VERIFICATION OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY PROTOCOLS BY MODEL CHECKING1010ijnsa04

International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.2, No.4, October 2010
DOI : 10.5121/ijnsa.2010.2404 43
VERIFICATION OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
PROTOCOLS BY MODEL CHECKING
Mohamed Elboukhari1
, Mostafa Azizi2
and Abdelmalek Azizi1,3
1
dept. Mathematics & Computer Science, FSO, University Mohamed Ist
, Morocco
2
dept. Applied Engineering, ESTO, University Mohamed Ist
, Oujda, Morocco
elboukharimohamed@gmail.com , azizi.mos@gmail.com
3
Academy Hassan II of Sciences & Technology, Rabat, Morocco
abdelmalekazizi@yahoo.fr
ABSTRACT
Unlike classical cryptography which is based on mathematical functions, Quantum Cryptography or
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) exploits the laws of quantum physics to offer unconditionally secure
communication. The progress of research in this field allows the anticipation of QKD to be available
outside of laboratories within the next few years and efforts are made to improve the performance and
reliability of the implemented technologies. But despite this big progress, several challenges remain. For
example the task of how to test the devices of QKD did not yet receive enough attention. These apparatuses
become heterogeneous, complex and so demand a big verification effort. In this paper we propose to study
quantum cryptography protocols by applying the technique of probabilistic model checking. Using PRISM
tool, we analyze the security of BB84 protocol and we are focused on the specific security property of
eavesdropper's information gain on the key derived from the implementation of this protocol. We show that
this property is affected by the parameters of the eavesdropper’s power and the quantum channel.
KEYWORDS
Quantum Cryptography, Model Checking, BB84 Protocol, Verification
1. INTRODUCTION
Classical cryptography algorithms are based on mathematical functions. The robustness of a
given cryptosystem is based essentially on the secrecy of its private key and the difficulty with
which the inverse of its one-way functions can be computed. The problem is that there is no
mathematical proof that will establish whether it is not possible to find the inverse of a given one-
way function. On the contrary, Quantum Cryptography is a method for sharing secret keys, whose
security can be formally demonstrated.
Quantum Cryptography uses the laws of quantum physics in order to carry out a cryptographic
task. At first, the idea of Quantum Cryptography did not attract much attention but research
efforts have increased since the 1990s when it was proved that quantum computers could break
the public-key cryptosystems commonly used in modern cryptography. A more interest also has
been generated after the first practical demonstration over 30 cm of free space employing
polarization coding [1]. Various experimental and theoretical studies have been undertaken, and
prototype products are now commercially available.
The security of Quantum Cryptography or Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols is
guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics. The BB84 protocol is the first quantum cryptography
protocol, which was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. The security proof of this
protocol against arbitrary eavesdropping strategies was first proved by Mayers [2], and a simple
proof was later shown by Shor and Preskill [3].

44
In general, the mathematical proof of security of quantum cryptography protocols is not enough
to assure that the implementation of a system related to certain quantum cryptography protocol is
secure. As shown in traditional cryptography, during the progress from an ideal protocol to an
implementation, several flaws of security can appear. So, even extensive research has been
initiated for sophisticated implementation of Quantum Cryptography in practical communication
networks, these systems are difficult to design; for that it is very important to analyze and verify
such systems with more details related to their practical implementation.
Through our article we provide an analysis using PRISM [4], a tool of the technique of
probabilistic model checking, to analyze certain security property of the BB84 protocol. Our work
is done in the same manner as [5]-[6]-[7]-[8], but our effort is focused on the property of
obtaining information on the key by the eavesdropper. The key is generated by the BB84
protocol. We introduce the parameters of quantum channel’s efficiency and the parameter of the
eavesdropper’s power to show that these parameters affect the amount of information obtained by
the eavesdropper.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the related works is introduced. In Section 3 we
present a detailed description of the BB84 protocol. We give a simple presentation of the
technique of model checking in Section 4 and we show also why this technique is desired to
analyze quantum cryptography protocols. In section 5 we describe our analysis of BB84’s
security by introducing parameters of the channel and the eavesdropper in order to study the
property of the information on the key owned by the eavesdropper. We conclude our work by
giving the main results in section 6.
2. DESCRIPTION OF RELATED WORKS
The issue of analyzing quantum protocols by model checking is already introduced in the
literature. More specially, using the approach of model checking for studying quantum
cryptography protocols has been also introduced.
The authors Rajagopal Nagarajan and Simon Gay in the article [9] propose to analyze quantum
protocols by the techniques of formal verification which was applied and developed in classical
computing for the analysis of communicating concurrent systems. The first step in formal
verification is to define a model of the system to be analyzed, in a well-founded mathematical
notation and based on the same underlying theory, an automated analysis tool is used to reason
about the system.
In their article [10], the authors Rajagopal Nagarajan, Simon Gay and Nikolaos Papanikolaou
introduce fundamental and general techniques for formal verification of quantum protocols.
Knowing that current analyses of quantum protocols use a traditional mathematical approach and
require considerable understanding of the underlying physics, the authors argue that automated
verification techniques present an elegant alternative. To show the feasibility of these techniques,
they use PRISM, a probabilistic model-checking tool. For the automated analysis of quantum
information protocols the authors establish model-checking techniques in the articles [11]-[12].
Precisely they have introduced QMC, a model-checking tool for quantum protocols. As opposed
to simulation systems, QMC is proposed as the first dedicated verification tool for quantum
protocols. QMC enables the verification and modeling of properties of quantum protocols
expressible in the quantum formalism.
In the article [13] the authors Rajagopal Nagarajan, Nikolaos Papanikolaou, Garry Bowen and
Simon Gay introduce the use of computer–aided verification as a practical means for analyzing
the QKD protocol BB84. Using the probabilistic model–checking approach, they have used the
PRISM model–checker to show that, the equivocation of the eavesdropper with respect to the
channel decreases exponentially as the number of qubits transmitted in BB84 is increased. They

45
showed also that the probability of detecting the presence of an eavesdropper increases
exponentially as the number of qubits increases.
The authors Mohamed Elboukhari, Mostafa Azizi, and Abdelmalek Azizi in the article [6]
describe a methodology based on model checking in order to analyze quantum information
systems. They are interested in the QKD protocol B92. By using the PRISM tool as a
probabilistic model checker, they show that the protocol B92 fulfilled specific security properties.
The authors in the article [8] use the same technique to analyze certain security’s properties of
B92 protocol; they are interested in the specific security property of eavesdropping detection.
They have demonstrated that this property is affected by the power of eavesdropper and the
parameters of quantum channel. The same study has been done by the authors to the BB84
protocol [7].
3. PROTOCOL OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY: BB84
Quantum Key Distribution has a unique and important properly; it is the ability of the two
communicating users (traditionally referred to as Alice and Bob) to detect the presence of any
third party (referred to as Eve) trying to gain some information of the key. Eve trying to
eavesdrop on the key must in some way measure it, thus introducing detectable anomalies. By
using quantum entanglement or quantum superpositions and transmitting information in quantum
states over a quantum channel (such as an optical fiber or free air), a communication system can
be implemented which detects eavesdropping.
BB84 protocol is surely the most famous and most realized quantum cryptography protocol. This
protocol uses the transmission of single polarized photons. The polarizations of the photons are
four states, and are grouped together in two different non orthogonal basis.
Generally the two non orthogonal basis are:
-base ⊕ of the horizontal (0°) and vertical polarization (+90°), and we represent the base states
with the intuitive notation: 0 and 1 . We have ⊕ = { 0 , 1 } .
-base ⊗ of the diagonal polarizations (+45°) and (+135°). The two different base states are +
and − with
1
(
2
0 1 )+ = + and
1
(
2
0 1 )− = − . We have ⊗ = { , }+ − .
The association between the information bit and the basis in this protocol are described in Table
1.
Table 1. Information bit and the basis in the BB84 protocol.
Bit ⊕ ⊗
0 00
0 a= 10
a+ =
1 01
1 a= 11
a− =
The BB84 can be introduced as follows [17]:
1) Quantum Transmissions (First Phase)
a) Alice selects a random string of bits n
d {0,1}∈ , and a random string of bases n
b { , }∈ ⊕ ⊗ ,
where n N> ( N is the length of the final key).
b) Alice prepares a photon in quantum state ija for each bit dj in d and bi in b as in Table 1,
and sends it to Bob over the quantum channel.

46
c) With respect to either ⊕ or ⊗ selected at random, Bob measures each ija received. Bob’s
measurements produce a string ' n
{0,1}d ∈ , while his choices of bases form ' n
{0,1}b ∈ .
2) Public Discussion (Second Phase)
a) For each bit id in d :
i) Over the classical channel Alice sends the value of ib to Bob.
ii) Bob responds to Alice by stating whether he used the same basis for measurement.
Both id and '
di are discarded if '
i ib b≠ .
b) Alice chooses randomly a subset of the remaining bits in d and discloses their values to
Bob over the classical channel (over internet for example). If the result of Bob’s measurements
for any of these bits do not match the values disclosed, eavesdropping is detected and
communication is aborted.
c) The common secret key, {0,1}
N
K = (the final key) is the string of bits remaining in d once
the bits disclosed in step 2b) are removed.
In step 2b), Alice and Bob perform a test for eavesdropping. If Alice and Bob’s bases are
identical (i.e. '
i i
b b= ), the corresponding bits should match (i.e. '
i i
d d= ). If not, an external
disturbance is produced or there is a noise in the quantum channel. By need of security, we
suppose all disturbances are caused by Eve.
4. MODEL CHECKING AND QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY PROTOCOLS
More time and effort are spent on verification than on construction in design of complex systems
in software and hardware. The techniques are sought to reduce and ease the verification efforts
while increasing their coverage. In this spirit, formal verification is the act of proving or
disproving the correctness of intended algorithms underlying a system with respect to a certain
formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics. The technique of model
checking is an approach of formal verification. It is a verification technique that explores all
possible system states in a brute-force manner. In the field of computer science, model checking
refers to the following problem: Given a model of a system, test automatically whether this model
meets a given specification. By using a specialized software tool (called a model–checker), a
system implementor can mechanically prove that the system satisfies a certain set of
requirements.
We meet in the literature several Proofs of unconditional security of the BB84 protocol [2]-[3],
but as Gottesman and Lo [18] point out that “the proof of security of QKD is a fine theoretical
result, but it does not mean that a real QKD system would be secure”. So, more flexible approach
to analyzing the security of quantum cryptographic protocols is clearly desirable. Thus, in
practice a component of a system may be quantum, but others could still be classical. So,
manufacturers of commercial quantum cryptographic systems [19], require efficient and rigorous
methods for design and testing.
In our paper we propose to analyze the security of BB84 protocol by model checking. To realize
this, first we build an abstract model, noted M and we express it in a description language. Next,
we describe the desired behavior of the system in a set of temporal formulae i
p . Both the model
and the formulae are the input of the model–checker.
If the systems have a probabilistic behavior, a variation of this technique is used; a probabilistic
model–checker, such as PRISM [20]. PRISM models are illustrated by probabilistic transition

47
systems. The properties for PRISM models are written in Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
(PCTL).
We verify in PRISM if the model M satisfy the property defined by i
p (i.e. whether for each
property i
p i
M p‘ ), and PRISM computes the follownig probability:
{ }r iP M p‘ (1)
We can also, parameterize the model M by writing 1 2 3
( , , , , )n
M M x x x x= … and the probability
(1) can be calculated for different value of ix , this enables us to have a meaningful plot of the
variation of (1).
A model in PRISM is formed by components called modules. Each module has a sequence of
actions to be achieved and also its own local variables. The actions take the form:
[ ] ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2
: var : var : (var )n n n
action a value a value a value→ = + = +……+ = (2)
The variable vari
in this equation is assigned by i
value with probability i
a ( 1
1
i n
ii
a
=
=
=∑ ). If 1n =
we have the notation: ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1
: var vara value value= = = with 1
1a = . PRISM permits us to specify
arbitrarily probabilities for actions, for example in case 2n = we can model a tendency in BB84
protocol of Alice in the choice of the quantum states by a module containing the following action:
[ ] 00.8 : ( |1 ) 0.2 : ( );EtatOfAlice true EtatAlice EtatAlice→ = 〉 + = (3)
In this equation, Alice is biased towards choosing the state 1 to encode the data 1 according to
the Table 1.
5. VERIFICATION OF BB84 USING THE MODEL CHECKER PRISM
5.1 The Model BB84 in PRISM Tool
Classical model checkers input a description of a model, represented as a state transition system,
and a specification, typically a formula in some temporal logic, and return “yes” or “no”,
indicating whether or not the model satisfies the specification. When using a probabilistic model
checking, the models are probabilistic, in the sense that they encode the probability of making a
transition between states instead of simply the existence of such a transition, and analysis
normally entails calculation of the actual likelihoods through appropriate numerical or analytical
methods.
To begin our verification, we have elaborated a model of BB84 in PRISM noted 84BB
M . It is done
within a file including modules that represent the components of the system. So, in 84BB
M , there
is a module corresponding to each party involved in the protocol (Alice, Bob and Eve), plus a
module representing the quantum channel.
In our work, we are interested to the important security’s property that the protocol must ensure:
an enemy could never be able to obtain the value of the key. Even if an enemy succeeds to obtain
a certain quantity of information by trying to monitor the classical channel, this quantity has to be
minimal.
By using our model of BB84, we can calculate the probability:
84{ }tr B a aB dP M p‘ (4)

48
Here datap represents a formula PCTL, its Boolean value is TRUE if the enemy obtataind the
information data on the key. Let n is the number of photons transmitted by Alice to Bob. So, we
can vary n and in our PRISM model this probability is a function of n . We write the probability
that Eve gain the knowledge of data on the key as:
84( ) { }r BBdata dataP n P M p= ‘ (5)
In our paper, we will analyse the correct measurements that Eve does when she intercepts the
photons transmitted by Alice. Let i
β denote the event in which Eve makes a correct measurement
to the i-th photons transmitted. Eve is able to obtain the secret key if she measures all photons
correctly, this event occurs with the probability:
1
( )
i n
all r ii
P P β
=
=
= ∏ (6)
We want to examine a variation of a probability proportionel to all
P noted 1
2
P
>
when Eve measures
more than half the photon transmitted. This property is noted as 1
2
φ
>
.we will study the variation
of the probability:
1
2
1
2
84( ) { }r BBP n P M φ
>>
= ‘ (7)
The PRISM tool calculates exactly the probability that Eve measures correctly more than half the
photons sent by Alice to Bob. We give in the next paragraph the definition of 1
2
φ
>
according to
our model of BB84.
5.2 The expression o f 1
2
φ
>
Eve in our model 84BB
M performs the “intercept-resend” attack; Eve receives each photon on the
quantum channel, measures it with her basis denoted
''
i
b , obtaining a bit value
''
i
d , and then
transmits to Bob a new photon, representing ''
i
d in the ''
i
b basis. Eve must make a random choice
of basis, denoted ''
i
b , which may or may not match Alice’s original choice, i
b . If ''
i i
b b= , Eve is
sure that she measured the i-th photon correctly; otherwise, quantum theory predicts that her
measurement result will be correct with the probability of 1 2.
Our PRISM model 84BB
M has a module called Eve includes a variable nc by which we calculate
the number of time that Eve makes a correct measurement. nc is shown in our 84BB
M by the code
lines with LUCKY=0.5:
[evemeasure] (eve_state=1)&(eve_bas=ch_bas)&(nc<n) (eve_state'=2)&(eve_bit'=ch_bit)&(nc'=nc+1);→
[evemeasure] (eve_state=1)&(eve_bas!=ch_bas)&(nc<n) LUCKY: (eve_state'=2)&(eve_bit'=ch_bit)&(nc'=nc+1)→
+(1-LUCKY) : (eve_state'=2)&(eve_bit'= 1-ch_bit); (8)
In lines (8), eve_state, eve_bas and eve_bit denotes state, base and bit of Eve and ch_bas and
ch_bit represent base and bit of the quantum channel.
The fomulae of 1
2
φ
>
can be written in terms of nc as:

49
1
2
{ ( )}
2
n
TRUE ncφ
>
= ∪ > (9)
5.3 Influence of Quantum Channel’s Efficiency on the Eve’s Obtained Information
on the Key
In our model BB84 the quantum channel is written in a module called Quantum Channel. In
practice, quantum channel can be an optical fiber or free air. In this section, we present a
simulation of the influence of the channel’s efficiency on the information gain of Eve on the key.
This is done by elaborating three curves: curve when the quantum channel is perfect and if it is
noisy and if it produces a lot of noise. We expect if the channel becomes very noisy the amount of
information obtained by Eve on the key decreases. We consider in this paragraph that Eve is
powerful; Eve intercepts all photons sent by Alice to Bob.
There is no noise in the perfect quantum channel, we model this in the module Quantum
Channel by the line:
[ ]( _ 0) ( _ ' 1) &( _ ' _ ) &( _ ' _ );aliceput ch state ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit= → = = = (10)
Here, ch_state represets the state of the quantum channel and al_bas and al_bit denote base and
bit of Alice. The line (10) shows that the information sent by Alice (base and bit) remain
unchanged before it received by Eve.
For 1 60n≤ ≤ , PRISM calculates 1
2
(n)P
>
which described in 5.1) this produces the curve of 1
2
P
>
(noted (2)
1
2
Ch
P
>
) as illustrated in Fig. 1.
To draw a curve of 1
2
P
>
(noted (1)
1
2
Ch
P
>
) where there is a bit noise in the channel; we change the
line (10) by the following code lines:
[ ]( _ 0) 0 : ( _ ' 1) &( _ ' _ ) &( _ ' _ )aliceput ch state c ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit= → = = =
(11)
1 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' 1 _ ) & ( _ ' _ )c ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = − =
2 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' _ ) & ( _ ' 1 _ )c ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = = −
3 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' 1 _ ) & ( _ ' 1 _ );c ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = − = −
We give the values to the number c0, c1, c2 and c3 as: c0=0.7, c1=c2=c3=0.1. We remark from
these lines that the information of Alice has been changed in little way. if we modify these lines
by giving new values like c0=0.4, c1=c2=c3=0.2 we simulate a channel very noisy. This permits
us to elaborate a curve of 1
2
P
>
(noted (0)
1
2
Ch
P
>
). All curves ( )
1 0 2
2
)Ch i
iP ≤ ≤
>
( are shown in Fig. 1.

50
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Number of photons sent by Alice, n
Theprobabilities{P
Ch(i)
>1
2
(n),i=0,1,2}
P
Ch(2)
>1
2
P
Ch(1)
>1
2
P
Ch(0)
>1
2
Figure 1. The probabilities
( )
1
2
{ (n), i 0,1, 2}
Ch i
P
>
= that Eve measures more than half the photons
transmitted by Alice to Bob when we change the canal’s efficency.
We note from these curves, that if we increase the number of photons emitted by Alice (n), the
probability that Eve measures more than half the photons decreases and tends towards 0 and we
note ( )
1
2
lim 0( )Ch i
n
P n
→∞ >
= for0 2i≤ ≤ . Also, as the channel becomes noisy the probability that the
amount of information on the key owned by Eve becomes smaller as expected and we have the
following inequality for 5 60n≤ ≤ :
( ) ( ) ( )1 20
1 1 1
2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
C h C h C h
P n P n P n
> > >
≤ ≤ (12)
5.4 Influence of Eve’s Power on the Information Obtained on the Key
We want to simulate as in paragraph 5.3) the influence of the power of Eve on its information
obtained on the key. We expect that if the power is lower, the information which gained by Eve
on the key is lower too. We suppose in this paragraph that the quantum channel is perfect.
The curve 1
2
P
>
(noted also
( )2
1
2
P
Eve
>
) represents the function 1
2
( )n P n
>
→ if Eve is powerful; Eve
performs the intercept-resend attack to all photons emitted by Alice to Bob. So, Eve measures all
photons. This appears firstly in the previous lines (8) and in the following line included in the
module Quantum Channel:
[eveput] (ch_state=2) -> (ch_state'=3)&(ch_bas'=eve_bas)&(ch_bit'=eve_bit); (13)
Now, we modify the lines (8) by the following with d1 0.7= andd2 0.3= :

51
[evemeasure] (eve_state=1)&(eve_bas=ch_bas)&(nc<n) d1:(eve_state'=2)&(eve_bit'=ch_bit)&(nc'=nc+1)+→
d2:(eve_state'=2)&(eve_bit'=ch_bit)&(nc'=nc) ;
[evemeasure] (eve_state=1)&(eve_bas!=ch_bas)&(nc<n) LUCKY*d1 : (eve_state'=2)&(eve_bit'=ch_bit)&(nc'=nc+1)+→
LUCKY*d2 : (eve_state'=2)&(eve_bas'=ch_bas)&(eve_bit'=ch_bit)&(nc'=nc)+
(1-LUCKY)*d1 : (eve_state'=2)&(eve_bit'= 1-ch_bit)+
(1-LUCKY)*d2 : (eve_state'=2)&(eve_bas'=ch_bas)&(eve_bit'=ch_bit);
(14)
Here, the lines (14) in which appears the number d2 Eve doesn’t measure the photon intercepted,
so she doesn’t alter its state (base and bit). So the lines (14) and (13) model a weak attack of Eve
because for several photons Eve doesn’t measure. By varying n in the interval [5, 60], we
realise the curve 1
2
P
>
; we note it by
( )1
1
2
Eve
P
>
.
When Eve measures a lot of photons, we simulate a medium attack of Eve; this is done by
changing the number d1 and d2 in the lines (13) as d1 0.4= and d2 0.6= . So, the new form of
lines (14) and the line (13) illustrate a medium attack.
In this case PRISM provides a curve of 1
2
P
>
noted 1
2
(0)Eve
P
>
. The curves 1
2
(i)
0 2)Eve
iP
>
≤ ≤( are shown in
Fig. 2.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Number of photons sent by Alice, n
Theprobabilities{P
Eve(i)
>1
2
(n),i=0,1,2}
P
Eve(2)
>1
2
P
Eve(0)
>1
2
P
Eve(1)
>1
2
Figure 2. The probabilities
( )
1
2
{ (n), i 0,1, 2}
Eve i
P
>
= that Eve measures more than half the
photons transmitted by Alice to Bob when we change the Eve’s power.
We remark from this figure if we increase n , the number of photons transmitted by Alice, the
probability that Eve measures more than half the photons correctly decreases too and we
have
( )
1
2
lim ( ) 0
Eve i
n
P n
∞ >→+
= , 0,1, 2i = .
More interesting, if the power of Eve become lower, the probability that Eve measures correctly
more than half the photons becomes smaller. This is clearly illustrated by the inequality
for 5 60n≤ ≤ :
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
E v e E v e E v e
P n P n P n
> > >
≤ ≤ (15)

52
6. Conclusion
Classical cryptography such as symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, often involve the use of
cryptographic keys. Unfortunately all cryptographic techniques will be ineffective if the key
distribution mechanism is weak. The security of these actual mechanisms of key distribution
mechanism is based on computational complexity and the extraordinary time needed to break the
code. Quantum Cryptography is attracting much attention as a solution of the problem of key
distribution; QKD offers unconditionally secure communication based on quantum mechanics.
And Quantum Cryptography could well be the first application of quantum mechanics at the
single quanta level. Now, many experiments have demonstrated that keys can be exchanged over
distances of a few tens of kilometers at rates at least of the order of a thousand bits per second and
there is no doubt that the technology can be mastered and will find commercial applications.
So, Quantum Cryptography cryptosystems are very promising and the technology is improving
more and more to fulfill requirements. But there is a big need of testing and analysis such systems
due to their complexity.
In this context, we have applied the technique of model checking to analyze the security of the
BB84 protocol. We have concentrated our effort on studying the property of the amount of
information on the key obtained by an eavesdropper. Using the model checker PRISM we have
obtained the following results:
- To decrease the probability that Eve measures more than half the photons sent by Alice, it is
necessary to increase the number of the photons transmitted,
- If the quantum channel is noisy than the probability that Eve obtained some information on the
key decreases too,
- If the power of Eve becomes stronger, the probability that Eve measures more than half the
photon sent is higher.
In the end, the automatic model checker PRISM enables us to analyze BB84 protocol and this
approach is adaptable to other protocol of Quantum Cryptography. Also this approach is adequate
to analyze heterogonous cryptographic systems containing quantum and classical components.
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