blob: 8fc5297e6b4a0775aa787e0115463adda2fd50f5 [file] [log] [blame]
Avi Drissmane4622aa2022-09-08 20:36:061// Copyright 2021 The Chromium Authors
Matthew Dentonbb0b03e2021-07-22 16:18:132// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
3// found in the LICENSE file.
4
5#include "base/stack_canary_linux.h"
6
7#include <dlfcn.h>
8#include <stdint.h>
9#include <sys/mman.h>
10
11#include "base/bits.h"
12#include "base/check_op.h"
13#include "base/compiler_specific.h"
14#include "base/logging.h"
15#include "base/memory/page_size.h"
16#include "base/rand_util.h"
17#include "build/build_config.h"
18
19namespace base {
20
21#if defined(LIBC_GLIBC)
22
23#if defined(ARCH_CPU_ARM_FAMILY)
24// On ARM, Glibc uses a global variable (exported) called __stack_chk_guard.
25extern "C" {
26extern uintptr_t __stack_chk_guard;
27}
28#endif // defined(ARCH_CPU_ARM_FAMILY)
29
30#if !defined(NDEBUG)
31// In debug builds, if we detect stack smashing in old stack frames after
32// changing the canary, it's nice to let someone know that it's because the
33// canary changed and they should prevent their function from using stack
34// canaries.
35static bool g_emit_debug_message = false;
36
37extern "C" {
38typedef __attribute__((noreturn)) void(GLibcStackChkFailFunction)();
39
40// This overrides glibc's version of __stack_chk_fail(), which is called when
41// the canary doesn't match.
42__attribute__((visibility("default"), noinline, noreturn)) void
43__stack_chk_fail() {
44 if (g_emit_debug_message) {
45 RAW_LOG(
46 FATAL,
47 "Stack smashing detected. The canary was changed during runtime "
48 "(see crbug.com/1206626). You may need to mark your function with "
49 "the no_stack_protector attribute, or just exit() before stack "
50 "smashing occurs. You can also disable this canary-changing feature "
51 "by adding --change-stack-guard-on-fork=disable to the command line.");
52 }
53
54 // Call the real __stack_chk_fail().
55 // Note that dlsym may not be safe to perform since this is called during
56 // corruption, but this code purposely only runs in debug builds and in the
57 // normal case might provide better debug information.
58 GLibcStackChkFailFunction* glibc_stack_chk_fail =
59 reinterpret_cast<GLibcStackChkFailFunction*>(
60 dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "__stack_chk_fail"));
61 (*glibc_stack_chk_fail)();
62}
63}
64#endif // !defined(NDEBUG)
65
66void NO_STACK_PROTECTOR ResetStackCanaryIfPossible() {
67 uintptr_t canary;
68 base::RandBytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
69 // First byte should be the null byte for string functions.
70 canary &= ~static_cast<uintptr_t>(0xff);
71
72 // The x86/x64 offsets should work for musl too.
73#if defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_64)
74 asm volatile("movq %q0,%%fs:%P1" : : "er"(canary), "i"(0x28));
75#elif defined(ARCH_CPU_X86)
76 asm volatile("movl %0,%%gs:%P1" : : "ir"(canary), "i"(0x14));
77#elif defined(ARCH_CPU_ARM_FAMILY)
78 // ARM's stack canary is held on a relro page. So, we'll need to make the page
79 // writable, change the stack canary, and then make the page ro again.
80 // We want to be single-threaded when changing page permissions, since it's
81 // reasonable for other threads to assume that page permissions for global
82 // variables don't change.
83 size_t page_size = base::GetPageSize();
84 uintptr_t __stack_chk_guard_page = base::bits::AlignDown(
85 reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(&__stack_chk_guard), page_size);
86 PCHECK(0 == mprotect(reinterpret_cast<void*>(__stack_chk_guard_page),
87 page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE));
88 __stack_chk_guard = canary;
89 PCHECK(0 == mprotect(reinterpret_cast<void*>(__stack_chk_guard_page),
90 page_size, PROT_READ));
91#endif
92}
93
94void SetStackSmashingEmitsDebugMessage() {
95#if !defined(NDEBUG)
96 g_emit_debug_message = true;
97#endif // !defined(NDEBUG)
98}
99
100#else // defined(LIBC_GLIBC)
101
102// We don't know how to reset the canary if not compiling for glibc.
103void ResetStackCanaryIfPossible() {}
104
105void SetStackSmashingEmitsDebugMessage() {}
106
107#endif // defined(LIBC_GLIBC)
108} // namespace base