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September 4, 2015
James A. Savage
Tennessee State University
Computer and Information Systems Engineering
Advisor: Dr. Sachin Shetty
AFRL Research Presentation
Agenda
 Virtualization and Cloud Computing
 Virtual Machines and Co-Residency
 Virtual Machine Side-Channel Vulnerability
 Watermarking network traffic
 Attempts to Reproduce Published Research Results
 Implications for Production Environments
What is Virtualization?
 A virtual machine is an instance of an operating system that runs in a software
“container” that provides all of the hardware-related components the operating
system expects, using software emulation for the machine’s instruction set.
 Virtual machine technology allows a single computer to host multiple virtual
machines, each potentially running a different operating system.
 The hypervisor, or virtual machine monitor (VMM) is the only software running
in kernel mode; it provides multiple copies of the actual hardware to the virtual
machines.
 The operating system running in a virtual machine is called a “guest” operating
system.
What is Virtualization?
Image: http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/creating-a-virtual-machine-on-vmware-tutorial
Virtualization is the Foundation of Cloud Computing
Image: http://modelschoolscnyric.pbworks.com/w/page/39729119/Cloud%20Computing
Virtual Infrastructure in the Cloud
Image: http://www.cisco.com/
DRS: Distributed Resource Scheduler
HA: High Availability
Virtual Machine Co-Residency
Image: http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/interfaces-modules/ucs-m81kr-virtual-interface-card/white_paper_c11-618838.html
Problem: Side-Channel Attack
Image: http://docs.openstack.org/security-guide/content/ch052_devices.html
References
 “Detecting Co-Residency” paper:
 A. Bates, B. Mood, J. Pletcher, H. Pruse, M. Valafar, and K. Butler,
"Detecting Co-Residency with Active Traffic Analysis Techniques,"
in CCSW’12 (Cloud Computing Security Workshop), October 19,
2012, Raleigh, North Carolina, USA.
Co-Residency Attack Model
 Two colluding hosts:
 Client (e.g., a browser on the Internet)
 Flooder (injects UDP packets)
 A victim:
 Web Server
 Capture the network flow from the web server to client
Co-Residency Attack Model
 Client contacts server (e.g., web
server)
 Requests web page (HTTP request)
 Server responds (HTTP response)
 Flooder injects UDP packets into
network flow
 Network packet arrivals are captured
and analyzed for co-location
Image: http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/tutorial-138750.html
Co-Residency Attack Model
Server and Flooder reside on the same virtual host and network
“Active” traffic analysis
Network
Interface
Card (NIC)
Packet Arrivals at the Client
0
50
100
150
200
250
0.000036637
0.000044260
0.000051883
0.000059506
0.000067129
0.000074752
0.000082375
0.000089998
0.000097621
0.000105244
0.000112867
0.000120490
0.000128113
0.000135736
0.000143359
0.000150982
0.000158605
0.000166228
0.000173851
0.000181474
0.000189097
0.000196720
0.000204343
0.000211966
0.000219589
0.000227212
0.000234835
0.000242458
0.000250081
0.000257704
0.000265327
0.000272950
0.000280573
0.000288196
0.000295819
0.000303442
0.000311065
0.000318688
0.000326311
0.000333934
0.000341557
0.000349180
0.000356803
0.000364426
0.000372049
0.000379672
0.000387295
0.000394918
Frequency – Approximate Poisson Distribution
Network Traffic Analysis
 Injected UDP packets create an intermittent delay in
Server’s network traffic flow
 Delay creates an intermittent pattern resulting in two
distinct packet distributions
 Distinct packet distributions act like a “beacon” to test
for co-location
Flooding Creates “Watermark”
 Distinctive network traffic pattern from flooding
creates a type of “watermark” – to easily identify co-
residency
 Hypothesis test can be applied to identify flooding
traffic (Kolmogorov-Smirnov – KS - test)
 Allows for detection of co-residency when KS test fails
Packet Arrivals at the Client
Packet Arrivals at the Client
No Flooding (i.e., Normal Traffic) With Flooding
(i.e., Co-Resident Traffic)
Packet Arrivals at the Client
With Flooding
No Flooding
Experimental Configuration
 VMware Workstation 9.0 host environment:
 Apache 2 httpd server VM (Server)
 Ubuntu 14.04 VM (Flooder), using Packit network injection
 Web application uses AJAX and JSON to request/return data from large file to client
 Windows 7 Professional – not a VM (Client)
 .NET 4.5 C# Forms application (Client application)
 PERL (Flooder socket application) and C (Flooder flooding application)
 All nodes are on the same network (subnet)
Detecting virtual machine co residency in cloud computing with active traffic analysis
Detecting virtual machine co residency in cloud computing with active traffic analysis
Why Weren’t Bates’ Results Reproduced?
 Network Interface Card (NIC) capacity:
 Greater capacity (1000 Mbps) may result in less latency
 All machines on same subnet (network):
 Locating client on a different subnet may increase latency
 Hypervisor differences:
 Xen versus VMware versus Hyper-V
 Dynamic nature of TCP/IP network traffic
 Congestion algorithm
Congestion Algorithm
• The Congestion Algorithm dynamically manages network traffic flow
• Graph shows data transferred per iteration
• Traffic flow changes based on window size of client and server
Traditional Packet Management in
Virtual Environment
Image: PCI-SIG SR-IOV Primer (Intel)
Traditional Packet Management in
Virtual Environment
Single Root I/O Virtualization (SR-IOV)
Image: PCI-SIG SR-IOV Primer (Intel)
Benefits of Research
 Explore feasibility of simple co-residency detection
techniques
 Demonstrate relative ease of attack deployment
 Demonstrate simplicity of co-residency detection technique
 Deployment in physical and cloud environments (data
centers)
Implications for Production Environments
 Attack detection – internal and external environments
 Co-residency snooping from inside the organization – may be
the largest threat
 Simple reconnaissance tool
 Detection of potential side-channel attack victims
Attack Detection
 Firewall detection of outbound UDP packet flooding (e.g. for
cloud-based web server)
 Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect UDP packet floods
in data center traffic
 Machine Learning to sample network traffic for pattern
identification (similar to email spam detection)
 Network sniffing of data center traffic to detect UDP packets with
same data payload (could be randomized to avoid detection)
Future Work
 Introduce one or more subnets to separate client and
server/flooder virtual machines (introduce router
latency)
 Migrate the system to different virtual platforms (i.e.,
eliminate hypervisor differences)
 Analyze network flow for other statistical distribution
characteristics that may support Bates’ results
Questions
Image: http://www.cedar-rapids.org/government/departments/police/PublishingImages/Question-Mark.jpg
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Detecting virtual machine co residency in cloud computing with active traffic analysis

  • 1. September 4, 2015 James A. Savage Tennessee State University Computer and Information Systems Engineering Advisor: Dr. Sachin Shetty AFRL Research Presentation
  • 2. Agenda  Virtualization and Cloud Computing  Virtual Machines and Co-Residency  Virtual Machine Side-Channel Vulnerability  Watermarking network traffic  Attempts to Reproduce Published Research Results  Implications for Production Environments
  • 3. What is Virtualization?  A virtual machine is an instance of an operating system that runs in a software “container” that provides all of the hardware-related components the operating system expects, using software emulation for the machine’s instruction set.  Virtual machine technology allows a single computer to host multiple virtual machines, each potentially running a different operating system.  The hypervisor, or virtual machine monitor (VMM) is the only software running in kernel mode; it provides multiple copies of the actual hardware to the virtual machines.  The operating system running in a virtual machine is called a “guest” operating system.
  • 4. What is Virtualization? Image: http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/creating-a-virtual-machine-on-vmware-tutorial
  • 5. Virtualization is the Foundation of Cloud Computing Image: http://modelschoolscnyric.pbworks.com/w/page/39729119/Cloud%20Computing
  • 6. Virtual Infrastructure in the Cloud Image: http://www.cisco.com/ DRS: Distributed Resource Scheduler HA: High Availability
  • 7. Virtual Machine Co-Residency Image: http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/interfaces-modules/ucs-m81kr-virtual-interface-card/white_paper_c11-618838.html
  • 8. Problem: Side-Channel Attack Image: http://docs.openstack.org/security-guide/content/ch052_devices.html
  • 9. References  “Detecting Co-Residency” paper:  A. Bates, B. Mood, J. Pletcher, H. Pruse, M. Valafar, and K. Butler, "Detecting Co-Residency with Active Traffic Analysis Techniques," in CCSW’12 (Cloud Computing Security Workshop), October 19, 2012, Raleigh, North Carolina, USA.
  • 10. Co-Residency Attack Model  Two colluding hosts:  Client (e.g., a browser on the Internet)  Flooder (injects UDP packets)  A victim:  Web Server  Capture the network flow from the web server to client
  • 11. Co-Residency Attack Model  Client contacts server (e.g., web server)  Requests web page (HTTP request)  Server responds (HTTP response)  Flooder injects UDP packets into network flow  Network packet arrivals are captured and analyzed for co-location Image: http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/tutorial-138750.html
  • 12. Co-Residency Attack Model Server and Flooder reside on the same virtual host and network “Active” traffic analysis Network Interface Card (NIC)
  • 13. Packet Arrivals at the Client 0 50 100 150 200 250 0.000036637 0.000044260 0.000051883 0.000059506 0.000067129 0.000074752 0.000082375 0.000089998 0.000097621 0.000105244 0.000112867 0.000120490 0.000128113 0.000135736 0.000143359 0.000150982 0.000158605 0.000166228 0.000173851 0.000181474 0.000189097 0.000196720 0.000204343 0.000211966 0.000219589 0.000227212 0.000234835 0.000242458 0.000250081 0.000257704 0.000265327 0.000272950 0.000280573 0.000288196 0.000295819 0.000303442 0.000311065 0.000318688 0.000326311 0.000333934 0.000341557 0.000349180 0.000356803 0.000364426 0.000372049 0.000379672 0.000387295 0.000394918 Frequency – Approximate Poisson Distribution
  • 14. Network Traffic Analysis  Injected UDP packets create an intermittent delay in Server’s network traffic flow  Delay creates an intermittent pattern resulting in two distinct packet distributions  Distinct packet distributions act like a “beacon” to test for co-location
  • 15. Flooding Creates “Watermark”  Distinctive network traffic pattern from flooding creates a type of “watermark” – to easily identify co- residency  Hypothesis test can be applied to identify flooding traffic (Kolmogorov-Smirnov – KS - test)  Allows for detection of co-residency when KS test fails
  • 16. Packet Arrivals at the Client
  • 17. Packet Arrivals at the Client No Flooding (i.e., Normal Traffic) With Flooding (i.e., Co-Resident Traffic)
  • 18. Packet Arrivals at the Client With Flooding No Flooding
  • 19. Experimental Configuration  VMware Workstation 9.0 host environment:  Apache 2 httpd server VM (Server)  Ubuntu 14.04 VM (Flooder), using Packit network injection  Web application uses AJAX and JSON to request/return data from large file to client  Windows 7 Professional – not a VM (Client)  .NET 4.5 C# Forms application (Client application)  PERL (Flooder socket application) and C (Flooder flooding application)  All nodes are on the same network (subnet)
  • 22. Why Weren’t Bates’ Results Reproduced?  Network Interface Card (NIC) capacity:  Greater capacity (1000 Mbps) may result in less latency  All machines on same subnet (network):  Locating client on a different subnet may increase latency  Hypervisor differences:  Xen versus VMware versus Hyper-V  Dynamic nature of TCP/IP network traffic  Congestion algorithm
  • 23. Congestion Algorithm • The Congestion Algorithm dynamically manages network traffic flow • Graph shows data transferred per iteration • Traffic flow changes based on window size of client and server
  • 24. Traditional Packet Management in Virtual Environment Image: PCI-SIG SR-IOV Primer (Intel)
  • 25. Traditional Packet Management in Virtual Environment
  • 26. Single Root I/O Virtualization (SR-IOV) Image: PCI-SIG SR-IOV Primer (Intel)
  • 27. Benefits of Research  Explore feasibility of simple co-residency detection techniques  Demonstrate relative ease of attack deployment  Demonstrate simplicity of co-residency detection technique  Deployment in physical and cloud environments (data centers)
  • 28. Implications for Production Environments  Attack detection – internal and external environments  Co-residency snooping from inside the organization – may be the largest threat  Simple reconnaissance tool  Detection of potential side-channel attack victims
  • 29. Attack Detection  Firewall detection of outbound UDP packet flooding (e.g. for cloud-based web server)  Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect UDP packet floods in data center traffic  Machine Learning to sample network traffic for pattern identification (similar to email spam detection)  Network sniffing of data center traffic to detect UDP packets with same data payload (could be randomized to avoid detection)
  • 30. Future Work  Introduce one or more subnets to separate client and server/flooder virtual machines (introduce router latency)  Migrate the system to different virtual platforms (i.e., eliminate hypervisor differences)  Analyze network flow for other statistical distribution characteristics that may support Bates’ results

Editor's Notes

  • #7: HA – High Availability (form of redundancy) DRS – Distributed Resource Scheduler
  • #10: Adam Bates, PhD student, and colleagues at CIS Dept, University of Oregon
  • #11: UDP – User Datagram Protocol TCP – Transmission Control Protocol