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[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:371// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
2// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
3// found in the LICENSE file.
4
5#include <crypto/p224_spake.h>
6
7#include "base/logging.h"
8#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
9
[email protected]3c6cf57f2012-11-03 00:48:1710namespace crypto {
11
12namespace {
[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:3713
14bool RunExchange(P224EncryptedKeyExchange* client,
15 P224EncryptedKeyExchange* server) {
16
17 for (;;) {
18 std::string client_message, server_message;
19 client_message = client->GetMessage();
20 server_message = server->GetMessage();
21
22 P224EncryptedKeyExchange::Result client_result, server_result;
23 client_result = client->ProcessMessage(server_message);
24 server_result = server->ProcessMessage(client_message);
25
26 // Check that we never hit the case where only one succeeds.
27 if ((client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess) ^
28 (server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess)) {
29 CHECK(false) << "Parties differ on whether authentication was successful";
30 }
31
32 if (client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed ||
33 server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed) {
34 return false;
35 }
36
37 if (client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess &&
38 server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess) {
39 return true;
40 }
41
42 CHECK_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending, client_result);
43 CHECK_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending, server_result);
44 }
45}
46
[email protected]3c6cf57f2012-11-03 00:48:1747const char kPassword[] = "foo";
48
49} // namespace
[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:3750
51TEST(MutualAuth, CorrectAuth) {
52 P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
[email protected]78df46a2011-12-13 07:00:1953 P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient, kPassword);
[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:3754 P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
[email protected]78df46a2011-12-13 07:00:1955 P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer, kPassword);
[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:3756
57 EXPECT_TRUE(RunExchange(&client, &server));
[email protected]78df46a2011-12-13 07:00:1958 EXPECT_EQ(client.GetKey(), server.GetKey());
[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:3759}
60
61TEST(MutualAuth, IncorrectPassword) {
62 P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
63 P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient,
[email protected]78df46a2011-12-13 07:00:1964 kPassword);
[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:3765 P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
66 P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer,
[email protected]78df46a2011-12-13 07:00:1967 "wrongpassword");
[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:3768
69 EXPECT_FALSE(RunExchange(&client, &server));
70}
71
72TEST(MutualAuth, Fuzz) {
73 static const unsigned kIterations = 40;
74
75 for (unsigned i = 0; i < kIterations; i++) {
76 P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
[email protected]78df46a2011-12-13 07:00:1977 P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient, kPassword);
[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:3778 P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
[email protected]78df46a2011-12-13 07:00:1979 P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer, kPassword);
[email protected]d9a262d2011-11-22 01:29:3780
81 // We'll only be testing small values of i, but we don't want that to bias
82 // the test coverage. So we disperse the value of i by multiplying by the
83 // FNV, 32-bit prime, producing a poor-man's PRNG.
84 const uint32 rand = i * 16777619;
85
86 for (unsigned round = 0;; round++) {
87 std::string client_message, server_message;
88 client_message = client.GetMessage();
89 server_message = server.GetMessage();
90
91 if ((rand & 1) == round) {
92 const bool server_or_client = rand & 2;
93 std::string* m = server_or_client ? &server_message : &client_message;
94 if (rand & 4) {
95 // Truncate
96 *m = m->substr(0, (i >> 3) % m->size());
97 } else {
98 // Corrupt
99 const size_t bits = m->size() * 8;
100 const size_t bit_to_corrupt = (rand >> 3) % bits;
101 const_cast<char*>(m->data())[bit_to_corrupt / 8] ^=
102 1 << (bit_to_corrupt % 8);
103 }
104 }
105
106 P224EncryptedKeyExchange::Result client_result, server_result;
107 client_result = client.ProcessMessage(server_message);
108 server_result = server.ProcessMessage(client_message);
109
110 // If we have corrupted anything, we expect the authentication to fail,
111 // although one side can succeed if we happen to corrupt the second round
112 // message to the other.
113 ASSERT_FALSE(
114 client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess &&
115 server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess);
116
117 if (client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed ||
118 server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed) {
119 break;
120 }
121
122 ASSERT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending,
123 client_result);
124 ASSERT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending,
125 server_result);
126 }
127 }
128}
[email protected]3c6cf57f2012-11-03 00:48:17129
130} // namespace crypto