WDA: Wormhole Attack Detection Algorithm based on measuring Round Trip Delay for wireless Ad hoc networks

IJSRD - International Journal for Scientific Research & Development| Vol. 2, Issue 09, 2014 | ISSN (online): 2321-0613
All rights reserved by www.ijsrd.com 284
WDA: Wormhole Attack Detection Algorithm based on measuring
Round Trip Delay for wireless Ad hoc networks
Anuradha1
Dr. Puneet Goswami2
Gurdeep Singh3
1
M.Tech 2
Professor & HOD
1
Department of Computer Science & Engineering
1,2
Galaxy Global Imperial Technical Campus 3
MMU, Sadopur, Ambala
Abstract— The recent advancements in the wireless arena
and their wide-spread utilization have introduced new
security vulnerabilities. The wireless media being shared is
exposed to outside world, so it is susceptible to various
attacks at different layers of OSI network stack. For
example, jamming and device tampering at the physical
layer; disruption of the medium access control (MAC) layer;
routing attacks like Blackhole, rushing, wormhole; targeted
attacks on the transport protocol like session hijacking, SYN
flooding or even attacks intended to disrupt specific
applications through viruses, worms and Trojan Horses.
Wormhole attack is one of the serious routing attacks
amongst all the network layer attacks launched on MANET.
Wormhole attack is launched by creation of tunnels and it
leads to total disruption of the routing paths on MANET. In
this paper, Wormhole detection algorithm (WDA) is
proposed based on modifying the forwarding packet process
that detects and isolates wormhole nodes in ad hoc on
demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol.
Keywords: Wormhole, MANET, Attack, Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) consists of mobile
hosts that can forward packets for neighbors. Every node
could be router in these networks and is responsible for
organizing and controlling the network. Many critical
applications of MANET, such as military tactical
communication or emergency rescue operations require a
secure cooperative environment [1]. Due to the wireless
nature of communications in MANETs, the security threats
are more than corresponding wired environment. The
unique features of MANET like low profile autonomous
terminals, bandwidth constrained and dynamic configuration
give unsatisfactory results of effects of applying the security
techniques like access control and authentication that are
used in wired networks to wireless and mobile networks.
Thus, achieving security for MANET has gained significant
attention in the past few years.
Among several possible attacks in wireless
networks, wormhole is one of the dangerous attacks. In
wormhole attack, an attacker intercepts packets at one
location and tunnels them to another location within the
wireless network. Any routing protocol that relies on
network topology for routing packets can’t work normally
and is prone to wormhole attack. Because of this reason, the
detection of wormhole attack has become an essential issue.
Wormhole attack when used against an on-demand routing
protocol like AODV or DSR increases the probability of
choosing routes through the wormhole nodes.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the
related work. Section 3 elaborates wormhole attack in detail
and detection algorithm is proposed in Section 4. The
simulation environment details are shown in section 5 and
section 6 concludes our results.
II. RELATED WORK
Some of the previous work for defense against wormhole
attack is listed below. Jen et al. [2] provided a Multipath
wormhole attack model to prevent wormhole attack in
MANETs. MHA (Multipath Wormhole Attack Analysis)
consisted of three steps: 1) considering hop count values of
all routes; 2) choosing a reliable set of paths for transmitting
data; 3) sending data packets randomly by routers through
paths calculated in step 2 according to decreasing the level
of packet as sent by wormhole tunnel. This method
minimizes the level of using the path consisting wormhole
nodes even though it can’t completely avoid wormhole
nodes in the path chosen. The simulations were done on
AODV routing protocol and did not use any specialized
hardware.
Jain et al. [3] presented a novel trusted-base
scheme to detect wormhole attack, where a trust model
based on Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) was used to detect
wormhole attack. In DSR protocol, the control packets store
the address list of each node that it has to traverse. In this
scheme, the wormhole attack is identified by using effort-
return based trust model in which each node following DSR
routing calculated trust levels in other nodes.
Choi et al. [4] introduced wormhole attack
prevention (WAP) model for preventing the wormhole
attack. In this prevention technique, all nodes need to
monitor the neighbor’s behavior by using a special list
known as neighbor list after broadcasting or forwarding
RREQ. From the respond packet, if received, it can detect
the path under wormhole attack. Once wormhole node is
detected, it is the responsibility of source node to record
them in the Wormhole List and avoid them taking part in
routing. Furthermore, the WAP method can detect both
hidden and exposed attack without any external hardware
devices.
In [5], authors developed a simple and efficient
distributed algorithm using communication graph for
wormhole detection in wireless ad hoc and sensor networks
without making unrealistic assumptions. Their algorithm
performed well in relatively dense or regular networks but
gave false positives in sparse or random networks.
Lu et al. [6] presented Multi-Dimensional Scaling
(MDS) scheme in which each node locally collects its
neighborhood information and reconstructs the
neighborhood sub-graph by MDS. Potential wormhole
nodes are detected by validating the legality of the
reconstruction of neighborhood sub-graph. Further, a

WDA: Wormhole Attack Detection Algorithm based on measuring Round Trip Delay for wireless Ad hoc networks
(IJSRD/Vol. 2/Issue 09/2014/065)
refinement process is introduced to filter the suspect nodes
and to remove false positives.
Chaurasia et al. [7] proposed an efficient method to
detect a wormhole attack called modified wormhole
detection AODV protocol. Wormhole attack is detected by
using number of hops along different paths from source to
destination and delay of each node along these paths.
Banerjee et al. [8] proposed a cluster based
Wormhole attack avoidance scheme that used DSR as an
underlying protocol. In order to avoid attacking during the
route discovery phase, hierarchical clustering with a novel
hierarchical 32-bit node addressing scheme is used.
Song et al. [9] proposed a statistical approach as
defense against wormhole attack. Each sensor node
collected the recent history of number of neighbors and
detected if the current neighbor count shows abrupt increase
as compared to the normal ones.
III. WORMHOLE ATTACK
Wormhole attack is one of the most severe routing attacks in
wireless networks. In this attack, an attacker node intercept
packets at one location, tunnels them to another node at
some other location of the network, where it is retransmitted
in the network by a colluding attacker [10]. The tunnel can
be established either by using out-of band private wired link
or logical link via packet encapsulation technique. The
colluding attacker nodes create an illusion that two remote
regions of a network are in direct connection through nodes
that appear to be neighbors thus violating security. Based
on the tunneling mechanism used, wormhole attack can be
classified into following two categories:
 Out-of-band wormhole: In this, the colluders create
a direct link between the two nodes so it requires
specialized hardware to support the communication
between them. The tunneled packets arrive faster
due to high speed private link than the multi-hop
packets. It enhances capacity of the communication
channel.
 In-band wormhole: It does not require any external
communication medium, specialized hardware or
special or special routing protocol. The packets
reach much slower than out-of-band wormhole. It
can be launched by any node in the network to
another colluder and are more likely to occur in
real world. It consumes network bandwidth and
capacity thus degrading network performance.
The existence of wormhole tunnel disrupts the
normal routing procedure in several ways. The attackers can
attract a significant amount of network traffic from their
surroundings. If the attackers do not drop any data packets
and keep the wormhole tunnel active all the times, they are
rendering useful service to the network. But actually they
are responsible for disrupting the normal flow of data
packets by selectively dropping, spoofing or modifying
packets, recording packets for later analysis and generating
unnecessary routing activities by making wormhole link
up/down periodically. The paths attracted by wormhole
nodes are having different advertised and actual routes. The
advertised routes are much shorter than the actual routes
which go through the wormhole tunnel. For instance,
consider the path between nodes S and D in Figure 1. The
advertised route from source to destination traverses nodes
in the order from S to W1 to E to D, but the actual route
taken by packets goes through nodes S, W1, B, W2, E and
D. In this way, actual path between nodes S and D is
different from that of advertised path. As seen from Figure
1, actual path and the advertised path between nodes F and
G stay the same, but overlap with the wormhole tunnel.
Abnormal network behavior exhibited by wormhole tunnel
can be further exploited to devise defense mechanism
against it.
Fig. 1: Wormhole attack
IV. WORMHOLE DETECTION ALGORITHM (WDA)
We have used Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing
(AODV) protocol for wormhole detection. In our proposed
wormhole detection algorithm, a wormhole tunnel is
suspected between two nodes if the RTD (Round Trip
Delay) between the nodes is greater than the threshold
value. RTD calculated by a node for a packet is the time
difference between the route request (RREQ) packet sent to
the neighboring node and the route reply (RREP) message
received. The source node is responsible for calculating the
RTD between all the successive nodes in the path
established during the route discovery phase. RREP
message format is appended with field RTD_value. Each
intermediate node receiving RREP inserts their RTD values
to assist in calculating delay by the source node.
( )
(
–
)
The delay is expected to increase with increasing
wormhole nodes because more the number of paths getting
attracted towards the wormhole, more traffic pass through
the wormhole tunnel. This will increase the delay at these
tunnel nodes. Thus, delay criterion suits well for detecting
the wormhole attack in this case. Enough space is allocated
for
RTD_value field depending on number of hops.
(
)
A node then forwards the RREP message to the
next hop along the reverse path. Each intermediate node
receiving RREP message will calculate RTD and embed it
into RTD_value field and forward it to the next hop along
the reverse path. When the RREP message reaches the
source node, it contains the RTD values of all the
intermediate nodes. RTD between the adjacent nodes N1
and N2 is calculated by the source node as:
( ) ( ) ( )
S
G
W
2
B
F
W
1
D
Wormhole
Tunnel
E

A wormhole is suspected if the RTD between two
nodes is greater than the RTD between the other nodes in
the established path. But RTD can also increase due to
longer delays caused by congestion or queuing delays.
Therefore a confirmation mechanism is needed to detect
whether the long delays caused is due to congestion or
queuing delays. Queue status is used for detecting
congestion at a node level. After successful detection of
wormhole attack, the source node broadcasts an alert
message to its neighborhood with wormhole node id to
isolate wormhole nodes from the network so that their
packets are discarded. The detailed algorithm for processing
RREQ and RREP by a mobile node is outlined as below:
AODV Receive RREQ
{
if (source address and broadcast ID pair already in request
buffer)
discard RREQ
else
add source address and broadcast ID pair to request
buffer
if (no route to source in routing table)
create a route entry for source address
else
{
if (source seqno in RREQ > source seqno in route
entry)
update route entry for source address
if ((source seqno in RREQ = source seqno in route
entry) AND (hop count in RREQ < hop count in
route entry))
update route entry for source address
}
if (a node is destination of RREQ)
{
Calculate size of RTD_value field using
( )
Create a RREP packet with allocating space for
RTD_value field
Unicast RREP to source of request
}
else
{
if ((have unexpired route to destination) AND
(destination seqno in route entry >= destination
seqno in RREQ))
{
Calculate size of RTD_value field using
(
)
Create a RREP packet with allocating space for
RTD_value field
Unicast RREP to source of request
}
else
broadcast RREQ to its neighboring nodes
}
}
AODV Forward RREP
{
if (route to requested destination does not exist)
create a route entry for requested
destination
else if (destination seqno in RREP > destination
seqno in route entry)
update-route entry for requested
destination
else if ((destination seqno in RREP = destination
seqno in route entry) AND (hop count in RREP < hop
count in entry))
update route entry for requested destination
if (route to requesting source exists)
{
Calculates RTD and insert in RTD_Value field
Forward RREP to requesting source
}
}
AODV Receive RREP by source node
{
{
Calculate RTD of successive nodes as
( ) ( ) ( )
for each RTD (N1, N2) pair
{
If RTD (N1, N2) > threshold
Check anamoly
}
else
Create a route entry for destination
}
}
else if (destination seqno in RREP > destination
seqno in route entry){
{
Check anamoly
}
Update route entry for destination
}
else if ((destination seqno in RREP = destination
seqno in route entry) AND (hop count in RREP <
hop count in entry))
{
{
Check anamoly
}
Update route entry for destination
}
else
discard RREP
}
AODV check anomaly

{
If delay increases due to congestion
Proceed as normal
Else
{
Wormhole attack is detected and RREP is
discarded
Source node creates wormhole lists and
broadcasts an alert message to isolate
wormhole nodes from the network
}
}
V. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
The simulations were carried out using network simulator
(Ns-2), a discrete event driven simulator [11]. This section
presents the topology and different parameters used in the
simulation process. This simulation process considered a
wireless network of nodes which are placed within a 1000m
X 1000m area. CBR (constant bit rate) traffic is generated
among the nodes. The simulation runs for 100 seconds.
Keeping all other parameters constant, pause time and
number of nodes are varied to observe the behavior of
performance metrics.
Parameter Value
Simulation area 1000m x 1000m
Antenna Omni antenna
Number of nodes 25, 35, 45, 55
Speed 5 m/s
Pause Time (sec) 1, 2, 5, 10
Max queue length 50
Traffic CBR (Constant bit rate)
Routing protocol AODV
Transport Layer UDP
Data Packets 512 bytes/packet
Data Rate 2Mbps
Mobility model Random Way Point
Wormhole nodes 2
Table 8.1 Important Simulation Parameters
A. Effect of Wormhole Attack and proposed Algorithm on
PDR
PDR is the ratio of packets received at destination node to
that of packets sent by source node. It decreases with
increase in wormhole nodes. It is clear from Fig. 2 and 3
that PDR of AODV is heavily affected by the wormhole
nodes where as the PDR of Wormhole Detection Algorithm
are immune to it. This graph confirms that while proposed
AODV is secure against wormhole nodes, AODV is not.
Pause time is the time for which mobile nodes wait at a
destination before moving to other destination. Low pause
time signifies high mobility as the node will have to wait for
lesser time duration. Higher pause time leads to slower
detection time and higher accuracy. This is because the
longer the node stays at one place; it can collect enough
neighbor count evidence in that location to declare the
wormhole with more precision. However, if the wormhole-
attacked area is the last one to be visited in the cyclic
monitor, the detection time is higher since it is delayed more
as it spends time in its previous locations. This is mainly
due to the fact that our protocol detects the attacker and
allows the source nodes to avoid it. By avoiding the
attacker, our protocol finds shortest paths, and so, delivers
more packets. PDF drops from 94.35 to 26.10 in presence of
wormhole attack and with our scheme it improves to 81.21
in Figure 2.
Graph 1: PDR vs Pause time
Graph 2: PDR vs Number of nodes
The PDR decreases in the case of AODV that is
subject to an attack. This is due to the fact that the number
of correctly received packet is very less than the number of
transmitted packets. Our proposed algorithm is independent
of number of nodes and shows consistent performance as
nodes varies from 25 to 55 with an average PDF of 84.86
close to PDF of normal AODV.
B. Effect of Wormhole Attack and proposed Algorithm on
Average E2E Delay
Average End-to-End delay is average time taken for
successfully transmitting data packets across MANET from
source to destination which can be calculated by summing
the time taken by all received packets at destination divided
by their total numbers. It includes all kinds of delays like
buffering during the route discovery latency, queuing at the

interface queue, retransmission delay at the Medium Access
Control, the propagation and the transfer time. The average
end-to-end delay The Average End-to-End Delay should be
less for high performance. E2E delay increases in AODV
under wormhole attack as expected. As pause time
increases from 1 to 5 seconds, E2E delay increases from
206.35 ms to 304.12 ms in normal AODV, 509.97 ms to
560.07 ms in AODV under wormhole attack and 241.55 ms
to 409.65 ms as shown in Fig 4. Our proposed algorithm
does not incur much additional delay. There is abrupt
decrease in average E2E delay as pause time reaches 10
second because more pause time means low mobility.
Whenever node changes its direction or speed, route
maintenance occurs so delay increases.
Graph 3 Average E2E Delay vs Pause time
Graph 4 Average E2E Delay vs Number of nodes
C. Effect of Wormhole Attack and proposed Algorithm on
throughput.
Throughput is the ratio of the total data received from
source to the time it takes till the receiver receives the last
packet. Fig 6 and 7 shows the effect of pause time and
number of nodes on the throughput. There is huge
difference between the throughput for AODV and AODV
under attack. High pause time means less mobility and more
stable network but when pause time increases then the node
will not move and throughput decreases. With AODV,
without attack, its throughput is higher than in the case with
under attack because of the packets discarded by the
wormhole nodes.
The throughput of network drops from 66.10 kbps
to 18.03 kbps with wormhole attack and rises to 56.10 kbps
with proposed algorithm. The throughput of network
increases from 66.95 kbps to 91.85 kbps for normal AODV
as number of nodes increases from 25 to 55, for AODV
under AODV attack throughput decreases from 20.16 kbps
to 17.12 kbps. With our proposed algorithm, throughput
increases from 57.11 kbps to 82.21 kbps.
Graph 5 Throughput vs Pause time
Graph 6 Throughput vs Number of nodes
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE
In this paper, we have simulated the self-contained in-band
wormhole attack and detection algorithm. We have also
explained theoretically some metrics affecting wormhole
attack that helps in developing the strategy for the detection
of wormhole attack. Finally, we have presented the
simulation results which shows
Having simulated the wormhole attack, we saw that
the PDR falls drastically in the ad-hoc network. Our
proposed solution tries to eliminate the wormhole effect
with minimum increase in average end to end delay and the
detection accuracy of our solution is quite high. Our
proposed algorithm works well with node mobility, and does
not require any strict clock synchronization and its network
performance is independent of network density and pause
time. The proposed method is equally effective for higher
speed networks such as VANETs.
As part of the future work, we can integrate packet
drop and round trip delay for detecting wormhole attack to
improve the detection ratio. We would like to study
Blackhole, Jellyfish and Sybil attacks in comparison with
wormhole attack. These can be categorized on the basis of
network performance degradation caused by the network.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1 2 5 10
E2EDelay
Pause Time
AODV

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WDA: Wormhole Attack Detection Algorithm based on measuring Round Trip Delay for wireless Ad hoc networks

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WDA: Wormhole Attack Detection Algorithm based on measuring Round Trip Delay for wireless Ad hoc networks