Wec 00220 00701_snowdon

The Enduring Elixir of
Economic Growth
Xavier Sala-i-Martin on the wealth
and poverty of nations

Brian Snowdon

What makes some countries rich and others poor? Economists have asked this
question since the days of Adam Smith. Yet after more than two hundred years,
the mystery of economic growth has not been solved.

Elhanan Helpman (2004)

If we want to understand why countries differ dramatically in standards of liv-
ing we have to understand why countries experience such sharp divergences in
long-term growth rates…. Economic growth is the part of macroeconomics that
really matters.

Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2003)

Introduction
Xavier Sala-i-Martin is widely recognised as one of the world’s leading
economists in the field of economic growth. Since 1990, he has made
numerous theoretical and empirical contributions to growth analysis,
recognised by numerous awards, fellowships, and research grants.1 He is
also the co-author, with Robert Barro, of Economic Growth (2003), the lead-
ing graduate textbook in the field.

Xavier Sala-i-Martin is Professor of Economics, Columbia University, USA. Brian Snowdon is
Principal Lecturer in Economics at Newcastle Business School, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK.
1
Details of Professor Sala-i-Martin’s publications and professional activities can be found at his personal (and
magnificently entertaining!) webpage: http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/home.html.

WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 7 • No. 1 • January–March 2006 73

Xavier Sala-i-Martin interviewed by Brian Snowdon

Educated at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Harvard
University, Professor Sala-i-Martin has taught at Yale (1990–96), and
Columbia (1996–to date), where he is currently Professor of Economics.
He is also a Visiting Professor at Barcelona’s Universitat Pompeu Fabra
(1994–2005), and was Visiting Professor at Harvard University in 2003–04.
Among his many professional activities, Professor Sala-i-Martin has
been a consultant to the IMF and World Bank (since 1993), and Senior
Economic Advisor to the World Economic Forum (since 2002). In 2002 he
founded the ‘Umbele Foundation: A Future for Africa’. Professor Sala-i-
Martin is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Research,
London, the Institute for Policy Research, Washington D.C., and the
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is
also Associate Editor of the prestigious Journal of Economic Growth.2
In the interview that follows, I discuss with Professor Sala-i-Martin sev-
eral important issues relating to economic growth and development. First,
to provide some background to the interview, I review the historical con-
text of recent research.

The elixir of economic growth
The power and importance of economic growth in raising living standards
is perhaps best illustrated by the history of the twentieth century. Despite
two devastating World Wars, the Great Depression and collapse of inter-
national integration during the interwar period, and the rise and fall of the
communist experiment, the majority of the world’s population are better
off than their parents and grandparents in terms of income per capita
($PPP). If the worldwide dramatic gains in life expectancy are also taken
into account, there has been a remarkable improvement in welfare (see
Maddison, 2001; Becker et al., 2003; Crafts, 2003; Komlos and Snowdon,
2005). In McCloskey’s (1994) words:
No previous episode of enrichment approaches modern economic growth; not
China or Egypt in their primes, not the glory of Greece or the grandeur of
Rome.

2
The Journal of Economic Growth, first published in 1997, is designed to serve as the main outlet for theoretical
and empirical research in economic growth and dynamic macroeconomics.

74 WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 7 • No. 1 • January–March 2006

The Enduring Elixir of Economic Growth

Economic growth, not redistribution, is the single most powerful mech-
anism for generating long-term increases in income per capita. It will also
act as the main source of divergences in living standards if growth rates dif-
fer across the regions and countries of the world. Over very short time hori-
zons, the gains from moderate economic growth are often imperceptible to
the beneficiaries, but the gains in the long run are highly visible. It is
hardly surprising, then, that for many economists, to understand the
causes of economic growth is far more important than gaining a better
understanding of business cycles. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) argue,
‘If we can learn about government policy options that have even small
effects on long-term growth rates, we can contribute much more to
improvements in standards of living than has been provided by the entire
history of macroeconomic analysis of countercyclical policy and fine tun-
ing’. Although Keynes (1930) is normally associated with his work on
short-run macroeconomic issues, at the beginning of the Great
Depression, the worst business cycle in the history of capitalism, we find
him reminding contemporary observers that they should not be blind ‘to
what is going on under the surface—to the true interpretation of
things…the power of compound interest over two hundred years is such
as to stagger the imagination’.

Modern economic growth in historical perspective: extensive
vs. intensive growth
As Maddison’s data (Table 1) show, prior to the modern era living stan-
dards for the vast majority of the World’s population progressed at a glacial
pace. Reflecting on the ‘Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren’,
Keynes (1930) commented that:
From the earliest times of which we have record… there was no very great
change in the standard of life of the average man living in the civilised centres
of the earth…This slow rate of progress, or lack of progress, was due to two rea-
sons—to the remarkable absence of important technical improvements and to
the failure of capital to accumulate.
As the numerous growth models reviewed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2003) show, capital accumulation and technology play a central role in the
analysis of the causes of growth.


76
Table 1: Level1 and rate of (intensive) growth2 of GDP per capita: world, major regions, and selected countries,
1–2001 A.D.

Region 11 10001 18201 20011 1–10002 1000–15002 1500–18202 1820–702 1870–19132 1913–502 1950–732 1973–20012

Western Europe 450 400 1,204 19,256 –0.01 –0.13 –0.14 –0.98 1.33 –0.76 4.05 –1.88
UK – – 1,706 20,127 – – –0.27 –1.26 1.01 –0.93 2.42 –1.86
France – – 1,135 21,092 – – –0.14 –1.01 1.45 –1.12 4.04 –1.71
Germany – – 1,077 18,677 – – –0.14 –1.08 1.61 –0.17 5.02 –1.60
Italy – – 1,117 19,040 – – –0.00 –0.59 1.26 –0.85 4.95 –2.10
3
Western off-shoots 400 400 1,202 26,943 –0.00 –0.00 –0.34 –1.41 1.81 –1.56 2.45 –1.84
USA – – 1,257 27,948 – – –0.36 –1.34 1.82 –1.61 2.45 –1.86
Japan 400 425 0,669 20,683 –0.01 –0.03 –0.09 –0.19 1.48 –0.88 8.06 –2.14
Latin America 400 400 0,692 0,5,811 –0.00 –0.01 –0.16 –0.03 1.82 –1.43 2.58 –0.91
Eastern Europe 400 400 0,683 0,6,027 –0.00 –0.04 –0.10 –0.63 1.39 –0.60 3.81 –0.68
Former USSR 400 400 0,688 0,4,626 –0.00 –0.04 –0.10 –0.63 1.06 –1.76 3.35 –0.96

Asia (excluding Japan) 450 450 0,577 0,3,256 –0.00 –0.05 –0.00 –0.10 0.42 –0.10 2.91 –3.55
China – – 0,600 0,3,583 –0.00 –0.06 –0.00 –0.25 0.10 –0.62 2.86 –5.32
India – – 0,533 0,1,957 –0.00 –0.04 –0.01 –0.00 0.54 –0.22 1.40 –3.01
Africa 430 425 0,420 0,1,489 –0.00 –0.01 –0.00 –0.35 0.57 –0.92 2.00 –0.19
World 445 436 0,667 0,6,049 –0.00 –0.05 –0.05 –0.54 1.30 –0.88 2.92 –1.41
Source: Adapted from Maddison’s tables, http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison
1
Measured in 1990 Geary–Khamis international dollars.
2
Annual average compound growth %.
3
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.

WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 7 • No. 1 • January–March 2006


Since an increase in real GDP can either be absorbed by an increase in
population, or lead to an increase in per capita income, it is important at
the outset to distinguish between extensive and intensive growth. Extensive
growth is a situation where an increase in GDP is fully absorbed by popu-
lation increase, with no upward trend in per capita income (see Figures 1
and 2). Galor and Weil (2000) refer to this as a ‘Malthusian Growth
Regime’. The pre-modern world economy was not characterised by per-
sistent stagnation. The fact that for thousands of years the world’s popula-
tion increased, even if ‘glacially slowly’, is evidence of extensive growth.
If we assume that for the vast majority of people, subsistence living was
the norm, then a larger population is only possible if total output also rises
(Kremer, 1993). So extensive growth has been ‘fairly common’ throughout
human history.
In contrast, intensive growth is where GDP growth exceeds population
growth, allowing a sustained rise in living standards as measured by real
income per capita. Periods of intensive growth have usually been pre-
ceded by a long period of extensive growth, often lasting several centuries,
and the significant ‘turning point’ for any economy is the period of transi-
tion from extensive to intensive growth. However, throughout most of
human history the possibilities for sustained intensive growth in predom-
inantly agrarian (organic) economies were extremely limited. The avail-
ability and productivity of land determined the amount of extensive
growth, but once the supply of suitable agricultural land was exhausted,
diminishing returns set in. When these forces are combined with
Malthusian population dynamics it is hardly surprising to find that many
classical economists predicted the inevitability of a long-run stationary
state involving subsistence standards of living for the vast majority of
humanity.
Eric Jones (1988) distinguishes between two forms of intensive growth,
namely, ‘Smithian growth’ and ‘Promethean growth’. Smithian intensive
growth relies on the gains to productivity that can be made from the divi-
sion of labour, specialisation and trade. Such growth must eventually run
into diminishing returns, as there are limits to the gains from resource real-
location. In contrast, Promethean intensive growth is sustainable, being
driven by technological progress and innovation, and lies at the heart of
the ‘capitalist growth machine’ (Baumol, 2002). It was in the latter part of
the eighteenth century that we begin to see the emergence of Promethean



intensive growth in Britain with the coming of the Industrial Revolution.
Why did Promethean growth first emerge at this specific point in history,
and, in this specific geographical location, i.e., Britain? This is the billion-
dollar question that many economists and economic historians have tried
to answer (see, for example, Landes, 1998; Pomeranz, 2000; Jones, 2001;
Mokyr, 2006).
The phenomenon of intensive Promethean growth represents a dis-
tinctive ‘regime change’ and several economists have recently argued that
any story of the growth process, in addition to accounting for the modern
experience of sustained intensive growth, should also be able to account
for the long period of Malthusian stagnation (see Snowdon and Vane,
2005).
Since the middle of the eighteenth century, human history has been
dominated by the emergence and impact of the first ‘Industrial
Revolution’. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, economic
growth was largely confined to a small number of countries, but gradually,
modern economic growth spread from its origins in Great Britain to
Western Europe, and initially to ‘Western Offshoots’ (overseas areas set-
tled by European migrants; Maddison, 2001). As Figures 1, 2 and 3 indi-
cate, even though world population has exploded during the last 250 years,
average world living standards, measured by GDP per capita, have shown
a marked improvement, and this achievement is due to the dramatic accel-
eration of world growth rates of per capita GDP. However, because the dif-
fusion of the modern economic growth regime during the last 250 years
has been highly uneven, and, in some cases, such as sub-Saharan Africa,
negligible, the result is a current pattern of income per capita differentials
between the richest and poorest countries of the world that almost defies
comprehension. For example, the most recent World Bank data for 208
economies show that in 2004, Luxembourg (Rank 1) had a Gross National
Income per capita (PPP) of $61,220, the USA (Rank 2) had $39,710, and
the UK (rank 13) had $31,460. At the other end of the scale, Nigeria (Rank
193) had a GNI per capita (PPP) of $930, Ethiopia (Rank 200) had $810,
and Malawi (Rank 208) had $620! Such huge disparities in living standards
are a recent historical phenomenon.
But it is not all bad news. Sala-i-Martin’s recent research demonstrates
that, especially during the last twenty-five years, significant improvements
in living standards via growth have now spread to other heavily populated



Figure 1: World population over time

7,000

6,000

5,000
Population (millions)

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Year
Source: Based on Maddison’s data, http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison/

Figure 2: World per capita GDP over time

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

$ 4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

Year



Figure 3: World per capita GDP over time: growth rates

%
3

2

1

0

–1
0–1000 1000–1500 1500–1820 1820–1870 1870–1913 1913–1950 1950–1973 1973–2000

Year


parts of the world, most significantly to China and India (two countries
with a combined population of 2.3 billion people). This is now having a
dramatic impact on reducing world poverty and inequality (see Sala-i-
Martin, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2006). The main tragedy remains sub-
Saharan Africa and ‘there should be no doubt that the worst economic
disaster of the twentieth century is the dismal growth performance of the
African continent’ (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003).
The importance of economic growth as a basis for improvements in
human welfare and poverty reduction cannot be overstated, and is con-
firmed by numerous empirical studies (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). There is
no better demonstration of this fact than the impact on living standards
since 1960 of the comparative growth experiences of the ‘miracle’ East
Asia economies with those of the majority of sub-Saharan African
economies. Growth theory suggests that poor countries have enormous
potential to ‘catch up’ through rapid growth. So, in many ways, the ‘mira-
cle’ rapid growth of East Asia is much less of a puzzle to economists that
the stagnation of sub-Saharan Africa.



Developments in growth theory and empirics
The classical economists, inspired by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations
(1776), gave prominence to the issue of economic growth. An important
message from Smith is that ‘little else is requisite to carry a state to the
highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy
taxes, and tolerable administration of justice’. In contrast, the growth mod-
els of Thomas Robert Malthus and David Ricardo, each for different rea-
sons, generated pessimistic conclusions with respect to the possibility of
long-term growth of living standards. Karl Marx’s model of capitalist
development also predicted doom and gloom for the working classes. But,
as Maddison’s data confirm (see Table 1), Smith was right concerning the
capacity of successful capitalist market economies to generate sustained
increases in living standards. The real income and life style of the working
classes in the leading capitalist economies has been transformed beyond
belief (see Clark, 2005).
The post WWII scholarly interest in economic growth peaked in the
1950s, before declining markedly throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and early
1980s. Following the stimulating and important papers of Moses
Abramovitz (1986), William Baumol (1986), Paul Romer (1986, 1990), and
Robert Lucas (1988), this trend reversed itself abruptly after the mid-
1980s. Since then, a surge of publications on economic growth, that shows
no sign of letting up, indicates that the study of long-run economic growth
is once again a very important research area for economists. Notable con-
tributions have been made by several economists who, during the 1970–85
period, did seminal research in the business cycle field, in particular,
Robert Lucas, Edward Prescott, Robert Barro, and Gregory Mankiw (see
Snowdon and Vane, 2005). This reorientation of economists’ research
emphasis was long overdue and was stimulated by several factors, in
particular:

1. new theoretical insights inspired by the 1980s research of Paul Romer
and Robert Lucas, and, more recently, by the modern political econ-
omy analysis of economists such as Daron Acemoglu and his co-
authors (Snowdon, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson , 2006);



2. the availability of a rich array of new data sets for a large number of
countries (e.g. Summers and Heston, 1991; Maddison, 2001), com-
bined with innovative empirical research (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1991, 1992a);
3. a growing realisation that a large number of developing countries, par-
ticularly in sub-Saharan Africa, were not displaying ‘catch up’ tenden-
cies with the levels of income per capita of the rich OECD economies
(Baumol, 1986; Romer, 1986, 1994);
4. the sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and other
‘Eastern Bloc’ economies at the end of the 1980s focussed economists’
attention on economic reform processes, and the relationship between
social, political and economic institutions (Desai, 2006); there is now
widespread acceptance of the idea that ‘good’ governance and institu-
tions are crucially important pre-conditions for successful growth and
development (North, 1990; World Bank, 1997, 2002; Rodrik, 2006);
5. increasing concern, especially within the United States during the
1980s, that the economic position of the US relative to other major
OECD economies, especially Japan and Germany, was being eroded
(Thurow, 1992); during the last decade, China-phobia seems to have
replaced the earlier phobias relating to Japan and Europe;
6. concern relating to the causes of the productivity growth slowdown,
beginning in the late 1960s/early 1970s, but not clearly recognised
until the early 1980s (Fischer et al., 1988); more recently, in the late
1990s interest in the US has focussed on a productivity acceleration
associated with the emergence of an information technology driven
‘new economy’ (Crafts, 2004);
7. increasing awareness of problems relating to the measurement of eco-
nomic growth and that the true rate of progress is likely to be ‘sub-
stantially underestimated’ using conventional estimation techniques
(Fogel, 1994, 1999; 2004; Nordhaus, 2001; Becker, et al., 2003);
8. growing awareness of the spectacular growth performance displayed
by the ‘East Asian Tiger’ economies as well as the ‘growth disasters’
and disappointments experienced in many developing economies,
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Southern Asia
(World bank, 1993; Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003);
9. the increasing influence, during the 1980s, of the real business cycle
approach to the study of economic fluctuations where the Solow



neoclassical growth model is used as the benchmark for studying both
fluctuations and growth; real business cycle theorists argue that the
growth process has a large random element and consequently aggre-
gate instability is a manifestation of the stochastic growth process
(Prescott, 2004);
10. for many economists, such as Robert Lucas (2003), Edward Prescott
(2004), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), the renewed interest in
growth stems in large part from their belief that business cycle fluctu-
ations, of the magnitude experienced during the second half of the
twentieth century, are not very costly to society, therefore it is far more
important for economists to concentrate their research efforts on how
to increase the rate of growth. Indeed, an obsession with short-run sta-
bilisation could adversely affect long-term growth prospects.

Four waves of growth theory
Four main waves of growth theory were influential in the second half of
the twentieth century, namely:
1. the neo-Keynesian Harrod–Domar model;
2. the Solow–Swan neoclassical model;
3. the Romer–Lucas inspired endogenous growth models;
4. modern political economy models.
The first three approaches emphasise the proximate determinants of
growth. Interestingly, in each case the ideas developed represent exam-
ples of multiple discovery. The first wave of interest focussed on the neo-
Keynesian work of Roy Harrod (1939, 1948) and Evsey Domar (1946,
1947). In the mid 1950s, the development of the neoclassical growth
model by Robert Solow (1956, 1957) and Trevor Swan (1956) stimulated a
second, more lasting and substantial wave of interest, which, after a period
of relative neglect between 1970 and 1986, has been reignited (Mankiw,
1995). The third and most recent wave, initiated by the research of Paul
Romer (1986) and Robert Lucas (1988), led to the development of
endogenous growth theory, which emerged in response to perceived the-
oretical and empirical deficiencies associated with the neoclassical model
(see Romer, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Snowdon and Vane,
2005).



In the most recent wave of growth theory and empirics, modern politi-
cal economy models have been used to investigate the deeper or fundamen-
tal determinants of growth. This research focuses on the impact on growth
of such factors as the quality of governance, legal origins, ethnic diversity,
democracy, trust, corruption, and institutions in general (for example, Zak
and Knack, 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Landau, 2003; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006). Major debates relating to the deeper determinants of
growth also consider the relative importance of geographical constraints
(Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2005), the natural resource curse (Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian, 2003), and the links between international eco-
nomic integration and growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Bhagwati, 2004;
Wolf, 2004).
Figure 4 provides a suggested framework for thinking about the major
proximate and fundamental (deeper) factors that influence the rate of
growth.
While growth theory and empirical research show that poor countries
have enormous potential for catch-up and convergence, these advantages
will fail to generate positive results on growth in countries with an inade-
quate growth supporting institutions (Rodrik, 2003, 2006).

Conditional convergence: The Barro–Sala-i-Martin hybrid
growth model
If all economies were intrinsically the same in terms of factors such as sav-
ings rates, preferences, access to technology, and population growth, then
according to the neoclassical growth model, poor countries should grow
faster than rich countries because of diminishing returns to capital accu-
mulation (Barro, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 2002d). This would result in absolute
convergence of living standards. However, in a heterogeneous world, the
growth rates of poor countries may be high or low depending on their ini-
tial per capita GDP relative to their long-run steady state positions, which
are determined by savings rates and the other key variables. That is, we
should expect to see in the data evidence of conditional convergence (Barro,
1997). The research of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 2003)
finds strong and robust support across countries and regions for the neo-
classical growth model’s prediction of conditional convergence.



Figure 4: A framework for growth analysis

Growth and
level of GDP

Mainstream
macroeconomic
growth theories

Harrod–Domar: World Economic
Neo-Keynesian Micro and macro
environment Forum
Solow: Neoclassical ‘competitiveness’
Romer: Endogenous Formal growth models emphasising
factor endowments + innovation

International Institutions
economic and policies
integration

Fundamental
determinants of
Geography economic growth
= natural
resources
+ climate
+ topography
Culture
+ ecology

Source: Adapted from Snowdon and Vane, 2005.

An important deficiency of recent endogenous growth theories is that
they do not predict conditional convergence. To rectify this flaw, Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1997) develop an interesting hybrid model that combines
elements of endogenous growth theory with the convergence implications
of the Solow model. Their model has the following elements:
1. in the long run, the rate of growth in the world economy is driven by
technological discoveries in the leading economies;
2. follower economies share in the new innovations via a process of imitation;



3. since imitation is generally cheaper than innovation, ‘most countries
prefer to copy rather than invent’;
4. the relatively low cost of imitation implies that the follower economies
will grow relatively faster than the leader economies and converge, at
least part way, towards the leaders;
5. as the amount of un-copied innovations decreases, the costs of imitation
will tend to rise and therefore the follower’s growth rate will tend to
slow down;
6. in the long run ‘all economies grow at the rate of discovery in the lead-
ing places’.
The Barro–Sala-i-Martin hybrid model therefore establishes an intu-
itively appealing framework where long-run growth is driven endoge-
nously by the discovery of new ideas in the ‘leading-edge’ economies, but
also retains the empirically supported convergence properties of the neo-
classical growth model via the impact of the imitation behaviour of fol-
lower countries.

Analysing global competitiveness: sustaining growth and the
power of productivity
Since 2002, Professor Sala-i-Martin has been a senior economic advisor to
the World Economic Forum, best known for its annual meeting in Davos
and the publication of its annual Global Competitiveness Report. The objec-
tive of the World Economic Forum’s ‘competitiveness’ project is to pro-
vide a detailed assessment of the competitiveness of a large sample of
nations. Prior to 2004, the Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report analysed
the competitiveness of nations using two alternative but complementary
approaches. The first approach uses the medium to long-term macroeco-
nomic oriented ‘Growth Competitiveness Index’ (GCI), developed by
John McArthur and Jeffrey Sachs (2001). The second approach to measur-
ing competitiveness utilises the ‘Business Competitiveness Index’ (BCI),
developed by Michael Porter (Porter, 2001, 2005). Both the GCI and the
BCI combine hard data with information gleaned from the World
Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey of leading business execu-
tives and entrepreneurs from over 100 countries. Tables 2 and 3 provide a
sample of GCI and BCI rankings from the most recent Global
Competitiveness Report, 2005–06.



Table 2: Selected growth competitiveness rankings and components,
2005–06

Macroeconomic
GCI rank GCI rank Technology Index Public Institutions Environment
Country 2005* 2004** 2005 Index 2005 Index 2005

Finland 1 1 2 5 4
USA 2 2 1 18 23
Sweden 3 3 4 17 12
Denmark 4 5 5 2 3
Taiwan 5 4 3 26 17
Singapore 6 7 10 4 1
Japan 12 9 8 14 42
UK 13 11 17 12 18
Germany 15 13 16 8 28
Korea Republic 17 29 7 42 25
Chile 23 22 35 22 15
Malaysia 24 31 25 29 19
Spain 29 23 27 36 24
France 30 27 24 20 27
Thailand 36 34 43 41 26
Hungary 39 39 30 34 63
South Africa 42 41 46 47 31
Italy 47 47 44 46 47
Botswana 48 45 76 39 36
China 49 46 64 56 33
India 50 55 55 52 50
Poland 51 60 39 64 53
Egypt 53 62 58 53 55
Mexico 55 48 57 71 43
Columbia 57 64 74 49 61
Brazil 65 57 50 70 79
Turkey 66 66 53 61 87
Tanzania 71 82 86 60 72
Argentina 72 74 59 74 86
Indonesia 74 69 66 89 64
Russian Fed. 75 70 73 91 58
Pakistan 83 91 80 103 69
Ukraine 84 86 85 90 78
Nigeria 88 93 90 98 76
Kenya 92 78 71 94 106
Bolivia 101 98 108 84 103
Ethiopia 106 101 115 79 108
Zimbabwe 109 99 98 80 117
Bangladesh 110 102 101 117 83
Chad 117 104 117 116 114
Source: Adapted from The Global Competitiveness Report, 2005–06.
* Full sample for 2005 = 117 countries.
** Full sample for 2004 = 104 countries.



Table 3: Selected business competitiveness rankings and components,
2005–06

BCI rank BCI rank Company operations Quality of national GDP per capita
Country 2005* 2004** and strategy, 2005 business environment, 2005 $PPP, 2004

USA 1 1 1 2 39,498
Finland 2 2 9 1 29,305
Germany 3 3 2 4 28,889
Denmark 4 7 4 3 33,089
Singapore 5 10 14 5 26,799
UK 6 6 6 6 28,968
Japan 8 8 3 10 29,906
France 11 12 10 11 27,913
Sweden 12 4 7 14 28,205
Taiwan 14 17 13 15 25,614
Malaysia 23 23 24 23 10,423
Korea Republic 24 24 17 24 21,305
Spain 25 26 25 26 23,627
South Africa 28 25 26 30 10,603
Chile 29 29 31 29 10,869
India 31 30 30 31 3,029
Hungary 34 42 40 32 15,546
Thailand 37 37 35 37 7,901
Italy 38 34 28 39 28,172
Poland 42 57 43 46 12,224
Brazil 49 38 32 52 8,328
Turkey 51 52 38 51 7,503
Botswana 55 62 76 50 10,169
Colombia 56 58 49 57 6,959
China 57 47 53 58 5,642
Indonesia 59 44 50 59 3,622
Mexico 60 55 55 62 9,666
Argentina 64 74 52 64 12,468
Pakistan 66 73 68 65 2,404
Kenya 68 63 60 69 1,075
Egypt 71 66 58 74 4,072
Russian Fed. 74 61 77 70 10,179
Ukraine 75 69 71 76 6,554
Nigeria 76 81 65 79 1,120
Tanzania 82 90 93 81 673
Zimbabwe 84 82 78 84 2,309
Bangladesh 100 95 99 101 1,875
Ethiopia 111 99 113 110 814
Bolivia 113 101 115 112 2,902
Chad 116 – 116 116 1,555
* Full sample for 2005 = 116 countries. **Full sample for 2004 = 103 countries.



In addition to the GCI and BCI, the Global Competitiveness Report
2004–05 introduces a new index of competitiveness developed by Xavier
Sala-i-Martin and Elsa Artadi (2004). The new ‘Global Competitiveness
Index’ aims to ‘consolidate the World Economic Forum’s work into a
single index’ that reflects the growing need to take into account a more
comprehensive set of factors that significantly influence a country’s growth
performance.

The ‘Global Competitiveness Index’
As noted in the Global Competitiveness Report 2004–05, the year 2004 repre-
sented a transition period, because future reports will begin to make use
of a new single ‘Global Competitiveness Index’ (GLCI) that consolidates
and extends the current dual-track approach involving the construction of
the macroeconomic oriented GCI and the microeconomic oriented BCI.
In constructing the new ‘flagship’ GLCI, Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2004)
take as their starting point a productivity based definition of competitive-
ness similar to the one recommended by Michael Porter’s (2005):3
Competitiveness is defined as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that
determine the level of productivity. The level of productivity in turn, sets the
sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy (and) a more
competitive economy is one that is likely to grow at larger rates over the
medium to long run.
In other words, productivity, as a measure of competitiveness, has both
static and dynamic elements. Because the 2003 rank correlation between
the GCI and BCI was 95.4 per cent, Sala-i-Martin and Artadi argue that
‘the macroeconomic and microeconomic determinants of competitiveness
cannot and should not be separated’. Consequently, the new GLCI is
based on three basic principles:

Principle 1: The main determinants of productivity can be encompassed
within twelve pillars of competitiveness and each pillar plays a major role,
depending on the stage of development, in one of three broad areas,
namely, ‘Basic Requirements’ (BR), ‘Efficiency Enhancers’ (EE), and
‘Innovation and Sophistication’ factors (IF). The GLCI is therefore a

3
Emphasis added.



Figure 5: The twelve ‘pillars’ of the Global Competitiveness Index

1 Institutions Basic requirements
2 Infrastructures
3 Macroeconomic stability
4 Personal security
5a Basic human capital
Key for factor-
driven economy
Efficiency 5b Advanced human capital
enhancers 6 Goods market efficiency
7 Labour market efficiency
8 Financial market efficiency
9 Technological readiness
10 Openness/market size
Key for efficiency-
driven economies 11 Business sophistication Innovation and
12 Innovation sophistication factors

Key for innovation-
driven economies

Source: Adapted from Sala-i-Martin and Artadi, 2004.

weighted composite index comprising these latter three elements, as
follows:

GLCI = α1BR + α2 EE + α3IF, and α1 + α2 + α3 ≡ 1

Figure 5 illustrates the components of Principle 1.

Principle 2: The process of economic development evolves in three
stages, namely a factor-driven stage, an efficiency-driven stage, and an
innovation-driven stage (Porter, 1990, 2005). The classification of coun-
tries, according to stage of development, is based on GDP per capita and
the proportion of total exports in the form of primary commodities (Xp/X).
While basic requirements, efficiency enhancers, and innovation factors
play a role in all economies, they are given different weights in the con-
struction of the GCLI, depending on a country’s stage of development.
The assignment of weights is as follows:



Figure 6: Five stages of development

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

Factor-driven Efficiency-driven Innovation-driven
countries (41) countries (21) countries (24)

GDPpc < $2k $3k < GDPpc < $9k GDPpc > $17k
or and and
Xp/X > 70% Xp/X < 70% Xp/X < 70%

Transition A economies (10) Transition B economies (8)
$2k < GDPpc < $3k $9k < GDPpc < $17k

At the ‘Factor Driven Stage’ α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.4, α3 = 0.1
At the ‘Efficiency Driven Stage’ α1 = 0.4, α2 = 0.5, α3 = 0.1
At the ‘Innovation Driven Stage’ α1 = 0.3, α2 = 0.4, α3 = 0.3

Principle 3: As economies develop they move smoothly from one stage to
the next. Therefore, there are also two additional groups of transition
economies and the weights of the sub-indexes ‘change smoothly as a coun-
try develops’.
This overall framework, set out by Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2004), is
captured in Figure 6. Table 4 provides the 2005–06 Global Competitiveness
Rankings for a range of countries representing each of the five country
groupings.
The theoretical underpinnings of the GLCI reflect one of the main les-
sons to come out of over two hundred years of economists’ thinking on the
causes of economic growth. As Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2004) note, ‘The
process of economic development is complex and many factors are needed
for a country to succeed’. From 2006, the Global Competitiveness Index,
developed by Sala-i-Martin and Artadi, is expected to become the main
analytical tool in the World Economic Forum’s research on
competitiveness.4
4
In the 2005–06 Global Competitiveness Report, the determinants of productivity are encompassed within 9 rather
than 12 pillars of competitiveness, and the stages of development are defined in terms of GDPpc only.



Table 4: Selected global competitiveness rankings and components,
2005–06*

Country and stage GCI** rank GCI*** rank Basic Efficiency Innovation
of development 2005 2004 requirements enhancers factors

USA (3) 1 1 18 1 1
Finland (3) 2 2 2 5 5
Denmark (3) 3 3 1 3 7
Singapore (3) 5 7 3 2 14
Germany (3) 6 6 8 19 3
Sweden (3) 7 5 7 9 6
Taiwan (B) 8 11 19 6 8
UK (3) 9 9 17 4 11
Japan (3) 10 10 25 17 2
France (3) 12 17 16 18 9
Korea Republic (B) 19 26 20 20 17
Malaysia (2) 25 23 26 25 25
Chile (2) 27 29 24 31 32
Spain (3) 28 24 28 27 28
Thailand (A) 33 33 34 41 38
Hungary (2) 35 46 49 30 39
Italy (3) 38 56 44 36 30
South Africa (2) 40 36 46 43 29
Poland (2) 43 72 57 38 45
India (1) 45 37 65 46 26
China (1) 48 32 45 62 48
Egypt (1) 52 47 53 68 71
Russian Fed. (2) 53 64 60 53 66
Argentina (2) 54 75 62 57 52
Brazil (2) 57 49 77 51 36
Colombia (A) 58 69 63 67 49
Mexico (2) 59 60 55 61 57
Ukraine (1) 68 73 74 64 60
Indonesia (1) 69 48 71 74 55
Turkey (2) 71 67 89 54 44
Botswana (2) 72 58 61 69 77
Nigeria (1) 83 77 78 90 72
Kenya (1) 93 84 108 83 51
Pakistan (1) 94 87 105 87 63
Bangladesh (1) 98 94 95 100 90
Tanzania (1) 105 97 103 105 88
Zimbabwe (1) 110 101 113 93 87
Ethiopia (1) 116 102 115 116 111
Chad (1) 117 103 117 117 116
* A = Transition A Economy, and B = Transition B Economy
**Full sample for 2005 = 117 countries. *** Full sample for 2004 = 104 countries.



INTERVIEW5

Background information
How did you become interested in economics?

In high school I was unsure what to do, so I asked my parents …Who is
the richest member of our family? It turned out to be one of my uncles, so
I then asked … What did he study? He studied economics, so that’s how
I chose (laughter).

Were there any people who during your student days particularly influenced the
development of your thinking?

Yes, although I have to confess that I was not a very good student as an
undergraduate because I did not find many of the subjects that interest-
ing. However, I did very well in those areas that did interest me, in par-
ticular, microeconomics. At that time I was an undergraduate student at
the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and microeconomics was being
taught by a Visiting Professor from the University of California, Davis. His
name was Joaquim Silvestre, and he changed my way of thinking and the
way that I saw economics. He really raised my interest in economic theory,
first micro, then macro. I also enjoyed the mathematical approach to eco-
nomic analysis. Because of Joaquim’s influence, I then went on to Harvard
where I met people like Jeff Sachs and Robert Barro and my interest grad-
ually moved towards macroeconomics, development, and growth.

The renaissance of growth research
You have written a large number of influential papers in the field of economic
growth6 as well as a very successful graduate textbook, co-authored with Robert
Barro.7 What is it about economic growth that fascinates you?

5
I interviewed Professor Sala-i-Martin in his office at Columbia University, New York, on 6th May, 2005.
6
For example, Sala-i-Martin, 1990a, 1990b, 1994, 1997a, 1997b, 2006; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992a,
1992b, 1992c, 1997; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1993, 2000; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Barro,
Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin, 2004.
7
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003.



To me the interest comes from the fact that economic growth is potentially
so important for improving human welfare. I think that the most important
question that an economist can ask is, What is it that makes a country
grow? More than anything else it is economic growth that affects human
welfare, including the discovery of an AIDS vaccine. Millions more peo-
ple have died as the result of bad economic policies than have died of
AIDS!8 It is also a very old question, since it is the one that Adam Smith
set out to answer in his classic The Wealth of Nations (1776). This question
remains unanswered even though many organisations, such as the World
Bank, IMF, OECD, United Nations, and many policy advisors, act as if we
economists did know the answer. I don’t think that we do know with any
certainty what we need to do in sub-Saharan Africa today to turn economic
performance around. If you look at poverty eradication, something that
also interests me, you do find that the countries that are successful in erad-
icating poverty are the countries that grow and vice versa.9 So the absence
of sustained growth has incredibly important consequences for human
welfare and this is why it must remain a major research interest for
economists.

Economic growth is crucially important and yet between the mid-1960s and mid-
1980s, research into economic growth went into relative decline compared to other
areas of macroeconomics.10 How do you explain this recession in the field, given its
importance?

I think the main reason is that many young economic theorists at
American Universities are obsessed with math. The beauty of economic
modelling is so attractive that some of the best young economists tend to
focus on theorising in areas that are not always so important and relevant
for the major problems facing the world. During the 1960s, the neoclassi-
cal revolution made growth theory highly mathematical and abstract. So
many beautiful mathematical growth models were created but with results
that were essentially irrelevant. The final product of a paper might be that
a unique equilibrium for this particular model exists and everybody in the
room would be very happy (laughter). But the real world demanded
8
The most extreme examples being the millions of lives lost as a result of policy-induced famines, for example,
in the Soviet Union, 1931–34, 1947; China, 1959–61; Ethiopia, 1984–5; and North Korea, 1995–97.
9
See the evidence presented in Dollar and Kraay, 2002.
10
See Laband and Wells, 1998.



answers to important questions and so, beginning in the 1950s, there
emerged an alternative, low-tech approach to providing answers, which we
call ‘development economics’. So interest in growth theory died for
twenty years and discussions of growth were mainly confined within the
field of development economics. But because development economics
was not built on strong theoretical foundations, many of the answers it pro-
vided turned out to be wrong.11 Then, in the early 1970s, new techniques
associated with the equilibrium business cycle research of Robert Lucas,
Thomas Sargent, Edward Prescott, Robert Barro and others were incredi-
bly influential. This new methodology was very attractive to young econ-
omists just out of graduate school.12 Macroeconomists became obsessed
with business cycle theory during the 1970s and early 1980s. However,
growth was reborn and today many macroeconomists see long-run growth
as the major issue, much more important than the analysis of short-run fluc-
tuations. Perhaps the most exciting aspect of the resurgence of interest in
growth analysis has been the integration of theoretical and empirical
research. In the new wave of research on economic growth, economists
have taken economic theory more seriously when it comes to empirical
research. A good example is the work on convergence.13

Growth and history
You mention the importance of empirical research, and obviously, such research
requires good data. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, economists
interested in economic growth have also had access to much improved data sets,
notably the Heston–Summers Penn World Tables.14 Angus Maddison has also
made some heroic attempts to estimate GDP per capita for a large sample of regions
and countries going back 2000 years.15 How much faith do you have in data sets
that go back a long way into history?

I don’t think that the data are very reliable once you go back beyond 1960:
data is a luxury good and only rich countries are likely to be able to collect

11
See Krugman, 1997.
12
See Snowdon and Vane, 1996.
13
Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992a.
14
The Penn World Table provides purchasing power parity and national income accounts converted to inter-
national prices for 168 countries for some or all of the years 1950–2000. For details go to http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
15
Maddison, 2001.



reliable data. Once you start looking at poor countries, you need to have a
large degree of imagination to collect data. Having said that, some of the
lessons we get from these data sets are probably true, for example, the les-
sons on growing economic inequality (or divergence) between the 1760s
and, say, 1980. Basically, the whole world was poor until about 1760, with
the vast majority of people living on subsistence income. Regional differ-
ences in real GDP per capita were very small. The average income of a
peasant in China was about the same as that of the average European serf
or the average American or African farmer. From the beginning of organ-
ised agriculture until the mid-eighteenth century, Malthusian dynamics
prevailed.16 And then, around 1760, the Industrial Revolution arrived: ini-
tially, a small number of countries manage to take off, allowing them to
experience sustained growth of per capita income for the next 250 years.
The main distinguishing characteristic of the Industrial Revolution is not
that incomes are higher, but that they grow continuously for the first time
in human history. Because the spread of the Industrial Revolution is
highly uneven, this led to the emergence of growing income inequalities
between nations, which continued until about 1980. Fortunately, during
the last two and a half decades, the process has been reversing as the
majority of the citizens of the world are now experiencing rising incomes,
especially as a result of the growth accelerations in China and India which
together contain over 2.3 billion people, about 37 per cent of the world’s
population.17 I think these big trends are correct, even though we do not
have that much reliable data. However, I don’t think we can tell with any
real precision what the income per capita was in China or the United
States, or anywhere else, in 1700, 1750 or 1820, never mind in 1100 AD.

One of the recent trends in the growth literature has been the attempt by many
growth theorists to build models that can provide a unified explanation of the his-
torical evolution of income per capita. Such models try to account for the
Malthusian, post-Malthusian, and modern growth regime periods.18 Are you sym-
pathetic to this recent work?

16
See Galor and Weil, 2000.
17
See Sala-i-Martin, 2002a, 2002b, 2006.
18
See, for example, Galor and Weil, 2000; Jones, 2001; Parente and Prescott, 2006.



This literature began with Michael Kremer’s 1993 paper and the authors
of these papers have produced some very innovative theories. But will we
gain much from being able to explain from the same theory the stagnation
of the pre-Industrial Revolution period, the Industrial Revolution take-off
period, and the sustained growth of the post-Industrial Revolution era? I
am not so sure.

Growth theory and empirics
Greg Mankiw has argued that ‘whenever practical macroeconomists have to
answer questions about long-run growth they usually begin with a simple neoclas-
sical growth model’.19 To what extent is the Solow neoclassical growth model20 still
the central idea in the analysis of economic growth?

The way that I look at theories or models is that they are tools that enable
us to address particular questions. Relating back to your previous ques-
tion, suppose we develop a theory that explains why, at a particular point
in human history, income per capita starts to grow and people decide to
reduce the number of children that they want. Such a theory is not much
use if we want to answer questions such as, How do we get growth started
in Malawi? Models address particular questions. The Solow model is an
important framework for answering one very important question, namely:
Is capital accumulation the key to economic growth? We do observe, by
and large, that countries with high rates of growth have high invest-
ment–GDP ratios. For example, Africa has a poor record of growth, and
has investment rates of about 5 per cent; the OECD grows at about 2 per
cent with investment rates of about 20 per cent; and East Asia grows at 5,
6 and sometimes 10 per cent and has investment ratios at 30, 40, some-
times even 50 per cent. The Soviet Union also believed that investment
would lead to growth. During the 1950s, Rostow’s theory relating to the
stages of development and ‘take-off’ into self-sustained growth was also
based on increasing investment ratios.21 Moreover, institutions like the
World Bank claim that capital accumulation is the key to economic growth.
In fact, the financing gap model (whose central element is that investment

19
Mankiw, 1995, 2003.
20
Solow, 1956, 1957, 2002.
21
Rostow, 1956, 1960.



is the engine of growth) has guided official development aid for decades.
Therefore, many economists believe that investment is a key variable in
any explanation of economic growth. So the Solow model is an excellent
tool for examining the importance of the relationship between capital
accumulation and economic growth. The answer to that question is that if
there are diminishing returns to capital accumulation, then increasing
investment ratios are not the key. That is a very important insight.22 An
additional insight of the theory is that it leaves technological progress as
the only long-run source of growth. Unfortunately, the Solow model
assumes that technology is exogenous so it is obviously not a good tool for
explaining technological progress. This is why theories of endogenous
growth became so popular during the 1980s. The Solow model tells us
nothing about why people have fewer children as their incomes increase:
declining fertility is a very important phenomenon that occurs as an econ-
omy develops, but the Solow model has nothing to say about this.23 The
same applies to questions relating to the role of the financial sector and the
importance of institutions in promoting growth. But the fact that the
Solow model does not help us answer all economic development ques-
tions does not mean that it is not very useful for answering the questions
for which it was designed. It is also a very simple tool, which means that it
is easy to teach undergraduates the basics of growth theory. I suppose that
is why it is the classic textbook model!

What are the most important lessons that economists have learned from the endoge-
nous growth literature?

There have been various important insights from this literature. First, the
endogenous growth literature attempts to deal seriously with important
questions relating to technology. One major problem is this. In the classi-
cal world of Adam Smith we have classical goods that are both rival and
excludable.24 In this kind of world, the invisible hand and perfect compe-
tition lead to the best possible outcome. But technology is not a classical
22
Robert Solow found this insight to be a ‘real shocker’ and ‘not what I expected at all’. See Snowdon and Vane,
2005, p. 665.
23
See Lee, 2003.
24
A rival good is one where one person’s use of that good reduces the availability of that good to other people.
A non-rival good is one where one person’s use of that good does not reduce the availability of that good to
other people. A good is excludable if it has the property that people can be prevented from using the good.
While all goods are either rival or non-rival, the degree of excludability can vary considerably.



good. Once someone invents a formula, everyone can use that formula at
the same time and they can all use the formula as many times as they wish.
Technology is a non-rival good. Take the example of a vaccine. The for-
mula for the vaccine has to be invented and this can be a very expensive
process because there is a large fixed cost. But once we know the formula
many people can use it. In the case of perfect competition, we will not get
an optimal outcome because prices converge to marginal cost and, conse-
quently, there is no surplus to pay for the initial research cost. Therefore,
in a world of perfect competition, very few things will be invented! Adam
Smith’s invisible hand does not work in the case of ideas.25 So we need to
think about what kind of institutions we need to create the ideas that lead
to technological progress which is the driving force behind long-run eco-
nomic growth. That is a very interesting insight. A second important idea
is the focus of research on various social interactions and institutions that
allow markets to work. For example, there is now a vibrant literature that
investigates the importance for economic growth of trust or the rule of
law.26

These are things that Adam Smith emphasised.

Absolutely. No economy can work in a lawless environment. However, the
question of how countries develop and can best improve their legal sys-
tems and institutions is complicated. For example, when one country tries
to impose the institutions that work in one setting on another country, it
does not always work. In fact, it really never works. Take the example of
the imposition of institutions by the West in the countries of Africa when
they gained independence. Initially, these countries began as parliamen-
tary democracies, with either British or French rule of law. Five to ten
years later, the democracies had disappeared and had been largely
replaced with autocratic dictators. We need to think how we can develop
Africa-specific institutions that will allow markets to operate efficiently,
because we all know that, at the end of the day, the only way out of
poverty is growth, and sustained growth can be generated only through
markets. The solution to Africa’s poverty is not debt forgiveness and more

25
See Jones, 2006.
26
See, for example, Zak and Knack, 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2004; Helpman, 2004;
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005.



aid. Targets for the rich nations to provide assistance to poor nations of 0.7
per cent of GDP are not very useful. None of the rich nations of the world
has reached that position because of aid and debt forgiveness. They
became rich through being successful market economies.27

But there are many variants of the capitalist market system. For example, China
has also developed a unique institutional approach that has been very successful
during the last twenty years.

Yes, and who would have imagined that a capitalist system without a pre-
dominance of private property would work. Certainly not Adam Smith. No
reasonable economist would have imagined that this would be possible.
But it helped China during the first years of their transition from commu-
nism. The Chinese developed their own institutions that allow markets to
work and reach similar outcomes to a Western-style market economy with
private property. Certainly, the market systems of Sweden, Hong Kong
and the US are very different; they all have their own peculiarities, but
they all work in their own way.28 So we know that for economic success you
need markets, but how you achieve those markets, and how those markets
are regulated by the state, is open for debate. If you try and impose a US,
or Chinese, or Swedish style of market system in Malawi, it will not work.
Japanese-style capitalism is not going to work in Zambia. Each country
needs to develop its own market supporting institutions. Every time a new
region of the world takes off, they do so with an entirely different and
often surprising set of rules and institutions. For example, compare the
growth take-offs of the UK, Japan, the ‘Asian Tigers’, and China. We as
economists could not imagine in advance that the Chinese model of capi-
talism would work. If Jeff Sachs, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Barro or Adam
Smith had been economic advisors to China in 1979, they would not have
advocated or advised the institutional path actually chosen by the Chinese
leadership. They would have advocated Western-style reforms. Most
likely, their advice would have led to failure.29 The Chinese have come up
with a new style of capitalism that surprised everybody and, so far, it

27
See Barro, 1997.
28
See Dore, Lazonick O’Sullivan, 1999; Shleifer et al., 2003.
29
Dani Rodrik takes a similar position. See Rodrik, 2003, 2006.



works.30 Even if we learn what are the key differences between Chinese,
US, Swedish and Japanese-style capitalism, I do not believe that compar-
isons, such as the relationship between the origins of the legal system and
subsequent economic success, will provide lessons that will help us
answer the question of what we need to advise in Africa in order to pro-
mote sustained growth.

Growth, globalisation, and convergence
You mentioned earlier that a good example of the merging of theoretical and empir-
ical work is to be found in the research on growth and convergence. You have made
an influential contribution to this literature, especially during the early 1990s.31
Initially it was thought that the lack of evidence for the ‘absolute convergence
hypothesis’—that poor countries as a whole tend to grow faster than rich coun-
tries—was evidence in favour of the new endogenous growth theories and against
the traditional neoclassical model.32 However, your research with Robert Barro,
and the paper by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), made it clear that the neoclas-
sical model predicts ‘conditional convergence’. Has this hypothesis been confirmed
in the data?

Yes, I think so. There are many studies confirming conditional conver-
gence, although the speed of convergence, at about 2 per cent per year, is
slower than predicted by the neoclassical model with a capital share of 0.3.
An important feature of the neoclassical growth model is the convergence
property. This is the idea that the growth rate of per capita income will be
inversely related to some initial level of income per capita. However,
Solow’s neoclassical growth theory predicts conditional convergence, that
is, poor countries will tend to grow faster than rich countries only if they
approach the same steady state. This requires rich and poor countries to
have very similar preferences, population growth rates, and to have access
to similar technology. Clearly this is not the case. In our research, we found
strong evidence for conditional convergence in various data sets, providing
diminishing returns set in slowly.33

30
See Jeffrey Sachs’s comments on China’s institutions in Snowdon, 2005.
31
For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992a; Sala-i-Martin, 1990a, 1990b, 1996a, 1996b.
32
See Romer, 1986; Rebelo, 1991.
33
See Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003, for a survey.



While economists are in general pro-globalisation,34 we do observe considerable
hostility towards globalisation from other social scientists, politicians, and large
sections of the general public. To what extent is increasing international integration
a powerful force promoting international convergence of per capita incomes?

It is unquestionably a powerful force for convergence. There are five
important aspects of globalisation, namely, the mobility of goods, capital,
labour, and information, and the diffusion of technology. Look at the coun-
tries that have had a disastrous growth record and compare them with the
countries that have experienced sustained steady growth or growth mira-
cles. For example, compare sub-Saharan Africa’s experience with East
Asia. The US and Europe have sustained steady growth and are doing
fairly well, Latin America has stagnated, and the Arab world is underper-
forming.35 But when it comes to sub-Saharan Africa, you need to ask your-
self the following question: Which of the five globalisation factors has
arrived in Africa? What answer do you get? Is the problem of Africa that
there is too much capital mobility and foreign direct investment? No. Not
even Africans invest in Africa where private investment is less than 5 per
cent of GDP. Is the problem that there is too much labour mobility? When
people from Africa cross the straights of Gibraltar, Spain does everything
it can to return them to Africa! Spanish people, on the other hand, can
work in Germany, Belgium, or Sweden, for example, but Africans cannot
freely move to Spain. Does Africa trade too much? No. If anything, the
problem they have is that they are prevented from exporting to Europe
and the US by our protectionism. In the US, Europe, and Japan we see
these obscene agricultural subsidies that deter consumers in the rich coun-
tries from buying their products. Because of these subsidies, it is cheaper
for people in many parts of Africa to buy agricultural products from the
rich countries. This is crazy. So the idea that Africa suffers from too much
trade is completely absurd. Does Africa have too much Western technol-
ogy? No. In the West we have the anti-retroviral drugs that can help HIV-
positive patients. We have the technology, and they cannot apply it
because they have too few doctors and hospitals. Finally, information.
Information is, perhaps, the only one of the five factors that moves easily

34
See Sachs and Warner, 1995; Snowdon, 2002; Milanovic, 2003; Bhagwati, 2004; Wolf, 2004.
35
See Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2002.



to Africa. That is the surprising thing when you visit Africa. You see
people watching Real Madrid play Barcelona live on TV (laughter). But
you must agree with me that, of the five factors that define globalisation,
information (as opposed to capital, labour, goods and technology) is the
least important. Now ask the same questions about China. Take labour
mobility. There are unlimited amounts of Chinese people working abroad.
Moreover, there are numerous Chinese studying around the world. Take
capital mobility. China has enjoyed a huge inflow of FDI. Take trade in
goods. China has experienced export-led growth. Technology and infor-
mation pour into China. There should be no doubt that globalisation helps
countries to grow faster and catch up. I think that the experience of Africa
and Asia over the last three decades has clearly demonstrated that global-
isation is good, period. Numerous empirical papers try to estimate econo-
metrically whether growth is positively correlated with openness.36 Some
papers show that openness is good for growth. Others show that this rela-
tion is weak. But none of them shows that this relation is negative. Given
all of this, I do not think we can blame globalisation for what is going on
in Africa. In fact, if you were to ask African political leaders what their
opinion is of globalisation they will answer, What globalisation? We do not
have globalisation!

Political barriers and the ‘natural resource curse’
Given that capital and technology can migrate across political boundaries, the per-
sistence of significant differences in the level of output per worker and lack of con-
vergence suggests the presence of entrenched barriers to growth and development.
Daron Acemoglu’s recent research highlights the importance of political barriers to
development.37 This work focuses on attitudes to change in hierarchical societies.
Political elites deliberately block the adoption of institutions and policies that
would help to eliminate economic backwardness. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)
argue that superior institutions and technologies are resisted because they may
reduce the political power of the elite. Where there are abundant natural resource
revenues to plunder by the politically powerful, this problem is likely to be a seri-
ous barrier to development.

36
For recent surveys of the literature on the relationship between openness, trade reform and economic
performance, see Panagariya, 2004; Winters, 2004; Winters, McCulloch, and McKay, 2004.
37
See Snowdon, 2004.



Yes, the political and economic elites in many poor countries certainly
oppose the use of new technologies and they also oppose many reforms.
Look at Nigeria, which by almost any measure has been a development
disaster. If you look at the distribution of income for countries like Nigeria,
you will see that eighty per cent of the population are making little or no
progress, or even becoming worse off, and twenty per cent are doing very
well.38 In 2000, the richest 2 per cent of Nigeria’s population had the same
share of income as the poorest 55 per cent. So it is not surprising that the
political elites do not want reforms that will threaten their wealth and
power. Why change the legal system or the current arrangements for the
distribution of oil revenues if it’s working in your favour? Why introduce
more competition and open up the economy when this will erode your
power? Nigeria has had forty years of mismanagement under military rule.
The natural resource curse in Nigeria’s case has worked through the detri-
mental impact that oil revenues have had on domestic institutions and the
consequent corruption and waste that has plagued Nigeria’s economic and
political history since independence. The oil revenues in Nigeria have
fuelled rent-seeking activity which has adversely affected long-run growth
of per capita income. In my paper with Arvind Subramanian, we show that
Nigeria’s per capita income between 1965 and 2000 did not increase, even
though $350 billion of oil revenues were generated.

What can be done to reverse this cycle of failure?

Our proposal focuses on the management of the oil revenues. This should
be taken out of the hands of government. We propose that all Nigerians
should have a constitutional right to an equal share of the oil revenues.
And this proposal would also apply to other countries suffering from a nat-
ural resource curse induced deterioration of institutions.

Religion, culture, and growth
Robert Barro has recently argued that empirical research by economists on the
determinants of growth has neglected the influence of religion.39 Do you think that
religion and culture have an important influence on economic growth?
38
See Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003.
39
Barro and McCleary, 2003, 2005.



There are very few issues where I disagree with Robert but this is defi-
nitely one of them (laughter). My reason for disagreeing is that you cannot
explain something that changes rapidly with factors that do not change at
all, or change only very slowly. In the nineteenth century, the first person
to talk about religion and economic performance was Max Weber.40 He
believed that predominantly protestant countries would have superior
economic performance compared to catholic countries because of differ-
ences between the protestant and catholic religions. He talked about the
‘protestant ethic’. Obviously he was wrong because now there are many
predominantly catholic countries that are as rich as protestant countries.
There are many other examples that undermine the culture hypothesis.
Many people at the beginning of the twentieth century believed that the
future major powers in the world would be Argentina and Brazil, not the
US. The reason for this line of argument was that the US was attracting
many migrants who came from a cultural background that was not con-
ducive to the spirit of capitalism. By this time, educated northern
Europeans were migrating to Argentina. Of course today, Polish and
Italian Americans are as rich as other groups. The English used to com-
plain about the Irish. The Irish were characterised as lazy, always drinking,
and would never become rich. But look at Ireland now. It is richer in per
capita terms than the UK!41 So every time predictions are made on the
basis of culture or religion they turn out to be wrong. We keep observing
countries where all of a sudden income starts to grow even though culture
and religion have stayed the same.

How does the East Asian miracle fit into this debate?

In the 1950s, many sociologists used to say Asia will always be poor.
Buddhism and the Confucian philosophy were supposed to constrain the
desire for material goods, and for capitalism to work effectively you need
people who are motivated by the desire to accumulate material goods. So
the analysis based on religion and culture predicted that Asia would always
be poor. But as everybody now knows, during the last fifty years we have
witnessed the remarkable ‘miracle’ growth of Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan,

40
Weber, 1904.
41
World Bank data show that Ireland’s GNI per capita for 2004 was 33,170($PPP) while the UK’s GNI per
capita was 31,460 ($PPP).



Singapore, South Korea, and, more recently, China. There has been a mas-
sive convergence of living standards between East Asia and the rich coun-
tries. Some now have a higher per capita income than many countries in
Europe and the ‘Western Offshoots’.42 Now we hear the counter argument
that this success is also down to culture and religion, because Asian peo-
ple are submissive and non-conflictual and this allows capitalists to exploit
the workforce! This sounds like Monday morning quarterbacking! Clearly
there is a problem with these types of argument. Why all of a sudden did
South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand or Malaysia start
to grow without any change of religion? Why all of a sudden did China
start to grow rapidly after 1978? China did not change its culture or religion
in 1978, did it? China stagnated for hundreds of years then suddenly it
started to grow. Why? To explain this dramatic change using religious and
cultural variables you would have to find some dramatic change in those
variables around 1978. And you will fail because nothing happened to reli-
gion or culture in China in 1978.

International inequality
You have written some widely cited papers on the issue of global poverty and
inequality.43 In discussions outside of academia the concepts of poverty and
inequality often become confused. Do you think that inequality matters so long as
poverty is being effectively reduced?

No. In my forthcoming Quarterly Journal of Economics (2006) paper I state
clearly that in most cases I don’t think that we should pay much attention
to inequality, especially income inequality. Why do I say this? Well,
inequality would go up if the rich become richer by 10 per cent and the
poor become richer by 5 per cent. Is this a bad situation? No. Surely this
is good because the poor have become better off. If inequality goes up
because the rich become richer and the poor become poorer in absolute
terms, then this might be something to worry about. Or we could imagine
a situation where the rich become poorer and the poor also become poorer,
but by an even greater amount. This would certainly be bad. In all three
situations, inequality has increased but the implications are very different.
42
See Maddison, 2001.
43
See Sala-i-Martin, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c.



It follows that it is very important to look carefully at the data to see why
inequality increases or falls. I also believe that measuring inequality just
by using income is a bad idea. Imagine you have a situation where you
have two brothers. One brother likes to work hard, the other does not like
to work. One brother likes to study in order to improve his employment
prospects, the other hates to study. They are both reasonable people. It
just so happens that one of the brothers prefers to have as much free time
as possible and spend his time walking on the beach, while the other
works like crazy, and has a lot of material goods. In fact, they could be
equally happy. Then along comes the government and guess what? It
looks at the distribution of income, not happiness. It observes one rich
brother and one very poor brother, as measured by income. So the gov-
ernment transfers some income from the rich brother to the poorer
brother, who now ends up with leisure time, and similar income! Notice
that, because the government cares about income as opposed to happi-
ness, redistribution ends up creating more (not less) inequality.

Why are you writing papers on inequality if you do not think it to be that
important?

My main objective is to estimate the world distribution of income, because
many people claim that this is important and because it allows me to study
the fraction of the population below certain levels of income, a phenome-
non we usually call poverty. Once I have this distribution, it is easy for me
to estimate measures of inequality so that people who care about it can
have a sensible debate about its evolution.

There has been a huge output of research on the issue of world poverty and inequal-
ity during the last decade.44 What is your assessment of the current state of econo-
mists’ knowledge about trends in poverty and inequality? What do the data tell us?

The world is moving in the right direction. Poverty is clearly going down.
The World Bank did not agree a few years ago but now they also estimate
that poverty is falling. Some economists say that it is not all good news,
because the improvements come mainly from China and India with

44
See, for example, Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002.



2.3 billion people. But this is not a legitimate criticism: to remove from the
data the two largest countries, where poverty has declined, and then
declare that poverty in the world is increasing, is not acceptable.45 Would
it make sense to remove Africa from the data and declare that poverty is
falling even faster? Of course not, and notice that, if we did, we would be
ignoring many less citizens than if we were to ignore China and India! In
assessing trends in world poverty, we need to include all countries in the
data set. When you do that, the results show that poverty and inequality
across the world is falling. Some people say that if you look across countries,
inequality is increasing. That may be true, but it is not relevant for human
welfare because looking at countries, rather than citizens, would give 700
times more weight to the farmer in Mozambique than to a Chinese peas-
ant, simply because the former lives in a smaller country! We need to look
at population-weighted measures of poverty and inequality, because China
has 1.3 billion people and Mozambique has about 19 million people.46 We
are interested in human welfare and we therefore have to look at individ-
ual income.47 The implications for human welfare of rapid growth in India
and China are much more important than the effect of rapid growth in
poor countries with small populations. This does not mean that all we
should be talking about is human welfare. In much of my research I talk
about countries because I want to test theories. If we want to know which
policies produce growth then we need to look at countries, because each
country is an independent experiment and we can compare the outcomes
of different strategies. So when you are asking questions about policies
you must look at country data. If you want to talk about human welfare, you
need to look at individual data. Every data set is useful for a particular
question. It is a conceptual mistake to assume that because different data
sets provide different impressions that this implies we do not know anything.

Can the growth tragedy of sub-Saharan Africa be reversed? If we could look at the
data on international inequality at the end of the twenty-first century, is there some
possibility that lower international inequality will include Africa?

45
See Wade, 2004a, 2004b.
46
The population-weighted variance of the log of income per capita represents a better measure of inequality
than the variance of the log of per capita income which gives the same weight to each country, no matter how
large or small the population.
47
The analysis of global inequality is further complicated by changes in inequality over time within countries.
See Milanovic, 2002.



It is possible. But, as I said earlier, what Africa needs is not more aid and
debt relief but better policies, more businesses, more trade, and more
domestic and foreign direct investment.48 The share of public spending in
GDP also needs to be reduced.49 The rich countries can also play a major
role by allowing easier access of goods into their markets. Above all, sub-
Saharan Africa needs peace and an end to violence and civil wars.

Foreign aid and growth
Throughout 2005, Jeffrey Sachs, Tony Blair, and Gordon Brown have argued in
favour of increasing substantially the aid flows to developing countries, especially
to sub-Saharan Africa.50 From what you have just said, you clearly have little
sympathy for this strategy as a way of promoting growth and development.

The plans to increase aid over the next decade might be very dangerous if
the recipient governments are corrupt, and lack accountability. By promis-
ing billions of dollars in development aid over the next ten years, what you
are saying to the leaders of such countries is that they have ten years to
enrich themselves. Moreover, you are telling them that after ten years all
the money will be gone. The Blair–Brown plan to solve the ‘poverty trap’
in sub-Saharan Africa, by bringing forward future aid allocations for the
next thirty years to be allocated during the next decade, is, potentially, a
recipe for theft on a grand scale.

So there is no case for agreeing with Jeff Sach’s (2005) call for aid to be increased
to 0.7 per cent of GDP of the developed nations?

No, I am not at all sympathetic to calls for more foreign aid until we find
better ways to distribute it without causing harm.

Is this because of the governance problems?

No, governance is one important reason, but not the only one. My feeling
is that aid also has perverse consequences on the allocation of talent in a

48
See Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003.
49
See Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin, 2004.
50
See Snowdon, 2005.



developing country.51 Foreign aid is a very important industry, more than
15 per cent of GDP, in many African countries. The existence of all this
money may very well lead potentially productive citizens to move away
from productive activities into the international aid industry. In other
words, rather than becoming engineers, many kids may find it more eco-
nomically advantageous to become part of the bureaucratic network that
specialises in channelling international aid, with the potential to allocate
money to friends and relatives. A third problem is that donors do not know
how best to spend aid resources. But whatever the reason, it seems clear
to me that over the last fifty years international aid has been largely
wasted.52 While international aid was increasing in Africa, the growth rate
of income per capita was declining continuously. I think international aid
has, by and large, failed to promote widespread economic development.

Jeffrey Sachs would probably say that this failure is because we did not give enough
in aid…

Jeff is very articulate and persuasive and I have often heard him use a very
appealing parable to describe this situation: “The fact that one fireman is
unable to put out a big fire does not mean that we should send less fire-
men to the fire. We should send more”! This sounds very good and very
appealing, but a careful reading of the growing evidence is that foreign aid
has failed almost everywhere. After some research from the World Bank53
showed that development assistance was positively related to growth, pro-
vided that it was given to governments that follow “good policies”, subse-
quent research showed that aid does not generate growth even in those
countries that follow good policies.54 One reason is that the aid institutions,
like the World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations, are getting it
wrong. And they are getting it wrong because we, by which I mean econ-
omists, do not know what to do. Given our ignorance on this issue, the
Gordon Brown plan, which consists of bringing forward 30 years worth of
international aid to the next 10 years, may be a bit dangerous because
there is no guarantee that increasing aid will work. In effect, we are going
to bet thirty years of resources on the next ten years. This is a huge (and
51
See Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991.
52
See Easterly, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Snowdon, 2003.
53
See Burnside and Dollar, 2000.
54
See Easterly, Levine, and Roodman, 2004.



perhaps irresponsible) gamble. An additional problem is that the obsession
over the Millennium Development Goals might be counterproductive.
The Millennium Development Goals are set for 2015. That is, ten years
from now. Devoting all development strategies (which are essentially
long-term strategies) to only achieve goals by 2015 may end up inducing
political and economic leaders of the developing world to follow the wrong
development strategies. In other words, it might be that the best strategy
is to channel resources into activities that will produce benefits to Africa
after 2015—but this is too late to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals, so those activities will never be financed!

What kind of strategy should the rich countries be following to help Africa?

I am not sure, but I think that one of the priorities should be the financ-
ing of R&D that searches for solutions to the three pandemics: AIDS,
Malaria and TB. The payoff from this would be huge (although it may
well come after 2015). I like Michael Kremer’s idea of a research fund to
purchase vaccines at prices that exceed marginal cost.55 Africa cannot do
this alone because they do not have the technology, the doctors, and the
pharmaceutical industry to carry out the necessary research. The rich
world should do this. Other things rich countries should do is to promote
business activity in Africa (which does not necessarily mean more financial
aid). One way to develop this business activity is to reduce trade barriers
(including agricultural subsidies).

Human capital and growth
In your discussion paper ‘Fifteen Years of Growth Economics: What Have We
Learnt’ (2002d), you note that the cross-country regression literature, which
attempts to identify the empirical determinants of growth, does not find a strong
relationship between ‘most measures of human capital and growth’. Does that not
surprise you?

The Lucas 1988 paper stimulated a huge literature on the impact of
human capital on growth. But when researchers started to measure human

55
See Kremer, 2002; Kremer and Glennerster, 2004; Kremer and Snyder, 2004.



capital accumulation, they found that very few measures of human capital
have a positive sign in regressions.56 Human capital has been a disap-
pointment. If you actually look at Robert Barro’s regression, many human
capital measures come with a negative sign! The one measure that does
seem to be positively related to growth is investment in primary schooling.
Neither university education nor secondary schooling seem to matter.
This is important because for a while the World Bank and other institu-
tions spent millions of dollars building schools and promoting investment
in human capital. Unfortunately, this did not seem to translate into a pos-
itive impact on economic growth. Perhaps the wrong investments were
made. Perhaps the key ingredient in the process of education is the pro-
ductive use of student’s time, not the school buildings or teachers salaries.
But the main lesson from the human capital growth literature is that the
results have been disappointing.

Geography and growth
In recent years, several economists, notably, Jeffrey Sachs, have revived the idea
that geography has an important influence on economic performance.57 This litera-
ture emphasises the direct impact that geography can have through climate, natural
resources, and topography. Such factors obviously influence the health of a popula-
tion, agricultural productivity, the economic structure of an economy, transport
costs and the diffusion of information and knowledge. Do you agree with Sachs that
geography matters for economic growth?

I think that we can all agree that geography matters, but there is disagree-
ment on the channels of causation. How does geography matter? Jeffrey
Sachs says that the link is direct: it affects through geographically related
diseases, such as malaria, which is a tropical disease, and therefore geo-
graphically concentrated or geographically related productivities, for
example, tropical weather is less amenable to certain types of high-yield
agricultural products. Daron Acemoglu and his co-authors think that
geography matters because it created the wrong kind of colonial institu-
tions.58 The Europeans were reluctant to settle in locations with high

56
See Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 2000.
57
See Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs 2005; Snowdon, 2005. See also, Gallup, Gaviria, and Lora, 2003.
58
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002. See also Acemoglu, 2003; Snowdon, 2004.



malaria incidence. So in those areas, the Europeans established extractive
institutions that had long-lasting adverse effects. Jeff Sachs believes that
there are additional direct effects on technology and the health of popula-
tions from adverse geography. But they all agree that geography matters.
It is obvious that tropical countries have problems with tropical diseases
such as malaria, and that there is a relative lack of research and develop-
ment relating to their specific health and agricultural problems.

You argued earlier that increasing international economic integration and global-
isation are powerful forces for convergence. Since trade is obviously influenced by
transport costs, do you agree with Sachs that in many cases landlocked countries
are at a particular disadvantage when it comes to achieving satisfactory economic
growth? 59

But the highest growth country in the world in recent decades has been
Botswana, which is a landlocked country in sub-Saharan Africa!
Switzerland and Austria are two of the richest countries in the world and
they are also landlocked. About half of US states are landlocked. Vermont
and Ohio are landlocked. Obviously this hypothesis has problems.

Botswana is landlocked but how much of its success is down to the discovery of dia-
monds in the 1960s?

The diamonds have been important but as you know, the possession of
valuable natural resources does not always lead to economic growth. In
fact, most countries that discover natural resources end up going down the
tubes. They become victims of the ‘natural resource curse’.60 In the early
1960s diamonds were discovered in Botswana, and King Seretse Khama,
who became Botswana’s first President in 1965, did not to steal the dia-
monds as happened in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and he also main-
tained democracy. He made sure that the diamond revenues were
diverted to useful investments. The strategy worked, and Botswana has
not been a victim of the natural resource curse. Why? I don’t really know,
but it is a very big exception.61 It is true that other landlocked countries

59
See Faye et al., 2004.
60
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Sachs and Warner, 2001.
61
See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2003.



like Chad, Niger, and the Central African Republic have been develop-
ment disasters. But are they disasters because they are landlocked? The
Democratic Republic of the Congo is largely landlocked, it has diamonds
and other natural resources, so why has it not been able to grow like
Botswana? And of course there are lots of poor countries that are not land-
locked. Take the countries of Central America such as Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. They have oceans on both
the east and west sides of the country but they are poor! Somalia is not
landlocked and neither are the poor countries of West Africa such as
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. So I think the quality of economic policies,
regulations, and other factors are a far more important explanatory factor
of economic performance than whether a country is landlocked or not.

Perhaps Botswana has been more successful than resource-rich countries like
Nigeria because it has had a more accountable democratic government?

That is true, but it remains to be explained why the government in
Botswana did not become kleptocratic and steal the diamond revenues.
Why was there no military coup after the diamonds were discovered? The
diamond deposits are actually in Seretse Khama’s own tribal territory. So
the key question is: Why did Seretse Khama not behave like Mobutu Sese
Seko in the Congo, or Sani Abacha in Nigeria, and transfer vast fortunes
into a personal Swiss bank account? Unlike human capital or wages which
are hard to steal, it is relatively easy for dictators of resource rich countries
to enrich themselves. In rich democratic countries, when natural resources
are discovered, good things tend to happen. Good examples are Norway
and Britain after the discovery of North Sea oil. In poor countries, after the
discovery of valuable natural resources, the norm is that terrible things
happen.

Growth, and economic and political freedom
The impact of political institutions on economic performance is another area that
has been receiving increasing attention from economists.62 Does the evidence support
the idea that democracy is good for economic growth?

62
See Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Barro, 1996, 1997, 1999. See also Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 2004.



I agree with Robert Barro on this issue. There are lots of political dictator-
ships that have worked in terms of producing economic growth. China is
the most recent example. But Singapore, Chile, Taiwan and South Korea
have also had successful growth even though they have been dictatorships
for much of their recent history. We also have many examples of success-
ful democracies, including postwar Japan and Germany who experienced
growth miracles during the 1950s and 1960s. There are also many exam-
ples of democracies and dictatorships that have been a disaster with
respect to economic growth. In fact, most dictatorships have been disas-
ters. The main point made in Robert Barro’s research, and one that I com-
pletely agree with, is that democracy is not a critical factor for achieving
growth. Let me be clear, this in no way suggests that dictators are a good
idea. Remember, the correlation between growth and democracy is zero,
not negative. However, for practical purposes, if you have $10 billion to
spend in one country, and many things need to be created from scratch,
then if the goal is to promote economic growth, democracy should not be
the immediate priority. With a budget constraint, there are other projects
that appear to be more important, such as investment in infrastructure,
establishing law and order, or creating a vibrant business fabric.

The modernisation thesis suggests that growth and economic development are
important pre-requisites for the establishment of a sustainable democracy. Do you
think that growth promotes democracy?

This is the other part of Barro’s story. Eventually, as people become rich,
then they begin to demand democracy.63 If you impose democracy on poor
countries that are not ready, able, or willing to defend democracy, then it
will invariably fail. This has happened many times. In the early 1960s, fol-
lowing the decolonisation process, most countries in Africa started out as
democracies. By 1975, only one country was democratic! Military coups
occurred everywhere, eliminating democracy.

63
This is the so-called ‘Lipset hypothesis’, named after Seymour Lipset, 1959. ‘From Aristotle down to the
present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty
could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could
develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues’ (Lipset,
p. 75). For recent critiques of the Lipset–Barro hypothesis, see Feng, 2003, and Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2005.



Growth and competitiveness
The World Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report analy-
ses the competitiveness of nations.64 Until recently, the Report used two alternative
but complementary approaches to measuring competitiveness. The first approach
uses the medium to long-term macroeconomic oriented ‘Growth Competitiveness
Index’, developed by John McArthur and Jeffrey Sachs (2001). The second
approach to measuring competitiveness utilises the ‘Business Competitiveness
Index’, developed by Michael Porter (2001, 2005). In the Global Competitiveness
Report, 2004–05, a new index of competitiveness, that you developed with Elsa
Artadi (2004), made its debut. The new ‘Global Competitiveness Index’ aims to
‘consolidate the World Economic Forum’s work into a single index’ that reflects the
growing need to take into account a more comprehensive set of factors that signifi-
cantly influence a country’s growth performance. Michael Porter thinks that ‘com-
bining these two measures would suppress useful information’65 while you seem to
prefer a single index of Global Competitiveness. Why do you favour a single index
of competitiveness?

Michael Porter wants to separate static from dynamic influences, and
micro from macro factors, in the construction of competitiveness indices.
He thinks of the ‘Growth Competitiveness Index’ as a macroeconomic
dynamic index, whereas he views his ‘Business Competitiveness Index’ as
a static microeconomic index.66 I think that conceptually it is very hard to
distinguish between these influences on competitiveness. Both Porter and
I define competitiveness in terms of productivity. There is no doubt that
productivity determines the wealth of nations as Adam Smith so clearly
pointed out in 1776. But productivity also determines the rate of return to
investment, and so is a determinant of growth. Hence, the same concept,
productivity, has both static and dynamic considerations. Also, it is difficult
to decide what belongs in the realm of macro and micro. For example, take
the rule of law which at the micro level obviously influences the effec-
tiveness of business operations. But the rule of law is also an important fac-
tor in determining economic growth through its influence on institutions
and regulations. So for me, it is very hard to distinguish the micro from the

64
http://www.weforum.org/
65
See Snowdon and Stonehouse, 2006.
66
See Porter, 2005; Blanke, Paua, and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Sala-i-Martin and Artadi, 2004.



macro and the static from the dynamic factors. All macro policies have
micro consequences and all the decisions made at the micro level of the
firm have macroeconomic consequences. That is why I prefer to use one
‘Global Competitiveness Index’.

In developing your index you argue that the main determinants of productivity can
be encompassed within twelve ‘pillars of competitiveness’ and each pillar plays a
major role, depending on the stage of development. What led you to that approach?

I was influenced by Porter on this. He thinks in terms of stages of devel-
opment. What competitiveness is for poor countries is not the same as
competitiveness for rich countries. Porter distinguishes three levels of
competitiveness. Poor countries are in the first stage of competitiveness
where they compete through prices; you need to make things cheaply. For
countries in the intermediate stage of development, they compete
through quality—that is, you try to make things better than your neigh-
bour rather than cheaper. For the developed countries, the key to com-
petitiveness is innovation. This means that the factors that determine how
cheap you can produce should be given more weight in countries that are
poor than in richer countries. The factors that determine efficiency should
be given more weight in intermediate countries, and the factors that drive
innovation need to be given more weight in rich developed countries.
Although the concept of stages of development appears in many of
Porter’s research papers, in his previous index all these factors are given
the same weight. This means that a country like Zambia is penalised for
not carrying out innovation. But I think that Porter would agree with me
that, today, Zambia should not be pouring resources into innovation.
Zambia needs to prioritise on other aspects. For example, it should inte-
grate more with the rest of the world, reduce crime and guarantee prop-
erty rights to produce an environment where enterprises can produce
goods cheaply to sell on the world market. In contrast, if a country like
Spain, which is quite a bit richer than Zambia, does not have a good record
in R&D, it will be in trouble. The reason is that Spain can no longer com-
pete with China by producing cheaper or better goods. Its only chance is,
therefore, to do different or new things. That is, to innovate. Therefore, a
competitiveness index should penalise Spain if it does not innovate. So all
I did was to implement his idea of stages of development and assign



weights to the various factors depending on how important they are at
each stage of development.

But how do you choose the weights?

Using maximum likelihood techniques I tried to find the weights that I
would need, using my index, to explain the actual growth experience of
countries during recent years.

Growth and happiness
In our earlier discussion relating to inequality you mentioned that what the gov-
ernment should be measuring is happiness inequality, rather than income inequal-
ity. What is your view of the recent literature on the economics of happiness?67

I had some interest until I read a paper which persuaded me to drop this
literature (laughter). In this paper, comparisons of happiness were being
made across countries. This was done by comparing the level of income
per capita plotted against a measure of happiness. The result was a curve
showing an increasing but diminishing rate of increase of happiness with
higher income per capita. The conclusion was that after you reach a cer-
tain level of income, then extra income does not bring much extra happi-
ness. When I looked at the graph I noticed two things. First, happiness
was measured on the vertical axis with an index number ranging between
one and ten. People were asked how happy they were on a scale of 1–10.
This is completely flawed, because if you are very happy and answer ten this
year, and you are even happier in five years time, you can still only answer
ten if you are very happy. You are not allowed to say eleven (laughter). So
the curve must be flat at the top… by construction! A further problem was
that the 15 countries that were very poor, with low levels of happiness,
were all former Soviet Republics. So I think that such measures do not
really reflect happiness but changes in happiness relative to previous cir-
cumstances (former Soviet republics are countries that have deteriorated
substantially over a very short period of time). Another puzzle to me is that

67
See Easterlin, 2001; Kahneman et al., 2004; Layard, 2005, Komlos and Snowdon, 2005. See also the discussion
by Kahneman et al., of the ‘Day Reconstruction Method’ of measuring well-being, in the December, 3, issue of
Science.



it does not seem to matter which type of survey I see, Finland is always at
the top. This suggests to me that different countries respond to surveys in
different ways. Maybe in Finland it does not matter what is being asked,
the answer will always be 10 (laughter). So the Finns are supposed to be
very happy and yet other evidence clearly conflicts with this. For example,
they have one of the highest suicide rates in the world.68 If they are so
happy, why do so many Finns want to kill themselves?

Current research
What are your current research interests?

I am still working on problems of growth and development in Africa, try-
ing to find out what the optimal economic policy strategy might be for
each country. I am also trying to implement an idea related to the Umbele
Foundation69 that I helped to set up. I am looking at the issue of corporate
responsibility and how firms can help Africa develop, not by giving money,
but by actually moving to Africa and becoming associated with a particu-
lar town that wants to be helped. I think that we in the developed coun-
tries do not really listen to what the people in Africa want or need. But we
don’t have effective mechanisms for listening to what they say. Bill
Easterly puts it brilliantly when he says that the market is generally a good
instrument to achieve what people want. If a business wants to make prof-
its it has to satisfy a demand. If you do not produce what people want, the
market kills off your business. International aid is exactly the opposite. If
the World Bank goes to help a country and the country does not grow and
is worse off after the World Bank intervenes, what happens? The World
Bank says that the country has ‘moved away from the Millennium
Development Goals’… and then asks for a bigger budget to solve the
problem.

68
In a recent paper, Helliwell (2004) also notes that ‘very high Scandinavian measures of subjective well-being
are not matched by equally low suicide rates’. Data from the World Health Organisation
(http://www.who.int/topics/suicide/en/) shows that the male suicide rate in Finland was 32.3 per 100,000 in 2002.
This compares with 80.7 for Lithuania, 69.3 for Russia, 60.3 for Belarus (2001), 52.1 for Ukraine (2000), 17.1 for
the USA (2000), and 11.8 for the UK (1999). Limited data for China (1999) indicates that it is one of the very
few countries where the female suicide rate exceeds that of males.
69
The Foundation Umbele looks for ‘experience, honesty, simplicity, transparency and efficiency’ in order to
return the future of Africa to its own citizens. See information on the activities of the foundation at
www.umbele.org.



So how do we devise a responsive system of help to Africa that listens to what the
people who live there actually want, and also penalises failure?

One way is to actually encourage firms, that have the technology, human
capital and other resources, to go to Africa. Let these firms find out what
the real problems are that the people want solving. What are the priorities
in the face of budget constraints? Do the people want a new school, more
doctors, or better roads? The World Bank doesn’t know, the United
Nations don’t know, Bono doesn’t know, and I don’t know. Only the peo-
ple in Africa themselves really know what the priorities should be. We
need to find better ways of getting this information and meeting their
needs.

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