Fundamentals of

Transmission,
Generation and System
Protection
Differential Protection
 Outline

 Differentialprotection basics
 Current transformer performance
challenges

3
What goes in must come out

Unless there’s a fault! 4

Kirchoff’s Current Law

I4

I1 I3
I2
The sum of currents into a node is zero

I1 + I2 + I3 + I4 = 0
If the sum is not zero, we are not measuring all the
current so there must be a short circuit!
5
 Benefits of differential
protection
 Current transformer (CT) locations define the
protected zone
 The protection only operates for faults between the
cts where inputs and outputs currents are measured.
 Identifies the fault location
 It requires no coordination (or minimal) with protections
external to the zone.
I1 I2

87
 Common applications
 Where all currents are readily available in
the same (or adjacent) substations
 Generator
 Transformer
 Busbar
 Shunt capacitor or reactor
 Where the current sensors are remote
from each other
 Transmission line protection
7
Some single line diagrams

87R

Busbar
Generator

Shunt Shunt
capacitor reactor
87G

8
 More single line diagrams

Transformer Transmission line

(ratio matching required) (communications required)

9
But current transformers must be accurate

Ip

If Is is not an accurate
representation of Ip we
cannot be sure how
Kirchoff’s Law applies.
Is

Relay 10
 Example CT Excitation Curve (from Day 2)

Saturation
voltage
(decreases
with CT ratio)

If burden voltage too

high, exciting current
becomes large
 Performance with symmetrical current

80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
-60
-80
-0.017 0.000 0.017 0.033 0.050 0.067 0.083 0.100 0.117 0.133 0.150

Unsaturated CT, actual secondary current matches Ip/N

Ideal secondary current = Ip/N Actual secondary current from saturated CT

80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
-60
-80
-0.017 0.000 0.017 0.033 0.050 0.067 0.083 0.100 0.117 0.133 0.150

Saturated CT, actual secondary current Error is due to large

drops to zero for much of each cycle. Not exciting current
an accurate representation of Ip/N
 Effect of burden
 For a CT with low leakage reactance
 To avoid saturation with symmetrical current, burden
voltage (including CT secondary winding resistance)
must be less than Saturation Voltage (available from
excitation curve)

Ve= VB = iB(Rs+RL+ZB)

 If RL is one way lead resistance, it must be multiplied by

2 for single phase to ground faults.
 CT performance depends on a combination of burden
impedance, fault current and saturation voltage
13
 Effect of transient offset

 t    VB t dt
 Flux in a coil is the integral of
voltage with respect to time.
t
 The intetgral of a symmetrical
current over 1 cycle is 0
 If there is an offset to the current,
(which translates to an offset on 0
the burden voltage) the integral will
not become zero after each cycle

Integral over 1 ~ = 0 Integral over 1 ~ ≠ 0

80 IDEAL SECONDARY CURRENT 100 IDEAL SECONDARY CURRENT

60 80
40 60
20 40
0 20
-20 0
-40 -20
-60 -40
-80 -60
0.000 0.017 0.000 0.017
 Transient offset causes CT saturation

Flux density reaches saturation level after integrating VB

30 0.80000
0.60000
20
0.40000
10 0.20000

0 0.00000
-0.20000
-10
-0.40000
-20 -0.60000
-0.017 0.000 0.017 0.033 0.050 0.067 0.083 0.100 0.117 0.133 0.150

At saturation, Ie causes large When offset goes away,

error in secondary current integral of VB no longer causes
saturation
30 0.80000
0.60000
20
0.40000
10 0.20000

0 0.00000
-0.20000
-10
-0.40000
-20 -0.60000

15
-0.017 0.000 0.017 0.033 0.050 0.067 0.083 0.100 0.117 0.133 0.150
 CTs can be made with high Vs
 If saturation flux level is high, then CT
performance will improve
 To avoid saturation altogether, with full offset
current, CT saturation voltage should be
Vs > (X/R+ 1) Is Zb
 For high X/R ratios, this results in a much larger
CT than would be otherwise required (to avoid
saturation with symmetrical current)
 Differential protection schemes are usually built
to be tolerant of CT saturation
16
 Conclusion so far
 The differential protection principle is
excellent for speed, security, and
sensitivity
 But only if CTs do not saturate
 Unfortunately, CTs that never saturate are
impractical (large and expensive)

17
 Possible Solutions
 Various types of differential protection
systems are applied to avoid misoperation
due to CT saturation
 Some problems and solutions are
presented

18
Differentially connected overcurrent relay

The simplest way to

measure differential
current is to use an
overcurrent relay.

Operates when magnitude of

current is above a set threshold
I1 I2

i2
i1

87
I1+i2

19
 Internal fault

I1 I2

i2CT2
i1CT1

i1CT1+i2CT2 87

Overcurrent relay will measure the sum of

currents from each side and differential
current will not be zero and relay will operate

20
 External fault

I1 I1 I2

87

If CT performance is matched, i1CT1 = -i1CT2

and differential current will be zero.

But CT performance is not always matched!

21
 Different CT performance
20 CT1 is good
CT1

CT2 saturates CT2

Differential
15

10

5
Current (A)

0
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1

-5

A simple overcurrent relay will operate on

-10

the secondary differential current

-15

22
Time (s)
 Causes of CT mismatch
 Different external burdens:
 Due to unequal lengths/resistance of secondary wiring
 Due to extra relays or measuring devices in one CT
secondary but not the other
 Accuracy class mismatch
 Different types of CTs with different saturation voltages
 Different currents
 In bus protection applications with many current sources, the
CT on the branch supplying the external fault will normally
have more current through it than any other CT. This means
that if all CTs are identical, the CT measuring the outgoing
current to the fault location is more likely to saturate than any
of the other CTS.

23
 Bus protection

More current on the faulted feeder

than on the others will tend to
saturate the CT on that feeder
even if it is identical to the others
in all respects.

24
Differential overcurrent solutions
 Increase pickup setting of relay
 Reduces sensitivity
 Apply a time delay to the relay
 To overcome unequal saturation caused by transient offset
 To override external fault clearing
 Reduces speed of operation
 Use a stabilizing resistor to force the remaining CT into
saturation.
 This resistor is heavy duty and causes high voltages.
 Differentially connected overcurrent relays are not
normally applied on transmission systems due to the
above noted problems
25
 Percentage restrained
differential
 Since the CTs tend to saturate under high
fault current conditions
 The relay can be designed to operate if the
ratio of differential current to restraint current
exceeds a set value.

i2CT2
i1CT1

Iop

26
 Percentage restraint
characteristic
Operate current is (|IR1+ IR2|) (vector sum)
Restraint current is (|IR1|+|IR2|)/2
(average of two magnitudes)
5
Operate Current (PU)

4
Relay operates in this area
3
2
1 Relay restrains in this area
0
0 1 2 3 4 5
Restraint Current (PU)
Minimum
operating Relay will operate if Iop is greater than the
current minimum setting and if it is greater than the
average of the restraint currents 27
(0.3 PU)
 Example 1

I2

This CT saturates and

87 produces only 15 A
secondary instead of
expected 25A

Given the currents shown, and the relay settings from the previous slide,
will the relay operate for this external fault?

Irestraint = (25+15)/2=20 A Iop=10 A.

Iop<Irestraint, therefore relay will not operate.
28
 Example 2

No infeed from
2.5A

0A
2.5 A
the right side.

Given the currents shown, and the relay settings from the previous slide
(1.0 pu = 5A secondary), will the relay operate for this internal fault?

Irestraint = (2.5+0)/2=1.25 A Iop=2.5 A (or 0.5 pu).

Iop>Irestraint, and Iop>0.3 pu, therefore relay will operate.
29
 Multi slope percentage
restrained
6

5 Single slope 100%

Area of
4 decreased
security
Iop (PU)

3 Area of
2
improved
sensitivity
1

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ir (PU)
Simple
Slope 1 - 25% Slope 2 – 150% overcurrent
Minimum (0.3 pu)
(more sensitivity) (more security)
operating
current At lower levels of current, CTs are less likely to saturate 30
(0.3 PU)
 Example of current trajectory
20
CT1
CT2
Differential
15

10
Then decays
to negligible
level when
5
Current (A)

offset has
0

Time delayed
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18

subsided
overcurrent could
-5

-10
be secure too!
-15
10
Time (s)
9
Diff-60Hz
8
7
Then 6
Multi Slope
increases
Charact
5

Differential substantially 4
3
current 2
starts small 1
0 31
0 2 4 6 8 10
 Other types of differential
 High impedance bus differential
 Voltage differential relay set higher than maximum
voltage across a fully saturated CT
 Is fast, sensitive, secure and economical
 Works best with full CT ratio and different full winding
ratios cause problems
 Percentage restrained with CT saturation
detector
 Is fast, secure, and can be more sensitive than conventional
percentage restrained
 Is the basis for most modern HV bus protection
systems
32
 Conclusion
 CT saturation due to transient offset lasts only a limited
time
 Differential overcurrent relays must be de-sensitized or
delayed to override CT saturation
 Multi slope percentage restrained relays provide fast,
sensitive and secure protection
 High impedance bus differential relays are widely applied
where full winding CT ratios are the same
 Modern differential protection systems include saturation
detector for improved sensitivity

33
Transformer Protection
 Outline

 Some problems and solutions are

presented
 Transformer windings have different
currents under normal load
 Zero sequence differential current can
flow during an external fault
 Transformer inrush looks like an internal
fault
 Reference NPAG Chapter 16 35
 Transformer differential
protection
 Can be faster and more sensitive than overcurrent
protection, but –
 Must not operate on inrush
 Must not operate due to CT saturation during external fault
 For sensitivity, protect only one transformer
 For security, use separate restraint input for each CT

36
Ratio matching
Tfr diff. relays include ratio
matching settings.
CTR1/CTR2=N Example
100 MVA 138 kV/13.8 kV
N = 0.1

Ip1 = 420 A
Ip2 = 4200 A

CTR1 = 500:5 = 100

CTR2 = 5000:5 = 1000

Is1 = 4.2 Is2 = 4.2

CTR1/CTR2 = 500/5000 = 0.1

37
Sources of error (I)
Total 20-80%
Depending on LTC,
current level and
CTs

LTC +/-15%
CT error 10-60%
(depending on
saturation)
Relay measuring
error 5%
Excitation and
losses 1-2% 38
 Percentage restraint overrides errors

High slope to 4.0

override CT
3.5
saturation
3.0
Differential Current - Amps
2.5

Medium slope to Diff-60Hz

2.0
Charact
override steady
1.5
state errors
1.0

0.5

Minimum pick 0.0

up of relay – 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
30-50% ONAN Restrain Current - Amps

39
Sources of error (II) - Phase shift

Modern digital relays compensate for phase shift internally – no

need or benefit in CT delta connection.

Ic- Ia

IB- IC Ib- Ic

IA- IB Ia- Ib
40
Sources of Error (III) - 0 Seq. Current
Modern digital relays compensate for 0 seq. current
internally – no need or benefit in CT delta connection.
Usually needs explicit setting or configuration

3I0

41
 Challenges for 87T
 Provide good speed and sensitivity
 Remain secure in the presence of
 Magnetizing inrush
 Power transformer current ratio difference
 Current transformer ratio difference
 Phase-angle shift
 CT saturation

42
 Transformer Inrush

 Large value of exciting current when

transformer is energized.

H1 X1

Iinrush
H2 X2

Flows through the magnetizing reactance while flux is becoming

symmetrical 43
 Simplified excitation curve

10

Saturation
Flux Density
Flux (PU of Sat'n.)

Normal
operating
point

0.1
0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10
Ie (PU)

44
Ie < 1%
 Voltage/Flux Relationship

Steady state max=0.9pu

1.2

V  N d

  (1 N )  Vdt
dt
V or 

0
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1

if
V  sin(t )
   cos(t )  0
-1.2

=-cos(t)
Time (s)

V=sin(t)
45
Voltage/Flux Energization at V zero

max=
1.8 pu

0.8
Vor

-0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1

-1.2 46
Time (s)
 Inrush Current (Ie)

0.18

0.13

0.8 0.08

Ie (PU)
V or 

0.03

-0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05

-0.02

-0.07

-1.2 -0.12

Time (s) 47
Voltage/Flux Energization at V zero

max=
1.8 pu

0.8
Vor

-0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1

-1.2 48
Time (s)
Inrush current – expanded scale
10

0.8 4

Ie (PU)
V or 

0
-0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3

-2

-4

49
-1.2 -6

Time (s)
 Voltage/Flux
Energization at V peak

max=
1.2

0.9 pu
V or 

0
-0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1

-1.2

Time (s) 50
 Transformer Inrush
700
A P hase B P hase C P hase
500

300

100
Current (A)

-1 0 0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .0 8 0 .1

-3 0 0

-5 0 0

-7 0 0
T im e (S )

(Simulated 90 MVA Transformer, energized from 230 kV cable circuit)

Actual Inrush Example

2000

1500

1000

500 Ia
Ib
Ic

-500

-1000

-1500

-2000
 Inrush Charateristics
 Richin second harmonics
 Decays over several seconds
 Peak value depends on:
 point of wave of energization
 Remanent flux in the core
 Leakage reactance of transformer
 Will be less than short circuit current on the
other side of transformer

53
 Harmonic Restraint (I)
 Inrush
current has high percentage of 2nd
harmonic (asymmetrical shape). Good
candidate for restraint
2000

1500

1000

500 Ia
Ib
Ic

-500

-1000

54
-1500

-2000
 Percentage Restraint
 Allows for significant CT error, especially
at high currents
 May be multiple slope
 Must define restraining quantity (varies
with different manufacturers)
 Each important circuit must provide
restraint for through faults.

55
 Percentage Restraint

I(pu)in = I(pu)out

7 H1 X1
6

Iinrush
Id

1 H2 X2
Ir
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12

But inrush current looks

like an internal fault.
 Harmonic Restraint (II)
 15% second harmonic was a common value for restraining 87T
 In modern transformers and in some other cases, not all phases have
so much second harmonic
Undesirable trip on inrush Consider letting -
90%

High harmonic in one

75% phase block all three

60%
Or -
Ia
Ib Reduced setting of
Ic
45% harmonic restraint (7.5%?)
% H2

30%
BUT NOT BOTH!
15%

Or -
0% Add 4th harmonic restraint
cycles

Or –
Two samples with less Use other restraint
than 15% 2nd harmonic 57
techniques (NPAG 16.9.3)
 Harmonic Restraint (III)
 Saturated CT can also have high percentage of second
harmonics

150

100

50

-50

-100
-0.017 0.000 0.017 0.033 0.050 0.067 0.083 0.100 0.117 0.133 0.150

 Threatens dependability of harmonic restrained protection

for severe faults that could saturate CTs.

 High set, unrestrained differential function is also usually

applied for dependability with severe faults.
 Must not operate on inrush. Need to consider maximum
inrush current (less than for fault on opposite side)
58
 Protected Zone
 HV bus protection must be able to carry
bus load
 Transformer differential sensitivity limited
by CT ratios
 Dedicated bus protection more selective
and more expensive.

59
Bus/Transformer protection option 1

60
Bus/Transformer protection option 2

61
Bus/Transformer protection option 3
(not recommended)

62
 Transformer/tertiary protection options

87
T

Tertiary shunt
equipment

63
 Differential protection
 Zone may or may not include bus section.
 Percentage restrained
 Harmonic restrained
 Includes high set unrestrained differential
element.
 May include restricted earth fault
protection

64
 Other transformer protection
 Phase overcurrent and fuse
 Restricted earth fault (REF)
 Negative sequence differential
 Frame-earth
 Non electrical
 Sudden pressure
 Buchholz
 Pressure relief
65
 Transformer inrush plus
damage curve
1000

ZT=12%
Frequent faults
ZT=10%
(>5 /lifetime)
100
ZT=4%

Time (S) Infrequent faults

10 (<5 /lifetime)

I (times rated)
0.1
1 10 100 66
Fuse
Protection
for 138 kV
10 MVA
Transformer

Fuse
manufacturers
recommend
fuse sizes for
given
transformer

67
 Overexcitation
  = Vdt = V/Hz
 Saturated core does not attract flux
 Excess flux flows outside core, heats up non
laminated paths
 Set to be slower than exciter limiter (for generator
step up transformers)
 Not applicable to overvoltage due to overspeed (good
for accidental excitation at low speed)
 Range limited by relay input VT capability

68
 Non-electrical protection

 Gas accumulation (alarm)

 Sudden gas pressure (and
earthquakes)
 Low oil plus gas accumulation trip?
 High oil temperature (alarm)
 Hot spot temperature (alarm)

69
 Radial and networked
systems

Is the fault in front of me, or behind

me?
Transmission shield wire

71
Tower Footing Resistance

72
 Distribution or transmission?
 Distribution characteristics
 Radial
 Four wire multi-grounded neutral
 Multiple reclosures
 Time overcurrent protection
 Single phase loads
 Transmission characteristics
 Networked
 Balanced loads
 Definite time or instantaneous protection for phase
faults
73
Distribution Circuit Sectionalizers

74
Distribution system protection

Source Load

Non directional protection is usually applicable

because of radial system configuration
Distribution system (radial)

F2

F1

76
 Protection of a radial system
 Radial configuration means the power and
the current to a fault can flow in one
direction only
 High current (above load or other
conditions) means there is a short circuit
downstream
 Suitable for non directional time delayed
and instantaneous overcurrent protection
e.g.
 Overcurrent relays (50/51) 77
Example Transmission System One Line

Sub-
Transmission

Bulk
Trans
-mission

78
Transmission network – Vancouver, BC

79
 Bulk
Trans-
mission
System

80
 Protection of a networked system
 Current during a fault may flow in either
direction depending on where the fault is
 High current (above load or other conditions)
means there is a short circuit in front of, or
behind the measuring point
 Directional discrimination is needed
 Three phase loads makes transmission
phase currents better balanced (than
distribution)
 Stability and power quality concerns require
higher clearing speed
81
 Modern distribution systems
 Distribution systems with
 Distributed resources
 Sensitive loads
 Looped connections
 Impact of distributed resources
 On fault currents
 On coordination
 On voltages
 Some protection solutions to looped
distribution systems
82
 Drivers
 Distributed resources
 Green power
 Less dependence on transmission
 Looped distribution
 Reliability for high performance loads

83
Distributed resource connection I

Busbar 7 115 kV

Dedicated feeders 9

TR1

8
Busbar 6 34.5 kV

Busbar 4 7 6 Busbar 5

DG1 DG2
34.5 kV 34.5 kV
Busbar 3 34.5 kV

Busbar 2 34.5 kV

TR2

Busbar 1 13.2 kV

1 2 3

84
Distribution system (radial)

F2

With
coordinated
F1 protection this
fuse melts first
(neglecting
“fuse saving”)
 DR on non-dedicated feeders

F2
DG1
STN
A 1
2 3
F1

Fuses exposed
to melting
undesirably DG2
And Distributed Generation

86
 DR Protection problems
 For faults F1 and F2, sensitivity of
protection at Substation A is reduced
because it doesn’t see all the fault current.
 For fault F1, fuses 1 and 2 should not melt
before fuse 3
 For fault F2, fuse 2 should not melt before
fuse 1.

87
Ground Protection Sensitivity
Zs1 ZR1

V1 1V

Zs2 ZR2

DG provides
Zs0 ZR0
another source
51N (and path) for
fault current
51N measures (3x) Total fault current
zero sequence Fault resistance now split into two
current limits total fault parts
current 88
 DR Protection problems
 Sensitivity
for resistive single line to
ground faults is largest concern.
 Total fault current is low because of fault
resistance.
 Some current is diverted from Substation A
transformer neutral through the DR
transformer neutrals
 Neutral impedance in DR transformer
could result in non effectively grounded
system when Substation A breaker opens
 Resulting in high temporary overvoltages on 89
unfaulted phases
 Impedance grounding

Neutral(s) of the
power system are
grounded through
an impedance to
limit the amount of
single line to ground
fault current.
ZG
 Voltage impacts not limited to sag

1.732 times normal

phase to ground
voltage
Normal phase to
ground voltage

Short circuits to ground with ungrounded or non

effectively grounded neutral can result in swells 91
 Application of directional overcurrent

Devices 67 are fast to

clear feeder faults
Busbar 7 115 kV

from system TR1

8
51
Busbar 6 34.5 kV

51Busbar 4 7 6 Busbar 5

DG1 DG2
34.5 kV 34.5 kV
Busbar 3 34.5 kV

Devices 51 are slower Busbar 2 34.5 kV

to clear bus faults

from DG
5

TR2

without 4

tripping for other Busbar 1 13.2 kV

feeder faults 1 2 3

92
 Looped distribution feeders
 Similar sensitivity and coordination
problems as with DG
 Will normally cause desensitization of
station protection
 Fast and sensitive directional relays at tie
points can convert quickly to radial
configuration
 Accept some overtripping but retain
coordination and sensitivity
93
 Looped distribution feeders
STN A STN B
60 kV Transmission

N.O.
Voltage regulators
may fight with each
51
F

other
12kV
Other Fdrs.
FDR
51
F
Other 12 kV
Fdrs. Field swgr. 12k VR
Fdr

140K 140K 67 67
140K 140K
N.C.
Tapped Tapped
Load(s) 51 51 Load(s)
F1 F2

Higher reliability for these loads Infeed from two feeders to a fault on
– BUT…… either will desensitize feeder protections
at STN A and STN B
Loss of the 60 kV line 51 51

can force
FL1 FL2

transmission power
through the feeders
and overload them
94
High sensitivity High sensitivity
loads loads
Application of directional relaying
STN A STN B
60 kV Transmission

N.O.
This breaker opens
immediately for a
51
F

fault on station A 12kV

FDR
Other Fdrs.
51
F feeder
Other 12 kV
Fdrs. Field swgr. 12k VR
Fdr

Fuse melts
140K 140K 67 67
140K 140K Feeder relay
Leaving feeder
N.C.
has full
Tapped
sensitivity and
Tapped
energized Load(s) 51 51 Load(s)
opens breaker
F1 F2

Switch recloses in normal time

Feeder breaker
recloses
51 51
FL1 FL2

Switch recloses

95
High sensitivity High sensitivity
loads loads
 Conclusions
 DR and looped distribution feeders result
in coordination and sensitivity problems
 Directional overcurrent relays can solve
some of the problems
 Neutral impedances applied to mitigate
sensitivity problems can result in
temporary overvoltages (swells)
 Not a simple issue

96
 Conclusion
 Distributedresources mean distribution
systems are taking on some of the
characteristics of transmission systems
 Fault current flow in either direction
 Stability and power quality concerns are
present

97
 Directional Overcurrent
Protection

Is the fault in front of me, or behind

me?
Need for directional protection

Relays must be directionalized

F1 F2
R1 faster R2 faster
than R2 than R1

99
 Directional Relays
Vpol
 Q: what is direction Or
of an alternating Ipol
current? The sign of
the current changes Iop
direction twice per
cycle 
 A: Phase
relationship of
current with respect 67 Directional Overcurrent Relay

to a polarizing
quantity
Forward current into resistance

Vs Vs and Is
In phase
(0 degree
Is Difference)
Phasor
representation
Is

Ip
Vs
Vp

101
Reverse current into resistance

Vs Vs and Is
In opposite
phase
Phasor (180 degree
representation Difference) Is
Is

Ip
Vs
Vp

102
Forward current into reactance

Vs Vs leads Is
by 90
degrees

Phasor Is
representation
Is

Ip
Vs
Vp

103
Directional Relay Application

180-
Phase Directional Overcurrent Relay (67) Operating
Characteristics
NPAG 9.14

Vpol
op

Max Torque
Angle (MTA)

Operating region
Where
Iop*Cos(-MTA)>Iopmin
Iop

105
 Close-in faults I

 Zero ohm fault at the

relaying point results in zero
polarizing voltage
 Not possible to determine
phase relationship to zero
phasor

Can use healthy

phase polarization
Eg. jBC for A
phase current.
 Close in faults II
 Healthy phase polarization is known as
“cross polarization”
 jBC for Ia is “Quadrature polarization”
 Can also use sequence voltage
polarization, eg, positive, negative or zero
seq.
 Need memory polarization for zero voltage
3 phase faults.
107
Polarizing sources for
directional relays

What should we use?

Example System Single Line
Diagram

From Reference 1
109
Sequence Network Connections

From Reference 1 110

 Measured quantities for SLG
 Operating quantity may be 3I0 or I2 or 3I2
 Polarizing quantity may be V0 3V0 or V2
or Ip
 Negative sequence directional relays use
I2 or 3I2 for operating and V2 for
polarizing
 Zero sequence directional relays use 3I0
for operating and V0 or 3V0 or Ip for
polarizing
111
 Dual polarized zero sequence directional
Current or voltage polarization for 67N?
END S END R

Z0L Z0H Z0H Z0L

67N 67N Z0T
IpolZ0T Ipol

112
112
Current or voltage polarization?
END S END R

67N 67N
Ipol Ipol

113
113
 Current polarization
 Pros
 Depending on strength of source impedance, could be a more reliable
source of polarizing signal than V0
 If is taken directly from the system (from tertiary CTs) it will not be as
susceptible to errors (as V0) due to instrument transformer error.
 Neutral current from 2 winding wye-delta transformer is good
 Cons
 Needs a source of polarizing current at the station
 Needs great care in connections to ensure correct polarity
 Needs extra cabling to transformers
 Depending on number of transmission circuits using the polarizing
signal, could have several protections connected (in series) to a
common set of CTs
 Need careful check of 3 winding transformer and source impedance
parameters to ensure the signal is reliable. Check may need to be re-
done before changing power system configuration.
 Neutral current from an autotransformer is not good
 Susceptible to effects of V0 reversal too
114
114
 Direction of Ipol for SEL-311C
 Current coming
out ot the
ground goes
into the polarity
mark of the
relay
 Fig. 4.11 of
instruction
manual says
Ipol in phase
with IG is
forward
direction.

115
115
Inappropriate 3 wdg. Tfr. and system for using Ipol
END S END R

(Z0S+Z0L)<0

Z0T 67N 67N

Z0L of many transformers is negative. If (Z0S+Z0L) is also negative, current

polarizing is not appropriate. Since parallel combination of (Z0S+Z0L) and
Z0T will be negative

Voltage across Z0T will be reversed compared to system V0 and direction

of (Ipol) with respect to (Iop) will be opposite of expected.

Suitability of system can be checked with OneLiner

116
116
 Vo reversals affect Ipol too
If
END S END R

67N I0M and 67N

V0M

117
117
 Fault Voltage Profiles
(see also NPAG 4.3.1 and 4.3.2)

IA2

VA2F

IA0

VA0F

118
Or, if the direction of current is always towards the fault,
V2 and V0 are negative with respect to VF and V1
 Phase directional or sequence
directional

Phase Directional 67P -ve or zero seq.

Directional 67Q or 67G

Max torque angle

Operating
region

Vpol
Iop(min.)

119
 Zero sequence voltage reversal

Fwd Fwd

V0
3I0

3I0M

V0M

V0 Fwd
Fwd
E.g, V0 reversal at 36 Fite 115 kV terminal of line 33586 when LE fault on 120
33691 at 33 NE Gate 161 kV
Forward and reverse directions may be
shaped

-ve or zero seq. directional 67Q or 67G

Iop.
Fwd.

No man’s land

Rev.
121
 Current polarized Characteristic

zero seq. directional 67G

Operating Region

Rev.

Fwd.

No man’s land 122

 Sensitivity issues
 If source impedance is small, and/or operating
current is low
 Vpol (=Iop*Zsource) could be very small, maybe too
small for reliable operation.
 That’s why Ipol is often used (or dual polarizing)
 But the polarizing voltage could be reinforced by a
portion of the impedance in front of the relay.
 Giving “Current reinforced polarizing voltage”
 Or, SEL directional protection principle of
measuring negative or zero sequence impedance
(positive for reverse direction and negative for
forward direction)

123
 Measuring sequence impedances

No man’s land Rev.

Fwd.

124
 Conclusion I
 3I0 and V0 or Ip have been used
traditionally
 I2 and V2 now becoming used more
 Relatively insensitive to zero sequence
mutual coupling
 May be different sensitivity from 3I0 and V0
 Current reinforcement provides improved
sensitivity
 Also impedance measurement provides
improved sensitivity 125
 Conclusion II
 Zero sequence current polarizing may be
more robust than voltage polarizing, but
can have some problems too
 Be aware of difference between forward
directions of Ineut or Itertiary in OneLiner
with respect to direction of Ipol.
 Check correctness of transformer data
 Check direction of Ipol with respect to Iop
for all

126
126
 References
1. IEEE Power System Relaying Committee
Report “Considerations in Choosing
Directional Polarizing Methods for
Ground Overcurrent Elements in Line
Protection Applications” (undergoing final
review). Will be published in
“Publications” section of www.pes-
psrc.org
2. C. Henville and M. Nagpal, “How Low
Can You Go?”, Western Protective 127

Relaying Conference October 2005

Distance Relay Principles
Basics of impedance measurement for
transmission line protection
NPAG Chapter 11
 Where we are
2. Transmission and distribution comparison
3. Directional overcurrent protection
4. Directional relay polarization
5. Setting and coordinating directional overcurrent relays
in networks and loops
6. Distance relay principles (phase and ground)
7. Setting and coordinating distance relays in networks
8. Transmission line protection example case study
9. Communications assisted protection
10. a)Complicating factors and b)example application

129
 Application of phase overcurrent relays on
transmission
 Long lines and variability of power system
configuration means that load currents
may be similar to, or even higher than fault
currents
 Limits usefulness of directional phase
overcurrent for multiphase faults
 Impedance relays measure voltage and
current and are usually more sensitive
than overcurrent relays
 The fixed “reach” of distance relays
provide more precision (and thus faster 130

protection over a larger range) than

 Relay Characteristic Diagrams
 Up to now, relay characteristics have
been normally plotted on a time current
characteristic (TCC) diagram.
time
 In earlier presentations of this week, we
saw relay time overcurrent characteristics
plotted on a time/distance diagram current

131
Distance
“Reach” of an overcurrent relay
 The reach of an instantaneous overcurrent relay depends on
the total current (sum of load plus fault)
 Setting of instantaneous element will underreach next protective
device for highest current (minimum fault resistance and maximum
source strength)
 Resistance in the fault and/or the strength of the system supplying
fault current will affect the reach of the instantaneous element

Reach is reduced by
fault resistance or
weaker source.
132
Reach of instantaneous O/C elements
 Impedance measurement
 If line construction is homogenous for its full length,
impedance of the line to the fault point will be directly
proportional to distance to the fault
 Impedance relays measure voltage and current to
determine impedance
 If impedance is less than a set amount, a fault may be
declared
 Of course it is necessary to discriminate between fault
and load
 Load is mainly resistive
 Fault impedance is mainly reactive (with low fault resistance)

133
 Impedance relays
NPAG 11.7.2

Restrain Operate

Balanced Beam (Ohm characteristic)

Magnitude Comparator
134
 RX Diagram and Ohm Characteristic

l ts
e) low
fau
da of (
n
nc
im egio
pe
R

Region of reverse load Region of forward load

135
 Impedance measurement

 Indicationof distance to the fault, plus

fault impedance
 Sometimes called “Distance
measurement”
 “Reach” is not dependent on system
conditions (unlike overcurrent relay
whose “reach” is determined by
magnitude of current)
136
RX Diagram and Ohm Characteristic

137
 Example
 For the system given below – assuming a balanced system and
balanced load
 Find the current flowing in the load, and the apparent
impedance of the load presented to the distance relay
 For a three phase “bolted” fault at the end of the line, find the
current flowing, and the apparent impedance to the relay.

Source Line
V1 = 1.0 PU

2.0 pu @ 00
VR
Load

138
 Example Calculation
 Find the total impedance Z total  j 0.1  0.0515  j.1932  2
including the load
 2.0515  j.2932  2.0723 pu8o
 The current is the voltage I  1 / Z total  1 / 2.0723 pu8o
divided by the total  0.4826 pu  8o
impedance

 Apparent impedance of the Z load  0.0515  j.1932  2

load is  2.0515  j.1932  2.0606 pu5o

 For the fault case, total Z total _ fault  j 0.1  0.0515  j.1932
impedance to the fault is  0.0515  j.2932  .2977 pu80o

 So the fault current is I  1 / Z total _ fault  1 / .2977 pu80 o

 3.3591 pu  80 o
 And the fault impedance
seen by the relay is Z fault  .2 pu75o
 Conclusion
 Impedance relays can be set more
sensitively than overcurrent relays
 Their reach is not dependent on current
level, only on impedance to the fault
 Simple impedance relays need to be
directionalized
 Load impedances are generally higher,
and closer to resistive in nature than fault
impedances
140
More advanced distance protection

 Outline
 Principles of the self and cross polarized
phase comparator distance relay
 Specific measured quantities for different
types of faults

141
 Mho Relay
 An advancement on the impedance relay
is the “Mho” relay most commonly used for
transmission line impedance.
 The self polarized mho relay compares the
voltage developed across a “replica
impedance” with the voltage at the relay.
NPAG 11.7.3
 If the measured voltage is less than that
across the replica impedance, the line is
faulted.
142
Pre fault load

IL

V=IL*Zc

143
Fault conditions

If

V=If*Zc

144
 Phase comparator distance relay

 Measure angle between

(If*Zc-Vf) and Vf.
 If less than set angle, fault in
zone
 If greater than set angle, fault
out of zone

Set angle – 90 degrees, characteristic is a circle with

diameter If*Zc
Plot on RX Diagram

Divide all phasors

by If, and since
Vf/If = Zf

This is the
characteristic of a
self polarized mho
distance relay
 A two input phase comparator [1]

If T set = 4.16 ms, an output

will occur for
-90o <phase shift <+90o

Wave “b” lags

wave “a” by 90o
Width depends
on phase match
4.16 ms here
For 90 deg shift

Regions of positive coincidence Regions of zero coincidence

 Coincidence timer

>4.16 ms <4.16 ms
 Mho Relay vs Ohm Relay
NPAG 11.7.4

Set reach of
both relays Self
Directionally
polarized
controlled
mho relay
ohm relay

More Immunity
to load

149
 Close-in faults
 In the case of a self polarized distance relay, if Vf
becomes zero, or close to zero.
 Not possible to compare angle Vf with angle If*Zc-Vf
 Performance for close-in zero volt fault is uncertain
 Instead of using Vf, can use (suitably shifted) healthy
phase voltage for reference
 Cross polarization or quadrature polarization
 NPAG 11.7.5
 For three phase faults, use memory polarization

150
 Characteristic expansion
Expanded mho characteristic
looks like the ohm characteristic,
but……..

Expanded characteristic due to

healthy phase cross polarization
Applicable to unbalanced faults
only – not sensitive to balanced
load, and…

Expanded characteristic
due to memory
polarization is temporary
only, - not sensitive to
steady state load.

151
 Measured quantities
 Faults are classified into different types and measured
quantities are different for each type. NPAG 11.9
 Phase to phase fault
 Vbc/Ibc and Vca/Ica and Vab/Iab
 Phase to ground fault
 Va/(Ia+K3Io) and Vb/(Ib+K3Io) and Vc/(Ic+K3Io)
 Where K3Io is a multiple of the neutral current to
compensate for the increased impedance of the
ground fault loop
 Correct selection of the faulted phase loop is
important (incorrect selection can lead to overreach of
Inst. element)

152
Reach for different faults I
Three phase – may be
detected by phase to
phase or phase to
ground measuring
elements

 I f  Z1
VL  L
3
 Z1
VL  L
3If Zero (0) Volts
 Reach for different faults II
Phase to Phase
VA B  2Z1I A

 2 Z1
V A B
IA
I A  I B

 Z1
V A B
I A  IB
Reach for SLG Faults (Radial)

V A  G  ( I 1 Z 1  I 2 Z 2  I 0 Z 0)
I A  I1  I 2  I 0 ; andI1  I 2  I 0 ; andZ1  Z 2

 ( 2 Z 1  Z 0)
IA
V A G
3
Z 0  Z1
KN  ; soZ 0  Z1(1  3 * KN )
3 * Z1
VAG 3Z1(1  KN )

IA 3

 Z1
V AG
And in a radial system with SLG, IA=3Io
I A (1  KN )

 Z1
V AG
I A  3IoKN
 Faulted phase selection
 The previous slides show the measured impedances in
the various fault loops.
 Except for the unique case of three phase faults, it is
important to measure the impedance of the correct
phases which are involved in the fault.
 In some cases distance elements for phases that are not
involved in the fault may measure reduced impedances
and produce incorrect or undesired response
 Thus “fault classification” as to the type of fault and
phases involved is important in the application of
distance relays.

156
 Conclusion
 The mho type impedance relay is inherently directional
 Characteristic shapes can be adjusted by adjusting the
coincidence time
 Distance relays need cross polarization and memory
polarization just like directional phase overcurrent relays
 Fault classification and faulted phase selection are an
important part of measuring distance to fault.
 Ground distance relays need additional zero sequence
current compensation because of zero sequence
impedance in the fault loop.

157
 Additional Issues

Outline
 Various types of polarization for mho
relays
 Various types of characteristics for
distance relays
 Supplementary functions

158
 Close-in faults
 Vf becomes zero, or close to zero.
 Not possible to compare angle Vf with angle Vf-If*Zc
 Performance for close-in zero volt fault is uncertain
 Instead of using Vf, can use (suitably shifted) healthy
phase voltage for reference
 Cross polarization or quadrature polarization
 Similar to cross polarization for phase overcurrent relays
 For three phase faults, can use memory polarization
 May also use positive sequence memory polarization
that is good for zero voltage balanced and unbalanced
faults.

159
 Characteristic expansion
Expanded mho characteristic
looks like the ohm characteristic,
but……..

Expanded characteristic
due to memory
polarization is temporary
only, - not sensitive to
steady state load.

160
 Disadvantages of memory polarization

 Most distance relays use some degree of cross

polarization (including positive sequence voltage
polarization) for unbalanced faults
 If a relay uses memory polarization, there is a danger of
the polarizing voltage becoming undesirably shifted from
the fault voltage due to frequency changes. This fact can
threaten security.
 Distance relays will usually include features to reduce
the impact (or duration) of memory polarization if
sufficient voltage is present during the fault. Memory is
really only needed when all three phase voltages are too
low for reliable measurement.
161
 Frequency change on islanded system
Sub-transmission
loads ~ 30 MW
25 kV
Distribution
13.8 kV 64 kV
Loads
64 ~ 5 MW
MW
21

8
Integrated MW

system
(360 kV)
 Frequency Change Causes
Mho Elements to trip on load

Device 21 trips
generator off line

Frequency is now about 66 Hz, but polarizing

voltage is still “remembered” from lower frequency

Polarizing voltage becomes phase shifted from real time

voltage and intermittently the angle between polarizing
and operating voltages enters operating region
Different types of characteristics
 Various operating and polarizing quantities
in phase comparators can be used to
produce straight lines on the RX diagram,
resulting in complex characteristics
 These characteristics are intended to
improve the sensitivity of the distance
element to large fault impedances (long
lines or high resistance) while not allowing
load impedance to enter the tripping
characteristic 164
Long reaching characteristics

Lens or lenticular Offset mho

165
Use of blinders

Reactive May be tilted

Resistive

Directional
166
Example quad characteristic

167
 VT Location
 VT’s are often located on the line side of a line terminal
switch. This has the advantage of gaining information
about the line (energized, or not)
 But it means that when the line is de-energized, the
distance relays have no potential (or restraint) applied.
 There exists the concern of uncertain operation
0V/0I=????
 Also there is a concern about a line being energized with
a close-in three phase fault on it since there will be no
polarizing voltage (no cross polarizing and no memory
voltage to depend on)

168
 VT is on line side of breakers

When line is de-energized,

there is no restraint on the CT1

distance function CB
1

A danger of undesired
operation exists Line protection

Minimum current supervision

Line
Sw

will normally prevent CT2

unwanted operations with

CB
2

very low voltages

Bus # 2

169
 Switch on to fault protection
 In addition to the concern about undesired
operation for no or low voltage there is a
concern about failure to operate with no or
low voltage
 If a line is energized with a close-in three
phase fault on it (for instance with safety
grounds on the near terminal) there will be
plenty of current, but no polarizing voltage
 Switch on to fault protection (SOTF) is
used to provide dependability in this case 170
 SOTF Protection
 Applicable when the line is dead, and for a short
while after energization
 Not required with bus side VTs

Window duration for SOTF

1-2
CB Open
~ 0.2 AND SOTF Fault

No volts ~.02
AND
Current 0
Small coordinating delay
All times are in seconds
Stepped Distance Protection
 Outline
 Difference between “protection zone” and
distance relay “zones”
 Application of stepped distance protection
schemes
 Setting a basic distance protection system

173
 Protection zone
 Defined by current transformers and circuit
breakers within a substation.
 Defined by local current transformer and
circuit breaker and downstream protective
devices such as fuses or reclosers on a
distribution system.
 Defined by local and remote current
transformers and circuit breakers on a
transmission line
 Time overcurrent relays may back up
protection for a remote zone. 174
 Example distribution protection zones

Protection at A is
primary for red
zone

And backup
for all blue
zones

175
Example transmission protection zones

Bus protection zones

Line protection zones

176
“Reach” of a distance relay
 The reach of an instantaneous overcurrent relay
depends on the total current (sum of load plus fault)
 Resistance in the fault and/or the strength of the system
supplying fault current will affect the reach of the
instantaneous element
 Setting of instantaneous element will underreach next
protective device for highest current (minimum fault
resistance and maximum source strength)

Reach is
reduced by fault
resistance or
weaker source.
Reach of instantaneous O/C elements 177
Line protection reaches [1]
Distance relay zones

Inst. O/C
zones
(max. reach)

178
Resistive Faults

179
 Effect of fault resistance
Quad Rf more significant
characteristic may withSLG faults
provide more
resistive coverage

180
 Ground distance relays
 Since they may be set to reach quite far in
the resistive direction, the apparent
impedance of load is a concern
 Most ground distance relays require
ground overcurrent supervision in addition
to phase overcurrent supervision
 As long as the ground overcurrent
supervision is set higher than max ground
current with unbalanced load, distance
element will not operate on load 181
 Stepped distance protection
NPAG 11.6

 Must not trip for normally cleared faults

beyond remote terminal. But must be as
fast as possible for internal faults.
 Instantaneous for 80-85% of the line (Zone 1)
 Delayed for remaining portion plus some
margin (Zone 2)
 May also provide remote backup for other
lines (Zone 3)
182
 Zones of Distance Protection I
 Zone1 – must not operate for fault beyond
remote terminal.
 Normally instantaneous, underreaches
remote terminal 80-85% of line
 Reach may be reduced for security, or zone
may be eliminated altogether on short lines
 Short delay may be added for security on
short lines

183
Zones of Distance Protection II
 Zone2 – covers rest of line not covered by
Zone 1.
 Normally delayed to be slower than remote
instantaneous protection
 Underreaches remote instantaneous
protection
 Reaches at least 120% of line, maybe longer
for speed and sensitivity
 Coordinating time margin allows remote
clearing first.
184
Zones of Distance Protection III

 Zone3 – may be used to provide

backup protection for remote lines or for
breaker failure at remote station.
 Normally delayed to be slower than remote
Zone 2 protections
 May be set to cover remote lines with or
without infeed
 Cannot provide thermal overload protection
because does not model thermal
characteristics of line 185
 Must not trip for maximum loadings even
 Converting Ohms Pri/Sec
 Convert primary impedances to secondary
values
 Vpri = Vsec*VTR
 Ipri = Isec* CTR
 Vpri/Ipri = Zpri = (Vsec*VTR)/(Isec*CTR)
 Zpri = (Vsec/Isec)*(VTR/CTR)
 Zpri = Zsec * VTR/CTR
 Zsec = Zpri *CTR/VTR

186
 Converting Ohms Pri/Sec Example

 VT Ratio = 1200-1
 CT Ratio = 800-5
 Primary ohms = 100
 Secondary = 100*160/1200=13.33 ohms sec.
 Secondary ohms = 5
 Primary ohms = 5*1200/160 = 37.5 ohms pri.

187
 Per Unit ohms to physical
 Base MVA=Sbase and Base kV=kVbase (given)
Sbase1000
 Base Amps = (kVbase 3)

(kVbase1000)
 Base ohms = (Ibase 3)

kVbase 1000
Base ohms =  
3  ( Sbase 1000)

 (kVbase  3 )

 Base ohms = (kVbase) 2

Sbase
 Per Unit ohms to physical Example

 Base MVA=100 and Base kV= 60 kV (given)

1001000
 Base Amps =
 962A
(60 3)
Base ohms =(60  1000)
 36ohms


(962  3 )
Base ohms =
 36ohms
 2
(60)
100
 Setting a Distance Relay 1
 Zone 1 set 80%-85% of line Z (less than 80% for short
lines)
 Zone 2 set at least 120% of line Z and more if not
overreaching any remote zone 1 or instantaneous
protections.
 If 120% overreaches remote zone 1, use zone 3 time.
 If there is infeed (eg to tap, or third terminal) check
overreach of remote terminal with infeed.

190
 Setting a Distance Relay II
 Zone 3 is for remote (protection or breaker
failure) backup.
 Must allow load to be carried under
maximum emergency conditions.
 Add ground distance elements (in most
cases)
 Ground time overcurrent elements if
needed for high resistance faults.

191
Zone 3 relays and heavy load

Mho relay has more

Immunity to load (than
ohm relay), but…

192
Distance Relay Loadability [2]

ZL = ZR *Cos(θ-φ) X

For any given Z,

Smax = VLL2/ Z N O TRIP
O U TSIDE
O F CIRCLE
Physical
units

Understand the units ZR Steady State

X
Loadability Limit
used in this formula.
Study and understand ZL A pparent steady state
two examples in load impedance
in this region
Appendix A of ref 2  
R
Load blinders can help
X

Blinder No. 1

Blinder No. 2
R
Sammis-Star line trip triggers cascade
Zone 3 trip on heavy load
 Pros and Cons of stepped impedance
systems
 Cons:
 Time delayed for faults near remote terminal
 Delays affect power quality and stability
 Pros:
 Simple
 Economical
 Doesn’t need communications

197
 Conclusions (from several lectures on
transmission line protection)
 Transmission line protection differs from distribution system protection
 Because direction of flow of fault current can be bi-directional
 Because the three phases are normally better balanced reducing normal
negative and zero sequence current levels.
 Because the short circuits fault currents may be less than the maximum load
currents
 Phase distance relays detect multiphase faults regardless of T/L
construction (shielded or not shielded)
 Heavy load appears as a low impedance and may limit the sensitivity of
distance relays to resistive faults.
 Ground distance relays detect single line to ground faults on transmission
line if fault resistance is low enough.
 Long reaching distance relays are susceptible to undesirable operation on
heavy load

198
 References
1. “The Art and Science of Protective Relaying”, Chapter 14

2. IEEE Committee report, “Transmission Line Relay Loadability

Report” http://pes-psrc.org (click on link to “Published Reports”,
(Old Format Publications Page) then “Line Protection”)

3. Go to NERC http://www.nerc.com then search for Blackout

Presentation to IEEE Tampa, February 26, 2004

199
 Case Study

Setting an example stepped distance

protection scheme
 Example system
 Using the principles of the previous lecture
 Set a multi zone stepped impedance protection system for an
example transmission line application
 Find settings for phase distance relays on CB1, CB3 and CB5 on
Lines 1, 2, and 3

NEVADA
132.kV 6

CLAYTOR OHIO
132.kV 2 *CB7 132.kV 7
*CB6
*Line 3
*CB15 21

*CB5
21

FIELDALE
*CB1 132.kV 5 *CB4

*Line 1 21
*Line 2

*CB2
*CB3
 Performance specifications I
 Reaches
 Zone 1 shall not overreach protected line.
 Zone 2 elements shall be set as far as possible without
overreaching remote instantaneous elements
 Zone 3 elements shall be set to cover longest remote line, or as
far as possible without risk of tripping under emergency load
conditions
 Speed
 Zone 1 instantaneous
 Zone 2 time delayed to coordinate with remote protection
 Zone 3 time delayed to coordinate with remote protection
 Sensitivity
 Max phase fault resistance is 5 ohms

202
Performance specifications II
 Loadability
 Maximum load under emergency conditions is 150 MVA
 Minimum voltage under emergency conditions is 85%
 Worst case power factor of load is 0.866
 Protection system parameters
 Phase distance relays shall be SEL type SEL-321 mho
characteristic
 Nominal clearing time of circuit breakers is 8 cycles
 All VT ratios are 1200:1
 All CT ratios are 1200:5 (240:1)

203
 Power System parameters
 1.0 PU = 100 MVA at 132 kV
 Line 1 impedances (PU)
 Z1=0.0472+j0.1983,
 Line 2 impedances (PU)
 Z1=0.046+j0.116,
 Line 3 impedances (PU)
 Z1=0.0267+j0.082,
 Fault levels may be obtained from computer
model of system
204
Starting with furthest downstream
Line 3 Calculations

 Convert Line 3 impedances to primary

ohms
Base ohms=(132)2/100 = 174.2 ohms
primary
Z1=0.0267+j0.082 = 0.0862 pu@72deg.
= 0.0862 *174.2=15.02 ohms primary at 72
deg
205
 Line 3 parameters

Z+L3pri=15.02Ω @72 deg.

CLAYTOR *CB7 *CB6

FIELDALE
132.kV 2
132.kV 5 Line L2 OHIO
*CB15 *CB5 132.kV 7

Line L1
*CB1 *CB2 *CB3 *CB4

Line L3
VTR=1200:1 CTR=1200:5 Sec Ω= pri Ω*CTR/VTR = pri Ω/5
Z+L1sec=3.0Ω @72 deg.

206
 Line 3 Calculations Continued
 Convert line impedances to Secondary ohms
Z1= 15.02 ohms pri = 0.2* 15.02 = 3 ohms sec 72 deg.
 Set Zone 1 at 85% of line impedance to underreach remote terminal
Zone 1= 0.85*3= 2.55 Ω sec @72 deg.
 Since this is a relatively short line, reaching into a strong remote
terminal, there won’t be a concern with overreaching remote Zone 1
functions. Set Zone 2 at 7 ohms secondary to reach beyond Line 2
Zone 3 and check underreach of remote Zone 1 (with strongest
infeed to remote source removed)
Zone 2= 7.0 Ωsec@72 deg (to be confirmed later when CB3 Zone 2 is set)
Reach past end of line is 7-3 ohms = 4 ohms secondary
Zone 2 delay = 2 cycles for remote protection + 8 cycles for remote
breaker + 10 cycles margin = 20 cycles or 0.33 s

207
 Check CB5 Response to resistive faults (with
infeed)

Line 3 impedance is 15.02

ohms primary at 72
degrees.
Zone 3

Zone 2

Zone 1

208
Check CB5 Response to resistive faults
(without infeed)

209
 Line 3 Calculations Continued
 For Zone 3 settings we know that this is a weak source reaching into
a relatively strong bus; so we cannot hope to protect the remote
lines. This element will be set at the maximum possible without
operating on load.
 From Line 1 calculations we know that the minimum load impedance
is 16.8 ohms, and worst power factor angle is 30 degrees. Therefore
Zone 3 must not operate at 16.8 ohms at 30 degrees.
 Characteristic angle of this relay is 72 degrees.
 Maximum reach of Zone 3 is therefore
 16.8 ohms/Cos(72-30) = 22.6. Choose a setting of 20 ohms
secondary to provide some margin below minimum load impedance.

210
CB5 21P security under load

Zone 3 reaches as far as possible

without operating on load.

Minimum load impedance

Is 83.9 ohms primary

30 Deg.

211
 Line 2 Calculations
 Convert Line 2 impedances to primary
ohms
Base ohms=(132)2/100 = 174.2 ohms primary
Z1=0.046+j0.116 = 0.1248pu@68deg.
= 0.1248*174.2=21.7 ohms primary at 68 deg

212
 Line 1 and 2 parameters
Z+L3pri=15.02Ω @72 deg.

CLAYTOR *CB7 *CB6

132.kV 2 FIELDALE
132.kV 5 OHIO
*CB15 *CB5 132.kV 7

Line L1 Line L2
*CB1 *CB2 *CB3 *CB4
Z+L1pri=35.5Ω @77 deg. Z+L2pri=21.7Ω @68 deg.

Line L1 Line L2
VTR=1200:1 CTR=1200:5 Sec Ω= pri Ω*CTR/VTR = pri Ω/5
Z+L1sec=7.1Ω @77 deg. Z+L2sec=4.34Ω @68 deg.

213
 Line 2 Calculations Continued
 Convert line impedances to Secondary ohms
Z1= 21.7 ohms pri = 0.2* 21.7 = 4.34 ohms sec 77 deg.
 Set Zone 1 at 85% of line impedance to underreach remote terminal
Zone 1= 0.85*4.34= 3.7 Ω sec @68 deg.
 Set Zone 2 at 135% of line impedance to cover whole line, and
check underreach of remote Zone 1
Zone 2= 1.35*4.34 =5.86 Ωsec@68 deg
Reach past end of line is 5.86-4.34 ohms = 1.52 ohms secondary
Zone 2 of CB3 on Line 2 only reaches 1.52 ohms into line 3, so it
underreaches line 3 Zone 1. OK
Zone 2 delay = 2 cycles for remote protection + 8 cycles for remote
breaker + 10 cycles margin = 20 cycles or 0.33 s

214
Check CB3 Response to resistive faults

Line 2 impedance is
21.7 ohms primary at
68 degrees.

215
 Line 2 Calculations Continued
 For Zone 3 settings we need line 3 impedance
Base ohms=(132)2/100 = 174.2 ohms primary
 Z1 of Line2+Line3= 0.046+j0.116+0.0267+j0.082=.0727+j0.198
=.2109 at 70 deg.
= 0.2109*174.2=36.7 ohms primary at 70 deg
=(1/5)36.7= 7.35ohms secondary at 70 deg.
Desired reach of Zone 3 is 1.35*7.35 = 9.92 ohms secondary
choose the reach angle to be 68 degrees for consistency with
Zone 2.
 Set Zone 3 to be secure at maximum load and check underreach of
remote Zone 2
 Zone 3 reach past end of line is 9.92-4.34 = 5.6 ohms secondary
 Remote Zone 2 is set at 7.0 Ωsec, which longer than this amount; so
OK.

216
 Line 2 Calculations Continued
 We have already checked that the longer reaching Zone
3 element (20 ohms) on Line 3 CB5 will not operate on
load, therefore no need to check again with this shorter
reaching zone 3 element.
 Since we are have ensured that remote Zone 2 on Line 3
is set to reach further than this Zone 3 element, time
delay need only coordinate with remote Zone 2 function.
Zone 3 delay = 20+2 cycles for remote (zone 2)
protection + 8 cycles for remote breaker + 10
cycles margin = 40 cycles or 0.67 s

217
CB5 and CB3 Coordination

CB5 Zone 2 deliberately set longer

than necessary so that CB3 Zone 3
can have 40 cycle delay

218
 Line 1 Calculations
 Convert Line 1 impedances to primary
ohms
Base ohms=(132)2/100 = 174.2 ohms primary
Z1=0.0472+j0.1983 = 0.2038pu@77deg.
= 0.2038*174.2=35.5 ohms primary at 77 deg

219
 Line 1 parameters

CLAYTOR *CB7 *CB6

132.kV 2 FIELDALE
132.kV 5 OHIO
*CB15 *CB5 132.kV 7

Line L1 Line L2
*CB1 *CB2 *CB3 *CB4
Z+L1pri=35.5Ω @77 deg.

VTR=1200:1 CTR=1200:5 Sec Ω= pri Ω*CTR/VTR = pri Ω/5

Z+L1sec=7.1Ω @77 deg.

220
 Line 1 Calculations Continued
 Convert line impedances to Secondary ohms
Let K=CTR/VTR so Zsec=KZpri
K= 240/1200 = 1/5 = 0.2
Z1=35.5 ohms pri = 0.2*35.5 = 7.1 ohms sec 77 deg.
 Set Zone 1 at 85% of line impedance to underreach remote terminal
Zone 1= 0.85*7.1=6.04 Ω sec @77 deg.
 Set Zone 2 at 135% of line impedance to cover whole line, and
check underreach of remote Zone 1
Zone 2= 1.35*7.1=9.58 Ωsec@77 deg (to be confirmed later)
Reach past end of line is 9.58-7.1 ohms = 2.48 ohms secondary
Zone 2 delay = 2 cycles for remote protection + 8 cycles for remote
breaker + 10 cycles margin = 20 cycles or 0.33 s

221
Check CB1 response to resistive faults

Line 1 impedance is
35.5 ohms primary at
77 degrees.

222
 Line 1 Calculations Continued
 For Zone 3 settings we need line 2 impedance
Base ohms=(132)2/100 = 174.2 ohms primary
 Z1 of Line1+Line2=
0.0472+j0.1983+0.046+j0.116=.0932+.3098=.3235 at 73 deg.
= 0.3235*174.2=56.35 ohms primary at 73 deg
=(1/5)56.35= 11.3ohms secondary at 73 deg.
Desired reach of Zone 3 is 1.35*11.3 = 15.3 ohms secondary
choose the reach angle to be 77 degrees for consistency with
Zone 2.
 Set Zone 3 to be secure at maximum load and check underreach of
remote Zone 2
 Zone 3 reach past end of line is 15.3-7.1=8.2 ohms secondary
 This will overreach remote Zone 2 (set at 5.86 Ωsec), therefore we
must coordinate above Line 2 Zone 3 time.

223
 Line 1 Calculations Continued
 We have already checked that the longer reaching Zone
3 element (20 ohms) on Line 3 CB5 will not operate on
load, therefore no need to check again with this shorter
reaching zone 3 element.
 In fact, zone 3 reach of 15.3 ohms will not operate on
load at any power factor.
Zone 3 delay = 40+2 cycles for remote (zone 3)
protection + 8 cycles for remote breaker + 10
cycles margin = 60 cycles or 1.0 s

224
CB1 21P Security under load

Minimum load impedance

Is 83.9 ohms primary

30 Deg.

225
CB1 and CB3 coordination
CB1 Zone 3 overreaches CB3 Zone
2 so longer than normal Zone 3 time
is needed for CB1 21P

CB1 Zone 2 underreaches CB3

Zone 1 so normal Zone 2 time is OK
for CB1 21P

226
 Stepped Distance Scheme

CB3 21P CB5 21P

Time (Cycles) CB1 21P

Zone 3
60
Zone 3 Zone 3
40
Zone 2 Zone 2 Zone 2
20
Zone 1 Zone 1 Zone 1

Claytor Fieldale Ohio

Nevada

227
Communications Assisted
Transmission Line
Protection
 Pros and Cons of stepped impedance
systems
 Cons:
 Time delayed for faults near remote terminal
 Delays affect power quality and stability
 Pros:
 Simple
 Economical
 Doesn’t need communications

229
 A little exercise

Where’s the Fault?

Use High Speed (communications assisted) protection to help.

230
 Pilot assisted protection
NPAG Chapter 12
 “Pilot” means additional pilot wire for
communications
 Nowadays pilot is often replaced by radio,
fibre, microwave or power line carrier
 Communications assistance allows the
other end to provide information about
fault location.
 Assists in “instantaneous” declaration of
fault in protected zone.
231
 Direct Underreach Transfer trip
Requires very secure communications
Not very sensitive on short lines.
Internal Fault

I see a fault! OK, I don’t see

Since I cannot see past the anything; so it must be
end of the line, you must beyond my reach. I’ll
trip too do as you say.

232
Direct Underreach Transfer Tripping (DUTT)[1]

Requires very secure communications

233
Directional Comparison Blocking - Internal Fault
Tolerant of less dependable communications but
less secure than other alternatives

I see a fault
in front! I see a fault
in front!

I’ve waited long I’ve waited long

enough. It must not be enough. It must not be
behind him so I’ll trip behind him so I’ll trip

No Signal 234
 Directional Comparison Blocking
Will overtrip if communications not
External Fault reliable

It’s behind me
I see a fault!
do not trip, even
for 150 ms after I
stop telling you
OK, I won’t trip.

235
 Directional Comparison Blocking[1]
OR
REV

REV OR

OR OR
Tc
REV REV
0

OR OR
Tc
AND AND
0

RX
RX REV
0
0 Tr
TX
Tr
TX
REV

1. Reverse looking element (REV) must be as fast or faster than forward

looking element (OR) at the remote terminal. Needs high speed
communications. Sometimes REV is non directional for speed (then need
zone 1 block keying override)
2. Blocking reset delay must override current reversals due to parallel line
sequential clearing 236
Directional Comparison Permissive Overreach Transfer trip

Requires dependable communications

Internal Fault Will fail to trip if communications missing

I see a fault!
So do I, lets
open the line.

OK.

237
Basic Permissive Overreaching Transfer Tripping (POTT) [1]
OR

OR

OR OR

OR OR
AND AND

RX RX

TX TX

238
 POTT – External Fault
Blocking element with delayed reset
enhances security during current reversals
External Fault

It’s behind me
I see a fault!
I will not trip, even
for 150 ms after it
goes away.
No reply, I’ll just
keep on giving
permission.

239
 Directional comparison with reverse blocking
Permissive Overreaching Transfer Tripping (POTT) [1]

1. Reverse looking element (REV) must be as fast or faster than forward

looking element (OR) at the remote terminal.
2. Blocking reset delay must override current reversals due to parallel line
sequential clearing
240
 POTT with echo
Echo enhances sensitivity to high
resistance SLG
Weak source echo Also may enhance speed under
contingency condition

No action at this
I see a fault!
end. You can go
ahead and trip
anyway.
OK, thanks for
permission.

241
 POTT With Echo [1]
REV OR

REV REV

OR OR
OR OR
0 0
AND AND
Tr Tr

RX RX

TX TX
AND AND

1. Echo function requires reverse looking element to block (with memory) for
external faults
2. Weak source tripping can be also be added with echo. But may cause extra
insecurity. Sometimes the source becomes strong after the remote terminal
opens. This is nearly always true for high resistance faults.
3. Echo delay (not shown) is added for security and echo cut off to avoid “ping
242
pong”
 Setting a reverse looking function

 For some communications assisted schemes a

reverse looking function must be applied
 Must be at least as sensitive and fast as forward
looking zone 2 or DEF at remote terminal.
 Use same types of relays at each end (or at least
same principles and speed)
 Line impedance provides margin
 Check current supervision elements – especially
if there are different CT ratios at each end.

243
 Pros and cons of directional comparison

 Pros
 Simple
 Less demanding communications
 Mature technology
 Cons
 Communications speed and reliability impacts type of
scheme
 Stuck PT received can cause insecurity (easy to add
and alarm)
 Measures each end only, multiple terminals decrease
sensitivity

244
 Line Current Differential
Percentage restrained
IOP

Slope is increased at
higher restrain current
to improve the security
(to prevent mis-
operation).

IR
Pilot Wire Current Differential

Now Replaced by phase by phase current

differential

Now Replaced by optical fibre or other

broadband communications
246
Modern Pilot Wire (Siemens)

Short distance, leased or self owned pilot

247
Modern Broadband Differential
(Siemens)

248
 Phase comparison differential [1]

Local squared Local squared

Signal at “A” Signal at “A”

249
Segregated Phase Comparison
Transmit time compensation

251
 Long lines and short lines [1]
 Physical length only affects communications
media
 Short - pilot wire or fibre optic
 Long – power line carrier or microwave
 For relaying, short means low voltage for remote
terminal fault
 SIR = Source to line impedance ratio
 SIR>5, voltage at relay for remote bus fault less than
20% (short line)
 SIR<1, long line
 Anything else is medium length.
252
 Conclusion
 Communications provide
instantaneous protection for
100% of the transmission line
 Directional comparison
 Current differential

 Phase comparison

 Need
fallback plan for failure of
communications

253
 References
1. IEEE Std C37.113-1999 “Guide For Protective Relay Applications to Transmission
Lines”

254
Complicating Factors
Concepts
 Outline
 Some complicating factors
 Infeed and outfeed
 For overcurrent relays
 For distance relays
 Infeed to resistive faults
 Coordination with tapped loads
 Effects of mutual coupling
 Two current inputs to a single line
protection 256
 Application of Overcurrent Relays
On Distribution Systems
 Must not operate for
 Steady state load
 Cold load pickup
 Magnetic Inrush
 Faults beyond downstream devices
 Must operate
 For short circuits even with fault resistance
 Faster than equipment short time withstand capability
 Faster than upstream devices

257
 Desensitization of primary device

Outfeed desensitizes primary protection

258
 Desensitization of backup device

Infeed desensitizes backup protection

259
 Infeed and outfeed affect distance relays
too
 If the distance relay doesn’t measure all
the current that affects the voltage at the
measuring point, it will not measure
impedance correctly.
 Infeed will result in underreach
 Outfeed will result in overreach

260
Z measured with no infeed

V1/I1 = Z1+Z2
261
 Effect of infeed
I1 I1+I2

Z1 Z2
V1

V2
Tap point where infeed occurs

V1 = V2+I1*Z1
I2

Zinfeed

V1 = (I1+I2)*Z2+I1*Z1
V1 = I1(Z1+Z2)+I2*Z2
V1/I1 = (Z1+Z2)+(I2/I1)*Z2
Increase in apparent impedance due to infeed 262
 Effect of outfeed

V1 = V2+I1*Z1
V1 = (I1-I2)*Z2+I1*Z1
Tap point where
V1 = I1(Z1+Z2)-I2*Z2 outfeed occurs

V1/I1 = (Z1+Z2)-(I2/I1)*Z2
Decrease in apparent impedance due to outfeed 263
Three terminal lines

Path for
outfeed

Source of infeed 264

 Drivers for three terminal lines
“The grid runs through it”
GENERATING
STATION

TRANSMISSION
LINES 525kV
or
230kV IPP

Gas Line
Wholesale
Customer IPP

RETAIL
 Infeed increases apparent fault resistance

I1 I2

Single infeed Two ended infeed

266
Infeed increases apparent fault resistance

Rf more significant Single With

with SLG faults source Infeed
(Rf) (Rf+(I2/I1)Rf)

267
Effect of fault location on sensitivity to resistive
SLG faults

268
 Transmission line taps
GENERATING
STATION

TRANSMISSION
LINES 525kV
or
230kV
Length (or impedance)
of this tapped branch
could be significant
Wholesale
Customer

RETAIL
Transmission Tapped Loads I
IoS IoR
S R

IoT

Tap impedance
HV Neutral
Increased by infeed
T ground may
provide zero
sequence
current infeed
0 Seq current infeed from T
de-sensitizes ground protection at S and R 270
Transmission Tapped Loads II
S R

Problem:
How to coordinate protection at S and T (must we wait at S?)

Solution:
Let S and T both trip instantaneously, then let S reclose
automatically (simultaneous coordination) - OK when faults on
HV of tapped load much less frequent than line faults
271
Transmission Tapped Loads III
S R

Problem:
How to coordinate protection at S and T LV bus
Solution: Make sure instantaneous protection at S or R
doesn’t “reach” LV bus at T.
Transformer impedance must be greater than line
impedance. 272
 Mutual Coupling

3Iom

- 3Vom=3Io*Zm +

Zero sequence current in one line can induce significant

zero voltage in a parallel line. The polarity of the induced
voltage is such that it tends to drive current in the
opposite direction in a parallel line.

The induced zero sequence voltage will try to drive zero

sequence current in the opposite direction to the current
on the parallel line.

273
 Parallel lines start and end together

Zm makes 3Io_L1 and 3Io_L2 less than they would have been otherwise

Zm makes 3Io_L1 and 3Io_L2 more than they would have been otherwise274
Parallel lines with one out of service

Zm has no effect on 3Io_L1

Zm makes 3Io_L1 larger than if there had been no mutual coupling

275
Station arrangement double bus 1 1/2 breaker

276
 CT outputs summed before measurement

i1

Primary line current is the CT1

sum of two primary currents CB
1 i1
I1
If the CT polarities are
correctly connected i1+i2
Line protection

Secondary line
I1+I2 Line
I2 i2
current is the sum of SW

the two sets of CT

CT2

secondary currents.
CB
2
i2

277
 CT outputs summed inside line protection

Each CT current is separately CT1

measured, then summed CB

internally. 1

Allows additional functionality

related to each CB
individually (e.g. breaker Line protection
failure protection)
Provides additional security Line

for line current differential

Sw

schemes CT2

Also aids disturbance CB

analysis. 2

278
Bus # 2
 Single phase tripping and reclosing
Theory
 Most short circuits are single phase to
ground
 Disconnecting only the faulted phase may
be all that is necessary to extinguish the
fault arc
 Reclosing quickly enough minimizes the
duration of unbalanced supply (to three
phase systems)
 If the fault is permanent, trip all three
phases
279
 Applications
 Distribution
 Single phase laterals and single phase loads
 Transmission
 Radial connection to generating plant
 Single interconnection between two systems
 To increase reliability
 To reduce SPS mitigation actions during fault

280
 Frequency of fault types [1]
HV Transmission EHV Transmission

Single phase to Single phase to

70% 93%
ground ground

Phase to phase 15% Phase to phase 4%

Ph. to ph. to Ph. to ph. to

10% 2%
ground ground

Three phase 5% Three phase 1%

Independent phase interrupters
Distribution Transmission
 Secondary Arc

 Persists after primary arc

is interrupted
 Caused by capacitive and
inductive coupling to
faulted phase
 May go out by itself if
current is low enough
 Will prevent successful
reclosure if it doesn’t go
out
Secondary Arc Voltage – short duration

Primary arc current

Primary arc voltage

Secondary arc
extinguished

Secondary
arc voltage
284
Secondary Arc Voltage – long
duration

285
 Secondary arc reduction
 Reduce the
recovery voltage
by using a neutral
reactor (tune the
zero sequence
network)[2]
 Bypass the arc
current by a high
speed ground
switch [3] 286
 Impact on protection
 Negligible for distribution systems (if designed for
single phase loads connected phase to neutral)
 Fuses and/or single phase reclosers are designed for
single phase tripping
 Significant added complexity for transmission
protection
 Identifying the faulted phase
 With fault resistance
 Tripping and reclosing only the faulted phase
 Coping with the unbalanced system during the single
phase open time
 Identifying extinction of the secondary arc

287
 With one pole open
 System is unbalanced
 Sequence voltages on line are meaningless
 Negative and zero sequence currents flow in
faulted circuit and parallel circuits
 Sensitive protection may be need to be
disabled
 Polediscrepancy protection on breakers
control absolute duration of unbalances.

288
 References
1. J. Esztergalyos, et. Al., “Single phase tripping and Auto Reclosing of Transmission
Lines IEEE Committee Report”, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 7 No.
1, January 1992
2. EW Kimbark, “Suppression of Ground Fault Arcs on Single Pole Switched EHV
Lines by Shunt Reactors”, IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems,
Vol PAS-83, pp. 285-290, March/April, 1964
3. R.M. Hasibar, AC Legate, JH Brunke and WG Peterson, “The Application of High
Speed Grounding Switches for Single-pole Reclosing on 500-kV Power Systems”,
IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol PAS-100, pp. 1512-
1515, March/April, 1981
4. N. Fischer, et Al., “Digital Communications for Power System Protection: Security,
Availability, and Speed.” A copy of this paper is on the SEL web site at
www.selinc.com.
5. IEEE Std C37.113-1999 “Guide For Protective Relay Applications to Transmission
Lines”

289
 System and Digital
Protection
Instructors
Charles (Charlie) F. Henville, Henville Consulting
Inc.
Mukesh Nagpal, BC Hydro
 Overview
1. Rotating machines
2. Generator interconnection
3. System integrity protection
4. Voltage stability and undervoltage load shedding
5. Fault and disturbance analysis
6. Digital Protection
7. Multifunction IEDs – how much functionality is too
much?
8. IEC 61850 and manufacturer’s communications
9. Protection upgrades
10. Recent developments and future trends

291
 After this session you will -
 Know the purposes, varieties and
applications of various system protection
schemes
 Know how to approach disturbance
analysis
 Understand the key issues associated with
digital protection systems
 Have learned about how modern
technology can help power system
protection and what to look for in the future
292
Generator Protection
Generators
NPAG Chapter 17
ANSI/IEEE C37.102 “Guide for AC
Generator Protection”

12/10/2015
 Threats
 Shortcircuits
 Abnormal operating conditions
 Minimize protection operating time while
maintaining security
 Limit damage to limit repair time and cost
 Cost of lost generation or production often
more than cost of repair
• Generators may be too big to have spares
• Motors need spares
294
 Short circuits

Operate for in Restrain for out

zone faults of zone faults

295
Abnormal operating conditions
Problem source may be in generator, or in system

296
 PROTECTIVE DEVICES
 Differential Relays
 Instantaneous and Time Delay Relays
 Negative Sequence Relays
 Loss-of-field Impedance Relays
 Volts per Hertz Relays
 Mechanical devices

297
 Discrete relays

50
May back each other up BF

87G
GEN 81 24

87
SP

32 78 46 40 21
G G G G G

59 59
N1 N3

298
 Multifunction relays

99GS
99G
50
BF
50
Provide full
27 59
BF
59 27

redundancy
87
8 87
G GEN 81
1 G
8
81
1 87 59 59
SP N1 N3
59 59
N3 N1
46 40 21
32
G G G
21 40 46
32
G G G

299
 Trip vs. Alarm
 Many abnormal conditions do not require that the
generator be removed from service.
 Some protective devices only actuate alarms.
 Others initiate tripping, either an immediate closing of
valves and opening breakers or a sequential program is
initiated.

300
Stator winding short circuits

 Phase to phase
 Differential (87)
 Distance or overcurrent backup (21 or 51V)
 Turn-to-turn
 Split phase (87SP)
 Ground
 95% of winding – 59N
 100% of winding – 27N or other
301
 Differential protection

For most severe

phase to phase fault
But not for interturn
fault
Nor for SLG fault

302
STATOR PHASE FAULTS

Percentage Differential Relay

 Differential Protection
 Normally percentage restrained
 Sometimes high impedance
 Neutral CTs subject to proximity effect
• Causes ratio error – affecting high impedance differential
• Compensating windings do not compensate enough!
 Transient offset (as in transformer inrush) can
cause unequal CT saturation
 Can affect black start ability with medium voltage
CB

304
 PERCENTAGE DIFFERENTIAL
RELAY CHARACTERISTIC
Operating Current

Operate region

Restrain region

Through- Current
12/10/2015
 Split Phase Protection
(Usually Limited to Hydro Units)
Time and inst.
For interturn fault O/C (Other
phases similar)
Maybe not for
SLG fault

306
STATOR GROUND FAULTS

GENERATOR

Direct connected and solidly grounded

Or impedance grounded
 Medium (directly connected generators)
 High (unit connected generators)
 Hybrid (directly connected generators but with damage limited)
 Generator Neutral Grounding
 High impedance grounding is always used
for large generators
 Limit the fault damage (speed repair time)
 Means for detecting ground fault within the
machine
 But neutral is not ungrounded
 Limit transient over-voltages during faults

308
Sizing the grounding resistor

+
_

Xc

Ratio N
R
To avoid transient over-voltages:
R = XC/3N2
N Open circuit ratio of distribution transformer.
XC Phase-to-ground per phase capacitor of the
generator stator windings and bus.
309
 GROUND FAULTS
 Distribution Transformer Grounding
abc g
Generator

resistor 59GN
w 60Hz Voltage Relay
Overcurrent Relay
51N

12/10/2015
Stator Ground Fault Protection
IEEE ANSI C37.101 – 1993 – Ground fault detection schemes

Normally,fundamental frequency
neutral voltage is zero.

311
 SLG at
terminal

59N Measures
neutral voltage
Down to about 90-95% of
shift
winding (region closest to
neutral not covered)

312
Resistance Grounded Neutral

 Neutral resistance limits

fault current, but
 Elevates voltage on
unfaulted phases, and
stresses insulation on
those phases
 With older windings,
stressed insulation can
fail
 Resulting in LLG fault

313
 Hydro Electric Generator Stator Fault

Initial single phase to ground fault caused voltage elevation on unfaulted phase and
subsequent catastrophic LLG fault
95% stator ground fault pn.
coordination

59
N

315
 95% stator ground fault pn.
coordination
 Must not trip for transmission faults
(normally cleared quickly)
 Must not trip for VT secondary faults
 Check maximum primary fault current during
SLG at pickup of 59N
 Convert to VT secondary current
 Check timing of secondary protection

316
 100% stator ground fault pn
 If
neutral is grounded, resistor is bypassed
 Next SLG will be high current
 Can use 3rd harmonic undervoltage
 3rd harmonic ratio
 Subharmonic primary injection
 See IEEE ANSI C37.101 – 1993 – Ground
fault detection schemes

317
 ROTOR PROTECTION
AC Detector DC Detector

Generator Generator
Field Non-linear resistor Field

Relay
120 vac Relay

Has a “dead spot”

Capacitance can limit
sensitivity

12/10/2015
 Field ground faults detection –
Subharmonic Injection method
 Measures impedance, and can alarm as impedance
starts going down
 Use low frequency AC injection (less affected by field
winding capacitance)
 Plan a shutdown to determine why impedance is
lowering, versus an eventual unplanned trip!

319
 Field or rotor ground faults
Trip, or alarm?
 A single ground fault - No damage
 A second ground fault occurs – a portion of the field
winding is short circuited and produces unbalanced air-
gap fluxes in the machine

320
 Abnormal conditions
• Loss-of-Excitation (40)
• Over-load – Stator or Field or Rotor
• Negative Sequence (46)
• Out-of-Step (78)
• Off-nominal Frequency Operation (81)
• Over-Excitation or Volts per Hertz (24)
• Over-Voltage (59)
• Anti-Motoring or reverse power (32)
• Start up (low frequency)
• Inadvertent Energizing
• Open Pole Flash Over
Synchronous Machine Capability Curve
Generator Maximum Theoretical
Q (p.u.) Capability
Overexcited
operation +1 Field Limit

Armature Current

Stator + 1 P (p.u.)
End-
Core SSSL (Xd > 1)
Limit
Underexcited - 1
SSSL (Xd < 1)
operation
Synchronous Machine Capability Curve Xd<1

Q (p.u.)
Overexcited
operation +1 Field Limit

Armature Current
Stator
End-
Core
+ 1 P (p.u.)
Limit
(not for
hydro)
Underexcited - 1 SSSL (Xd < 1)
operation
Synchronous Machine Capability Curve Xd>1

Q (p.u.)
Overexcited
operation +1 Field Limit

Armature Current

Stator + 1 P (p.u.)
End-
Core SSSL (Xd > 1)
Limit
Underexcited - 1
operation
Synchronous Machine Capability Violations
Field current Limit Violation
Max. excitation limiter then
field overcurrent protection
Q (p.u.)
Overexcited Armature Current
operation +1 Limit Violation
Long time const. Usually
alarm is adequate.
Sometimes exciter stator
current limiter. Thermal
O/L protection

+ 1 P (p.u.)

Stator End-Core
Underexcited
-1 Limit Violation
operation Steady-State Limit Min. Ex. limiter then Loss of
Violation (Xd > 1)
excitation (40G) protection
 Minimum Excitation –
Causes and Protection
 Causes
 Excessive VAr absorption – Self Excitation
 Failure of excitation control system

 Consequences
 Stator end-core heating – turbo generators
 Loss of steady-stability (pole slipping)

326
 Machine Behaviour During Loss
of Excitation
Overexcited Q (p.u.)
operation +1

+ 1 P (p.u.)

Underexcited
-1
operation Steady-State Limit
Violation (Xd > 1)
 BALANCED OPERATION
 Overvoltage
 Dielectric withstand
 Volts/Hz (overflux) withstand
 Undervoltage
 Affects auxiliary systems
 Overfrequency and Underfrequency
 Withstand capability depends on prime mover
 Hydroelectric turbine generators more tolerant
than steam or gas turbine generators
328
12/10/2015
 MOTORING
 System supplies losses (negative power)
 Reverse power relay (with time delay)
 Steam-turbine unit—problem is with the
turbine blades.
 Protective devices-exhaust hood thermostat;
steam input limit switches
 Gas-turbine and Hydro units may be more
tolerant
329
12/10/2015
 VOLTS PER HERTZ
 Applied to protect both step-up
transformer and generator.
 Inverse time delay relay
 Exciter control is first line of defense
 If transformer and generator rated voltage
are the same, one relay can protect both.
If ratings are not the same-use separate
protections.
330
12/10/2015
 UNBALANCED OPERATION

 Unsymmetrical faults produce more

severe heating than symmetrical
faults.
 Negative sequence currents induce
120 Hz rotor currents
 I22xt =k I2 = per unit negative
sequence current; T is in seconds;
k~10 to 40 depending on machine
size and type
12/10/2015
 Other abnormal conditions
 Startup protection
 Some units are excited during startup
 Need special low frequency protection
 Inadvertent energization protection
 Flash-over while shut down or while
synchronizing
 Bad synchronization
 Plant auxiliaries
 High speed motor bus transfer
332
 Low voltage susceptibility
Generator Interconnection
 EPS and Generator
Electric Power System Generator
 Responsible for the whole  Responsible for a few
power system generating plants
 Providing reliable power  Achieve company growth
that is focused, responsible
 Focus on the system and and opportunistic
long term sustainability  Focus internal to plant and
 Encouraging Conservation short term finance
 Can file a claim if deprived
of opportunity to sell
product.

The motivations of generators and obligations of the

EPS operators do not always coincide
 DR Connections
 Increasing in number
 Include power electronic sources
 PV
 Wind generators
 Protection issues
 Multiple infeeds to faults
 Desensitization of station protection
 Possible uncontrolled islanding
 Voltage issues
 Temporary overvoltage (TOV) on unfaulted phases
 Voltage regulators not used to reverse power flow

335
 Small DR
 IfDR is small, impact on existing
protection may be negligible
 What is “small”?
 Relative to minimum loads on the circuit
 Existing protection works as per normal
 DR “dies” due to heavy load when source
is disconnected.

336
 Transmission tap connections
+ Cheapest, fastest way to connect a
generator to existing transmission system
‐ Increased fault exposure on line
(decreased reliability)
‐ Fault current infeed (phase and ground)
and protection desensitization
‐ Temporary islanding with other tapped
loads/generators /line capacitance during
fault clearing
337
 DR Connection Criteria
 Developed by EPS
 Publicly available
 Transparent rules
 Interconnection studies use these criteria
 Study results affect cost of interconnection

338
 Transmission interconnection
 Tapped connection is most economical
 Also creates the most problems
 Facilities studies using published criteria
establish project interconnection
requirements.
 Protection and “multi terminal line
protection” issues may be the most critical

339
 Increased fault exposure
 Longer line = more exposure to faults =
lower reliability
 No taps allowed on EHV backbone system
 Industry study gives example limit of tap
length < 10% of trunk length
 This criteria may or may not be used to
reject a tap connection

340
Infeed and relay desensitization

341
 Hazards of tap connection infeed
 May require extreme reach settings to see
internal faults with generator in service
 May have excessive reach when generator
not in service, necessitating slow clearing
 May require generator to trip before utility
terminal can see fault (sequential clearing)
 EPS may not accept schemes which require
a non-utility terminal to trip before the utility
terminal can see the fault.
342
 Phase desensitization
 Must not limit load carrying ability of line,
system stability (slower clearing times) or
system security (excessive reach)
 Typically not an insurmountable problem
due to low fault resistance for phase to
phase faults

343
Preferred Transformer Connections
 Preferredconnection for transmission
loads is HV delta
 Introduces a zero sequence breakpoint in the
system
 Prevents desensitization of line terminal
ground relays
 Preferred connection for generation is HV
wye
 Do not want ungrounded transmission system
energized by the generator 344
 Criteria for NUG ground
desensitization
 EPS protection must still meet its ground
sensitivity requirements anywhere on the
EPS owned portion of the line with the
generator in service.
 Desensitization due to the generator on
the transmission line must not exceed
10% anywhere on the main trunk

345
 Example

EPS Terminal 1 Point of Generator Proposed

interconnection Generator

Load station taps

Existing tapped EPS

Load Stations or
Customer Stations
 Solutions to loss of ground
sensitivity
 Add three breaker ring substation to
service generator tap line
 Add grounding impedance to generator
step-up transformer
 Change generator step-up transformer to
delta HV winding
 Line current differential protection??
347
New Three Breaker Substation

$5-$10 Million

348
 Impedance Grounding and HV Delta

 Impedance grounding can reduce the

effect of zero sequence infeed
 HV Delta connections avoid zero
sequence infeed altogether
 Both come at the price of increasing
temporary phase overvoltages during fault
clearing (up to 1.73 pu, disregarding other
effects)

349
 TOV mitigation
 Special surge arrestors
 DTT to clear generator before EPS
terminals allowed to trip
 May delay EPS tripping for SLG faults only
in stability challenged regions
 Need to address loss of DTT scenario

350
 TOV + 60 Hz resonance
Simulation of TOV When Distribution IPP Isolates With 230 kV Ungrounded System
No Saturation Effects or Surge Arrester Conduction Modelled
2.00E+03
Near Power-Freq. Resonance
V230_A High TOV on Unfaulted Phases
1.50E+03 V230_B
V230_C
Interconnecting Station 230 kV Phase-Gnd Voltges (kV)

1.00E+03 30 MW Distribution IPP Isolates

With 137 km 230 kV Line, Neutral "Floats"

5.00E+02

0.00E+00

-5.00E+02

Phase A-Ground Fault

-1.00E+03 on 230 kV Line

-1.50E+03

-2.00E+03
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Time (s)
 Solutions
 Excessive ground desensitization with Grd-Y HV
Generator transformer
 Decision to ask Generator to connect w/HV delta
 DTTs to solve temporary overvoltage problem, w/
delayed tripping of local breaker until Generator off
line
 Phase desensitization may also be a problem
 Needed to add blocking scheme from load
substation to avoid line PN overreach onto LV bus
 Leased line comm w/operating orders for loss of
comm
352
SIPS AND STRETCHED POWER
SYSTEMS

By
Charles Henville
and
Emile Struyk
 Power System States

Normal

Restorative Alert
“SIPS”
Action

In Extremis Emergency
354
354
Based on L. Fink, K. Carlsen, IEEE Spectrum, pp 48-53, March 1978
 Definitions
“A protection scheme that is designed to
detect a particular system condition that is
known to cause unusual stress to the
power system, and to take some type of
predetermined action to to counteract the
observed condition in a controlled manner”
(CIGRE)

355
355
 More definitions

Joint CIGRE/IEEE definition of SPS [3]

IEEE Power System Relaying Committee
Definition of SIPS
Local, or Wide Area, or combination

NERC/WECC Safety Nets Underfrequency Undervoltage Out of Step O/L Load

SPS/RAS Load Shedding Load Shedding Protection Shedding

356
356
 Contingencies

Category A (Normal)

Cat. B (N-1)
“Safety
Net”
NERC/
WECC
“RAS”

Cat. D (N - >2) Cat. C (N-2)

357
357
 Purposes of SIPS
 Preserve Frequency Stability
• eg. U/F load shedding
 Preserve Voltage Stability
• eg. U/V load shedding
 Preserve Angular Stability
• eg. intentional separation
 Prevent thermal overload
• eg. thermal overload load shedding
 Reduce voltage fluctuations
• eg. direct load or generation shedding
 Combinations of above
358
358
 Classification
Response Based
Disturbance

Electric Variables
Power System
Direct Detection
Event Based

SIPS
Decision
Action Process Input

From CIGRE Task force on SPS

359
Major Characteristics

 More economical than building a

system which withstands the
unusual stress
 Rarely called upon to work
 Severe consequences of failure
 Non Operation
 Unnecessary operation

360
360
 Applications
Major WECC Major WECC
Transmission RAS

361
361
 WECC RAS Reliability S/C
 Reviews “RAS of Significance”
 Purpose and Overview
 Engineering, Design, and Coordination
 Operating Procedures for Abnormal
Conditions
 Commissioning Maintenance and Testing
 Performance and Operational History
 Catalog information

362
362
 Factors Affecting RAS
Performance I
 Coordination
 Between different RAS
 Between RAS and equipment protection
 Independent redundant systems
 No common mode failure mechanism
 Maybe need extra security too
 Telecommunications [10]
 Availability of redundant systems
 Speed
 Auxiliary functions (controls and alarms)
363
363
Factors Affecting RAS Performance
II

 Monitoring facilities
 Normal status of RAS facilities
 Operational performance during disturbances
 Test and isolation facilities
 Good designs enable good practices
 Good operating and maintenance practices lead to
good performance
 Identification of RAS facilities
 Special function not associated with equipment
 Care when part of multifunction systems. 364
364
 Event based, decentralized arming
BACKUP
CONTROL CENTRE
RULES

SCC EMS SIC

*
PLANNING (TSA)
STUDIES
ARMING FACILITY

SYSTEM STATUS
SCADA

ACTION STATION

*
ARMING
GMS, PATTERNS
MCA,

*
(4 MIN UPDATE)
REV INITIATING STATION

SEV
CBK (typ)

*
ARMING/
ACTION SITES

*
WAN (typ)
ACTION
KOOTENAY DTT
CONTINGENCY CANAL

*
DTT NICOLA
ARMING SITES
NLY (typ)
SELKIRK
ING (typ) ACTION SITES
INITIATING SITES
BC HYDRO RAS SYSTEM OVERVIEW 365
365
E. STRUYK 15 NOV 2005
 96 hr.
p.u.
Inst. d.o.

Response based Alarm

redundant
(Slow LS timer "on")
Reset
Latch Alarm

(dependable)
AND Funct- (Dynamic Overload
Set ion Capability Exhausted)
1 Min

RAS
Current > p.u 2 Hr. p.u OR
IRATED 1 Min Inst. d.o.
Key Load Shed
d.o. AND
(Continuous)
Current < irated

Secure equipment Key Load Shed

protection.
Current < irated (Continuous)
10 Sec And Alarm
p.u AND
Current >Imax A "Severe Cable
120 Sec Overload"
d.o.
10 Sec 15 min.
p.u
10 Sec p.u Current sensors and logic
d.o. Inst. d.o. development in Device 50L1

AND Trip Cable

Output from equivalent

logic in Device 50L2
Note, "IRATED" and
"irated" settings depend
on status of cooling
Input from 48T to equivalent system. Settings will be
logic in Device 50L2 reduced if cooling system
Current sensors, logic, and output is not in service.
development in Device 50L2 are IRATED is filtered with a
identical to those shown above for longer time constant
50L1 (several minutes) than
irated (one second).
Interties

367
367
 Event based simplified logic

Loss of BPA
INITIATING
500kV Tie 1
SITE
AND
Loss of BPA
500kV Tie 2

BCH Import
EMS/SCADA Equipment
ACTION
from US high
ARMING DECISION SITE
SITE

BCH Export Trip BPA

ARM RAS FOR AND
to US very OR 230 kV Tie 230 kV Tie
high TRIPPING

BCH Export to ARMING

US medium SITE
high, with
Import from
Alberta
368
368
 BPA Ingledow INITIATION SITES ARMING AND ACTION SITES

PRIMARY KEYING GENERATION

L1 North (local at ING)
Ingledow Remote SHEDDING

*
South

Event based
OR
PY TT1
R
L1
Keying L1 South AND T
TT1 R
from TT2 L2 Gen Stn
BPA TT2
R 4 Units 500 MW
L2 South R

RAS
T
OR

L2 North (local at ING)

STANDBY KEYING INTERTIE TRIPPING

*
TT1
L1 North (local at ING) T R R
Tie Station
OR TT2

Multiple
T R R L4 Tie Tripping
South TT1
R L1
SY L11 South
AND
Keying TT2
R L2
from L2 South

types of
BPA OR
REACTIVE SW ITCHING
L2 North (local at ING)

*
T
TT1
R
Stn 4
TT2

actions
Note : Both L1 and L2 have "open Trip Shunt Cx - Insert Shunt Rx
L1 "AND" L2 T R
breaker keying." This means that if one
Primary and Standby
terminal of a line trips for any reason, the far
Key Buses
terminal is opened by the transfer trip.

*
TT1
T R
Stn 3
T
TT2 Insert Shunt Rx
R

*
T
TT1
R

TT2
Stn 2
T R Insert Shunt Rx

*
Local Initiation (No TT Required)
NOTES Stn 1
Local Initiation (No TT Required) Trip Shunt Cx - Insert Shunt Rx

Action Sites AGC SUSPENSION

*
SCC "A"
TT1 Local RTU SCC
T R
AGC
TT2
Arming Sites
R
T

SCC "B"
Backup
Local RTU AGC
Ingledow SCC & SIC (SIC)

BC Hydro Protection & Control Planning

L1 "AND" L2 LINE LOSS RAS

E. STRUYK
L1 & L2 RAS
 LEGEND
Generating station for
STN 500 kV Transmission generation shedding 2730 MW
1 switching station

Major Generating
GEN Station
GEN
Wide area LP
500 kV Transmission
Line and circuit
designation
Line Status T'fer STN
Generator LP-3Ø-S
LP-1Ø-S
Trip (3 phase and
1 phase)
1

Approximate
Shedding Double Line
LP
STN LR-1Ø-N
distance from
generating station
to boundary with
LP & LQ Outage T'fer Trip 2 LR-3Ø-N
LP & LQ-N LQ-N neighbouring utility
Initiators LP & LR-N LQ & LR
= 1000 km

Series Capacitor
Status T'fer Trip SC1 SC1 SC3
SC3
SC2

LQ
LR
LP
LP-S LR-3Ø-S
LQ-S LR-1Ø-S
STN Other
3 Generation
and load
Other
STN
Generation
4
and load STN
7

STN
STN 5
6

STN
8

Boundary with adjacent Utility Transfer Trip Signals for

Adjacent Control Centre

STN
9
Adjacent Control
Generation Shedding
370
Centre Backup For Illustrative Purposes
Transfer trip signals
Transfer trip signals
 Conclusions

 Can result in very complex schemes

 Low cost is attractive compared to
alternatives
 SPS Scheme cost not the most significant
issue
 Increasing regulatory interest in
performance
 Increasing system dependence on
protection and control 371
371
 Voltage Stability
(A relatively recent concern caused by increased transmission loadings.)

Inadequate Reactive Support

Which results in

Voltage drops

Which results in
Reduced reactive power from
capacitors and line charging
Which results in
Less Reactive Support

Greater voltage drops

Application of reactive limiters or
tripping of generating plant
Voltage Collapse

(Graphic from AEP literature)

 Outline

 Description of Phenomena
 Reactive Power Support
 Distribution Voltage Control
 Load Shedding
 Real consequences follow
imaginary power deficiencies

373
 Radial Supply

Transmission X Qc

P Load
R
Vs Vr

P = (Vr)2/R
But Qc usually available
If Vs = 1.0 and X = 1.0
to support Vr.
Pmax = 0.5,
As Qc increases,
when |X|=1/|G|
Pmax rises
and |Vr| = 0.707
 PV Curves
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
V (PU)

0.8
No Compensation
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
P (PU)
 Regulated Delivery Voltage
(Transmission Voltage)
1.6

1.4

1.2 (c) Constant pf -0.09

1
Vr (PU)

0.8
(a) Uncompensated
0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
P (PU)
 Regulated Delivery Voltage
(Transmission Voltage)
1.6

1.4

1.2 Regulated Voltage

1
Vr (PU)

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
P (PU)
 Regulated Delivery Voltage
(Transmission Voltage)
The edge of the
1.6

1.4

1.2 precipice Regulated Voltage

1
Vr (PU)

0.8

0.6
Synch
0.4
Condenser
at limit
0.2 Shunt Caps
at limit
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
P (PU)
 Q - V Curves
0.8

P=0 P=0.5 P=0.7

0.6
Q Injected (PU)

0.4

0.2

Qmissing
0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4

Qreserve Vr (PU)
-0.2

-0.4
Voltage and Angular Stability

P = Vs*Vr*Sin()/X

Vs Vm Vr Vs Vr
Vm
X/2 X/2 X/2
X/2

Vs Vm Vr Vm

Vs Vr

If |Vs| = |Vr| = 1.0

If |Vs| = |Vr| = |Vm| = 1.0
Pmax = 1/X
Pmax = 2/X
380
 Load/Voltage Characteristics
0.5

“Hard” Load P = V0.3

0.4
.
Power (p.u.)

0.3

“Soft” Load P = V1.2

0.2
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2

Load/Voltage Characteristics are time dependent

(often becoming “Harder” due to load tap changers
or other control actions)
Load Relief due to Voltage Drop

11

0.8
0.8

Stressed System
Stressed System
Voltage(p.u.)
Voltage(p.u.)

(XL = 1.5 p.u.)

0.6
0.6

(XL = 1.5 p.u.)

0.4
0.4

NormalSystem
Normal System
0.2
0.2

(XL L==1.0
(X 1.0p.u.)
p.u.) ..
00
00 0.05
0.05 0.1
0.1 0.15
0.15 0.2
0.2 0.25
0.25 0.3
0.3 0.35
0.35 0.4
0.4 0.45
0.45 0.5
0.5 0.55
0.55
 Some Time Frame Factors
Transient Voltage Longer-Term
Stability Voltage Stability
Generator/Excitation LTCs & Dist.
Dynamics
Voltage Reg.
Mech.
Switched Cap’s Excitation Limiting

Undervoltage Line/Transformer
SVC Load Shedding Overload
DC System Operator

Protective Relaying Including

Overload Protection

0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000

Time - Seconds 383
(Chart concept by Carson W. Taylor)
 SVC’s and STATCON’s

Controlling
Controlling Vt range Vt
range

Supplying Absorbing Supplying Absorbing

Current Current

SVC STATCON

384
 Generator Capability
vars
Mvar Rotor current
out limited region
100
Stator current
Terminal 110% limited region
Voltage 90%
100 200 (MW)
0

vars
-100 Stator end winding
in heating limited region

385
Generator Q Capability

 Maximum Available Depends on:

 Real Power Out
 Terminal Voltage
 Temporary Overload
 Can use PLC to measure
 Rotor (field) current is good
indicator of capability
386
Measuring Reactive Capability Limit

Stator Current Limit

Field Current Limit

Q

Increasing Field Current

P

Mechanical Power Limit

387
 Reactive Power
and Low Voltage
DMR
U/V

AND Shed Block 1

SAT
U/V OR
AND t1

VIT AND Shed Block 2

U/V t2
Shed Block 3
VIT
t3
MVAR

388
Mech. Switched Capacitance

 Cheaper than SVC/STATCON

 Good for slow voltage control
 Can be boosted by power electronic switches.
 Complements other sources
 Faster sources stay in mid-range
 PLCs or smart controllers coordinate operation
with faster sources
 Faster schemes more complex

389
Distribution Voltage Control

 Brownout or blackout?
 LTC Blocking
 Allows lower voltages
 More power quality concerns
 Improved by centralized
decision (made before LTC
moves to limit)
 Voltage Reduction
 Better quality control
 Less load reduction
 Less dependent on centralized
commands
390
 Load Shedding

 Manual

 Part of EMS

 Automatic

391
 Automatic Shedding

 Lastresort, but effective

 May be initiated by
 Undervoltage
 System status (connectivity)
 System status (margin to collapse)

392
Automatic Schemes - Factors

 Relayand transducer accuracy

 Measuring techniques
 3 phase
 Window
 Communications systems
 Overshedding
 Stages/Inverse Time
 Manual arming
393
 Quebec, March 1989
 Remote generation in North. Long 765
kV transmission to loads in South
 Voltage supported by SVCs on
transmission corridor
 A severe solar storm induced
Geomagnetic Currents (GIC)
 GIC being almost dc, triggers harmonics
-SVC’s absorbed harmonics and tripped
off line. 394
Quebec Transmission System
Mid
Transmissio
n Voltage no
Angle (10 Deg./Div.)
longer
90o

supported

Angular Last SVC

instability
Trips

follows 60o

Time (1s/Div)
 Western US 2 June, 1996
 Short circuit on one 345 kV line
 Parallel line trips due to “hidden failure”
 2000 MW generation shed due to SPS
 Voltages decline lines become heavily
loaded
 Zone 3 relay trips 230 kV line
 McNary generators trip
 11,850 MW lost
397
WSCC Voltage
Collapse, 525k

2 June, 1996
V
AMPS LINE TRIP
(Extracted from MCNARY UNITS TRIP
WSCC Disturbance
Report)
 14 August 2003 Incident

 Barely enough imaginary power all afternoon

 Eastlake 5 generator no better than McNary
generators - trips off line when needed most
 Transmission voltages fairly well maintained,
hide the edge of the “precipice”
 At 16:06 free fall starts
 By 16:13, 61,800 MW lost

399
Eastlake 5 Trip off line
Hourly Voltages W to E
Final Hour Voltages
 S. Sweden/Denmark- 23 Sept.
2003
 Single Contingency loss of 1200 MW
generator
 Followed in a few minutes by double
contingency loss of two 900 MW
generators
 Voltage collapse in Southern Sweden and
Denmark

403
 Voltage North of Collapsed Area

Time (s)
V
(kV)
Pre-Disturbance Conditions

405
Sequence of Events

406
Currents and Voltages vs.
Time
A Real Life PV Curve
 Conclusions

 Anticipate
problem (off line)
 Diagnose problem (on line)
 Temporary measures
 temporary reactive overload
 LTC control
 Permanent measures
 Increase transmission
 Mix reactive supports
 Shed load 409
 For Further Information
 IEEE Committee paper, "Summary of System Protection and Voltage Stability",
IEEE WG on Voltage Stability, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery Vol. 10 No.
2, April, 1995 p.p. 631-638
 IEEE Committee publication “System Protection and Voltage Stability”, IEEE
Special Publication No. 93 THO 596-7-PWR
 N.E. Nilsson and J. Mercurio, “Synchronous Generator Capability Curve Testing
and Evaluation” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 9, No. 1, January
1994, p.p. 414-424
 C. W. Taylor, “Concepts of Undervoltage Load Shedding for Voltage Stability”,
IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, April 1992, p.p. 114-123.
 G. C. Bullock, “Cascading Voltage Collapse in West Tennessee”, Proceedings,
Western Protective Relaying Conference, 1990, Spokane Washington.
 IEEE Committee report, “Voltage Collapse Mitigation”, Available from IEEE
Power System Relaying Committee Web page http://www.pes-
psrc.org/Reports/Voltage%20Collapse%20Mitigation.pdf

410
Disturbance Analysis
 Outline

 DigitalRelay Event records

 Disturbance analysis

412
 Relay Indications

 What tripped a Breaker?

 Relay targets
 Current operated – first off the mark
 Voltage operated – everyone who
crossed the finish line.
 Sequence of event records

413
 E/M Current operated

Relay Targets (1)

Trip Seal In with
indicator

(+ )

TSI

01
T SI PR-1 PR-2 R
G

52b

52a
Indicating
instantaneous trip
(IIT)
TC-1

414
(-)
Voltage operated E/M
Relay Targets
(+ )

TSI

01
G T TARSI1 PR-11 PR-2 R
TAR 2

52b

All past the

52a

finish line, but

who was first?
TC-1

415
(-)
 Digital Relay Targets
All past the finish line, but
LED Targets who was first?

416
 Digital Relay Sequence of Events
Record (SER)
Event NumbeDate/Time Cause (Hex) Cause Relative time
572 Jan 24 2007 05:05:03.289629 8890 PHASE UV1 PKP A
573 Jan 24 2007 05:05:03.289629 8891 PHASE UV2 PKP A t=0
574 Jan 24 2007 05:05:03.297959 8C90 PHASE UV1 PKP B 0.00833
575 Jan 24 2007 05:05:03.297959 8C91 PHASE UV2 PKP B 0.00833
576 Jan 24 2007 05:05:03.340924 602 52a/CSC1 Off 0.051295 0.042965
577 Jan 24 2007 05:05:03.622940 9090 PHASE UV1 PKP C 0.333311

Relative
578 Jan 24 2007 05:05:03.622940 9091 PHASE UV2 PKP C 0.333311
579 Jan 24 2007 05:05:03.631264 8.80E+01 SRC1 VT FF VOL LOSS 0.341635
580 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.290458 9490 PHASE UV1 OP A 7.000829

times
581 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.290458 9491 PHASE UV2 OP A 7.000829
582 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.290458 0C09 Virt Op 9 On 7.000829
583 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.292543 0C01 Virt Op 1 On 7.002914
584 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.292543 0C04 Virt Op 4 On 7.002914

in post
585 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.292543 7C01 OSCILLOGRAPHY TRIG'D 7.002914
586 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.292543 1001 CF1 trip On 7.002914
587 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.298794 9890 PHASE UV1 OP B 7.009165

processing
588 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.298794 9891 PHASE UV2 OP B 7.009165
589 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.307131 8200 CF1 TC Fault PKP 7.017502
590 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.339710 601 52a/CF1 Off 7.050081
591 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.357146 8A00 CF1 TC Fault DPO 7.067517
592 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.357146 0C07 Virt Op 7 On 7.067517
593 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.357146 0.00E+00 Virt Op 9 Off 7.067517
594 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.359240 0.00E+00 Virt Op 1 Off 7.069611
595 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.359240 0.00E+00 Virt Op 4 Off 7.069611
596 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.359240 0.00E+00 Virt Op 7 Off 7.069611
597 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.359240 1201 CF1 trip Off 7.069611
598 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.623898 9C90 PHASE UV1 OP C 7.334269
599 Jan 24 2007 05:05:10.623898 9C91 PHASE UV2 OP C 7.334269
600 Jan 24 2007 05:12:28.528571 8951 RESET OP(COMMS) 25.238942
601 Jan 24 2007 05:30:08.915699 8551 RESET OP(PUSHBUTTON) 5.62607

417
602 Jan 24 2007 05:35:07.271883 404 GRID/DAWSON On 3.982254 Switch off grid, onto Dawson.
603 Jan 24 2007 05:35:07.288230 8550 SETTING GROUP ACT 2 3.998601
 Time alignment from different
relays
 Timestamps from GPS clocks are
simplest
 GPS time resolution to 1 microsecond
 GPS clocks not everywhere
 SCADA resolution is about 1-5 seconds
(depends on scan rate)
 Alignclocks by using the same event on
both recorders 418
Synchronizing Mayo DFR clock

SCADA Log
reports unit off line
at 13:23:04 hours
Difference =
Mayo MH2 off line at 5 min 51 s
+/- 6 seconds!
13:17:13.325 hours

419
 Analogue disturbance records

 Add another
dimension to SERs
 Digital relays provide
an economical
window to the
disturbed power
system
420
Transformer Inrush, Unfiltered
Transformer Inrush, Filtered
500 kV C-G Unfiltered

~2 cycle duration

Fault ends at 4.816

seconds

423
Same 500 kV SLG Fault filtered

~3 cycle duration

Fault ends at 4.833

seconds

424
 Fault Analysis
(1/4 cycle samples)
Filtered or not?

Fault type?

Fault current?

System voltage?

Close in?

Trip time?

Breaker opening
time?
425
 Fault analysis
(with time in cycles)

Filtered or not?

Fault type?

Fault current?

System voltage?

Close in?

Trip time?

Breaker opening
time?
426
 Fault analysis
(with current in kA, time in cycles)

Filtered or not?

Fault type?

Fault current?

System voltage?

Close in?

Fault clearing
time?

427
 Fault analysis

Filtered or not?

Fault type?

Fault current?

System voltage?

Close in?

Fault clearing
time?

Breaker trip
time? 428
 500 kV Single phase tripping

Filtered or not?

Fault type?

What’s wrong
with this
picture?
 What happened here?
Parallel circuits, L23 and L24. Current in kA.

Filtered or not?

System voltage?

Close in?

Fault type?

Fault current?

Fault clearing time?

Breaker trip time?

430
 A large
substation
51B Beats 51F
relays due to
parallel feeder
paths

431
 Start of fault
B-G Fault initially

Evolves to B-C-G Fault

Phase B voltage
decreases
Phase C voltage
decreases
3Io decreases for LLG flt.

Time overcurrent
relays start

432
0.194 ms later

“Steady state” BCG fault

Trip 0.176 s after 50P2 starts

(off record)

433
 Conclusion
 Compare the time of the same event from
different recordings to correlate
 Be aware of the precision of time
measurement
 Be aware of automatic scaling
 Consider whether oscillographs are true
sampled values or filtered values
 Not everything recorded is primary
phenomena! 434
 Digital Relays

More than just protection

 History
 Electromechanical relays used since the early days of
electrical power (late 1800’s)
 Have given good service for their intended purpose with
some drawbacks
 Limited sensitivity
 Limited range
 Maintenance intensive
 High burden
 In the 1970’s solid state analogue relays were introduced
to overcome some of the above noted drawbacks…..
 With mixed success and limited penetration

436
Relaying Technologies

Electromechanical

Solid State – Early 1960’s

Microprocessor-based – Mid 1980’s

IEC 61850 – 2000’s

437
Directional Overcurrent Relay -
electromechanical

438
Under impedance Relay -
electromechanical

439
 Microprocessor based relays
Evolution Milestones
.G.D. Rockefeller – 1968
Explored possibility of station protection using computers.
.First field installation of line protection relay – 1971
Experimental development inspired by Rockefellers work
Remained in service for 8 years with excellent technical performance
Drawn attention to waveform capture and self monitoring
Significantly large in size
.Dr. M. Ramamoorty – 1971
First to propose the use of discrete Fourier Transformer (DFT) to
calculate voltage and current phasors from sampled values.
Hardly noticed or understood.
.First commercial relay – 1979
Microprocessor a as platform – Hybrid Design
440
First fully integrated protection and control system
1980 – (includes merging units)

441
Courtesy of Eric Udren
 A microprocessor relay [1]

Eg., CB Eg. Trip,

CTs, VTs
status close

Transient
suppression LPF

Signal processing,
A/D converter logic, and self
monitoring

HMI Eg.,
Front panel,
SCADA,
442
DC or CT peer to peer
 443
Source: Pac Word
 Early applications
 Trial applications “in monitoring mode”
 Production applications for protection replacements as
well as for new applications offered many benefits:
 Reduced cost/function and spares (asset management)
 Design (flexibility and standardized designs)
 Construction (multifunction with reduced wiring, space)
 Operation and maintenance (self monitoring, setting groups)
 Information (metering, fault location, SER , oscillography)

444
 Relay inputs
 Must be immune to power system transients and
noise
 Anti aliasing filtering
 Sensitivity limitations
 Must be immune to secondary transients
 Input debounce
 DC Short interruptions and depressions
 DC ground faults
 Surge withstand capability (ANSI/IEEE C37.90.1)
 Fast DC Transients
 Must be immune to RF transients
445
 Relay outputs
 Contacts
 Number of outputs
 N/O, N/C, Changeover
 Speed
 Make/break capability
 Binary and Analogue I/O are where much
of the cost of computer relays lie

446
 Digital I/O and communications I
 Front panel
 Rear panel port hardware
 Serial
 Ethernet
 Fibre optic
 IRIG PPS
 Communications applications
 SCADA
 Engineering
 Peer to peer
• Local
• Remote
 Phasor Measurement Units (PMU)
447
 IEC61850
 Digital
communications systems for all
substation protection and control
communication applications
 Integrated with Utility Communications
Architecture (UCA) 2.0
 Minimizes station wiring
 Maximizes interoperability
 Increasing scope of application
 Increasing usage world wide
448
Example IEC 61850 architecture

Control room

Fiber
optics

copper
Substation
449
Analog Signal Conditioning

Surge Suppression:
Surge suppressers are provided to block lightening or switching surges from entering
into the relay.

Signal Reduction:
Voltages and currents from instrument transformers are available at 69 V and 5 A level,
whereas most A/D converters accept 5 or 10 V input. Thus signals are sufficiently
before being applied to relays. Also currents are converted into voltage.

Low pass or anti-aliasing filtering:

All signals must be band-limited before sampling to avoid mis-interpretation of high
frequency signals.

450
Surge Suppression and Signal Reduction
Ferrite
Beads

From main ct To low-pass filter

Precision
Resistor

Surge
Suppresser Auxiliary ct

451
 A/D converter
 Important factors
 Sampling rate (speed, frequency response)
 Bits per sample (accuracy and dynamic
range)
 Synchronization
 With power system
 With universal time

452
 Typical Spectrum Power System
Voltage and Current
100
90
80
70
Magnitude - %

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
100
0 60 120 180 240 300 360 420 480 540 600 660 720 800
90
Frequency - Hz
80
Power System Current Spectrum 70

Magnitude - %
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600 4200 4800 5400 6000
Frequency - Hz

Power System Voltage Spectrum 453

Aliasing Effect
5
Magnitude

-5
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02
Time - Seconds

A 660 Hz or 11th-harmonic
frequency signal sampled at 600
Magnitude

Hz appears to be 60 Hz for
0

fundamental frequency signal.

454
-5
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02
Time - Seconds
 Anti-Aliasing or Low-Pass Filter
It is not always possible to choose sampling rate that would prevent all frequency signals
from aliasing as low frequency signals. Thus, high-frequency energy of analog signals
must be limited by applying them to low-pass filters.
5

-5
Magnitude - dB

-10

-15

-20

-25
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Frequency - Hz
Characteristic of 3rd order lowpass filter with cut-off
frequency of 360 Hz.

Magnitude response = 20 × log (Vout/Vin) dB

Vin Vout
455
 Sample and Hold

INPUT

Electronic switch is closed for small

duration (10-30 ns) at regular intervals of
5

∆T seconds to charge a capacitor. The

0

-5
capacitor voltage indicates the
instantaneous value of the signal.
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02

SWITCH

OUTPUT
5

-5
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02

456
Sampling Frequency
6

Magnitude
0

-2

-4

-6
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02
Time - Seconds

A 60 Hz current signal containing 20% of

5th-harmonic (or 300 Hz) distortion.
Distinctive “humps”
seen in original
6 6
signal from 5th
harmonic are lost at
low sampling rate.
4 4

2 2
Magnitude

Magnitude

0 0

-2 -2

-4 -4

-6 -6
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02
Time - Seconds Time - Seconds

Sampled on 960 Hz. Sampled on 480 Hz. 457

Nyquist Sampling Theorem

A continuous waveform must be sampled at a minimum rate of twice the frequency of

the component of highest frequency. This rule is usually referred to as the sampling
theorem and is frequently called the Shannon sampling theorem, or the Nyquist
sampling theorem.

Example:

A 60 Hz signal containing 5th-harmonic (or 300 Hz) distortion must be sampled at least at
600 Hz more.

Rule of thumb:
Sampling rate ≈ 3 × cut-off frequency of lowpass filter.

458
Asynchronous Sampling
Asynchronous sampling frequency or interval is fixed and typically selected to provide
integer number of samples of per cycle of a 60 Hz waveform. Sampling frequency is
maintained irrespective of deviations in frequency of 60 Hz waveform.

For example, a 60 Hz waveform is sampled at 960 Hz:

Sampling frequency is 960 Hz
Sampling interval is fixed at about 1 ms (1/960 seconds).
Number of samples per 60 Hz cycle is 16 (or 960/60).
Sampling angle is 22.5º (or 360/16).

Synchronous sampling frequency or interval may be

adjusted with deviations in frequency of 60 Hz waveform
to maintain a fixed number of samples per cycle

459
Analog to Digital Conversion

A 60 Hz waveform sampled at 960 samples per

second and digitized using 12-bit A/D converter.

Resolution of ±5 volt A/D Converter

8-Bit 16-Bit

39 mV (or 10/28) 0.15 mV (or 10/216)

460
 Power supply
 Auxiliary power
 DC (station battery)
 CT (current operated)
 AC + capacitor charging
 May be redundant
 Internal battery backup

461
HMI

462
 Microprocessor Functions I
 Signal processing
 Digital filtering (phasor estimation)
• Discrete Fourier Transform
• Least squares error filter
• Cosine filter
• Kalman filter
 Other signal processing
• Wavelet transform
• Artificial neural network

463
 Microprocessor Functions II
 Signal processing
 Measurement functions
 Current (inst. Definite time and inverse time)
 Voltage (inst. Definite time and inverse time)
 Impedance
 Frequency
 Power
 Overload (current, time, temperature)
 Logic functions
 Trip
 Alarm
 Indication
 Reclose
 Self monitoring (depth of monitoring)
 Metering, and other control
 Oscillography and event recording
464
 Ongoing challenges
 Life cycle length
 Hardware
 Software
 Transient immunity (common with solid
state analog)
 Complexity
 Data processing – a mixed blessing of
increased information!
465
 Reference
1. IEEE PES Power System Relaying
Committee report “Understanding
Microprocessor-based Technology
Applied to Relaying”, available at
www.pes-psrc.org click on the link to
Publications

466
 Multifunction IEDs
– How Much Functionality is
too Much?

By Charles F. Henville

467
 Where we are
2. a)Complicating factors and b)example application
3. Communications assisted transmission line protection
4. Single phase tripping and reclosing and secondary arc
extinction
5. Series compensated line protection
6. Generator interconnection
7. System integrity protection
8. Voltage stability and undervoltage load shedding
9. Fault and disturbance analysis
10. Multifunction IEDs – how much functionality is too
much?
11. IEC 61850 and manufacturer’s communications
12. Protection upgrades
13. Recent developments and future trends
468
 How much is too much?

 It all depends on how you look at it

 Planning
 Design
 Installation and commissioning
 Maintenance
 Operation
 Everyone has a different viewpoint

469
Distributed Multifunctional IEDs

Replaced by one

Two panels of transmission

line protection 470
Drivers for increasing functionality

Things to consider
Cost savings Negative impacts
Hardware Complexity
Engineering Interdependencies
Space Impact of failure
Installation Difficulties in
Maintenance testing
Difficulties in
Which outweighs maintenance
which?

471
 Different types of functionalities
Relatively benign
 Functionality enhancements
 Self checking
 Sequence of events
 Oscillography
 Remote data retrieval
 Functionality extensions
 Concentration of protection functions
 Addition of control functions
 Addition of monitoring functions
 Extension of protection zones
• Bay
Add complexity
• Station

472
 Planning studies One basket is
not enough!

 Redundancy of protection functions

is a must
 All the eggs in two baskets?
 Must consider the number of eggs
and baskets
 Some functions may be better as
non redundant

473
 Transmission line protection systems

 All the eggs in

two baskets
 Except
reclosing?
 Synch check?
 Breaker failure?
 What about
SIPS?

474
 Design Considerations

 Implementation costs
 How much space is available?
 How much savings will integration realize?
 Should protection zones be concentrated
into a single device?
 Should relay to relay communications
facilities be extended beyond line
protection?

475
Installation and commissioning
 New Substation  P&C Replacement
 All equipment or addition
commissioned  New P&C on one
before energization primary equip’t
 All functionality is outage at a time.
commissioned with  Like performing
station dead brain surgery with
patient conscious!

476
 Maintenance complexities
 More functions (except enhancements) – more
impact of outage – e.g. SIPS in line protection
 More functions more complexity in knowing
what is taken out of service.
 Some functions may need software update,
some may not. Everything must be updated.

477
 SIPS Integration
 Application and design of SIPS may be subject
to reliability regulation
 Logic, inputs and outputs may be dedicated or
integrated with other protection systems
 Eg, line status inputs for SIPS integrated with
line protection?
 Protection not needed when line out of service
 SIPS inputs needed especially when line out of
service

478
478
Caution RAS (SIPS) included!

Marked
I/O

479
 Documentation issues
 Protection changes involve rigorous
procedure and documentation
 Control and monitoring changes are more
freely implemented
 Using a single configuration file for a
multifunction device means everything
needs highest process.

480
Single function relay setting sheet

481
Multifunction IED Setting sheet cover

482
 What functions are in the box?
 ANSI/IEEE Standard C37.2 assigns
numbers to protection functions
 E.g Function no. 50/51 means
instantaneous/time overcurrent
 Function No. 11 – A multifunction device
 New C37.2 includes a “list box “ facilitating
identification of Protection and Control
functionality

483
Extracted from
“Many Changes to C37.02”
Published on www.pes-psrc.org
Link to “Published Reports” 484
484
 Reliability

 Fewer parts
 Lower mtbf
 Higher impact
 Mitigation
 Improved design
 Redundancy
 Better understanding

485
 Conclusion
 Lifetime costs need to be considered in addition to the
initial installed costs
 Hard to weigh the hard cost savings against the soft
disadvantages
 Disadvantages are mitigated by
 clear definition of what functionality is included
 understanding of interdependencies
 Too much functionality is when one IED is too
complicated to operate and maintain effectively
 Much more detail in the references

486
 Concluding Comments

 Protection upgrading projects

 Looking ahead
 The role of protection in power system
reliability

487
 Justifying protection upgrade projects
 Lifetime of electromechanical relays >30
years
 Lifetime of computer based relays <20
years
 Why replace something that lasts longer?
 Increased information
 Increased functionality (but how much is too
much?)
 Increased performance (accuracy and
sensitivity) 488

I d fl ibilit
 Some project drivers
 Unreliability of balanced beam distance
relays
 Incorrect tripping threatens system reliability
 (replacing broken parts with worn out parts)
 Increased visibility of power system
 Fault location
 Individual phase metering on distribution feeders
 Monitoring of DR and transmission generation
interconnections
 Alarms for instrument transformer problems
 Synchrophasors
 Increased performance
489
 Loadability with shaped characteristics and load
blinders
 Some more project drivers
 Incompatibility with station expansion
 New P&C won’t interact with existing
 Primary asset management
 More accurate metering
 Equipment health monitoring (breakers,
transformers)
 Flexibility to allow emergency system
configurations (multiple settings groups)
 Additional functionality is needed
 Out of step protection
 System integrity protection schemes 490
 Usually a combination of reasons
 Operations
 Maintenance
 Asset management
 Station changes
 System changes
 Primary equipment loadings
 All beneficiaries need to support
 Financial benefits may not all be
calculable 491
Looking ahead

492
 Smart grid
 Integrationof protection and control
 Adaptive protection
 Accommodating primary system
reconfiguration
 Accommodating stressed conditions
 Accommodating changing needs of all
stakeholders
 Improved and expanded transducers and
sensors
 Low energy instrument transformers 493
 Improved efficiency
 Shorter project lead times
 Lower hardware costs
 Lower engineering costs
 Higher value of new products

494
 And more headaches!
 More data and information management
issues
 Too much data!
 More complex systems
 More financial pressures
 Faster changing technology
 Shorter lead times

495
The role of power system protection in
A Network of Primary Assets

With a Problem
To Maintain the Rest of the
Network

The glue that holds the system together 497

 Questions?
 What is the relative cost of protection and
control (secondary) assets with respect to
primary assets?
 Could power systems survive without
reliable protection and control?

498