrator and Accredited Experienced Mediator, Institute of
12. Arbitrators and Mediators Australia and former Chair of the Tasmanian
Chapter.
He has presented papers on commercial law at Australia and New Zealand
universities and on maritime law to the International Congress of
Comparative Law Montreal 1990, Athens 1994 Bristol 1998 and papers on
aviation policy and law at the Asian Institute of Air and Space Law Taipei
1991, Beijing 1995, Seoul 1997, 2008 Shanghai 1999.
Since 1990 he has been Editor of Transport: Laws of Australia with
contributing chapters on carriage by road, rail and sea and limitation of
liability. Publications include the Australian reports in Ocean Bills of Lading:
Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (editor Yiannapoulos, AN
Kluwer Law International, 1998) and Multimodal Transport: Carrier
Liability and Issues Related to Bills of Lading (editor Kiantou-Pampouki, A
Bruylant, 2000). Other publications include chapters on road, rail, and air
carriage in Palmer, N Bailment (Law Book Company, 1979), Exemption
Clauses and Implied Obligations in Contracts (Law Book Company, 1986)
and Marketing Law (with Clarke, E Law Book Company, 1994).
He enjoys bushwalking, relaxing in the company of family and friends,
travelling overseas whenever possible, unravelling historical mysteries,
fossicking through second hand bookshops.
E-mail: [email protected]
Website: www.johnlivermo.com
Australia
13. Table of Contents
The Author
List of Abbreviations
Preface
General Introduction
§1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE COUNTRY
I. Geography and Climate
II. The Economic Setting
III. The Constitutional, Political, and Legal Systems
IV. The Road and Rail Systems
V. Australian Transport Safety Bureau
VI. Inland Waterways
VII. Airports and Civil Aviation
VIII. Pipelines
Part I. Introduction
§1. INSTITUTIONS REGULATING THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM
14. I. The Department of Transport and Regional Development
II. The Australian Transport Advisory Council
III. The Bureau of Transport and Communications, Economics
IV. Australian Maritime Safety Authority
V. Australian Transport Safety Bureau
VI. The National Transport Commission
VII. The Ministerial Council for Road Transport
VIII. The Australian Road Transport Advisory Committee
IX. Austroads
X. The Australian Road Research Board
XI. The National Rail Corporation
XII. Airservices Australia
XIII. Civil Aviation Safety Authority
XIV. The International Air Services Commission
§2. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS
Part II. Maritime Law
Chapter 1. Carriage by Sea
§1. GENERAL
§2. DEMISE CHARTER PARTIES
§3. VOYAGE CHARTER PARTIES
I. ‘Gencon’ Provisions
II. The ‘Near’ Clause
III. Safe Ports
IV. Loading
V. Demurrage
§4. TIME CHARTER PARTIES
I. General Provisions
15. II. Anti-technicality Clauses
III. Cessation of Hire
IV. Speed Warranties
V. Redelivery
VI. Cancelling Clauses
§5. SPECIAL CLAUSES AND FRUSTRATION
I. War, Ice, and Penalty Clauses
II. Frustration of Charter Parties
§6. BILLS OF LADING
I. Principal Functions
II. Evidence of Quantity Shipped
III. Good Order and Condition
IV. Transfer of Ownership
V. Authority to Sign Bill of Lading
VI. Cessation
§7. THE HAGUE-VISBY RULES
I. Application of the Hague-Visby Rules
II. The Carrier’s Obligations
III. Exemptions from Liability
IV. Duty Not to Deviate
V. Dangerous Goods
VI. Limitation of Actions
VII. Limitation of Liability
VIII. Third Party Liability on a Bill of Lading
§8. REFORM OF BILLS OF LADING LEGISLATION
§9. CARGO OWNER’S RIGHTS IN TORT TO SUE A CARRIER
§10. INTERNATIONAL LINER AND CARGO SHIPPING LEGISLATION
16. Chapter 2. Shipping Law
§1. INTRODUCTION
§2. REGISTRATION OF SHIPS
§3. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
§4. MARINE POLLUTION
I. MARPOL
II. Sea Dumping
III. Intervention
IV. Civil Liability
V. Fund: The 1992 Protocol and the National Plan
VI. Preparedness and Response
VII. The 2001 Bunker Oil Pollution Convention
§5. COLLISION
§6. SALVAGE
§7. TOWAGE
§8. PILOTAGE
§9. ADMIRALTY
Part III. Other Transport
Chapter 1. Carriage by Road
§1. GENERAL
§2. COMMON AND PRIVATE CARRIERS
17. I. Common Carriers
II. Private Carriers
A. General
B. Liability for Negligence
C. Contracting Out
D. Subcontractors
E. Liability of the Carrier as a Warehouseperson
F. Delay
G. Deviation
H. Misdelivery
I. Transit and Stoppage in Transit
J. Measure of Damages
§3. CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS
§4. FEDERAL ROAD TRANSPORT LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
I. Freedom of Interstate Trade
II. The Interstate Commission
III. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and Road Transport
IV. Uniform Road Transport Law
§5. OPERATION OF MODEL LEGISLATION
I. Heavy Vehicles
II. Vehicle Charges
III. Vehicle Operations
IV. Australian Road Rules
V. Dangerous Goods
VI. Compliance and Enforcement
VII. State and Territory Law
Chapter 2. Carriage by Rail
§1. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
18. I. Commonwealth and Railway Management
II. State Authorities: Rail Provision
A. New South Wales
B. Queensland
C. South Australia
D. Tasmania
E. Victoria
F. Western Australia
III. Standard Conditions of Rail Carriage
§2. AUSTRALIAN RAIL TRACK CORPORATION AGREEMENT
Chapter 3. Carriage by Air
§1. INTRODUCTION
§2. WARSAW CONVENTION (AMENDED)
§3. SUCCESSIVE CARRIERS
§4. BAGGAGE CHECK
§5. AIRWAY BILL
§6. LIABILITY FOR DESTRUCTION, DAMAGE, OR LOSS
§7. WILFUL MISCONDUCT AND THE CARGO CARRIER
§8. LIABILITY FOR CARGO LOSS AND DAMAGE DUE TO DELAY
§9. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY AND SPECIAL DECLARATIONS
§10. RECOURSE BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE CARRIERS
§11. LIMITATION OF CARRIER’S LIABILITY
19. §12. PASSENGER TICKET
§13. LIABILITY FOR PASSENGER INJURY AND DEATH
§14. BILATERAL AIRLINE AGREEMENTS
§15. DOMESTIC AIRLINE DEREGULATION
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
Selected Bibliography
Index
20. List of Abbreviations
ABLR Australia Business Law Review
AC Appeal Cases
ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ACT Australian Capital Territory
AGPS Australian Government Printing Service
All ER All England Reports
ALJ Australian Law Journal
ALJR Australian Law Journal Reports
ALR Australian Law Reports
ALRC Australian Law Reform Commission
ALT Australian Law Times
AMSA Australian Maritime Safety Authority
ARTC Australian Rail Track Corporation
ATPR Australia Trade Practices Reporter
ATS Australia Treaty Series
BC British Columbia
BIMCO Baltic and International Maritime Conference
CA Court of Appeal
CA (Ont) Court of Appeal Ontario
CCH Commercial Clearing House
CCR (Vic) County Court Reports Victoria
21. Ch Chancery Division (Law Reports)
CLR Commonwealth Law Reports
CPD Common Pleas Division
CRISTAL Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker
Liability for Oil Pollution
Cth Commonwealth (Australia)
Dist Ct District Court
DLR Dominion Law Reports
ER English Reports
FLR Federal Law Reports
HC High Court
HCA High Court of Australia
HL House of Lords
IASC International Air Services Commission
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICLQ International Commercial Law Quarterly
IMDG International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code
Imp Imperial
IR Irish Reports
ITOPF International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
JBL Journal of Business Law
JCL Journal of Contract Law
JMLC Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
KB King’s Bench Division
Lloyd’s Rep Lloyd’s Law Reports
LOF Lloyd’s Open Form
LQR Law Quarterly Review
LT Law Times
Mal LR Malaysian Law Review
MIA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement
22. Mod LR Modern Law Review
NRC National Rail Commission
NRTC National Road Transport Commission
NSW New South Wales
NSWLR New South Wales Law Reports
NT Northern Territory
NYPE New York Produce Exchange
NZ New Zealand
NZLJ New Zealand Law Journal
NZLR New Zealand Law Reports
P Probate Division
PC Privy Council
QB Law Reports, Queen’s Bench Division
QBD, QB Queen’s Bench Division
Qld Queensland
SA South Australia
SALR South Australian Law Reports
SASR South Australian State Reports
SC Supreme Court
SDR Special Drawing Rights
SR(NSW) State Reports of New South Wales
St RQ State Reports (Queensland)
Tas Tasmania
TR Tasmanian Reports
TLR Times Law Reports
TOVALOP Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning
Liability for Oil Pollution
Vic Victoria
VR Victorian Reports
WA Western Australia
24. Preface
I would wish to acknowledge, in the completion of this work, those who have
made it possible.
First, to my wife Netta who has been supportive of me during what
seemed a long process of arriving at the final version. Second, to Catherine
Roberts of Thompson Laws of Australia, Sydney who secured permission for
me to include material from ‘Carriage’ in Transport: Laws of Australia of
which I am Editor and draw on my entry under ‘Shipping’ in the same
publication. Readers are referred to Transport: Laws of Australia as fuller
reference for Australian transport law.
I appreciate the permission given by Thomsonreuters, publishers of Laws
of Australia for permission to include material from ‘Carriage’ in ‘Transport:
Laws of Australia ‘of which I am Editor and draw on my entry in ‘Shipping’
in the same publication. Readers are referred to ‘Transport Laws of Australia’
as a fuller reference for Australian Transport Law. I am grateful to Professor
Marc Huybrechts and Joeri Lauwers for continued support for updating this
entry for the ‘International Encyclopaedia of Laws’. I am honoured by the
original request (at the suggestion of Dr Kristian Bernauw to Professor
Blanpain) to produce the original Australian contribution.
I also wish to thank Debra Bowring, Head Librarian, Law School,
University of Tasmania, for help in accessing research facilities and Harry
Bown of Thomson Reuters for assistance in using the Westlaw database.
No one ever produces any written work without the support and criticism
25. of friends and colleagues. I have been fortunate to have attended international
conferences where I could meet others specialists in this complex but vital
field of research. To them I owe a great debt of gratitude for their good
humour and encouragement. I would particularly mention Professors Doo
Hwan Kim, Yianapolous, Aliki Kiantou-Pampouki, Bin Cheng, and Norman
Palmer.
The law as stated-is this September or November 2013.
26. General Introduction
§1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE COUNTRY
I. Geography and Climate
1. Australia is situated between the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans,
and lies between latitudes 10 41’S (Cape York) and 43 39’S (South East
Cape), and longitudes 113 09’E (Steep Point) and 153 39’E (Cape Byron).
The latitudinal distance between the two points is 3,680 kilometres and the
longitudinal distance about 4,000 kilometres. The overall area of Australia is
almost as great as that of the continental United States of America and thirty-
two times greater than the United Kingdom. By far, the greatest land area of
the country is made up of the largest island, ‘the mainland’. However, other
significant islands off the coast are the State of Tasmania, Kangaroo Island in
South Australia (SA), Melville Island in the Northern Territory (NT), and
Fraser Island in Queensland (Qld). There are also a large number of out-lying
islands including Christmas Island, Macquarie Island, and Norfolk and Lord
Howe Islands.
2. A wide range of climatic zones are present in Australia, from the
tropical north, the dry interior, to the temperate south. Eight per cent of
Australia has a median rainfall of less than 600 millimetres per year, with
50% having less than 300 millimetres. The rainfall pattern is strongly
seasonal, with a winter (May–October) regime in the south, and a summer
27. (November–April) regime in the north. Fluctuations in temperature can be
great, from above 50 °C to well below freezing. However, average annual air
temperatures range from 28 °C along the Kimberley coast of Western
Australia (WA) to 4 °C in the alpine areas of South-eastern mainland
Australia. The absence of extensive mountainous terrain and the surrounding
oceans prevent minimum temperatures dropping to levels recorded
elsewhere. However, droughts, floods, cyclones, and bushfires are all
common in Australia due to Australia’s physical geography and climate.
II. The Economic Setting
3. Australia’s geographic setting means that it is crucially dependent on
international shipping for the bulk of its exports.1 Reforms in the transport
sector have been closely tied with government economic policies such as the
full sale of Qantas by the Federal Government. Related measures included the
sale of Federal airports, and on the waterfront a package of measures
designed to enhance the efficiency and international competitiveness of the
Australian shipping industry. In relation to the road network, the introduction
of charges for heavy vehicles was designed to ensure the application of user
pays principles.2
III. The Constitutional, Political, and Legal Systems
4. Australia is a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary government
under the Westminster tradition. The Australian Constitution of 1901
established a Federal Parliament and the six Australian colonies transferred
specified powers to it while retaining residual powers for State
responsibility.3 Most of the Federal powers are contained within section 51 of
the Constitution. The Commonwealth (Federal) Parliament is one of three
branches of government established by the Constitution. The Executive and
Judicature are the other two branches. A division of powers exists between
the three branches. The scheme of government was, therefore, broadly based
on the Westminster model of responsible government.
28. 5. The Parliament of the Commonwealth exercises the legislative power of
the country. The Parliament itself consists of the Queen’s representative (the
Governor-General), the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate
is the Upper House, an elected body with each State electing an equal number
of Senators regardless of electorate size. The House of Representatives is the
Lower House and is elected by the people of the entire nation. By convention
both the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition are drawn from this
House. The size of the House of Representatives must be as close as possible
to twice that of the Senate. This excludes Territory Senators who have the
same terms of office as Representatives, and was designed to maintain the
relative strength and importance of the Senate.
6. The Senate largely exercises a review function over the House of
Representatives, although there are limitations on its power over financial
matters. In order to give it a degree of independence from the Lower House,
Senators have a longer term of office than Representatives, and that office is
rotated. Therefore, the term of office of State Senators is twice that of
Representatives, and half the Senators for each State retire at 30 June every
three years. Like the House of Representatives also, since 1949 the Senate
has been elected under a system of proportional representation. This operates
to give voice to a wide range of views across the entire community. Voting is
compulsory in Federal elections.
7. With the exception of Qld, all of the States mirror the Federal
Parliament in being bicameral legislatures. In addition, each of the States has
a representative of the Queen, the Governor. However, since 1986 the
Parliament of the United Kingdom has ceased to exercise any powers over
the Commonwealth, and the Australian electorate is becoming aware of its
right to choose an Australian Head of State in the future to replace the Queen.
At present the Queen’s role is primarily limited to the exercise (through the
Governor-General and Governors, and on the advice of the respective
governments), to give Royal Assent to Acts passed by the Commonwealth
and State and Territory Parliaments. However, under certain specified
29. conditions, the Governor-General may dissolve both Houses if the Senate
fails to pass a Bill from the House. The possible exercise of this power has
generated great national debate in relation to Australia’s ties with the British
Crown and the issue of Australia becoming a republic.4
8. Australia is a Common Law jurisdiction. The most important sources of
the law consist of Acts passed by the Commonwealth Parliament, together
with regulations, rules and orders made under those Acts; Acts passed by the
State and Territory Parliaments, together with regulations, rules and orders
made thereunder; some common law or statute law of England still applicable
to Australia and un-revoked by domestic legislation; and common law
principles developed by Australian judicial decisions.
9. Under the Australian Constitution, the Commonwealth of Australia is
empowered to make laws in relation to matters specified, such as trade and
commerce, taxation, defence and external affairs. Some of these matters may
be exercised by either the Commonwealth or the States and Territories. With
regard to some matters the Commonwealth’s power is absolute, and
Commonwealth laws are binding on the States and Territories if exercised
within the area of federal jurisdiction. States and Territories retain
independent legislative power on a wide range of matters however, and it is
this statute and common law that has the greatest impact upon the majority of
Australians.
10. The High Court of Australia (HCA) is the highest court in the land,
exercising both original and appellate jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction may
be exercised in respect of treaty matters, suits between States or relating to
States, suits by the Commonwealth or relating to the Commonwealth, or writs
of mandamus or prohibition. The High Court can also remit matters to other
courts, and is the Court of Disputed Returns. Appellate jurisdiction permits
the High Court to grant leave to appeal from decisions of the State Supreme
Courts, State courts exercising federal jurisdiction, the Federal Court of
Australia, and the Family Court of Australia. It is, therefore, the final Court
30. of Appeal (CA) in Australia. The Federal Court of Australia was created in
1976. As is necessary, it sits in each State and Territory. Concurrent with the
High Court, it is also able to deal with matters in which a writ of mandamus
or prohibition or an injunction is sought, where these are against an officer of
the Commonwealth of Australia. It also exercises a limited appellate function,
for example, in relation to the decisions of individual judges of the Court.
11. Specialist courts at the Federal level include the Industrial Relations
Court of Australia. The Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 transferred
matters from the Federal Court in this regard to the Industrial Relations Court
of Australia. The Family Court of Australia is the other specialist court, being
established under the Family Law Act 1975 to deal with matrimonial and
related proceedings. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is another
specialist court. It was created as an independent body to review the decisions
made by Commonwealth Ministers and authorities.
12. In the States and Territories, courts have original jurisdiction on all
matters brought under State and Territory laws and matters under federal
laws where jurisdiction has not been reserved to the courts of federal
jurisdiction. Within each State and Territory there are courts with general,
appellate and specialist jurisdiction. The Federal Constitution gives Federal
Parliament power to create Federal courts or to invest a state court with
jurisdiction.5 The Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) in
1988 provided a cross vesting scheme between the States and
Commonwealth. However, in 1999 the High Court declared the scheme
invalid under the Constitution in Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999) 73 LJR
839.6 Cross vesting can only be resorted by an amendment to the Constitution
by a national referendum or reference of powers by the States to the
Commonwealth in certain areas.
IV. The Road and Rail Systems
13. Australia is a physically vast country with large sparsely settled inland
31. area and population concentrated around the coast. The road system is in
three categories; federal highways, state highways and local roads. The road
network totals 913,000 kms (353,330 kms sealed, 559,669 kms unsealed).7
Australia has the second highest car ownership in the world and has nine
times more road length per capita than Asia.
Canberra and Darwin have only bus based public transport as the other
capital cities have multimodal networks. Light rail has been developed in
Adelaide, Gold Coast, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. Canberra is in the
process of planning light rail as is Hobart.
14. The large rail network totals 35,819 kms of which 2,450 kms is
electrified. All mainland capital cities are linked by standard gauge rail.
Interstate rail services include the Great Southern Railway, owned by Serco
Asia Pacific which operates the Indian Pacific (Sydney-Adelaide-Perth), the
Ghan (Adelaide-Alice Springs-Darwin) and the Overland (Melbourne-
Adelaide). Country Link services link Brisbane, Canberra and Melbourne via
Sydney. Tasmania through Tasrail owns and operates a government freight
only service since 2009.8
15. State and city services are operated by both government and private
companies. These include V/Line( regional trains and buses in
Victoria);Metro Trains Melbourne operates the Melbourne rail network;
RailCorp runs passenger rail services in NSW including Sydney Trains and
CountryLink; Queensland Rail(QR) operates the City train network, SE
Queensland passenger network Translink and Transwa operates train and bus
services in Western Australia.
High Speed Rail in Australia has been under investigation since the
1980’s. The Australian Government has undertaken a study of
implementation of high speed rail on the east coast of Australia, linking
Melbourne, Canberra, Sydney and Brisbane. A feasibility study into the
project began in 2010. The second in April 2013 found to the project a cost of
$114 billion with a completion date by 2065.9
32. V. Australian Transport Safety Bureau
16. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) contributes to
transport safety by independently investigating, analysing and openly
reporting on transport safety matters.10 The ATSB was established by the
Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (Cth) and conducts its investigations
in accordance with the Act’s provisions which allow the ATSB to investigate
transport safety matters in the aviation, marine and rail transport modes
within the Australian Government’s jurisdiction.11
Under the Transport Safety Investigation Act, it is not a function of the
ATSB to apportion blame or provide a means for determining liability. The
ATSB does not investigate for the purpose of taking administrative,
regulatory or criminal action. The independence of the ATSB is integral to
the Bureau’s safety investigations. The Act allows the ATSB to investigate
transport safety matters in aviation, marine and rail transport modes within
the Australian Government’s jurisdiction. The Act contains powers for the
release of transport safety information, including investigation reports that
detail the findings and significant factors that led to a particular safety
occurrence.
The ATSB is a member of key safety bodies which include the
International Transportation Safety Association, the International Society of
Air Safety Investigators, the Flight Safety Foundation and the Marine
Accident Investigators’ International Forum.
VI. Inland Waterways
17. The longest river system in Australia is the Murray-Darling that drains
part of Qld, the major part of NSW and a large part of Vic. It finally flows
into an arm of the sea called Lake Alexandria, on the eastern side of the
South Australian coast. The Murray is about 2,520 kilometres long, and the
Darling and Upper Darling are collectively about 2,000 kilometres long.
There are also other rivers of considerable size, including those of the north-
west coast of Australia, and rivers in the NT and Qld. The largest of the
33. Australian lakes are drainage sumps for its rivers. There are, however, many
other types. Australia is affected by both droughts and floods which impact
upon the inland waterways. With south-eastern Australia containing about
75% of the nation’s population, droughts affecting this region have a severe
affect on the economy. Widespread flood rainfall is particularly common in
the north and eastern coastal areas and is most economically damaging along
the eastern uplands eastward towards the seaboard of Qld and NSW. Floods
also occur in the great Fitzroy and Burdekin river basins of Qld, and the
Murray itself is often affected by flood rains. As a consequence of these
natural conditions and the location of the population and port facilities, most
of Australia’s inland waterways are not used for transport and traffic is
essentially that of private recreational craft.
VII. Airports and Civil Aviation
18. Airports are all now privatized or held by local authorities or locally
based boards. In 1990, the Federal Government deregulated the domestic
airline market. This market is currently dominated by three companies,
Qantas, Jetstar and Virgin Airlines, all of which also operate international
airlines.
VIII. Pipelines
19. Natural gas pipelines are some of the more significant in Australia.
These include those running from Bunbury to Dampier through the Perth and
Carnarvon Basins in WA; from the Amadeus Basin, near Alice Springs, to
Darwin in the NT; from the Cooper Basin near Moomba in SA to Adelaide
and Whyalla, and from there also to the NSW coast; and from Wallumbilla to
Brisbane and Gladstone. In general, infrastructure investment in the gas
industry has been small except for the construction of the North-West Shelf
to Perth pipeline in the early 1980s and the Moomba pipeline in 1976. The
construction of the North-West Shelf to Perth pipeline in the early 1980s has
been followed by a large export contract for liquefied gas from the North-
34. West Shelf to China.12 The pipeline systems carry crude oil (2,500
kms);petroleum products (500 kms); natural gas (5,600 kms). Water is
carried in pipelines; Perth to Kalgoorlie-Goldfields Water Supply Scheme;
Morgan on the Murray River to Adelaide, Wyalla, Port Lincoln; Waranga
Western Channel, near Colbainabbin to Bendigo and Ballarat-Goldfields
Superpipe. Other completed water pipelines in Victoria link the Goulburn
River to Melbourne, Melbourne to Geelong, Wimmera to Malle and the
Hamilton-Grampians pipeline.
1. For current export statistics see Australian Bureau of Statistics www.abs.gov.au under
International Trade Statistics.
2. See ch. 2.
3. See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp); for the legislative powers of the
Commonwealth see sec. 1, the executive power see sec. 61, the judicial power see sec. 71. See
also the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth) and the Australia Act 1988 (Cth). See
also Australian Government Publishing Service, Final Report of the Constitutional Commission
(Canberra, 1988).
4. The issue of the Vice Regal (Governor-General’s) power has already been actively discussed
since the dismissal of the Whitlam Government in 1975 by the then Governor-General Sir John
Kerr. For the current law-making powers of the Federal Parliament acting for a sovereign
independent nation see the Australia Act 1986 (Cth); Australia Act 1988 (UK).
5. Constitution sec. 77(iii).
6. See P. Latimer, Australian Business Law 14–15 (20th ed., CCH 2001).
7. For infrastructure statistics see Australian Infrastructure Statistics-Yearbook 2012 at
Department of Transport and Regional Services at www.dotars.gov.au.
8. See D 86, p. 50.
9. See AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (2013) ‘Phase 2 high speed rail study’
wwwinfrastructure.gov.au/rail/ trains/high_speed/index.aspx.
10. See website www.atsb.gov.au.
11. See G. Heilbronn, Aviation Regulation and Licensing 101–123 (Thomson: Law Book Co 2008)
for a detailed account of the ATSB’s functions and powers in relation to air accident and safety
investigation.
12. For current energy statistics (including gas) see Australian Bureau of Statistics at
www.abs.gov.au.
35. Part I. Introduction
§1. INSTITUTIONS REGULATING THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM
I. The Department of Transport and Regional Development
20. The Department of Transport and Regional Services administers the
Government’s domestic and international aviation policies. Previously the
Department of Transport and Communications, it has taken on functions of
regional development also.13
II. The Australian Transport Advisory Council
21. This comprises the Commonwealth, State and Territory ministers
responsible for transport, roads, marine and ports matters. Its main role is to
review and coordinate particular aspects of transport policy, development,
and administration. It does this through biannual meetings, initiating
discussion and reports on issues raised by members. It thereby provides
advice on policies which will promote better coordination and development
of transport in Australia.
III. The Bureau of Transport and Communications, Economics
22. This is a centre for applied economic research in the Department of
Transport and Regional Services.14 It undertakes research to contribute to
greater understanding of these industries. It is particularly concerned with the
factors influencing the efficiency and growth of the transport and
36. communications sectors, and the development of effective transport and
communications policies. It has been involved in a number of matters
recently, including studies of the international air industry and shipping
reform.
IV. Australian Maritime Safety Authority
23. Established under the Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act 1990
(Cth), it is responsible for maritime safety activities in Australia, and for
providing the Australian maritime navigational aids network. It operates the
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, which coordinates major maritime
search and rescue activities in Australian waters. It is also responsible for
pollution prevention and clean-up, and for the registration of Australian
ships.15
V. Australian Transport Safety Bureau
24. The ATSB contributes to transport safety by independently
investigating, analysing and openly reporting on transport safety matters.16
The ATSB was established by the Transport Safety Investigation Act
2003(Cth) and conducts its investigations in accordance with the Act’s
provisions which allow the vATSB to investigate transport safety matters in
the aviation, marine and rail transport modes within the Australian
Government’s jurisdiction.17
Under the Transport Safety Investigation Act, it is not a function of the
ATASB to apportion blame or provide a means for determining liability. The
ATSB does not investigate for the purpose of taking administrative,
regulatory, or criminal action. The Act contains powers for the release of
transport safety information, including investigation reports that detail the
findings and significant factors that led to a particular safety occurrence.
The ATSB is member of key safety bodies which include the International
Transport Safety Association, the International Society of Air Safety
Investigators, the Flight Safety Foundation and the Marine Accident
37. Investigators’ International Forum.
VI. The National Transport Commission
25. Established as a result of legislation agreed at the Special Premiers
Conference in 1991, the National Transport Commission has responsibility
for road vehicles, drivers, other road users and related matters. It is concerned
with developing uniformity in road transport law, and for improvements in
road safety and transport efficiency. It is also concerned to see reductions in
the cost of the administration of road transport. The Commonwealth has
power to legislate in relation to interstate road transport pursuant to the trade
and commerce power in the Constitution, section 51(i), subject to the
restriction of section 92 that provides that trade and commerce between the
States shall be absolutely free.
26. The Special Premiers Conference of 1991 envisaged the development
of uniform and consistent road transport law by the Commission, to
overcome the inconsistencies that different State and Territory legislation had
brought. The Commission is created by the Act, together with the Ministerial
Council for Road Transport (below). The Act, therefore, defines the legal
status of the Commission and sets out its functions in relation to the
Ministerial Council. Following legislation enacted for the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT) by the Commonwealth, it was agreed that each of the States
and the NT would pass legislation providing for the automatic repeal,
amendment, or modification of existing legislation to avoid conflict with the
Act. Other incidental powers were designed to ensure its further effective
functioning. Until that time, however, the States and the NT will continue to
exercise powers under their existing legislation.
VII. The Ministerial Council for Road Transport
27. The Ministerial Council, as created under the Act, is required to
perform four main functions: it is required to consider and where appropriate
38. disallow legislative proposals made by the Commission (within two months);
it has the power to allow exemptions for certain jurisdictions from particular
aspects of the package, which are known as Application and Emergency
Orders; it is required to make decisions as to budget and funding; and it is
required to oversee the administration of the legislation by the States and
Territories.
VIII. The Australian Road Transport Advisory Committee
28. The Australian Road Transport Advisory Committee was established
in April 1990 as part of continuing reforms to the road transport sector. Its
role is to provide the Minister for Transport and Regional Services with
direct industry-based advice on all aspects of the road transport industry. Its
specialist advice also helps in the task of integrating road and rail with other
types of transport.
IX. Austroads
29. Austroads is a national association of road and traffic authorities,
which provides strategic direction for the development, management and use
of Australia’s road system through consultation with stakeholders. It
coordinates research, prepares guides and standards, and is concerned with
improvements in and harmonization of practices within an agreed national
policy framework.18
X. The Australian Road Research Board
30. The Australian Road Research Board is a non-profit making national
group owned by the Department of Transport and Communications, the State
and Territory authorities and the Local Government Association. As well as
conducting research into all aspects of roads and their use, it also provides an
information service to government in general, industry, educational and
research organizations and the general public.
39. XI. The National Rail Corporation
31. The National Rail Corporation was established by the Commonwealth
Government to achieve coordinated development of the national rail system,
replacing the National Railways Commission which was established in 1983.
In 1991 an agreement was made between the Commonwealth, NSW, Vic,
Qld and WA which was given effect by the National Rail Corporation
Agreement Act 1992 (Cth). This Act set up the National Railway Corporation
which took over the assets of the Australian National Railway Commission
which were assets of the Commonwealth and other assets acquired by the
company under the 1991 Agreement. The National Rail Corporation carried
out its operations over the interstate network to Sydney, Melbourne,
Brisbane, Perth, and Alice Springs. The great majority of the National Rail
Corporation’s shares were owned by the Commonwealth Government. This
reflected that most of the shares transferred to the National Rail Corporation
consisted of interstate rail freight operations of the Australian National
Railways Commission. The National Rail Corporation was wound down and
sold by the Australian National Railways Commission Sale Act 1997 (Cth)
which repealed the Australian National Railways Commission Act 1983
(Cth). The 1997 Act provided for the assets of the Australian National
Railway Commission to pass to the Commonwealth. While the
Commonwealth does not have direct constitutional power over railways
(other than for military purposes), it can acquire and construct railways in a
State either by agreement or with its consent.
XII. Airservices Australia
32. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was established by the Civil
Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) which was set up to deal with the safety regulation of
civil aviation in Australia and of Australian registered aircraft overseas. It
also provided air traffic control, search and rescue and other facilities to the
industry. It was replaced by Air Services Australia in 1995 under the Air
Services Act 1995 (Cth). The Civil Aviation Legislation Amendment Act 1995
40. (Cth)19 transferred the assets, liabilities and staff to the new body. Air
Services Australia continues to provide the functions of the CAA in a cost-
effective way. Although it regards the safety of air navigation as its most
important consideration, it is also required to act in a manner that ensures, as
far as practicable, that the environment is protected from the effects of
aircraft operations. There are three operating divisions: Air Traffic Services,
Rescue and Fire Fighting Service and Facilities Management. There are also
five support divisions.
XIII. Civil Aviation Safety Authority
33. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) established in July 1995
by the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) is the most important aviation safety
regulatory body in Australia. It shares with Airservices Australia (AA) most
of the functions previously carried out by the now defunct CAA and the
Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) which CASA and AA replaced in 1995
under the responsibility of the relevant Commonwealth department. This is
now the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and
Local Government which retains more or less direct powers over air accident
investigation and aviation security. In 2007, CASA acquired the regulatory
authority that AA previously exercised over airspace, and CASA now
exercises regulatory supervision over most AA functions, importantly
airports and air traffic control. CASA has taken over the only remaining
regulatory role that AA previously exercised in airspace regulation and
administration. As a result, CASA has been responsible since mid-2007 for
designation of air routes and controlled and prohibited areas.20
XIV. The International Air Services Commission
34. This body was set up under the International Air Services Commission
Act 1992 (Cth). It is an independent body with the duty of allocating
international aviation capacity and route entitlements among Australian
international carriers. The Commission works with wide-ranging public
41. benefit criteria set by the Minister for Transport and Regional Services. In
2003, the Federal Government made changes to the International Air
Services Commission Act 1992 (Cth) and issued new regulations. The
Minister also issued a new policy statement to the Commission. The main
aim of the new regulations were to:
(a) make the object of the Act focus more strongly on competition
benefits; and
(b) speed up decision-making by providing for the delegation of
Commission powers and functions to an officer of the Department of
Transport and Regional Services (the delegate) in circumstances set out
in the regulations.
Under these arrangements, the delegate can make a range of determinations
previously made by the Commission. However, the more complex matters
continue to be dealt with by the Commission.21
§2. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS
35. Chapter 1 provides a concise account of carriage of goods by sea. The
contractual arrangements provided by demise, time, and voyage
charterparties are illustrated by reference to standard clauses litgated over
time and put in the context of common shipping practice. The principal
features of bills of lading are outlined and the main issues confronting the
shipper, the carrier and the consignee are dealt with. The problem of third-
party liability under a bill of lading is appraised in the light of key cases. The
provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules enacted in Australian municipal law by
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991(Cth) are noted as modernizing the
Australian maritime carriage liability regime. The chapter concludes with a
summary of statutory provisions governing the regulation of overseas liner
shipping by the Commonwealth.
36. Chapter 2 concisely reviews aspects of the general law relating to
42. shipping which deals with the operation of maritime vessels. The chapter
gives the constitutional context of the role and powers of the Commonwealth
to regulate shipping. Shipping registration and the coverage of the Shipping
Registration Act 1981(Cth) are noted, as is the right of shipowners, managers,
operators, and salvors to limit their liability. Marine pollution, which has
increased both in its potential for environmental and economic loss, is largely
regulated by a range of international conventions to which Australia is party.
The National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1973 provides a
coordination of Commonwealth and State resources to deal with specific oil
pollution threats and actual spills. Collision is governed by international
convention given effect by the Navigation Act 2012(Cth). Salvage, apart from
some statutory provisions, is generally regulated by private standard form
agreements.
37. Admiralty law is only briefly summarized regarding its provisions
dealing with actions against vessels under the Admiralty Act 1988(Cth).This
reform in Australian admiralty law replaced and repealed the Colonial Courts
of Admiralty Act 1890(Imp) and provided a more modern statute and much
needed reform.
38. Chapter 1 deals with carriage by road. The law of carriage by road is
regulated by standard form contracts between the parties and increasingly, by
Federal legislation and enacted international conventions. In the early law of
carriage, the position of the common carrier was crucial. Although the
common carrier has ceased to exist for all practical purposes in the regime of
land, sea, and air transport, the distinction between common and private
carriers has moulded the law significantly. Modern standard form contracts
provide a detailed framework for the law of carriage and the rules governing
such contracts are those that apply to standard form contracts and exemption
clauses. The general position is that once the courts accept a document as
contractual in nature and its terms protect the carrier from a range of
liabilities, then the consignee will normally bear the risks of carriage.
However, statute has made inroads into this principle, particularly in relation
43. to consumer protection under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010(Cth).
39. The impact of Federal legislation on road transport has been
significant. This is illustrated by the Interstate Road Transport Act
1985(Cth), the Interstate Road Transport Charges Act 1985(Cth), the
National Road Transport Commission Act 1991(Cth), the Road Charges
(ACT) Act 1993(Cth), and the Road Transport Reform(Vehicles and Traffic)
Act 1991(Cth).The development of the Uniform Road Transport Law on a
cooperative basis between the Federal, State, and Territory Governments is
accordingly set out. The laws of the States and Territory are referenced to
Laws of Australia: Transport.
40. Chapter 2 provides an account of the law of rail carriage. The role of
the Commonwealth was strengthened by the creation of the National
Railways Commission in 1983 and its successor, the National Rail
Corporation (since wound down) with increased power to the Commonwealth
as a result of the National Rail Corporation Agreement Act 1992(Cth), a
cooperative agreement between the Commonwealth Government and the
States. In 1998 the Australian Rail Track Corporation was formed which took
over the National Rail Corporation. As a result the Commonwealth has
retreated from direct rail management in Australia.
41. Chapter 3 is concerned with the framework of air carriage law, with
particular reference to the provisions of the amended Warsaw Convention
implemented to establish various liability regimes by the Commonwealth and
related State legislation. The position of the air carrier is detailed with
reference to the issues of liability for loss of and damage to cargo (including
baggage), delay, wilful misconduct, required air ticket and waybill
provisions, and time limits for claims. Air carriage, while still in its
technological infancy, was subjected to an early attempt to secure uniformity
of law affecting the liability of air carriers to passengers and shippers in the
shape of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
relating to International Carriage by Air(Warsaw Convention Warsaw 1929.
44. Since then the law governing air carriage has grown in coverage and
complexity .These developments in Australia have occurred against a
background of transport deregulation, including the domestic airline system,
the rise of the international airline’ megacarriers’ and national economic
reform in general.
42. The Civil Aviation(Carrier’s Liability Act 1991(Cth) ratified the
Montreal Protocols Three and Four. These Protocols raised the limit of a
carrier’s liability to international carriage of passengers by air and cargo and
registered baggage. In relation to liability for passenger injury and death,
which has seen much litigation, the position has changed radically with the
adoption by a large number of IATA carriers (including Qantas) of the
Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability and the supplemental
agreement to it outlined in the chapter.
13. For current Federal Government transport policy and information see www.dotars.gov.au.
14. See http://btre.gov.au.
15. See www.amsa.gov.au.
16. See website www.atsb.gov.au.
17. See G. Heilbronn, Aviation Regulation and Licensing 101–123 (Law Book Co 2008) for a
detailed account of the ATSB’s functions and powers in relation to air accident and safety
investigation.
18. See www.austroads.com.au.
19. For a detailed description of AA and its administrative and legal status see G. Heilbronn,
Aviation Regulation and Licensing 54–57 (Law Book 2008).
20. For a detailed description of CASA’s administrative context and legal status see G. Heilbronn,
Aviation Regulation and Licensing 45–53 (Law Book Co 2008).
21. The object of the International Air Services Commission Act 1992 (Cth) is to promote
economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services resulting
in:
(1) increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased
range of choices and benefits;
(2) growth in Australian tourism and trade; and
(3) the maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of
foreign countries. For the IASC website see www.iasc.gov.au.
45. Part II. Maritime Law
Chapter 1. Carriage by Sea
§1. GENERAL
43. The carriage of goods by sea may be conducted by adopting one of
two courses. The first course is that the services of a ship and its crew may be
chartered for a specified time or voyage and arrangement made for the
carriage of goods by that ship. This hire of services is often loosely referred
to as ‘the hire of the ship’, an expression more accurately confined to demise
charter parties.22/23 Second, and more commonly, the cargo owner may seek
space in a general ship, that is, one which will carry the goods of all who so
wish, and they will generally employ a forwarding agent to find the space.24
The forwarding agent will arrange this with a loading broker acting on behalf
of a shipowner or, where the ship is under charter, on behalf of the
charterer.25 Although not normally in possession of the goods, the forwarding
agent will often arrange for them to be placed on board the ship, taking in
return from the master a mate’s receipt, which will be subsequently
exchanged for the document of title (a bill of lading), again issued by the
master. The bill of lading, as a document of title, may be sold several times
over while the goods are in transit, thereby altering the relationship of the
various parties concerned in the transaction. It is necessary to pay careful
attention to the times of passing of property and of risk and the need to insure
the goods.26
46. 44. A sea carrier’s common law obligations are of limited relevance
because liability is governed in practice by contract and statute. At common
law a shipowner who carries goods is absolutely bound to provide a
seaworthy ship at the commencement of the voyage,27 to proceed on the
voyage with reasonable despatch28 and without unreasonable deviation.29 It
is not clear whether a carrier by sea is absolutely liable to deliver goods at the
port of destination in exactly the condition it received them, subject to
recognized defences at common law, or whether a carrier is liable only to
exercise due care and diligence. Much will depend on whether or not the
shipowner is a common carrier. In such a case, the carrier is absolutely liable.
A common carrier must engage regularly in the carriage trade for reward,
employing its ship, or at least part of it, as a general ship. It is not clear
whether a carrier must ply regularly between fixed places or whether it
should habitually carry for the public. Part of the difficulty in determining the
nature of a sea carrier’s liability originates in doubt as to whether a sea carrier
can be sued for refusing to take goods offered to it as in the case of a
common carrier, and whether in the absence of such a liability the
shipowner’s liability for carriage is similar to that of a common carrier.30 The
common law defences – act of God, loss caused by the monarch’s enemies,
inherent vice, defective packing, loss due to sacrifice (such as a jettison of
cargo to save the common venture) – were limited and could be denied if a
shipowner contributed to the loss or damage by negligence,31 deviation,32 or
by providing an unseaworthy ship.33
45. A shipowner may expressly limit its liability by contract, subject to
implied duties under the contract. It is customary for a shipowner to include
in a contract the common law defences but, given the wide range of standard
contractual exceptions, a shipowner’s obligations are said to have been
reduced to merely receiving the freight.34 A shipowner may exclude liability
for loss or damage caused by strikes,35 perils of the sea,36 and even
negligence of itself and its crew.37 However, a carrier may lose the benefit of
the exceptions where it is in breach of its implied duties under the contract of
affreightment38 to provide a seaworthy ship,39 to proceed without
47. unreasonable delay,40 and not to deviate.41
46. The liability of a sea carrier has been significantly modified by statute.
By virtue of their superior bargaining power, shipowners were often able to
reduce their liabilities so as to effectively reverse the common law
relationship between shipper and carrier.42 Essentially, the shipper could
either ship the goods on the terms offered or not at all. An additional problem
was that the usefulness of bills of lading were reduced by their varied and
complex characters and by their restricted usefulness to third parties.
Following legislative reform in the United States,43 an attempt to
overcome these difficulties resulted in the recommendation by an
international conference at Brussels in 1924 of a uniform set of rules for the
carriage of goods by sea, commonly known as the Hague Rules.44 However,
dissatisfaction arose concerning issues such as the limitation of carrier’s
liability instanced by unit liability limits set in relation to boxes, bales or
bundles, during a time when international trade was increasingly occurring
through the use of standardized shipping containers.45 As a result in 1968 the
Visby Rules, amending the Hague Rules were signed.46 These amended rules
received further modification through the SDR Protocol.47 which substituted
‘francs’ with ‘special drawing rights’48 producing the Amended Hague
Rules.49
The purpose of the Hague-Visby Rules is to establish a balance between
the shipper and the shipowner, the latter being obliged to accept certain listed
liabilities in return for enumerated qualifications on its liability. In this sense,
the Hague-Visby Rules represent a compromise between the positions under
common law and under contract.50
The Hague-Visby Rules have been given wide effect internationally and
enacted into Australian domestic law (with some modification) in the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991(Cth).51
47. A contract of charter is known as a charter party. It will not necessarily
contain terms which can be referred to a shipment of cargo. In other words,
not all charter parties are contracts of carriage.52 The main function of a
48. charter party is to obtain a vessel or its services for a number of uses by the
charterer. In the event that a charterer requires a shipowner to carry cargo, the
charter party usually includes the terms of carriage. Both common law and
maritime codes, such as the Hague-Visby Rules, reproduced in Schedule 1 of
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth), classify a body of law by
reference to the charter party, as it is a standard type of commercial contract.
48. Three principal types of charter party have been recognized by the
courts.53 These are:
(1) the demise or ‘bareboat’ charter which is in the nature of a lease
whereby the charterer takes possession and control of the ship for an
agreed period.54 Here, the charterer assumes liability as a carrier if the
charterer contracts to transport cargo for third persons and the
charterer’s liability will be determined by the individual contracts of
shipment independently of the charter party;
(2) the voyage charter, where the exclusive use and services of the ship are
obtained on designated voyages; and
(3) the time charter, which is similar to the voyage charter but expressed
for a prescribed period.
A hybrid of a voyage and time charter party is what is commonly termed a
‘mixed’ charter party. Sometimes a charter in the form of a time charter party
is expressed to be for a voyage or a round voyage. The effect may be to
maintain the contract in the form of a time charter as the basis and method of
payment by time with the essence of a voyage charter incorporated to make
the prescribed voyage the main part of the contract, the length of time of the
voyage being used to measure the period of chartered service and payment of
chartered hire.55 Alternatively, a charter party may be so drafted, in
connection with consecutive voyages, to operate as a voyage rather than a
time charter.56 Such mixed charter parties may be regarded as a sub-category
of voyage charters.57
49. 49. Where a charterer wishes to reserve the ship for the carrying of its own
cargo, the charter party will include terms dealing with the shipment. In such
a case, the shipowner acts as a carrier and the charterer is cast in the role of
the shipper. If the charterer subcontracts the ship to third parties, this
subcontract will govern the relations between the charterer and the third
parties. As an alternative arrangement, the shipper may reserve space for
cargoes over prescribed routes or periods under a contract of affreightment.58
Charter is commonly used where liner services are unsuitable, either because
the destination is not travelled to regularly by the liners concerned, or the
cargo is not suited to general carriage. Since Australia is economically
dependent on revenue from bulk shipments of oil, ore, and grain, it is
significant that these are usually shipped under charter for the reasons given
in the preceding sentence.
§2. DEMISE CHARTER PARTIES
50. A demise charter party is the effective lease of a ship by a charterer.59
This occurs when the shipowner provides the charterer with full possession
and control of the vessel.60 The charterer assumes liability as a carrier (if the
charterer contracts to transport cargo for third persons) and the charterer’s
liability will be determined by the individual contracts of shipment
independent of the charter party. Although this form of charter party is
generally uncommon in contracts of carriage by sea, it may occur for
particular purposes such as financing the charterer’s purchase of the vessel.61
Occasionally a distinction may be drawn between a charter by demise of a
ship without master and crew (called a ‘bareboat charter party’) and a demise
charter party that include the services of the master and crew (although there
is a tendency for the terms to be used interchangeably). In the case of
bareboat charterparties a commonly used standard form is the BIMCO
Standard Bareboat Chater (Barecon 2001).62
In either case, a key distinction between demise (whether bareboat or
otherwise) and time charter parties is that demise charter parties do not
50. contain an ‘off hire clause(see II p. 72): the charterer is obliged to pay hire for
the full term of the charter.63 As a demise charter party places the ship under
the complete control and possession of the charterer, standard form charter
parties are carefully worded to place the full obligations of operating the
vessel on the charterers.64
§3. VOYAGE CHARTER PARTIES
I. ‘Gencon’ Provisions
51. Voyage charter parties are often entered into on standard terms. These
standard form documents such as the ‘Gencon’65 voyage charter may be
amended by the parties so that only general principles can be laid down. The
following provisions are found in most voyage charter parties:
(1) the shipowner agrees to provide a ship and states her position,
capacity and class on the register;
(2) the shipowner promises that the ship will proceed with reasonable
despatch;
(3) the shipowner undertakes that the ship is seaworthy;
(4) the shipowner undertakes to carry the goods to their destination;
(5) the charterer agrees to provide a full cargo;
(6) the charterer agrees to pay freight;
(7) Excepted perils are listed;
(8) the manner of loading and discharge is laid down with particular
reference to time for these operations, and the rate of demurrage;
(9) the charterer is given the right to cancel the contract if the ship does
not arrive at a certain port on a given date;
(10) a clause incorporating the Hague-Visby Rules (reproduced in
Schedule 1 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth)), known
as a ‘general paramount clause’;
(11) the amended ‘Jason’ clause, concerning general average;66
51. (12) a ‘both to blame’ collision clause;
(13) an arbitration clause;
(14) a clause governing payment of commission to the broker for
negotiating the charter party;
(15) a ‘cesser’ clause which purports to relieve the charterer from paying
demurrage;67 and
(16) a war clause.68
52. In a voyage charter party, the shipowner makes three implied
undertakings: to provide a seaworthy ship for the voyage, to proceed without
unjustifiable deviation, and to proceed with reasonable despatch. A ship must
be seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage for that particular voyage
and for the cargo carried.69 A shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy ship
includes a duty to have its loading and discharging tackles available for the
ordinary purposes of loading and discharging. This will be the case even
where a charter party provides that stowing, trimming, and discharging are to
be paid for by the charterers.70 An express clause in a voyage charter party
that the ship is to be ‘tight, staunch, and strong, and in everyway fitted for the
voyage’ relates to the preliminary voyage to the port of loading. It refers to
the time at which the contract is made,71 or to the time of sailing from the
port of loading. The express undertaking does not displace the undertaking
implied by law (i.e., to provide a seaworthy ship for the voyage).72
53. The voyage must be completed without unjustifiable deviation. The
terms of the voyage charter party often give the shipowner the right to call at
ports off the ordinary trade route. A clause will normally give liberty to the
vessel to tow or assist vessels, or both, in all situations, and to deviate for the
purpose of saving life or property or both, and to comply with any orders
given by the government of the nation under whose flag it sails, or by any
other government.73 It is also common for goods to be covered by item or
floating policies under an Institute of London Underwriters clause (known as
an ‘Institute clause’), which hold the goods covered in the event of delay and
deviation.74 Voyage charter parties generally include a deviation clause
52. which allows a limited right to deviate from the voyage route. A charter party
normally stipulates that the vessel will sail and proceed with reasonable
despatch expressed as ‘with all convenient speed’ or some other similar
expression. The common law obligation to be diligent is not generally
extended by these stipulations.75
54. The principal implied undertaking by a charterer under a voyage
charter party is that it will not ship dangerous goods.76 A charterer will be
liable for any loss or damage caused even by the master’s acceptance of
dangerous goods on board, unless the master has acted unreasonably in
carrying them. A charter party may expressly prohibit the loading of
dangerous goods, although an express term may entitle a charterer to load
provided due notice is given to the master. Goods may be dangerous not only
because they may create a danger to the vessel,77 but also because they are
liable to cause detention of the ship by authorities.78
II. The ‘Near’ Clause
55. An undertaking by a shipowner to perform a voyage is usually
expressed in the charter party in terms of a ‘near’ clause in relation to the
specified port for loading and discharging cargo. The ‘near’ clause is usually
expressed in the following terms:
[T]he said vessel shall proceed to … (loading port) or so near thereto as
she may safely get and lie always afloat and there load … and being so
loaded the vessel shall proceed to … (loading port) or so near thereto as
she may safely get and lie always afloat and there deliver the cargo.79
A charterer is obliged to furnish the required orders to the ship’s master to
proceed within the time specified or within a reasonable time if none is
specified. If a charterer does not give orders within the required time then the
ship has to await orders until the delay is such to constitute frustration of the
voyage. Until frustration occurs, the ship’s master is not entitled to proceed to
53. a port of the master’s own choice.80 If a ship is required to proceed to a port
of call for orders as to a port of discharge, and if at the port of call the
charterer will only name a port that is impossible to get into, the charterer
then commits a breach of contract. The shipowner, accordingly, on
discharging the goods at the port of call, if that is a reasonable place for
discharge, can claim freight under a quantum merit and damages for any
detention of the ship at the port of call due to the charterer’s refusal to
nominate a proper port.81 This rule will only apply if the port is impossible or
subject to delay which will frustrate the commercial object of the
undertaking. The charterer, in selecting a port, does not have to consider the
shipowner’s convenience.82 The main purpose of the ‘near’ clause – ‘or so
near thereto as she may safely get and lie always afloat’ – is to give the
shipowner the option of refusing to proceed further than to a point where the
vessel will not be in danger. It also entitles the shipowner to substitute an
alternative destination. Thus, the clause qualifies the shipowner’s duty to
bring the vessel to an agreed place. A vessel, chartered to unload at a named
port, dock or berth, subject to such a clause, is bound to wait a reasonable
time before adopting the alternative place of loading or discharge, if by
waiting the vessel can enter the named location.83 What constitutes a
reasonable time is determined by commercial considerations and by the
nature of the voyage in which the vessel is employed. In determining what
would be reasonable from a commercial point of view, the interests of both
parties have to be considered.84
56. The issues involved in assessing a ‘near’ clause hinge on
foreseeability, the nature of the obstacle and an alternative port or ports.
Questions arise as to whether the hindrance is known to the shipowner or
could reasonably have been foreseen by the shipowner, and whether and to
what extent it has a duty to inquire about the conditions of the port. Where
the port, berth, or location is to be specified in the charter party, the
shipowner is usually considered to be under a duty to ascertain the condition
of the place before it undertakes to bring the vessel there. Where a shipowner
had knowledge, actual or implied, of the obstacle or hindrance then it is
54. doubtful whether the shipowner has the protection of the ‘near’ clause.85
Where neither of the parties knew or ought to have known of the obstacle, a
distinction should be made between charter parties with a clause designating
a general area (such as ‘East Coast, United States’) known as an ‘order’
clause and those which state a simple port or nominate a narrow range of
ports. In this first case, the ‘near’ clause is of commercial value as a
shipowner cannot be expected to have knowledge of every port to which it
could be ordered at short notice. By contrast, where a limited number of ports
are included in the charter party, a shipowner can usually discover the
existence of any obstacles in advance. In this situation, it may be argued that
the courts will only permit a shipowner to invoke the ‘near’ clause when the
obstacle would have come into existence after it had accepted the port of
destination and be one that it could not have reasonably foreseen.86
Therefore, shipowners are advised to make careful enquiries before accepting
a port and are warned not to use the ‘near’ clause to protect themselves from
the consequences of faults within their own lines of information.87
57. No distinction is made in English (or Australian) law between local
obstacles, which are within a charterer’s ambit of responsibility and against
which the ‘near’ clause protects a shipowner, and marine obstacles, which are
within a shipowner’s expectation of risk. An obstacle may be of a physical
nature, such as ice or lack of draught, or refusal of port authorities to allow
the ship to proceed or dock. Insufficient draught, as an obstacle, has been the
subject of much litigation. Where insufficient draught is temporary, as when
tides are low, the ship has to wait until the water rises.88 The length of time
an obstacle is likely to exist is also of importance.89 The shipowner appears
to be under no other duty than to proceed to the place nearest the primary
destination that the ship can safely reach, whether or not loading or
discharging facilities are available.90 It is usual for most charter parties to
cover this eventuality by the addition of the words ‘and there load’ or ‘and
there deliver’.
III. Safe Ports
56. So too Ficinus says in his Argumentum to the Protagoras: (p. 765)
“Tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur. Siquidem prudentia est
scientia eligendi boni, malique vitandi. Ambigitur autem utrum
bonum malumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor. Neque
affirmatur id quidem omnino, neque manifesté omnino negatur. De
hoc enim in Gorgiâ Phileboque et alibi,” &c.
When a critic composes an Argument to the Protagoras, he is
surely under obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is
declared by Sokrates in the Protagoras, whether it be consistent or
not with the Gorgias and Philêbus. Yet here we find Ficinus
misrepresenting the Protagoras, in order to force it into harmony
with the other two.
151 This is so directly stated that I am surprised to find Zeller
(among many other critics) announcing that Plato here accepts for
the occasion the Standpunkt of his enemies (Philos. der Griech. vol.
ii. p. 380, ed. 2nd).
152 Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ
εἰρημένα.
153 When Stallbaum asserts that the thesis is taken up by Sokrates
as one which was maintained by Protagoras and the other Sophists
(Proleg. p. 33), he says what is distinctly at variance with the
dialogue, p. 351.
Schleiermacher maintains that this same thesis (the fundamental
identity of good with pleasure, evil with pain) is altogether
“unsokratic and unplatonic”; that it is handled here by Sokrates in a
manner visibly ironical (sichtbar ironisch); that the purpose of the
argument is to show the stupidity of Protagoras, who is puzzled and
imposed upon by such obvious fallacies (Einleitung zum Protag. 230,
57. bottom of p. 232), and who is made to exhibit (so Schleiermacher
says, Einl. zum Gorgias, p. 14) a string of ludicrous absurdities.
Upon this I have to remark first, that if the stupidity of Protagoras
is intended to be shown up, that of all the other persons present
must be equally manifested; for all of them assent emphatically, at
the close, to the thesis as having been proved (Prot. p. 358 A): next,
that I am unable to see either the absurdities of Protagoras or the
irony of Sokrates, which Schleiermacher asserts to be so visible. The
argument of Sokrates is as serious and elaborate as any thing which
we read in Plato. Schleiermacher seems to me to misconceive
altogether (not only here but also in his Einleitung zum Gorgias, p.
10) the concluding argument of Sokrates in the Protagoras. To
describe the identity between ἡδὺ and ἀγαθὸν as a “scheinbare
Voraussetzung” is to depart from the plain meaning of words.
Again, Steinhart contends that Sokrates assumes this doctrine
(identity of pleasure with good, pain with evil), “not as his own
opinion, but only hypothetically, with a sarcastic side-glance at the
absurd consequences which many deduced from it — only as the
received world-morality, as the opinion of the majority” (Einleit. zum
Protag. p. 419). How Steinhart can find proof of this in the dialogue,
I am at a loss to understand. The dialogue presents to us Sokrates
introducing the opinion as his own, against that of Protagoras and
against that of the multitude (p. 351 C). On hearing this opposition
from Protagoras, Sokrates invites him to an investigation, whether
the opinion be just; Sokrates then conducts the investigation himself,
along with Protagoras, at considerable length, and ultimately brings
out the doctrine as proved, with the assent of all present.
These forced interpretations are resorted to, because the critics
cannot bear to see the Platonic Sokrates maintaining a thesis
58. Grounds of that doctrine.
Their insufficiency.
substantially the same as that of Eudoxus and Epikurus. Upon this
point, K. F. Hermann is more moderate than the others; he admits
the thesis to be seriously maintained in the dialogue — states that it
was really the opinion of the historical Sokrates — and adds that it
was also the opinion of Plato himself during his early Sokratic
stadium, when the Protagoras (as he thinks) was composed (Gesch.
und Syst. der Plat. Phil. pp. 462-463).
Most of the critics agree in considering the Protagoras to be one of
Plato’s earlier dialogues, about 403 B.C. Ast even refers it to 407 B.C.
when Plato was about twenty-one years of age. I have already given
my reasons for believing that none of the Platonic dialogues were
composed before 399 B.C. The Protagoras belongs, in my opinion, to
Plato’s most perfect and mature period.
The commentators resort to this
hypothesis, partly because the doctrine
in question is one which they
disapprove — partly because doctrines inconsistent with it are
maintained in other Platonic dialogues. These are the same two
reasons upon which, in other cases, various dialogues have been
rejected as not genuine works of Plato. The first of the two reasons
is plainly irrelevant: we must accept what Plato gives us, whether we
assent to it or not. The second reason also, I think, proves little. The
dialogues are distinct compositions, written each with its own
circumstances and purpose: we have no right to require that they
shall be all consistent with each other in doctrine, especially when
we look to the long philosophical career of Plato. To suppose that
the elaborate reasoning of Sokrates in the latter portion of the
Protagoras is mere irony, intended to mystify both Protagoras
himself and all the by-standers, who accept it as earnest and
59. Subject is professedly still
left unsettled at the close
of the dialogue.
convincing — appears to me far less reasonable than the admission,
that the dialectic pleading ascribed to Sokrates in one dialogue is
inconsistent with that assigned to him in another.
Though there is every mark of
seriousness, and no mark of irony, in
this reasoning of Sokrates, yet we must
remember that he does not profess to
leave the subject settled at the close of the dialogue. On the
contrary, he declares himself to be in a state of puzzle and
perplexity. The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is
teachable? remains undecided.
61. Persons who debate in the
Gorgias. Celebrity of the
historical Gorgias.
GORGIAS.
Aristotle, in one of his lost dialogues,
made honourable mention of a
Corinthian cultivator, who, on reading
the Platonic Gorgias, was smitten with
such vehement admiration, that he abandoned his fields and his
vines, came to Athens forthwith, and committed himself to the
tuition of Plato.1 How much of reality there may be in this anecdote,
we cannot say: but the Gorgias itself is well calculated to justify such
warm admiration. It opens with a discussion on the nature and
purpose of Rhetoric, but is gradually enlarged so as to include a
comparison of the various schemes of life, and an outline of positive
ethical theory. It is carried on by Sokrates with three distinct
interlocutors — Gorgias, Polus, and Kalliklês; but I must again
remind the reader that all the four are only spokesmen prompted by
Plato himself.2 It may indeed be considered almost as three distinct
dialogues, connected by a loose thread. The historical Gorgias, a
native of Leontini in Sicily, was the most celebrated of the Grecian
rhetors; an elderly man during Plato’s youth. He paid visits to
different cities in all parts of Greece, and gave lessons in rhetoric to
numerous pupils, chiefly young men of ambitious aspirations.3
1 Themistius, Or. xxiii. p. 356, Dindorf. Ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ Κορίνθιος
τῷ Γοργίᾳ ξυγγενόμενος — οὐκ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ Γοργίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ
ὃν Πλάτων ἔγραψεν ἐπ’ ἐλέγχῳ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ — αὐτίκα ἀφεὶς τὸν
ἄγρον καὶ τοὺς ἀμπέλους, Πλάτωνι ὑπέθηκε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ
62. Introductory circumstances
of the dialogue. Polus and
Kalliklês.
ἐκείνου ἐσπείρετο καὶ ἐφυτεύετο· καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὃν τιμᾷ
Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ.
2 Aristeides, Orat. xlvi. p. 387, Dindorf. Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι καὶ ὁ
Σωκράτης καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς καὶ ὁ Γοργίας καὶ ὁ Πῶλος, πάντα ταῦτ’
ἐστὶ Πλάτων, πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ τρέπων τοὺς λόγους; Though
Aristeides asks reasonably enough, Who is ignorant of this? — the
remarks of Stallbaum and others often imply forgetfulness of it.
3 Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, vol. iii. p. 22) is of
opinion that Plato composed the Gorgias shortly after returning from
his first voyage to Sicily, 387 B.C.
I shall not contradict this: but I see nothing to prove it. At the
same time, Schleiermacher assumes as certain that Aristophanes in
the Ekklesiazusæ alludes to the doctrines published by Plato in his
Republic (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 20). Putting these two
statements together, the Gorgias would be later in date of
composition than the Republic, which I hardly think probable.
However, I do not at all believe that Aristophanes in the
Ekklesiazusæ makes any allusion to the Republic of Plato. Nor shall I
believe, until some evidence is produced, that the Republic was
composed at so early a date as 390 B.C.
Sokrates and Chærephon are
described as intending to come to a
rhetorical lecture of Gorgias, but as
having been accidentally detained so as
not to arrive until just after it has been finished, with brilliant
success. Kalliklês, however, the host and friend of Gorgias, promises
that the rhetor will readily answer any questions put by Sokrates;
which Gorgias himself confirms, observing at the same time that no
63. Purpose of Sokrates in
questioning. Conditions of
a good definition.
one had asked him any new question for many years past.4 Sokrates
accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is? what it is that he
teaches? what is the definition of rhetoric? Not receiving a
satisfactory answer, Sokrates furnishes a definition of his own: out of
which grow two arguments of wide ethical bearing: carried on by
Sokrates, the first against Polus, the second against Kalliklês. Both
these two are represented as voluble speakers, of confident temper,
regarding the acquisition of political power and oratorical celebrity as
the grand objects of life. Polus had even composed a work on
Rhetoric, of which we know nothing: but the tone of this dialogue
would seem to indicate (as far as we can judge from such evidence)
that the style of the work was affected, and the temper of the
author flippant.
4 Plato, Gorg. pp. 447-448 A. The dialogue is supposed to be
carried on in the presence of many persons, seemingly belonging to
the auditory of the lecture which Gorgias has just finished, p. 455 C.
Here, as in the other dialogues
above noticed, the avowed aim of
Sokrates is — first, to exclude long
speaking — next, to get the question
accurately conceived, and answered in an appropriate manner.
Specimens are given of unsuitable and inaccurate answers, which
Sokrates corrects. The conditions of a good definition are made plain
by contrast with bad ones; which either include much more than the
thing defined, or set forth what is accessory and occasional in place
of what is essential and constant. These tentatives and gropings to
find a definition are always instructive, and must have been
especially so in the Platonic age, when logical distinctions had never
yet been made a subject of separate attention or analysis.
64. Questions about the
definition of Rhetoric. It is
the artisan of persuasion.
About what is Rhetoric as a cognition
concerned, Gorgias? Gorg. — About
words or discourses. Sokr. — About
what discourses? such as inform sick
men how they are to get well? Gorg. — No. Sokr. — It is not about
all discourses? Gorg. — It makes men competent to speak: of course
therefore also to think, upon the matters on which they speak.5 Sokr.
— But the medical and gymnastic arts do this likewise, each with
reference to its respective subject: what then is the difference
between them and Rhetoric? Gorg. — The difference is, that each of
these other arts tends mainly towards some actual work or
performance, to which the discourses, when required at all, are
subsidiary: but Rhetoric accomplishes every thing by discourses
alone.6 Sokr. — But the same may be said about arithmetic,
geometry, and other sciences. How are they distinguished from
Rhetoric? You must tell me upon what matters the discourses with
which Rhetoric is conversant turn; just as you would tell me, if I
asked the like question about arithmetic or astronomy. Gorg. — The
discourses, with which Rhetoric is conversant, turn upon the
greatest of all human affairs. Sokr. — But this too, Gorgias, is
indistinct and equivocal. Every man, the physician, the gymnast, the
money-maker, thinks his own object and his own affairs the greatest
of all.7 Gorg. — The function of Rhetoric, is to persuade assembled
multitudes, and thus to secure what are in truth the greatest
benefits: freedom to the city, political command to the speaker.8
Sokr. — Rhetoric is then the artisan of persuasion. Its single purpose
is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers? Gorg. — It is so.
5 Plato, Gorgias, p. 449 E. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
65. The Rhetor produces belief
without knowledge. Upon
what matters is he
competent to advise?
6 Plato, Gorgias, p. 450 B-C. τῆς ῥητορικῆς … πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ
κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστίν …
7 Plato, Gorgias, pp. 451-452.
8 Plato, Gorgias, p. 452 D. Ὅπερ ἔστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν,
καὶ αἴτιον, ἄμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἄμα δὲ τοῦ
ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ.
Sokr. — But are there not other
persons besides the Rhetor, who
produce persuasion? Does not the
arithmetical teacher, and every other
teacher, produce persuasion? How does
the Rhetor differ from them? What mode of persuasion does he
bring about? Persuasion about what? Gorg. — I reply — it is that
persuasion which is brought about in Dikasteries, and other
assembled multitudes — and which relates to just and unjust.9 Sokr.
— You recognise that to have learnt and to know any matter, is one
thing — to believe it, is another: that knowledge and belief are
different — knowledge being always true, belief sometimes false?
Gorg. — Yes. Sokr. — We must then distinguish two sorts of
persuasion: one carrying with it knowledge — the other belief
without knowledge. Which of the two does the Rhetor bring about?
Gorg. — That which produces belief without knowledge. He can
teach nothing. Sokr. — Well, then, Gorgias, on what matters will the
Rhetor be competent to advise? When the people are deliberating
about the choice of generals or physicians, about the construction of
docks, about practical questions of any kind — there will be in each
case a special man informed and competent to teach or give
counsel, while the Rhetor is not competent. Upon what then can the
Rhetor advise — upon just and unjust — nothing else?10
66. The Rhetor can persuade
the people upon any
matter, even against the
opinion of the special
expert. He appears to
know, among the ignorant.
9 Plato, Gorgias, p. 454 B.
10 Plato, Gorgias, p. 455 D.
The Rhetor (says Gorgias) or
accomplished public speaker, will give
advice about all the matters that you
name, and others besides. He will
persuade the people and carry them
along with him, even against the
opinion of the special Expert. He will
talk more persuasively than the craftsman about matters of the
craftsman’s own business. The power of the Rhetor is thus very
great: but he ought to use it, like all other powers, for just and
honest purposes; not to abuse it for wrong and oppression. If he
does the latter, the misdeed is his own, and not the fault of his
teacher, who gave his lessons with a view that they should be turned
to proper use. If a man, who has learnt the use of arms, employs
them to commit murder, this abuse ought not to be imputed to his
master of arms.11
11 Plato, Gorgias, pp. 456-457.
You mean (replies Sokrates) that he, who has learnt Rhetoric from
you, will become competent not to teach, but to persuade the
multitude:—that is, competent among the ignorant. He has acquired
an engine of persuasion; so that he will appear, when addressing the
ignorant, to know more than those who really do know.12
12 Plato, Gorgias, p. 459 B. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας
τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ
πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα
67. Gorgias is now made to
contradict himself. Polus
takes up the debate with
Sokrates.
Polemical tone of Sokrates.
At the instance of Polus he
gives his own definition of
rhetoric. It is no art, but an
empirical knack of catering
for the immediate pleasure
of hearers, analogous to
cookery. It is a branch
πειθοῦς εὑρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι
τῶν εἰδότων.
Thus far, the conversation is carried
on between Sokrates and Gorgias. But
the latter is now made to contradict
himself — apparently rather than really
— for the argument whereby Sokrates
reduces him to a contradiction, is not tenable, unless we admit the
Platonic doctrine that the man who has learnt just and unjust, may
be relied on to act as a just man;13 in other words, that virtue
consists in knowledge.
13 Plato, Gorgias, p. 460 B. ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκώς, δίκαιος.
Aristotle notices this confusion of Sokrates, who falls into it also in
the conversation with Euthydemus, Xenoph. Memorab. iv. 2, 20, iii.
9, 5.
Polus now interferes and takes up
the conversation: challenging Sokrates
to furnish what he thinks the proper
definition of Rhetoric. Sokrates obeys,
in a tone of pungent polemic. Rhetoric
(he says) is no art at all, but an
empirical knack of catering for the
pleasure and favour of hearers;
analogous to cookery.14 It is a talent
falling under the general aptitude
68. under the general head
flattery.
called Flattery; possessed by some bold
spirits, who are forward in divining and
adapting themselves to the temper of
the public.15 It is not honourable, but a mean pursuit, like cookery. It
is the shadow or false imitation of a branch of the political art.16 In
reference both to the body and the mind, there are two different
conditions: one, a condition really and truly good — the other, good
only in fallacious appearance, and not so in reality. To produce, and
to verify, the really good condition of the body, there are two
specially qualified professions, the gymnast or trainer and the
physician: in regard to the mind, the function of the trainer is
performed by the law-giving power, that of the physician by the
judicial power. Law-making, and adjudicating, are both branches of
the political art, and when put together make up the whole of it.
Gymnastic and medicine train and doctor the body towards its really
best condition: law-making and adjudicating do the same in regard
to the mind. To each of the four, there corresponds a sham
counterpart or mimic, a branch under the general head flattery —
taking no account of what is really best, but only of that which is
most agreeable for the moment, and by this trick recommending
itself to a fallacious esteem.17 Thus Cosmetic, or Ornamental
Trickery, is the counterfeit of Gymnastic; and Cookery the counterfeit
of Medicine. Cookery studies only what is immediately agreeable to
the body, without considering whether it be good or wholesome: and
does this moreover, without any truly scientific process of
observation or inference, but simply by an empirical process of
memory or analogy. But Medicine examines, and that too by
scientific method, only what is good and wholesome for the body,
whether agreeable or not. Amidst ignorant men, Cookery slips in as
the counterfeit of medicine; pretending to know what food is good
69. Distinction between the
true arts which aim at the
good of the body and mind
— and the counterfeit arts,
for the body, while it really knows only what food is agreeable. In
like manner, the artifices of ornament dress up the body to a false
appearance of that vigour and symmetry, which Gymnastics impart
to it really and intrinsically.
14 Plato, Gorgias, p. 462 C. ἐμπειρία … χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς
ἀπεργασίας. In the Philêbus (pp. 55-56) Sokrates treats ἰατρικὴ
differently, as falling short of the idea of τέχνη, and coming much
nearer to what is here called ἐμπειρία or στοχαστική. Asklepiades
was displeased with the Thracian Dionysius for calling γραμματικὴ by
the name of ἐμπειρία instead of τέχνη: see Sextus Empiric. adv.
Grammat. s. 57-72, p. 615, Bekk.
15 Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 A. δοκεῖ μοι εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα, τεχνικὸν
μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς
προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον
κ ο λ α κ ε ί α ν .
16 Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 D. πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.
17 Plato, Gorgias, p. 464 C. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν, τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν
ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ
στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον
τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ· καὶ τοῦ μὲν
βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν
καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι.
The same analogies hold in regard to
the mind. Sophistic is the shadow or
counterfeit of law-giving: Rhetoric, of
judging or adjudicating. The lawgiver
and the judge aim at what is good for
70. which pretend to the same,
but in reality aim at
immediate pleasure.
Questions of Polus.
Sokrates denies that the
Rhetors have any real
power, because they do
nothing which they really
wish.
the mind: the Sophist and the Rhetor
aim at what is agreeable to it. This
distinction between them (continues
Sokrates) is true and real: though it
often happens that the Sophist is, both by himself and by others,
confounded with and mistaken for the lawgiver, because he deals
with the same topics and occurrences: and the Rhetor, in the same
manner, is confounded with the judge.18 The Sophist and the Rhetor,
addressing themselves to the present relish of an undiscerning
public, are enabled to usurp the functions and the credit of their
more severe and far-sighted rivals.
18 Plato, Gorgias, p. 465 C. διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει· ἅτε δὲ ἐγγὺς
ὄντων, φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες,
καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ, τι χρήσωνται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι
ἄνθρωποι τούτοις.
It seems to me that the persons whom Plato here designates as
being confounded together are, the Sophist with the lawgiver, the
Rhetor with the judge or dikast; which is shown by the allusion,
three lines farther on, to the confusion between the cook and the
physician. Heindorf supposes that the persons designated as being
confounded are, the Sophist with the Rhetor; which I cannot think to
be the meaning of Plato.
This is the definition given by
Sokrates of Rhetoric and of the Rhetor.
Polus then asks him: You say that
Rhetoric is a branch of Flattery: Do you
think that good Rhetors are considered
as flatterers in their respective cities?
Sokr. — I do not think that19 they are
71. All men wish for what is
good for them. Despots and
Rhetors, when they kill any
one, do so because they
considered at all. Polus. — How! not considered? Do not good
Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities? Sokr. — No: if
you understand the possession of power as a good thing for the
possessor. Polus. — I do understand it so. Sokr. — Then I say that
the Rhetors possess nothing beyond the very minimum of power.
Polus. — How can that be? Do not they, like despots, kill,
impoverish, and expel any one whom they please? Sokr. — I admit
that both Rhetors and Despots can do what seems good to
themselves, and can bring penalties of death, poverty, or exile upon
others: but I say that nevertheless they have no power, because
they can do nothing which they really wish.20
19 Plat. Gorg. p. 466 B. Polus. Ἆρ’ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν
ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες; .... Sokr. Οὐδὲ
νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
The play on words here — for I see nothing else in it — can be
expressed in English as well as in Greek. It has very little pertinence;
because, as a matter of fact, the Rhetors certainly had considerable
importance, whether they deserved it or not. How little Plato cared
to make his comparisons harmonise with the fact, may be seen by
what immediately follows — where he compares the Rhetors to
Despots? and puts in the mouth of Polus the assertion that they kill
or banish any one whom they choose.
20 Plato, Gorgias, p. 466 E. οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὃ, τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.
That which men wish (Sokrates lays
down as a general proposition) is to
obtain good, and to escape evil. Each
separate act which they perform, is
72. think it good for them. If it
be really not good, they do
not do what they will, and
therefore have no real
power.
performed not with a view to its own
special result, but with a view to these
constant and paramount ends. Good
things, or profitable things (for
Sokrates alternates the phrases as
equivalent), are wisdom, health,
wealth, and other such things. Evil things are the contraries of
these.21 Many things are in themselves neither good nor evil, but
may become one or the other, according to circumstances — such as
stones, wood, the acts of sitting still or moving, &c. When we do any
of these indifferent acts, it is with a view to the pursuit of good, or
to the avoidance of evil: we do not wish for the act, we wish for its
good or profitable results. We do every thing for the sake of good:
and if the results are really good or profitable, we accomplish what
we wish: if the contrary, not. Now, Despots and Rhetors, when they
kill or banish or impoverish any one, do so because they think it will
be better for them, or profitable.22 If it be good for them, they do
what they wish: if evil for them, they do the contrary of what they
wish and therefore have no power.
21 Plato, Gorgias, p. 467 E. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν
τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία
τούτων; Ἔγωγε.
22 Plato, Gorgias, p. 468 B-C. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτίννυμεν, εἴ τιν’
ἀποκτίννυμεν, .... οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἢ μή; … ἕνεκ’
ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες .... ἐὰν μὲν
ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά· βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα, οὐ
βουλόμεθα.…. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὧς φῂς σύ, &c.
To do evil (continues Sokrates), is the worst thing that can happen
to any one; the evil-doer is the most miserable and pitiable of men.
73. Comparison of Archelaus,
usurping despot of
Macedonia — Polus affirms
that Archelaus is happy,
and that every one thinks
so — Sokrates admits that
every one thinks so, but
nevertheless denies it.
The person who suffers evil is unfortunate, and is to be pitied; but
much less unfortunate and less to be pitied than the evil-doer. If I
have a concealed dagger in the public market-place, I can kill any
one whom I choose: but this is no good to me, nor is it a proof of
great power, because I shall be forthwith taken up and punished.
The result is not profitable, but hurtful: therefore the act is not good,
nor is the power to do it either good or desirable.23 It is sometimes
good to kill, banish, or impoverish — sometimes bad. It is good
when you do it justly: bad, when you do it unjustly.24
23 Plato, Gorgias, p. 469-470.
24 Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 C.
Polus. — A child can refute such
doctrine. You have heard of Archelaus
King of Macedonia. Is he, in your
opinion, happy or miserable? Sokr. — I
do not know: I have never been in his
society. Polus. — Cannot you tell
without that, whether he is happy or
not? Sokr. — No, certainly not. Polus.
— Then you will not call even the Great
King happy? Sokr. — No: I do not know how he stands in respect to
education and justice. Polus. — What! does all happiness consist in
that? Sokr. — I say that it does. I maintain that the good and
honourable man or woman is happy: the unjust and wicked,
miserable.25 Polus. — Then Archelaus is miserable, according to your
doctrine? Sokr. — Assuredly, if he is wicked. Polus. — Wicked, of
course; since he has committed enormous crimes: but he has
obtained complete kingly power in Macedonia. Is there any
Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be Archelaus than
74. any other man in Macedonia?26 Sokr. — All the public, with Nikias,
Perikles, and the most eminent men among them, will agree with
you in declaring Archelaus to be happy. I alone do not agree with
you. You, like a Rhetor, intend to overwhelm me and gain your
cause, by calling a multitude of witnesses: I shall prove my case
without calling any other witness than yourself.27 Do you think that
Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been defeated in
his conspiracy and punished? Polus. — Certainly not: he would then
have been very miserable. Sokr. — Here again I differ from you: I
think that Archelaus, or any other wicked man, is under all
circumstances miserable; but he is less miserable, if afterwards
punished, than he would be if unpunished and successful.28 Polus. —
How say you? If a man, unjustly conspiring to become despot, be
captured, subjected to torture, mutilated, with his eyes burnt out
and with many other outrages inflicted, not only upon himself but
upon his wife and children — do you say that he will be more happy
than if he succeeded in his enterprise, and passed his life in
possession of undisputed authority over his city — envied and
extolled as happy, by citizens and strangers alike?29 Sokr. — More
happy, I shall not say: for in both cases he will be miserable; but he
will be less miserable on the former supposition.
25 Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 E.
26 Plato, Gorgias, p. 471 B-C.
27 Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 B. Ἀλλ’ ἐγώ σοι εἶς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ.… ἐγὼ
δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ
ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ
λόγος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς ὢν μόνος,
τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς.
75. Sokrates maintains — 1.
That it is a greater evil to
do wrong, than to suffer
wrong. 2. That if a man has
done wrong, it is better for
him to be punished than to
remain unpunished.
28 Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 C.
29 Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 D.
Sokr. — Which of the two is worst: to
do wrong, or to suffer wrong? Polus. —
To suffer wrong. Sokr. — Which of the
two is the most disgraceful? Polus. —
To do wrong. Sokr. — If more ugly and
disgraceful, is it not then worse? Polus.
— By no means. Sokr. — You do not
think then that the good — and the
fine or honourable — are one and the same; nor the bad — and the
ugly or disgraceful? Polus. — No: certainly not. Sokr. — How is this?
Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies, colours,
figures, voices, pursuits, &c., so denominated from some common
property? Are not fine bodies said to be fine, either from rendering
some useful service, or from affording some pleasure to the
spectator who contemplates them?30 And are not figures, colours,
voices, laws, sciences, &c., called fine or honourable for the same
reason, either for their agreeableness or their usefulness, or both?
Polus. — Certainly: your definition of the fine or honourable, by
reference to pleasure, or to good, is satisfactory. Sokr. — Of course
therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be defined by the contrary, by
reference to pain or to evil? Polus. — Doubtless.31 Sokr. — If
therefore one thing be finer or more honourable than another, this is
because it surpasses the other either in pleasure, or in profit: if one
thing be more ugly or disgraceful than another, it must surpass that
other either in pain, or in evil? Polus. — Yes.
30 Plat. Gorg. p. 474 D. ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς
θεωροῦντας;
76. Sokrates offers proof —
Definition of Pulchrum and
Turpe — Proof of the first
point.
31 Plato, Gorgias, p. 474 E. Sokr. Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους
καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ
ὠ φ έ λ ι μ α ε ἶ ν α ι ἢ ἡ δ έ α ἢ ἀμφότερα. Pol. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Sokr. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως; Pol. Πάνυ γε· καὶ
καλῶς γε νῦν ὁριζει, ἡ δ ο ν ῇ τ ε κ α ὶ ἀ γ α θ ῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ
καλόν. Sokr. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λ ύ π ῃ τ ε κ α ὶ
κ α κ ῷ ; Pol. Ἀνάγκη.
A little farther on βλαβὴ is used as equivalent to κακόν. These
words — καλόν, αἰσχρόν — (very difficult to translate properly)
introduce a reference to the feeling or judgment of spectators, or of
an undefined public, not concerned either as agents or sufferers.
Sokr. — Well, then! what did you say
about doing wrong and suffering
wrong? You said that to suffer wrong
was the worst of the two, but to do
wrong was the most ugly or
disgraceful. Now, if to do wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer
wrong, this must be because it has a preponderance either of pain
or of evil? Polus. — Undoubtedly. Sokr. — Has it a preponderance of
pain? Does the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer?
Polus. — Certainly not. Sokr. — Then it must have a preponderance
of evil? Polus. — Yes. Sokr. — To do wrong therefore is worse than
to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful? Polus. — It appears so.
Sokr. — Since therefore it is both worse and more disgraceful, I was
right in affirming that neither you, nor I, nor any one else, would
choose to do wrong in preference to suffering wrong. Polus. — So it
seems.32
32 Plato, Gorgias, p. 475 C-D.
77. Proof of the second point.
Sokr. — Now let us take the second
point — Whether it be the greatest evil
for the wrong-doer to be punished, or whether it be not a still
greater evil for him to remain unpunished. If punished, the wrong-
doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things fine or
honourable, in so far as they are just? Polus. — I think so. Sokr. —
When a man does anything, must there not be some correlate which
suffers; and must it not suffer in a way corresponding to what the
doer does? Thus if any one strikes, there must also be something
stricken: and if he strikes quickly or violently, there must be
something which is stricken quickly or violently. And so, if any one
burns or cuts, there must be something burnt or cut. As the agent
acts, so the patient suffers. Polus. — Yes. Sokr. — Now if a man be
punished for wrong doing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher
does what is just? Polus. — He does. Sokr. — You admitted that all
just things were honourable: therefore the agent does what is
honourable, the patient suffers what is honourable.33 But if
honourable, it must be either agreeable — or good and profitable. In
this case, it is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be good and
profitable. The wrong-doer therefore, when punished, suffers what is
good and is profited. Polus. — Yes.34 Sokr. — In what manner is he
profited? It is, as I presume, by becoming better in his mind — by
being relieved from badness of mind. Polus. — Probably. Sokr. — Is
not this badness of mind the greatest evil? In regard to wealth, the
special badness is poverty: in regard to the body, it is weakness,
sickness, deformity, &c.: in regard to the mind, it is ignorance,
injustice, cowardice, &c. Is not injustice, and other badness of mind,
the most disgraceful of the three? Polus. — Decidedly. Sokr. — If it
be most disgraceful, it must therefore be the worst. Polus. — How?
Sokr. — It must (as we before agreed) have the greatest
78. The criminal labours under
a mental distemper, which
though not painful, is a
capital evil. Punishment is
the only cure for him. To be
punished is best for him.
preponderance either of pain, or of hurt and evil. But the
preponderance is not in pain: for no one will say that the being
unjust and intemperate and ignorant, is more painful than being
poor and sick. The preponderance must therefore be great in hurt
and evil. Mental badness is therefore a greater evil than either
poverty, or disease and bodily deformity. It is the greatest of human
evils. Polus. — It appears so.35
33 See Aristotle, Rhet. i. 9, p. 1366, b. 30, where the contrary of
this opinion is maintained, and maintained with truth.
34 Plato, Gorgias, p. 476 D-E.
35 Plato, Gorgias, p. 477 E.
Sokr. — The money-making art is,
that which relieves us from poverty:
the medical art, from sickness and
weakness: the judicial or punitory, from
injustice and wickedness of mind. Of
these three relieving forces, which is
the most honourable? Polus. — The
last, by far. Sokr. — If most honourable, it confers either most
pleasure or most profit? Polus. — Yes. Sokr. — Now, to go through
medical treatment is not agreeable; but it answers to a man to
undergo the pain, in order to get rid of a great evil, and to become
well. He would be a happier man, if he were never sick: he is less
miserable by undergoing the painful treatment and becoming well,
than if he underwent no treatment and remained sick. Just so the
man who is mentally bad: the happiest man is he who never
becomes so; but if a man has become so, the next best course for
him is, to undergo punishment and to get rid of the evil. The worst
79. Misery of the Despot who is
never punished. If our
friend has done wrong, we
ought to get him punished:
if our enemy, we ought to
keep him unpunished.
lot of all is, that of him who remains mentally bad, without ever
getting rid of badness.36
36 Plato, Gorgias, p. 478 D-E.
This last, Polus (continues Sokrates),
is the condition of Archelaus, and of
despots and Rhetors generally. They
possess power which enables them,
after they have committed injustice, to
guard themselves against being
punished: which is just as if a sick man
were to pride himself upon having taken precautions against being
cured. They see the pain of the cure, but they are blind to the profit
of it; they are ignorant how much more miserable it is to have an
unhealthy and unjust mind than an unhealthy body.37 There is
therefore little use in Rhetoric: for our first object ought to be, to
avoid doing wrong: our next object, if we have done wrong, not to
resist or elude punishment by skilful defence, but to present
ourselves voluntarily and invite it: and if our friends or relatives have
done wrong, far from helping to defend them, we ought ourselves to
accuse them, and to invoke punishment upon them also.38 On the
other hand, as to our enemy, we ought undoubtedly to take
precautions against suffering any wrong from him ourselves: but if
he has done wrong to others, we ought to do all we can, by word or
deed, not to bring him to punishment, but to prevent him from
suffering punishment or making compensation: so that he may live
as long as possible in impunity.39 These are the purposes towards
which rhetoric is serviceable. For one who intends to do no wrong, it
seems of no great use.40
80. Argument of Sokrates
paradoxical — Doubt
expressed by Kallikles
37 Plato, Gorgias, p. 479 B. τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾷν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ
ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς
σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ.
38 Plato, Gorgias, pp. 480 C, 508 B. κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ
υἱέος καὶ ἑταίρον, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, &c.
Plato might have put this argument into the mouth of Euthyphron
as a reason for indicting his own father on the charge of murder: as
I have already observed in reviewing the Euthyphron, which see
above, vol. i. ch. xi., p. 442.
39 Plato, Gorgias, p. 481 A. ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ
τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ
δίκην.… ἐάν τε χρυσίον ἡρπακὼς ᾖ πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο, ἀλλ’
ἔχων ἀναλίσκηται … ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, &c.
40 Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.
This dialogue between Sokrates and Polus exhibits a
representation of Platonic Ethics longer and more continuous than is
usual in the dialogues. I have therefore given a tolerably copious
abridgment of it, and shall now proceed to comment upon its
reasoning.
The whole tenor of its assumptions,
as well as the conclusions in which it
ends, are so repugnant to received
opinions, that Polus, even while
81. whether he means it
seriously.
Principle laid down by
Sokrates — That every one
acts with a view to the
attainment of happiness
and avoidance of misery.
compelled to assent, treats it as a
paradox: while Kallikles, who now takes
up the argument, begins by asking
from Chærephon — “Is Sokrates really in earnest, or is he only
jesting?”41 Sokrates himself admits that he stands almost alone. He
has nothing to rely upon, except the consistency of his dialectics —
and the verdict of philosophy.42 This however is a matter of little
moment, in discussing the truth and value of the reasoning, except
in so far as it involves an appeal to the judgment of the public as a
matter of fact. Plato follows out the train of reasoning — which at
the time presents itself to his mind as conclusive, or at least as
plausible — whether he may agree or disagree with others.
41 Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.
42 Plato, Gorgias, p. 482.
Plato has ranked the Rhetor in the
same category as the Despot: a
classification upon which I shall say
something presently. But throughout
the part of the dialogue just extracted,
he treats the original question about
Rhetoric as part of a much larger ethical question.43 Every one
(argues Sokrates) wishes for the attainment of good and for the
avoidance of evil. Every one performs each separate act with a view
not to its own immediate end, but to one or other of these
permanent ends. In so far as he attains them, he is happy: in so far
as he either fails in attaining the good, or incurs the evil, he is
unhappy or miserable. The good and honourable man or woman is
happy, the unjust and wicked is miserable. Power acquired or
employed unjustly, is no boon to the possessor: for he does not
82. Peculiar view taken by
Plato of Good — Evil —
thereby obtain what he really wishes, good or happiness; but incurs
the contrary, evil and misery. The man who does wrong is more
miserable than he who suffers wrong: but the most miserable of all
is he who does wrong and then remains unpunished for it.44
43 I may be told that this comparison is first made by Polus (p. 466
C), and that Sokrates only takes it up from him to comment upon.
True, but the speech of Polus is just as much the composition of
Plato as that of Sokrates. Many readers of Plato are apt to forget
this.
44 Isokrates, in his Panathenaic Oration (Or. xii. sect. 126, pp. 257-
347), alludes to the same thesis as this here advanced by Plato,
treating it as one which all men of sense would reject, and which
none but a few men pretending to be wise would proclaim — ἅπερ
ἅπαντες μὲν ἂν οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ἔλοιντο καὶ βουληθεῖεν, ὀλίγοι δέ
τινες τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφῶν, ἐρωτηθέντες οὐκ ἂν
φήσαιεν.
In this last phrase Isokrates probably has Plato in his mind,
though without pronouncing the name.
Polus, on the other hand, contends, that Archelaus, who has
“waded through slaughter” to the throne of Macedonia, is a happy
man both in his own feelings and in those of every one else, envied
and admired by the world generally: That to say — Archelaus would
have been more happy, or less miserable, if he had failed in his
enterprise and had been put to death under cruel torture — is an
untenable paradox.
The issue here turns, and the force
of Plato’s argument rests (assuming
Sokrates to speak the real sentiments
83. Happiness.
Contrast of the usual
meaning of these words,
with the Platonic meaning.
of Plato), upon the peculiar sense
which he gives to the words Good —
Evil — Happiness:—different from the sense in which they are
conceived by mankind generally, and which is here followed by
Polus. It is possible that to minds like Sokrates and Plato, the idea of
themselves committing enormous crimes for ambitious purposes
might be the most intolerable of all ideas, worse to contemplate than
any amount of suffering: moreover, that if they could conceive
themselves as having been thus guilty, the sequel the least
intolerable for them to imagine would be one of expiatory pain. This,
taken as the personal sentiment of Plato, admits of no reply. But
when he attempts to convert this subjective judgment into an
objective conclusion binding on all, he fails of success, and misleads
himself by equivocal language.
Plato distinguishes two general
objects of human desire, and two of
human aversion. 1. The immediate,
and generally transient, object —
Pleasure or the Pleasurable — Pain or the Painful. 2. The distant,
ulterior, and more permanent object — Good or the profitable — Evil
or the hurtful. — In the attainment of Good and avoidance of Evil
consists happiness. But now comes the important question — In
what sense are we to understand the words Good and Evil? What
did Plato mean by them? Did he mean the same as mankind
generally? Have mankind generally one uniform meaning? In answer
to this question, we must say, that neither Plato, nor mankind
generally, are consistent or unanimous in their use of the words: and
that Plato sometimes approximates to, sometimes diverges from, the
more usual meaning. Plato does not here tell us clearly what he
himself means by Good and Evil: he specifies no objective or
84. Examination of the proof
given by Sokrates —
external mark by which we may know it: we learn only, that Good is
a mental perfection — Evil a mental taint — answering to
indescribable but characteristic sentiments in Plato’s own mind, and
only negatively determined by this circumstance — That they have
no reference either to pleasure or pain. In the vulgar sense, Good
stands distinguished from pleasure (or relief from pain), and Evil
from pain (or loss of pleasure), as the remote, the causal, the lasting
from the present, the product, the transient. Good and Evil are
explained by enumerating all the things so called, of which
enumeration Plato gives a partial specimen in this dialogue:
elsewhere he dwells upon what he calls the Idea of Good, of which I
shall speak more fully hereafter. Having said that all men aim at
good, he gives, as examples of good things — Wisdom, Health,
Wealth, and other such things: while the contrary of these, Stupidity,
Sickness, Poverty, are evil things: the list of course might be much
enlarged. Taking Good and Evil generally to denote the common
property of each of these lists, it is true that men perform a large
portion of their acts with a view to attain the former and avoid the
latter:—that the approach which they make to happiness depends,
speaking generally, upon the success which attends their exertions
for the attainment of and avoidance of these permanent ends: and
moreover that these ends have their ultimate reference to each
man’s own feelings.
But this meaning of Good is no longer preserved, when Sokrates
proceeds to prove that the triumphant usurper Archelaus is the most
miserable of men, and that to do wrong with impunity is the greatest
of all evils.
Sokrates provides a basis for his
intended proof by asking Polus,45
85. Inconsistency between the
general answer of Polus
and his previous
declarations — Law and
Nature.
which of the two is most disgraceful —
To do wrong — or to suffer wrong?
Polus answers — To do wrong: and this
answer is inconsistent with what he
had previously said about Archelaus.
That prince, though a wrong-doer on
the largest scale, has been declared by Polus to be an object of his
supreme envy and admiration: while Sokrates also admits that this is
the sentiment of almost all mankind, except himself. To be consistent
with such an assertion, Polus ought to have answered the contrary
of what he does answer, when the general question is afterwards
put to him: or at least he ought to have said — “Sometimes the one,
sometimes the other”. But this he is ashamed to do, as we shall find
Kallikles intimating at a subsequent stage of the dialogue:46 because
of King Nomos, or the established habit of the community — who
feel that society rests upon a sentiment of reciprocal right and
obligation animating every one, and require that violations of that
sentiment shall be marked with censure in general words, however
widely the critical feeling may depart from such censure in particular
cases.47 Polus is forced to make profession of a faith, which neither
he nor others (except Sokrates with a few companions) universally
or consistently apply. To bring such a force to bear upon the
opponent, was one of the known artifices of dialecticians:48 and
Sokrates makes it his point of departure, to prove the unparalleled
misery of Archelaus.
45 Plat. Gorg. p. 474 C.
46 Plat. Gorg. p. 482 C. To maintain that τὸ ἀδικεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ
ἀδικεῖσθαι was an ἄδοξος ὑπόθεσις — one which it was χείρονος
86. ἤθους ἑλέσθαι: which therefore Aristotle advises the dialectician not
to defend (Aristot. Topic. viii. 156, 6-15).
47 This portion of the Gorgias may receive illustration from the third
chapter (pp. 99-101) of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments,
entitled, “Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is
occasioned by the disposition to admire the rich and great, and to
neglect or despise persons of poor and mean condition”. He says —
“The disposition to admire and almost to worship the rich and the
powerful, and to despise, or at least to neglect, persons of poor and
mean condition, though necessary both to establish and maintain
the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time,
the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral
sentiments.… They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly — a select,
though I am afraid, a small party — who are the real and steady
admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the
admirers and worshippers — and what may seem more
extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and
worshippers — of wealth and greatness.…. It is scarce agreeable to
good morals, or even to good language, perhaps, to say that mere
wealth and greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve our
respect. We must acknowledge, however, that they almost
constantly obtain it: and that they may therefore in a certain sense
be considered as the natural objects of it.”
Now Archelaus is a most conspicuous example of this disposition
of the mass of mankind to worship and admire, disinterestedly,
power and greatness: and the language used by Adam Smith in the
last sentence illustrates the conversation of Sokrates, Polus, and
Kalliklês. Adam Smith admits that energetic proceedings, ending in
great power, such as those of Archelaus, obtain honour and worship
87. The definition of Pulchrum
and Turpe, given by
Sokrates, will not hold.
from the vast majority of disinterested spectators: and that,
therefore they are in a certain sense the natural objects of such a
sentiment (κατὰ φύσιν). But if the question be put to him, Whether
such proceedings, with such a position, are worthy of honour, he is
constrained by good morals (κατὰ νόμον) to reply in the negative. It
is true that Adam Smith numbers himself with the small minority,
while Polus shares the opinion of the large majority. But what is
required by King Nomos must be professed even by dissentients,
unless they possess the unbending resolution of Sokrates.
48 Aristot. De Soph. Elench. pp. 172-173, where he contrasts the
opinions which men must make a show of holding, with those which
they really do — αἱ φανεραὶ δόξαι — αἱ ἀφανεῖς, ἀποκεκρυμμέναι,
δόξαι.
He proceeds to define Pulchrum and
Turpe (καλὸν-αἰσχρόν). When we
recollect the Hippias Major, in which
dialogue many definitions of Pulchrum
were canvassed and all rejected, so that the search ended in total
disappointment — we are surprised to see that Sokrates hits off at
once a definition satisfactory both to himself and Polus: and we are
the more surprised, because the definition here admitted without a
remark, is in substance one of those shown to be untenable in the
Hippias Major.49 It depends upon the actual argumentative purpose
which Plato has in hand, whether he chooses to multiply objections
and give them effect — or to ignore them altogether. But the
definition which he here proposes, even if assumed as incontestable,
fails altogether to sustain the conclusion that he draws from it. He
defines Pulchrum to be that which either confers pleasure upon the
spectator when he contemplates it, or produces ulterior profit or
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